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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW BILL OF RIGHTS

Dean Hilario Justino F. Morales


Police Power
01.
Define police power. What are the two tests, requisites or limitations for the valid exercise of
police power?
ANSWER: Police power is the power to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes, ordinances whether with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. (MMDA vs . Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15,
2005)
The two tests for the valid exercise of police power are: 1) Lawful Subject the interest of the public in
general, and not of a particular subject, requires an interference with private rights, and 2) Lawful Means- the
means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose It must not be unduly
oppressive upon individuals. (City of Manila vs. Laguio, GR No.118127, April 12, 2005)
02.
Upon whom is police power lodged? May it be delegated? What are the limitations if the
exercise of police power is merely delegated?
ANSWER: Police power is lodged with the National Legislature which in turn may delegate it to local
government units. Congress has delegated police to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. The
other limitations if the exercise of police power is merely delegated are: 1) the delegation is by express
provision of law, 2) it must be exercised within the territorial limits of the delegate, and 3) such exercise is not
contrary to law.
03.
Does the MMDA have the power to confiscate, suspend or revoke drivers licences?
ANSWER: NO. the MMDA does not have the power to confiscate, suspend or revoke drivers licences without
a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those of the local government units to whom
legislative powers have been delegated. Once there is such a law, MMDA is duty-bound to confiscate, suspend
or revoke drivers licences in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management. License to
operate a motor vehicle is not a property, but a privilege granted by the state which may be suspended or
revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of public safety and welfare, subject to
the procedural requirements of due process. (MMDA vs . Garin, supra.)
04.
The Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003 grants to senior citizens 20% discount from all
establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar establishments as
well as purchases of medicines. State the nature or justification of the law.
ANSWER: The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
the general welfare for its object. When conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights
must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield
to the general welfare. (Carlos Super Drug Corp. vs. DSWD, GR No. 166494, January 29, 2007)
Power of Eminent Domain
05.
What is the power of eminent domain? What are the constitutional limitations in the exercise
of the power of eminent domain?
ANSWER:
The power of eminent domain is the rightful authority, which exists in every sovereignty to
control and regulate those rights of public nature which pertain to its citizens in common, and
to appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public safety,
necessity, convenience, or welfare may demand. The exercise of the power of eminent domain
is constrained by two constitutional provisions: (1) that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation under Article III, Section 9 on Bill of Rights and (2) the
due process clause which states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law also under Article III, Section 1. (Lagcao vs. Labra, GR No.
155746, October 13, 2004)
06.
Distinguish the power of eminent domain from police power.
ANSWER: In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the taking of property is for public use while in the
exercise of police power, the taking is a mere incident to a valid regulation to promote public interest. In the
exercise of eminent domain, property or right of property is taken from the owner and transferred to a public
agency to be enjoyed by its as its own while in the exercise of police power, the taking of property or a right
therein is accomplished not by transfer of ownership but by destroying the property or impairing its value.
07.
Distinguish the effects of the exercise of police power and the power of imminent domain in
relation to the right to private property.
ANSWER:
In the exercise of police power, there is a limitation or restriction of property interests to
promote public welfare which involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary only when the
states power of eminent domain is exercised. In eminent domain, property is appropriated and applied to
some public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of police power, on the other hand, is noxious or
intended for noxious or forbidden purpose, and consequently, is not compensable. The restriction imposed to
protect lives, public health and safety from danger is not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of
noxious use which interferes with paramount right of the public. (Social Justice Society vs. Atienza, 545 SCRA

92)
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May LGUs exercise the power of eminent domain? May LGUs validly expropriate small
lots to accommodate no more than few tenants or squatters?
ANSWER: YES. While LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain, by virtue of the Local Government
Code, Congress conferred upon LGUs the power to expropriate. However, condemnation of small private lots
in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the random expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a
few tenants or squatters is certainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by the Constitution. This
is depriving a citizen of his property for the convenience of a few without perceptible benefit to the public. While
housing is one of the most serious problems of the country, LGUs do not possess unbridled authority to
exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem. (Lagcao vs. Labra, supra)
09.
May a barangay government expropriate a property which shall be used as a feeder road for
the benefit of the residents of Purok Paraiso, yet the Purok is within a private subdivision?
ANSWER: NO. The expropriation was intended for private purpose. It would benefit only the owners of the
subdivision who will be able to circumvent the commitment to provide road access to the
subdivision and relieved from spending their funds for a right of way. The intended
expropriation of private property for the benefit of a private individual is clearly proscribed by
the Constitution, declaring that it should be for public use or purpose. Likewise, public fund can
be used only for a public purpose. In this proposed condemnation, government funds would be
employed for the benefit of a private individual without any legal mooring. (Barangay Sindalan
vs. CA, GR No. 150640, March 22, 2007)
10.
Spouses H and W were the lessees of a parcel of land in Quezon City. A law was
enacted authorizing the national government to expropriate certain properties, among
others, for the extension of EDSA. The land leased by H and W was part of those
expropriated under the said law. They were not included in the expropriation
proceedings because they were mere lessees of the property, according to the Solicitor
General. To be entitled to just compensation, should the defendant be the owner of the
property expropriated?
ANSWER: NO. The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property
condemned. They include all other persons, owning, occupying, or claiming to own the property. When a
parcel of land is taken by eminent domain, the owner of the fee is not necessarily the only person entitled to
compensation. A lessee, mortgagee, or a vendee in possession under an executory contract of the land has
the right to take part in the expropriation proceeding. If a person claiming an interest in the land sought to be
condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene and lay claim to the compensation. (Knecht
vs. CA, GR No. 108015, May 20 1998)
11.
A property was converted into an airport by the Air Transportation Office (ATO) depriving the
owners of the beneficial use and enjoyment of the same as early as 1948 without an
expropriation proceeding. It was contended that there was taking, hence, just compensation
should be reckoned from 1948. Is the contention legally tenable?
ANSWER:
NO. As a general rule, the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is
reckoned from the time of taking. (Gabatin vs. LBO, 444 SCRA 176) In this case, however,
application of the said rule would lead to grave injustice. Note that the ATO had been using the
property as airport since 1948 without having instituted the proper expropriation proceedings.
To peg the value of the property at the time of taking in 1948, despite the exponential increase
in its value considering the lapse of over half a century, would be iniquitous. ATO cannot
conveniently invoke the right of eminent domain to take advantage of the ridiculously low value
of the property at the time of taking that it arbitrarily chooses to the prejudice of the owners.
Justice and fairness dictate that the appropriate reckoning point for the valuation of the
property is when the trial court made its order of expropriation in 2001. (Heirs of Mateo
Pidacan and Romana Eigo vs. ATO, GR No. 162779, June 15, 2007)
Concept of Due Process
12.
What is due process? What are its purposes? Who are covered by the due process clause?
ANSWER: There is no controlling and precise definition of due process but its standard may be described. This
standard may be described as responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of
justice, and as such, it is a limitation upon the exercise of police power.
Among the purposes of the guaranty of the right to due process area: 1) to prevent governmental
encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals, and 2) to secure to all persons equal and
impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. (City of Manila vs. Laguio, supra.)
The guarantee serves as protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and
partnerships are persons within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. (Ibid.)
Due Process and Right to Counsel
13. Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry?

ANSWER: NO. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of
counsel or not. Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such
inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against
erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. The
right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. (Lumiqued
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vs. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125 and Remolana vs. CSC, 362 SCRA 304)
Due Process and Preliminary Investigation
14.
The charge filed against petitioner was modified from violation of Art. 220 (Technical
Malversation) of the Revised Penal Code to violation of Secs. 3(e) and 3(h), RA 3019. Petitioners claim
that their right to due process was denied since they were not given the opportunity to answer and
present evidence on the new charge in a preliminary investigation. Decide.
ANSWER: The petition lacks merit. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right but it is
merely conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity
of Information or otherwise render the same defective. The denial of the motion for reinvestigation
cannot likewise invalidate the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners were not denied due process because they had the opportunity to refute the charges
by filing their counter-affidavits. The modification of the offense charged was based on the same
set of facts and the same allegedly illegal acts. Furthermore, the right to preliminary investigation
is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea on
arraignment. (Budiongan vs. dela Cruz, GR No. 170288, September 22, 2006)
15.
A respondent claim denial of due process when she was given the opportunity to file her
affidavits and other pleadings and submit evidence before the DOJ during the preliminary investigation
of her case and before the Information was filed against her. Decide.
ANSWER: There is no denial of due process. Due process is merely an opportunity to be heard. In addition,
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ is merely inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the merits.
Its sole purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether the respondent therein is
probably guilty of the crime. It is not the occasion to the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence.
Hence, if the investigating prosecutor is already satisfied that he can reasonably determine the existence of
probable cause based on the parties evidence thus presented, he may terminate the proceedings and resolve
the case. (Santos vs. People, GR No. 173176, August 26, 2008)
16. Is there a violation of the right due process if members of a faction of the Liberal Party were
expelled from said party in a meeting where they were not even notified nor given the chance to be
heard?
ANSWER:: NO. Due process could be invoked only before tribunals created by the State through which
governmental acts or functions are performed. The right to due process guards against unwarranted
encroachment by the State into fundamental rights and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving
private rights. Atienza vs. COMELEC, February 16, 2010)
Concept of Equal Protection
17.
What is your understanding of the equal protection clause? Does it take way from the State
the power to classify? What are the requisites of valid classification?
ANSWER: The guaranty to equal protection and uniformity is satisfied 1) when the laws operate uniformly on
all persons under similar circumstances, and 2) all persons are treated in the same manner in terms of both
privileges conferred and liabilities imposed, the conditions not being different, and that favoritism and
preference are not allowed.
NO. The equal protection clause does not take away from the state the power to classify in the
adoption of police power laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regards and
avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. (Re:
Request for the grant of Special Distortion Allowance, A.M. No. 03-11-25-SC, October 1, 2004)
The requisites of valid classification are: 1) there must substantial distinctions which must make for
real differences; 2) the classification must be germane to the issue; 3) it must apply not only to existing
conditions but future conditions as well; and 4) it must be applicable to all members of the same class. (People
vs. Vera, 65 Phil 56)
18.
The President issued an EO creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 to investigate
officers and employees of the previous administration for graft and corruption . The constitutionality
of the said EO was questioned on the ground that it violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Decide with reasons.
ANSWER: The EO is unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. It singles out the officials of
the previous administration only even though there are also alleged graft and corruption in other administration
before that of president Arroyo. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, December 7, 2010)
19.
The petitioners assail the validity of Administrative order No. 1, which prohibited motorcycles
on limited access highways on the basis of RA 2000 (Limited Access Highway Act). The petitioner

seeks redress from the motorcycle ban under the equal protection clause, because AO 1 singled out
motorcycles. Decide.
ANSWER: There is a real and substantial distinction between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles. Not all
motorized vehicles are created equal real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other
forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways.
(Mirasol vs. DPWH, GR No. 158793, June 8, 2006)
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20.

Does the VAT Law violate the due process and equal protection clauses when it reduced the
input credits to only 70% of output VAT?
ANSWER: NO. Input VAT is not a property or a property right within the constitutional purview of the due
process clause being merely a statutory privilege. Persons have no vested rights in statutory privileges. The
State may change or take away rights, which were created by laws of the State, although it may not take away
property, which was vested which was vested by virtue of such rights. (Abakada Guro PartyList vs. Ermita, GR
No.
168056,
Sept.
1,
2005)
21.

Does a city ordinance that prohibit motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside
of
this
area
violate
the
equal
protection
clause?
ANSWER: YES. A city ordinance violates the equal protection clause where it prohibits motels and inns but not
pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments despite the fact that these
establishments are all similarly situated. Furthermore, it prohibits the business and operation of motels in the
Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. There is no valid classification because a noxious
establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area. (City of Manila vs
.Laguio,
supra.)
Search and Seizure; Probable Cause
22.
What are the requisites for issuing a search warrant? What are the two kinds of probable
cause? What are the requisites in the determination of the existence of probable cause?
ANSWER: A search warrant shall not issue but 1) upon probable clause 2) in connection with one specific
offense a) to be determined personally by the judge b) after examination under oath or affirmation of i) the
complainant ii) the witness he may produce, and 3) particularly describing a) the place to be searched and b)
the things to be seized i) anywhere in the Philippines.
The two kinds of probable cause are: 1) the executive determination of probable cause by the
Prosecutor where he determines whether to file a criminal in court or not; and 2)judicial determination of
probable cause to be done by the judge for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest against the accused.
( Leviste v. Judge Alameda, August 3, 2010)
Under the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon
a finding of probable cause. In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the
judge must examine the complainant of his witness personally; (2) the examination must be under oath;
and (3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers. In People
vs. Mamaril, GR No. 147607, January 22, 2004, the records only show the existence of an application for
search warrant, The affidavits of complainants witnesses and return of the search warrant. The prosecution
failed to prove that the issuing judge put into writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant, rendering the search warrant
invalid and the evidence seized pursuant thereto is inadmissible.
23.

May the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures be extended to
acts committed by private individuals?
ANSWER: NO. As held in People vs. Marti, 193 SCRA 57, the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person from interference by government and it cannot
be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion. (People vs. Mendoza, 301 SCRA 66)
24.
Can the place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, be amplified or modified by the
officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduce in support of
their application for warrant?
ANSWER: NO. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to
particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede
to the police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the
warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search
warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the
description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the judge, and only in the warrant itself; it
cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search. (People vs. CA, 291 SCRA 400)
25.
What are the instances of valid warrantless searches and seizures?
ANSWER: 1) search incident to a lawful arrest 2) when it involves prohibited articles in plain view.
3)
search of a moving vehicle 4) consented warrantless search 5) customs searches 6) searches without

warrant of automobiles 7) Stop and frisk 8) Exigent and emergency circumstances . (People vs. Nuevas,
GR No. 170233, Feb. 22, 2007)
26.
What is probable cause in warrantless arrest?
ANSWER: Probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion. Thus, there is no
personal knowledge of facts where the police officers merely relied on information given to them by others
such as a report of the killing, information from a witness who saw the killing, the physical description given of
the last man who saw the victim fitting the person arrested and information where this man lived. (People vs.
Cubcubin, GR No. 136267,July 10, 2001)
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27.
What is the plain view doctrine?
ANSWER: Objects falling within the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure even without search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.
28.
What is the Fruit of the Poisoned Tree Doctrine?
ANSWER: Evidence obtained from illegal search and seizure shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceedings. [Art. III, Sec. 3(2)]
Privacy of Communication
28.
ANDREA and MONICA had confrontation in the latters office. ANDREA secretly taped the
conversation. The conversation between them bordered on humiliating and vexing the personality and
dignity of MONICA for which she filed a civil case for damages. During the hearing ANDREA
produced the recorded tape t o prove that MONICA indeed insulted her.
MONICA, in a countersuit filed a criminal case against ANDREA for violation of RA 4200 which
prohibits and penalizes wire tapping and other violations of private communications. ANDREA moved
to dismiss the criminal case on the ground that the allegations do not constitute an offense and that
the taping of conversation between the parties is not covered by RA 4200. The trial court granted said
motion which decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. ANDREA elevated the case to the
Supreme Court on certiorari. Is ANDREA liable for violation of RA 4200? Decide.
ANSWER: YES. Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocably prohibits any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private conversation, to secretly tape record any communication by means of
a tape recorder. Congressional records support the view that the intention of the lawmakers in
enacting RA 4200 is to make illegal any unauthorized tape recording of private conversation or
communication taken by either of the parties themselves or third persons. Absent a clear
showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the
inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under RA 4200. (Ramirez vs. CA, 248 SCRA
590 and Salcedo-Ortanez vs. CA, 235 SCRA 111)
In Mamba vs. Judge Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1110, June 25, 2001, the Supreme Court likewise
ruled that the investigating judges reliance on the tape-recorded conversation is erroneous. The recording of
private conversation, without the consent of the parties, contravenes the provisions of RA 4200, otherwise
known as the Anti-Wire Tapping Law, and renders the same inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding. The
law covers even those recorded by persons privy to the conversation, as in this case.
29.
Can a detention prisoner validly invoke his right to privacy of communication guaranteed
under Section 3 of the Bill of Rights?
ANSWER: I qualify. While letters containing confidential communication between detainees and their lawyers
enjoy a limited protection in that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not
read the contents thereof without violating the inmates right to correspondence, letters folded but not in a
sealed envelope and are not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials
of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication
between detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the
envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees. (Alejano vs. Cabuay, 468 SCRA 188)
Right to Privacy and Right Against Self-incrimination
30.
Does a Senate Committee inquiry violate Philcomsat Holding Corporation and Standard
Charter Banks right to privacy and right against self-incrimination?
ANSWER: NO. Since the inquiry focused on the acts committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and
directors of said corporations, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on matters involving their offices
in a corporation where the government has interest. Such matters are of public concern and over which the
people have the right to information. This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is
an overriding compelling state interest.(Sabio vs. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704) Employing the rational basis
relationship test, as laid down in Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, there is no infringement on the individuals
right to privacy as the requirement to disclose information is for valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the
government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in
foreign securities. Suffice it to say that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with
the assailed legislative investigation. (Standard Charter Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, GR 167173,
December 27, 2007)

The right against self-incrimination may be invoked by the said directors and officers of the
corporations only when the incriminating question is being asked, since they have no way of knowing in
advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them. That this right may possibly violated or
abused is no ground for denying the Senate Committees their power of inquiry. When this power is abused, it
may be presented before the courts. What is important is that the Senate Committees have sufficient Rules to
guide them when the right against self-incrimination is invoked. (Sabio vs. Gordon, supra.) An accused
occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be
compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer
is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any
questions. In this case, petitioners neither stand as accused in criminal case nor will they be subjected by the
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respondent to any penalty by reason of their testimonies. Hence, they cannot altogether decline appearing
before respondent, although they may invoke the privilege when a question calling for an incriminating answer
is propounded. (Standard Charter Bank vs. Senate Committee, supra)
Right to Privacy and the Human Security Act
31.
May police authorities listen to, intercept and record any communication of as person without
violating the right to privacy?
ANSWER: YES. Under RA 9372, a law enforcement official and the members of his team, may upon written
order of the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form or kind or type of
electronic or other surveillance equipment, any communication, message, conversation between members of a
judicially declared and outlawed organization or group of persons or of any person charged with or suspected
of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. The surveillance, interception and recording of
communications, however, between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and
confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized.
Freedom of Expression
32.
The National Telecommunications Commission issued this press release: NTC GIVES FAIR
WARNING TO RADIO AND TELEVISION OWNERS TO OBSERVE ANTI-WIRETAPPING LAW AND
PERTINENT CIRCULARS ON PROGRAM STANDARDS. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition alleging that
the acts of respondents are violation of the freedom on expression and of the press, and the right of
the people on information on matters of public concern.
ANSWER: It is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to be subjected to the clear and present
danger rule, as they are content-based restrictions. The acts of the respondents focused solely on but one
subject a specific content- fixed as these were on the alleged tape conversation between the President and a
COMELEC official. Undoubtedly, these did not merely provide regulations as to the time, place or manner of
the dissemination of speech and expression. The records of the case at bar, however are confused and
confusing, and respondents evidence fall short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. (Chavez vs.
Gonzalez, GR No. 168338, February 15, 2008)
33.
What is hecklers Veto?
ANSWER: It is an impermissible content-based restriction on speech where the speech is prohibited due to an
anticipated disorderly or violent reaction of the audience.
34.
Is freedom of speech and expression affected by RA 9372?
ANSWER: YES. Section 26 of the Human Security Act provides that persons who have been charged with
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism even if they have been granted bail because the evidence of guilt
is not strong can be prohibited from using any cellular phones, computers, or other means of communication
with people outside their residence.
Freedom of Religion/Separation of Church & State
35.
Can the courts, in the performance of their judicial functions, exercise control over church
authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions?
ANSWER: NO. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution or organization is a
matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is
not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and
official functions. In disputes involving religious institution or organization, there is one area which the Court
should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary matters. The amendments of the constitution, re-statement of
articles of religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by the appellant, having to do with faith,
practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the
power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of civil courts. (Taruc vs. Cruz, 453 SCRA 123)
36.
What do you understand by the Doctrine of
BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY or
ACCOMMODATION?
ANSWER: The doctrine believes that the wall of separation that divides the church and the state is meant to
protect the church from the state. The principle recognizes that the state is not hostile to religion because it
plays an important role in public life. It believes that the wall of separation does not require the state to be
adversary, rather, the state must be neutral in its relations with groups or religious believers and non-believers.

Under the doctrine, accommodation of religion may be allowed not to promote the governments favored
form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Thus, the
Philippine Constitution provides for tax exemption of church properties, salary of religious officers in
government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools. The adoption of the benevolent
neutrality-accommodation approach does not mean that the Court ought to grant exemption every time a free
exercise claim comes before it. (Estrada vs. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1)
Liberty of Abode & Travel
37.
What are the limitations on liberty of abode? What are the limitations on the right to travel?
ANSWER: The limitation on the liberty of abode is upon lawful order of the court while on the right to travel is in
the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law. (Art. III, Sec. 6)
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38.
Is the right to travel affected by the Human Security Act?
ANSWER: YES. Section 26 of the law provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism even if they have been granted bail because the evidence of guilt is not
strong can be detained under house arrest; restricted from travelling; and/or upon application of the
prosecutor, the suspects right to travel shall be limited to the municipality or city where he resides or the case
is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety. These restrictions shall be terminated upon
acquittal of the accused; or the dismissal of the case filed against him; or earlier upon the discretion of the
court or upon motion of the prosecutor.
Right to Information
39.
Does the COMELEC have the constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of
the nominees of the party-list groups.
ANSWER: YES. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public or the
citizens. The right to information is limited to matters of public concern and is further subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. Also, the policy of public disclosure on Art. II Sec. 28, is confined to
transactions involving public interest and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. However, no
national security is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question.
(Bantay RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, GR No. 177271, May 4, 2007)
40.
Are the offers made by the Philippine and Japanese governments during the negotiations of
the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) covered by the executive privilege
on diplomatic communications?
ANSWER: YES. In Akbayan Citizens Action Party vs. Aquino, GR No. 170516,July 16, 2008, it was held that
the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that historic confidentiality
would govern the same and that they continue to be privilege even after the agreement has been published.
Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other
foreign governments in future negotiations. A ruling that Philippines offers in treaty negotiation should now
be open to public scrutiny would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their
views during negotiations. The diplomatic negotiation privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative
process and presidential communication privilege.
41.
What are the limitations on the right to information?
Some of the recognized limitations on the right to information as enumerated by jurisprudence are 1)
national security matters, including state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security
concerns, and information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements; 2) trade secrets and banking transactions, pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other
related laws, and to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act; 3) criminal matters or classified law enforcement
matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which
courts may not inquire into prior to such arrests, detention, and prosecution; and 4)) other confidential matters,
including diplomatic correspondence, closed-door cabinet meetings and executive sessions of Congress, and
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
Right to Form Associations
42.
Does the right the right to strike form a part of the freedom of expression?
ANSWER: NO. The claim that the right to strike is a part of the freedom of expression and the right to
peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, and should thus, be recognized
even in the case of government employees, was rejected by the Supreme Court in (GSIS vs. Kapisanan ng
Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, GR No. 170132, December 6, 2006)
Non-impairment Clause
43.
What is the non-impairment clause?
ANSWER: The non-impairment clause is a constitutional prohibition for Congress and Sanggunians to enact a
law or ordinance which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of
performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed or authorizes for its satisfaction
something different from that provided in its term. It impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and
void. To constitute impairment, the law must affect a change in the rights of the parties with reference to its
other and not with respect to non-parties. (PHILRECA v. The Secretary, DILG, GR No. 143076, June 10, 2003)

44.
United BF Homeowners Associations, Inc., questions the constitutionality of a zoning
ordinance reclassifying certain portions of BF Homes Paranaque from residential to commercial zone
because it impairs the contracts between the developer and the lot buyers. One of the promises of the
developer is that the property shall be used for residential purposes only. Is the ordinance violative of
the non-impairment clause in the Bill of Rights?
ANSWER: NO. The Court has upheld in several cases the superiority of police power over the non-impairment
clause. The constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of police power
of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. (United BF Homeowners
Associations, Inc. vs. The City Mayor, Paranaque City) In Ortigas & Co. vs. Feati Bank and Trust Co., 94
SCRA 533, The Court held that contractual restrictions on the use of property could not prevail over the
reasonable exercise of police power through zoning regulations.
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Right to Remain Silent and to Counsel
45.
What is custodial investigation? What are the rights of a person under custodial investigation?
ANSWER: Custodial investigation is the stage of police investigation 1) when a parson is taken into custody
and 2) is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation and 3) the police officers
begin to ask questions on a) the suspects participation therein and b) which tend to elicit an admission.
(People vs. Pavillare, GR No. 129970, April 5, 2000)
The Miranda rights of a person under custodial investigation are the right 1) to be informed of his
right to remain silent, 2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice and the right
to be informed of such rights. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights, except the right to be informed of such rights, cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel. (People vs. Naag, GR No. 123860, January 20, 2000)
The person under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood by
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. (People vs. Mahinay, GR
No. 122485, February 1, 1999)
Exclusionary Rule
46.
Does the exclusionary rule under paragraph 2, Section 12 of the Bill of Right apply to
admissions made in an administrative investigation? What about extrajudicial statements
made before an employer?
ANSWER: NO. The exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to
admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
Admissions made by a respondent during an administrative investigation may be used as evidence to justify
his dismissal. As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating authority is not part of criminal prosecution.
The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of a custodial investigation. The right to counsel under
Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial investigation.
(Remolana vs. CSC, 362 SCRA 304)
NO. Admissions made during the course of administrative investigation by an employer (Philippine
Airlines) do not come within the purview of Section 12. The protective mantle of the constitutional provision
also does not extend to admissions or confessions made to a radio announcer who was not part of the
investigation, or even to a mayor approached as a personal confidante and not in his official capacity. The right
exist only in custodial investigations, or in-custody custody interrogation of accused persons. And, by
custodial interrogation is meant questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. (People vs. Ayson,
175 SCRA 216; People vs. Tin Lan Uy, 475 SCRA 248: Astudillo vs. People, GR No. 159734, Nov. 30, 2006)
Right to Bail
47.
What is bail? What are the forms of bail?
ANSWER: Bail is a security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter
specified. (Sec. 1, Rule 114, ROC)
Bail may be in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit or recognizance.
48.
When is bail a matter of right?
ANSWER: All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as prescribed by law of the Rules of Court 1) before conviction by the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and 2) before
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. (Sec. 4, Rule 114, ROC)
49.
When is bail matter of discretion? In what court can the application for bail be filed?
ANSWER: Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, admission to bail is discretionary. xxx Should the court
grant the application, the accused may be allowed provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under
the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman. (Sec. 5, Rule 114)

Whenever the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on
recognizance, the application can only be filed in the court where the case is pending, whether on preliminary
investigation, trial, or appeal. (Sec. 17, Rule 114)
50.
Explain the concept of discretionary bail pending appeal after conviction for non-capital
offense.
ANSWER: The discretion to extend bail during the course of the appeal should be exercised with grave caution
and for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court. Reason: Bail
should be granted only when it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that
uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking be absurd to admit bail. From another point
of view, it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction
that the accused is more likely to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction. (Yap, Jr. vs. CA, GR No.
141529)
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51.

Is hearing mandatory when the accused is charged with an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment?
ANSWER: YES. The judge shall conduct a hearing whether summary or otherwise, not only to take into
account the guidelines set forth under the Rules for the grant of bail, but primarily to determine the existence of
strong evidence of guilt or lack of it, against the accused, only for purposes of the bail. If evidence of guilt is not
strong, bail becomes a matter of right.
Presumption of Innocence
52.
Are the signatures of the accused on the boxes and on the plastic bags tantamount to
uncounselled extrajudicial confessions and therefore inadmissible in evidence?
ANSWER: YES. They are not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights and are therefore inadmissible as evidence. The
fact that all of the accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the Exclusionary rule
because the constitutional guarantee embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extends to all persons, both
aliens and citizens. (People vs. Wong Chuen Ming, GR No. 112801-11, April 12, 1996) The accused have the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
Right to Speedy Trial
53.
When is the right to speedy trial deemed violated?
ANSWER: Mere mathematical reckoning of time involved is not sufficient in determining violation of right to
speedy trial. It is violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked and secured, or when without cause or
unjustifiable motive, along period of time is allowed to lapse without the party having his case tried. (Ty-Dazo
vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 143885-86, January 21, 2002)
Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
54.
What is writ of habeas corpus? When may the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus be
suspended? To whom may the suspension be applied?
ANSWERS: The writ of habeas corpus is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully

being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person.


In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, the President may suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. (Art. III, Sec. 15, PC)
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. During the suspension of the
privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially released within three days,
otherwise he shall be released. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, 5th and 6th pars. PC)
55.
What is the Writ of Amparo? Writ of Habeas Data?
ANSWERS: The Writ of Amparo is a special constitutional writ or order issued by a court to protect or enforce a
constitutional right (other than physical liberty which is already covered by the writ of habeas corpus) in
consonance with the power of the Supreme Court to adopt rules to protect or enforce constitutional rights,
including life, liberty and security. The writ is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances and it must be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried
out by, or with authorization, support or acquiescence by the State. In the Philippines, the remedy resorted to
by relatives of missing persons is the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. While petitions for habeas corpus
just ended up with state agents saying the missing person was not in their custody, under the writ of Amparo, it
is not enough for officials to say that. The writ compels state agents to look for the missing person. And if the
court finds that the officials did not exert enough effort in finding the person, it can hold them liable.
The Writ of Habeas Data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones
right to the truth and to informational privacy. It includes the right of a person (1) to access registries (data
bank); (2) right to complement information contained in the registries and (3) the right to rectification of said
registries. It is a legal process by which an individual may petition, through courts, that government present to

the petitioner all information gathered by government on his person, and demand that said data be corrected if
erroneous, or totally destroyed if ridiculous.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
56.
What is the scope of the right against self-incrimination? What are the mechanical acts that,
without the use of intelligence, do not fall within the scope of the protection?
ANSWER: The scope of the right includes 1) prohibition against testimonial evidence and 2) prohibition
against act that require use of intelligence, such as providing handwriting for comparison.
Some acts which are not covered by the right against self-incrimination are: 1) Fingerprinting,
photographing and paraffin testing, physical examination; 2) Physical examination of a woman accused of
adultery to determine if she is pregnant; 3) Undergoing ultra-violet rays examination to determine presence of
fluorescent powder on the hands; 4) Subpoena directing government officials top produce official documents or
public records in their custody; and 5) Fitting the accused foot over a foot print, putting on a pair of trousers,
shoes, etc.
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57.
Can an accused invoke the right against self-incrimination? What about ordinary witnesses?
ANSWER: An accused is exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself [Sec 1 (e), Rule 115,
ROC], so he could validly refuse to take the witness stand.
An ordinary witness who is not the accused may be compelled to testify. However, he could claim the
privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to answer only as each question requiring an incriminatory
answer is propounded to him. (Badiong vs. Gonzales, 94 SCRA 906)
Double Jeopardy
58.
What is the concept of double jeopardy?
ANSWER: When an accused 1) has been convicted or acquitted, or 2) the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated a)without his consent b) by a court of competent jurisdiction, c) upon a valid complaint
or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and 3)after the accused had
pleaded guilty to the charge, 4) the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be
a bar to another prosecution a) for the offense charged, or b) for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or c) for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information. 1st par. Sec. 7, Rule 117 ROC)
59.
What are the protection afforded by the right against double jeopardy?
ANSWER: 1) Against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal
2) Against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction
3) Against multiple punishments for the same offense
60.
What are the requisites for double jeopardy? What are the proofs that the first jeopardy had
attached?
ANSWER: Requisites:1) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; 2) the first jeopardy must
have been validly terminated; 3) the second jeopardy must be a) for the same offense; b) the second offense
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is 3) an attempt to commit
the same or is a frustration thereof. (Cudia vs. CA, GR No. 110315, January 16, 1998)
Proofs: 1) court of competent jurisdiction; 2) valid complaint or information 3) arraignment; 4) valid
plea; and 5) the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused. (Cudia vs. CA, supra.)
61.
Is there double jeopardy if acquittal violates due process?
ANSWER: NONE. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction due to a violation of due process, ie, that
the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case, in which case certiorari may be resorted to cure
an abusive denial. In that extraordinary proceeding it must be clearly demonstrated that the trial court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. (People vs.
Sandiganbayan, GR No. 140633, February, 2002)
62.
Is there double jeopardy upon a conviction for violation of Anti-Graft Law and a subsequent
charge for falsification of public documents?
ANSWER: NONE. One of the elements of double jeopardy that is missing is that the second jeopardy
(falsification of public documents) must be for the same offense as that in the first (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices). The crime of falsification of public documents is not necessarily included in Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices. They have different elements. The guilt or innocence of the accused in the anti-graft case does not
hinge on the validity or falsity of the documents which is the subject of the falsification. Furthermore, it is clear
that the Sandiganbayan did not rule on the validity or falsity of the public documents. (Suero vs. People, GR
No. 156408, Januray 31, 2005)
63.
When it became manifest before the judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense against A, the first charge was dismissed to pave the way for the filing of the
proper offense. Does the filing of the proper offense constitute double jeopardy?
ANSWER: No. The dismissal of the first case will not give rise to double jeopardy inasmuch as the proper
offense was not the one charged against A in such case. The filing of the proper offense, therefore, does not

constitute double jeopardy. (Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 667)
64.
What is the so-called Finality-of-Acquittal Doctrine?
ANSWER: The doctrine is a safeguard against double jeopardy where verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded
as absolutely final and irreviewable. In the Absence of a finding of mistrial, i.e., the criminal trial was a sham, a
judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial
court level or at the Court of Appeals. In People vs. CA, GR No. 142051, February 24, 2004, the special civil
action of certiorari seeking a review and reversal of decision acquitting an accused on ground of grave abuse
of discretion is not proper. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of
the findings of the court a quo, without demonstrating that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice, the constitutional right against double
jeopardy would be violated. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal,
contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double
jeopardy. (Ibid.)
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Overbreath Doctrine and Void for Vagueness Doctrine


65.
Define/explain briefly the following doctrines:
(1)
Overbreath Doctrine
(2)
Void for Vagueness Doctrine
(1)
The Overbreath Doctrine states that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. In David vs.
Ermita, the Supreme Court prevented the government, pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 1017
and General Order No. 5, from hunting down terrorists since acts of terrorism had not been defined
and made punishable by Congress.
(2)
The Void for Vagueness Doctrine which renders a law invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Thus, a statute may be rendered void
if its terms are uncertain or not sufficiently definite rendering it incomprehensible to ordinary people
and thereby making the enforcement of the law arbitrary and subject to abuse. Such a vague or
ambiguous piece of legislation violates due process of law. It provides a rule to the effect that a
statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons
of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is condemned.
66.
R challenges the validity of Section 5 of RA 3019, a penal statute on the ground that the act
constituting the offense is allegedly vague and impermissibly broad and thus violated due
process right of individual to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
Will his suit prosper?
ANSWER: NO. overbreadth and vagueness doctrine have special application only to free speech cases. They
are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. When the allegation in the information is vague or
indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.
(Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371)
A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the constitutional principle
that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to State regulation may not
be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
(Chavez vs. COMELEC, 437 SCRA 415)
67.
What is the effect of an on its face invalidation of criminal statutes? What is the test in
determining whether a criminal statute is void?
ANSWER: The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding
and practice. The vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
Facial invalidation or an on its face invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate because it
would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such
invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of actual case and controversy and
permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness. The test in
determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. The
vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. (Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, supra.)
No ExPost Facto Law
68.
What is ex post facto law? What are the characteristics of ex-post facto law?
ANSWER: Ex post facto law which penalizes a person for having committed an act which was not punishable
at the time of its commission. Such retroactive application violates a persons right to due process.
An ex post facto law is one that 1) Makes an act done before the passage of the law and which was
innocent when done, and punishes such an act; 2) Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater that it was, when
committed; 3) Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime

when committed; 4) Alters the legal rules of evidence, authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony
than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; 5) Assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful;
and 6) Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such
as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. The prohibition against ex
post facto law applies only to penal laws which are given retroactive effect. Penal law is one that prescribes a
criminal penalty imposable in a criminal trial. A law is also penal if it prescribes a burden equivalent to a
criminal penalty (eg. disqualification from the practice of a profession) even if such burden is imposed in an
administrative proceeding (Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344)
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