ay Manny Hewweccer General Editors: J. Clean Gray Joan Stambaugh Basic Writings Being and Time Discourse on Thinking Early Greek Thinking ‘The End of Philosophy Hegel's Concept of Experience Identity and Difference On the Way to Language (On Time and Being Poetry, Language, Thought ‘The Question Concerning Techno and Other Essays : ml What Is Called Thinking? MARTIN HEIDEGGER? Se BASIC WRITINGS from Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964) EDITED, WITH GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND INTRODUCTIONS TO EACH SELECTION DAVID FARRELL ynre> REBISILAO/ BK HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERSeae MAIN hegre th Slatin in iron oe eta fo he fowig Caan ens Seh wn Za © Max Niemeyer Verag, 1972, Weemarkon Vito Ke termans, 1976 oleae, © Vitti Kotenann, 1972 Di rege mach docs Ding, coprigt by Sta Niemeyer Verag 16%; Verb tnd Aen ce {git 131 by Vetus Gunter Nek; War helen Denker’ @ Mat Newer ‘Veg 197; Zu Sa des Dens © Mat Newojer Vr 190). {contact on next pes) isc watraes, Knglh transaton Copyright © 1977 by Harper & Ro, Pub lhe, Ine, General Introduction and Tntodvetions to Each Selection Copy ‘ght © 1977 by David Face Krell Al rights reseed. Printed inthe Uaited ‘States of America. No part of this book may be wed or teprodneed fa any ‘manner whatever without weitten permision except io the eae of Bil gua tations embodied in ctesl articles and reviews. For information adress Harper & Row, Publishes, Ine, 10 East 53d Suet, New York, NY. 1002 Published simottneouay in Canada by Fitcheny & Whiteside Limited “Toronto Designed by Sidney Feinberg ‘Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Heidegges, Matin, 1889-1976, Bsc writings tom Being and tne (1927) to The ‘ask ehinkng (1961), (Bis Works) [Bibliogamhy:_p. CONTENTS: “Beingand time: introduction What ‘metaphysis? —On the esence of truth. [ete 1. Phosophy~Colected works. I. Title, BSTOEATES 1976 19376-9957 [SBN 0-06-063846- ISBN 0-06-063845-1 pb. 86 €7 G8 85 2 109 cnotbdbment mack es Alay egy Cems, ash fr into rept “Maden Scene, Meaphysts, ad bxhematy” on atts Thong? Copy © 1967 by Henry Regnery Company oe , pipe thrat oped pele esr eee fee Paar gla Si ie ee te Se oe B3aA14 Hay ES) 19717 op 4, paneContents Preface General Inrodvtion: “The Quon of Being” by Dav Fama Kem, 1. Being and Time: Introduction IL What Is Metaphysics? TIL. On the Estence of Truth 1V. The Origa ofthe Work of Art. V. Latter on Humanism VI. Modem Science, Metaphysics, nd Mathematics VIL. The Qvestion Conceming Tecnology VII, Building Dwelling Thinking IK. What Cl for Thinking? 4X “The Bad of Phosofy andthe Tak of Thinking Suggestions for Further Study 37 o 3 8 189 28 283 319 oIna BASIC WRITINGS Aivsion of academic philosophy nor 2 fel of atbitary notion Metaphysics i the lt oeutace of Das. It Das ist “Boeatse the ath of motaplyais INET WU GOUT Ground {tsande in doost proximity tothe estat aking pemty of deepest ero, For this fon no amount of sentierig atin to the Seounes of metaphysis. Philosophy can ns Te the question of te nothing uNOIGET hee has actly ques tion us then we have ot simply Brought metaphysis before in an extinsie manner Nor have we merely beet “transpose” fo it, We cannot be tenspoel there a ll, bees insofar a8 we txist we ave alvay thee already. Pye! gar, 8 hile, ene Philosophie 12 tou andes dianote ("For by nar, tye, fra's ind wes im plop”) (Pho, Phaedra, 279) So Tongs man exists, pilosophiing of some sot occurs. Philosophy 2Pifhat we call pileanphy™ is metaphsie”getting under wet ‘hich plsopi comes to ul an to its expe tk, Pld ty els ender wey only by « posal: Lavon of sr own existe into the fandamental posits of Dien as whale Foe ti insertion it of dei linportance fst that allow tpace for Beings as «whole; second, thet we fleas ous ito the nothing which ff say that we Hbeate ourselves fom thse des everyone has and to "Which hei woot to go engin. and folly, thet we tthe sweep of or suspense ake fl one, 2 that swings back into the base question of metaphysis wich the nothing tel compels: Why ae thre bogs a al and hy not ether thing? IL ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH‘According to Franz Brentano “being” in the sense of “the true” ‘was the second of being’s manifold meanings in Aristotle. The difficulty proved to be that “true” also meant many different things. Judgments, propositions, and mathematical formulas could be true or false but 60 could something we perceive or remember, dream or imagine; “things” (pragmata) might be ‘rue or false in a dense and so might people ‘Now all these senses of “true” are analogous: while distinct in meaning they all tend toward “one sense and one dominent source.” Brentano tried to get at that one basic sense by offering f familiar example from geometry: at a certain point in the demonstration of a geometrical theorem one can anly ask, ‘Is this, or is it mot?" He means, “Is this true, or false?" Hence the meaning of "the true” turns out to be the thatitis of something, {ts Belng—which of course has manifold senses! Even as a youth Heldegger was intrigued by the intimate re lationship of Being and truth. Brentano stated but did not solve this problem which stimulated Heldegger’s thought through the years. “On the Essence of Truth” (discussed in the General Introduction, pp. 29 f., above) stems from the decade of the 1930s but points back to Being and Time and forward to viru ally all the later works, Section 44 of Being and Time is entitled “Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth.” It is divided into three sub- sections which treat (a) the traditional concept of truth and its ‘ontological foundations, (b) the original phenomenon of truth and the derivative character of the traditional concept, and (¢) truth’s mode of being, and its presupposition, The traditional ‘concept derives from Aristoue, and Brentano ts surely right in conjoining truth and Being—if only as a problem. Aristotle's 4 On the Essence of Truth us ‘iscussion of truth as homoidsis, a kind of “likening” between things and the soul's experience of them, ansmitted through various Jewish and Arabian philosophers, influences medieval scholastlo philosophy; the latter's formulations survive in mod- fem and even contemporary philosophy of knowledge. Aquinas speaks of adaequatio intellects et rei, the corzespondence of a- tellect and thing, Kant of “the agreement of knowledge with its ‘object," while some contemporary logical positvists define sruth as “empirical veriability”—the conformity of assertion to matter of fact. Now Heidegger wishes to know what is “tacitly posited” {in the Idea of truth as correspondence and what sort of Boing the agreement between knowledge and its object or conformity ‘of proposition and fact must have. The upshot is that a discovery ‘Gmidecken) of beings that lets them be seen i always presup- posed in all correspondence or adequation of judgment and state of affairs. Hence section 44 refers back to the meaning of apophansis in section 7 (cf. pp. 79 ff. above): the original meaning of truth appears in the word “phenomenology” af 2 "taking beings out of concealment, etting them be sven in thelr tunconcealment (uncoveredness).” Bur discoverery of beings is grounded in the disclosedness (Erschlossenhelt) of world and Daseln. Disclosedness or unconcealment (Unverborgenkeit) is therefore the most original meaning of truth However, disclosedness never goes unchallenged. Dasein dis- covers beings but also covers them over: aware of its possibil- ties, Dasela is nevertheless “thrown” into the world and “en- snated” by it, Hehoe Dasein is “equally in truth and in untruth.” (Open to beings and to its own being possible, Dasein nonetheless relinguishes this openness in exchange for the security of what- lever “they” say fs true. It lets truth slip into the same oblivion #5, Being and finds its “uths” as so many scintillating beings there before it, polished yet manipulable. The most dazzlingly finished become “eternal truths.” Presupposed in such truths of faith or science or even the university of life, however, is a kind of open- ing or openness by virtue of which something can and does show itself and let itself be seen. This opening resists depiction.ns BASIC WRITINGS Indeed the attempt to speak of it becomes embrotled in the most ‘complicated abstrusites in order to let this quite simple thing— Which is no thing at all-—show itself and become manifest. Heidegger labors to uncover the “tacitly posited” openness of Being in the sense of truth from Being and Time to “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” (Reading X, below). What 4s at stake in thia attempt becomes gradually clearer in all the other essays of this collection. The attempt is perhaps most re- Tentless in the present piece. ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH (Our topie is the essence of truth. The. question regarding the es sence of truth is not concerned with whether truth is a truth of practical experience or of economic calculation, the truth of technical consideration or of politcal sagacity, or, in particular, 2 truth of scientific research or of artistic composition, or even the truth of thoughtful reflection or of cultic belief. The question of essence disrogards all this and attends to the one thing that in eer tingly every "ta a Yat this quoition-concataing eaamée do we not sear too igh ino the void of geneity which depves all thinking of treath? Does not the extavaance of such questioning bring to Tight the grundlessnes of al pitsopy? Arad thinking that tars to what actual mus suey fom the stint bn on ‘Stublshing the ata! truth which today gies ws « measure and 2 Stand aginst the confson of opinion an tetoning In the ace tf this ata need what ses the question concering the essence of tet this abst” queston tat degudseveything atl? Tsnot te question of esence the most nesental and soperiaons that could be asked? No one ean evade the evident certainty ofthese considerations None can gh neglect thir compelingseonses. But what "Tis rasan of Vom Woven der Walvhele by John Solis vas prepared specially forthe volome It appears here complete A pevieus English tans ‘Shon by Rc F.C. Halland Alan Crk war poled in Masta Heidegger, Heston ond Being. edited by Werner Brock (Chicago: Hemty Rernery, 1049), pp. 292-524 The German text 6 contained ix Martin Heidegge, Wegnaften (Frakfat am Main Vitoro Kiestemana Vetag, 1967)" pe 7397. This tranttion based on the foul ebiion of the cay, publed 2y Kloten i 1961 uy8 BASIC WRITINGS it that speaks in these considerations? “Sound’” common sense. It hharps on the demand for palpable utility and inveighs against knowledge of the essence of beings, which essential knowledge has Tong been called “philosophy.”* ‘Common sense ls its own necessity; it asserts its sights with the ‘weapon peculiarly suitable to it, namely, appeal to the “obvious- ness” of its claims and considerations. However, philosophy can ‘never refute common sense, forthe latter is deaf to the language of philosophy, Nor may it evea wish to do so, since common sense is ‘lind to what philosophy sets before its essential vision. “Moreover, we ourselves remain within the sensibleness of com- ‘mon sense to the extent that we suppose ourselves to be secure in those multiform “truths” of practical experience and action, of research, composition, and belie, We ourselves intensify that re sistance which the “obvious” has to every demand made by what is questionable "Therefore even if some questioning concerning truth is neces sary, what we then demand is an answer to the question as to where we stand today. We want to know what our situation is today, We call for the goal which should be posited for man in and for his history. We want the actual “truth.” Well then—truth! ‘But in calling for the actual “truth” we must already know what, truth as such means. Or do we know this only by “feeling” and jn a general way"? But is not sch vague “knowing” and our indifference regarding it more desolate than sheer ignorance of the essence of truth? 1, The Usual Concept of Trath ‘What do we ordinarily understand by “truth’? This clevated yet at ‘the same time worn and almost dulled word “truth” means what * Throughout the tranhtion das Seende is readesed a “being” ot “bins ‘in Selden a6 “3 being” Sein 8 "Being," day Seonde im Ganson 3 ih "ting es whole” or “bingy 22 whole” depending onthe contents, i ae AN Nhe EERO On the Essence of Truth ug makes a true thing ruc. What isa true thing? We say, for example, “esa true joy to cooperate in the accomplishment ofthis task" We mean that ts purely an actually ajo. The trae isthe actual. Accordingly, we speak of true gold in distinction from false. False gold is not actually what it appears to be. Tt is merely a “sem: lance” and thus isnot actual. What is not actual is taken to be the opposite of the actual. But what merely seems to be gold is nevertheless something actual. Accordingly, we say more pre cisely: actual gold is genuine gold. Yet both are “actual,” the cirelating counterfeit no less than the genuine gold. What is true about genuine gold thus cannot be demonstrated merely by its acto- aly. The question recurs: what do “genuine” and “true” mean here? Genuine gold is that actual gold the actuality of which is ia cna in der Ubereimatimmang tht] with what, vay ad in wane, we “propia by“ Conversely, wherever, swe suspect ETE OIG, We ‘ay: “Here something is not in accord” [stimmt nicht}. On the other hand, we say of whatever is “as it should be": “It is in accord.” The matter is in accord [Die Sache stimmt) However, we call true not only an actual joy, genuine gold, and sil beings of such kind, but algo and above all we call true or false our-statements about beings, which can themselves be genuine or not with regard to their kind, which can be thus or otherwise in their actuality. A statement is true if what it means and says is i sccordance with the’ matter about which the statement is made “Here too we say, "It Ts in accord.” Now, though, it is not the matter thet isin accord but rather the proposition ‘Tue tue, whether it bew matter or a proposition, is wha crs, the accordant [das Stimmende]. Being true and truth here ‘Sguify accord, and that in a double sense: on the one hand, the consonance [Hinstimmigheit] of a matter with what is supposed in advance regarding it and, on the other hand, the accordance of ‘what is meant in the statement with the matter TThis dual character of the accord is brought to light by the120 BASIC WRITINGS On the Essence of Truth 1 i ‘tagitional definition of truth: veritas est adaequatio rei et intel Veritas as adaequatio rei (creandae) ad intellectum (divinum) tects. Ths can be taken to mean: tooth isthe somespondenct | guarantees veritas as adaequatio intllectts (humani) ad rem [Angleichung) of the matter to_knowledge, But it can also be | (creatam). Throughout, veritas essentially implies convenientia, taken as saying’ truth is the correspondence of knowiedge to the matter, Admittedly, the above definition is usually stated only in the formula veritas est adacquatio intellects ad rem (truth isthe 1 adequation of intellect to thing). Yet truth so conceived, propos al_truth, is possible only, on the basis of material truth [Sachwahrheit], of adaequatio rei ad intellectum [adequation of to intellect]. Both concepts of the essence of veritas have i continually in view a conforming to . . . [Sichrichten nach . . J, and hence think truth as correctness [Richtigheit] Nonetheless, the one is not the mere inversion of the other. On ‘the contrary, in each case intellectus and res ate thought dilfer the coming of beings themselves, as created, ito agrezment with the Creator, am “accord” with regard to the way they ae deter mined in the order of exeation Bat this order, detacd frm the notion of creation, can also be represented in a gener and indefinite way asa worltorder. The | theologically conceived order ofereaton is replaced by the capac. Sy ofall objects to be planned by meant of « worldly reason | {Wetvermim] which supplies the law for ise and Shir also chims that its procedure i immediatly intelligible (what is con: sidered “logical"). That the esence of propositional trth consists the corretnes of statements neods no further special proof. gyn order to recognize this we mast trace the sweal formut | Ton where an eft is madewith «conspicuous lek of stcess | @=—~?~Ssstsrts™et™sé—F—sésFsh—s—s—fTifeses selina) engin, Ventas daeuatio ea intlectum ds nt} eng the exer of th Like, nate ath ava aig t imply the later transcendental conception of Kant—possible only | pifes the consonance af samething at hand with the “rational” 1 ' on the basis ofthe subjectivity of man's esenco—that “objees | EoeSrie cite Theimpraaee aise tet tis daintorst | conform to our knowledge.” Rather, it implis the Christian te | te eseace of truth independent ofthe interpretation of the $ i logical belief that, with respect to what itis and whether 4 | esenoe of the Being of all beings, which always includes cor r matter, 28 created (ens creatum), is only insofar as it coresponds } eonding interpretation ofthe een the bearer and i to the idea preconceived in the intellects divinus, ie, in the mind} Ceoutor of intlletus. Thus the formula for the exenee OF fa f | ‘OF God-and thos measures up to the idea (is comect) and in thi J (yrtas est adaequtio intellects et rei) comes to ave its general oo sense is “true.” The intellectus humanus too is an ens creatum. As validity as something itnmediately evident to everyone. Under the f a capacity bestowed upon man by God, it must satisfy its ide. FF domination of the obviousness which this concept of truth scems ' \ Ht the enderstaingentes upto theo by accmolsh | tne ba ich baly stented to mes (0 cal ( ing in its propositions the coespondence of whatit thought ote | grounds, itis considered ejally gbvious that truth has an oppo- | a E—Erti‘To en” nay transite ie only if itis undetood in its 108 sense fied gor the Latin era, "to wander fom the opht way,” and uly sendy in the see "ofl nto eror Te, art Dd ever136 BA inner constitution of the Dasein into which historical man is a initted, Exancy is the free space for that tuming.in_which i sistent cksistence adroity forgets and_mistakes itself constantly. fnew. The concealing of the concealed being as a whole holds } aa et dislosue of specific beings, which, as frgottenncs of concealment, becomes eran. VS. Mon- Envancy is the esential counteressence to the primordial sence of truth. Ertancy opens itself up asthe open region for every posit to eentiltrthEsany it theapen ste eran sad lof error, Bro: is not just an isolated mistake but rather the realm Te dean) of the history of those entanglements in which ll indsof ering gt interwoven. ee aot genes nd Seated to beng 4 whole, every mode of compostment hes its mode of ening, Exor textends from the most ordinary wasting of time, making a mistake dnd miscaloulating, to going astay and ventuting too far in one’s ‘esentil attitudes and decisions. However, what is ordinarily and teven according to the teachings of philosophy recognized as ret, Inconectuess of judements and falsity of knowledge is only one Frode of ening and, moreover, the most superficial one. The er ancy in which any given segment of historical Humanity must froceed for its course to be ercant is essentially connected with the openness of Dascin, By leading him astray, ersaney dominates rman through and through. ar testing at, ery 3 Be Taine Te contrib 704 possibility that san is capable of draw ing up ftom his eksstence—the possibilty that, by experiencing tcrangy itself and by not mistaking the mystery of Dasein, he nt Tet himself be led astray ‘Because man's insistent eksistence proceeds in evrancy, and cause errncy a leading astray always oppresses in some man vores foie on the basso hs apecsin ce mystery, specifically as something forgotten, in the eksistente Of Dan man especialy sobeted to theo ofthe stay fand the oppression of errancy. He is in the needful condition of (On the Essence of Truth 37 being constrained by the one and the other. The full essence of truth, including its most proper non-essence, keeps Dasein in need this perpetual taming to and fro, Dasein is a turning into need. From man’s Dasein and from it alone arises the disclosure of Teecesity and, asa result, the possibility of being transposed into “essen ce| & what is inevitable ‘The beings as such is simultaneously and intsin cally fie concealing of being as a whole. In the simultancty of “Gsdarre and coneaiing evancy Tels Svay. iran) and the concealing of what is eoncesled belong to the primordial essence of truth, Freedom, conceived on the basi of the insistent ck- Sstence of Dain, isthe essence of truth (in the sense of the conectness of presenting) only because freedom ste originates from the primordial essence of truth, the rule of the mystery in exrane. Letting beings be takes its course in open comporiment However, letting beings as such be as a whole occurs in a way befitting its essence only when from time to time it gts taken up in its primordial esence. Then resolute openness toward the mystery {Entzchlossenheit cum Geheimnis] is under way into erancy 28 such. Then the question of the esciee of truth gets asked mote oviginally, ‘Then the ground of the intrtvining of the estence of teuth with the truth of essence reveals isl, The glimpse into the mgtery out of erancy is a question—in the sense ofthat unique question of what being as such is as 2 whole. This questioning thinks the question the Being of beings, a question that i exsen- tialy misleading and thus in its manifold meaning is sill not mx tered. The thinking of Being, from which such questioning pimor- dilly originates, has sincePlato een understood as “philosophy” aad later received the tile “metaphysi.” 8, Philosophy and the Question of Trath In the thinking of Being the liberation of man for eksistence, the liberation that grounds history, is put into words. These are not138 BASIC WRITINGS just the “expesion” ofan opinion bat are aways already the aly Tonserved articulation of the truth of beng asa whole. How many fave eat for thse words matters not. Who thse are that can hear them determines man’s standpoint in history. However, in the Same pevod in which th Beginning of philosophy takes place, he ranked domiaation of commonsense (sophistry also begins. Sophisty appends to te unquestionable character ofthe beings that ate opened up and interprets al thonghtful questioning a a attack on, an unfortunate imitation of, common sense THowerer, what philosophy is acording to the estimation of common sense, which i quite justified in its own domain, dae nt touch on the esence of philosophy, which canbe determined ot on the bass of relatedness tothe xgital tt of being as such a whole. But because the full esenes of truth contains the no: tence and above all holds svay as concealing, philosophy as SS ae wath seal dunt, Puophil “Tiaking a gentle eceasement that does ot renounce the eons reat of being aba whole, Philosophical thinking is especially th stem and resolute openness that does not disrupt the concealing Dut entreats its unbroken essence into the open region of under standing and thus into its own truth In the gentle steraness and stern gentleness with which it les being as such be a a whole, philosophy becomes a questioning which does not cling solely to beings yet which also can allow m0 externally imposed decree saged this innermost need that thinking has. For he says of philosophy: Here philosophy is sen infact to be placed in « precarious position which is supposed to be stable—although neither in heaven nor 00 arth is there anything on which it depends or on which it is base It is here that it has to prove ite integrity as the keeper of its laws [Selbsthalterin ihrer Gesetze], not 2s the mouthpiece of laws sexy communicated to it by some implanted sense of by who knows what tutelry nature. (Grundlegung sur Motophysik der Sitten. Werke, ‘Akademicausgabe 1V, 425.) On the Essence of Truth 139 With this essential interpretation of philosophy, Kant, whose vwotk introduces the final tuming of Westem metaphysics, eavi- sions a domain which to be sure he could understand only on the basis of his fundamental metaphysical position, founded on subjec- tivity, and which he had to understand as the keeping ofits lw ‘This essential view ofthe determination of philosophy nevertheless, goes far enough to renounce every subjugation of philosophical thinking, the most destitute kind of which lets philosophy still be of value a5 an “expression” of “culture” (Spengler) and as an omament of productive mankind. However, whether philosophy as “keeper of its laws” Fol its primordilly decisive esence, of whether itis not itself fst of all, kept and appointed to its task as Keeper by the truth of that to which its laws pertain—this depends on the primordiality with ‘hich the orignal essence of truth becomes essential for thought fal questioning. ‘The present undertaking takes the question of the essence of truth beyond the confines ofthe ordinary defnition provided inthe ‘ual concept of essence and helps us to consider whether the question of the essence of truth mast not be, atthe same time and ven fist ofall, the question concerning the truth of esence, But in the concept of “essence” philosophy thinks Being. In tracing the inner possibilty ofthe correctness of statements Back to the ek- sistent freedom of lettingbe as its “ground,” likewise in pointing to the essential commencement of this ground in concealing and in ercancy, we want to show that the essence of trth isnot the empty “generality” of an “abstract” universality but rather that which, seltconcealing, is uniquern the unremitting history of the disco: seltconcealing, is uniquein the unremitting history of the disco sure of the “meaning” of what we call Being—what we for a long ‘Time have been accustomed to considering only as being asa whole.BASIC WRITINGS 9. Note “The question of the essence of truth arises from the question of the truth of essence, In the former question essence is understond jnitially in the sense of whatness (quidditas) or material content (reaitas), whereas truth is understood as a characteristic of Kmowledge. In the question of the truth of essence, essence is ‘understood verbally in this word, remaining still within metaphys- ical presentation, Being is thought asthe difference that holds sway between Being and beings. Truth signifies sheltering that lightens [lichtendes Bergen) _as_ the basic characteristic of Beng. Te ‘question of the essence of trath finds its answer in the propostion tive essence of truth isthe truth of essence. After our explanation it can easily be seen that the proposition does not merely reverse the ‘word order $0 as to conjure the specter of paradox, The subject o the proposition—if this unfortunate grammatical category may still be used at all—is the truth of essence. Sheltering that lightens isi, lets essentially unfold—accordance between knowledge and beings, The proposition is not dialectical. It is no propostion atall in the sense of a statement, The answer to the question ofthe ‘essence of truth is the saying of a turning (die Sage einer Kehre] within the history of Being. Because sheltering that lightens be longs to it, Being appears primordially in the light of concealing withdrawal, ‘The name ofthis lighting [Lichtung] is letheia. ‘Already in the original project the Tecture “On the Essence of “Truth” was to have been completed by 2 second lecture “On the ‘Truth of Essence.” The latter failed for reasons that are now ind cated in the “Letter on Humanism” [Reading V, below] “The decisive question (in Being and Time, 1927) of the mear ing, ie, of the projectdomain (cf. p. 151), i, of the openness i.e, of the truth of Being and not merely of beings, remains inte= tionally undeveloped. Our thinking apparently remains on the path of metaphysics. Nevertheles, in its decisive steps, which lead from truth as correctness to ekesistent freedom, and from the latter © (On the Essence of Truth ui truth as concealing and as exrancy, it accomplishes a change in the ‘questioning that belongs to the overcoming of metaphysics. The thinking attempted in the lecture comes to fulfillment in fhe essen- tial experience that a neamess to the truth of Being is first pre- pared for historical man on the basis of the Dasein into which ‘man can enter, Every kind of anthropology and all subjectivity of, man as subject is not merely left behind—as it was already in Being and Time—and the truth of Being sought asthe ground of transformed historical position; rather, the movement of the lee- ture is such that it sets out to think from this other ground (Da- scin). The course of the questioning is intrinsically the way of a thinking which, instead of furnishing representations and concepts, cxereoes andes sla a tansionmaton ofits reeves cing,Vv LETTER ON HUMANISM 198 To think isto confine yourself to asingle thought that one day stands stil like a sarin the world’s sky.Jn Brussels during the spring of 1845, not long after his expul- sion from Paris, Karl Marx jotted down several notes on the Gorman philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach. The second of these xeads: "The question whether human thought achieves objective truth is not a question of theory but a practical question. ...Dis- pute over the actuality or nonactuality of any thinking that {olates itself from praxis is a purely scholastic question.” Ever since that time—especially in France, which Marx exalted as the Iheart of the Revohution—the relation of philosophy to political practice has been a burning issue. Jt fs not surprising that the Impulse for Heidegger's reflections on action, Marxism, existen- ddalism, and humanism in the “Letter on Humanism” came from 4 Parisian colleague. (On November 10, 1946, a century after Marx sketched his theses on Feuerbach, Jean Beaufret addressed a number of ques tions to Heldegger, who responded to Beaufrets letter in Decem ‘ber with the following piece. (Actually Heidegger reworked and ‘expanded the letter for publication in 1947.) [Both Beaufrer's ‘nguiry and Heidegger's responte refer to a brief essay by Jean: Paul Sartre, originally a public address, with the title Existential. tem Is a Humanism (Paris: Nagel, 1946). There Sartre defined ‘existentialism as the conviction “that existence precedes essence, or... that one must take subjectivity as his point of departure), (p-17). In Sartre's view no objectively definable “human nature” ‘underlies man conceived as existence: a man {a nothing more than how he acts, what he does. This because he has lost all ‘otherworldly underpinnings, has been abandoned to 2 realm Where there are only human beings who have no choice but to ‘make choices. For Sartre man is in the predicament of having to choose and to act without appeal to any concept of human 190 Letter on Humanism wt nature that would guarantee the rightness of his choice and the efficacy of his action. There is reality only in action,” Sartre in- sists (p. 55), and existentialism “defines man by action’|(p. 62), which fs to say, “in connection with an engagemend™%p. 78). Nevertheless, Sartre reaffitms (pp. 64 f.) that man's freedom to act is rooted in subjectivity, which alone grants man his dignity, so that Whe Cartesian cagito becomes the only possible point de départ for existentialism and the only possible basis for ani 25 Hlegger responds by keeping open the question of acon wi sity which cele brates the “T think” as the font of Ibert. Much of the "Leter” is taken up with renewed insistence that Daten or existence ix fand remains beyond the pale of Cartes subjecdvim. Again Heldegger writes Exiions as Besson: tn order to etess mas “standing out" into the “uth of Being” Humanism under timate mais unique poston inthe igitog of lng (Lichtung des Soin), Holdoggerargucs, conceding tat to this extent he rejects the humanistic talon, For it remains stamped in the ‘hold of metaphysts, engrowed in beings, oblivious to Being. But any oppoidon to humanism sounds Dke a reece ot humanity and of ane values, Heldegges therefore ocvoes the meaning of “values and of the “allen” that ostensibly resute when such things are put in question le finds-—ag Niet Sehe did—that not the denial of such values but thei installa toa in the frst place isthe source of nlm, Por establishment of values andfpates their disestablehment, oth actions Smounting to a wilful selfcongratulaion of the representing bec. ‘As Sarre tres oclaar a path between the lading competitive “numaaisms,” those of Christianity nd Communism, Heidegger attempts to dstingulsh his understanding of elealetence frm ‘nan as imago dei ox homo Faber feces to preven the question of the lighting of Beng from collapsing into the avaiable an- swers of divine or human light. In so doing he comments on Baste questions of religion and ethics, He relect Sartre's "over12 BASIC WRITINGS hasty” identification with atheism, not in onder to embrace thelsm but to reflect freely on the nature ofthe holy and the hale, of malignancy and dhe rage of ev] Returning at the end to the question of action, Heidegger claims that thought of Being occurs prior to the distinction be. ‘ween theory and practice or contemplation and deed. Such thinking seems of the highest Importance to Heidegger—yet he warns us not to overestimate it in terms of practical conse- quences, LETTER ON HUMANISM “We are still far from pondering the essence of action decisively enough. We view ation only teasing an eet. The actuality of the eect is valued according to its utlty, But the esencr of action i secomplahment To tecompith metas to nfo some thing into the fullneeof its exence to lead it forth into this falesr—producere. Therefore only what aleady i can tay be accomplited. But what “is” above all Being. Thinking accom. plishs the rclation of Being to the esence of many Tt doesnot Tiake or use the ration, Thinking brings this elon to Being folly a something handed overt it fmm Being Sech oftring consists inthe fact hat in thinking Being comes to language. Lane grade s the howe of Being|In its home man dwell. Those who think and those who creat aith words ae the guardians of thi tome. Their guardianship accomplabes the manifeaton of Beng insofar as they bing the manifestation to language and taints inlanguage through thir speech, Thinking doesnot become action only Becaoe some effect isucs fiom itox beau itis applied “Thinking acs igor a5 think, Soch action is presumably the simplest and atthe same time the highest because it concerns the ‘dation of Being to man. Bt all woking or effecting les n Being “This acm jaan of Bf Wher den Humenianus by Funk A. Capazs Jn elaboration with J. Clana Gray appears heve fs entity. Ihave ected {evith reference fo the helpful Pench biingal edition, Martin Meee, Letre sur Thumaniame, translated by Roger Munir, revised edition (Paes ‘Seber Montaigne, 1984). A previows Engiah tension by Edger Loner ‘nchded In Phlnophy inthe Twanteth Cente, edited by Wiliam Bae fest and Henry D. Aiken (New Yosh: Random Totse, 1962), I, 271-302 ‘The Geoman text was ot pbliied in 1997 by A. Francke Veg, Ber, the ‘recat teanaation based on the text in Marin Hedesaer, Wepnarten [Fuankirt um Main; Visio Klostemnann Verlag, 1961), nm 43-184, 1931st BASIC WRITINGS and is divectd toward beings. Thinking, in contrast, lets tlt be éltimed by Being so that it ean say the truth of Being [Thinking accomplishes this letting. Thinking i Pengogemant par lire pour ‘Bir [engagement by Being for Being) ido not know whether its linguistically posible to say both of hese “par” and “pour”) at once, inthis way: penser, Cert Pengogement de Pre [thinking isthe engagement of Being). Here the possessive form “de. js suppose to express both subjective and objective genitive. In this regard[subject” and “object” are inappropriate terms of retaphysies, which very carly on inthe form of Occidental “ogi” and “grammar” seized contol of the interpretation of lang ‘We today can only begin to descry what is concealed in that oct rence. The liberation of langnage from grammar into a more org ‘nal essential framework i rsened for thought and poetic res tion. Thinking isnot merely Fengagement dans action for and by beings, inthe sense of the actuality of the present situation. Think. ing is Pengagemert by and forthe truth of Being The history of Being is never past but stands ever Before; it sustains and defines every condition et situation humaine [Tn order to lean how to esperince the aforementioned esence of thinking purely, and that means atthe same time to cary it through, we must free ourses feom the technical interpretation of thinking, The beginnings of that interpretation reach back to Plato and Aristotle. They take thinking itself to be a techn, a process of rection in sevice to doing avd making, But here reflection is already seem from the perspective of prais and pois. For this reason thinking, when taken for selfs not “practical.” The chamscteriation of thi as thedrie and the determination of knowing as “Theoretical” be- havior otic already within the “echnical” interpretation of think ing Such characterization isa reactive attempt to rescue thinking zi preserve its autonomy over against acting and doing. Since then “philosophy” has been in the constant predicament of having to justify its existence before the “sciences” It believes it can co that not ebetrely by clevating itself the rank of scenge But Letter on Humanism 195 such an efor ithe abandonment ofthe estence of thinking. Phi- Tsopy is Wounded by the fer tat it ses prestige and ait i itsnota scence Noto bea scene stake aa fang which i equivalent to beng uscentfe Beng, athe clement of thinking ‘Subandowed by te cca itepeation of tiking. “Logo” eginnng with the Sopits und Plat sancions thi explanation. ‘Thinking judged bya standard that does nt onase up ot Soch julgent may be compared tothe proosre of ting to evaluate the nature tnd powers of Sh by teting ow lng ican ive on diy tnd. Fora Jong tine now all to tng thinking bas been sand onde and Can then the eft to ctr thinking toitsclement be eld “rationals? Srey the queions edn our ltr would have hee better angered in det eonvenation In wate form thinking cay Tou ts Rei But in waiting it aifeut above alt ean the muliimensfonality of the fealm peu to thinking. The igor of thinking in cont to that ofthe sciences, dots not const merely in an ote), that i, tedinial tenet exact eof conepts Ti inthe fat that speaking eatin purl in the clement of Being and lel the simply ofits mania dimen Sins ale On theater hand written composition ext a whole tome pressure tovard dlberte logit formulation, Today 1 wo ke to apple with enone of your questions. Perhaps discussion will aso shed some light on the others. "You it: Conant danny un tens at mot ‘Himes now can we restore meaning to the word "hananisn’?) This nproceds fom yeu intention fo ean he word “Huan tim I wonder whether ats necnary. Or sth damage eased by al such tre stl nt suftcientlyebvoust Toe," have fecalong time now been sspeet: But the mat of pbl pion contncally demands new ons, We ase always preprd o apn the demand, Even auch names at “log” “thie” and “py begin to wish only when aginal fhnking ene to an end Daring the time oftheir geenes the Crees thought without196 BASIC WRITINGS such headings. They did not even call thinking “philosophy.” Thinking comes to.an end when it lips ont of its element. The ele ‘ment is what enables thinking to be a thinking. The element is what propery enables: the enabling [das Vermigen). It embraces ‘thinking and s0 brings it into its essence. Said plainly, thinking is the thinking of Being, ‘The genitive says something twofold. Think is of Being inasmuch as thinking, coming to pass from Being. Being. At the same time thinking is of Being insofar 3 ‘thinking, belonging to Being(stens WpBeing. As the belonging ‘to Being that listens, thinking jg what it is according to its essenta orig Thinking itis sat Being bas ateflly embraced se sence. To embrace a “thing” ora “person” in its essence means to Jove it, to favor it. Thought in a more original way such favoring [Mogen] means to bestow essence a8 a gift. Such favoring is the proper essence of enabling, which not only can achieve this or that butalso can let something essentially unfold in its provenance, that is, let tbe. Itis on the “stengeh” of such enabling by favoring that something is propery able to be. This enabling is what is propedy “possible” [das “Mégliche”], that whose essence resides in fj voring. From this favoring Being enables thinking.JThe former makes the latter possible. Being is the enabling-favoring, the “ay be” [das "Mogliche”]. As the clement, Being is the “quiet power” ofthe favoringenabling, that is of the possble. OF course, four words miglich (possible) and Méglichkeit {possbiiy), ‘under the dominance of “logic” and “metaphysics,” are thought solely in contrast to “actuality”; that i, they are thought on the basis of a defnite—the metaphysical—interpretation of Being at actus and potentz,a distinction identified with the one between cxistntia and essentia, When I speak of the “quiet power of the possible” Ido mot mean the possibile of a merely represented possbiltes, nor potenta as the estentia of an actus of existentis, rather, I mean Being itself, which in its favoring presides over thinking and hence over the essence of humanity, and that means Letter on Humanism 197 over its relation to Being. fo enable something here means to ‘preserve tin its essence, to maain tins element. ‘When thinking comics to an end by slipping out ofits element it replaces this loss by procuing a validity for itself as techne, as an instrament of education and therctore as a classroom matter and Inter a cultural conoem. By and by philosophy becomes a tech- nique for explaining from highest causes. One no longer thinks; one oceupies himself with “philosophy.” In competition with one ‘another, such occupations publicly offer themselves as “sms” and try to offer more than the other. The dominance of such terms is not accidental. Tt rests above all in tie modern age upon the pe- celia Gitatorship of the publie Tali However, socalled “private ~ existence” is not really essential, eae to say free, human being. 1 simpy insists on negating the public realm. Tt remains an off shoot that depends upon the public and nourishes itself by a mere withdrawal from it. Hence it testifies, against its own will, to its subservience to the public realm. But because it stems from the dominance of subjectivity the public realm itself isthe metaphysi- cally conditioned establishment and authorization ofthe openness of individual beings in theic unconditional objectfcatign{ Lan- suage thereby falls into the service of expediting communication along routes where objectifcation—the uniform accessibility of everything to everyone—branches out and disregards all limits. In this way language comes under the dictatorship of the public realm which decides in a@vance what is ineligible and what must be rejected a8 unintelligible. What is suid in Being and Time (1927), scetions 27 and 35, about the “they” in no way means to furnish a incidental contribution to socilogy.* Just as litle does the ‘The preparatory fundamen] anslls of Dustin tries to define concrete structures of Homan being ins, edomiant state, "average very.” Fer the mor part Dasa abered in the public realm (ate Ofendichaett) ‘nh diate te sage of oosties that thal bias frie im all dine tons oft fe! "We enjoy comeiver and take our Peas as they doy we fee, and jodge works of Ueatre and at at they do; bat we lo sn198 BASIC WRITINGS “they” mean merely the opposite, understood in an ethicists. tell way, ofthe selfhood of pesos, Rather, what i sai hee contain reference, thought in ters ofthe question ofthe truth of Being tothe wou primcdil beloogingnes to Bing. Ths ‘eaton remains cones beneath the dominance of subjectivity that presents itself a the public realm. But ifthe truth of Being has become thought-rovokng for thinking, then refeton onthe essent of ngage mist alo attain a diferent rank. Tecan 10 longer be a mere philosophy of language. That i the only rexson Being and Time (ection 4) contin a reference tothe eset dlipension of language and touches upon the simple question as to what mode of Being language as language in any given case has* {Te wadely and mapily spreading devastation of fngeage not ony undermines athete and moral esponbiity in every ase of la img: tars fom a tent to the essence of humans. A merely Exltrated vse of language i sil no prot that we have a yet escaped the dnoger to our esenge,{These day, in ft sach wgE might sooner testy that we have ot yet seen and cannot se fhe Sein und ets. 126-27) deans seis that the poole redin-the neat, mpestnal “they’fends or level of {enuine posites and force indvidons to Keep tisc ditance fom cn other tnd from themeshaafit holde Dasin im siberince and hinges Knowledge of the suf sad A98 word, If allows the ldoand dent hes af eaten proper to disolve in “hates” whichis "the pontbity of ender Sanding eveything without rie dedication to, and s7propation ofthe tater a stala” (Sein und Zat, p. 169). (Al elerence #0 Being nd Tee inh ct and thoogout the too te fhe pagan ofthe Camas “in sectim 34 of Being and Time Heidegger defines the existential on tologcalfoundetionoflngoage as spech or tal (di Rede). Tee a oa 2 structue of bein thererld as mocd of understanding, of which tit the mesningfil articulation,‘ fe Belong not only speaking oot and asst bot ato heacng snd lsteaing heeding and being stent apd atone. As the Greeks expenenced it, Daze is living being that seals, got so much producing vocal sounds sin distovering the worl, and ths by ltiog Beings Gu apes they Cth eno logo in sexton 7 Bp 9B Letter on Humanism 19 danger bcase we ave never yet placed cures in view oft Mach bemomed of lite, and Inst too late, the dowatal of langage i howerer, not the grounds for, but alesdy a cone quent ofthe state of aa in whch langage ander the dom Tne of the modem metaphysics of sbjetat amet inemed abl alls out ofits element. Language sil denies us ts esenot that its the howe ofthe uth of Bong. nen, language sure dest to our mere wing ad ticking a an trent of domination over beings. Beng thensclves appear es acta in theinteaction of ase and eect. We enounter beings a aca tes in alent busines ike way, but al weatiealy and by say of phovophy, with explanations and proofs Even the a Tormce that something is iexpable belongs to thee expan. tons and proofs With such statements we believe that we con- toot the uyste. Asif it were andy deidd thatthe tts of eing lt Ho ll beetle in aes and explanatory ods ot, what come othe samen ther ineompchens “But it man isto find his way once again into the nearness of the nameless Inthe sme way Being he must fist learn to exist he must recognize the seductions of the public cealm as well as the impotence of the private. Before he speaks man must frst let himself be claimed again by Being, taking the risk that wnder this claim he will seldom have much to say. (Only thus will the pre- ness of its essence be once more bestowed upon the word, and upon man a hotne for dwelling i the truth of Being But in the claim upon man, in the attempt to make man ready for this claim, is there not implied a concem about man? Where clse does “care” tend bubin the direction of bringing man back to his essence?” What else docs that in tern betoken but that man “In the foal chapter of division ove of Being ond Time Heidsgper de. fines are” a5 the Beng of Das Tes a name forthe sacral whole of stece in all ts mods and forthe bcadest and mest base pssbilits of ‘Escovery and discioute of slf and woikd. Most poeuantiy cxpenced the plienomenen of anciey—which Ws aot fear of anything at hand but200 BASIC WRITINGS (Homo) become human (humans)? Thus fumanitas rally does remain the concem of sich thinking For this is humanism: medi tating and caring that man be human and not inhumane, “n- human,” that is, ouside is esence. But in what des the huma- ity of man consist? It ies inhi sence. Tut whence and how is the esience of man determined? Marx demands that “man's humanity” be recognized and. acknowl feed? He finds it in “society” “Socal” man s for hin “natural rman, In “society” the “natore” of man, that i, the totality of “natural needs” (ood, clothing, reproduction, economic suf cienoy) i equably secureé, The Chritian ses the humanity of ian, the humanits of hom, in contadstinction to Deltas. He is the tnan of the history of redemption who as 2 “child of God” heats and accepts thecal of the Father in Christ. Manis not of this world, since the “worl,” thovght in terms of latonic theory, is only temporary passage to the beyond Humanitas, explicitly so called, was fist considered and striven for in the age of the Roman Republic. Homo humanus was op- pote to homo barbarus. Homo hurnamus here means the Remans, tho exalted and honored Roman virtus through the “embod rent” of the paideia {edvcation) taken over from the Gresks ‘These were the Grecs ofthe Hellenistic age, whose eltare vas acquired in the schools of philosophy. Tt was concerned with tnudito et institution bons artes scholarship and traning in amaes of ay Beinginthewodd sack "cad dailies the snd way Tat lnvelied in fhe foe of ny bie ie, ad death, whether by Proectsincinationy noah, or asians. “Cree iy the aiocosve name {er'my concem for sther peor, preoceapations with things and awareness cry proper Being, exe te movetnent of my ite ook oF pat te Shitting Through fe peceat. la section 6F the ontologies! seaing of the Being of cae prover tobe temporality Eo, fe phe der menalche Mens spats in Kan Mave, Economic pdosopkie Marascriis of 1844, the socalled “Pazs Mamoscipt” thd Mis ptV. Ce Marcuse Werke (Ben, 1973), Expinsimpsbnd 1, 53% ‘Th id nansnenpt perhaps the bee soore for Manes ayer "he sme ted on man atl socal, pact and comic Spec Letter on Humanism 201 good conduct). Pideia thus understood vas translated as hu ranits. The gequine romanitar of homo romaus cnssted in toch humantae {We encounter the fst humanism in Rome it therefore remains in esence a specifelly Roman phenomenon which emerges from the encounter of Roman elation with the culture of late Greck civilization. The socaled Renaisanceof the fourteenth and ftenth centres in Unis a renrcentia roma tats. Beeawse romenitasis what mates, itis concemod with Inumanits and thetetore with Grock paidela. But Greek civiliza tion is always seen init later form and thi tls seen from a Roman point of view. The homo romanus ofthe Renaissance also stands in opposition to home babar. But now the inchomane i the supposed barbers of gothic Scholsticm in the Middle Ages. Therefore a sdium humanitts, which in a certain way reaches back to the ancients and thus alo becomes 2 rcvtal of Greek civization, slays adheres to historically understood. hu smanism,/For Germans this is apparent in the humanism of the cightcsnth century supported by Winckeimann, Goethe, and Schillec.On the other hand, Holden dos not belong to “horan- ism precisely because he thought the destiny of man’s esence ina ‘moe original way than “humanism” could But if one understands humanism in general as a concern that rman become fre for his humanity and find his worth in it, then humanism difers asording to one's conception of the “freedom” and “nature” of maz} So too are there various paths tovard the relation of such conceptions. ‘The humanism of Mare does not need to retum fo antiquity any more than the humanism which Sartre conceives existentialism to be, In this broad sense Cstian- ity too isa humanisny, in that according to ts teaching cverything depends on man's salvation (talus astera); the Higtory of man appeas in the context of the history of redemption However dif- ferent these forms of umsiem may be in purpose and in princi ple in the mode and means ofthe respective esiations and in2 BASIC WRITINGS the form of their teaching, they nonetheless all agree in this that the Fumanitas of fonso humanus is determined with regard to an already established interpretation of nature, history, world, and the rund of the world, thats of beings as a whole, Brey humanism ether pounced in « metysc or tel tnade tobe the ground of one Every detenuinaton ofthe essence ‘of man that already presupposes an interpretation of being with- out asking about the truth of Being, whether knowingly or not, i rnetaphysial [The results that what pecalae to all metaphysics, specially with respect to the way the essence of man is deter: Ihined, is that it is “humanist,” J Accordingly, every homanism remains metaphysical. In defining the humanity of man Imani not only doesnot ak about the ration of Being to the essence of tan; because of its metaphysical origin humanism even impedes the question by nether recognizing nor undestanding it. On the contrary the necessity and proper form of the question concerning the truth of Being, forgotten in and through metaphysis, can come to light only if the question “What is metaphysics?” is posed in the midst of metaphysics domination, [Indeed every inguty into Being, even the one int the truth of Being, must at fist introduce its inquiry a8 « “metaphysical” one. ‘the ist mans, Roman humans, and every ind that bs cererged foi that time to the present, has presupposed the most tmivenal “essence” of man tobe obviows, Man is considered to be an animal rationale, This deinition isnot simply the Latin trans tion of the Creek z60n logon echon but rather a metaphysical interpretation of it. ‘This esentis] definition of man is not fa. Bt is canton by metaphysics The eset provenance metaphysis, and not jst its Tmits, became questionable in Being tnd Fine, Whats qestinable above all gomiended 0 thie ing as what is to be thought, but not at all left to the gnawing Alot ofan empty skepticism. Metaphysics does indeed represent beings in their Being, and so it thinks the Being of beings. Butt does not think the difference of Latter on Humanism 203 both. Metaphysics does not ask about the truth of Being itself Nor does it therefore ask in what way the essence of man belongs to the tuth of Being. Metaphysies has not oly filed up to now to ak this question, the question is inacesible to metaphysics as such. Being is stil waiting for the time when it will become thought provoking to man. With regard tothe definition of man's ssvence, however one may determine the ratio of the animal and the reason ofthe living being, whether as a “facalty of principles.” aca “faculty of categories," or in some other way, the esence of reason is always and in each case grounded in this: for every apprehending of beings in th Being itself is already il Iumined and comes to pass ia its truth|So too with animal, zdon, sn interpretation of “We” is already posited which necesaiy les in an interpretation of beings as 08 and phys, within which what is living appears] Above and beyond everything else, howere, it finally remains to ask wither the essence of man primordilly and amost decisively les in the dimension of animalts at allPAre we realy on the right track toward the estence of maa at long a8 we set him off as one living eeatuze among others in contrast 0 plants, beasts, and God We can proceed in that way, we ean in such fshion locate sat within being as one being among others. We will thereby always be able to state something correct about ran, But we must be clear on this point, that when we do this we abandon man to thy essential zal of nimalitas even if we do not ‘equate him with beasts but attnbute a specie diffecence to him, In incipe we are stl thinking of home animati-—even when anima [soul] is posited as animus sive mens (spirit or mind], and this in turn is later posited ai"@ubject, person, or spitit [Geist]. Such posting is the manner of metaphysics, But then the essence of man js too litle heeded and not thought in its origi, the essential 1 Ch Martin Heideges, Vern Wien der Grandes (1929), p. 8; Kant ithe Problem of Metaphysics, taes. J. Chorcil (Boman, In, ig Unive Pres, 1062), p24; aid Being end Time section 4, .204 BASIG WRITINGS provenance that is always the essential future for historical man. kind JMetaphysics thinks of man on the basis of animalitas and does not think in the diection of his humanitas, ‘Metaphysics closes itself to the simple essential fact that man ‘essentially oveurs only in his essence, where he is claimed by Being. Only from that claim “bas” he found that wherein his e sence dwells, Only from this dwelling “has” he "as the hhome that preserves the ecstatic for his essen the lighting of Being I call the eksistence of man. This way of Being is proper only to man, Eksistence so understood is not only the ground of the possiblity of reason, ratio, but is also that in which the essence of man preserves the source that determines ity Eksistence can be said only of the essence of man, that is, only cof the human way “to be.” For as far as our experience shows, only man is admitted to the destiny of eksistence. Therefore ck sistence can also never be thought of as a specifi kind of living ‘creature among others—granted that man is destined to think the essence of his Being end not merely to give accounts of the nature and history of his constitution and activities. Thus even what we attribute to man as animalitas on the basis of the comparison with “beast” is itself grounded in the essence of eksistence. ‘The human body is something essentially other than an animal organism, Nor {s the error of biologism overcome by adjoining a soul to the Jaman body, a mind to the soul, and the existentell to the mind, ‘and then louder than before singing the praises of the mind—only to let everything rclapse into "lifeexperience,” with a warning that to Boing end Tne “ecstatic” (hom the Gree estan), means the wr Daca "pais atin the rou moment of the trporty of ese, he itonot so of pat and “peta” oe tava ate by way of ie Pere rend any Red eather Heeger iowa now | ‘Gott te ona se of man Bing"oketenee Tis 00 mes te we sein “sans nt nf the th of Beg nd 0 eceptonl sen De Rat aon hod only ring of atte or homan Pci Ci, Hse Bet Teethe'e iene ta eng ond Tone 54 above, and se GF cksetneo Reading I above. Letter on Humanism 205 thinking by its inBexible concepts disrupts the Row of life and that thought of Beng dons extencel The fact ht pyilogy an] } physiologia! chemistry can scentiscally investigate man at an fy. ‘organism is no proof that in this “organi” thing, that is, im the) F body scientifically explained, the essence of man consists. Poa ba as itl validity a5 the notion thatthe etence of nature has been discovered in atomie energy. It could even be that nature, in he face she tums toward man’s technical mastery, is simply conceal ing hee ewenee. Just a8 little a the exence of man consist in being an animal organism can this insufient detnition of man’ essence be overcome or offset by outitting man with ¢n immortal soul, the power of reason, or the character of a perton. In each instance essence is pased over, and passed over on the bass ofthe Semel pot ‘What man is—or, as it isalled in the traditional language of metaphysics, the “essence” of mai —Hies in his eksistence, But ek sistence thought in this way isnot ideatial with the traditional cancept of exitentis, which means actuality in contrast to the meaning of exsentia as possibilty. Yin Being and Time (p. 42} this sentence is italicized: “The ‘esence’ of Dasein lies in its ei tence.” However, here the opposition between existentia and ex sentia is not under consideration, because neither of these meta- physical determinations of Being, let alone cei eationship, i yet, in question, Stil Tes docs the sentence contain 2 universal state ment about Dasein since the word eame into fashion in the eigh teenth century as 2 name for “objec,” intending to express the aetaphysical concept of he actuality of the actual. On the con tray the sentence says-{n occurs essentially in such a way that his the “there” (das “De"}, that i, the lighting of Being. The “Being” ofthe De, and only i, has the fundamental character of Asstence, that is, of an ecstatic inherence in the truth of Bein The ecstatic exence of man consists in ekaistence, which is difler en from the metaplysically conceived exstentia, Medieval philos ophy conceives the later 38 ectualtas. Kant represents existentia.206 BASIC WRITINGS as actulity in the sense of the objectivity of experience. Head defines exstentia a the self knowing Idea of absolute subjectivity. Nietasche gasps exitenia as the eternal recurrence of the sane ere it resins an open question whether through existenta—in these explanations of it 35 actuality, which at Bist seem quite Aiffereat-the Being of a stone or even Wife as the Being of plants and animal is adequately thought. Tn any case living creatures are 2s thy ae without standing outside their Being as such and within the tut of Being, preserving in such standing the esental nate of their Being, Of all the beings that are, presumably the most Giffclt to think about ate living ereatres, becase on the on hand they are in @ certain way met clos related to us and oe te oer a hese tine set fom om ett sence by an abyss. However, it might also seem 25 though the oor of tvany slows tow an wht fei in ote Tiving. creatures, closer, namely, in an essential distance whic however distant is nonetheless more familie to our eksstent sence than is our appalling and scarcely conceivable bodily kinship with the beast. Such reflections east a strange light upon the xt rent and therefore always stil premature designation of man 2 ‘imal rationale [Because plants and animals ae lodged in thei respective environments but are never placed fely in the Bihting Of Being which slone is “worl,” they lack language. )But in bein denied lenguage they are not thereby suspended worldlessy thei environment. Sil inthis word “envionment” converges 2 that is puzzling about living creatures. In its essence language not the utterance of an onganismy nor is it the expresion of living thing. Nor can it evr be thought in an essentially come: way 2a terms ofits symbole character, perhaps not even in ter Of the character of signification, Language isthe lighting conceal ingadvent of Being iselt easter, thought in terms of eta, docs not coinie wi existentain ether form or content, In ters of content cksisten tneans standing out into the rth of Being. Exitentia (extent Letter on Humanism 207 ‘Hloes cksistence itself even effect and posit what is essential. [If we208 BASIC WRITINGS ‘Time, p. 88, above). Here everything is reversed. The section in gestion was held back because thiaking failed in the adequate Saying ofthis toring (Kehre] and did not succeed with the help ofthe language of metapiysics, The lecture "On the Essence of TTeath;” thought out and delivered in 1930 but not printed until 1943, provides a certain insight into the thinking of the turning from “Being and Time” to “Time and Being.” This tuming is nota change of standpoint from Being and ‘ime, but in it the thinking that was sought fist arives atthe location of that dimension out ‘of which Being and Time is experienced, that isto say, expt ‘enced fom the fundamental experience ofthe oblivion of Being TBy way of contrast, Srtre expresses the basic tenet of eristen tilism in this way: Existence precedes essence.* In this statement hes taking exstentia and esentia according to their metaphysical caning, which from Plato's time om has said that esentia pr- cedesexstnti. Sartre reverses tis statement But the reversal of 4 metaphyseal statement remains « metaphysical statement. With ithe stays with metaphysics in oblivion of the truth of Being, For ven if pilosophy wishes to determine the relation of esentia nd txstentia in the sense ita in medieval controvesies, in Leibni’s Sense, ot in some other wa, it still remains to ask fst ofall from what destiny of Being this differentiation in Being as ese essentige and esse exstentiae coxnes to appear to thinking. We have yet to fonsider why the question about the destiny of Being, was never tasked and why it could never be thought. Ors the fact that this how it is with the diferentiation of exsentia and existentia not at alla sign of forgetfulness of Being? We must presume that tht destiny does not rest upon 2 mere failure of human thinking, lt Bone upon s lesser capacity of ealy Westem thinking. Concealed jn its esential provenance, the diferentiation of essentia (een tility) and exitentia (actuality) completely dominates the des tiny of Western history and of al history determined by Europe + Ch, Jean Pay] Sate, L'Ectemiaine et mt humanism (Pai: Natl 1940), pp. 17,21, and hewhere- Eo, Letter on Humanism, 209 Sartre's key proposition about the priority of existentia aver ‘esentia does, however, justify using the name “existentialism” as { sn appropriate ttle for a philosophy of this sort. But the basie | tenet of “exits” has nothing at all in common ith the ‘ttoment om Being nd Tieaprt tom te fact that in Being and Tine no atement about the ation of een and extent Gan yet be expesed since here ti ail a question of preparing something presrry. Asis obvious fom what we have ft Sie that happens uly enoagh, What il ody romans ob could perhaps become an impets for guiding he esence of tan tothe point where hough ants ota dimonson of the i =st=SsrsSOSOrisCOC—rdst—aCiit. take place oly tothe honor of Being and forthe beet of Da ssn whch man eliingly sotaing not, howe for the sake of tm that ciation and alte trough man's ings might be vindicated, . ce | i_ié4=2=—_ teth of Being in or fo poor ite should fat fal ake Gla how Behg concer tn and how it chins him, Sich an | i ==sSsese in that he cate Were we nowt ny inte guage ofthe | _ssSes That hy in Beng and Tome the sentence oe eeus “The ‘stance’ of man it extn (pp. 7,212,314)” at “ae stance" thoght io ton of the sony of Bing, ahead biakettranation of oul a word tat degrates the presence of wat prot and a he sone tne, with pung ambiguity, tml pans what petit itll If we think the metaphyseal term “robetane” in the sense akeady suggested in crorcanee vith he “phenomesclogildestrocton” aed out in Being and Time (cp. 6, above), then the sistement "The ‘substinee of san eases” ays noting be ot that the way that man in Wis proper esncebegomes pret to Being is emtaticinhence inthe tah of Beng. Though ths detention ofthe esence of |20 BASIC WRITINGS man the humanistic interpretations of man as animal rationale, as “person,” as spirtualensouled-bodily being, are not declared false and thrust aside-{Rathes, the sole implication is that the highest determinations of the essence of man in humanism still do not realize the proper dignity of man. To that extent the thinking in Being and Time is against humanism. But this opposition does not ‘mean that such thinking aligns itself against the humane and advo" cates the inhuman, that it promotes the inhumane and deprecates the dignity of man. Humanism is opposed because it does not set the Irumanitas of man high enough Of course the essential worth ‘of man does not consist in his being the substance of beings, as the “Subject” among them, s0 that as the tyrant of Being he may eign to release the beingness of beings into an all too loudly baited “objectivity.” ‘Man is rather “thrown” from Being itself into the truth of Being, so that ck-sisting in this fashion he might guard the truth of ‘Being, in order that beings might appear in the light of Being as the beings they are. Man docs not decide whether and how beings appear, whether and how God and the gods or history and nature ccome forward into the lighting of Being, come to presence and depart. The advent of beings lies in the destiny of Being, But for serettar ever question of finding what is Eng in his eset Bch ceponde to suc destiny for in aseord ith his destiny Man as ckelting as to goad the toth of Being, Man it te Theghrd of Beng Tes inthis decton alone that Beng and Tine photog wen estate existence i experienced as “xe” (ch section #4 C, pp. 225 .)- fat belng_ni is Beng? Tis Titel The thinking that ist ome nat fam to experince tha an to yt (Being"—that sot Cod and nota cosmic ground Being i ther than all being: srt yet nearer to man than every being, Beit zoe, a east 2 tok of arta machine, be tan angel or God ings the near Yer te ner remains test fom mas. Maat fst clings aay Letter on Humanism and onl to beings. But when thinking represents beings as beings it no doubt relates itelé to Being. In tuth, however, it slays thinks only of beings as suck; pressely not, and never, Being a8 such, ‘The “question of Being” alvays remaing x question About beings. Tei sl not at all what is elisive name indenter: the question in the direction of Being, Philosophy, even when it be comes “tical” though Descartes and Kant, always follows the oust of metaphysical representation. It thinks from beings back to beings with a glance in passing toward Being. For every depar- ture from beings and every retum to them stands already in the lishbof Being But metaphysics recognizes the lighting of Being either solely as tie view of what is present in “outward appearance” (idea) oF critically as what i sen a5 a result of categoria representation on the part of subjectivity, This means that the truth of Being as the lighting tcf remains concealed for metaphysics. However, this concealment isnot a defect of metaphysics but treasure withheld from it yet held before i, the treasure ofits on proper wealth Bat the lighting itselé is Being, Within the destiny of Being in imetahysics the lighting ist affords a view by which what is pres eat comes into touch with man, who i present to it, so that ma himself can in apprehending (noein) fist touch upon Being (thi- sein, Aristotle, Met. IX, 10). "This view fat gathers the aspect to itself Te yields to such aspects when apprehending has become a setting fortsbeftetself in the pereptio ofthe rex cogitans taken specu of coins, Bat how—provded we relly ought to ak such a quéstion at all-how does Being rlate to ckaistence? Being itself js the rel tion tothe extent that It the location ofthe trth of Being aid beings, gathers to itself apd embraces ekaistence in its existent, tat, ete, ne pense tren asthe one wo cits comes to standin this ation that Being destins for tel in that hie ectatclly sustains i, that i in care takes it upon hime, he22 BASIC WRITINGS at Gist fails to recognize the nearest and attaches himself to the next nearest, He even thinks that this is the nearest. But nearer than the nearest and at the same time for odinary thinking farther than the farthest is nearness itself: the truth of Being, Forgetting the truth of Being in favor of the pressing throng of beings unthought in their essence is what ensnarement [Ver- fallen) means in Being and Time.* This word does not signity the Fall of Man understood in 2 “moralphilosophical” and at the same time seculaized way; rather, it designates an essential rel tionship of man to Being within Being’ relation to the exsence of ‘man, Accordingly, the terms “authenticity” and “inauthenticty,” which are used in a provisional fashion, do not imply 2 mora cxistentiel or an “anthropological” distinction but rather a rel tion which, because it has been hitherto concealed from philoso- phy, has yet to be thought for the first time, an “ecstatic” relation of the essence of man to the truth of Being. But this relation is as it is not by reason of eksistence; on the contrary, the essence of ek- sistence derives existentially ccstatcally from the essence of the truth of Being, "The one thing thinking would like to attain and for the first time tries to articulate in Being and Time is something simple. As such, Teing remaine mysterious, the simple neamess of an unobtrusive govemance. The neamess oceurs essentially as language itself. But Janguage is not mere speech, insofar as we represent the latter at * In Being and Tima, (of exp sections 25-27, 38, and 68C) Verfalen, tnealy'a“alng" or “apt sees sa thd consatuive moment of ‘eingintheword. Dusin'w potently for Being, dieses toward latte in which it an eal tr potitiet Uisits“ectetalty.” But exitece 4 Saye thrown” oot of 3 put that determines ts taectory: ths ss ete.” Menwhil, Daca’ wally buses tal io qootdee aa foie isl nthe poset eeeting what most sow this ts Verflenen (ie lat samedi not sapiy ater of “eteyday” dealings, bowen, since the tendency to let thcretal problems clip into the readymade 3 iow of a taditon ates ltepctation tle) To forget what Ses! is ‘wn i wha Teldeger means by Unegentichke, arcllyrendewed a" sithentty Letter on Humanism a3 best as the unity of phoneme (or written character), melody, 4 hyn, and meaning fo scse).We think ofthe phoneme and jot hata eal yo: neg of oy ad a = ie wu ino lnguge crap t ee ‘ence of man reprinted sana tional that he wy " of bodysoul-mind{ But just as cksistence--and through it the EC r—eOC—sC_C—ssCsN homanits of home animati 30 doe the wells ex a === | history of Being fSceording to this essence language is the house Of Beg which somes to pas fom Being tnd poral y —.—Crti“C—s—sOCOOSCS