FactSet Equity Winner - 2015

Hertz Global Holdings, Inc.
(NYSE: HTZ)
Long: $21.75 Intrinsic Value: $34.50 (+59%) Time Horizon: 1 Yr
March 23, 2015 Analyst: David R. Hanson
Metrics (3/23/2015 - Intraday)
Stock Price / Volume Chart

35.00
Price: $21.75 (52 L/H $18.50-31.61)
100
90
Market Cap: $10.0bn / EV $16.0bn
30.00
Valuation: $34.50 (+59%)
14e
15e
Now
12.4x
10.7x
EBITDA
(mm) Adjusted
14e $2,240
15e $2,491
P/E
Target
20.0x
16.5x
EV / EBITDA
Now
Target
7.2x
9.8x
6.4x
8.8x
Share Price ($)
EPS
Adjusted
$1.75
$2.04
Sum-of-the-Parts
31.37 - 35.92
26.32 - 32.72
29.52 - 33.64
25.00
70
20.00
60
21.75
50
15.00
40
Volume (shares mm)
Current
L-T
Midpoint
80
30
10.00
20
5.00
0.00
7.2
10
Upcoming Events:
- Financial Statements Re-Filed TBD
- Debt Covenant Waiver Expires ~6/30
Recommendation
Conclusion: Leading rental car company (substantially higher margins & fleet efficiency vs. peer CAR)
trading at 59% discount to IV ($34.50); Multiple near-term, reasonably-attainable catalysts to reach IV
Long Price: $21.75 Target: $34.50 (+59%) Position Size: ~5-7% position until HERC spin-off (~Q415)
Executive Summary & Situation Overview (Update to HWPs October 2013 Underwriting Memo.)
Consistent w/ HWP 2013 thesis, HTZ announced Q114 that it would separate HERC via tax-free spinoff
o Management recognized that pure-play equipment rental & rental car valuation multiples had
returned to and above pre-Crisis levels, but that HTZ was still trading at a discounted multiple
o Post-spin, HTZ estimated to receive net cash proceeds of $2.5bn, to be used to Pay down Hertz
debt and Support a new $1 billion share repurchase program (may increase up to 20% of o/s);
o Spinoff will give 1) HTZ better transparency, optimized capital structure, the ability to return
capital to shareholders 2) HERC ability to grow, and becomes best pure-play comp to URI
HTZ has been hit by a plethora of woes (accounting, ERP roll-out, management, Ebola)
Core operating results for rental car (RAC) & equipment rental (HERC) progressing nicely
o From 12-14, HTZ revenue, EBITDA, FCF grew nicely
o RAC business has grown to ~$10bn in revenue, driven by 48% growth in US RAC
o HERC revenue is approaching pre-Crisis levels, but with a more-balanced business mix
o While HERC revenues & margins have not year reached pre-Crisis peaks, cost-cutting and
efficiency measures have pushed RAC to all-time high levels
HWP thesis on improving industry pricing proved correct as reflected by peer Avis (CAR)
o Since 9/2013, CAR (lower-margin peer) returns +113% vs HTZ -12%
Vast majority of actual & potential material negative business updates already announced and/or
reflected in current share price - with no credit for future improvement
New, strong management team is in place and is working quickly to right the ship
o CEO, CFO, CRO, CIO, Lead Independent Director, 3 additional Independent Directors are all
new within last ~1 year, with substantial rental-car industry expertise
Icahn/Jana own 19% / top 15 non-passive 50%; Pressuring HTZ mgmt. to address subpar share
returns; Jana (2/5/15) said HTZ EPS could double and shares could triple over the next few years
Bull-case: several years out, HTZ could earn $3.50+/share with very reasonable margin and growth
assumptions; Using a 20x P/E multiple, this would equate to $70/share (+222%)
CONFIDENTIAL
Property of HWP. Not for Redistribution without express written consent.
This presentation does not constitute an offer to purchase securities of Hanson Wells Partners Fund, LP. The information contained herein is confidential and is provided to you solely for
informational purposes only. This information is not to be shared, distributed, or otherwise used, for any other purpose or by any other person without the written permission of Hanson
Wells Partners Fund, LP. See Disclosures page.
David R. Hanson / hanson@hansonwells.com
Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: HTZ)

Business Description (Update to HWPs October 2013 Underwriting Memo.)
Hertz is the largest airport & general use car rental brand in the world; 95-year old company
o 10,270 locations worldwide and 700,000 vehicles
o NAm (79% of locations) Europe, Africa, Middle East (17%), LatAm (2%), Asia (2%), ANZ
o #1 on-airport market share (39% / Ent 33% / CAR 26%)
o #2 OAP (12% / Ent 69% / CAR 10% / Other 9%)
Rental car (RAC):
o On-airport (946 locations / 2/3rds US; ~67% of RAC revenue)
o Off-airport (3,400 locations / 75% US; ~27% of RAC revenue)
o Hertz peak business is mid-week servicing business renters
o Dollar & Thrifty acquired 11/2012; peak business is weekends & renting to business travelers;
o Car Sharing (24/7) Zipcar (Avis) competitor; rents cars by the hour and/or the day in NAm
o Services: Equip (child seat, nav, XM), Insurance (damage waiver, theft, liability & accident)
Equipment Rental (HERC) - $1.6bn revenue; 70% US (232 locations), 21% Canada (35), 7% EU (67)
Fleet leasing and management (Donlen Corp.) manages commercial fleets and tracks data such as
fuel management, vehicle maintenance, and accident management
Hertz is a market leader in RAC with a leading equipment rental business bolted-on
Hertz Global Holdings, Inc.

(NYSE: HTZ)
2014 Revenue: $11.0 Billion
Rental Car (~81%)

On- and Off-Airport
U.S.
$7.2 Billion
Leasing /
Other (~5%)
$0.6 Billion
Intl
$2.7 Billion
~16% Corp. EBITDA margin

Worlds largest general-use airport car rental
brand; #1 airport car rental brand in U.S. and
at 119 major airports in Europe
Approximately 8,750 locations in ~150
countries Offering rentals for hourly, weekly,
monthly, yearly (leases) for leisure, business,
insurance replacement, etc.
Equipment Rental (~14%)

Construc.
~$0.6Bn
Industrial
~$0.4Bn
Other
~$0.5Bn
~42-44% Corp. EBITDA margin

One of the largest operators in North America
Low cost structure
Diversified revenue mix
Approximately 330 locations worldwide
Largest national account base
Source: Hertz, Company Filings, HWP Analysis
CONFIDENTIAL

Background Note: HWP has been involved with Hertz since ~Q3 of 2013. Below and throughout, there are
references to our original underwriting document, as well as to Hertz financials and circumstances at that time.
Catalysts For Intrinsic Value To Be Realized / Update on Prior Catalysts (Realized / ~In-Progress)
Firmer industry pricing / Industry consolidation improves pricing dynamics.

o HTZ, CAR, Enterprise have 94% market share overall, prices rising every quarter
o Gaining share by increasing value, not decreasing px; technology gets HTZ there
~ Firmer industry pricing / Industry consolidation has improved pricing dynamics (but more to go)
o Following HTZ/Dollar Thrifty deal, market share for top 3 increased to 94%, industry pricing
rising annually at 1-2% thereafter
o HTZ announced incremental price increases Jan 1, 2015
o CAR reported pricing +1% y/y 2012-2013 and +2% y/y 2013-2014 (fair proxy for HTZ 14)
Strong organic revenue growth opportunities
o OAP and Leisure/Value segment higher RPD/length vs. commercial
Hertz has only 12% market share in profitable off-airport (OAP), a three-player market
Since 06, HTZ increased OAP locations 60%; expects 9.6% increase 13. Significant
opportunity to capture more share and insurance replacement market
Didnt have budget brand during recession (where all volume growth was); DT will
capitalize on value segment, fastest growing on-airport RAC market +25% 12
DT brands to continue double-digit growth in 2013-2014
o China Auto Rental 20% stake Q1 2013 (Warburg Pincus)
o Hertz On Demand (hourly rentals) will expand to 3,500 locations by Q3 2013: Mgmt. expect little
to no cannibalization from the continued expansion of this business
o Services growth: all of Hertz's ~500k US vehicles will have On Demand tech by YE2014
o Revenue synergies from DT (2012), Donlen (2011), 11 HERC tuck-ins since 2010
~ Strong organic revenue growth but more work to be done
o Despite recent turmoil, RAC business grew to ~$10bn in revenue, driven by 48% growth in US
RAC HERC revenue is approaching pre-Crisis levels, but with a more-balanced business mix
Higher margins via:
o 1) Technology (e.g., Self-serve Kiosks)
Kiosks allows 24/7 rentals, which increases fleet utilization in a cost-effective manner
Allows for rapid expansion of higher profit off-airport network: asset-light model will
increase returns on capital
ExpressRent 400: moving into body shops, auto dealerships, hotels, parking garages;
partnership with Lowes: kiosk / vans w 24/7
Significantly reduces labor costs: live agents maintain a high-quality, personal
experience for customers in a cost-effective manner
o 2) Optimizing remarketing channels yields $500-$1100/vehicle in incremental margin; online
sales via Rent2buy.com / dealer direct / 100 retail lots by YE13
o 3) Focused on taking out costs; $2.6bn taken out since 2006, $2.9bn target YE13
o $300mm in cost synergies from DT over 3 years (2012-2015)
~ Higher margins were realized, but more work to be done
o HTZ US RAC margins rose from 14% in 2011 to 16% in 2013 (Targeting 20%+)
o HERC margins rose from 40% to 43%
o Remarketing via Dealer Direct (+$400 vs auction) and Retail/Rent2Buy (+$1000) channels
increased from 44% in 2011 to 54% in 2013, with a target of 70% by YE2014
o Cumulative cost savings increased from $226mm to $235mm and employee efficiency
increased from $2.2mm to $2.9mm
o HTZ announced in Jan 2015 it was cutting expenses by an additional $100mm annually
o Targeted cost synergies from DT ($300mm 2012-2015) have likely not been realized due to
poor integration
CONFIDENTIAL

Summary of Catalysts For Intrinsic Value To Be Realized / Update on Prior Catalysts (continued)
Investments complete, now cashflow (in progress)

o Investments in technology, RAC, and HERC have stabilized post 2012 ($3..8bn last 4yrs); now
corporate EBITDA and FCF will increase
o EVA and Corporate EBITDA are primary bonus metrics; Corporate EBITDA = (EBITDA) (car
rental fleet interest) (car rental fleet depreciation) + (non-cash expenses) + other nonrecurring expenses.
o ~ HTZ FCF grew 190% 2012-2013, but likely did not hit 34% 2013-2014 growth target
Delevering and returning capital to shareholders (in progress)

o Net corporate debt / EBITDA looks high 3.6x; With full year DTG 3.3x; With synergies 2.8x
o Targeting delever to IG target 1.6x (net debt / EBITDA); Strong FCF generation would allow
Hertz to pay down corporate debt and achieve target by 2014
o Mgmt repeatedly asserted Hertz will return cash to shareholders once target leverage ratio met
o Clarity on return of capital to shareholders would be a huge catalyst; Future payout of FCF as
share repurchase or dividends all incremental upside
o Spin-off or sale of HERC (non-core) would delever corporate balance sheet and free up capital,
as much of the corporate debt supports HERC; Only recently became able to separate HERC
~ Net corporate debt / EBITDA still looks high given fall in EBITDA (net debt stayed fairly flat)
o Spin-off of HERC will delever corporate balance sheet and give HTZ substantial capital to return
to shareholders
Post-Spinoff, HERC & HTZ will each trade up towards peer multiples (URI/ CAR)
Sponsor ownership overhang removed (Q213)

o In December 2005, CDR, Carlyle, and ML acquired Hertz from Ford for $14.5bn ($4.4bn cash,
$10.5bn assumed debt and fees)
o November 2006 IPO at ~$16/share
o May 2013, Sponsors sold remaining shares ($23-26 range)
o While realized, difficult to estimate impact this positive / removal of overhang had on shares
New: Filing of restated financial statements and update of 2014 results / 2015+ Guidance
o The vast majority of actual and potential material negative business updates have already been
announced and/or are reflected in the current share price with no credit given for future results
/ solid results from core operating business
o Financials will likely be restated before YE2015, with expectations for ~6/30/15; Waiver
on debt covenants gives management a financial incentive to re-file by this date
o A new, strong management team is in place and is working quickly to right the ship (CEO,
CFO, CRO, CIO, Lead Independent Director, 3 additional Independent Directors are all new
within the last ~1 year, with substantial rental-car industry expertise)
o Two significant share re-ratings are on the horizon:
Given HTZ size (1.5x Avis), non-activist investors will re-enter shares post restatement (driving a re-rating towards CAR multiples)
Post-Spinoff, HERC & HTZ RAC will each trade up towards peer multiples (URI / CAR)
New: Activists (Icahn, Jana, Fir Tree own 19% / top 15 non-passive 50%) will maintain pressure
on management team to address subpar share returns; HERC is a key lever to unlock value
o Even post-appointment of new HTZ CEO, Icahn and Jana have increased stakes and citing
ongoing focus on fixing HTZ
New (lower-quality catalyst): Lower gas prices spur additional leisure trip spend / RAC demand
CONFIDENTIAL

Hertz Equipment Rental (HERC) Spinoff
HWP October 2013 thesis Spin-off or sale of HERC (non-core) would delever corporate balance sheet
and free up capital, as much of the corporate debt supports HERC; Only recently became able to
separate HERC
March 2014: HTZ announced that it would separate HERC into a standalone public co. via tax-free spin
o Hertz estimated the HERC spinoff would close by early 2015
Target HERC net leverage ratio of 3.5x-4.0x at separation
Target HTZ net corporate leverage ratio of 2.5x-3.5x
o Post-spin, Hertz estimated to receive net cash proceeds of $2.5 billion, to be used to:
Pay down Hertz debt
Support a new $1 billion share repurchase program (may increase up to 20% of
o/s); Replaces $300 million program announced in 2013 / $87.5 million utilized
o Received Private Letter Ruling from IRS giving comfort to tax-free nature of spin
The spinoff will allow:
o HTZ to be the leading pure-play rental car co. in a consolidated industry
Better transparency, and an optimized capital structure (currently skewed by HERC)
Primarily focus on cash generation and growth
Fixed leverage target range / FCF profile may provide for ongoing return of capital to
shareholders
o HERC to grow and reduce costs through cycle
Will be the only other US public peer to URI
Hertz management recognized that pure-play equipment rental and rental car companies had both
returned to and above pre-Crisis levels, but that HTZ was still trading at a discounted multiple
Source: Hertz
CONFIDENTIAL

Summary of Noteworthy Hertz Developments since HWP Involvement
In Sept 2013, HTZ revised its fleet cost guidance (cost to dispose of each rental car) upward
In December of 2013, Tom Kennedy was appointed CFO

o Well-regarded CFO (Harvard MBA)
o Served as Hiltons CFO during the balance sheet restructuring and deleveraging initiatives
o Was CFO for Vanguard Car Rental (National and Alamo brands) and was part of the senior
leadership team which engineered the transformation and ultimate sale of Vanguards European
business to Eurazeo and the sale of the North American business to Enterprise Rent-a-Car
o Ideal background to be the CFO of HTZ but inherited a jumbled array of systems from
the HTZ/Dollar Thrifty transaction and has been playing catch-up ever since
o Leading a recently-appointed accounting team (CAO Robin Kramer hired in mid May, VP of
SOX/Compliance, Randy Walford, hired in late April, plus additional new hires to strengthen
technical and managerial expertise in these departments)
In December of 2013, HTZ also adopted a 1-year poison pill (shareholder rights plan) in response to
Icahn/Activist share accumulation
In March of 2014, HTZ delayed filing its 10-K citing delays due to its newly-implemented ERP system
o HTZ also identified adjustments relating to prior periods which would require restatements that
were immaterial to Hertzs reported results of operations, financial condition, or liquidity
On March 18, 2014, HTZ announced its plan to spin-off its equipment rental business, HERC, to
dividend cash from HERC to HTZ, and to buyback ~$1bn of HTZ shares outstanding
Delay of Q114 10-Q

o On May 13, 2014, Hertz delayed filing Q114 10-Q, citing difficulty in evaluating capitalization of
depreciation for certain non-fleet expenditures
o HTZ also identified immaterial errors relating to the financial statements for 2011
o On May 19, HTZ again delayed Q1 results, but reaffirmed its full year 2014 guidance
In June of 2014, Brian MacDonald was named CEO of HERC
On June 6, In a reversal to prior comments, HTZ announced that it had found a material weakness in
internal controls, and would need to restate 2011, 2012, and 2013 financials
o HTZ also previewed that Q1 would be below consensus reflecting costs associated with the
accounting review, other unusual items, and certain anticipated operating results
During/after Q314, airlines and car rental firms hit by slower world growth estimates + Ebola concerns
In mid-August, Hertz withdrew its full-year financial estimates, saying it would be well below the low end
of its 2014 guidance, citing costs and challenges relating to the GM recalls, higher expenses in the US
rental car segment, the rollout of an enterprise resource planning (ERP) system, and soft demand in the
equipment rental segment
o This represented the straw that broke the camels back
o Activist investors Carl Icahn, Jana Partners, Fir Tree Partners all reported large stakes, and
cited management missteps with regard to accounting errors and operational issues
o Under pressure from Icahn, Chairman & CEO Mark Frissora resigned In September
o Icahn added 3 Directors to Board, 2 of which will be part of 5-person CEO search committee
o Hertz also reported that Scott Sider retired as group president of RAC Americas / Linda Fayne
Levinson would become independent lead director; Seen as tough outside director (among first
female partners ever at McKinsey & Co.) who will push management to resolve problems
CONFIDENTIAL

Summary of Noteworthy Developments (continued)
In mid-November, HTZ provided a business update:

o Hertz remains committed to the separation of its equipment rental business and is continuing to
advance those plans, although the timing of the actual separation will be delayed and will not
occur until after the Company has completed its accounting review and filed the necessary
updated financial statements with the SEC
In late-November, HTZ appointed John Tague as CEO (selected unanimously, indicating support from
Icahn), former President and COO of United Airlines, CEO of Cardinal Logistics
o Icahn: "I have been involved in a number of CEO searches during the last decade and have
been quite impressed by the knowledge and imagination of a number of these candidates,
many of whom have turned into very successful CEOs," Icahn said. "I am happy to say that
after listening to John's ideas concerning Hertz and evaluating what he has accomplished at
United, I believe he ranks at or near the top of the group."
As of December 2014, Icahn, Jana and Fir Tree collectively represented 21% of HTZ shares, and
overall the top-15 non-passive investors represented 43%
In January of 2015, HTZ continued to make key hires

o Hired Jeffrey Foland as Senior EVP & Chief Revenue Officer; previously at United Airlines
o Hired Tyler Best as EVP & Chief Info. Officer; Previously held senior IT roles at Vanguard Car
Rental (Alamo & National) and at Budget Rent-a-Car. Served in senior executive IT roles at YP
& Ally Financial. Worked for Vanguard, GMAC and YP while each owned by Cerberus
HTZ announced that it was raising pricing across-the-board as of Jan 1, 2015 and cutting expenses by
an additional $100mm annually
o Driven by fleet depreciation increases, primarily related to residual value declines
o +1% change in RAC pricing = +$67mm pretax income ~5%; CAR saw 2% price change in 14
o $100mm expense cut equals ~1% of total expenses / $0.22 per share
February 25, 2015 HTZ released preliminary 2014 business update

o Cumulative financial statement errors to date not material: ~4% of 2013 pre-tax income
o Re-committed to HERC separation and doubled cost savings goal to $200mm
o Revenue of $11bn (+2.3% despite all business / execution / mgmt. issues); EBITDA at low end
of $1.3-$1.45bn range
HWP believes:
o The vast majority of actual and potential material negative business updates have
already been announced and/or are reflected in the current share price
o Financials will be restated before YE2015, with expectations for ~6/30/15; Waiver on debt
covenants gives management a financial incentive to re-file by this date
o Hertzs core operating business (US rental car) and the US rental car industry are
progressing in-line with our prior expectations
o A new, strong management team is in place and is working quickly to right the ship
(CEO, CFO, CRO, CIO, Lead Independent Director, 3 additional Independent Directors are
all new within last ~1 year, with substantial rental-car industry expertise)
o HERC spinoff and subsequent HTZ share buyback will continue as announced
o Activist investors will maintain pressure on management team to address subpar share
returns, with HERC being a key lever to unlock value
o Two significant share re-ratings are on the horizon:
Given HTZ size (1.5x Avis), non-activist investors will re-enter shares post restatement (driving a re-rating towards CAR multiples)
Post-Spinoff, HERC & HTZ will each trade up towards peer multiples (URI/ CAR)
CONFIDENTIAL

Summary of Noteworthy Hertz Developments Since HWP Involvement

While HTZ has been hit by a plethora of woes (accounting, ERP roll-out, management, Ebola), they have also benefitted from improving
core operating results and substantial activist investor involvement; Avis (CAR) is a good proxy for how HTZ should have performed
65.00
65.00
09/26/13 Revises FY'13 Guidance

09/30/13 HWP Initial Investment
11/04/13 Q3'13 Results
11/14/13 Philippe Laffont Elected Director
12/02/13 Tom Kennedy Appointed CFO
12/30/13 Adopts 1-Year Poison Pill in
response to Icahn/Activist accumulation
60.00
60.00
55.00
03/03/14 Delays Q4'13 Results
03/18/14 Q4 Results & HERC Separation
05/13/14 Delays Q1'14 & Bus. Update
05/19/14 Delays Q1'14
06/02/14 B.MacDonald new HERC CEO
06/06/14 Announces Broader Acctg. Issue
50.00
52.52
45.00
50.00
45.00
08/20/14 Icahn increases stake to 8.5%
09/08/14 M. Frissora Resigns as CEO
09/11/14 Agreement w Icahn
09-10/14 Ebola Scare in US
10/20/14 JANA increases stake to 7%
40.00
40.00
11/14/14 Bus. Update / Guid. Low'd
11/17/14 JANA increases stake to 8.3%
11/20/14 J. Tague new HTZ CEO
02/25/15 Business update
35.00
30.00
25.00
35.00
30.00
25.00
Avis (CAR) Share Price - Indexed ($)
HTZ Share Price ($)
55.00
21.75
Mar-15
Feb-15
Jan-15
Dec-14
Nov-14
Oct-14
Sep-14
Aug-14
Jul-14
Jun-14
May-14
Apr-14
Mar-14
Feb-14
Jan-14
Dec-13
15.00
Nov-13
15.00
Oct-13
20.00
Sep-13
20.00
Source: Hertz, Avis, Company Filings, Bloomberg, HWP Analysis
CONFIDENTIAL
This presentation does not constitute an offer to purchase securities of Hanson Wells Partners Fund, LP. The information contained herein is confidential and is provided to you solely for informational purposes only. This information is not to be shared,
distributed, or otherwise used, for any other purpose or by any other person without the written permission of Hanson Wells Partners Fund, LP. See Disclosures page.

Activist Investor Involvement

Hertz has significant activist investor presence: Icahn and Jana collectively own 18.9%;
Overall, the top 15 non-passive investors represent 49.9%
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Holder
Carl Icahn
Jana Partners
Vanguard
Glenview Capital
Fir Tree
SRS Investment
Tiger
York Capital
JGD Management
Wellington
Iridian Asset
BlackRock
GSAM
Highfields
Fidelity
DEShaw
State Street
Sab Capital
TIAA-CREF
Neuberger
Ivory Investment
Owl Creek
Eminence Capital
Top 5 Active
Top 15 ex-Passive
Active Ex-Icahn
Shares Amount
(mm)
$mm
% of OS
51.9
$1,177.1
11.3%
34.8
789.4
7.6%
24.6
558.6
5.4%
18.5
420.2
4.0%
15.2
343.5
3.3%
15.0
340.1
3.3%
14.3
323.3
3.1%
13.5
305.6
2.9%
13.5
305.6
2.9%
13.3
301.3
2.9%
12.6
284.8
2.7%
11.8
267.4
2.6%
10.6
239.2
2.3%
9.2
208.2
2.0%
8.9
201.1
1.9%
8.8
199.7
1.9%
8.5
193.1
1.9%
7.5
170.3
1.6%
7.1
159.9
1.5%
6.3
143.3
1.4%
4.8
108.8
1.0%
4.6
104.4
1.0%
4.5
101.6
1.0%
135.4
228.6
176.7
$3,070.1
5182.4
4,005.4
From Prior
#mm
%
13.1
34%
23.8
217%
-1.3
-5%
-1.0
-5%
-2.9
-16%
-5.0
-25%
-1.6
-10%
1.9
7.2
3.3
-0.2
1.6
-4.8
1.3
-0.3
0.4
0.0
0.4
-1.6
4.8
16%
120%
36%
-1%
18%
-34%
17%
-3%
5%
0%
6%
-20%
New
Date
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
12/31/2014
29.6%
49.9%
38.6%
Icahn (8/20/2014) [We believe HTZ shares] were undervalued [and] intend to have discussions with [HTZ]
management and board of directors relating to shareholder value, accounting issues, operational failures,
underperformance relative to its peers and the Reporting Persons' lack of confidence in management. The
Reporting Persons may also seek shareholder board representation if appropriate.
Fir Tree (8/20/2014) The CEO has had some serious missteps, and its time for a change. We believe Hertz has an
incredible brand and an opportunity to show leadership in the car-rental industry. We look to work constructively with
management and the board to address these issues.
Jana Partners (Q3 2014 Letter) Hertz is a leader in a consolidated industry that we believe has substantial
unrealized pricing power. We have been following HTZ and the transformation of the car rental industry over the last three
years. Against a backdrop of healthy industry fundamentals, HTZ has been plagued recently by fleet mismanagement
problems and an accounting restatement. The dreadful share price performance of HTZ relative to its peers has fostered a
shareholder rebellion that led to the ouster of CEO Mark Frissora and important changes to the HTZ board. What HTZ needs
now is new leadership a CEO who can reposition and right size the fleet, take the lead on improving pricing, resolve the
accounting problems, reinvigorate the troops, and complete the spin-off of Hertz Equipment Rental (HERC).
With the right CEO at the helm be it Scott [Thompson, former CEO of Dollar Thrifty] or an equally qualified
leader and the appropriate strategy and capital allocation plans in place, we believe HTZ is capable of
generating nearly $3.00/share of free cash flow. This combined with an estimated value for HERC of roughly
$6.00 per share, suggests that HTZ is trading at a very deep discount to intrinsic value.
Jana Partners (10/20/2014) Jana continues to believe that Hertzs shares are undervalued and that it may hold
discussions with management.
Jana Partners (2/5/2015) Hertz could double earnings per share over the next couple of years and the stock
could triple - EnTrust Investment Summit
Source: Company Filings, Morningstar, HWP Analysis
CONFIDENTIAL

Potential Risks & Mitigants
Continued fall in residual value of cars

o Potential mitigant(s):
Hertz has shifted remarketing channels away from auctions towards higher profit
channels (online, direct to dealer), decreasing the required sales price to break-even
HTZ has already increased its depreciation per vehicle from $275-280/unit (Q413) to
$280-$300/unit (2014) equal to +2% to +9%
As part of its fleet upgrade announced in Nov. 2014, HTZ is shifting towards new cars,
acquiring 35,000 model year 2015 vehicles in the U.S.
Additionally, Hertz accelerated used car sales during Q414, increasing risk vehicle
dispositions by 45% vs plan, targeting its highest mileage vehicles
For 2015, HTZ is decreasing U.S. non-program cars from 79% to 70%, decreasing the
portion of its operating fleet that is impacted by residual values
HTZ raised prices (effective Jan. 1, 2015) to offset declining residual values
2
Per management, falling residuals = decrease in new car costs (0.81 r ) and increase in
2
revenue per day (0.72 r )
Delay in re-filing of financial statements

Given the new management team, activist board pressure, and financial incentive to refile by 6/30/2015, HWP believes financials will be filed as soon as possible
Delay or cancellation of spin-off of HERC

In mid-November 2014, HTZ management re-committed to the HERC spinoff - the
timing of the actual separation will be delayed and will not occur until after the Company
has completed its accounting review and filed the necessary updated financial
statements with the SEC
New management team and activist board pressure is keenly focused on effecting
HERC spinoff and returning capital to shareholders
Exit of investor with large stake in HTZ, given concentration of current shareholder base
Given HTZ size (1.5x Avis), non-activist investors will re-enter shares post re-statement
(driving a re-rating towards CAR multiples)
Larger drawdown in US economy

Flexibility to dispose of fleet (similar to 2008-2009 downturn) given lower number of
program cars
Highly variable cost structure, with part-time workers (33% of direct op. expenses)
Long-term growth in enplanements worldwide offsets temporary economic conditions
and cycles
Even during the worst of the crisis, 2009 RAC revenues only fell 13% and overall 17%
Sustained economic woes may shift customers to rent vs. purchase, or hourly rentals
Europe risk
Europe only represents 22% of HTZ 13a revenues
Hertz is expanding its franchise arrangements in Europe (risk is on partners capital)
Hertz is expanding its discount/value brands in Europe, including Firefly (ex Advantage
Europe) which would appeal to budget-strapped Europeans
CONFIDENTIAL
10

Valuation
Currently, Sum-of-the-Parts is most meaningful

o 14 metrics less relevant given large adjustments, announced spinoff of HERC, and special
situation interest in HTZ (activist involvement, etc.)
o However, current SOTP includes some equip. peers trading at cyclical high valuation multiples
P/E 15e of 16.5x
o Adjusting 2014 results to back-out non-core / extraordinary items
o $1.75 EPS $0.10 below midpoint of managements 3/14 guidance
o Growing 14 revenue @ 5.5% (vs 6-10% pre-DTG growth rate) plus a 2% pricing increase
(~$135mm pretax income) supported by CAR 2014 and HTZ 2015 px increase announcement
o CAR trading at 16.7x and equipment rental peers at ~16x
EV/EBITDA 15e of 9.0x (vs. CAR trading at 9.3x and equipment peers trading at 6.3x)
HWP estimates intrinsic value ~$34.50/share, based on conservative estimates (+59% current)
o Assigning HTZ a discount vs CAR due to poor recent execution / non-pure play nature of HTZ
o In reality, HTZ deserves a premium to CAR based on substantially higher EBITDA margin
o Bull-case: several years out, HTZ could earn $3.50+/share with very reasonable margin and
growth assumptions; Using a 20x P/E multiple, this would equate to $70/share (+222%)
o Jana Partners (2/5/2015) Hertz could double earnings per share over the next couple of years
and the stock could triple Barry Rosenstein at EnTrust Investment Summit
Metric
Valuation Multiples
Low
High
Implied
Multiple
Valuation Range
High
Low
Midpoint
SOTP Current
$31.37
$35.92
$33.64
SOTP Long-Term
$26.32
$32.72
$29.52
P/E ('14)
$1.75
19.0x
21.0x
20.0x
$33.24
$36.73
$34.98
P/E ('15)
$2.04
16.0x
17.0x
16.5x
$32.59
$34.63
$33.61
Memo: Y/Y
16%
EV/EBITDA ('14)
$2,240mm
9.5x
10.5x
10.0x
$33.18
$38.08
$35.63
EV/EBITDA ('15)
$2,491mm
8.5x
9.5x
9.0x
$32.95
$38.39
$35.67
$32.77
$31.61
$36.32
$36.08
$34.55
$33.84
Memo: Y/Y
11%
Median
Average
HWP Estimate
Implied P/E
Implied EV/EBITDA
Implied Valuation Multiples

'14
19.7x
'15
16.9x
'14
9.8x
'15
8.8x
EV/EBITDA ('15)
$32.95
$38.39
EV/EBITDA ('14)
$33.18
$38.08
P/E ('15)
$32.59
P/E ('14)
SOTP Long-Term
SOTP Current
CONFIDENTIAL
$34.50
$21.75
+59%
$34.63
$33.24
$26.32
Target
Current
Upside
$36.73
$32.72
$31.37
$35.92
11

Valuation (continued)
HTZ Adj. 2014 Results / HWP 2015e Est.
($ mm)
Rev
2013a
10,772
2014a
11,018
2.3%
5.5%
1,153
1,234
1,302
10.7%
11.2%
11.2%
1,234
801
1.75
135
1,437
932
2.04
Rev Growth
PTI
PTI %
Price Inc.
Adj PTI
NI
EPS
1,153
748
1.67
2015e
11,624
Memo
Pre DTG growth 6-10% p.a.
Assumes PTI +50bps (sub mgmt est); Upside from margin inc. /cost cuts
Assumes 2% price increase in 2015 (CAR +2% in 2014)
Assumes no change in share count
Sum-of-the-Parts Valuation
Using conservative assumptions, adjusted 14 EBITDA & EPS in-line with 3/14 Mgmt Guidance
3/14 '14e
Corp.
Midpoint
($ Millions)
RAC
+
HERC
Other
=
Total
Guidance
Revenue
Corp. EBITDA
9,444
1,558
16.5%
PTI
1,386
937
2.05
699
300
435
19.0%
9.9%
EPS
44.4%
14.7%
NI
1,574
194
330
12.3%
0.42
0.72
11,018
11,550
2,257
2,240
20.5%
19.4%
1,250
1,320
11.3%
11.4%
801
855
7.3%
7.4%
1.75
1.85
FCF
600
Current SOTP yields a $34.58 valuation, with several peers (CAR, URI) trading near cyclical-high
valuation multiples; using HTZ and URI L-T multiples results in a $30 Price Target post spinoff
P/E
RAC
$28.57
1,558.3
10.3x
16,031.3
9,943.3
$21.72
Per Share
193.9
17.3x
3,364.1
$7.35
698.9
6.3x
4,417.0
$9.65
Total
Per Share
16,442.4
$35.92
14,360.3
$31.37
Midpoint
Upside
$33.64
55%
Equity
EV
Per Share
HERC
647.1
20.2x
13,078.3
Current (Adjusted 2014)

EV/E
CONFIDENTIAL
Memo
CAR
URI, AHT, AGK, HEES
P/E
Post Spin Long-Term (Adjusted 2014)

EV/E
Memo
647.1
20.0x
12,942.7
$28.27
1,558.3
8.5x
13,245.2
7,157.2
$15.63
193.9
10.5x
2,036.3
$4.45
698.9
7.0x
4,892.0
$10.69
14,979.0
$32.72
12,049.2
$26.32
HTZ L-T
URI 10-Year
$29.52
36%
12

Comparables
($ millions)
Company
Auto Rental
Hertz Global Holdings
Avis Budget Group
Ticker
HTZ
CAR
23-Mar
Price
21.75
58.81
Average (ex HTZ)

Median (ex HTZ)
HTZ vs CAR
Equipment Rental
Hertz Global Holdings
United Rentals
Ashtead Group plc
Aggreko
H&E Equipment
Average (ex HTZ)
Median (ex HTZ)
HTZ
URI
AHT LN
AGK LN
HEES
21.75
88.24
11.16
15.78
24.10
Market
Cap
($mm)
EV
($mm)
EPS
CAGR
'11-'14
'13E
P/E
'14E '15E
'16E
'13E
EV / EBITDA
'14E '15E
9,957.37
6,254.44
16,045.37
9,012.24
20.4%
12.6%
13.3x
26.7x
29.4x
20.2x
17.1x
16.7x
13.4x
14.4x
7.8x
11.7x
11.1x
10.3x
8.7x
9.3x
7.8x
8.7x
17%
10%
18%
11%
19%
10%
8,105.91
8,105.91
12,528.81
12,528.81
12.6%
12.6%
26.7x
26.7x
20.2x
20.2x
16.7x
16.7x
14.4x
14.4x
11.7x
11.7x
10.3x
10.3x
9.3x
9.3x
8.7x
8.7x
14%
14%
15%
15%
14%
14%
59%
78%
63%
(50%)
45%
3%
(7%)
(33%)
8%
(7%) (11%)
+6%
+7%
+9%
9,957.37
8,516.92
5,617.27
4,041.57
849.77
16,045.37
16,443.30
6,867.27
4,503.57
1,695.93
20.4%
61.5%
124.1%
(2.2%)
13.3x
18.0x
35.3x
16.3x
19.1x
29.4x
12.9x
24.5x
19.2x
15.4x
17.1x
11.0x
18.1x
18.4x
14.6x
13.4x
9.4x
14.4x
16.9x
12.2x
7.8x
7.2x
13.2x
6.9x
6.7x
11.1x
6.1x
10.3x
6.5x
5.5x
8.7x
5.5x
8.8x
17%
34%
18%
43%
34%
38%
19%
41%
38%
40%
12%
39%
41%
41%
8,216.49
8,443.33
12,357.81
13,138.80
51.0%
41.0%
22.2x
18.5x
18.0x
17.3x
15.5x
16.4x
13.2x
13.3x
8.5x
7.1x
7.1x
6.3x
6.3x
5.5x
25%
25%
33%
36%
34%
39%
33%
40%
1.2x
1.2x
50%
(28%)
69%
(26%) 128%
5%
55%
1%
43%
11%
8%
76%
82%
59%
59%
HTZ vs Median
HTZ vs URI
'16E
7.8x
'11A
EBITDA Margin
'12A '13E '14E
12%
10%
4.8x
(33%) (50%) (52%) (70%)
Source: Company Filings, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, HWP Analysis
CONFIDENTIAL
13
This presentation does not constitute an offer to purchase securities of Hanson Wells Partners Fund, LP. The information contained herein is confidential and is provided to you solely for informational purposes only. This information is not to be
shared, distributed, or otherwise used, for any other purpose or by any other person without the written permission of Hanson Wells Partners Fund, LP. See Disclosures page.

HTZ Financials Trend

From 12-13, HTZ revenue & EBITDA grew nicely; Revised 11/2014 guidance shows revenue close to plan, but EBITDA lagging badly
Revenue & Corp EBITDA ($mm)
14,000
19%
12,000
10,000
11,550
10,772
7%
9,025
8,299
8,000
7,102
2%
7,563
6,000
10%
-33%
26%
4,000
2,000
11,018
974
1,094
1,371
2009
2010
2011
1,626
2012
2,044
2,240
2013
2014e 3/14
1,375
2014e
Similarly, HTZ Pre-Tax Income, EPS, Free Cash Flow all grew nicely 12-13, and were originally estimated to continue for 2014
1,600
2.00
1.85
14%
Pre-Tax Income
29%
1,400
1.80
Free Cash Flow
1,153
1,200
1.63
1.60
1,320 13%
EPS
892
1,000
1.40
1.31 24%
800
1.20
662
600
600 34%
463
0.94
1.00
449
400
193
0.80
340
190%
200
63
155
0.60
0
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014e 3/14 2014e 11/14 0.40
0.51
-200
0.28
-347
0.20
-400
Adjusted EPS ($)
PTI / FCF ($mm)
-600
0.00
CONFIDENTIAL
14

Operating Performance Trends

Despite recent turmoil, the Rental Car (RAC) business has
grown to ~$10bn in revenue, driven by 48% growth in US RAC
Int'l RAC
2,000
Donlen / Other
9,234
10,000
1,672
9,748
7,640
8,000
6,274
6,801 6,730
5,873
6,355
6,941
6,000
6,628
4,000
2,000
1,755
Construction
Industrial
48%
Fragmented
1,657
1,538 1,548
1,600
HERC Revenue ($mm)
US RAC
4,469
HTZ RAC Revenue ($mm)
12,000
HERC revenue is approaching pre-Crisis levels, but with a morebalanced business mix
1,385
30%
1,210
36%
1,110 1,071
1,200
18%
800
26%
52%
400
38%
0
2006
2008
2010
2012
2006
9M'14 ann.
2008
2010
2012
9M'14 ann.
While HERC revenues, EBITDA margins, and PTI margins have not year reached pre-Crisis peaks,
cost-cutting and efficiency measures have pushed RAC to all-time high levels
46%
47%
25%
44%
41%
38%
40%
40%
42%
43%
Corp EBITDA Margin
RAC Total
US RAC
10%
20%
Int'l RAC
20%
11%
11%
10%
12%
14%
6%
0%
2006
2007
2008
16%
6%
2009
2010
21%
RAC
2011
2012
19%
16%
19%
US
20%
Equipment
30%
Equipment
21%
Pre-Tax Income Margin
50%
16%
16%
Int'l
13%
15%
14%
10%
10%
17%
15%
12%
8%
9%
18%
9%
7%
5%
7%
6%
4%
8%
4%
0%
2013
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
CONFIDENTIAL
15

Operating Performance Trends

Prior to the Accounting / ERP issues, HTZ operating performance had shown consistent improvement
Source: Hertz
CONFIDENTIAL
16

Liquidity and Leverage Trends

Hertz Q314 liquidity of $1.5bn is flat (-2%) from YE13, and up
(+13%) Y/Y despite numerous operational issues during FY14
8,000
5.0x
7,054
423
666
613
1,000
500
882
1,041
1,146
525
1,157
6,081
6,274
5,935
3.0x
5,000
4,000
3.0x
2.6x
3.0x
2.5x
2.0x
3,000
2,000
2,044
1,363
611
4.0x
-3%
3.5x
1,929
1,029
3.7x
3,676
1,542
6,000
1,390
HTZ Liquidity ($mm)
1,580
Net Corp. Debt / Corp EBITDA ($mm)
1,757
3.6x
-33%
1.5x
876
750
1,000
0
Q4'12
Q2'13
Q3'13
Q4'13
Q3'14
1.0x
0.5x
357
Q4'11
4.5x
Leverage (Net Corp Debt / Corp EBITDA)
2,000
1,636
2,070
1,500
4.4x
7,000
6,083
ABL Capacity
1,375
Cash
2,062
2,500
Leverage has increased because EBITDA has temporarily

declined (-33%) while net debt has stayed flat (-3%)
0.0x
Q4'11 Q4'12 Q2'13 Q3'13 Q4'13 Q3'14
CONFIDENTIAL
17

Peer Comparison: Hertz vs. Avis

Standalone HTZ RAC should trade at a substantial premium to CAR, given substantially better fleet efficiency and EBITDA margins
($ millions)
HTZ (Total)
Sales
'13
'14e
HTZ (RAC only)
CAR
HTZ/CAR
Memo
10,772
11,296
8,707
9,181
7,937
8,533
10%
8%
2,088
2,372
1,436
1,636
769
870
87%
88%
EBITDA Margins (adj.)

'13
'14e
19%
21%
16%
18%
10%
10%
70%
75%
HTZ has substantially better EBITDA Margins
Leverage
4.3x
3.5x
23%
HTZ has higher leverage due to HERC
FCF (adj.)
'13
441
460
-4%
'13 was slated to be the last large CapEx year
71%
9%
EBITDA (adj.)
'13
'14e
Fleet Efficiency
78%
RAC Locations
NAm
Int'l
Total
5,874
3,876
9,750
60%
40%
467,225
160,800
628,025
74%
26%
Car Rental Fleet Size

NAm
Int'l
Total
3,150
5,650
8,800
36%
64%
342,430
145,262
487,692
70%
30%
HTZ has consistently better fleet efficiency
CAR may be getting more credit for

potential international growth.
11%
While HTZ has a ~30% larger fleet than CAR,

it has been significantly over-fleeted post-DTG.
29%
Source: Hertz, Avis, Company Filings, HWP Analysis
CONFIDENTIAL
18

HTZ RAC Standalone Visibility Will Add Value

Post-Separation, HTZ RACs best-in-class financial performance should capture greater valuation
Source: Hertz
CONFIDENTIAL
19

Rental Car Industry Pricing Trends

Consistent with HWPs initial thesis: following the Hertz / Dollar Thrifty transaction, the market share for Enterprise, Hertz, and Avis
increased to 94%, and industry pricing has been rising annually at 1-2% thereafter
HTZ /
Dollar Thrifty
100%
87%
87%
86%
95%
87%
45.00
44.00
80%
43.00
73%
42.00
60%
+2%
41.00
40.00
+1%
40%
39.00
HTZ/CAR Rev Per Day (Pricing)
Market Share of Top 3 Players
86%
95%
94%
38.00
20%
37.00
0%
36.00
2006
2007
2008
2009
Market Share of Top 3 Players
2010
2011
CAR NA Pricing
2012
2013
2014
HTZ NA Pricing
Source: Hertz, Avis, Company Filings, HWP Analysis
CONFIDENTIAL
20

Fleet Management and Productivity Improvements

Hertz has struggled with fleet depreciation and residual value
issues during 2014; As of mid-April, Hertz was still estimating
that it would be able to send 30% of its 2014 fleet dispositions
through alternative resale channels like Rent2Buy, which
yields ~$1,000 more per vehicle than the Auction channel
45%
3,500
Dealer Direct (+$400 vs Auction)

Retail & Rent2Buy (+$1000)
39%
38%
Cumul. Cost Savings ($mm)

Employee Efficiency ($000)
40%
35%
32%
30%
25%
20%
15%
15%
15%
12%
240
235
229
230
2,939
222
2,639
220
211
2,500
36%
203
210
2,156
2,000
200
193
1,698
190
1,500
1,260
175
180
Employee Efficiency ($000)
30%
4%
226
3,000
Cumulative Cost Savings ($mm)
40%
% of HTZ Fleet in Alternative Resale Channels
Employee efficiency (+4%) and cumulative cost savings (+36%)

have continued to improve from the levels observed pre-HWP
involvement; Management is expanding Lean Six Sigma to offairport rental car locations and targeting ~$200mm+ in annual
gross cost savings to offset inflation
1,000
10%
170
500
500
5%
160
187
0%
0
2011
2012
2013
2014e
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
150
Source: Hertz
CONFIDENTIAL
21

Financial Sensitivity
Pre-Tax Sensitivity to Incremental 1% Changes
Source: Hertz
CONFIDENTIAL
22

Appendix (From HWPs October 2013 Underwriting Memo.)

Market Segmentation: Following the acquisition of DTG, HTZ finally has a large presence in the MidTier and Value segments, which have been the fastest growing part of the U.S. airport market
Ten years of consolidation have led to a landscape where 3 competitors control 94% of the market
Market Share (Revenue)
100%
90%
9%
6%
8%
6%
7%
7%
7%
7%
6%
7%
5%
7%
80%
13%
13%
14%
14%
14%
15%
70%
9%
10%
7%
8%
8%
60%
50%
40%
19%
20%
19%
19%
11%
11%
10%
11%
6%
6%
6%
6%
20%
19%
20%
19%
8%
7%
8%
7%
7%
18%
18%
20%
20%
19%
20%
13%
13%
Budget
Avis
Dollar Thrifty
Hertz (inc. DT)
30%
20%
Others
47%
33%
33%
34%
35%
33%
34%
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
48%
49%
49%
National / Alamo
Enterprise
10%
0%
While HTZ leads the on-airport

market
2009
Enterprise dominates the

OAP market
2011
2012
Which makes ENT a clear #1

overall and HTZ #2
Other,
5%
Other,
2%
Other,
9%
CAR,
26%
2010
HTZ,
39%
HTZ,
12%
CAR,
10%
ENT,
50%
ENT,
69%
ENT,
33%
On-Airport $12.5bn
HTZ,
26%
CAR,
19%
OAP market ~$11bn
Total market $23.5bn
Source: Hertz, Company Filings, HWP Analysis.
CONFIDENTIAL
23

Buyout Transaction
2005 December: Clayton, Dubilier & Rice, The Carlyle Group, and Merrill Lynch acquired all of Hertz's
common stock from Ford for aggregate consideration of $15bn
o $4,379 million in cash; $10,116 million of debt refinanced or assumed
o $447 million transaction fees and expenses
2006: Sponsors began to exit
o IPO in 11/2006 at ~$16/share at 88.235mm shares
o Secondary offering 6/2007 51.75mm
2009 May/June: Crisis requires fresh capital
o 5-6/2009 52.9mm share follow-on at 6.50 ($343.9mm)
o Private offering w CD&R and Carlyle for $200mm at $6.23/sh
2011 2013: Sponsors complete exit
o Secondary offerings March 2011, December 2012, March 2013 and May 2013
o Hertz repurchased 40% of March 2013 offering to offset future dilution from convertible note
33% IRR and 2.6x Cash-on-cash return
As of May 2013, the overhang from Sponsor ownership of Hertz has finally been removed
100%
100%
80%
55%
60%
51%
38%
40%
26%
20%
13%
0%
0%
Q3'06
Q2'07
Q4'10
Q4'11
Q4'12
Q1'13
Q2'13
M&A Activity
Americas Car Rental (5 since 2010)
o Eileo (2008)
o Donlen (2011)
o Navigation Solutions (2011)
o Dollar Thrifty (2012) / Divested Advantage in connection with DT acquisition
o Penske Automotive Memphis Franchise (2012)
International Car Rental (3 + minority)
o Flexicar (2010)
o Ace Rental Cars (2011)
o Emil Frey Group Franchise (2012)
o China Auto Rental (10% - 2013)
Worldwide Equipment Rental (10)
o Forces, Western Machinery, 24/7 Studio Equipment, 1st Call Studio Equipment (2010)
o Offshore equipment business of Delta Rigging & Tools, We Got It Rentals, DW Pumps (2011)
o Cinelease, Arpielle, Pioneer Rentals (2012)
CONFIDENTIAL
24

Dollar Thrifty (November 2012)
$87.50 / share in cash ($2.6bn or 7.8x EV / corporate EBITDA; 40% premium to HTZ/CAR)
o DT had a ~5% market share pre-acquisition
o Outside of HTZ, CAR, and Enterprise, no other competitor has more than a 1% market share
o HTZ began looking at DTG in April 2007
o Made formal offer of $1.2bn in 2010 that shareholders rejected
o Made another offer in 2011 that was withdrawn due to market conditions
o HTZ agreed to divest Advantage to meet antitrust clearance
o Instant scale in mid-tier value segment: known brand, airport infrastructure U.S. airport leisure
business as % of HTZ WW RAC revenue to significantly increase
o Faster and more certain strategy than growing Advantage organically
Revenue and cost synergies from DT acquisition.
Each of our brands generally maintains separate airport counters, reservations and reservation
systems, marketing and all other customer contact activities, however a single management team
manages all three brands. As we integrate the Dollar and Thrifty brands into our operations, we expect
to eliminate many of the duplicative functions previously performed separately by Dollar Thrifty and
identify synergies through combined fleet management, insurance, information technology functions,
back office processing and procurement.(7)
Cost synergies originally $170mm now $300mm

Revenue synergies originally $0 now $300mm
Recognized over 3 years
China Auto Rental (April 2013)

On April 15, 2013, Hertz agreed to made a strategic investment in China Auto Rental
o Largest car rental company in China
o Hertz invested cash and agreed to contribute its China RAC entities to China Auto Rental
o Hertz received common stock (10%) and a convertible note in return and will receive an
additional convertible note upon completion of the contribution
Initial closing of the transaction occurred on May 1, 2013
Hertz owns 10% of China Auto Rentals ordinary shares and has a seat on China Auto Rentals Board
Upon conversion of the convertible notes, Hertz would have 18.64% on a fully diluted basis
Source: Hertz, Company Filings.
CONFIDENTIAL
25

Hertz Global Equipment Rental (HERC)
Targeting more efficiency through centralized operations / hub and spoke model
o Hubs (regional) manage maintenance, fleet & fleet logistics, customer service center
o Rolling out tablets in the field for technical data, communication, on spot procurement 2yr roll
out, expect $2mm in savings for $0.35mm investment
o Plugging Donlen into HERC (optimal routing, automated transport compliance, e paperwork
process) - 2 Year Roll Out, expect $5mm in savings for $1.5mm investment
POS expansion with kiosk / mobile app (see truck and equipment rental options at kiosk)
Equipment point global telematics
o Gives customers 24/7 mobile access to their fleet and utilization and to HERC fleet available
o 3yr roll out, expect 20-30% pretax margin from revenue & cost savings
HERC revenue still $370mm below 06
Diversified and updated fleet
o Strategically increased mix of consistent industrial revenue
o Expanded into non-cyclical niche markets (entertainment svcs.)
HERC is NAm-focused, but has expanded into Asia, Central America, and South America
CONFIDENTIAL
26

HERC has diversified away from Construction and has deepened its Industrial & Fragmented verticals
2006
2012
Const.
35%
Const.
50%
Frag.
35%
Frag.
40%
Indu.
15%
Indu.
25%
Similarly, HERC has balanced its fleet mix; Higher dollar utilization with Specialty equipment
2006
Spec.
Other
7%
9%
2012
Spec.
15%
Earth
moving
30%
Other
9%
Trucks
13%
Trucks
14%
Mat.
Handl.
19%
Earth
moving
22%
Aerial
22%
Mat.
Handl.
16%
Aerial
24%
HERC Key Metrics (Q2 2013)
CONFIDENTIAL
27

Donlen
Founded 1965; HQ Northbrook, IL; Acquired Sept. 2011, fully integrated YE 2012
Q213 revenue: $134mm; $530mm 13e
500 corporate customers and over 166,000 vehicles; 98% customer retention
Offers fleet financing, asset integration, fleet management
Spans cars (light duty), trucks (medium and heavy duty), and equipment
Hertz value lease (shorter term alternative to a full lease)
Number of Leased and Managed vehicles

growing significantly post-Hertz acquisition
180,000
Lease
CAGR 14%
Donlen Revenue ($mm)
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
530
471
500
CAGR
Lease 4.6%
Mgmt 4.3%
120,000
Vehicles
600
CAGR
Lease 11.0%
Mgmt 14.5%
Mgmt
160,000
140,000
Revenues have accelerated and are on track to be

over 50% higher in 2013e than 2010
CAGR 1.6%
400
361
362
2007
2008
329
408
340
351
2009
2010
300
200
100
20,000
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012 2013e
2006
2011
2012
2013e
CONFIDENTIAL
28

Structural Shift in Rental Car Pricing Environment
Historically, GM, Chrysler, Ford overproduced cars and used RAC market to unload excess production
o This resulted in consistent over-fleeting and under-utilization in the car rental market
o In order to increase utilization, car rental companies were incentivized to lower prices, ultimately
resulting in a highly competitive pricing environment marked by low returns
As a result of major restructurings, auto manufacturers are more rational with their production
o This has significantly mitigated over-fleeting in the car rental market and increased utilization
Car rental utilization rates across the industry are at their all-time high
High utilization dis-incentivizes car rental companies from competing on price
Renewed focus on returns and profitability
Consolidation Improves Industry Competitive Dynamics
Source: Columbia Business School Presentation April 2013 (Hunt, Lieu, Raymoulik)
CONFIDENTIAL
29

Strategy
1) Transforming Hertz
Transforming Hertz: All pieces in place for a transformation
CONFIDENTIAL
30

2) Optimize strategies, maximize profit & cash flow
$55mm in video revenue so far
$3.4mm net labor savings 2012
93% cust satisfaction
Ancillary sales higher
Higher return investments: technology & innovation
CONFIDENTIAL
31

3) Grow U.S. Off Airport Rental Car
Including insurance replacement
o 1/3 of OAP revenue ($2,237mm / $746mm)
o market share has grown from 8% in 2007 to 13% in 2012
US OAP locations have lower labor costs, direct op. expenses, SG&A, and higher utilization;
This lower cost structure coupled with longer-rentals drives higher off-airport margins
CONFIDENTIAL
32

4) Cash flow improvement
Commitment to Accelerating Cash Flow Generation: Hertz generated approximately $2.7 billion in net
cash flow from operations in 2012, a $485 million year-over-year improvement. Having completed the
Dollar Thrifty acquisition last year, and 11 HERC acquisitions over a 3-year period, as well as investing
heavily in our rental fleets as the U.S. economy recovered, we believe we will now rapidly accelerate
corporate cash flow generation in 2013 and beyond.
DTG and lower overall fleet investment requirements will drive future corporate cash flow:
o HERC fleet growth: 2013E investment declining YoY vs. increasing over past 3 years
o RAC fleet growth: 2013E stabilizing / declining due to initiatives: risk fleet, remarketing
channels, and higher utilization
o DTG: positive cash flow + synergies more than offset incremental interest expense
o Non-fleet capital: increasing as we invest in technology and new / updated facilities slight
offset to cash flow
o Expect 2013 Free Cash Flow of $500M to $600M
CONFIDENTIAL
33

5) Shift U.S. Remarketing Strategy
A 10% shift, wholesale to retail, reduces depreciation expense $12M
Reduces cost of sales, improves sale price, keeps cars on rent longer
7%
7%
47%
47%
70%
19% 7%
80%
9%
90%
8% 11%6%
100%
7%5%
Hertz has shifted away from the Auction remarketing channel; Shift into more profitable resale
channels increases margins and mitigates potential drop in used car prices
33%
20%
10%
23%
30%
Retail/Rent2Buy
Auction
23%
40%
13%
Dealer Direct
65%
50%
75%
Other
88%
60%
0%
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013e
CONFIDENTIAL
34

6) Reduce costs and improve employee efficiency
Source: Hertz.
CONFIDENTIAL
35

Appendix: Debt and Liquidity
While HTZs total debt figure, $17.8bn (Q2 2013) seems high, please note:
o Only $7.6bn ($7.1bn net) is at HTZ Corporate level
o Remainder ($10.2bn) is Fleet level and is bankruptcy remote, not guaranteed by HTZ
HTZ has only $1.5bn of debt maturities before 2018

3,500
Corporate Debt Maturities ($mm)
3,064.8
3,000
2,950.0
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,005.8
1,000
523.4
500
0
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2018+
Including unrestricted cash of $483mm, Hertz has $840mm of corporate liquidity

Remaining
Capacity
Corporate Debt
Senior Term Facility
Senior ABL Facility
357.3
Senior Notes
4.25% Senior Notes due April 2018
7.50% Senior Notes due October 2018
7.375% Senior Notes due January 2021
Senior Notes
Promissory Notes
Convertible Senior Notes
Other Corporate Debt
Unamortized Net Discount (Corporate)
357.3
Total Corporate Debt
Available
Under
Borrow B
357.3
Avg. Int.
Rate at
6/30/2013
3.26%
2.89%
4.25%
7.50%
6.75%
5.88%
7.38%
6.25%
6.58%
6.96%
5.25%
3.51%
357.3
5.58%
Fixed or
Floating?
Floating
Floating
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Floating
Maturity
3/2018
3/2016
4/2018
10/2018
4/2019
10/2020
1/2021
10/2022
4/2018-10/2022
6/2012-1/2028
6/2014
Various
12/31/2011
1,389.5
0.0
2,638.6
2,638.6
224.7
474.7
49.6
(72.3)
4,704.8
12/31/2012
2,125.5
195.0
6/30/2013
2,114.8
1,005.8
0.0
700.0
1,250.0
700.0
500.0
500.0
3,650.0
48.7
474.7
88.7
(37.3)
6,545.3
250.0
700.0
1,250.0
700.0
500.0
500.0
3,900.0
48.7
474.7
58.5
(23.7)
7,578.8
CONFIDENTIAL
36
Senior Term Facility

Senior ABL Facility
357.3
Senior Notes
7.375% Senior Notes due January 2021
Senior Notes
Promissory Notes
Convertible Senior Notes
Unamortized Net Discount (Corporate)
Remaining
357.3
Total Corporate Debt
Corporate Debt
Capacity
Senior
Term
Facility
Fleet Debt
Senior
357.3
HVF
U.S.ABL
ABSFacility
Program
Senior
NotesVFN
HVF
US Fleet
4.25%
Senior
Notes due April 2018
HVF
Series
2009-1
148.8
7.50%
Senior
Notes due October 2018
HVF
Series
2010-2
6.75%
Senior
Notes
due
April
2019
HVF Series 2011-2
Senior
Notes due January 2021
HVF7.375%
U.S. Fleet
MTNs
6.25%
Senior
Notes due October 2022
HVF
Series
2009-2
Senior
Notes
HVF
Series
2010-1
Promissory
HVF Series Notes
2011-1
Convertible
Senior
HVF Series 2013-1Notes
Unamortized
Net
Discount (Corporate)
RCFC
U.S. ABS
Program
357.3
TotalUS
Corporate
Debt
RCFC
Fleet VFN
RCFC Series 2010-3
60.0
Fleet
RCFCDebt
US Fleet MTNs
HVF
U.S.Series
ABS Program
RCFC
2011-1
HVF
US Series
Fleet VFN
RCFC
2011-2
HVF Series 2009-1
148.8
Donlen
ABS Program
HVF Series
2010-2
Donlen
GN II2011-2
VFN
60.0
HVF
Series
3.26%
2.89%
Floating
Floating
3/2018
3/2016
4.25%
7.50%
6.75%
5.88%
7.38%
6.25%
6.58%
6.96%
5.25%
3.51%
Avg. Int.
Rate5.58%
at
6/30/2013
3.26%
2.89%
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Floating
4/2018
10/2018
4/2019
10/2020
1/2021
10/2022
4/2018-10/2022
6/2012-1/2028
6/2014
Various
4.25%
1.04%
7.50%
N/A
6.75%
N/A
5.88%
1.04%
7.38%
6.25%
5.37%
6.58%
3.77%
6.96%
2.86%
5.25%
1.68%
3.51%
3.37%
Fixed
Floating
Fixed
Floating
Fixed
Floating
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Floating
4/2018
3/2014
10/2018
3/2013
4/2019
4/2012
10/2020
1/2021
10/2022
3/2013-3/2015
4/2018-10/2022
2/2014-2/2018
6/2012-1/2028
3/2015-3/2017
6/2014
8/2016-8/2018
Various
5.58%
1.03%
357.3

Appendix: Debt
Other
Fleet
Debt
HVF U.S.
Fleet
MTNs
US
Financing
HVFFleet
Series
2009-2 Facility
European
HVF
SeriesRevolving
2010-1 Credit Facility
European
Notes
HVF SeriesFleet
2011-1
European
HVF
SeriesSecuritization
2013-1
Hertz Canadian Securitization
DollarU.S.
Thrifty
Canadian
RCFC
ABS
ProgramSecuritization
Australian
Securitization
RCFC
US Fleet
VFN
Brazilian
Fleet2010-3
Financing Facility
RCFC
Series
Capitalized
Leases
RCFC
US Fleet
MTNs
Unamortized
Premium
RCFC Series 2011-1 (Fleet)
RCFC Series 2011-2
Total ABS
FleetProgram
Debt
Donlen
Total
Donlen GN II VFN
Available
Under
357.3
Borrow B
European Securitization
357.3
0.0
19.0
58.5
157.4
85.0
66.9
112.3
60.0
767.9
1,125.2
60.0
Corporate
Other FleetEBITDA
Debt
Cash
US Fleet Financing Facility
Net
Corporate
Debt Credit Facility
European
Revolving
Corporate
EBITDA
EuropeanDebt
Fleet/ Notes
357.3
0.0
0.0
357.3
19.0
58.5
157.4
Hertz Canadian Securitization

Source:
Hertz, Company Filings, HWP85.0
Analysis.
Dollar Thrifty Canadian Securitization
Australian Securitization
Brazilian Fleet Financing Facility
Capitalized Leases
Unamortized Premium (Fleet)
Total Fleet Debt

Total
Corporate EBITDA
Cash
Net Corporate Debt
Corporate Debt / EBITDA
CONFIDENTIAL
66.9
112.3
767.9
1,125.2
0.0
357.3
Fixed or
Floating?
Floating
Floating
Maturity
3/2018
3/2016
1,389.5
0.0
2,638.6
2,125.5
195.0
2,114.8
1,005.8
0.0
700.0
1,250.0
700.0
500.0
500.0
3,650.0
48.7
474.7
88.7
(37.3)
6,545.3
12/31/2012
2,125.5
195.0
250.0
700.0
1,250.0
700.0
500.0
500.0
3,900.0
48.7
474.7
58.5
(23.7)
7,578.8
6/30/2013
2,114.8
1,005.8
1,384.3
2,638.6
749.8
224.7
598.0
474.7
0.0
49.6
2,732.1
(72.3)
4,704.8
0.0
0.0
2,350.0
700.0
0.0
1,250.0
0.0
700.0
2,350.0
500.0
500.0
1,095.9
3,650.0
749.8
48.7
598.0
474.7
0.0
88.7
2,443.7
(37.3)
6,545.3
519.0
250.0
2,590.0
700.0
0.0
1,250.0
0.0
700.0
2,590.0
500.0
500.0
807.5
3,900.0
749.8
48.7
598.0
474.7
950.0
58.5
3,105.3
(23.7)
7,578.8
540.0
2,638.6
224.7
474.7
49.6
(72.3)
4,704.8
12/31/2011
1,389.5
0.0
2,638.6
1,000.0
170.0
175.0
1,345.0
Floating
12/2013
2.81%
3.21%
1.04%
2.25%
N/A
1.00%
N/A
1.04%
Fixed
Fixed
Floating
Floating
Floating
2/2015
5/2015
3/2014
3/2013
12/2013
4/2012
0.0
0.0
1,000.0
0.0
170.0
811.2
175.0
1,345.0
500.0
400.0
2,350.0
1,419.0
0.0
899.3
0.0
2,350.0
500.0
400.0
2,590.0
1,440.0
0.0
943.8
0.0
2,590.0
2.95%
5.37%
2.67%
3.77%
8.50%
2.86%
2.50%
1.68%
2.14%
3.37%
2.13%
4.17%
13.89%
1.03%
4.08%
Floating
Fixed
Floating
Fixed
Fixed
Floating
Fixed
Floating
Floating
Floating
Floating
Floating
Floating
9/2015
3/2013-3/2015
6/2015
2/2014-2/2018
7/2015
3/2015-3/2017
7/2014
8/2016-8/2018
6/2013
8/2014
12/2014
2/2013
12/2013
Various
2/2015
5/2015
136.0
1,384.3
200.6
749.8
517.7
598.0
256.2
0.0
68.3
2,732.1
0.0
169.3
23.1
0.0
363.7
(10.9)
0.0
1,724.0
0.0
0.0
6,612.3
11,317.1
811.2
166.0
1,095.9
185.3
749.8
529.4
598.0
242.2
0.0
100.5
2,443.7
55.3
148.9
14.0
519.0
337.6
12.1
500.0
1,791.3
400.0
1,419.0
8,903.3
15,448.6
899.3
171.0
807.5
357.9
749.8
520.5
598.0
363.0
950.0
124.2
3,105.3
76.4
119.7
13.0
540.0
429.6
8.8
500.0
2,184.1
400.0
1,440.0
10,263.2
17,842.0
943.8
1,389.5
931.8
136.0
3,773.0
200.6
2.7x
517.7
1,635.6
533.3
166.0
6,012.0
185.3
3.7x
529.4
2,155.0
483.1
171.0
7,095.7
357.9
3.3x
520.5
4.44%
256.2
68.3
0.0
169.3
23.1
363.7
(10.9)
1,724.0
242.2
100.5
55.3
148.9
14.0
337.6
12.1
1,791.3
363.0
124.2
76.4
119.7
13.0
429.6
8.8
2,184.1
2.64%
3.89%
6,612.3
11,317.1
8,903.3
15,448.6
10,263.2
17,842.0
1,389.5
931.8
3,773.0
2.7x
1,635.6
533.3
6,012.0
3.7x
2,155.0
483.1
7,095.7
3.3x
2.81%
4.44%
3.21%
2.25%
2.64%
3.89%
1.00%
Fixed
Fixed
Floating
12/2013
2.95%
2.67%
8.50%
2.50%
2.14%
2.13%
4.17%
13.89%
4.08%
Floating
Floating
Fixed
Floating
Floating
Floating
Floating
Floating
Floating
9/2015
6/2015
7/2015
7/2014
6/2013
8/2014
12/2014
2/2013
Various
37

Appendix: Historical Valuation

Hertz has historically traded at a 12-14x trailing P/E
60.0x
TTM P/E
50.0x
40.0x
30.0x
20.0x
14.2x
13.9x
10.0x
13.0x
12.0x
Nov-13
Aug-13
May-13
Feb-13
Nov-12
Aug-12
May-12
Feb-12
Nov-11
Aug-11
May-11
Feb-11
Nov-10
Aug-10
May-10
Feb-10
Nov-09
Aug-09
May-09
Feb-09
Nov-08
Aug-08
May-08
Feb-08
Nov-07
Aug-07
May-07
Feb-07
Nov-06
0.0x
HTZ pre-LBO pre-IPO P/E was volatile, in the 8-20x range, but averaging 16x
Source: JPMorgan, Bloomberg, HWP Analysis.
CONFIDENTIAL
38


HTZ has historically traded between 7.4-9.3x trailing EV/EBITDA
12.0x
9.3x
TTM EV/EBITDA
10.0x
7.4x
8.0x
8.9x
8.1x
6.0x
4.0x
2.0x
Nov-13
Aug-13
May-13
Feb-13
Nov-12
Aug-12
May-12
Feb-12
Nov-11
Aug-11
May-11
Feb-11
Nov-10
Aug-10
May-10
Feb-10
Nov-09
Aug-09
May-09
Feb-09
Nov-08
Aug-08
May-08
Feb-08
Nov-07
Aug-07
May-07
Feb-07
Nov-06
0.0x
HTZ pre-LBO pre-IPO EV/EBITDA was in the 4.5-5.25x range
Source: JPMorgan, Bloomberg, HWP Analysis.
CONFIDENTIAL
39


Post-Crisis, HTZ traded at ~20x forward P/E,
a premium to CAR and DTG at ~17x
Historically, forward P/E for CAR & DTG was in the 10-20x range
CAR has traded at 7-28x forward P/E

(L-T average 13x, 2 turn discount to HTZ)
Pre-acquisition, DTG traded at 6-25x forward P/E

(L-T average 12x, 3 turn discount to HTZ)
Source: JPMorgan
CONFIDENTIAL
40


Pre-crisis, CAR EV/EBITDA was trading in the 10-12x range; mid-crisis, ~9-10x; post-crisis, 11-12x
Pre-crisis, DTG, the weakest of the 3 RACs, was trading in the 15x EV/EBITDA range; mid-crisis, ~0-1x; post-crisis 3-4x
Source: JPMorgan
CONFIDENTIAL
41

Appendix: Impact of Interest Rates

Hertz Revenue & Profits Increase as interest rates increase: Change in 3-Month LIBOR vs Change in HTZ Revenue
Source: Hertz
CONFIDENTIAL
42

CONFIDENTIAL
43

Disclaimer / Disclosure
This document is not a solicitation to invest in any investment product, nor is it intended to provide investment advice. It is
intended for information purposes only and should be used by sophisticated investors who are knowledgeable of the risks
involved. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Please refer to the relevant confidential offering document for
full details on investment products and strategies.
The information contained herein reflects the opinions and projections of Hanson Wells Capital Management LLC, and its
affiliates (collectively HWP) as of the date of publication, which are subject to change without notice at any time subsequent
to the date of issue. HWP does not represent that any opinion or projection will be realized. All information provided is for
informational purposes only and should not be deemed as investment advice or a recommendation to purchase or sell any
specific security. While the information presented herein is believed to be reliable, no representation or warranty is made
concerning the accuracy of any data presented. This communication is confidential and may not be reproduced without prior
written permission from HWP. Performance returns reflect the time weighted return, net of expenses and full fees, for a
hypothetical partner. Returns are shown net of the incentive allocations. Performance returns are estimated pending the
year-end audit. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Actual returns may differ from the returns presented.
Each partner will receive individual returns from HWPs administrator. Reference to an index does not imply that the
Partnership will achieve returns or other results similar to the index. The total returns for the index do not reflect the
deduction of any fees or expenses which would reduce returns. Weightings, exposure, attribution and performance
contribution information reflect estimates and are the result of classifications and assumptions made in the sole judgment of
HWP. Positions reflected in this letter do not represent all the positions held, purchased, or sold, and in the aggregate, the
information may represent a small percentage of activity. The information presented is intended to provide insight into the
noteworthy events, in the sole opinion of HWP, affecting the Partnership.
THIS SHALL NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFER TO SELL OR THE SOLICITATION OF AN OFFER TO BUY ANY INTERESTS
IN ANY FUND MANAGED BY HWP OR ANY OF ITS AFFILIATES. SUCH AN OFFER TO SELL OR SOLICITATION OF AN
OFFER TO BUY INTERESTS MAY ONLY BE MADE PURSUANT TO CONFIDENTIAL OFFERING DOCUMENT
BETWEEN A FUND AND AN INVESTOR.
An investment in Hanson Wells Partners Fund, LP (the Fund) is subject to a high degree of investment risk, including the
possible loss of the entire amount of an investment in the Fund. An investor should carefully read and review the
confidential offering document, including the description of risk factors, before making an investment in the Fund.
Statements herein that reflect projections or expectations of future financial or economic performance of the Fund are
forward-looking statements. Such forward-looking statements are based on various assumptions, which assumptions may
not prove to be correct. Accordingly, there can be no assurance that such assumptions and statements will accurately
predict future events or the Funds actual performance. No representation or warranty can be given that the estimates,
opinions or assumptions made herein will prove to be accurate. Any projections and forward-looking statements included
herein should be considered speculative and are qualified in their entirety by the information and risks disclosed in the
confidential offering document. Actual results for any period may or may not approximate such forward-looking statements.
Prospective investors are advised to consult with their own independent tax and business advisors concerning the validity
and reasonableness of the factual, accounting and tax assumptions. No representations or warranties whatsoever are made
by the Fund, the Partners, or any other person or entity as to the future profitability of the Fund or the results of making an
investment in the Fund. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results.
This presentation and its contents are confidential and proprietary information of the Fund and any reproduction of this
information, in whole or in part, without the prior written consent of the Fund is prohibited. Additional information is available
from the Fund upon request. The Fund, the Partners, and their respective affiliates are not acting as your adviser or agent.
Partners generally refers to Limited Partners of Hanson Wells Partners Fund, L.P.
Sources: JPMorgan, Credit Suisse, Columbia Business School Presentation April 2013 (Hunt, Lieu, Raymoulik), Company Filings, HWP Analysis.
CONFIDENTIAL
44
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Hertz Global Holdings, Inc.

Stock Price / Volume Chart

Price: $21.75 (52 L/H $18.50-31.61)

Market Cap: $10.0bn / EV $16.0bn

Valuation: $34.50 (+59%)

Share Price ($)

Volume (shares mm)

Property of HWP. Not for Redistribution without express written consent.

Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: HTZ)

Business Description (Update to HWPs October 2013 Underwriting Memo.)

Hertz Global Holdings, Inc.

2014 Revenue: $11.0 Billion

Rental Car (~81%)

~16% Corp. EBITDA margin

Equipment Rental (~14%)

~42-44% Corp. EBITDA margin

Source: Hertz, Company Filings, HWP Analysis

Property of HWP. Not for Redistribution without express written consent.

Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: HTZ)

Firmer industry pricing / Industry consolidation improves pricing dynamics.

Property of HWP. Not for Redistribution without express written consent.

Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: HTZ)

Investments complete, now cashflow (in progress)

Delevering and returning capital to shareholders (in progress)

Sponsor ownership overhang removed (Q213)

Property of HWP. Not for Redistribution without express written consent.

Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: HTZ)

Hertz Equipment Rental (HERC) Spinoff

Property of HWP. Not for Redistribution without express written consent.

Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: HTZ)

Summary of Noteworthy Hertz Developments since HWP Involvement

In December of 2013, Tom Kennedy was appointed CFO

Delay of Q114 10-Q

In June of 2014, Brian MacDonald was named CEO of HERC

Property of HWP. Not for Redistribution without express written consent.

Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: HTZ)

Summary of Noteworthy Developments (continued)

In mid-November, HTZ provided a business update:

In January of 2015, HTZ continued to make key hires

February 25, 2015 HTZ released preliminary 2014 business update

Property of HWP. Not for Redistribution without express written consent.

Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: HTZ)

Summary of Noteworthy Hertz Developments Since HWP Involvement

09/26/13 Revises FY'13 Guidance

Avis (CAR) Share Price - Indexed ($)

HTZ Share Price ($)

Source: Hertz, Avis, Company Filings, Bloomberg, HWP Analysis

Property of HWP. Not for Redistribution without express written consent.

Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: HTZ)

Activist Investor Involvement

Property of HWP. Not for Redistribution without express written consent.

Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: HTZ)

Potential Risks & Mitigants

Continued fall in residual value of cars

Delay in re-filing of financial statements

Delay or cancellation of spin-off of HERC

Larger drawdown in US economy

Property of HWP. Not for Redistribution without express written consent.

Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: HTZ)

Currently, Sum-of-the-Parts is most meaningful

Implied Valuation Multiples

Property of HWP. Not for Redistribution without express written consent.

Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: HTZ)