A Rational Strategy for Addressing Afghanistan’s Energy Needs

Dan Milstein, U.S. Department of Energy

February 3, 2010

Limited access to energy in Afghanistan constrains economic development and

undermines its citizens’ quality of life. Expanding the populace’s access to energy to
would arguably win the support of whomever it is that delivers the energy. In an attempt
to bolster the Afghan central government, U.S. development assistance has gone toward
repairing and expanding the generation capacity of large, technologically sophisticated,
electricity infrastructure, the Kajaki hydroelectric dam on the Helmand River is a perfect
example. This approach is misguided for a number of reasons. A rationale energy
strategy for Afghanistan would focus on using appropriate technology to deliver the
energy services that Afghans need, where they are; which for most Afghans, is in a rural
environment. What might this strategy look like? Here are 4 guidelines:

#1: Use appropriate technology, not high-technology

In a country in which the vast majority is very poor, illiteracy is very high and technical
expertise is exceptionally rare, it is inappropriate and unwise to pursue an energy strategy
for which Afghanistan’s deficiencies are prerequisites for its success. USAID’s
investment of $300million to construct a large-scale diesel fuel power plant for Kabul is
the epitome of the folly of following an inappropriate, “hard path” energy strategy in
Afghanistan. Even when the construction—by U.S. contractors—is complete, the
Afghans can neither afford the expensive, imported diesel fuel nor have the technical
expertise to operate the high-tech plant1. Any energy system that the Afghans cannot
operate and maintain without foreign assistance from the start should be viewed with
skepticism. A rationale energy strategy for Afghanistan should promote energy solutions
that do not need fuel, do not need technical expertise, and need few spare parts, especially
foreign manufactured parts. Better still, energy systems should be built by Afghans with
locally-available materials. A workable, sustainable solution requires appropriate
technology in its local context, not high-technology.

#2: Think about heat before thinking about electricity

Today and for the foreseeable future, the most pressing energy end-use demands are for
heat, not electricity. Afghans need heat to warm their homes and cook their food. The
majority (70–75%) of Afghanistan’s energy needs is met by traditional energy sources
such as fuel wood, animal dung, and crop residues2. Fuel wood constitutes the basic
source of energy for cooking and heating in rural areas, where roughly 80% of the
population lives and where the Taliban has the most support. The overexploitation of
fuel wood to serve the energy needs of Afghans (and unfortunately, Pakistan through
illegal logging and smuggling) has led to deforestation throughout Afghanistan, which
also causes erosion which undermines the agricultural basis of the economy. Urban air
quality and public health also suffers from the pollution from the combustion of wood—
and reportedly tires, plastic bags, trash, etc.—to provide heat. A rational energy strategy

1
http://www.philly.com/inquirer/world_us/20100121_New_power_plant_in_Kabul_called_ill-
conceived.html
2
http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/afg_soe_E.pdf
must primarily be focused on enabling Afghans to heat their homes, cook their food, and
boil their water efficiently, affordably and in an environmentally sustainable manner with
technology that Afghans can make and operate themselves.

In practical terms, this could mean insulating homes with locally-available materials to
minimize the energy needed for space heating; installing simple solar water heaters on
rooftops; spreading the know-how to make simple, energy efficient cookstoves that
require far less wood; building simple household or village-scale biogas plants with local
materials to convert livestock manure, agricultural waste, human waste, etc. into methane
for heating and cooking (and fertilizer); and other such locally appropriate means of
heating space, food, and water.

#3: For most of Afghanistan, electricity production should be distributed and

exploit renewable energy sources.
The Kajaki Dam and its transmission lines make very tempting targets for Afghan
insurgents fighting the central government in Helmand Province. Despite a $16million
USAID project to rehabilitate the hydroelectric dam begun in 2004, production of
electricity from the dam is far behind schedule because of the security situation.
Furthermore, due to a water dispute that has persisted since 1870, Iran sees upstream dam
projects in Afghanistan on the Helmand and other trans-boundary rivers as a threat to
their security. Accordingly, they have taken direct action against Afghan water diversion
projects. Even in the absence of security concerns, this “hard path” approach to
providing electricity is inferior to a “soft path”. Transmission and distribution lines need
to be maintained and their great expense of constructing them precludes the possibility of
delivering electricity to the rural villages where the vast majority of Afghans live. Trying
to replicate a high-tech American-style electrical system in Afghanistan is clearly
inappropriate. Instead, an energy strategy for Afghanistan should facilitate the
distributed small-scale exploitation of locally-available renewable energy resources—
particularly in rural Afghanistan—with simple energy systems that can be maintained, are
cheap to operate and maintain, and could possibly be built locally.

In Afghanistan, the most essential energy end-use that requires electricity—lighting—in

fact needs little electricity...and very little if households used highly efficient and durable
LEDs. To supply that small amount of electricity, Afghans should look to build more
micro-hydro plants in northern mountains, small-scale wind turbines where there is a
good wind resource (ex. in mountainous areas and around Herat), and small durable
photovoltaic panels coupled with small batteries, particularly in the south. It’s true that
these sources of energy are intermittent, but intermittent electricity would be a huge step
forward for a country in which only 10% of the population has access to any electricity3.
And in the cases where reliable electricity is essential, small-scale diesel generators could
provide back-up power, though expensively.

3
http://www.philly.com/inquirer/world_us/20100121_New_power_plant_in_Kabul_called_ill-
conceived.html
#4: Displace imported petroleum-based fuels with domestically-produced liquid
fuels
Demand for liquid fuels in Afghanistan has increased dramatically since 2003; with an
increased motor vehicle use and increased reliance on diesel power generation, this
demand is expected to continue increasing4. Almost all of this fuel is imported, primarily
from Pakistan and Uzbekistan. For such a poor country, these expensive energy imports
are a significant drag on the economy. Insofar as possible, Afghanistan should invest in
domestic oil production and refining its estimated 1596 million barrels of crude oil
reserves (mostly in the Afghan-Tajik basin in the northeast)5. The current national
production of 400 barrels/day (mostly the Angot oil field in Sar-i-Pol)6 can surely be
expanded dramatically…thus improving the country’s current account balance and
generating local employment.

In parallel, the possibility of producing and refining biofuels from locally-grown

feedstocks, such as jatropha, ought to be seriously explored. If successful, this would not
only help displace imported oil with an arguably more environmentally-friendly
substitute, but could potentially have the co-benefit of helping displace poppy production
with a rival cash-crop that is licit.

Conclusion
The development and execution of a rational energy strategy in Afghanistan could
improve the lives of its people, and if it’s the Afghan central government implementing
the strategy, it could quite possibly win broadly public support for having delivered this
essential service. Though perhaps tempting, the Afghan central government should not
make the mistake of pursuing an energy strategy characterized by centralized power
generation and distribution. Nor in supporting the Afghan government, should the U.S.
government make the mistake of trying to replicate our high-tech system in the entirely
different Afghan context. A rational strategy is, most of all, a strategy that uses
appropriate technologies, and in Afghanistan today, that looks a lot more like a home-
made biogas plant in a rural village than a state-of-the-art diesel power plant. Maybe in
the future, it will make sense to drill natural gas wells in the Amu Darya Basin and pipe
the fuel to gas-fired power plants to Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul and beyond, but not today.

4
http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/afg_soe_E.pdf
5
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2006/3031/pdf/FS-3031.pdf
6
http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/afg_soe_E.pdf