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Civil Wars
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The Greek and Spanish civil

wars: A comparison
Spyros Economides

Lecturer in International Relations and

European Politics , London School of
Economics ,
Published online: 20 Sep 2007.

To cite this article: Spyros Economides (2000) The Greek and Spanish civil wars:
A comparison, Civil Wars, 3:2, 89-105, DOI: 10.1080/13698240008402440
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The Greek and Spanish Civil Wars: A

Comparison

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SPYROS ECONOMIDES
In contemporary Europe, the complacent consensus of the victory of
liberal democratic values and principles in international relations has
been shattered by the tragic and bloodthirsty conflicts of exYugoslavia, which at least in part could be characterized as civil
wars. Similarly, in the short timespan of 10 years at the middle of the
twentieth century, and straddling the Second World War, civil conflict
in Spain and Greece shattered many illusions as to how international
relations could and should be conducted.
The Greek and Spanish Civil Wars occurred at vital historical and
intellectual junctures in the context of the evolution of the international
system and the study of international relations. Conflict in Spain, roughly
speaking between left and right, epitomized the breakdown in Wilsonian
values and was the final nail in the coffin of the 'idealist' trend which
characterized much thought in international relations in the interwar period.
It also highlighted the emergence of Fascism as a threat to international
order, an immediate precursor to the Second World War. The Greek Civil
War, also roughly speaking a conflict between left and right, was viewed as
the cockpit of the emergence of bipolar, superpower rivalry and the division
of the international system into opposed ideological camps. It also occurred
at a time when 'realism' progressively developed as the predominant
approach both in the practice and understanding of international relations.
In the case of Spain, the major Western democracies abstained from
direct physical involvement and practised a policy of non-intervention,
despite strong public support for action and the direct military intervention
of other actors such as Italy and Germany. As will be seen later, this policy
of non-intervention finally destroyed any lingering faith in the value of
collective security and its purported enforcer the League of Nations, and
signalled the re-emergence of realpolitik as the dominant trend in
international affairs.
In Greece, the major Western democracies opted for direct involvement
and practiced an interventionist policy against the perceived threat of Soviet
Civil Wars, Vol.3, No.2 (Summer 2000), pp.89-105
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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sponsored Communist expansionism and despite the lack of clear public

support for this policy. Even though this intervention was portrayed in terms
of the defence of democratic values and ideals, it too was power politics in
practice at a time in which the post-Second World War international system
was very much in its formative stages both in practice and in public
perception.
In this context I would like to trace and evaluate three distinct yet
interlinked issues.
First, to briefly compare and contrast the root causes of the respective
civil wars by way of providing historical background.
Second, to place each conflict in its international context; Greece's civil
war at the beginning of an era and Spain's at the end of an era, and compare
and contrast some of the more important responses elicited from the major
Western actors, primarily Great Britain and the US.
Third, to examine the extent to which there is any link between these two
conflicts, and the international responses to them, with the end of 'idealism'
in the Spanish case, and the affirmation of 'realism' in the Greek case,
within the boundaries of thinking about international relations. It is argued
that even though diametrically opposed policies were pursued in Spain and
Greece by the Western democracies, that is non-intervention in the first
instance and intervention in the second, both cases illustrate the return to
balance of power politics following the illusionary hiatus of the hope-filled
1920s. In fact it could be said that the Spanish and Greek Civil Wars mark
the extremes of the cusp at which this transformation in practice and thought
took place in international relations.
SPAIN AND GREECE: THE MAIN CAUSES OF CIVIL WAR

Spain
To many, the Spanish Civil War was a microcosm of an evolving European
order which pitted democracy against fascism and was, ' "the last great
cause" and a defining moment on the road to the Second World War'.1 In his
magisterial history of the civil war, Hugh Thomas depicts it as 'the Spanish
share in the tragic European breakdown of the twentieth century, in which
the liberal heritage of the nineteenth century, and the sense of optimism
which had lasted since the renaissance, were shattered'.2 Ultimately, as with
the majority of civil wars, the root causes are to be found domestically and
the Spanish case proves no different. As one historian put it, '[the civil war
was] the most recent example of Spain's perennial inability to establish a
state with the power to maintain the loyalty of the Spanish people'.3
For many it was the intriguing politics of the Second Republic,

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established in 1931, which was the immediate cause for the rising of the
generals in 1936 and the outbreak of civil strife. But the confused politics
of the 1930s were bedded down in a series of longer-term tensions, which
plagued the Spanish state and society and which finally resulted in the resort
to arms. In short, many of the issues dividing Spanish political life were
carried over from the nineteenth century which was characterized by
constitutional disagreement which, loosely speaking, pitted absolute
monarchists and the Church against the so-called 'constitutionalists', liberal
monarchists and much of the Army. Coupled with this were the constant
demands for autonomy in northern regions of Spain, especially by the
Catalans and the Basques.4
By the end of the nineteenth century the return to a constitutional
monarchy, coupled with the existence of universal male suffrage since 1869,
did nothing to change the impression of a parliamentary sham which
stemmed partially from the fact that the vast majority of the peasant vote of
the latifundias was controlled by the landlords. This mass of disgruntled,
poor peasantry was progressively supplemented by growing discontent
among the slowly increasing numbers of industrial workers and miners who
were coming into conflict with the high handed policies of their employers.5
That most of the emerging industries were concentrated in northern Spain
exacerbated the aforementioned problem of demands for regional autonomy.
The authority of government and the social unity of the Spanish state
were further damaged by the legacy of defeats in the Spanish-American
War of 1898 and the campaigns in Morocco at the beginning of the
twentieth century. The first proved to be a national humiliation while the
second linked in to the growing social tension in Spain as poor conscripts
were called up to defend Spanish mining concessions in North Africa.
Thus the period of the so-called 'Restoration' was beset by social,
regional, economic, constitutional and international problems which resulted
in the breakdown of the political consensus and the emergence of rival power
groups in the early 1920s. 'Radicals', Republicans, the Trade Unions
(primarily the CNT and the UGT), Basque and Catalan nationalists and
ultimately the Army all started eating away at the fabric of government and
eroding its authority and legitimacy until General Primo de Rivera carried
out a coup d'etat in 1923. His tenure in power until 1931 was characterized
by a repression that was directed at politicians and not the public at large.
On the eve of his coup he proclaimed that, '[O]ur aim is to open a brief
parenthesis in the constitutional life of Spain and to re-establish it as the
country offers us men uncontaminated with the vices of political
organization.'6 With the authority of the King, Primo took on the politicians,
regional autonomists, labour unions, the fiscal system and foreign policy

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with a mixture of repression, economic interventionism and reform. In the

end it was the loss of support from the right, the Army and the Church, and
Primo's own personal failings, which brought down his regime in 1930 and
with it the monarchy which had sponsored him.
The Second Republic, created in 1931, inherited all the problems faced
by Primo, and was confronted both by the extreme right and the
revolutionary left. Between 1931 and 1933 the Republic attempted reform
of the Church, the Army, the latifundios and granted some regional
autonomy to Catalonia. In doing so, the Republic created powerful enemies
among clerics, soldiers, agricultural landlords and nationalists, which in
tandem with the international economic crisis of the late 1920s, the rise in
unemployment among the peasantry and industrial workers, and a fall in
their standards of living, meant a bewildering array of adversaries.
Ultimately it was the perplexing divisions among the Republicans
themselves which led to the political impasse of 1936 and the intervention
of the generals, resulting in civil war. Electoral systems produced coalition
governments which were divided as to how Spain should be ruled; whether
Republicanism meant rule by consent of the people or simply government
by the anti-monarchists and those who opposed the interference of Church
and Army. The left was split between the reformers and radicals, and
undermined not only by the strong anarchist movement but also primarily
by splits in the Socialist Party itself which as it drifted from reformism to
revolutionism sealed the fate of the Second Republic. The inability of the
broader left to accept rightist republicans (paradoxically from the majority
parliamentary group), in government in October 1934 which they had been
invited to join, sparked off a socialist rebellion in the area of Asturias and a
separatist uprising in Barcelona. The rebellion in Asturias was violently
suppressed by the Army and the uprising in Barcelona petered out.
But the 'October revolution' signalled the beginning of the end of the
Second Republic. What ensued was a year of untenable coalition
governments and the total breakdown of co-operation between left and right
wing republicans culminating in the victory of the Popular Front in the
elections of February 1936. The Popular Front government relied on the
support of the Socialists to stay in power, but the latter were riven by
internal disputes between those reformers and revolutionists. In short the
swing to the revolutionary wing in the Socialist movement, in unison with
the revitalization of a right wing bent of confronting the left rather than cooperating brought violence to the streets of Spain in double quick time.
The immediate spark for the military coup resulting in full-blown civil
war was the murder of Calvo Sotelo, a leading right-wing politician, in July
1936. This gave the pretext to Francisco Franco and his fellow generals of

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the Spanish Army of Morocco to intervene in political life and restore order
to a state that was under the threat of both radicalism and disintegration. The
Republican experiment perished among a morass of contradicting political
groupings and personalities, let alone class distinctions and regionalist
tendencies, which encompassed so many inherent contradictions that it was
no longer possible for it to refrain from resorting to violence to resolve
differences. This in turn brought to the fore the re-emergent right and the
backing of the Army, which took the law into its own hands.

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Greece
As with the Spanish case, many saw civil war in Greece as a microcosm of
the broader international situation: '[S]hots are being fired and men killed
in Greece in the same war which is elsewhere waged with words - a war
between eastern totalitarianism and western democracy'.7 Of course, this
reference is to the so-called 'Third' and final 'Round' of the Greek Civil
War, but it was this part of the conflict that captured the attention of the
broader public and the major involvement of foreign powers. It could be
argued that while the Spanish Civil War was the 'last great cause' on the
road to the Second World War, the latter stages of the Greek Civil War were,
in many eyes, 'the first great cause against Soviet expansionism' and a
defining moment in the development of the early Cold War.8
Yet as with Spain, where the involvement of foreign powers was to play
a major role in the outcome of the conflict, in Greece the root cause of civil
war is also primarily to be found domestically. Even though in the Greek
case, civil war was to erupt in the form of fighting between rival resistance
organizations during the years of occupation, the origins of the conflict
predate the Second World War. In addition, some of the main causes of civil
war share much in common with the features of the Spanish experience
which have been outlined above. Without wishing to overstate the case, or
being reductionist to the extreme, one could point to a series of similar
features that have comparable effects in the breakdown of the political
systems of the respective countries.
The most obvious and strongest parallels can be found in the divisions
between right and left and the related and intertwined issue of the
'constitutional question' separating monarchists from republicans. In Greece,
as in Spain, the divisions between right and left came to the fore in the
interwar period (mainly in the 1930s), and were to later find expression in
military confrontation. The emergence of a prominent communist party in
Greece did not occur until 1936 when the KKE captured just under six per
cent of the vote in the general election of that year. Working within the
framework of the Popular Front which had captured 15 crucial seats in a hung

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parliament, the KKE became a vital actor on the Greek political stage. This
occurred at a time of political instability and a growing public disillusionment
with politicians who it seemed were always indulging in intrigue rather than
addressing the nation's problems.9 Hence, the KKE's sudden emergence into
prominence and its potential involvement in a coalition government, either
with the Liberals or the Populists, precipitated through a tortuous process the
coming to power of General Ioannis Metaxas, the abrogation of elements of
the constitution and the installation of the dictatorship.
In the longer-term, this growing support for the left accounted for the
ability of the KKE-dominated National Liberation Front (EAM), and its
armed wing, the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS), to become the
pivotal domestic actor in the context of the civil war itself. Within this rise
in support for the left is also embedded the second feature mentioned above,
which allows for comparisons with the Spanish case, namely the split
between monarchists and republicans.
Much of the political history of Greece from the turn of the century had
been coloured by the so-called 'Great Schism' that ultimately pitted
republicans against monarchists. In its inception it was a political struggle
between Eleftherios Venizelos and King Constantine I over which side to
back in the context of the First World War. But in essence it encapsulated
the perennial great divide which existed in Greek politics over the question
of the monarchy and its legitimacy and desirability. As with Spain this
would lead to immense political cleavages, enhance the left-right divide
and, in addition, allow EAM in its republican guise to pick up support
among those disenchanted by the monarchy and its internal and external
supporters, who were not necessarily left wing in their political outlook.
Thus to many, the onset of civil strife in Greece can be attributed as much
to the divide between monarchists and republicans as to ideological
differences between right and left.
In terms of sketching out other possible contributing factors to the
origins of civil war in Spain and Greece one has to consider three other
points. In the case of Spain, autonomist movements in Catalonia and the
Basque region, foreign misadventures in the Spanish-American War and
Morocco, and the world economic situation in the interwar period, all
played a part in the creation of ripe conditions for civil discord. Similarly,
in Greece, foreign misadventure and international economic turmoil played
a considerable role in the rise in popularity of the left, hence indirectly
contributing to the civil war; the issue of autonomy, in this case of
Macedonia is more debatable but a case could be made for it.
In brief, the pursuit of the 'Megali Idea' led to the disastrous military
defeats in Asia Minor in 1922 at the hands of Kemal Attaturk, and the influx

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of some 1,300,000 refugees into Greece which would have immense

implications on the country's socio-political and economic life.10 In effect,
this massive shift in population brought with it political and economic
influences which arguably gave a dramatic impetus - in the longer term - to
the rise of the Greek left and republicanism.
Similarly, in the longer term it also exacerbated the effects of the Great
Depression on what was already a relatively underdeveloped, nonindustrialized economy, giving rise to economic grievances which could
only but contribute to social and political tensions in the future.
Finally, the question of autonomy of Macedonia, even though totally
different in nature and impact to those of Catalonia and the Basque region,
also figured highly in the internal politics of the KKE and featured some
changes of position on this issue which were clearly geared to attract
popular support. The most clear-cut of these reversals was the decision by
the KKE to abandon the old 1924 position of, 'a united and independent
Macedonia' and move, in 1935, to a position of 'equal rights to all
nationalities'." This would remain the position until early 1949, when the
Communists went back to a policy of Macedonian autonomy. Nevertheless,
it could be argued that the change of 1935 was a contributing factor to the
ability of the KKE to garner votes among the refugees of Asia Minor who
otherwise would not have a supported a less nationalist position.
Hence the fear of the KKE's entry into government was the immediate
spark which precipitated the actions of Metaxas, with the support of both
king and armed forces. The outbreak of civil war in Greece would occur with
the onset of the Axis occupation, a wholly different set of circumstances than
that in Spain. Nevertheless, as argued above, there did exist a series of
comparable factors and features, which allow for a meaningful comparison
of the domestic origins of civil conflict in both countries.
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF AND RESPONSES TO CIVIL WAR

Context
The international context within which the Spanish Civil War took place,
was one of heightened disillusionment with the inability of the League of
Nations and other international institutions to deal effectively with the
challenges provided to the Versailles Peace settlements and the lofty ideals
meant to be upheld. Furthermore, the growing, and increasingly aggressive,
challenge of Fascism in the form of Mussolini and Hitler provided a
massive threat to European peace and stability and few wished to confront
the dictators and thus tempt the possibility of another general European war.
The early and mid-1930s saw a series of hostile actions by Italy and

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Germany which totally undermined the letter and spirit of the post-war
settlements and provided a harbinger for the descent into a general
European war. Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 was not only a blatant
violation of international law but also a clear-cut case for the triggering of
the League's mechanism of collective security. But the collective response
of the western world was one of diplomatic and moral indignation yet
ultimately one of inaction.
Similarly, Hitler indulged in a series of provocative and bellicose acts to
which the West reacted meekly under the veil of appeasement in the hope of
averting a war. The Versailles Treaty was openly flouted with the
transgression of disarmament clauses through the reactivation of the
Luftwaffe and the reintroduction of conscription as a part of a broader policy
of the rearmament and militarization of Germany. This was swiftly followed
by the reoccupation of the Rhineland, in March 1936, and the creation of the
'greater German Reich' following 'Anschluss' with Austria just two years
later. Hitler then turned his sights to the East and the Sudetenland in
Czechoslovakia, commencing a process which resulted in the ignominy of
the Munich agreements, provoking Churchill to comment in having to chose
between shame and war, 'we have chosen shame and will get war'.12
This was truly the end of an era in which the hopes and ambitions of
those who suffered through the Great War, and put their faith in a new form
of international relations epitomized by the League of Nations, foundered
against the rocks of aggression and expansionism, and the unwillingness of
their leaders to empower the system they had fought for and created. The
spirit of disarmament, peaceful resolution of disputes, non-aggression pacts
and the outlawing of war, and collective security was now overshadowed by
the relentless march toward a confrontation with the Fascist powers.
Amid this dramatic decline in the idealist principles and institutions of
the interwar era, we have the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War that both
contributed to and signalled the end of this era, short of the outbreak of war
in September 1939. In the later section on the international responses to war
in Spain we shall see the more detailed reversion of the Western
democracies, including Great Britain, France and the US, to a policy of nonintervention in the hope of maintaining a European balance of power. This
was a distinct move away from the democratic ideals of 'Wilsonianism' and
the institutional mechanisms for collective response against aggression
embodied in the League of Nations.
The international context within which the Greek Civil War took place
can be divided into three separate stages: first, the occupation years of the
Second World War; second, the end of the war and liberation; and third, the
decline of British influence and the emergence of the US as an

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interventionary superpower. For our purposes, it is the third phase which is

of relevance as it indicates the beginning of a new era in international
relations.13 As in the Spanish case, this third phase of the Greek conflict also
formed part of a period of disillusionment. In this instance the
disillusionment stemmed from the frustration of not being able to reach an
equitable and sustainable accommodation with a former ally, the USSR,
over the future of Germany and Europe at large.
This disillusionment was tempered by an optimism in the spirit of the
Atlantic Charter and the fledgling United Nations to put right all those
elements of international co-operation, law and collective security which
had failed so miserably in the 1930s. It was also accompanied by a grim
determination emerging in the Western powers, and especially the US, to
defend democratic rights and institutions wherever deemed possible if not
necessary. Western experiences at Yalta and Potsdam in negotiations with
the USSR were early indications of the difficulties that lay ahead.
Growing Soviet intransigence over the future of Germany and a host of
Other issue areas progressively reinforced these indications. The resolution
of the matter of the Polish government and generally free elections in
Eastern Europe were major sticking points, as was the increasing Soviet
pressure to force a review of the provisions of the Montreux Treaty
regulating passage through the Dardanelles. Furthermore, Soviet actions in
Iran indicated that the newly emergent adversary would not hesitate to use
force to achieve objectives.
Therefore it became increasingly apparent in the West, that idealistic
foreign policy could possibly lead to the same ignominy that accompanied
the disasters of the interwar period, if it were not accompanied by a distinct
physical commitment. Concessions would have to be made to the balance
of power accommodations which had been reached with the USSR at the
meetings at Yalta and Potsdam, and which delineated certain distinct
spheres of influence. Security needs had eroded the Wilsonian idealist
tradition that dominated the foreign policy of the US - the guarantor of
Western interests - and progressively Western leaders became convinced
that foreign policy goals would have to be pursued by principled power
rather than either principle or power. Churchill best encapsulated this at his
1946 Fulton speech, made famous by his reference to the 'Iron Curtain',
when he stated that, 'our Russian friends ... admire nothing so much as
strength'. This strength would be applied selectively in the defence of
interests and principles but none the less there would be little hesitation in
confronting the emergent Soviet threat.
This was the general context within which the last phase of the Greek
Civil War took place. It was the beginning of an new era in which British

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power was on the wane, to be replaced by the US, and the Soviet Union was
emerging as a rival as potent and threatening as the recently defeated Fascists.
It was an era in which those who had fought for a freer and fairer international
system in the Second World War were confronted with the dawning of a new
confrontation which would come to be known as the Cold War. This would
be as equally bloody and divisive as the decade beginning with the onset of
civil war in Spain. It was an era in which force would be considered a valid
and valuable tool of statecraft and in which realism would replace idealism
as the basis for foreign policy in the pursuit of order and stability.
Responses
The reaction of the major international actors to the outbreak of civil war in
Spain was in keeping with the general changes occurring in the international
system at the time. According to Hugh Thomas, '[T]he Spanish Civil War
remained throughout 1937 the main international crisis, an irritant to the
democracies, an opportunity to the dictators."4
The response of Hitler and Mussolini to the outbreak of hostilities in
Spain, and Franco's requests for military assistance, was immediate and in
line with their respective policies throughout the 1930s, as outlined in the
previous section. In fact, by late July 1936 both Italy and Germany were
supplying the Nationalist forces with military materiel, and especially
airplanes, which were vital in transporting the main elements of the Spanish
Army of Morocco across the Straits of Gibraltar and into the fray on the
Iberian peninsula.15 This pattern which was to continue throughout the
conflict and would include not only the dispatch of weaponry and
ammunition but also technicians, and the especially memorable example of
the German air force element, the Kondor Legion. It is estimated that
Germany sent up to 732 combat aircraft and 110 training aircraft to the
Nationalists during the three years of civil war.16
The reasons for Axis intervention are explicable in terms of the
opportunism highlighted by Hugh Thomas above.
For the lesser of the Fascist allies, Italy, a kindred regime in Spain would
not only provide another potential ally in the general European balance of
power, but also bolster Mussolini's attempts to rekindle Italian hegemony
over the Mediterranean and in realising his dream of re-establishing Mare
Nostrum.
Hitler's motivations for involvement in Spain were manifold and
dominated by the desire to see a friendly regime in Madrid which could
provide another link in the Fascist chain encircling France. A pro-German
government in Madrid would provide a constant thorn in the side of France,
politically, economically and militarily, and could have the added benefit of
destabilizing the rather shaky government of Leon Blum.

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Secondary considerations for German involvement, included the desire

to see a friendly regime controlling the Straits of Gibraltar, access to
Spanish mineral resources and other raw materials, and a useful testing
ground for German armaments and military tactics." All in all, the actions
of Germany were very much in line with all the other provocative actions
carried out in the mid-1930s in terms of destabilizing the European
international order established at Versailles.
The response of the Soviet Union to civil war in Spain has been
described as a, 'disinterested internationalism'.18 In fact, Stalin performed a
complicated juggling act between officially affecting a policy of nonintervention by joining the Non-intervention Committee, 'in the interests of
world peace',19 and pandering to the ideological sensibilities of the left both
within the USSR and beyond. The Soviet regime 'succumbed' to the will of
the workers of the Soviet Union who, '[were] doing no more than their duty
in rendering all possible aid to the Revolutionary Masses of Spain'.20
Aid did indeed flow from the USSR to the Spanish Republicans both in
terms of soldiers in the International Brigades and military hardware in vast
amounts. It is estimated that the Republicans transferred 75 per cent of the
nation's gold reserves to the USSR both for payment of weaponry but also
for safekeeping. This amounted to over 510 tons of gold at an estimated
value of $518 million, a massive sum in a period when Spain maintained the
fifth largest gold reserves internationally.21
In essence, Stalin's policy was not born out of idealism but rather out of
a deep desire to ensure that France, a potential ally against the growing
German threat, was safeguarded from the threat of fascism in neighbouring
Spain. His fundamental position was one of maintaining the balance of
power in Europe and to do so he had to ensure that France was not
threatened; 'Stalin had no ideals ... [he was] a realist and an opportunist'.22
And it was this balance of power which characterized the policies of the
two other major Western European actors, France and Great Britain. The
vast part of Great Power politics were played out in the framework of the
Non-intervention Committee set up in September 1936. This was a
committee comprising 27 member states with the duties of monitoring arms
smuggling, discovering violations of the arms embargo and creating general
measures to forestall foreign intervention in Spain. In short, the main aim
underpinning the creation of this compromise measure was to contain the
conflict in Spain, thus limiting the possibility of a general European war
resulting from rival foreign intervention, and to make a show of action
internationally while actually sitting on the sidelines.
The British attitude to war in Spain, and the ensuing intervention by
Germany and Italy, has been depicted as falling under the broader umbrella

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23

of appeasement. Yet there were many divisions within the British political
establishment as to what course of action to pursue. The British right saw the
Nationalists in Spain as anti-Bolshevik counter-revolutionaries who, 'were
concerned with internal politics of Spain and had no aggressive fascistic
ambitions to revise the international status quo'.24 Many in the Labour Party,
such as Philip Noel-Baker, an MP and sometime Professor of International
Relations at the London School of Economics, spoke out against Franco and
his 'international fellow-conspirators', and called for the sale of British arms
to the Republicans stopping short of advocating direct intervention.25
However, for the most part the British position was united around the
position of Stanley Baldwin's National government which supported nonintervention and a solid arms emargo to be imposed and policed against all
sides. Fundamentally, Britain wanted a mediated solution and a negotiated
armistice which would not threaten British interests.
The great conundrum faced by Britain was that a Republican victory, it
was feared, would mean a victory for Bolshevism which could spread
'contagion' into France, hence destabilizing relations with Britain and
weakening the stand against the emerging Fascist threat. On the other hand,
a Nationalist victory would lead to a threat to the seafaring lines of
communication to the Empire through the Mediterranean and lead to, 'a
temporarily working combination of dictators, major, minor and minimus'.26
In an attempt to minimize the importance of the Axis involvement in Spain,
Churchill referred to the Fascist volunteers in Spain as 'armed tourists' ,27
Therefore, British attitudes toward Spain make clear the complete
breakdown in the support of the democratic cause of 'Wilsonianism', its
idealism, and its accompanying international institutions. Despite being faced
with an issue of conscience and principle, in which a democratically elected
government was being attacked from within but with external support of rival
states, in Britain realpolitik prevailed. What was at stake were not the
principles of international law and peace but the reality that any direct
involvement could lead the division of Europe into two distinct blocs and an
explicit threat to British interests. The famous call to arms of the First World
War, 'to make the world safe for democracy' was superseded by the defence
of narrower national interests, despite a great public demand for action.
This was much the case in the US and France. The US, undergoing one
of its periodic isolationist phases played no substantial official role in the
Spanish conflict, despite being a rich arms market which the combatants in
the Spanish Civil War both attempted to exploit.
The position of France was much more delicate both in geographic and
political terms. France under the premiership of Leon Blum and his own
Popular Front government was under immense public pressure to come to

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the assistance of the Republic. Strategically, if the Nationalists were to be

victorious, France would be surrounded by three Fascist states, hence
Blum's initial reaction in deciding to allow arms sales to fellow Republicans
in Spain.28 This decision was immediately rescinded in favour of one of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states which proved paradoxical
as the Spanish Republicans had requested assistance.29 Ultimately, under
extreme pressure from the French right and the strategic arguments with
which the British government bombarded him as outlined above, Blum
relented and pursued the path of neutrality, non-interference and the
banning of the sale of arms to both sides.
Thus while the Republicans in Spain had the right of law and democratic
principle on their side, as well as a groundswell of public support among the
populations of democratic Western Europe and beyond who provided much
of the 60,000-strong International Brigades to fight in Spain, support from
the West was not forthcoming. This was in my view a clear sign that the
Western democracies had abandoned the more idealistic policies of the
interwar period in favour of a return to realist, balance of power politics.
This did in reality epitomize the end of an era in international relations.
The international response to the outbreak of internecine strife in Greece
is well known. In my view there was a case to be made for the defence of
the Greek state (and democracy in general), in the face of a possible
Communist expansion, indirectly sponsored by the Soviet Union. But the
intervention of both primary international actors, Great Britain and the US
were determined by narrow national interest and balance of power
considerations in the light of the perceived emerging Communist threat. It
was the dawning of a new era, in which force would be met by force in the
defence of defined spheres of influence, and realpolitik would be the
defining order of the day; the defence of democratic values in the periphery
of the sphere of influence would be an incidental benefit.
The third major, if less involved international actor in the Greek Civil
War, namely the USSR, understood this line of action as witnessed in the
aforementioned quotation on Stalin's 'realism' and ' opportunism'.30 This
language is very similar to that employed by George Kennan in his 'Long
Telegram', which laid the foundations for his thinking on the policy of
containment, and is clearly relevant to the general Soviet attitude toward the
conflict in Greece.31 Stalin was an opportunist, willing to make best use of
any weakness or chink in the Western armour, but he also understood the
politics of realism and the working of a balance of power system based on
agreed spheres of influence.
In the Greek case, Stalin had made his 'deal' with Churchill in the
Moscow 'Percentages Agreement', and was not willing to undermine his

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CIVIL WARS

own gains in Eastern Europe by an explicit grab for Greece in the face of
British, but more importantly American military might. Tacit, and
'opportunist' support for the Greek communists, would be provided, but the
reality of power politics would govern policy on Greece. In Stalin's own
words, '[T]his war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also
imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as
far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise.'32 The USSR would not
intervene directly in a civil war in which it would have to take on the might
of its major adversary, irrespective of the desire to defend fellow
'revolutionaries', and especially in the adversary's defined and agreed to
sphere of influence. This was ideology giving way to realist foreign policy.
Great Britain's role in the Greek Civil War is a lengthy and well
documented one, as is that of the US. Suffice it to say that British involvement
in Greece was always dominated by British interests, which subordinated the
defence of democracy and the protection of the Greek people to, an important,
but secondary role. In the first two 'rounds' of the Greek Civil War, the role
of Britain as the leading foreign power involved was of massive importance
to subsequent events. Despite the mediating factor of the Second World War
and the occupation of Greece, foreign intervention in the Greek Civil War was
a feature from the outset of the conflict.
This intervention took the form of British assistance to the resistance
organizations on the ground in Greece which were very quickly involved in
fighting each other as much as attacking the occupying forces. The British
role was initially one of guiding, and supplying the material for operations
against the Axis occupiers irrespective of their political colour. The
underlying aim of this policy was to support any group conducting
operations against the enemy; the support of Tito's Partisans in
neighbouring Yugoslavia is another case in point. Ideology was relegated to
the back burner in the face of the bigger enemy, the occupying forces and
the war effort in general. In brief, the British found themselves having to
support groups like EAM/ELAS for short-term military reasons and
wanting to defeat them in the interests of longer-term political objectives.
Therefore, for short-term balance of power considerations, the British
would support any viable resistance group while, in the longer term, the
post-war balance of power dictated the support of politically friendly forces.
Churchill made this perfectly clear in correspondence with Foreign
Secretary Anthony Eden in 1943, 'EAM/ELAS must be starved to death and
must be hit with every means in our possession'.33 And this was
progressively to be the policy of the British in the Greek conflict, wanting
to ensure that the 'right' side emerged victorious following occupation.
This was highlighted, of course, by the actions of the British during the

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so-called Second Round of the Greek Civil War in which they physically
confronted the forces of the left and ensured they did not capture the seat of
power in Athens. At stake for the British was not simply the well being of
a country and people for which there was much admiration and respect for
its ancient glories and more contemporary role in the struggle against the
Axis, but also (as previously seen with regard to Spain), a deep interest in
protecting the Eastern Mediterranean and its strategic importance with
respect to the Middle East and the lifeline to the Empire east of Suez.
British influence, was none the less steadily waning, as is evidenced in
the constant correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt, and the
former's constant demands for support from the US in its 'Greek policy'. In
fact if it were not for the active assistance of the US Navy in transporting
British troops to Greece, the events of December 1944 would have taken a
completely different turn.
Between December 1944 and the declaration of the Truman Doctrine in
March 1947, when the US finally assumed the mantle of the leading
interventionary force in Greece, US perceptions of the war in Greece took a
dramatic turn. While this was partially influenced by a realization that the
civil conflict was not one simply between republicans and monarchists as it
had been portrayed in the past, it was primarily influenced by the changing
broader international context in which the Soviet Union, and hence
Communism, was emerging as a threat. Within the short space of two years
Greece had been elevated to the status of a crucial outpost of democracy in
confronting Communism. In the words of Dean Acheson, '[L]ike apples in
a barrel infected by one rotten one ... the corruption of Greece would infect
Iran and all to the East. It would carry infection to Africa ... and to Europe
through Italy and France, already threatened by the strongest communist
parties in Western Europe.'34
The US, which had up to then deplored British imperialism and
colonialism in the Near East, took up the mantle of protector of the areas of
strategic importance, supplanting British dominance and influence, and
designating Greece as the proving ground for its strategic confrontation
with the USSR; '[O]ur interest in Greece is by no means restricted to
humanitarian or friendly impulses. If Greece should dissolve into civil war
it is altogether possible that it would re-emerge as a Communist state under
Soviet control.'35
What ensued under the Truman Doctrine, was a massive economic and
military effort by the US to defeat the Communist forces in Greece, and in
doing so to score a massive victory against perceived Soviet expansionism.
We were now entering an era in which realism would dominate the thinking
behind US foreign policy ambitions and hence have an inordinate influence
on the broader international system. Balance of power considerations would

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hold sway over idealist principles - even though those would be

incorporated in policy.
The Study of International Relations
Here I have tried to trace not only the primary reasons for civil war in Spain
and Greece, but also to evaluate international responses to the conflicts in
the context of the prevailing notions of conduct in foreign policy and
international relations. It is no coincidence that in the study of international
relations, one of the major texts was published in 1939, and it constituted a
massive attack on the dominant trend in international relations thought, that
of 'Idealism'. E. H. Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis was a devastating,
broad ranging, critique on interwar idealism which was now deemed
bankrupt. While Carr's work was primarily a trenchant critic of, 'a rich
variety of progressivist ideas', it struck a chord with the mood of the time
in light of the coming of the Second World War in which the events in Spain
had played an important political and psychological role.36 Carr's work,
apart from having significant intellectual and pedagogic merit, also
symbolized the end of the idealist era as has been repeatedly argued above.
It is also no coincidence that with the emergence of the US as a
superpower in 1945, and its assumption of the role of the protector of the
free world, we have a swing in the thinking behind the conduct of
international relations. The publication of Hans Morgenthau's Politics
among Nations in 1948, really sets the scene for a return to 'strict' political
realism based on national interests and balance of power politics. It is
argued above that US intervention in Greece was a manifestation of this
kind of thought and was indicative of the shift that was taking place.
In conclusion, civil wars in Spain and Greece are viewed as two separate
events grounded in different eras and eliciting different international
responses. What this essay has tried to show, in a schematic fashion, is the
range and breadth in similarity between the two conflicts, in their origins,
the international responses they elicited and the intellectual and political
eras in which the occurred. There is still much work to be done in this field,
but hopefully this will present a useful starting point.
NOTES
1. Introduction by Paul Preston in idem and Ann L. Mackenzie (eds.) The Republic Besieged:
Civil War in Spain 1936-1939 (Edinburgh UP 1996) p.v.
2. Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, 3d edn (London: Penguin 1986) p.947.
3. Harry Browne, Spain's Civil War (London: Longman 1996) p.81.
4. The clearest exposition of the political process and problems in nineteenth century Spain is
found in Raymond Carr, Spain 1808-1975 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1982). The first ten
chapters deal almost exclusively with the constitutional twists and turns in nineteenth century

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Spain in the most lucid and readable of ways.

5. For a brief exposition of the part industrialisation of (northern) Spain at the beginning of the
twentieth century see Carr (note 4) pp.398-9.
6. Ibid. p.564.
7. A.C. Sedgwick, 'The Plot Against Greece', Foreign Affairs 26/3 (April 1948) p.486.
8. See note 1.
9. For a brief expose of the KKE's rise and its role in 1936 see Richard Clogg, A Short History
of Modern Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1979) pp. 130-2.
10. Ibid. pp.121-2.
11. For a fuller account of the Macedonian issue in the Greek Civil War and especially in the
international context see Spyros Economides, 'The International Implications of the Greek
Civil War: The Interaction of Domestic and External Forces' (unpub. PhD thesis, U. of
London 1990) Ch.3.
12. Quoted in among other places, Norman Davies, Europe: A History (London: Pimlico 1997)
p.990.
13. There will be reference to events in the other two phases, as there are emerging patterns
within them which are also relevant to the argument.
14. Thomas (note 2) p.734.
15. For details of the initial German and Italian decision to come to the assistance of the
Nationalist forces see the account in the marvellous book by Gerald Howson, Arms for
Spain: the Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War (London: John Murray 1998) pp.17-20.
16. Ibid. p.19.
17. For a succinct discussion of German and Italian motivations see, Browne (note 3) pp.48-53.
18. Denis Smyth, 'Soviet Policy Toward Republican Spain: 1936-1939', in Preston and
Mackenzie (note 1) p.89.
19. Howson (note 15) p.123.
20. Ibid. p.124.
21. Ibid. p.121.
22. Alexis Leger, Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry at the time cited in, Smyth
(note 18) p.103.
23. Howson (note 15) pp.246-7.
24. Cited in Enrique Moradiellos, 'The Gentle General: the Official British Perception of
General Franco during the Spanish Civil War', in Preston and Mackenzie (note 1) p.6.
25. Ibid. p.5.
26. Ibid. p.11.
27. Thomas (note 2) p.572.
28. For details on tisdecision and its reversal see Howson (note 15) p.21.
29. Ibid. pp.25-33.
30. See note no.22.
31. For a fuller exposition on Kennan, 'Containment' and the Greek Civil War, see Economides
(note 11) Ch.4.
32. Cited in Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (NY: Harcourt, Brace and World 1962)
p.114.
33. PRO FO 371/37207 R11098.
34. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (NY: Norton 1969) p.219.
35. Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol.3 (1947) p.226.
36. Peter Wilson, 'The Myth of the "First Great Debate'", Review of International Studies 24
(Dec. 1998) p.1.