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LECTURE 1: Introduction.
Wireless communication.
Security and privacy goals.
Brief overview of security
mechanisms.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Topics
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Readings
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Today
Wireless
communication
Wireless architectures
Introduction to crypto
and attacks
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2) Authentication:
Data source authentication: the data is coming from
an authorized party.
Example: Alice receives a message from Bob. This
service ensures that the message is from Bob and not
from Carl.
Entity authentication: the entity is who it says it is.
Example: When Alice tries to obtain access to her
bank account, an authentication operation is performed
to ensure that Alice asks for the information.
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Privacy
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Wireless Specific
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Wireless communication
characteristics
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Wireless Communication
THERE IS NO LINK: electromagnetic waves
c
f =
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Wave Propagation
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Characteristics
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Wave Components
Multi-path components:
Result from reflection, refraction, scattering
Wave arrives at receiver shifted in amplitude, phase
and frequency
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Path Loss
Wavelength/frequency:
Long wavelength (low frequency), less loss
Short wavelength (high frequency), more loss
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Fading
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Interference
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Thermal Noise
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=
High
Low
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FDMA
Users are separated in frequency domain
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TDMA
Users transmit data on same frequency, but at
different times (separated in time)
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CDMA
Users separated both by time and frequency
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Spread Spectrum
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FHSS: Details
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FHSS Example
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DSSS Example
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DSSS vs FHSS
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OSI/ISO Model
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Constrained information
transmission
Distance vs data rates
Shared channel
Coordination
Open environment
Eavesdropping
Limited coverage
Cooperation
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Lecture 1/ WS Milano Summer 2011
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Wireless Networks:
Architectures and
Applications
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Spectrum Allocation
Name
900 Mhz
2.4 Ghz
5 Ghz
Range
902 - 928
2.4 - 2.4835
5.15 - 5.35
Bandwidth
26 Mhz
83.5 Mhz
200 Mhz
.06 m / 2.4
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Spectrum Regulators
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IEEE Standards
Slide by Omid Fatemieh (From Spring 2010 cs463 at UIUC)
WRAN
IEEE 802.22
Range
IEEE 802.20
WMAN
WiMax
IEEE 802.16
WLAN
ZigBee
802.15.4
Bluetooth
15.4c
802.15.1
WPAN
0.01
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[Heile06]
0.1
WiFi
802.11
1
10
Data Rate (Mbps)
Lecture 1/ WS Milano Summer 2011
802.15.3
802.15.3c
100
1000
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Wireless Networks
Cellular Networks
WMAN WiMAX
MANETs
WMNs
Sensor Networks
WPAN - Bluetooth
RFID
VANETs
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Cellular Networks
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WiMAX Networks
Architecture:
Long range system, licensed (2.3 GHz, 2.5 GHz and
3.5 GHz) or unlicensed spectrum
Uses a QoS mechanism based on connections
between the base station and the user device
Applications:
Mobile broadband connectivity across cities and
countries through a variety of devices.
Wireless alternative to cable and DSL for "last mile"
broadband access
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Sensor Networks
Architecture:
Low cost small devices, able to sense the
environment (temperature, light, humidity),
report sensed data using wireless
communication
A large number of sensors (static or mobile),
distributed in an ad hoc manner over an area
Nodes cooperate: communicate via multi-hop
wireless communication, some nodes
aggregate data
Unlicensed spectrum
Applications: battlefield surveillance, medical
monitoring, biological detection, habitant
monitoring, home security, disaster recovery
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SCADA
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Architecture:
Connect and exchange information in short
communication range of 1, 10 and 100 meters
Uses unlicensed spectrum
Applications:
PDAs, mobile phones, laptops, PCs, printers, digital
cameras and video game consoles
Cell phone and a hands free headset or car kit
PC input and output devices (mouse, keyboard and
printer)
Test equipment, GPS receivers and medical
equipment.
Remote controls where infrared was traditionally used
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VANETs Status
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Architecture:
Wireless communication between a reader and
an electronic tag attached to an object
RFID tag: microchip + RF antenna, can be active
or passive, stores few hundred bits
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Next Generation of
GPS
UAT/
1090
Squitter
HF/
Satcom
UAT
IP VPN
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Architecture:
24 satellites that orbit the
Earth in very precise orbits
twice a day and emit
signals
Applications:
Position and coordinates
Travel progress reports
Accurate time
measurement
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Galileo
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Wireless communication is
omnipresent today operating in
licensed and unlicensed spectrum
Architectures:
Centralized
Peer to peer
Communication:
One-hop
Multi-hop
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Information Security
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2) Authentication:
Data source authentication: the data is coming from an
authorized party.
Example: Alice receives a message from Bob. This
service ensures that the message is from Bob and not
from Carl.
Entity authentication: the entity is who it says it is.
Example: When Alice tries to obtain access to her
bank account, an authentication operation is performed
to ensure that Alice asks for the information.
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Security Attacks
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Interruption
Interception
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Modification
Fabrication (injection)
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Security Mechanisms
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Actually
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cryptography
cryptanalysis
cryptology
plaintexts
ciphertexts
keys
encryption
decryption
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Breaking Ciphers
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Breaking Ciphers
Ciphertext-only attack:
The cryptanalyst knows only the
ciphertext. Sometimes the language of the
plaintext and the cipher are also known.
The goal is to find the plaintext and the key.
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Known-plaintext attack:
The cryptanalyst knows one
or
several pairs of ciphertext
and the corresponding
plaintext.
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Chosen-plaintext attack
The cryptanalyst can choose a number of
messages and obtain the ciphertexts
for them
The goal is to deduce the key used in the other
encrypted messages or decrypt any new messages
using that key.
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Chosen-ciphertext attack
Similar to the chosen-plaintext attack,
but the cryptanalyst can choose a
number of ciphertexts and obtain
the plaintexts.
It can also be adaptive The choice of
ciphertext may depend on the plaintext
received from previous requests.
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Unconditional security
The adversary has unlimited computational
resources. Analysis is made by using probability
theory. Perfect secrecy: observation of the
ciphertext provides no information to an
adversary.
Complexity-theoretic security
The adversary is assumed to have polynomial
computational power. The analysis uses
complexity theory; Polynomial attacks although
feasible, in practice can be computationally
infeasible.
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Provable security
Proof of security relies on the difficulty of solving a
well-known and supposedly difficult problem
(example: computation of discrete logarithms).
Computational security (practical security)
Measures the amount of computational effort required
to defeat a system. Sometimes related to the hard
problems, but no proof of equivalence is known.
Ad hoc security (heuristic security)
Variety of convincing arguments that every
successful attack requires more resources than the
ones available to an attacker. Unforeseen attacks
remain a threat.
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One-Time Pad
Key is chosen randomly
Plaintext X = (x1 x2 xn)
Key
K = (k1 k2 kn)
Ciphertext Y = (y1 y2 yn)
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Summary so Far
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Stream Ciphers
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Block Ciphers
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DES Features
Features:
Block size = 64 bits
Key size = 56 bits
Number of rounds = 16
16 intermediary keys, each 48
bits
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Cryptanalysis of DES
Brute Force:
Known-Plaintext Attack
56 possible keys
Try all 2
Requires constant memory
Time-consuming
DES challenges: (RSA)
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Triple DES
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Rijandel Cryptanalysis
Resistant to linear and differential cryptanalysis
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Properties of ECB
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IV
C0
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M1
M2
M3
Ek
Ek
Ek
C1
C2
C3
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Properties of CBC
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Encryption
r-bit shift
r-bit shift
I1=IV
Ij
Ij
Oj
xj
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cj
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Properties of CFB
Randomized encryption
A ciphertext block depends on all preceding
plaintext blocks; reorder affects decryption
Errors propagate for several blocks after
the error, but the mode is selfsynchronizing (like CBC).
Decreased throughput.
Can vary the number of bits feed back, trading off
throughput for ease of use
Sequential encryption
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Decryption
Encryption
Oj-1
Oj-1
I1=IV
Ij
Ij
I1=IV
Oj
xj
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cj
cj
xj
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Properties of OFB
Randomized encryption
Sequential encryption, but preprocessing possible
Error propagation limited
Subject to limitation of stream cipher
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Encryption Modes:CTR
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Properties of CTR
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Summary so Far
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