Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
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190810
July 18, 2012
LORENZA C. ONGCO vs. VALERIANA UNGCO DALISAY, RESPONDENT.
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in
the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable
the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may be affected
by those proceedings. This remedy, however, is not a right. The rules on
intervention are set forth clearly in Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:
Sec. 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether
or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not
the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. - The motion to intervene may be filed at any
time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the
pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the
original parties.
It can be readily seen that intervention is not a matter of right, but is
left to the trial court's sound discretion. The trial court must not
only determine if the requisite legal interest is present, but also
take into consideration the delay and the consequent prejudice to
the original parties that the intervention will cause. Both
requirements must concur, as the first requirement on legal interest is not
more important than the second requirement that no delay and prejudice
should result. To help ensure that delay does not result from the granting of a
motion to intervene, the Rules also explicitly say that intervention may be
allowed only before rendition of judgment by the trial court.
In Executive Secretary v. Northeast Freight, this Court explained intervention
in this wise:
Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the
court when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the
statute authorizing intervention. Under our Rules of Court, what qualifies a
person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in
litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both; or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer
thereof. As regards the legal interest as qualifying factor, this Court
has ruled that such interest must be of a direct and immediate
character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct
legal operation of the judgment. The interest must be actual and
material, a concern which is more than mere curiosity, or academic
or sentimental desire; it must not be indirect and contingent,
indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential or collateral.
However, notwithstanding the presence of a legal interest,
permission to intervene is subject to the sound discretion of the
the Decision of the court a quo. This Court, however, found that the
intervention should have been granted, considering the indisputable
admission of the NHA, the grantor-agency itself, that the intervenor was the
rightful awardee of half of the lot mistakenly awarded. Thus, the intervenor
stood to be deprived of his rightful award when the trial court enjoined the
cancellation of the mistakenly awarded title and the subdivision of the lot
covered by the title. The intervenor's legal interest, in other words, was
directly affected.
G.R. Nos. 182136-37 August 29, 2008
BON-MAR REALTY AND SPORT CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES NICANOR
AND ESTHER DE GUZMAN, EVELYN UY AND THE ESTATE OF JAYME UY,
et al. (writ of execution was already issued)
To warrant intervention, two requisites must concur: (a) the movant
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, and (b) intervention
must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the parties nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of
being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The interest,
which entitles a person to intervene in a suit, must involve the
matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that
the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation
and effect of the judgment.
On third party claims:
Sec. 17, Rule 39 bestows upon third parties claiming rights to property under
execution the right to protect their interests by interposing a third-party
claim in the same case, or by instituting a separate reivindicatory action
against the executing creditor. The third-party claim that is heard in the
same case may be tried at length or summarily. Proceedings to resolve the
possession of third-party claimants may proceed independently of the action
which said claimants may bring to enforce or protect their claim of ownership
over the property.
G.R. No. 155785 April 13, 2007
SIMPLICIO GALICIA, for himself, and as Attorney-in-Fact of ROSALIA
G. TORRE, PAQUITO GALICIA, NELLIE GALICIA, LETICIA G. MAESTRO
and CLARO GALICIA vs. LOURDES MANLIQUEZ vda. de MINDO and
LILIA RICO MINANO (writ of execution was already issued)
It is true that the allowance and disallowance of a motion to intervene
is addressed to the sound discretion of the court hearing the case.
However, jurisprudence is replete with cases wherein the Court
ruled that a motion to intervene may be entertained or allowed even
if filed after judgment was rendered by the trial court, especially in
cases where the intervenors are indispensable parties. In Pinlac v.
Court of Appeals, this Court held:
The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is
intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely
available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive
adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the
timeliness of the filing thereof. Indeed, in exceptional cases, the
November 16, 1965 in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 became final and
executory. PCCAI bought the subject property from WPFI on November 13,
1973 and was issued TCT No. 482970 for the same on July 15, 1975; while
Rodriguez bought the subject property from Landicho on November 14,
1996. Second, as previously discussed herein, both PCCAI and Rodriguez
trace their titles back to Landicho. Hence, the intervention of PCCAI could not
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of Landicho, the
original party in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. Third, the latest proceedings in
Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 involved Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion, filed
before the RTC on May 18, 2005, in which he prayed for the execution of the
November 16, 1965 Decision of the CFI. PCCAI moved to intervene in the
case only to oppose Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion on the ground that the
subject property is already registered in its name under TCT No. 482970,
which originated from Landichos TCT No. 167681. And fourth, after learning
of Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 via the
November 3, 2006 subpoena issued by the RTC, PCCAI was reasonably
expected to oppose the same. Such action was the most opportune and
expedient remedy available to PCCAI to prevent the RTC from ordering the
issuance of a decree of registration and OCT in Rodriguezs name. For this
reason, the RTC should have allowed the intervention of PCCAI.
G.R. No. L-12826
September 10, 1959
LUCINA EVANGELISTA vs. PEDRO DEUDOR, ET AL.
Facts: Plaintiff Lucina Evangelista and Pedro Deudor entered into an
agreement to sell lot No. 126 situated in Quezon City, with an area of 750 sq.
meters for the sum of P2,250.00, payable in installments. Said lot is a portion
which forms part of a bigger parcel of land which Deudor possessed and over
which he claimed ownership and possessory rights. Evangelista made some
payments on account of the purchase price.
It would appear, however, that the large parcel of which Lot No. 126 forms a
part, was also claimed by Tuason & Co. under a Torrens Title. Deudor filed an
action against Tuason & Co. involving said large parcel. To protect her rights,
Evangelista filed a motion for leave to intervene in the case filed by Deudor
against Tuason & Co., but said motion was denied by the trial court on the
ground, among others, that "she can protect fully her rights claimed in her
motion to intervene, aforementioned, in a separate proceedings."
Thereafter, Deudor and his other vendees, and J. M. Tuason & Co. entered
into a Compromise Agreement, whereby in consideration of the sum of
P1,201,063.00 Deudor recognized the title in fee simple of Tuason & Co. and
Araneta & Co. over the big parcel aforementioned and he hereby renounce,
cede and quit claim unto and in favor of the owners, any right, title or title of
whatever nature they have had in the past, or may now have or any ever
have in and the said property, in the future. The Compromise Agreement
included a list of the vendees of Deudor and those who had already made
payments on account, this list including the name of Evangelista; Tuason &
Co. acknowledged said persons to be purchasers, and that they may
purchase from it the said lots which Deudor agreed to sell to them. It seems,
however, that Tuason & Co. contemplated new sales agreements between
itself and the said purchaser under its own conditions and under sales prices
different from the agreement entered into with Deudor.
On the basis of the compromise Agreement, the case filed by Deudor was
dismissed. Thus, Lucina Evangelista filed this present action against Deudor
and Tuason & Co. praying that she be allowed to pay the balance of the
purchase price to Lot No 126 to Tuason & Co. and Araneta & Co. and that the
latter companies be required to accept said payment and to execute in her
favor the corresponding deed of sale, and that should it be adjudged that her
agreement to sell with Deudor could not be enforced against Tuason & Co.
and Araneta & Co. and that she is forced to enter into a new contract with
them at a higher price per square meter than that agreed upon under the
first agreement, the difference should be deducted from the P1,201,063.00
which was to be paid by the two companies to Deudor.
The trial court dismissed the present case filed by Evangelista as against
Tuason & Co. on the ground that plaintiff had not shown her right which has
been violated by Tuason & Co. as would constitute a valid cause of action;
that in the agreement to sell between Deudor and Evangelista, Tuason & Co.
was not a party and so may not be held liable for any breach or nonfulfillment of the same; that in the Compromise Agreement, aforementioned,
Tuason & Co. has not assumed any obligation in favor of Evangelista which
could be a basis of an action.
Plaintiff appealed the dismissal, claiming that by virtue of the contract of sale
between her and Deudor, she acquired primary rights over the lot which
Deudor agreed to sell to her; that this right was valid when Deudor entered
into the Compromise Agreement and renounced his rights to the big parcel of
land, including the lot in question, in favor of Tuason & Co., for a money
consideration and that her right as a purchaser was recognized by Tuason &
Co., by including her name in the list of those who had purchased lots from
Deudor.
Issue: Whether or not plaintiff Evangelista has a cause of action against
Tuason & Co. Tuason & Co.
Ruling: By the Compromise Agreement, it is clear that there exists a sort of
contractual relation between the plaintiff and Tuason & Co. as regards the
sale of Lot No. 126; and that as regards said lot plaintiff is the purchaser and
has made payments on account of the purchase price, and Tuason & Co.
acknowledges the partial payments already made, the same to be deducted
from the sum payable to Deudor. That Deudor has an obligation and
responsibility to the plaintiff there is no question; and the case is still
pending against him, thereby giving the trial court an opportunity to
determine the nature and extent of said obligation and responsibility.
Tuason & Co., by reason of the Compromise Agreement, also assumed
certain obligations with regards to plaintiff, recognizing her as a purchaser
who has made partial payments. Whether the plaintiff can enforce against
Tuason & Co. the terms of the sales contract between her and Deudor or
whether Tuason & Co. can compel her to enter into a new sales contract with
it under new conditions and terms, especially as to the purchase price, will
have to be determined by the court. This can be done only if Tuason & Co.
continues to be a party defendant in the present case. As a matter of fact,
the trial court would have done well had it allowed plaintiff to
intervene in the case filed by Deudor against Tuason & Co. so that
her rights with regards to Deudor and Tuason & Co. could have been
finally determined. But she was not allowed to intervene and was
told that she can enforce her rights in a separate action. That is the
reason why she has brought the present suit not only against
Deudor but also against Tuason & Co.