A theory is empirically adequate exactly if what it says about the

observable things and events in this world, is true exactly if

itsaves the phenomena. A little more precisely: such a theory has at
least one model that all the actual phenomena ft inside. I must
emphasize that this refers to all the phenomena; these are not
exhausted by those actually observed, nor even by those observed at
some time, whether past, present, or future. (p. 12)
Belief that a theory is true, or that it is empirically adequate, does not
imply, and
is not implied by, belief that full acceptance of the theory will be
vindicated. To see this, you need only consider here a person who has
quite defnite beliefs about the future of the human race, or about the
scientifc community and the infuences thereon and practical
limitations we have. It might well be, for instance, that a theory which
is empirically adequate will not combine easily with some other
theories which we have accepted in fact, or that Armageddon will
occur before we succeed. Whether belief that a theory is true, or that
it is empirically adequate, can be equated with belief that acceptance
of it would, under ideal research conditions, be vindicated in the long
run, is another question. It seems to me an irrelevant question within
philosophy of science, because an affrmative answer would not
obliterate the distinction we have already established by the
preceding remarks. (13)
When Newton claims empirical adequacy for his theory, he is claiming
that his theory has some model such that all actual appearances are
identifable with (isomorphic to) motions in that model. (This refers of
course to all actual appearances throughout the history of the
universe, and whether in fact observed or not.) (45)
To accept the theory involves no more belief, therefore, than that
what it says about observable phenomena is correct (57)
My view is that physical theories do indeed describe much more than
what is observable, but that what matters is empirical adequacy, and
not the truth or falsity of how they go beyond the observable
phenomena. And the precise defnition of empirical adequacy,
because it relates the theory to the actual phenomena (and not to
anything which would happen if the world were different, assertions
about which have, to my mind, no basis in fact but refect only the
background theories with which we operate) does not collapse into
the notion of truth. (64)

the decision to accept is a decision to accept as empirically adequate.

The new belief formed is not that the theory is true (nor that it gives a
true picture of what there is and of what is going on plus
approximately true numerical information), but that the theory is
empirically adequate. In the case of a hypothesis, the belief formed is
that the theory which results from the one we have already accepted,
by adding this hypothesis, is empirically adequate. When the
hypothesis is solely about what is observable, the two procedures
amount to the same thing. For in that case, empirical adequacy
coincides with truth. But clearly this procedure leads us to
conclusions, about what the observable phenomena are like, which go
beyond the evidence available. Any such evidence relates to what has
already happened, for example, whereas the claim of empirical
adequacy relates to the future as well. (...) There does remain the fact
that even in endorsing a simple perceptual judgement, and certainly
in accepting any theory as empirically adequate, I am sticking my
neck out. (72-73)
since the empirical import of a theory cannot be syntactically isolated,
we must defne empirical adequacy directly, without an empirical
detour: all the actual observable phenomena ft the empirical
substructures in a certain one of these models. (84)
according to constructive empiricism, the only belief involved in
accepting a scientifc theory is belief that it is empirically adequate:
all that is both actual and observable fnds a place in some model of
the theory. So as far as empirical adequacy is concerned, the theory
would be just as good if there existed nothing at all that was either
unobservable or not actual. Acceptance of the theory does not
commit us to belief in the reality of either sort of thing. (197)

(EPS 253)