Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
TEAM CODE A . 23
MRS AJITHA...APPELLANT
VS.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONSIV
LIST OF AUTHORITIES...V
CONSTITUTIONS..V
ACTS, CODES AND STATUTES.V
INDIAN CASES.V
FOREIGN CASES...VIII
BOOKS REFERRED....VII
DICTIONARIES......VIII
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.IX
STATEMENT OF FACT..X
QUESTION PRESENTED.XIII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT XIV
ARGUMENT ADVANCED1 TO 18
1) Whether the Honble High Court was justified in refusing the exercise its powers under
Sec. 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973...............................................................1
a) There was miscarriage of justice by the Ld. Sessions Court overlooked by the Honble
High Court...................................................................................1
i) High Court can interfere in the exceptional case..2
ii) Charges framed against Ajitha on the basis of confessional statement of
Guruprasad2
iii) Confession Made in police custody is inadmissible.3
iv) Materials must be looked into, at the stage of framing of charges4
b) Error in framing of charge as no material produced by the police5
c) Honble High Court can interfere in the finding of Ld. Sessions Court6
2) Whether Non Speaking order can be sustained in law..........................................................7
a) Obligation on the High Court to give reasons for its judgment7
i) Failure to give reason amounts to denial of justice9
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
&
And
Paragraph
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
AIR
AllIndianReporter
Cr LJ
ed.
Edition
SCC
SupremeCourtCases
Sec.
Section
SCR
SupplementaryConceptRecord
vs..
versus
Mad.
Madras
Ori.
Orissa
Ors
Others
Lrs
Legal Representatives
A.P.
Andhra Pradesh
Cal
Calcutta
Anrs.
Others
U.P
Uttar Pradesh
Ald.
Allahabad
Ibid
ibidem
Vol
Volume
LIST
OF AUTHORITIES
CONSTITUTIONS
1- TheConstitutionof India,1950.
ACTS, CODE AND STATUTES
1- Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973
2- Indian Evidence Act, 1872
3- Indian Penal Code, 1860
INDIAN CASES
1. Amar Chand Aggrawalavs.Santi Bose [AIR 1973 SC 799]
2. BaburaoHariPawarvs. State of Maharas00000000000
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9. +++00tra[1987 Cr LJ 584 (Bom.)]..
10. Balbeer Singh vs. State of Punjab[AIR 1957 SC 126]..
11. Balbir Singh vs. State of Punjab[AIR 1956 SC 256].
12. Bhimavs..Parmanandai [1972 CrLJ 820 (Ori.)]
13. BhuboniSahuvs.TheKing[AIR 1949 PC 257]
14. BibhutiBhusan Das Gupta and Anr. vs.State of West Bengal [(1969) 2 SCR 171].
15. BudharmalKalanivs. State of Maharastra [(1998) 7 SCC 337]..
16. Chandra Kant ChimanLal Desai vs. State of Gujrat[(1992) 1 SCC 474]..
17. ChinnaSwamyvs. State of A.P.[AIR 1962 SC 1788]..
18. Devendra Prasad Tiwaryvs. State of UP[AIR 1978 SC 1544]
19. DhuleshwarBeheravs. State[1982 Cr LJ 2346 (Ori.)]
20. HaricharanKurmivs. State of Bihar[AIR 1964 SC 1184]..
21. Ibrahim vs.Regem[1914 AC 599]
22. JagannathChoudhary and Ors. vs.Ramayan Singh and Anr[(2002) 5 SCC 659]..
23. Jagtamba Devivs.Hem Ram and Ors[(2008) 3 SCC 509].
24. JayawantDattatraySuryaraovs. State of Maharashtra[(2001) 10 SCC 109]
25. Kalawativs. State of Himanchal Pradesh[1953 SCR 546]..
26. Kalu Ram and Anrsvs. State of Delhi[(2006) 5 SCC 674]
27. Kashmira Singh vs.The State of Madhya Pradesh[AIR 1952 SC 159]...
28. Kedar Singh vs. State[(1988) 3 SCC 609].
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
FOREIGN CASES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
BOOKS REFERRED
1.
C.K.Thakkar
Takwani,
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure
(3rd
Ed.,
Lexis
Chief Justice M. Monir, Law of Evidence (14th edition, Universal Law Publishing House
New Delhi, 2006).
5.
D.D.Basu, Commentary on Constitution of India (8th ed., Wadhwa and Company, Nagpur,
2010).
6.
7.
H.M.Seervai, Constitutional Law of India(4th ed. Universal Publishing House, New Delhi,
2007).
8.
I.P. Massey, Administrative Law(7th ed. Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 2008).
3.
4.
Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, V.R.Manohar, Ratanlal And Dhirajlal, The Law Of Evidence (22nd
Ed., Wadhwa and Company, Nagpur, 2007).
DICTIONARIES
th
1. Brayan A. Garner, Blackslaw dictionary(9 ed. Thomson West,2009).
nd
USA, 1983).
3. P. RamnathaIyer, The Major Law Lexicon (4th ed. Vol. 6, Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa,
Nagpur, 2010).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The appellant has approached to the Honble Supreme Court of India through Article 136 of the
Constitution of India, 1950. The matter is now posted for the final hearing before the Honble
Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I
Ajay Kumar worked as an Investment Banker at the New Delhi office of MNC Inc. He was
married to one Ms. Ajitha, who was once his secretary at the MNC Inc. However, after about 2
years of their marriage, there were rumours about Ms. Ajitha having illicit affair with one Mr.
Guruprasad, who also worked at MNC Inc., This led to immense friction between Ajay and Ms.
Ajitha, which consequently resulted in Ajitha moving out of the matrimonial house and living
separately in a rented house at JorBagh, New Delhi. Thereafter she filed for divorce, before the
10
Family Court, Saket Court Complex, New Delhi, alleging cruelty and Ajay have an illicit
relationship with other women.
II
It was during the pendency of the said divorce petition that on the morning i.e. on January 09,
2011, Ajay was found dead with bullet wounds on his chest and his body was dumped near
Chattarpur Farms. The police recorded an FIR under various section of IPC 1860 against
unknown persons and began investigation. Upon questioning the relatives and neighbours of
Ajay, including Ajitha, the Investigating Officer came to know about the pending divorce case
and also about the alleged illicit relationship between Ms. Ajitha and Mr. Guruprasad. The Police
arrested Ms. Ajitha and Mr. Guruprasad as suspects and were granted a 14 days police custody
by the Court.
III
During interrogation, Ms. Ajitha claimed that she was visiting her parents in Rajkot from January
5 to 9, 2011, and had returned only on the evening of January 09, 2011. She showed her flight
tickets as well as the boarding pass issued by the airline as a proof of her defence of alibi. Mr.
Guruprasad however, on the other hand, offered to turn approver for the prosecution and gave a
statement before the Investigating Officer stating therein that it was he who had shot Ajay with a
gun given to him by Ms. Ajitha and that she had helped him dispose off the body in Ajays car.
He made the statement that I was visiting Ajithas residence where unfortunately Ajay arrived
and saw us (Ajitha and me) in a compromising position after which a heated argument ensued
between Ajay and Ajitha. Ajitha, apprehending to save herself pulled out a revolver from her
drawer, and gave it to me and told me to shoot Ajay. Seeing this, Ajay grabbed a table lamp that
was near his right hand and headed towards me in an intimidating manner. I, fearing the safety of
my own and Ajithas life, shot 3(three) bullets at Ajay, immediately after which he collapsed on
the ground. After assuring ourselves that Ajay was dead, we dragged his body into his own car,
which I drove to Chhatarpur Farms, followed by Ajitha who drove my car. We dumped the dead
body of Ajay along with the weapon and the car at a secluded location at Chattarpur Farms, and
returned to Ajithas house in my car.
11
IV
The above statement though made in police custody, was made in the presence of a Magistrate.
The Police searched the area where the body of Ajay was found but could not recover any
weapon from there or from the residence of Mr. Guruprasad& Ms. Ajitha. Further, only a single
tyre mark was found at the place where Ajays body was found. The Police also could not
recover the table-lamp, which according to Mr. Guruprasad was grabbed by Ajay as a weapon to
assault him. Also no other finger prints were found inside Ajays car except his own. Basing its
entire case on the confessional statement made by Mr. Guruprasad, the Police filed a chargesheet against Ms. Ajitha before the Magistrate.
V
Upon committal and placing the case for framing of charges against Ms. Ajitha, Mr. Guruprasad
retracted from his statement and claimed to be innocent of all the charges levelled against him in
the charge-sheet, and demanded that he be put to trial. Similarly, even Ms. Ajitha denied all the
charges and claimed innocence. After hearing the prosecution and the defence counsel, the Ld.
Sessions Court recalled the conditional pardon and directed the framing of the following charges
against the both accused persons.
VI
Ms. Ajitha preferred a petition for quashing of the charges framed by the Ld. Sessions Court
before the Honble High Court of Delhi under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973. The Honble High Court dismissed the same after hearing arguments submitted by both,
the petitioner Ms. Ajitha as well as the Government Counsel representing the respondent, State
of Delhi NCT. The said petition was dismissed by a non-speaking order and no reasons were
given for the dismissal of the same.
VII
Ms. Ajitha has now filed a special leave petition before the Honble Supreme Court of India
challenging the order of the Honble Delhi High Court, whereby the petition of Ms. Ajitha came
to be dismissed. The Honble Apex Court was pleased to grant special leave to appeal and the
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
12
parties filed their respective pleadings. The matter is now posted for final arguments before the
Honble Supreme Court.
QUESTION PRESENTED
I.
II.
13
III.
IV.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1- The Honble High Court was not justified in refusing to exercise its powers under
Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
It is humbly submitted by the appellant the Honble High Court was not justified in refusing its
power under Section 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure. It is submitted that High Court can
interfere with the finding of the lower court in exceptional case, when there is the miscarriage of
14
justice is done by the lower court. In the instant case there is miscarriage of justice done by the
lower court by overlooking the materials produced by the appellant and charging solely on the
basis of confessional statement of the another accused without any other independent evidences
and materials against the appellant.
2- A non-speaking order cannot be sustained in law.
It is humbly submitted by the appellant that a non-speaking order cannot be sustained in law. It is
humbly submitted by the appellant that the High Court has an obligation to give reasons for its
finding, which in the instant case was not done by the Honble High Court of Delhi. Not giving
reasons for its finding amounts to the denial of justice, this in the instant case was done to the
appellant. It is also pleaded by the appellant that there are very serious issues in the instant case
which was overlooked by the Honble High Court without giving any reasons, thus justice was
denied to the appellant in the instant case. Giving Non- speaking order amounts to infringement
of the natural justice enshrined in the Constitution of India, 1950.
3- Confession of an approver can be retracted at the stage of S 227/228 of CrPC.
It is humbly submitted by the appellant that the confession made by approver can be retracted at
the stage of S 227/228 of CrPC. It is prayed by the appellant that approver can retract at the stage
of S 227/228 of CrPC, it is the fundamental right of a person to not to give self incriminating
statement. In the instant case as the statement given by the approver was not voluntary and was
incriminating him, he has all right to retract at the stage of framing of charge when the
opportunity is provided to him. it is also submitted that approver can retract, but by retracting his
statement he loses his right of approver when a decision is delivered against him.
4- A retracted confession by an approver may not be used as evidence against the other
accused.
It is humbly submitted by the appellant that a retracted confession of an approver maynot be used
as evidence against the other accused. It is prayed by the appellant that the retracted confession is
a weak type of the evidence and cannot be used against the other accused without full
corroboration with the other independent evidence. In the instant case the retracted confession
15
was used against the other accused without the corroboration with other independent evidence,
also in the instant case the approver Guruprasads confession was neither true nor made
voluntary, hence it cannot be used against the appellant Ajitha.
ARGUMENT ADVANCED
1- Whether the Honble High Court was justified in refusing the exercise its powers
under Sec. 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?
It is humbly submitted by the Appellant that the Honble High Court was not justified by not
exercising its power under section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
a- There was a miscarriage of justice made by the ld. Session Court.
It is submitted by the appellant that there was a miscarriage of justice made by the ld. session
court and subsequently over looked by the High Court. The Honble Supreme Court in plethora
of the cases ruled that High Court must exercise its revisional power under section 401 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In the case ofJagannathChoudhary and Ors.Vs..Ramayan
Singh and Anr1 it was pointed out by the apex court that the object of the revisional jurisdiction
Under Section 401 is to confer power upon superior Criminal Courts-a kind of paternal or
supervisory jurisdiction-in order to correct a miscarriage of justice arising from a misconception
of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper precaution or ostensible harshness of
treatment which has resulted, on the one hand or on the other in some undeserved hardship to
individuals. In the case of Krishnan and AnrVs..Krishnaveni and Anr 2 Supreme Court observed
that theSection 401 is to call for the records of any inferior Criminal Court and to examine the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to
the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court and to pass appropriate orders. In this
case the court further reiterated that the revisional power of the High Court merely conserves the
power of the High Court to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognized rules of
criminal jurisprudence and that its subordinates courts do not exceed the jurisdiction or abuse
the power vested in them under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of the inferior
Criminal Courts or to prevent miscarriage of justice. Section 401, upon the High Court is to
1(2002)5 SCC 659.
2(1997) 4 SCC 241.
It is submitted by the appellant that the Honble High court was not justified in not interfering
with the order of the lower court. In the case of Thakur Das (Dead) By Lrs.Vs.State of Madhya
Pradesh and Anr.3,The revisional jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court can be exercised in
exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a
manifest illegality or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. The apex court in the case
of Amar Chand Aggrawalavs..Santi Bose4ruled out that where there is glaring defect in the
procedure or there is a manifest error of law and consequently there has been a flagrant
miscarriage of justice, the High Court can exercise its revisional power.
ii-
It is humbly prayed that the Ajitha was charged only on the basis of the confessional statement of
the Guruprasad, who confessed his guilt, but the Honble Supreme Court in the cases ruled that
the confessional statement of an accused cannot be the sole basis of porthole garment of any
proceeding against the another accused. In the case of Chandra Kant ChimanLal Desai vs. State
of Gujrat5 it was held by the apex court that the confession of an accused cannot be made the
foundation of the conviction of another accused. The apex court again in the case of Kedar Singh
3(1978)1 SCC 27.
4AIR 1973 SC 799.
5(1992) 1 SCC 477.
vs. State6 held that in the absence of any strong, reliable and trustworthy evidence such
confession of an accused cannot be used against the another accused in a conspiracy case.in the
case of Siddharthvs. State of Bihar7 where the accused in his confessional statement mentioned
the name of the co-accused as his co-conspirator, but being there no independent evidence, the
co-accused was held not guilty. In Kashmira Singh vs.. The State of Madhya Pradesh 8wherein
the Supreme Court observed and laid down that the confession of an accused person is not
evidence in the ordinary sense of the term as defined in S3. It cannot be made the foundation of a
conviction and can only be used in support of other evidence. The proper way is, first, to marshal
the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see
whether, if it is believed a conviction could safely be based on it. In the case of Balbeer Singh vs.
State of Punjab9 it was said that where the accused made the confession and it appeared by
reading that confession that he is really trying to throw blame upon the other, then such
confession cannot be relied upon and cannot be used against the other accused. In the case of
Sawarn Singh Rattan Singh vs. State of Punjab 10it was held that the reliability of the approver's
evidence against a particular accused may be shaken if the approvers account against the
another accused is discrepant. In the case of DhuleshwarBeheravs. State11 it was held that a court
should not act upon the confession of the accused, which is later retracted, against the co accused
without the strongest and fullest corroboration. In another case of Sugumaranvs. State 12it was
held by the Madras High Court that a confession of an accused cannot be used against the
6(1988) 3 SCC 609.
7(2005) 12 SCC 545.
8AIR 1952 SC 159.
9AIR 1957 SC 126.
10AIR 1956 SC 537.
111982 Cr LJ 2346 (Ori.).
121987 (2) Crimes 691, 693 (Mad.).
another accused. In the case13 it was held that the satisfaction of the court as regard to the
existence of the conspiracy must be based upon the some other independent evidences and not by
the virtue of the confessional statement of another accused. In the case of Ram Tossa vs. State of
Assam14 it was held that the confession of an accused is not a substantive piece of evidence on
which can rest the entire foundation for the conviction of the accused, who is not the maker of
the confession. In thence, the confessional statement made by the Guruprasad became the sole
foundation garment of the conviction of Ajitha. Hence, this allowed the conferring of blame upon
Ajitha. It was overlooked by the Ld. Sessions Court and subsequently traced by the Honble
High Court. But in principal, this confessional statement cannot become the sole garment of
encapsulatingAjitha.
iii-
It is humbly submitted by the appellant that the confession made in police custody is
inadmissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 26 deals with a confession made by a
person in the custody of police, in the presence of magistrate, it is to be noted that the
expression used is in the presence of magistrate and not to a magistrate. For instance a
confession may be made to a police officer or any other person in the presence of the magistrate
and not to the magistrate, if it is so it comes under the ambit of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872, even though it is made in the presence of the magistrate and the Section 26 would not
apply. 15
iv-
It is humbly submitted by the appellant that the trial court must consider the material placed
before it at the stage of framing the charge, which may also include the plea of alibi, but in the
instant case was overlooked by the Ld. Session court subsequently by the Honble High Court. In
SatishMehra vs. Delhi Administration and Anr ,16 a two judge bench judgment, it was observed
that if the accused succeeds in producing any reliable material at the stage of taking cognizance
or framing of charge which might fatally affect even the very sustainability of the case, it is
unjust to suggest that no such material should be looked into by the court at that stage. It was
held that the object of providing an opportunity to the accused of making submissions as
envisaged in Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'the Code') is to
enable the court to decide whether it is necessary to proceed to conduct the trial. If the materials
produced by the accused at the earlier stage would clinch the issue. Why the court should shut it
out, saying that such documents need be produced only after wasting a lot more time in the name
of trial proceedings. It was further observed that there is nothing in the Code which shrinks the
scope of such audience to oral arguments and, therefore, the trial court would be within its power
to consider even material which the accused may produce at the stage contemplated in Section
227 of the Code. In Superintendent and Remembrancer of legal Affairs, West Bengal vs. Anil
Kumar Bhunja and Anrs.17, a three-judge bench held that the Magistrate at the stage of framing
charges had to see whether the facts alleged and sought to be proved by the prosecution prima
facie disclose the commission of offence on general consideration of the materials placed before
him (emphasis supplied). Though in this case the specific question whether an accused at the
stage of framing of charge has a right to produce any material was not considered as such, but
that seems implicit when it was held that the Magistrate had to consider material placed before it
by the investigating police officer.
b- Error in framing of charge as no material produced by the police
It is prayed before the Honble Court that there was error in framing the charge by the Ld.
Session Court, which was subsequently overlooked by the Honble High Court. It is submitted
by the appellant that at the stage of framing the charges the material placed by the accused and
by the police or investigating agency must be looked after, and after considering those
materials there is no strong ground to frame the charge, the accused must be discharged.
16(1996) 9 SCC 766.
171979 Cr LJ1390.
used to frame a charge against the other accused unless there are some other evidences for the
purpose. Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that If, upon considering the
police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination,
if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and
the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the
accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing.
InSheoraj Singh Ahlawat and Ors.vs.State of U.P. And Anr.19It is trite that at the stage of
framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a
view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the
existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offense. In State of Maharashtra
vs..PriyaSharanMaharaj and Ors20it was held that in Sections 227 and 228 stage the court is
required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the
facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients
constituting the alleged offense In State Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad and Anr. v. P.
Suryaprakasam21where considering the scope of Sections 239 and 240 of the Code it was held
that at the time of framing of charge, what the trial court is required to, and can consider is the
police report referred to under Section 173 of the Code and the documents sent with it.
c- Honble High Court can interfere in the finding of Ld. Session Court
It is humbly prayed that the Honble High Court can interfere with the finding of the trial
court, in the order of framing of charges but the Honble High Court didnt exercise its power.
In the case of Shankaranvs.. State of Delhi22 it was held that the High Court may revise the trial
Courts finding if there has been an error in framing the charge. In another case of State of
Karnataka vs.. L. Muniswami23it was held that where the accused is no- where concerned to the
incident, the Honble High Court in the revision would quash the proceeding against the
accused. In the instant case same is with the appellant as she pleads the plea of alibi as she was
out of town at the time of the incident, hence Honble High Court should have quashed the
charge against her which was not made by the Honble High Court. In the case of
ChinnaSwamyvs. State of A.P.24it was held that the Honble High Court would be justified in
interfering in cases such as (1) where the trial court had wrongly shut out evidence sought to
be adduced by the prosecution, (2) where the appeallate court had wrongly held evidence
admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, (3) where material evidence has been overlooked
either by the trial court or the court of appeal. In another case of R.B. Mithanivs. State of
Maharastra25it was held that a court of revision can take into consideration the further
evidence or order in the interest of the justice. In the another case of Bhimavs.Parmananda26it
was held that when the lower court commits serious illegality, omits to consider evidence and
bases its order upon inadmissible evidence, then revision court may disturb the finding of the
lower court. Thereof, the evidences and the materials which were produced like plea of alibi
and other was overlooked by the sessions court and subsequently by the Honble high court as
well. There being no findings of other evidences which could cement the base of evidence like
confession of Guruprasad which was made the garment in charging Ajitha. Hence, by not
interfering in the finding of Ld. Session court the Honble high court traced the miscarriage of
justice likewise the session court, charges should have been discharged as no materials were
22(1990) Cr LJ 550 (Del).
23(1997) 2 SCC 699.
24AIR 1962 SC 1788.
25AIR 1971 SC 1630.
261972 Cr LJ 820 (Ori).
produced to cement other evidences. Ergo, the miscarriage of justice being done by not
complying by the procedure this would have resulted in natural justice.
Supreme Court that High Court have made an error in passing the order without any reason,
hence it cannot be sustained and Apex Court in this case ordered High Court to reconsider the
matter. In the case of Rajeshwarivs.PuranIndoria30Supreme Court held that where a matter
involves the any substantial question of law or expressed any view on any of the aspects on the
merits of the case, High Court is not justified in passing a non speaking order. In another case of
U.P. AvasEvamVikasParishadVs..SheoNarainKushwaha and Ors31it was held by the Apex Court
that unless the order is reasoned, there will be no way of knowing whether the Appellate Court
has examined the appeal before deciding that it did not deserve admission. As a limited right to
appeal to Supreme Court is available against the appellate judgments of the High Court, unless
there are reasons in the order of dismissal, it will not be possible for the Supreme Court to
examine whether the High Court has rightly rejected the appeal. Thus it is an obligation upon the
High Court to give a concrete reason for its order. Apex Court in the case of State of
U.P.vs..ShriKishan32 held thatsince all these aspects have not been noted by the High Court and
by practically unreasoned order the matter was disposed off in the most unsatisfactory manner
High Court must reconsider the case.
In the instant case, Honble High Court of Delhi, dismissed the petition of the appellant through
a non- speaking order and without any reason. It was an obligation over the High Court to give
the reasons for dismissing petition as it involves substantive question of law as proper framing of
charge against Ajitha and involvement of Ajitha in the Murder of Ajay and there was many facts
like no material and independent evidences against Ajitha which need to be decided on merit, but
the trial court as well as Hon,ble High Court overlooked that very aspect. Hence it is humbly
prayed by the appellant to the Honble court to consider the matter as the Honble High Court
did not fulfilled its obligation to give the reason for dismissing the petition.
i-
10
It is submitted before the Honble Court that justice was decide to the appellant by deciding the
matter without giving any reason. Deciding any matter, without giving any reason amounts to
the denial of justice. Delhi High Court in R.S Bhagat vs. Union of India33ruled out that passing
a Non speaking order without recording the special finding amounts to the miscarriage of
justice. Lord Denning in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union34observed that "The giving
of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration, failing which amounts to denial
of justice. In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree35it was observed: "Failure to
give reasons amounts to denial of justice". Reasons are live links between the mind of the
decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at".
Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the
decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by its silence, render it virtually
impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial
review in adjudging the validity of the decision.
It is highly submitted by the appellant that by passing a non speaking order, Honble High
Court has denied the justice to Ajitha in the instant case. There was gross miscarriage of justice
which was done by the Honble High Court. It has breached the fundamentals of good
administration. Justice has been denied to the appellant by the Honble High Court by deciding
the issue through non speaking order.
b- To give speaking order is the requirement for natural justice.
It is humbly submitted on behalf of the appellant that to give reason is the basic requirement of
Natural Justice enshrined in the Constitution of India, 1950. In Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of
India, 36Reasons are the link betweenthe order and the mind of the maker. Reasoned Decision
33(1980) ILR Delhi1422.
341971 (1) All E.R. 1148.
351974 LCR 120.
36(1978) 1 SCC 248.
11
also involves the question of procedural fairness. A law which allows any administrative
authority to take decision affecting the right of the people without assigning any reason cannot
be accepted as lying down the procedure which is fair just and reasonable and hence would be
violative of article 14 and article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Supreme Court in Siemens
Engg.& Mfg. Co. vs. Union of India37reiterated that requirement of reasons may also be implied
in the principle of Natural Justice. In S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India38 , the Apex Court
observed that unless the requirement has been dispensed with, any authority exercising judicial
or quasi- judicial functions must record its reasons in support of its decision because it facilitates
the exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, act as a deterrent against the arbitrary exercise
of power and satisfies the party against whom the order is made. In Managing Director, United
Commercial Bank vs. P.C. Kakkar 39, the HonbleSupreme Court said that courts must give
reasons for its order because reasons substitute subjectivity with objectivity and Right to Reason
is the indispensible part of the sound Judicial System and one of the statutory requirement of
Natural justice.
In the instant case, Honble High Court has passed the non speaking order and thus the principles
of natural justice were denied to her. The Fundamental Right of the appellant was also abrogated
by the Honble High Court. By giving anon speaking order, the Honble High Court has
exercised its power arbitrarily and thus justice was denied to the appellant. The High Court by
not giving the reasons has breached the statuary requirement of the natural justice and thus
affected the fundamental right of the appellant.
c- Serious matter overlooked by the Hon,ble High Court without giving any reason.
In the case of KuldipKaurVs..Surinder Singh and Anr40 where a Non Speaking order was passed
by the Honble High Court without giving any reason in a serious matter filed by a helpless
37(1976) 2 SCC 981.
38(1990) 4 SCC 594.
39(2003) 4 SCC 364.
40(1989)1SCC405.
12
women, it was held by the Hon.ble Supreme court that We fail to comprehend how such an
important question arising in the context of the petition preferred by a helpless woman could
have been summarily rejected by the High Court by a non-speaking order. To say the least of it, it
betrays total lack of sensitivity on the part of the High Court. Were it not so, the High Court
would have at least passed a speaking order unfolding the rational process.
In the instant case there involve a serious matter to look after and to consider. The appellant
Ajitha has been falsely trapped into the cobweb of charge which werelevelled against her and
Honble High Court by dismissing her petition to review the lower court order for framing the
charge acted as a idle spectator. High court dismissed the petition without giving any reason, in a
serious matter. Thus there was a gross irregularity on the part of the High Court to decide the
matter without giving any reason.
3- Whether confession of an approver can be retracted and in what manner at the
stage of S 227/228 of Cr PC?
a- Approver can retract at the stage of framing of charge.
It is humbly submitted by the appellant that the approver can retract the stage of framing of
charge, under certain conditions which must be fulfilled.
i-
It is submitted by the appellant that the confession made by the approver in the police custody
was not voluntary, hence approver can retract at the stage of section 227 and section 228 of the
Cr PC, which is the charge framing stage. In the English case of State v. Mullin41'Voluntary', was
defined as a statement made of the free will and accord of accused, without coercion, whether
from fear of any threat of harm, promise, or inducement or any hope of reward. Lord Sumner in
Ibrahim v. Regem42 said, "it has long been established as a positive rule of English criminal law
that no statement by an accused is admissible in evidence against him unless it is shown by the
prosecution to be a voluntary statement, in the sense that it has not been obtained from him either
by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercise or held out by a person in authority. About the
4185 NW 2nd 598, 600, 249 lown 10.
42(1914) AC 599.
13
voluntary nature of confession in the leading case of NandaniSatpathyvs. P.L. Dani43 it was
pointed out by the Apex Court that it is evidence procured not merely by physical threat or
promise or violence, but also psychic torture, atmospheric pressure, environmental coercion,
tiring interrogative prolixity, overbearing and intimidatory methods. It was held that any mode of
pressure, subtle or crude, mental or physical, direct or indirect, but sufficiently substantial
applied by the police officer to obtain information from an accused strongly suggestive of guilt
become compulsion. In the case of Shankariavs. State of Rajasthan 44 court opined that in order
to ascertain that whether the confession is voluntary or not, If the confession appears to the Court
to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise such as is mentioned in Section 24,
Evidence Act, it must be excluded and rejected. In such a case, the question of proceeding further
to apply the second test does not arise. If the first test is satisfied, the Court must before acting
upon the confession reach the finding that what is stated therein is true and reliable. For judging
the reliability of such a confession, or for that matter of any substantive piece of evidence there is
no rigid canon of universal application. Even so, one broad method which may be useful in most
cases for evaluating a confession, may be indicated. The Court should carefully examine the
confession and compare it with the rest of the evidence, in the light of the surrounding
circumstances and probabilities of the case. If on such examination and comparison, the
confession appears to be a probable catalogue of events and naturally fits in with the rest of the
evidence and the surrounding circumstances, it may be taken to have satisfied the second test and
it failed to do so it cannot be relied upon as it is of involuntary in nature. In the another case of
Nazir Khan and Anrsvs. State of Delhi45it was held that the crux of making a statement
voluntarily is, what is intentional, intended, unimpelled by other influences, acting on one's own
will, through his own conscience. Such confessional statements are made mostly out of a thirst to
speak the truth which at a given time predominates in the heart of the confessor which impels
him to speak out the truth. Internal compulsion of the conscience to speak out the truth normally
43AIR 1978 SC 1025.
44(1978) 4 SCC 453.
45(2003) 8 SCC 461.
14
emerges when one is in despondency or in a perilous situation when he wants to shed his cloak
of guilt and nothing but disclosing the truth would dawn on him. It sometimes becomes so
powerful that he is ready to face all consequences for clearing his heart. In the case
ofKusumaAnkamaRaoVs..State of Andhra Pradesh46 An involuntary confession is one which is
not the result of the free will of the maker of it. So where the statement is made as a result of
harassment and continuous interrogation for several hours after the person is treated as an
offender and accused, such statement must be regarded as involuntary. The inducement may take
the form of a promise or of a threat, and often the inducement involves both promise and threat, a
promise of forgiveness if disclosure is made and threat of prosecution if it is not. In the case of
Devendra Prasad Tiwaryvs. State of UP 47it was pointed out that where confessional statement
suffer from the the serious infirmities in that, the magistrate did not question the accused as why
he was making the confession, and there is nothing on record to show that all the requirements of
section 164 Cr PC were fulfilled , that confessional statement cannot be relied upon as it lacks
the voluntariness of the accused to make such confession. In the case of Mahabir Singh vs. State
of Haryana
48
it was pointed out that where confessional statement neither points out any
warning against the making of the confession, nor does it shows that confession was made
voluntarily, the confessional statement cannot be used against the accused and the court will
presume that the confession was involuntary one. In the case of JayawantDattatraySuryaraovs..
State of Maharashtra49 and also in the case of Nazir Khan50it was held that that the initial burden
of proving that confession recorded was voluntary is upon the prosecution. In the case of R vs.
Thomson
51
it was held that it is on prosecution to show that the confession recorded was
15
In the instant case, the confessional statement made by the Guruprasad was made as an approver,
hence there was a promise of pardon and thus it can be said that it was not voluntary and he can
retract from his confessional statement. Moreover, Guruprasads confessional statement was
made in the police custody, though it was made in the presence of the magistrate but there was
still some sort of atmospheric pressure or environmental coercion of police officials hence the
confessional statement made by the approver was not voluntary and Guruprasad can retract. In
the instant case, there are no materials on record to show that the Guruprasad made his
confession voluntarily and it is burden upon the prosecution to prove that it was voluntary and
court will presume that it was not voluntary. Thus, confessional statement not being voluntary,
Guruprasad can retract.
b- Fundamental Right of the accused to retract
It is submitted by the appellant that it is the Fundamental Rights of a person under Article 20 (3)
of Indian Constitution, 1950 that no person can be compelled to give witness against himself. If
he is compelled to do so the fundamental right of that person would be abrogated. In the case of
Kalawativs. State of Himanchal Pradesh52 it was pointed out that Article 20(3) of the Indian
constitution provides the right to retract the confession by an accused it it is taken involuntarily
by the accused. The Honble Supreme Court, in State of Tamil Nadu Vs..Kutty alias Lakshmi
Narashinhan53 observed that to retract from confession is the right of the confessor and all the
accused against confessions were produced by the prosecution have invariably adopted that right.
It would be injudicious to jettison a judicial confession on the mere premise that its maker has
retracted from it. The Court has a duty to evaluate the evidence concerning the confession by
looking at all aspects.
In the instant case, Guruprasad did not made his statement voluntarily, hence he has all right to
retract from his statement which was involuntary. Article 20(3) will come into the picture to
51(1836) 1 Mood CC 465.
521953 SCR 546.
53( 2001 ) 6 SCC 550.
16
safeguard his interest for not giving self-incriminatingstatement, hence Guruprasad can retract
from his confessional statement.
c- Retraction can be made at the time of framing charge when accused is given
opportunity.
It is humbly submitted on behalf of the appellant that the approver can retract at the stageof
framing of charge. Section 228(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure laid down the provision that
judge,at this stage shall ask the accused whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or
claimed to be tried. In the instant case was same happened Guruprasad pleads the Guilty of the
offence at the stage of framing of charge. In the case of BibhutiBhusan Das Gupta and
Anr.Vs..State of West Bengal54it was said that the accused must be given opportunity to explain
the circumstances that appears against him in the evidences. It was well observed by Rankin J. in
PromothaNath v. Emperor55, that what is necessary is that the accused shall be brought face to
face solemnly with an opportunity given to him to make a statement from his place in the dock in
order that the Court may have the advantage of hearing his defence if he is willing to make one
with his own lips." In the case of BaburaoHariPawarvs. State of Maharastra56 Bombay High
Court held that it must be borne in mind that the accused is not guilty, unless he is proved to be
so and if he is able to point out before the commencement of trial that he has been falsely
implicated and there is no prima facie charge against him, he is at liberty to do so and ask for
discharge.
In the instant case the approver Guruprasad was provided with an opportunity to explain the
circumstance and in explaining so he has all the right to retract. Guruprasad has all liberty to
plead innocence when the opportunity is provided to him and retract from his statement which
was made in the instant fear and inducement.
17
18
It is submitted by the appellant that the retracted confession is a very weak type of evidence to be
relied upon. In the case of Md. Hussainvs.DalipSinghji60it was held that the retracted confession
is a very weak type of evidence and cannot be the sole basis of conviction when there is no
material evidences. In another case of mad.Yasinvs. King emperor61it was held that the value of
the retracted confession will depend upon the fact of the each case, more particularly on the fact
that whether the accused has an opportunity to retract the same.
ii-
19
65
65 391 US 123.
66(2006)3 SCC 374.
6785 NW 2nd 598, 600, 249 lown 10.
20
or inducement or any hope of reward. Lord Sumner in Ibrahim v. Regem68 said, "it has long been
established as a positive rule of English criminal law that no statement by an accused is
admissible in evidence against him unless it is shown by the prosecution to be a voluntary
statement, in the sense that it has not been obtained from him either by fear of prejudice or hope
of advantage exercise or held out by a person in authority.Devendra Prasad Tiwaryvs. State of
UP 69it was pointed out that where confessional statement suffer from the the serious infirmities
in that, the magistrate did not question the accused as why he was making the confession, and
there is nothing on record to show that all the requirements of section 164 Cr.p.C were fulfilled ,
that confessional statement cannot be relied upon as it lacks the voluntariness of the accused to
make such confession. In the case of Mahabir Singh vs. State of Haryana
70
that where confessional statement neither points out any warning against the making of the
confession, nor does it shows that confession was made voluntarily, the confessional statement
cannot be used against the accused and the court will presume that the confession was
involuntary one.
In the instant case, Guruprasad made his confessional statement in the police custody and under
promice and inducement of pardon which cannot be said to be voluntary and hence it cannot be
used against the Ajitha.
d- Ajitha cannot be charged on the basis of confession of acuused
It is humbly submitted by the appellant that the, appellant cannot be charged on the basis of the
confession ofGuruprasad by applying the provisions of Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872. In the case of BhuboniSahuVs.. The King71it was ruled that Section 30, however, provides
that the Court may take the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it
evidence on which the Court may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to
68(1914) AC 599.
69AIR 1978 SC 1544.
70(2001) 7 SCC 148.
71AIR 1949 PC 257.
21
amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The confession is only one element in the
consideration of all the facts proved in the case; it can be put into the scale and weighed with the
other evidence. Their Lordships think that the view which has prevailed in most of the High
Courts in India, namely that the confession of a co-accused can be used only in support of other
evidence and cannot be made the foundation of a conviction. Honble Supreme Court in the case
of Mohd. Khalid v. State of West Bengal 72held that the requirement of Section 30 of the Evidence
Act is that before it is made to operate against the co-accused the confession should be strictly
established. In other words, what must be before the Court should be a confession proper and not
a mere circumstance or an information which could be an incriminating one. Secondly, it being
the confession of the maker, it is not to be treated as evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of
the Evidence Act against the non-maker co-accused and lastly, its use depends on finding other
evidence so as to connect the co-accused with the crime and that too as a corroborative piece. It
is only when the other evidence tendered against the co-accused points to his guilt then the
confession duly proved could be used against such co-accused if it appears to effect him as
lending support or assurance to such other evidence. In the case of Suresh BudharmalKalanivs.
State of Maharastra73the confession of an accused cannot be use to frame a charge against the
other accused unless there is some other evidences for the purpose. When a confession of one
accused taken in the absence of the another accused, and the latter have no opportunity of
denying that what fellow accused has said, such confession can not be said to be proved. 74 Again
in the case of ReSheobhajanAhir and ohersvs.. King Emperor75 an approver cannot be deemed
as tried jointly with the accused, his confession is not, therefore, admissible under section 30
against the other accused. Thence, in this instant case the confession made by the Guruprasad
which was later retracted could not produce any substantial value as it was not supported by
other evidences and was not corroborative in nature. There being no other independent evidences
72(2002) 7 SCC 334.
73(1998) 7 SCC 337.
74R vs.Lakshman, (1882) 6 Bom 124.
75 AIR 1921 Pat. 499.
22
his retracted confession cannot be relied upon and hence convicting Ajitha solely on the
foundation garment of this retracted confession is procuring the miscarriage of justice and noncompliance of the procedure. In the instant case, there was no any other independent evidences
against the appellant except the confessional statement of the Guruprasad, which was later
retracted. The confessional statement of the Guruprasad being the weak evidence can only be
used to support the other evidence, but in the instant case there lacks the independent evidence
against Ajitha. To seek the provision of Seton 30 both the accused must be jointly tried, but in the
instant case, Guruprasad being the approver cannot be said to be jointly tried and hence his
statement cannot be used against the Ajitha. Further the confession must be proved to attract the
provision,but here Guruprasad retracted from his statement before the closing of the case and
also there is no other independent evidences against Ajitha hence Ajitha cannot be charged upon
the confessional statement of Guruprasad and it cannot be used against the Ajitha. Ergo, this
retracted confession which is a weak type of evidence should be repealed and abrogated and
should not be made any basis of conviction of Ajitha.
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the lights of facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it
is most humbly prayed and implored before the Honble Court, that it may be graciously pleased
to adjudge and declare1. High Court made an error by not interfering into the findings of lower court by exercising
its power under Section 401, Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. Honble High Court was not justified in dismissing the petition by non speaking order.
23