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478
The Nation
.~ . .
It is difficult to avoid
impresslon,
of Pitt,
wcote Lord Rosebery inhisLife
thattherehas.
been throughoutthepast
history of England-and Ireland a malignant
fate waving away everyauspicious chance,
andblighting every opportunity of beneficence as it arises.
Suchmelancholy reflections must have been forced upon many lifelong advocates of Home Rule for Ireland by
the news last week of the Insensate uprising
In Dublin. It IS one of those things which,
like the Phenlx Park assassln?tions of 1682,
almost tempt the truest frlends of Irlsh nationalityto despair. The London press, on
theday
following Mr. Birrells statement,
spoke of general sympathy for the Irish leader, John Redmond. Hemust, indeed, feel,
as Parnell dld when Lord Frederick Cavendlshand Mr. Burke were foullymurdered
in Dublin, that a felon blow had been dealt
bothhimandtheIrish
cause. Is it to be
the old story over again of theefforts of
the freely elected representatives of Ireland
in theBritishParliament,and
of largeminded English statesmen, cast to the earth
by desperate and criminal Irishmen?
Let it freelybe conceded that the existrevolutionence of theseconspiratorsand
a reproach to English
ariesinIrelandis
rule. It is a severeindictment of British
policy in Ireland that ever since Cromwells
day there hayebeen bands of Irishmen ready
to risk all in striking at England. This inveterate and inherited national hatred, this
settledandsullendistrust,this
smouldering desire for wild and blind vengeance, are
the bitter fruit of mistakenstatesmanship,
persisting through the centuries. The manifestations of thisspirithaveusually
been
actslikethose
of madmen;but
its existence, through all the generations, has been
a standing proof of English governmental
folly. England is to-day seeing the truth of
what she was told by Bright and Gladstone,
that her Irish
policy had been a source of
Imperial weakness, raising up enemies at
flank. Thefactthat
even at a world,crisis like this the preachers of sedition and
revolt in Ireland should have persuaded rash
men to rise and seek to stab England in the
back, is proof that the long years of oppressiveEnglishrulehad
generatedevil
passions not easily to be extirpated from Irish
hearts.
That the recent outbreak was so inept as
to be almost idiotic must be evident to the
minds of all but the Irishmen who took part
in it. Theyhavebroughtimmense
disre-
THE WAR.
If theBritlshtemperament
were
to Ironic self-inquiry, it might find a gloomy
sort of satisfaction in events on the Tigris,o
F o r nearly a century British policy was devoted t o keeping alive the Slck Man of Eu:
rope. How well the patlent has done d e i
Brltish ministrations, there are Gallipoli and
Kut t o show. The trouble was that the English generals in the East thought the Sick
Man much more enfeebled than he was. The
one outstanding reason for the British failure in Mesopotamia may be described as the
Kipling touch. There was about the expedition too much of the old feeling that a British general with his riding whip was aLways
a match
hosts of the lower breeds. The
mistake was in putting the Turks, in spite
of their unbroken tradition of excelleni fighting, on a level with the mountain tribes on
the Indlan border. About the Kipling state
of mind there is unquestionably something
splendid, and in other days it was effective.
I n justice to Gens. Nixon and Townsbend it
must be recalled how near the British did
get t o Bagdad, and that a different
to the battle of Ctesiphon would have made
theundertaking one of the mostsplendid
feats in military history. TheBritish gambled
Bagdad as the Germans gambled f o r
Paris; whet they lacked was resourcefulness
underfailure.
And for that matter
is yet likely to show that the defeat at the
Marne was a n infinitely greater failure than
the surrender at Kut.
~-
~~
The moral effect on military affairs in EUrope is much more serious. Thedisaster
at Kut-el-Amara
will
reinforce
the
wellestablished impression of Englands lack of
high-class generalship. In view of the blunders at Gallipoli and in Mesopotamia, it is
not necessary to suspect that the
compara.
tive ineffectiveness of the British land forces in the west is the result of a sinister plan,
that Great Britain has deliberatelychosen to
let French and Russians and Germans wear
themselves out in order that the war may
leave herwiththestrongestarmyin
Europe. GreatBritainhas
done her beston
land,butthat
best is notvery good when
it comes to a question of leadership. A n d
thisfactor
is all the more important because it is mainly to the British armies that
the Allies must look for the hopes of a decisive victorythatthey
cherish.Champagne
andVerdunhave
shown what it means to
break through. The attempt will undoubtedly be made by the British army. The long
period of inactivity may be due to the
determination to make that attempt with
unprecedented vigor. It is conceivable that
whattheFrenchwith
a quarter of a million men failed t o do in Champagne, and the
Germans with even greaternumbersfailed
to do around Verdun, Englandmay accomplish by sending in a million men
a million and a half. Shehasthe
men. The
problem is whether she has the leaders.
The Nation
linefromanxietyto
panic. There is
logical relation between Villas raid on Co.
lumbusand our need of an incomparable
Beet; andtheincidents
at Parraldid not
prove that we must have an army of 250,000
men instead of 140,000, yet we knowwhat
the effect has been on thetemper of Con
gress. Dublin andKut,
coming together,
may create a state of mindfor which the
strong men of England have been waiting.
. -.
..
. .-
102,
NO.2653
ing that it
as if there would have to
be third party in the field again this year.
The reason is that the Republicans are
ed totheir idols. Although theRepublican
leaders know that Theodore Roosevelt is the
most popular man in the land, and that they
ought to nominate him, the Progressive General Staff is making up its mind that they
will not. And so the talk comes fromthe
neighborhood of Roosev%lt that he will not
up-withanother
robbery. This is a
rather absurd baked meat left over from-the
funeral of fouryears ago, inasmuchasat
present no one pretends that anybody is taking
Roosevelt any delegates to whom
he has a shadow of a claim. But the
is
raised as a part of the intimidating tactics
which areallthat
the Progressives
have in reserve. As theyseetheirchance
of wheedling,
stampeding,the Republican Convention disappearing, they resort to
threats
and
bullying. If you dont take
Roosevelt, he will run a ticket of his
andsmash you again. Perhapstheymean
this seriously, but we much doubt if the
Coloneldoes.
It is a good enough attempt
at terrorism until after the Convention. but
those who fancy that Mr. Roosevelt has a
hankeringtoleadanotherforlorn
hope to
defeat had better take a closer look at the
man. We, a t least, do not so read his character.
Taking it as settled that the Republican
Convention is to be securely in the hands of
Republican leaders and delegates opposed to
Roosevelt, who are proof againsttheblare
of the Progressive brassbands, political speculation centres-on the question
whom they
aremostlikelytoagree
uponwhen
the
time comes to concentrate. Theearly balloting will apparentlybe indecisive.Severalfavorite sons-Sherman, Cummins, Fairbanks, Burton-will have to have their perfunctory compliments paidthem.Butthe
hour will arrive when
it will be necessary
to come to grapples with the question who
has the best chance of being elected if nominated. To say that this question is already
answered would be foolish; but it would be
equally foolish not t o note the spreading belief that the man will be Hughes. This drift
is eVerywhere observable. Everytestone
can make reveals it. Eventhe
Washingtondispatchesreportthe
deepening conviction of Republicans in Congress
that the nomination will
go to Hughes. As
one
evidence
.of thegeneraltrend,
Col.
George Harvey comes out in the latest issue
of the
Review with the positive prediction that Hughes will be the Re-
Nation
May 4, 19161
-.
publican
candidate.
We are sometimes
afraid of Col. Harvey when he mounts the
. tripodfororacular deliverances, but in this
case he is not far wrong when he sums up
the way in which political opinion is manifesting itself:
the man in the street, on the sldewalk,
in the
on the subway, In the Pullman, on
the jitney, in the vestibule after service, on
the golf links before or after, downtown
or uptown. In
out of clubs n.ot
dominated by masters of finance, in Hartford,
Springfield, or Peacham, in wealth-nalluwing
Plttsburgh, even,
Columbus, or on the
farms a$ Iuwa, in
o r Washington,
and everywhere,
hill
down
dale, in this broad land, ask yourself,
wife,
plethoric uncle,
spinster aunt
and what do you mnd?
Some
distrust the supporters of Root;
who are angry at Roosevelt; net a few,
inclusive of Democrats. who are sick of Wilson; none whose countenance fails to brighten
. at the mention of Hughes.
Likelihoods aresaferto
go upon than
sweeping predictions.Prophecy
in politics
has been rightly called a gratuitous blunder.
It is not a case of asserting to-day what surely will be, but only what probably will be.
Thecertainthing
is that the Republicans
have passed the turning-point, so far as the
Roosevelt attack is concerned. And the signs
pointsignificantly
tothe
conclusion that
they will find their best man t o rally behind
in the person of Charles E. Hughes.
473
474
it covered with the
The N a k t i o n
[Vol.
at
nisller
a llon
Slowly
2653
that
and
dying