MEINONG ON MEMORY

Fabrice Teroni
Department of Philosophy
Geneva University

Meinongs early essay, Zur erkenntnistheoretischen Wrdigung des

Gedchtnisses1, provides, despite its brevity, a very important
discussion of mnesic phenomena. In this paper, I investigate some
points I believe to be of particular interest: some of them are briefly
broached by Meinong, whereas others form an important part of his
argument. Moreover, I will connect the discussion with more recent
concerns in analytical philosophy. This presentation is structured in
the following way. In section (1), I present Meinongs definition of
memory, and contrast it with more recent conceptions. In section (2), I
present his epistemological discussion of memory judgements, which
is further investigated in section (3), where I discuss the notion of
presumptive evidence via the criticisms it elicited from Franz
Brentano. At the end of this presentation, we will understand why
Meinongs essay is a landmark in the philosophical investigation of
memory.
(1) WHAT IS MEMORY?
Meinongs interest in memory is primarily epistemological, his goal
being
to take possession of this area in the name of epistemology2.

According to him, the problems surrounding the epistemological

assessment of memory have been neglected, philosophers being more
interested in broad questions than in elucidating more mundane,
though fundamental, data of knowledge3. But of course, even though
Meinongs goal is of this nature, he must start with a conception of
memory providing the foundations for the discussion of its
epistemological status. What form does it take?
In this text, Meinongs remarks are quite sketchy, but he nevertheless
states some fundamental theses we can contrast with many other

Thanks to Christoph Hoerl for many helpful comments.

MEINONG, Alexius, Zur erkenntnistheoretischen Wrdigung des Gedchtnisses,
in HALLER, Rudolf, and KINDINGER, Rudolf (eds.), Gesamtausgabe, Band II,
Akademische Druck, Graz, 1969, translated as Toward an Epistemological
Assessment of Memory, in CHISHOLM, Roderick, and SWARTZ, R.J. (eds.),
Empirical Knowledge, Prentice Hall, 1966. References are given first to the
translation, and to the original in parentheses.
2
MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 254 (p. 188)
3
MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 254 (p. 188)
1

MEINONG ON MEMORY

accounts. His first point consists in distinguishing memory from

presentations. A presentation occurs for instance when a painter
imagines a scene before drawing it: he
has a presentation of something, but this something exists only
in [his] thought[], it is nothing but the content thereof.4

Memory differs from presentations because it is, to put it briefly,

assessable as true or false, as justified or unjustified, contrary to
presentations. They nevertheless play a crucial role: even though they
are not by themselves instances of knowledge, they can provide its
basis. Accordingly, Meinong understands memory as judgements
based on presentations:
What is added is the clear and, here, very essential conviction
[berzeugung] of the person remembering, that the image in his
memory relates to an actual experience.5

This conviction is grasped by Meinong as the occurrence of a

judgement which is, of course, assessable as true or false, and as
justified or not6. Memory is a form of knowledge, a judicative act
linked with a specific presentation. Do these presentations have a
specific nature and differ, for instance, from imaginative
presentations? Meinong does not provide a clear answer here, and one
can only gather the core of his position through some negative
remarks. For before stressing the fundamental role of judgement, he
notes that the distinction between memory and presentation cannot be
reduced to
the simple fact that the contents originated in the earlier
experiences of the person remembering, or the knowledge of
such origins gained from psychological investigation for both
might also be present in the artist who creates out of pure
fantasy.7

This may be the case, but it is important to note that Meinong does
not, and should not, say that these properties play no role in an account
of memory. If it is a kind of judgement, and is moreover based on
presentations, then presentations themselves must satisfy certain
constraints. For if memory judgements were made on the basis of
presentations that do not, in a certain way, originate from earlier
experiences, then the epistemological status of memory would be
problematic, and the difference between memory and (at least some)
imaginative presentations would disappear. Meinong should not
4

MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 254 (p. 189)

MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 255 (p. 189)
6
MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 255 (p. 189 in fine). Thus, Meinong does not make
reference to something more primitive than judgement, contrary to Russell. See
RUSSELL, Bertrand, The Analysis of Mind, Routledge, 199. This very important
point is only superficially broached in what follows.
7
MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 255 (p. 189)
5

FABRICE TERONI

reduce the difference between memory and imagination to the

occurence of a judgement directed to the past, but his epistemological
interests lead him to stress its fundamental role. His position is
compatible with many specific conceptions of their nature, and should
not be assimilated to those of philosophers who have stressed the
dispensability8 and generality9 of memory images which are
particularized with the help of judgements. For Meinong simply says
that to remember is in part to judge, not that memory presentations can
be of the same sort as what occurs in any case of sensory imagination.
Even if it were true that identical presentations can also be part of
imaginative acts, this should not obscure this fact10. Moreover, as I
briefly point out below, in order to reach his specific epistemological
position, Meinong should be more specific on the nature of memory
presentations.
But what is the source of Meinongs stress on judgements? It is to be
found in his classical methodology: he studies memory from the first
person point of view. And, as he argues,
it would certainly never occur to anybody to say that he
remembers this or that, if he lacks such a conviction.11

This is no doubt the case, but one could easily question the hidden
argument: why should the fact that one is ready to self-attribute mental
states have any role to play in their definition? Even if no one would
say that he remembers were he not convinced that something occurred
in the past, why should this play a central role in our conception of
memory? For note that there exist many situations, both intra- and
interpersonal, where we attribute memory at a time when no
judgement occurred. A case of the first type is the following. At t1,
John has a memory presentation, but does not make a judgement in the
past tense about what is presented because he has reasons to believe
that such cannot have been the case. At t2, he comes to know that his
former reasons were completely unfounded and says I remembered
this, but was not at the time inclined to believe that such was the
case12. Meinong should have used inclinations to believe, and not
judgements, to escape this problem. Case of the second type are more
problematic and occur whenever someone shows us, in a certain way,
that the past has a very specific influence on his present doings,
8

On the first point, see for instance ZEMACH, Eddy, A Definition of Memory,
Mind, 77, 1968 ; for dissenting views, see HOERL, Christoph, The Phenomenology
of episodic Recall, and MARTIN, M.G.F., Episodic Memory as retained
Acquaintance, both in HOERL, Christoph, and McCORMACK, Theresa (eds.), Time
and Memory, OUP, 2001
9
See EVANS, Gareth, The Varieties of Reference, OUP, 1982, p. 268
10
My caution is explained because, on some possible accounts of memory
presentations, they are different from imaginative presentations independently of
judgement. Such is the case if, for instance, objects are primitively presented as
having occured previously.
11
MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 255 (p. 189)
12
See section (2).

MEINONG ON MEMORY

without his realizing that this is so. We say for instance that he
remembers a specific event without believing that it occurred13. So,
Meinongs stress on judgements depends on a questionable
methodology, and has some problematic consequences, but is
basically sound because of his central concern: even if it can be argued
that to remember is not to judge, memory judgements nevertheless
take central stage when epistemological problems are investigated. For
only judgements and beliefs can be evaluated as justified or not.
An important thesis is Meinongs restriction of memory to judgements
occurring in specific contexts, namely when specific presentations
occur. He consistently uses the term Erinnerungsbild, with some
occurrences of Erinnerungsdatum (which are sometimes, correctly in
my opinion, translated also as memory images14). It seems therefore
that, according to Meinong, memory is always quasi-sensory, or
experiential, for he would probably have used the more neutral term
Vorstellung instead of Bild if he wanted to cancel this implication.
This is important, and in sharp contrast with many contemporary
conceptions of memory. For it is now a psychological and
philosophical commonplace to cite different forms of memory, the
usual list comprising at least procedural, propositional or semantic,
and personal or episodic memory. Procedural memory occurs for
instance when Mary remembers how to swim, something philosophers
use to refer to as procedural knowledge or know-how. Examples of
propositional or semantic memory are: John remembers that Napoleon
crossed the Alps or Michael remembers that 2+2=4, whereas episodic
memory is restricted to events the subject has witnessed. This
conception of the scope of memory is liberal, and Meinong is opposed
to this idea: memory is restricted to the episodic species, which he
moreover understands as experiential, in the sense that to remember is
to enjoy phenomenologically rich states of mind. The best way to flesh
out the traditional talk of memory images consists in saying that to
remember can be, for the subject, as if he was hearing or seeing. This
leads to a restricted, by contrast to a liberal, position on the scope of
memory: one remembers only when one judges on the basis of such
specific states of mind. Propositional memory is fundamentally
different, being nothing else that the retention of a judgement.
But Meinongs position remains unclear, for even though he
constantly uses the term memory image, at one point he notes that
we remember
thoughts and feelings, judgements and desires.15

In some of these cases, it seems implausible to extend the conception

of memory just mentioned, for a judgement can be retained without
13

For a classical example, see MARTIN, C.B. and DEUTSCHER, Max,

Remembering, The Philosophical Review, 75, 1966
14
See for instance p. 262 (p. 199)
15
MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 256 (p. 191)

FABRICE TERONI

any memory image being required. A plausible interpretation consists

in distinguishing judgements that I desired or that I judged that p in the
past from memory judgements, which are constitutively accompanied
by presentations of the contexts in which these acts have taken place.
In this sense, to remember a judgement is to remember judging that p,
thereby grounding a contrast between preserved judgements and
memory judgements. Another option starts by arguing for the sensory
character of these acts, to encompass them in this way in ones talk of
memory images, but this strikes me as far less plausible than the first
position.
For reasons that I can only briefly mention here, I think Meinong is
perfectly right in his restricted conception of the scope of memory, for
many fundamental properties distinguish the phenomena he
understands under this label from cases of propositional or semantic
memory, which are therefore best grasped as completely distinct.
Among them, one can cite the phenomenological dimension just
mentioned, the specific modes of thought characteristic of memory
(memory stricto sensu seems to allow for demonstrative thinking,
contrary to propositional memory16), and a specific form of
intentionality. More importantly for Meinongs own purpose, the
epistemological assessment of memory, it is very plausible to argue
that memory and preserved judgements have completely different
epistemic structures. There are therefore many reasons to accept
Meinongs restricted conception of memory judgements.
Another important position held by Meinong follows from this
restricted conception of memory and his specific analysis of mnesic
phenomena, namely the fact that he distinguishes between different
types of judgements made on the basis of memory presentations. Let
us go back to the citation at the beginning of page 2, where Meinong
notes that to remember is to be convinced that the image relates to an
actual experience. He immediately clarifies what he means:
i.e., that [the subject] is thinking of something that actually
happened, and not of something that () he arbitrarily or
accidentally thought up or invented.17

The relation between memory and experiences is best addressed by

two questions. First, and very importantly for those who stress the
experiential character of memory, what is the relation of memory
judgements to present memory experiences? Moreover, and contrary
to the case of perception, there is a second question: what is the
relation between memory judgements and past experiences? Let us
investigate Meinongs answers in turn. As regards the first, he notes
that

16
17

CAMPBELL, John, Reference and Consciousness, OUP, 2002

MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 255 (p. 189)

MEINONG ON MEMORY

while I am remembering, I can easily make a judgement about

that which I am remembering, without, at the same time,
making a special judgement about the remembering itself.18

Typical memory judgements occur, according to him, when one

judges that there was a wonderful party at Johns place last summer, or
that this lake was wonderful. And
cases () where the remembering itself forms the content of the
judgement () must be regarded as more complicated and, in
this respect, as secondary constructs, for here the simple act of
memory is supplemented by reflection on itself.19

We must distinguish between memory acts that are, as we saw above,

judgements made on the basis of specific presentations, from more
complex judgements about this act.20 As regards the first question,
Meinongs answer is therefore that for a subject to remember, i.e. to
judge about the past, he is not required to judge that he enjoys a
specific memory experience: memory does not depend on these further
achievements. Meinongs position can be interpreted in two ways:
either as saying that to require this achievement is to mistake
dispositions and occurrences (S is simply disposed to judge that he has
a memory experience when he makes a memory judgement), or that
the disposition itself is not even required in order to form memory
judgements.
What about the second question, the relation of memory to past
experiences? The issue is more tricky, for Meinongs remarks are
issued in order to bypass the problem of realism. He argues for a
reconciliation of what I take to be idealism and realism by stressing
that we should give a neutral account of memory, leaving the problem
of knowing whether it answers to any independent reality aside. Here
is his argument:
(1)
(2)
(3)

One can only remember what one has experienced.

One can only experience what goes on within oneself.
Therefore, one can only remember what went on within
oneself.

The conclusion is more precisely that

18

MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 255 (p. 190). He similarly refuses to conceive
memory judgements as sophisticated judgements of correspondence, see op. cit., p.
259 (p. 195).
19
MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 255 (p. 190)
20
This is in sharp contrast with Brentano, according to which each state of mind has
itself as secondary object, something he describes as eigentmliche Verfleckung. See
BRENTANO, Franz, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Routledge, 1995,
and JACQUETTE, Dale, Brentanos Concept of Intentionality, in JACQUETTE,
Dale (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, CUP, 2004, p. 101.

FABRICE TERONI

we can actually and directly [unmittelbar] remember only the

data of the mental life ().21

Anything else is remembered on the basis of such data , as

Meinong puts it. His strategy seems to consist in discounting the
problem of realism because an account of memory must in any case be
given independently of its resolution: what follows clearly shows that
he is happy to restrict the discussion to judgements about the subjects
former states of mind. Before proceeding, it is interesting to underline
that Meinong grasps knowledge of what is external to the mind as
problematic, contrary to knowledge of what has occurred in the mind
itself. Here, he is close to Russell who, in The Problems of
Philosophy, admits acquaintance with past sense-data, but not with
anything else than sense-data22. We tend today to conceive knowledge
of the past and of the external world as being equally problematic, as
Russell himself was to argue later23. Let me return with Meinongs
restriction of memory to judgements about past mental states. First,
note that this is in sharp contrast with Meinongs own examples of
memory judgements mentioned above, which are about normal
external events or objects, and seem independent both of judgements
about present and past experiences. If we follow Meinong, we have to
evaluate this as a simplification: memory judgements are primarily
directed at past experiences, and only secondarily at past external
events. A memory judgement about a past external event is always
made on the basis of a judgement about a past state of mind, and the
interesting conception of memory judgements as unsophisticated
vanishes. But this sounds implausible: we do not all the time judge
that we had experiences, but more commonly that events occurred.
Meinongs position is only motivated by the argument sketched above,
so we should question its credentials if we want to avoid this
implausible consequence. It is helpful here to sketch two types of
direct/indirect realism with respect to memory. First, memory can be
said to be about experiences in the sense that memory presentations
are presentations of former experiences. This does not imply anything
with respect to the object of the judgement, and is compatible with
direct realism. Second, one can argue that memory judgements are
primarily directed at past experiences, that past experiences constitute
their immediate objects. This is a form of indirect realism, parallel to
the idea that we immediately perceive sense-data. As far as I can see,
pointing to the fact that one can only remember what one has
experienced (premise (1)) grounds the first position: if memory
presentations depend on previous experiences, then the restriction of
memory to what subjects have previously experienced is respected.
This uncontentious claim should not be confused with the contentious
one that the object of memory is a past experience.
21

MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 256 (p. 191), my emphasis.

RUSSELL, The Problems of Philosophy , OUP, 1970
23
See especially RUSSELL, Bertrand, The Analysis of Mind, Routledge

22

MEINONG ON MEMORY

Moreover, premise (2) is at best dubious, for the mention of

experience is undeniably unclear: in a certain sense, I enjoy
experiences which may be said to go on inside of me24, but this is not
to say that their primary object is something of the sort. To say this is
not to adopt a reconciliatory position, but to refuse direct realism, and
Meinong seems happy with the alternative: idealism or indirect
realism. This is to omit direct realism about memory, which stresses
that memory judgements can be immediately about past events or
objects. Meinong neglects here important distinctions as well as his
former mention of memory judgements directly about external events.
Even if it is true that memory judgements are made on the basis of
mental states, this does not mean that they are immediately directed
upon a present, or past, mental state. Nor, I would add, is the fact that
memory presentations depend on former experiences a ground for
saying that judgements made on their basis cannot be directly about
past external events25. As far as I can see, Meinongs position is easily
reconciled with direct realism once his argument is dismissed: there is
room for a direct realist Meinongian position according to which
memory judgements are directly about past events. Note also that his
peculiar conception of memory judgements is not grounded in
classical foundationalist fashion, i.e. by arguing that uncertain
judgements depend on certainty, for judgements about past mental
states are uncertain and Meinong is not, as we shall see, committed to
this position26. His answer to the second question is nevertheless that
memory judgements are directly about past experiences, but is
inconclusively buttressed.
If we modify his position in the way suggested, we can see how a
fundamentally Meinongian conception of memory differs from an
important tradition which conceives memory judgements as complex
and reflexive. Thus, according to Locke,
the repository of the memory signifies no more than this, - that
the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions which
it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them,
that it has had them before.27

For Locke, as for William James28, memory is complex, for it depends

on the minds capacity to think about its own past experiences, an
24

Disjunctivists are prone to question a specific reading of this remark, see

HINTON, J.M., Visual Experiences, Mind, 1967 ; SNOWDON, Paul, Perception,
Vision and Causation, reprinted in DANCY, Jonathan (ed.), Perceptual Knowledge,
OUP, 1988 ; CHILD, William, Vision and Experience : The causal Theory and the
disjunctive Conception, The Philosophical Quarterly, 42.168, 1992 and Vision and
Causation : Reply to Hyman, The Philosophical Quarterly, 1994
25
These remarks must of course be grounded in a specific conception of memory
presentations and judgements that I cannot provide here.
26
See section (2) below.
27
LOCKE, John, An Essay concerning human Understanding, Book II, Chapter 10,
2. Emphasis in the original.
28
JAMES, William, The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, Dover Books, 1950, p. 648

FABRICE TERONI

important part of what is called today a theory of the mind. This

position has many contemporary advocates who stress that memory, or
at least an important form of memory (episodic or personal memory)
requires the subject to be able to think about his own states of mind:
they are metarepresentational, or second-order thoughts29. I said above
that Meinongs own stress on the unsophisticated nature of memory
judgements can lead, once his argument for indirect realism is
cancelled, to a plausible account according to which they are
independent on both judgements about present and past experiences.
This Meinongian account differs radically from the positions sketched
here: according to it, memory occurs when modest judgements are
made on the basis of specific presentations, more complex states of
awareness being no more than other judgements made on the same
basis. Memory is conceived as a fundamental endowment of the mind,
which can be sophisticatedly exploited once the relevant capacities are
acquired, but which functions independently of them. In a nutshell,
memory is a distinct first-level mental phenomenon, and there are no
different types of memory, but various judgements made on the basis
of memory presentations. In this, it is on a par with perception, on the
basis of which we can make reflexive judgements (such as I am
standing in front of a church), but which does not depend on the
capacity to make them: more mundane judgements are already
perceptual. For reasons that I have no time to discuss here, but which
are closely linked with the fundamental distinctions I mentioned
above, I think this Meinongian position to be philosophically sound,
and to ground an appealing conception of memory.
(2) THE JUSTIFICATION OF MEMORY JUDGEMENTS
Memory judgements have a specific nature, but Meinongs main
interest lies in their epistemological credentials. In this section, I
discuss the way Meinong argues for the specific justification he
endows them with, the next being devoted to the way we have to
unpack his position. My aim here is not to reconstruct fully his
argumentation, but to convey its motivation, plausibility, and
similarity with other positions.
Meinong points first that memory judgements are made
with a distinct claim to credibility ().30

29

Important contemporary accounts of this type are PERNER, Joseph, Experiential

Awareness, in SCHNEIDER, W. et WEINERT, F.E. (eds.), Interactions among
Aptitudes, Strategies and Knowledge in cognitive Performance, Springer, 1990 ;
PERNER, Joseph et RUFFMAN, Ted, Episodic Memory and autonoetic
Consciousness, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 59, 1995 ; DOKIC,
Jrme, Une Thorie rflexive du souvenir pisodique, Dialogue, 36, 3, 1997 ; Is
Memory purely preservative ? in HOERL, Christoph et McCORMACK, Teresa
(eds.), Time and Memory, OUP, 2001 ; OWENS, David, A Lockean Theory of
Memory Experiences, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56.2, 1996.
30
MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 255 (p. 189)

10

MEINONG ON MEMORY

When I remember and judge that the house by the lake was made of
brown wood planks, I feel entitled to this judgement, something which
is for instance not present if I judge out of the blue. The goal of
epistemology is according to Meinong to
attempt to determine whether this trustworthiness
[Vertrauenswrdigkeit] is based on something which these
judgements have in common with others that epistemologists
have already investigated, or whether it is based on something
which, due to its special nature, requires special consideration.31

His method consists in investigating the possibility to classify memory

judgements in classical categories. To complete this task, Meinong
uses two fundamental distinctions within the category of judgements,
which can be summarized in the following matrix:
Is the judgement based upon proof?

What is the type

of judgement?

Yes
Existential Indirectly evident
existential judgement.
Ex : the judgement
that there were giant
lizards on Earth.
Relational Indirectly evident
relational judgement.
Ex : mathematical
judgement derived
from a proof.

No
Directly evident
existential judgement.
Restricted to
judgements of inner
perception.
Directly evident
relational judgement.
Ex : judgements of
comparison and
compatibility.

Meinong next discusses, in turn, the plausibility of classifying memory

judgements in each of these categories. He provides two reasons
against assimilating them to directly evident relational judgements:
first, a claim to correspondence may exist with respect to memory, ie
the subject can claim that his memory image corresponds to what was
the case, but this
is as inessential to memory judgements (or only connected with
them in the majority of cases) as the above-mentioned reflection
on the remembering process.32

To classify memory judgements as relational is to intellectualize them

too much. Second, and more crucially, judgements of correspondence
depend on memory, since the reality to which the present image is
compared lies in the past and, according to Meinong, relational
judgements are
only possible if both terms of the relation are given, and not if
one of these terms must, as a precondition, belong to the past.33
31
32

MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 256 (p. 192)

MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 259 (pp. 194-5)

FABRICE TERONI

11

To compare Marys party with his memory image, the past party must
be cognitively accessible to John, and this can only be provided by
memory. Thus, to understand memory judgements as relational is to
be blind to their specific form, and to be caught in a vicious circle,
since the only remotely plausible relational judgements with which
they can be equated depend on them34.
Are they directly evident existential judgements? Meinong restricts
this category, in a Cartesian fashion, to introspection, and shows how
implausible it is to identify memory judgements with introspective
judgements stricto sensu (they do not have the form this occurs now
in my mental life35). Moreover, the only alternative is to say that they
are made on the basis of introspection, but with an eye to what
occurred in the past, something as what I enjoy now is identical with
something I enjoyed in the past: as Meinong notes, this is to come
back to the former implausible tentative to grasp them as relational.
Memory judgements are neither relational nor directly evident
existential judgements, thus they are not directly evident. This indirect
proof by elimination does not satisfy Meinong, who adds important
comments on the directly evident. What has the property of being
directly evident
has the characteristic of imposing an absolute firm conviction.36

If we come back to the matrix above, we see that directly evident

judgements are for Meinong indubitable, for how could I doubt that
2+2=4, or that I am enjoying such and such a conscious experience?
This does not lead him to say that to be directly evident is to be
absolutely convincing: this is one of its characteristics, and to equate
the two would be to confuse psychology with normativity. For
unshakable conviction is but too commonly present when no evidence,
but simply prejudice, has taken root in the mind. What is absent in this
case, but present when what is directly evident elicits conviction is, as
I understand Meinong, the right to be sure. In these last cases,
unshakable conviction is justified, or grounded: the intensity of the
judgement corresponds to available evidence37. I do not know how he
conceives the relation between direct evidence and firm conviction (is
the relation necessary? what kind of necessity does it have ?), but
these remarks suffice for my present purposes. For to stress this
33

MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 259 (p. 195)

I take Anscombe to make essentially the same point. See ANSCOMBE, G.E.M.,
Memory, Experience and Causation, in Collected Papers, Vol. II, Metaphysics and
the Philosophy of Mind, OUP, 1981, p. 126
35
This remark is also grounded in by distinction between sophisticated and modest
judgements discussed above.
36
MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 260 (pp. 196-7)
37
This is in contrast with SCHUBERT-KALSI, Marie-Luise, Meinongs Theory of
Knowledge, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, who opts for a more subjective reading of
evidence. One thing is clear : Meinong distinguishes here evidence from conviction.
34

12

MEINONG ON MEMORY

characteristic of directly evident judgements grounds another, and this

time direct, reason why memory judgements cannot be of this type: it
is indeed very common to doubt the deliverances of memory.
Meinong has thus plausibly eliminated three of the four options
represented in the above matrix, but what about the idea that memory
judgements are indirectly evident judgements of fact, i.e. the idea that
their evidence depends on a proof? The discussion of this possibility
takes an important part of Meinongs text, and I will be content with
stressing the main articulations of his argument. To affirm that
memory judgements are of this type is to say that their claim to
credibility results from a general method of investigation, empirical
verification. To show that such cannot be the case, Meinong proposes
two arguments. The first is as follows:
(1) The evidence of memory judgements is based upon a proof.
(2) Being empirical, their specific proof consists in empirical
verification.
(3) Empirical verification is either established by means of direct
sensory perception 38 or with the help of other individuals.
(4) Verifications of the first type rely on memory: the comparison
with what is provided by sense-perception always depends in
part on memory (to check my memory of the house by a
relevant perception requires my believing that houses do not
change, which in turn depends on memory).
(5) Verifications of the second type have the same defect: The
memory of A is verified by the memory of B ; what
significance could be attributed to the whole process, if the
memory of B had not been accorded a certain degree of
trustworthiness ? 39
(6) Individual verifications of memory judgements are always
epistemically circular.
The second is briefly sketched but can be reconstructed as follows:
(1) Induction depends on gathering evidence, which constitutes the
basis of inductive reasoning.
(2) Most individual verifications upon which the inductive
conclusion depends occurred in the past.
(3) In order to be available now, they must be remembered.
(4) The inductive procedure is epistemically circular.
The first argument concerns any procedure of verification: it cannot be
achieved without relying on the validity of memory. The second
argument is about the inductive process itself, even assuming there is a
way to cancel the first: memory provides the evidential basis on which
the inductive procedure depends. According to Meinong, each
38
39

MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 261 (p. 198)

MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 264 (p. 202)

FABRICE TERONI

13

argument is decisive against the option under review, but note that
there are slightly different theses in the neighbourhood, most notably:
(a) It is possible to prove non-circularily the validity of a
particular memory.
(b) It is possible to prove the validity of memory in
general.
(c) It is possible to prove the validity of memory in general
through the application of (a).
Meinongs first argument attempts to refute thesis (a), whereas he
seems to conceive the second to be directed to thesis (b). These two
questions are best kept apart, for (a) does not lead automatically to
(b) : even if the validity of a particular memory is non-circularily
demonstrated, this does not ground the possibility to demonstrate the
validity of memory in general. The relevant possibility here is that the
argument required in order to reach this further conclusion depends on
memory, and thus is viciously circular. This would be the case if the
only way to secure the general conclusion must rely on induction (that
is, (b) can be reached only via (c)), thus falling prey to Meinongs
second argument. I think that thesis (a) can be sustained in a certain
way, though not thesis (c). I cannot do justice to the complexity of this
problem here, but let me briefly broach some important points. This
will allow me to locate Meinong with respect to other positions.
For Meinong is here in sharp opposition with a series of analytical
discussions trying to demonstrate the validity of memory through
sophisticated arguments40. Some attempted proofs rely on the a priori
validity of the principle of induction41, which is at best problematic.
But by focusing on what he calls non-retrospective cases, what I called
earlier propositional memory, E.J. Furlong seems to succeed in
proving the validity of some cases of memory, but is nevertheless
unable to plausibly defend thesis (b): this move necessarily relies on
induction, thereby succumbing to Meinongs second argument. Note
also that if what I said above on Meinongs restrictive account of the
scope of memory is along the right tracks, then the first argument goes
through: there may be, as Furlong shows, non-circular ways to
demonstrate the validity of the preserved belief that 2+2=4, but not
judgements about what has occurred in the past made on the basis of
memory presentations. Why? Because in this case, the two types of
verification shown by Meinongs first argument to be circular are the
only available ones.
But this is not even required for Meinongs point to go through, for to
conceive memory judgements as indirectly evident is to grasp their
40

One can cite, among others, HOLLAND, R.F., The empiricist Theory of Memory,
Mind, 63, 1954 ; SAUNDERS, J.T., Scepticism and Memory, Philosophical Review,
1963 ; HARROD, R.F., Memory, Mind, 51, 1942 ; FURLONG, E.J., Memory, Mind,
57, 1948.
41
See HARROD, R.F., op. cit.

14

MEINONG ON MEMORY

epistemological status as dependent upon proofs, something Meinong

rightly grasps as artificial42. To opt for this conception is to sustain
thesis (d) :
(d) The epistemological status of any individual memory
judgement depends on a proof.
And there are only two options here: either to say that the justification
of any individual memory judgement depends on a proof of its own
validity, or on a proof of the general validity of memory. This
constitutes a dilemma: on the one hand, individual memory
judgements are almost never verified, and so would be unjustified; on
the other, any general proof of memory depends on induction, and
therefore cannot ground individual judgements non-circularily.
Meinongs most important conclusion, that memory judgements
cannot be based on a proof, is thus secured. His sophisticated
assessment of the epistemic circularity of any attempt to prove the
validity of memory is in this way apt to cancel the attempts of many
posterior analytic philosophers.
But where does this leave us? Meinong has shown that the options
represented in the matrix are all unfaithful to the specificity of
memory judgements. There remain two options: either to admit that
they are unjustified, or to extend our conception of justification in
order to cover their peculiarities43. The first option is a very strong
brand of scepticism, which Meinong rejects44, so what is his positive
account? It is as follows:
Memory judgements represent conjectures (Vermutungen).45

Conjectures are in sharp contrast with certainty, according to

Meinong, and this difference
can be described in terms of psychology as a difference in the
intensity of the act of judgement.46

Psychologically speaking, the difference between memory and

introspective judgements consists in distinct degrees of confidence:
the subject simply feels more confident in the later than in the former.
Meinong further notes that with conjectures we face
characteristics immanent in the types of judgement concerned.47
42

MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 265 (p. 203)

Note that, for reasons similar to those given by Meinong, perceptual judgements
cannot either be classified in the matrix. On this point, see CHISHOLM, Roderick,
Verstehen : The epistemological Question, in Foundations of Knowing, Minneapolis,
1982.
44
MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 265 (p. 204)
45
MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 266 (p. 204)
46
MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 266 (p. 205)
47
MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 267 (p. 206)
43

FABRICE TERONI

15

As I understand him, this means that for conjectural judgements,

though not for directly evident ones, we can detach justification from
factuality: a conjectural judgement which comes out false can still be
justified, whereas a false directly evident judgement is an
impossibility. In a nutshell, conjectural judgements are not as
immediately connected as evident ones to the way the world is (or
was).
Memory judgements have direct conjectural evidence. Because they
cannot be epistemically grounded on proofs, their justification must be
intimately linked with the judgement itself and hence direct; because
they are distinct from evident judgements, they are endowed with a
specific kind of justification, conjectural evidence, which is
compatible with error. Meinong concludes that
every individual judgement carries its whole guarantee in itself
().48

A memory judgement is by itself, because it is a judgement of this

type, endowed with its own specific (and faillible) guarantee. This is
not the case for every kind of judgement: a mathematical judgement,
for instance, is not justified for the simple reason that it is so. The
specificity of memory judgements, as we saw in section (1), is to be
made on the basis of presentations: this should motivate a specific
account of memory presentations, thereby explaining their
epistemological status49. Memory judgements are made on specific
bases, and are eo ipso endowed with justification.
In this section, I presented Meinongs way to ground his position on
the epistemological status of memory judgements. The conclusion is
reached via a process of elimination. This very interesting procedure
has had a fundamental impact on Roderick Chisholm50, and grounds a
sophisticated form of foundationalism that does not look for
unshakable foundations in any area of knowledge. Meinong is here in
profound agreement with many contemporary foundationalists whose
ancestor is Thomas Reid51. The relation between these two thinkers
could constitute the topic of another discussion, so let me simply note
that they share a form of faillibilism, the idea that justified beliefs can
be wrong, and of particularism: some individual judgements possess
their own guarantee. Moreover, Meinongs discussion is closely
related to contemporary debates on the distinction between being
justified and proving that one is, which William Alston applies against
many contemporary epistemologies52. Meinong, by refusing thesis (d),
48

MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 268 (p. 207)

Something Meinong does not provide in his essay.
50
See CHISHOLM, Roderick, Foundations of Knowing, Minneapolis, 1982, and
Theory of Knowledge, Prentice-Hall, 1989
51
REID, Thomas, Philosophical Works, Olms Verlag, 1983
52
See ALSTON, William, Epistemic Justification, Cornell UP, 1989
49

16

MEINONG ON MEMORY

and by stressing issues of epistemic circularity, displays a profound

sensitivity to this fundamental distinction.
(3) BRENTANOS CRITICISMS AND THE NATURE OF PRESUMPTIVE
EVIDENCE

Before concluding, I want to briefly discuss the way we have to

understand Meinongs position, which can be done by discussing
Brentanos criticism. Let me first mention some points about
Brentanos conception of evidence. He contrasts what he calls blind
with evident judgements53. When evident, a judgement is incompatible
with error, as well as doubt54. Brentano therefore works with a
restricted account of evidence, which corresponds to what Meinong
calls direct evidence. He moreover distinguishes between mediately
and immediately evident judgements, something we have already met
above and which corresponds to the presence or absence of proof.
Armed with this conception of evidence, Brentano addresses a
fundamental criticism to Meinongs position based on the nature of
knowledge of probabilities.
He points first that we can be certain of probabilities, for instance of
the fact that the probability of throwing this dice and scoring a six is
1/655. This kind of judgements can be evident, but what the subject
judges with evidence is the holding of a probability. What is, more
generally, the structure of this kind of knowledge? In reference to
Laplace, Brentano notes that
each probability is composed of knowledge and ignorance, of
which we must be aware56.

Thus, for instance, when Sam judges that it will probably rain
tomorrow, his judgement is constitutively linked with his awareness
that, let us say, the present weather is a sign of rain, and with his
awareness that it may not rain. The presence of knowledge and
ignorance explains why he makes a probabilistic judgement. This
immediately grounds this objection to Meinong: because probabilistic
judgements are composed of two elements, the notion of immediate
presumptive evidence is contradictory. Such judgements are
essentially mediately grounded, because their evidence depends on the
weighting of reasons. Meinong thus faces a dilemma: either to show
that memory judgements are not probabilistic, or to renounce his
appealing position on the problem of memory.
Note first that we should incline to interpret him as refusing to identify
memory judgements with judgements of probability understood in
53

See for instance BRENTANO, Franz, Versuch ber die Erkenntnis, Felix Meiner
Verlag, 1970, p. 178
54
BRENTANO, Franz, Wahreit und Evidenz, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1974, p. 144
55
BRENTANO, Franz, idem, p. 145
56
BRENTANO, Franz, idem, p. 145

FABRICE TERONI

17

Brentanos way, because to gather evidence for or against the

occurrence of an event probably depends epistemically on memory
(and presumably also on judgements about remembering itself), and
we saw how sensitive Meinong is to these problems. Moreover, he
never uses knowledge of probabilities in order to illuminate his
account of memory, but in this case memory judgements would be
based on something which [they] have in common with others that
epistemologists have already investigated 57, something he never
points out. Nevertheless, there is a passage translated in a way that
sustains Brentanos reading:
If a person () increases the intensity of his memory judgement
to certainty, then the failure of verification will obviously reveal
his error ; but is he now going to renounce his memory
judgement in the same way as he would have to cease to trust a
mathematical axiom at any time if this axiom had () been
included in a calculation and led to a wrong result ? By no
means ; his exaggerated confidence is somewhat reduced but
not destroyed, and no one has succeeded in exorcizing it. 58

Let me first construct this passage in what I take to be Brentanos way,

before suggesting another interpretation. For it is indeed puzzling. In
the first sentence, is it implied that if the judgement is not made with
certainty, then the failure of verification will not reveal his error? By
MTT, we have at least: if the failure of verification does not reveal his
error, then the judgement was not made with certainty. And Meinong
seems to imply that this is the case for memory judgements, which are
compatible with error. But the compatibility of a judgement with the
non-factuality of its objective occurs only for probabilistic
judgements. Hence, via Brentanos plausible remarks, we reach a
dramatic conclusion. This is unsatisfying on two counts.
First, in the case of probabilistic judgements, the degree of conviction
must be tuned to the evidence gathered for and against the occurrence
of an event, and this would, as noted above, run against the whole
thrust of Meinongs argument. Second, this means that memory
judgements are probabilistic: for instance that it is more probable than
not that I had some specific mental state in the past. This does not
respect the nature of memory judgements in two ways. (a) The
suggestion is psychologically implausible: normal memory
judgements simply do not have this form. And (b), dynamic
considerations show that this is wrong: when I make a memory
judgement about Marys party, and later find a reason against its
having taken place, I do not modify the strength of my inclination to
believe that such was the case, but more dramatically cancel the
judgement. Moreover, if the judgement is probabilistic, then I am not
required to modify its intensity even in the face of error. For judging
57

MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 256 (p. 192), see the beginning of section (2)
above.
58
MEINONG, Alexius, op. cit., p. 268 (pp. 207-8)

18

MEINONG ON MEMORY

with certainty that the probability of a specific past party having

occurred is 75/100 is compatible with its not having occurred. More
generally, two things should not be confused: the objective of the
judgement and its intensity. Any objective is compatible with any
grounded intensity: to judge that the probability of throwing a dice and
scoring six is 1/6 with certainty is sound in some gambling joints, as
well as to judge with presumptive evidence that there was a party.
Meinongs passage can be reconciled with these criticisms by looking
more closely at the original: the translation is misleading because it
uses memory judgement twice, whereas Meinong writes, first, die
Intensitt seiner Gedchtnisurteile (plural) and next das Urteil seines
Gedchtnisses. Thus, he can be interpreted as saying that someone
who is certain of his memory judgements in general will not renounce
to trust memory because one of them is mistaken, but will tune his
trust to their specific evidence. This does not imply that particular
memory judgements can be maintained in the face of defeating
evidence, and hence they need not be understood as probabilistic. So,
if Meinong does not defend the implausible position Brentano
attributes to him, what is his?
The most appealing position along Meinongian lines make use of the
distinctions just mentioned in the following way. First, by arguing that
memory judgements are not, for the reasons sketched above,
probabilistic: to judge on the basis of memory that there was a fire in
ones house is not to judge that this event probably occurred. Second,
by stressing something I mentioned before but neglected since then:
presumptive evidence should be given a normative reading.
Accordingly, to make a memory judgement is to have the right to
make a judgement, and its intensity has to match the specific evidence.
This evidence is moreover presumptive: this means, according to
Meinong, that one has no right to be certain (and is usually not). But
this is not to say that we should conceive memory judgements as
probabilistic, for we can give a more appealing account of the way
subjects can be tuned to the specific evidence of memory: by being
open to error. This is to stress that presumptive evidence is a way
judgements are made, and not judgements with specific objectives.
The idea is therefore that when remembering, but not when one has
direct evidence, one should be open to correction. Someone who
systematically maintain his memory beliefs on the face of
overwhelming evidence to the contrary is in this sense irrational. But
to say that subjects must be open to correction is not to say that their
judgements are probabilistic: they are not, but subjects are aware that
if they encounter some specific kinds of defeating evidence, they
should abandon them. We reach a foundationalist position according
to which judgements based on the deliverances of our primitive
faculties are justified until proven guilty, in Thomas Reids words, or

FABRICE TERONI

19

that they are prima facie justified59, according to the current idiom.
Prima facie justified judgements are not evaluated as unjustified when
defeating evidence is found, thus their epistemic status is compatible
with error, but are not maintained, with any degree of confidence,
once counterevidence is present. Thus, it is possible to remember
without believing, for instance when one mistakes misinformation as
defeating evidence, as well as being justified and wrong.
(4) CONCLUSION
Meinongs essay on memory constitutes a fundamental discussion of
this basic endowment of the mind. I argued above that his conception
of memory, as well as his remarks on different memory judgements
are important in the context of contemporary debates. Meinongs own
brand of memory foundationalism is also very interesting. It appeals to
internal bases of judgements: a memory judgement is justified because
it occurs in the context of a memory presentation relevant to its
subject-matter. This is in sharp opposition to contemporary forms of
reliabilism, and I would add far more plausible. His particularism, his
sensitivity to issues of epistemic circularity, as well as his faillibilism,
ground fascinating positions on the epistemic structure of fundamental
judgements. Many contemporary epistemologists have been seduced
by these antidotes to classical foundationalism, and can only profit
from interaction with Meinongs seminal discussion of memory.

59

On prima facie justification, see, among others, POLLOCK, John, Knowledge and
Justification, Princeton, 1974 ; ALSTON, William, Epistemic Justification, Cornell
UP, 1989 ; SOSA, Ernest, Knowledge in Perspective, CUP, 1991 ; and CHISHOLM,
Roderick, Theory of Knowledge, Prentice Hall, 1989