Eras Journal - Edition Three - June 2002

http://www.arts.monash.edu.au/eras/editions.htm

Having Hirtius to Dinner: optimates and populares in

the Late Republic
Eleanor Chambers (University of Exeter)

In May 44BCE, almost two months after Caesar's murder, a curious exchange of
letters took place between Cicero and Atticus. The letters concerned Cicero's attempt to
further the interests of the Liberators, Brutus and Cassius, by seeking the support of the
Consul designate, Aulus Hirtius. The letters are important because they illustrate the
presence of an ideological division in Roman politics between optimates and populares
which continues to be overlooked by those scholars who are convinced that 'Roman
politicians did not normally divide on matters of principle'.[1] They are also important
because they allow us to re-examine the assumption, another feature of much modern
scholarship, that 'the Roman aristocrat's commitment to causes was purely temporary in
so far as they promoted his own aggrandizement'.[2]

From the outset it must be stated that both of these modern assumptions have been
rigorously disputed in recent articles by N. Mackie and T.P.Wiseman.[3] The purpose of
this paper is, therefore, to build on the findings of these two scholars in order to provide
a reinterpretation of some valuable contemporary material.

The clearest surviving evidence for the presence of two distinct approaches to
public affairs in Rome comes from the Pro Sestio. In this speech, Cicero claimed that:
'there have always been two classes of men in this state who have sought to engage in
public affairs and to distinguish themselves in them: duo genera semper in hac civitate
fuerunt eorum, qui versari in re publica atque in ea se excellentius gerere
studuerunt'.[4]

Cicero went on to describe the nature of the division, stating that one 'genus'
aimed 'by repute and in reality to be populares, the other optimates'.[5] Popularis
politicians wanted to gain the support of the people whilst optimates sought the
approval of the best citizens.[6] The nature of the distinction between the two became
clearer as Cicero described the characteristics and interests of optimates. First and
foremost, they sought otium cum dignitate which was founded upon:

'...religious observances, the auspices, the powers of the magistrates, the

authority of the Senate, the laws, ancestral customs, criminal and civil
jurisdiction, credit, our provinces, our allies, the prestige of our
government, the army, the treasury: religiones, auspicia, potestates
magistratuum, senatus auctoritas, leges, mos maiorum, iudicia, iuris
dictio, fides, provinciae, socii, imperii laus, res militaris, aerarium'.[7]

His definition suggests that, although at the end of his career Cicero identified
himself as an optimas, there was no clear or circumscribed group of optimates. Instead,
the optimates include 'all good men'.[8] This indicates that, whilst it might have been
possible at particular times for Cicero to identify individuals or groups within the senate
as optimates, what was more important was the presence of an optimates tradition and
an optimates ideology.[9] So we are not dealing with a specific party or group in the
modern political sense, but with a set of shared values and interests and a collective
vision for the res publica.

Cicero then suggested that popularis politicians, by contrast, were driven to seek
the support of the people because they were criminals or naturally seditious. Thus, he
implied that it was both an illegitimate and an immoral stance to adopt and one which
ultimately represented an attack upon the res publica:

'For, in so large a body of citizens, there are great numbers of men who,
either from fear of punishment, being conscious of their crimes, seek to
cause revolution and changes of government; or who owing to a sort of
inborn revolutionary madness, batten on civil discord and sedition; or who,
on account of embarrassment in their finances, prefer a general
conflagration to their own ruin: Etenim in tanto civium numero magna
multitudo est eorum, qui aut propter metum poenae peccatorum suorum
conscii novos motus conversionesque rei publicae quaerant, aut qui
propter insitum quendam animi furorem discordiis civium ac seditione
 pascantur, aut qui propter implicationem rei familiaris communi incendio
malint quam suo deflagrare'.[10]

Cicero's definition is clearly polemical. It was meant to present a dichotomy, in

which all men, whether involved in politics or not, were either one or the other.[11] The
boni, whom Cicero associated with optimates ideology, represented a legitimate and
constitutional approach to politics and a wise and morally upright vision for the state.
Populares, he claimed, were willing to manipulate the people in order to gain their own
ends. It was certainly not in Cicero's interests, in this speech, to represent a popularis
political ideology in any other way.

Nevertheless, there exists evidence for an alternate, but equally legitimate and
constitutional, vision for the state related to popularis ideology.[12] Popularis ideology
was associated with problems of immediate concern to the urban populace - such as
housing, debt relief, famine, rents and grain shortages - as well as with broader political
issues. These broader issues have been identified by Wirszubski as issues to do with the
auctoritas of the Senate; the leges agrariae; the desire for popular sovereignty; the
leges tabellariae; the powers of the Tribunes; the position and opportunities for novi
homines; Senatus Consultum Ultimum and the grant of extraordinary powers to
individuals.[13] Furthermore, popularis politicians also claimed to be working for the
best interests of the res publica. [14]This was not, as Cicero would have his audience
believe, because individual politicians sought thereby to achieve personal power, but
because there was (and had always been) a different vision for the way that the res
publica should be governed.

Cicero's cynical view of the popularis politician has had a lasting effect upon
modern interpretations. It has lead many scholars to argue that popularis politicians
were merely using the people for a personal and non-ideological end. There are,
however, several problems with this view as both Mackie and Wiseman have
established.[15] Firstly, it is inconceivable that the popularis platform could have been
entirely devoid of genuine ideological content since, if it were, it would not have gained
support. That is, even if the ideologies could be used opportunistically by some
politicians it is still evidence for the fact that they existed and that there was the
potential for them to be sincerely upheld. Even if some politicians claimed to be
popularis simply to manipulate popular opinion, they were still tapping into a consistent
and widely understood series of ideas and values. Secondly, as Mackie has argued, the
voting populace was not politically naive.[16] It is clear from the sources that the people
judged between 'genuine' and 'false' popularis politicians and this again suggests that
there was some conception that it was possible to be genuinely popularis.[17] Thus, she
notes that Cicero (in an early and overtly popularis speech) contrasts his own actions
with those of the 'false' popularis tribune Rullus who, Cicero claims, was not really
interested in the people at all, and was willing to disparage them in the senate:

'And beyond doubt this is what was said by this tribune of the people
[Rullus] in the senate, that the common people [plebs urbana] had too
much power in the state [res publica]; that they ought to be drained off.
For this is the word that he used as if he was speaking of sewage instead of
a class of estimable Roman citizens. But do you Romans, if you will be
guided by me, keep possession of the influence you enjoy, of your liberty,
of your votes, of your dignity, of your city, of your forum, of your games,
of your festivals, and all your other enjoyments; unless perhaps you prefer
to abandon these privileges and this brilliant Republic and to settle in the
dry sands of Sipontum...with Rullus for your leader [dux]'.[18]

The very fact that so many of the people's champions met violent deaths at the
hands of their political enemies in the senate highlights the intensity of the division
between the views and the seriousness of the political commitments that they
entailed.[19] These were not ideologies to be taken up lightly and abandoned easily.

The biggest obstacle for accepting that a populares ideology might be genuine and
not simply a means of manipulating popular support is this - 'populares were members
of the senate and so they must have been self-interested because they worked against the
interests of the senate...'.[20] As Mackie has pointed out, this does not in fact address
the question of motivation at all. It does not ask, what motivated popularis politicians
but assumes that they were motivated by self-interest because they opposed the
optimates. That is, it suggests that one ideology was the 'norm' and was genuinely
concerned with the preservation of the res publica whilst the other was simply deceptive
and self-aggrandizing. But if we assume that both optimates and populares put forward
genuine visions for the state and that they were both sincerely working for the interests
of the state then, we are left with a situation in which both can be equally valid (as
socio/political/moral ideologies) rather than with a situation in which one has a
monopoly over 'genuineness'. This would seem to be what Cicero himself came to
believe at the end of his career when he acknowledged that the res publica was torn
apart not by the actions of individual populares but as a consequence of ideological
division between optimates and populares:

'For the administration of the government, like the office of a trustee, must
be conducted for the benefit of those entrusted to one's care, not of those to
whom it is entrusted. Now those who care for the interests of a part of the
citizens and neglect another part, introduce into the civil service a
dangerous element - dissension and party strife. The result is that some are
found to be loyal supporters of the democratic [populares], others of the
'aristocratic' [optimates] party, and few of the nation as a whole: Ut enim
tutela, sic procuratio rei publicae ad eorum utilitatem, qui commissi sunt,
non ad eorum, quibus commissa est, gerenda est. Qui autem parti civium
consulunt partem neglegunt, rem perniciosissimam in civitatem inducunt
seditionem atque discordiam; ex quo evenit, ut alii populares, alii studiosi
optimi cuiusque videantur, pauci universorum'.[21]

In his article, Wiseman has traced the history of the movement away from an
ideological reading of the sources. He has shown that it was a devotion to the theories
established in the work of Gelzer, Munzer and Meir which has provided the background
for the shift in emphasis. It was their insistence that ideology was not the driving force
in Roman political life which laid the foundation for what he termed the 'ideological
vacuum' in the study of Roman politics. Thus, Wiseman argues that 'even after three
generations, the sheer inertia of the Gelzer model seems to prevent the ideological
content of republican politics, amply attested in contemporary sources, from being
accepted as given'.[22]

In light of this, a re-examination of contemporary evidence can now be attempted.

The letters with which this paper is chiefly concerned were written in May 44BCE. In
the two previous months, events in Rome had been moving very swiftly and to the
disadvantage of Brutus and Cassius. Between the meeting of the Senate on the 17
March and Caesar's public funeral on 20 March, much of the original impetus had gone
out of the Liberators' action. They had been caught, as Cicero later realized, without a
plan for the future. The confirmation of Caesar's acta had been a compromise prompted
by vested interests. It became clear that compromise and negotiation, moderation and
prudence were favoured by a majority of senators and, more particularly, by the consul
M. Antony.[23] At the same time, however, talk of vengeance and retribution was never
far away. The urban populace, the army and the veterans were clearly restless and
dissatisfied with the way events were proceeding and both Balbus and M.Lepidus
advocated vengeance on the grounds that it would be profane and unsafe for Caesar's
friends to do otherwise. [24]

Cicero vacillated between hope for the future and fear that too little had been
done. The approval of Caesar's acta and the subsequent additions and interpretations of
them by Antony led him to exclaim that the tyranny lived on despite the fact that the
tyrant was dead.[25] By mid-April, Cicero's views on what should have been done on
the Ides had turned from praise to regret. If only, as Cicero had urged, the Praetors had
acted promptly and summoned the senate then things would have been different and 'all
good men' would have been able to rejoice:

'Great Heavens what might not have been accomplished then amid the
rejoicing of all honest men, even the moderately honest, and the
discomfiture of the bandits: di immortales, quae tum opera effici potuerunt
laetantibus omnibus bonis, etiam sat bonis, fractis latronibus'.[26]

Caesar's cremation and the public outpourings of affection which accompanied it,
spurred on by Antony's dramatic funeral oration, confirmed Cicero's belief that the deed
had been left 'half done'.[27] At the end of April he acknowledged that it would be
impossible for him to be seen as neutral in the coming conflict. He had been too
outspoken in his condemnation of the murdered Dictator. He believed that those who
rejoiced in Caesar's death would be the target of attacks from Antony's 'party':

'Neutrality, which was possible in Caesar's war, will not be possible now.
Anyone who in the opinion of this party of desperados was glad at Caesar's
death (and we all showed our delight without the faintest concealment)
will be considered by them as an enemy. This points to a large scale
massacre: neque enim iam licebit, quod Caesaris bello licuit, neque huc
neque illuc. Quemcumque enim haec pars perditorum laetatum Caesaris
 morte putabit (laetitiam autem apertissime tulimus omnes), hunc in
hostium numero habebit; quae res ad caedem maximam spectat'.[28]

Cicero's hopes revived at the beginning of May, when he received news that the
popular riots and protests in Rome - the spontaneous and genuine outpouring of popular
sympathy which Cicero termed an 'affectation of regret' for Caesar - had been forcefully
quashed by Dolabella.[29] He had previously been dubious about Dolabella's
allegiances, but this action confirmed him as a defender of the res publica.[30] Indeed,
Cicero reported that several people had associated Dolabella's actions and policy with
his own.[31] More than this, Dolabella seemed to have been able to unite the support of
the populace and the boni:

'In your case, and I dare say in yours only, the extreme of penal rigour has
brought not merely no odium but actual popularity, delighting the lower
orders as well as all honest folk: contigit enim tibi, quod haud scio an
nemini, ut summa severitas animadversionis non modo non invidiosa sed
etiam popularis esset et cum bonis omnibus tum infimo cuique
gratissim'.[32]

In all of this, Hirtius had been restrained and judicious. He advised Antony to
negotiate with the Liberators and had left Rome.[33] This led Syme to judge him (and
his colleague Pansa) as 'a worthy and innocuous pair'.[34] This seems, however, to
underrate the capabilities of the man, for to be able to hold in check a war, which Cicero
had immediately assumed was inevitable, was no small feat. Moreover, the idea that
Hirtius was 'innocuous' sits awkwardly with Velleius' assessment that it was Hirtius and
Pansa who counseled Caesar to hold by arms the position he had taken with arms.[35]
Such an assessment reflects, instead, Cicero's later view of the Consuls in a letter
written after the ascendancy of Caesar (Octavian) and the possibility for the
condemnation of Antony was beginning to be entertained.[36] In the heat of the
moment, when the Senate hesitated and Antony's position was gaining strength, Cicero's
judgment was quite different.

Cicero's assessment of Hirtius and the importance of Hirtius' support are revealed
in the letters he wrote to Atticus in May 44BCE. Throughout May, Cicero concerned
himself with the affairs of the Liberators. One of their chief concerns was that the
consuls designate be willing to support them when the Senate resumed meetings. Hirtius
and Pansa were with Cicero at Puteoli. Cicero did not care greatly for them and was
annoyed that they were demanding lessons in oratory from him.[37] Nonetheless it
placed him in a good position both to sound out their views and to impress upon them
the views of his political allies/friends, Brutus and Cassius.

There are five letters in the sequence, written throughout the month of May.
Atticus had explained that Brutus and Cassius wanted Cicero to act as an intermediary
and assure them of Hirtius' support. Cicero replied, 'you say that they [Brutus and
Cassius] want me to make a better republican out of Hirtius. Well, I am doing my best
and he speaks very fair: quod Hirtium per me meliorem fieri volunt, do equidem operam
et ille optime loquitur'.[38] Later that same day (11 May), Cicero had the opportunity to
write to his friend again: 'tomorrow I plan [to dine] at the house of Hirtius...That is how
I am planning to bring him over to the optimates: postridie apud Hirtium
cogitabam...sic hominem traducere ad optimates paro'.[39]

On 14 May, Hirtius dined at Cicero's house. Cicero discussed the meeting saying,
'as for my pupil who is dining with me this evening, he is greatly attached to that person
in whom our friend Brutus put his knife...'.[40] Consequently, Cicero believed, Hirtius
would be hostile to peace and would continue to proclaim what had by then become the
catch-cry of Caesar's supporters - a great man had been killed and the whole state was
plunged into chaos by his death.[41] Moreover, Cicero was afraid that Hirtius was
altogether too friendly with Balbus, and was likely to sympathize with his views.[42]
Hirtius was again the subject of an exchange of letters at the end of May, this time
between Cicero and Cassius. Cicero reported the content of this exchange to Atticus on
27-28 May: 'Cassius for his part begs and requests me to make Hirtius as good as I can.
Is he in his right mind, do you think? Cassius vero vehementer orat ac petit ut Hirtium
quam optimum faciam. Sanum putas?'[43] In a final, fragmentary, letter written on the
following day Cicero continued to express his doubts:

'Our friend Brutus has written (Cassius has as well) to ask me to make
Hirtius who has been sound so far' still sounder - I don't know that he has
been sound so far and have no confidence that he will be made any
sounder by my influence; he may be somewhat out of temper with Antony
but he's a firm friend of the cause... Cum ad me Brutus noster scripsisset et
 Cassius ut Hirtium, qui adhuc bonus fuisset <meliorem facerem, quem
neque adhuc bonum fuisse> sciebam, neque eum confidebam fore mea
auctoritate meliorem (Antonio est enim fortasse iratior, causae vero
amicissimus)...'[44]

From this we can gather the following: firstly, that Cicero and his correspondents
considered the support of Hirtius important if they were to gain the loyalty of the
wavering Senate; and secondly, that Hirtius would be a very hard man to persuade. He
was loyal not only to Caesar, but also to 'the cause' which Caesar had espoused, even to
the extent of supporting it when he did not support Antony, who claimed to be Caesar's
successor. The 'cause' is nowhere defined in the letter, but it is certainly arguable that it
is the political platform closely associated with Caesar, the 'cause' of a popularis
politician. The juxtaposition with boni throughout this letter and the preceding ones
confirms this.[45]

So there is, in these letters, clear and continuous evidence for a debate which is
present in Roman politics and which is manifest, not in the form of modern political
parties, but in the form of rival and competing ideologies, which were associated with
the terms optimates and populares. Cicero claims to be trying to make Hirtius an
optimas. Brutus and Cassius want Cicero to make him a bonus. Hirtius, however,
remained unconvinced and Cicero eventually despaired, claiming that the task was
impossible.[46]

The presence of such a debate has continued to be overlooked or rejected by many

modern scholars on the grounds that Roman politics was essentially non-ideological,
being largely concerned with 'the strife for power, wealth and glory' in which
personalities and family alliances counted for more than political platforms, ideals and
causes.[47] This evidence suggests, on the contrary, that ideological factors played an
important role in shaping, understanding and explaining contemporary events and
political interactions. More than this, however, the letters suggest that loyalty to
particular 'causes' could be deeply ingrained and could characterize one's participation
in political affairs in a way that went beyond personal alliances and allegiances.

Cicero is vague about how he might persuade Hirtius to become an optimas. The
suggestion is that simply giving him a good meal will be sufficient, but this is not
necessarily to be taken seriously. If Hirtius was 'deeply devoted' to Caesar, then what
arguments might Cicero have used to convince him to support Brutus and Cassius?
Some insight into the possible arguments that Cicero might have used for such a
purpose can be found by examining the letter that Cicero wrote to Dolabella.[48] The
Consul had once been an avid popularis and later became a supporter of Cicero's own
policies. He was also a pupil of Cicero's. In his circumstances and former loyalties, he is
not uncomparable to Hirtius.

In his letter to Dolabella, Cicero emphasized the glory that Dolabella had gained
and would continue to elicit if he were to continue in his present course. He praised
Dolabella's actions and the oratory which preceded them. He flattered himself that
Dolabella was credited with having followed his (Cicero's) advice and adhered to
Cicero's precepts. The language of the letter is the language of the current ideological
debate. Thus Cicero refers to Dolabella's gloria, his dignitas, his sapientia, all of which
must, in Cicero's view, lead Dolabella to support Brutus and Cassius. Thus, Cicero
exhorted Dolabella to continue to work for the future and good of Rome and of the res
publica, holding Brutus up as an example for him to emulate:

'So you have rescued Rome from danger and her inhabitants from fear. You
have done a vast deal of good, not only for the present occasion but as a
precedent for the future. Having done that you should understand that the
Republic rests upon your shoulders, and that those men from whose
initiative freedom has sprung are deserving not only of your protection but
of your favour: Liberasti igitur et urbem periculo et civitatem metu neque
solum ad tempus maximam utilitatem attulisti sed etiam ad exemplum. Quo
facto intellegere debes in te positam esse rem publicam tibique non modo
tuendos sed etiam ornandos esse illos viros a quibus initium libertatis
profectum est'.[49]

One final problem remains. In May, Cicero's summing up was that Hirtius was
unconvinced. Not only this - he was unconvinceable. Not all Cicero's eloquence, nor all
his persuasion could 'bleach the charcoal', as he confided to Atticus. How then can we
explain Cicero's final estimation of Hirtius as a vir bonus?[50] The key seems to be a
letter written to Atticus towards the end of June 44BCE.[51] In this letter, Cicero writes:
 'I don't doubt that Pansa speaks fair. I know that he has always been thick with
Hirtius, I think he [Pansa] is very amicably disposed towards Brutus and Cassius - if it
suits his book (but when is he going to see them?): Pansam bene loqui credo. Semper
enim coniunctum esse cum Hirtio scio; amicissimum Bruto et Cassio puto, si expediet
(sed quando illos videbit?)...'[52]

Ten days earlier, Cicero had praised Caesar (Octavian) for not trusting Hirtius and
Pansa, so how can this apparent change in his estimation of them be accounted for?[53]
The first thing to note is, of course, that the letter reveals Cicero's thoughts about what
Pansa will think and do, rather than Hirtius. Pansa, like Hirtius earlier, is beginning to
'speak fair'. Moreover, this need not imply a change in Pansa's fundamental ideological
position - as we have already noted, Hirtius could 'speak fair' and yet still be a 'firm
friend of the [popularis] cause'. More troubling, however, is Cicero's belief that Pansa
will simply do what is expedient. Does this necessarily mean that Pansa (and perhaps
even Hirtius) only subscribed to particular causes 'purely temporar[ily] in so far as they
promoted his own aggrandizement'.[54] I would submit that this is not the case. The
rapid deterioration of affairs in the Capital and the imminent threat posed by Antony
had, to a large extent, taken matters beyond the control of the Senate and had made
further ideological discussion difficult. Again, Cicero's letters make this clear. On 14
June Cicero received news of an alleged plot against the lives of the consuls.[55] The
next day, he wrote to Atticus, claiming that 'things seem to me to point to a massacre.
Frankly, I don't feel safe'.[56] By 20 June, Cicero's information was that 'the boni are
talking utter defeatism'.[57] Cicero was in despair. He complained that it was 'all Brutus'
fault' and that 'Antony is putting middle courses out of the question'.[58] Cicero was all
confusion - what should he do? What would others do? Which side would Pansa join if
it came to war?[59] Hirtius' falling out with Antony and his consistent attempts to take a
'middle course' placed him in an unenviable position. He was Consul at the time that the
Senate declared war on Antony and so it fell naturally to his lot to fight and die in the
defense of the res publica. There is no inconsistency with his popularis ideology in this
however and it is perhaps significant that Cicero did not choose to refer to him as a vir
bonus until after his death.

Roman politicians operated in an atmosphere of competition for honours, diverse

personal allegiances and alliances and under the constant pressure to win glory for
themselves and their families. So much has been generally accepted. What has been
consistently rejected by the orthodoxy in twentieth century scholarship, is that all of this
could take place against a backdrop of meaningful ideological debate. But Cicero and
his contemporaries did not live in a world devoid of political ideologies. On the
contrary, their letters indicate that ideologies and causes were central to Roman political
interactions.

Notes

[1] E.Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic, California University Press, Berkeley,
1974, p.2. I am indebted to Professor T.P.Wiseman for drawing my attention to this quote and to the
potential issues that it raised for contemporary scholarship. I am grateful also for his time and patience
reading drafts of this paper. I take responsibility for any mistakes herein expressed.

[2] J.Paterson, 'Politics in the Late Republic' in T.P.Wiseman (ed.) Roman Political Life Exeter
University Press, Exeter, 1985, p. 36.

[3] N.Mackie, 'Popularis Ideology and Popular Politics at Rome in the First Century BC',
Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie 135 (1992) 49-74 and T.P.Wiseman, 'Roman History and the
Ideological Vacuum', in T.P.Wiseman (ed.) Classics in Progress: Essays on Ancient Greece and Rome,
Proceedings of the British Academy (2002) ch 12: forthcoming. My thanks are due to Professor Wiseman
for allowing me to read this manuscript.

[4] Cicero, Pro Sestio 96: Loeb edition, 1958, translated by R.Gardner.

[5] Cicero, Pro Sestio 96.

[6] Cicero, Pro Sestio, 96.

[7] Cicero, Pro Sestio, 98.

[8] Cicero, Pro Sestio, 97 and Cicero, Philippics, II.xii.

[9] Some definition of 'ideology' for the purposes of this paper must be attempted. I am conscious
that 'ideology' is a word which carries a lot of 'baggage' for modern readers. In this paper, I do not intend
ideology to refer to a particular class consciousness, nor to any party political platform (codified or
otherwise). Instead, I would use the term loosely to refer to that 'closely related beliefs or ideas [and
interests]...characteristic of a group or community': J.Plamenatz, Ideology, London, 1970, 15.

[10] Cicero, Pro Sestio, 99-100.

 [11] Cicero, Pro Sestio, 97.

[12] The content of populares ideology has been discussed in R. Seager, 'Cicero and the Word
Popularis' , Classical Quarterly, 22 (1972) 328-339 at 331ff. See also Mackie, 'Popularis Ideology', p52-
60; Z. Yavetz Plebs and Princeps, Clarendon, Oxford, 1969, 75-6; P. Brunt, 'The Roman Mob', Past and
Present, 35 (1966) 3-28, pp25; P.Brunt, The Fall of the Roman Republic and related essays, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1988, chapter 6 'Libertas'; Ch. Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the
late Republic and early Principate, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968 chapter 2 'Optimates
and Populares'.

[13] Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome, p41ff. Also Yavetz, Plebs and Princeps,
p137.

[14] Seager, 'Cicero and the Word Popularis', pp 337f; Mackie, 'Popularis Ideology', pp54f. Note
that both Caesar and Augustus famously claimed to have been working to restore the res publica. Caesar,
Bellum Civile I.22; Augustus Res Gestae Divi Augustusi I.1; Velleius Paterculus, Roman History
II.lxxxix.3-4.

[15] Mackie, 'Popularis Ideology', pp 51ff and Wiseman, 'Ideological Vacuum', forthcoming. See
also Seager, 'Cicero and the Word Popularis', pp 335.

[16] Mackie, 'Popularis Ideology', pp 51ff and Seager, 'Cicero and the Word Popularis', pp 334-5.

[17] Cicero, De Domo Sua, XXIX.78 and Cicero, De Lege Agraria II.70-71.

[18] Cicero, De Lege Agraria II.70-71 with discussion by Seager, 'Cicero and the Word Popularis',
pp335; Mackie, 'Popularis Ideology', pp51f.

[19] Wiseman ('Ideological Vacuum') forthcoming.

[20] Mackie, 'Popularis Ideology', 68: 'So we are back with the problem of the populares own
motivation and with what has seemed to modern scholars the insuperable obstacle to the theory that the
populares were anything more than 'manipulators'. Populares were members of the senate and so they
must have been self-interested because they worked against the interests of the senate, that is of their own
group or class. Put clearly, this argument is breathtaking in the way it short-circuits the question of
motivation'.

[21] Cicero, De Officiis, I.85.

[22] Wiseman, 'Ideological Vacuum', forthcoming.

[23] R. Syme, Roman Revolution, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1939, p 97-8.
 [24] Nicolaus of Damascus, Life of Augustus, XXVII.106 Bristol Classical Press, translated by J.
Bellemore, 1984 with Syme, Roman Revolution p 97.

[25] Cicero, Ad Att XIV.9 Loeb edition, translated by D.R.Shackleton-Bailey, 1999.

[26] Cicero, Ad Att XIV.10.

[27] Cicero, Ad Att XIV.12.

[28] Cicero, Ad Att XIV.13.

[29] Cicero, Ad Att XIV.15: O mirificum Dolabellam meum!...sustulisse mihi videtur simulationem
desideri, adhuc quae serpebat in dies et inveterate verebar ne periculosa nostris tyrannoctonis esset'.

[30] Cicero, Ad Att XIV.15.

[31] Cicero, Ad Att XIV.17A.

[32] Cicero, Ad Att XIV.17A. The importance of being able to have the support of both sections of
the population in Rome was a constant theme in Cicero's thinking.

[33] Cicero, Ad Att XIV.17A.

[34] Syme, Roman Revolution, p163.

[35] Velleius Paterculus, History of Rome II.lvii.1.

[36] Cicero, Ad Fam XVI.xxvii.

[37] Cicero, Ad Att XIV.12.

[38] Cicero, Ad Att XIV.20.

[39] Cicero, Ad Att XIV.21.

[40] Cicero, Ad Att XIV.22.

[41] Cicero, Ad Att XIV.22 and Dio, Roman History XLVII.42.4-5 which seems to reflect the
contemporary slogans of Caesar's supporters.

[42] Cicero, Ad Att XIV.20 and XIV.21.

[43] Cicero, Ad Att XV.5: 'Cassius vero vehementer orat ac petit ut Hirtium quam optimum faciam.
sunam putas?'
 [44] Cicero, Ad Att XV.6.

[45] Seager, 'Cicero and the Word Popularis', pp330; see also Cicero, de Legibus III.35 and de
Republica frag. Nonius 519.14 for examples of other juxtapositions between boni and popularis.

[46] Cicero, Ad Att XV.5. Shackleton-Bailey gives a translation of the idiomatic Greek phrase as
'the fuller [cannot bleach] charcoal'.

[47] Syme, Roman Revolution, p 11.

[48] Cicero, Ad Att XIV.17A.

[49] Cicero, Ad Att XIV.17A.

[50] Cicero, Ad Brut VIII. Mirrored in Plutarch, Life of Cicero XLIII.2.

[51] Cicero Ad Att XV.22.

[52] Cicero Ad Att XV.22.

[53] Cicero, Ad Att XV.12

[54] Paterson, 'Politics in the Late Republic', p36.

[55] Cicero, Ad Att XV.17

[56] Cicero, Ad Att XV.18.

[57] Cicero, Ad Att XV.20.

[58] Cicero, Ad Att XV.20

[59] Cicero, Ad Att XV.22; XV.23.