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COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE

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IN THE MATTER CONCERNING

JUDGE VALERIANO SAUCEDO
CJP NO. 194

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CLOSING ARGUMENT BEFORE SPECIAL MASTERS

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

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April 27, 2015

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REPORTED BY:

SANDRA LEE HOCKIN

CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER NO. 7372

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UCCELLI & ASSOCIATES

Certified Shorthand Reporters
1243 Mission Road
South San Francisco, California 94080
Tel: 650.952.0774 Fax: 650.952.8688
www.UccelliReporting.com
Silicon Valley: 408.275.1122

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PARTICIPANTS:
Special Masters:
Presiding Special Master
Honorable Judith L. Haller
Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District,
Division One
Honorable Becky Lynn Dugan
Superior Court of California, County of Riverside
Honorable Louis R. Hanoian
Superior Court of California, County of San Diego
Examiner
James F. Harrigan, Esq.
Victoria Henley, Director-Chief Counsel
Office of Trial Counsel
Commission on Judicial Performance
Respondent's Counsel:
Randall A. Miller, Esq.
Caroline van Oosterom, Esq.
Miller LLP

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April 27, 2015

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Counsel, I think we should have the record

indicate why we were -- we started an hour later than we
anticipated. Certainly none of us thought that the first
flight out of the San Francisco/Oakland area would be
canceled, and that's why Mr. Harrigan was not able to be
here by 11:00. Fortunately he was able to get on the
10:00 clock flight and has literally come straight from
the airport. So I appreciate, Mr. Miller, your
flexibility on this. And with that, we will be ready to
proceed.
Counsel, the judges and I had an opportunity to
chat before we began this morning. We are going to
conduct this in a very traditional closing argument
setup. We will -- absent something extraordinary
happening, we will not be interrupting you in your
closing arguments. However, at the end of your closing
arguments, if there is something that we feel needs to be
covered that has not been, there may be questions from
the bench. There may not be.
So, Mr. Harrigan, when you finish yours, we will
ask questions.
Mr. Miller, then, after your closing, we'll ask
any questions.
But we thought that would be a better way to
proceed than interrupting you so that your train of
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Page
4 EXAMINER'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
5 RESPONDENT'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
6 EXAMINER'S REBUTTAL
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04-27-2015

11:58 A.M.
---oOo--SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: We are here in the
Commission on Judicial Performance inquiry concerning
Judge Valeriano Saucedo. I'm Justice Haller, presiding
over these proceedings. To my right is Judge Hanoian,
and to my left is Judge Dugan.
Counsel, I'm going to ask you to make
appearances for the record so that we have everything on
the record.
Mr. Harrigan, starting with you, sir.
MR. HARRIGAN: Thank you.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: And I'm just going to
ask you also to come to the microphone here.
MR. HARRIGAN: James Harrigan; I'm the examiner
in this case. And Victoria Henley from the Commission is
with me.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right.
And, Mr. Miller, sir.
MR. MILLER: Good afternoon, Your Honors.
Randy Miller for the respondent, Judge Valeriano Saucedo,
as well as Caroline van Oosterom.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: And the record shall
reflect also that Judge Saucedo is present with us. All
right.
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thought is what it has been. All right? Okay.

Then, Mr. Harrigan, if you would like to begin.
MR. HARRIGAN: Justice, before I start, there's
a small housekeeping matter regarding redacted exhibits
that I need to provide -SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right.
MR. HARRIGAN: -- if I might do so.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: Yes. We received an
indication that there was some concern that personal bank
account numbers, et cetera, are in some of the exhibits.
MR. HARRIGAN: That's correct. And I think also
there might be additional personal information; phone
number -- other phone numbers or Social Security numbers.
I didn't do the redaction, so I can only represent that
they were done carefully and according to the discussions
between counsel.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right. So am I
correct in understanding, then, that Mr. Miller has seen
these, the redactions are acceptable to him and that
these will substitute for the original exhibits that are
in the hands of the Commission?
MS. VAN OOSTEROM: Yes, Your Honor.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right. Thank you.
And -MR. HARRIGAN: May I?
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MR. HARRIGAN: That's correct, Justice.

For example, the examiner's exhibits, I believe,
were 52.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right.
MR. HARRIGAN: And in the redacted ones, it
begins with 8, and then it goes on to include several
others. So not all 52 are represented in here.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: Understood.
MR. HARRIGAN: Which I think I should have said
it that way to begin with.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: That's okay.
And as I understand it, the original exhibits
are in the hands of the CJP, and they too will receive
redacted copies?
MR. HARRIGAN: Yes.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right.
MR. HARRIGAN: Yes. I think, actually,
Janice Brickley had received it as well today.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right. And,
Mr. Miller, is this acceptable to you, sir, on behalf of
Judge Saucedo?
MR. MILLER: It is. It's consistent with our
understanding.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right. And again,
Counsel, thank you for taking care of that so that today
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SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: Certainly.

And, Mr. Harrigan, if you would identify those
for the record so we know that what we're supposed to
receive.
MR. HARRIGAN: Justice, I have not seen these
until this morning.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: That's fine.
MR. HARRIGAN: However, each binder, or packet,
contains redacted examiner exhibits as well as respondent
exhibits, which I believe reflect the exhibits that had
been introduced and moved into evidence.
Without having a chance to compare them, I would
ask only that the exhibits that you do have, to the
extent that they are not reflected in these, that you
already have those into evidence, I think it's important
that nothing be missing. And I haven't had a chance to
compare.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: If I understand what
you're saying then, there may be pages from any number of
the exhibits. It's not as if it's one exhibit or two
exhibits. It may be several.
So the packets that you're giving us, we are to
take each page and use the redacted copy as opposed to
what was admitted into evidence when we were all together
in Fresno; is that correct?
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we can put our attention on the closing arguments. All

right. Good.
If you would like to distribute those, that's
just fine.
MR. HARRIGAN: Thank you.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right. And this is
very helpful because there's a table showing us what's
been redacted on both the examiner exhibits and the
respondent exhibits. All right then.
Mr. Harrigan, when you're ready to proceed. And
please make yourself comfortable at the podium. There is
a button that will adjust it to your height.
MR. HARRIGAN: I thought it was the microphone.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: No. It's the whole
podium.
MR. HARRIGAN: I always wanted to be taller.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right. Just make
yourself comfortable.
---oOo--EXAMINER'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
MR. HARRIGAN: Good morning, Justice Haller,
Judge Dugan and Judge Hanoian. I thank you for the
opportunity to present remarks to you at this time.
As you know, there is a process before a
post-hearing brief to be submitted, and that presentation
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will largely treat many of the issues that I have -- I am

not going to discuss today. However, I thought that
there were some points that should be made, and I hope to
do so.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right.
MR. HARRIGAN: This is a case that involves a
lot of paperwork and a lot of documents. And in
preparing for this argument, it became clear to me that
this case might be analogized to a painting. The
painting that I have thought about is a painting by a
Belgian artist, Rene Magritte. He is one who often
presented a male figure in a black bowler hat. One of
his famous ones involved a green apple in the place of a
face.
The painting that I'm thinking about is called
The Blank Signature or The Rider. And it's a painting of
a woman on a horse, a chestnut horse, a beautiful horse,
riding through a scene of a forest with very vertical
trees. And you may be familiar with this.
At first glance, it's an ordinary, normal scene.
But the more you examine it, the more you view it
critically; you find that it's not at all normal. There
are elements of that that jar the senses and that don't
add up with our initial impression.
And this case is much the same. The more
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Now, in a single week, there might well be,

conservatively, 100 instructions from the judge to his
clerk, which would be roughly 5,000 in a year or. In the
three years they worked together, 15,000 times when he
told her to do something, and she did it. She would have
followed every one of those instructions. She trusted
him, and she was told what -- she did what she was told
to do.
Also, we shouldn't fail to recognize that he is
a graduate of University of California Berkeley and
Stanford Law School. She's a high school graduate. He
enjoyed a position of power over her. And throughout the
course of the months involved, he used that position to
inculcate himself into her life, to control her, to
threaten her, to gain her dependence on him, to identify
her vulnerabilities, to test her trust and obedience, to
forge an intimacy. And when his advances were ultimately
rejected, he humiliated her. He injected the possibility
of her being criminally prosecuted. These are the facts.
As the judge testified on April 10th, on
Page 1203, Lines 15 to 17, the quote is: "I have always
lived a very ethical, very orderly life, and that period
of time was -- I've expressed it already -- was a lapse."
And I submit that that's -- it was quite a
lapse.
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evaluation of the evidence is undertaken, the more a

different picture emerges.
And this is not simply the case of improper
gifts provided by the judge to a subordinate court clerk
or a mentoring relationship that got out of hand. No.
The evidence demonstrates a compulsive, singlemindedness
of purpose, a design by the judge to apply increasing
pressure to secure a special-friend relationship with
Mrs. Tovar. This is a case of seduction, of
psychological manipulation intended to achieve financial
dependence with a quid pro quo of intimacy.
And this is important, I believe, to direct our
focus on the context within which the judge's conduct
occurred. He was her boss in the parlance of those who
serve in the courts. She is subordinate to him. They
worked in his department together for three years. She
was used to doing what she was told.
For example: Call the next case. Is the jury
panel ready? Have the jury instruction -- requested
instructions been received? Do we have a probation
report? Have you heard from the public defender? Is
there a general appearance of counsel on file? Is there
a surety bond posted? Is conflict counsel identified?
Please contact the district attorney. We need to reset
this motion.
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Now, as I mentioned, the post-hearing brief will

explore, in detail, the evidentiary record and provide a
full treatment of the issues that will supplement what I
have to say today, but I wish to discuss four different
topics: the primary reason the judge is not credible and
the significance of certain falsehoods, why his conduct
is not mentoring and is unethical, why the evidence
establishes that he is the author of the anonymous
letter, and finally the type of misconduct committed by
the judge, prejudicial misconduct and, in some instances,
willful misconduct.
Now, the judge has shown ongoing willingness to
lie to advance his interests. He admitted lying to
Ms. Tovar about intercepting the letter at the hospital.
He repeated that lie 12 days later in the September 30th
long note about the risk he took. He falsely denied that
this risk was intercepting the letter in his verified
answer. He was impeached by Witness Lisa Buehler on this
point.
The significance of the interception lie was to
make her feel grateful, beholding to him for what he was
doing. It also suggests that the authorship of the
letter is -- he is the author because it only makes sense
that he decided not to actually contact the hospital
after saying he would if he knew there was no letter to
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be intercepted.
Now, the judge lied in his written response to
the Commission and in testimony at the hearing as to what
Mrs. Tovar told him was her relationship with
Deputy Knoy. He claimed she told him there was an
ongoing affair; that she was trying to extricate herself
from it. This was a fabrication.
Both Mrs. Tovar and Deputy Knoy testified there
was no romantic relationship between them in -- after
2008. This was corroborated by Tessie Velasquez. And
the judge was impeached by his own wife, who testified
that he told her that Tovar reported just a financial
connection had existed. Lisa Buehler, who testified that
he told her Tovar said there was just a financial
connection, also impeached him on this point.
The significance of his lie about the existence
of an affair between Mrs. Tovar and Deputy Knoy in 2013
is that it was his rationale for much of his ensuing
conduct. He was helping her through a crisis, ending an
affair she had in order to strengthen her marriage.
Additionally, he sought to develop the fiction of this
affair because without one, the pool of theoretical
suspects as to being the authors of the letter
evaporates.
Now, the judge was untruthful as to why he gave
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of course, as you know, we have records from the flower

shop that they were delivered on the 24th.
The fact that he sent these flowers anonymously
was an example of his effort to control the situation.
He didn't want anybody else to know that he sent them.
In fact, he told her to lie about who sent them. It was
a way that he tested her to see if she was willing to lie
for him.
The judge maintained, in his testimony, that he
believed Mrs. Tovar had all along told her husband the
truth about the gifts and the money and the trips. But
when he texted her on November 3rd to say she would -when she texted him on November 23rd -- November 3rd, to
say she wouldn't tell her husband anything, he thanked
her for saving his life. This is inconsistent with his
position.
Now, he told his staff that he submitted a
resignation letter and decided to rescind it.
Tessie Velasquez corroborates this fact. He falsely
stated, in his written response, that he had told
Mrs. Kennedy he thought of drafting a resignation letter
for her to hold, quote, "in my file." Kennedy impeached
him on this point.
Now, there are several other examples of where
the judge falsely claimed the facts to be other than
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Mrs. Tovar his brother's contact information. He said,

in his response, it was only in connection to her son's
arm injury. He denied, in his answer, that he ever told
her his brother would take care of her financially. He
falsely claimed, in that answer, that Buehler did not
even ask him why he gave Tovar his brother's number.
Buehler impeached him on this point. He
testified he gave his brother's number because of her
son's medical issue. However, Lisa Buehler testified
that he told her he did so because he had made a
commitment to pay $200, and Tovar could continue to
receive this with his brother's help as the judge wanted
her to be financially free, meaning financially free of
Deputy Knoy, not of the judge.
Now, the judge was evasive when he was asked to
explain his text of October 29th, when he told Mrs. Tovar
that he had had a wonderful conversation with his brother
about her, and he didn't -- she didn't know how well she
was covered.
The judge lied about seeking permission to send
flowers to Mrs. Tovar. If he had done so, the flowers
would have been delivered on the anniversary of her
brother's death, not a week or two earlier. This
explains why he denied, in his answer, that the delivery
was on September 24th. He said it was October 1st. And
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alleged, sought to supply evasive answers, testified

nonresponsively to avoid answering specific questions, or
gave explanations intended to obscure and to dodge
culpability. The post-hearing brief will incorporate
these examples.
His credibility is critical to the findings of
fact, and I submit that the record convincingly
demonstrates that he has no credibility at all.
I think Sir Walter Scott said it best in 1808:
"Oh, what a tangled web we weave when first we practice
to deceive."
Now, the judge was not engaged in mentoring
Mrs. Tovar. That claim is simply nonsensical. His
conduct toward her was nothing at all like the examples
his character witnesses described.
First, they sought his help. She did not.
Secondly, they had a specific reason such as
studying for the Bar exam. She did not.
And third, they were not subordinate employees.
She was.
Mentoring is guidance and the imparting of
wisdom to one less experienced. Described here, from the
earliest days, the judge had his interests as paramount.
He tested the waters by giving her cash for her
son. He gave her cash for her birthday when he had not
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done so before. He gave her cash for a new cell phone.

He used the letter -- anonymous letter to find out the
depth of her financial relationship with Knoy. He gave
her cash the next day to substitute himself for
Deputy Knoy. Within days, he sent her flowers and gave
her $500 more, unrelated to any payment for a Jeep loan.
He gave her luxury items like Disneyland vacations and a
BMW automobile. He regularly told her that she had no
financial worries as long as she agreed to be his special
friend, to trust him completely and to tell him
everything about her life. He would pay for body
sculpting if it made her feel better about herself.
He used various means, mechanisms to insert
himself into her life such as writing the legal advice
letter to -- for her son, scheduling auto repairs once he
overheard that she was having a car problem, buying a AAA
card for her protection on a trip she was taking with her
daughter.
He obtained her bank account number to control
and manipulate her with deposits of money. For example,
he wanted his texting privileges reinstated and wrote
that in the October 18th note while depositing $500 in
her account.
He apologized to her on October 31st, at 7:42 in
the morning and twice later that day after they had gone
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emotional affair that she did not want.

Now, it's very rare that a case will have a
significant evidentiary issue; that is, both the smoking
gun and a red herring. And this is what is presented in
a discussion of the authorship of the anonymous letter.
It's a red herring because for purposes of the
charges in this case, authorship does not need to be
established. The actions of the judge following receipt
of the letter are prejudicial misconduct and, arguably,
willful misconduct. Nevertheless, I ask for a finding
that he did write this letter based on the following
circumstantial evidence that I believe is convincing as
to his authorship.
Now, the judge is the only person to have ever
received this letter. Why? Because he wrote it. His
subsequent and immediate conduct after receipt of the
letter demonstrates that he had the motive to write it.
It served as the mechanism he used to insinuate himself
into her life, to secure a close relationship, a special
friend. The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates his
desire for a closer relationship. And we also know that
the various ways in which he used the letter, the threat
of disclosure of the letter, were part and parcel of his
design.
Now, despite obvious potential for a physical
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to the BMW dealership together. Those texts are at 1:52

and 2:00 p.m. And he followed those apologies up with
another deposit in the afternoon of $500.
He claimed that everything was over after
November 3rd, but he deposited $200 on November 12th.
When he realized that she was going to seek a
transfer from the HR office of the court, he deposited
$8,000 to buy her silence, to ward off disclosure as to
the reason for her transfer request.
I submit the evidence is undisputed regarding
his misconduct in the following ways: He embarked on an
undue and oppressive level of unsolicited attention to a
subordinate court employee, including more than 450 text
messages over 63 days and notes seeking a special-friend
relationship. He lied to a subordinate court clerk. He
encouraged her to lie to coworkers. He continually
sought an improper relationship, a personal one, with a
subordinate. He gave her multiple gifts and cash
totalling over $26,000. And he ultimately told her he
was committing suicide unless she spoke with him after
she had made it crystal clear that she did not want to
receive any more texts, any more phone calls.
He regularly sought reassurance that she liked
him, appreciated what he was providing, notwithstanding
her expressed concerns that he was asking for an
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confrontation, he did not report it to the court

administration, to the Human Resources Department, to his
PJ or to the sheriff. He never reported it to anyone.
Why? Well, there was no need to. He had the only copy
because he wrote it.
Despite his expressed concern for Mrs. Tovar's
safety, including telling his wife that he was concerned
her husband might beat her up, he did not tell her of the
letter until the following day.
Now, if a person gets what is a copy of a
letter, normally I think it's reasonable to conclude that
the person getting a copy would get it at the same time
or after the original letter was delivered to the
addressee. So his decision to do nothing about this on
the 17th of September, provide no immediate notification
to her at all until the next day, is implausible given
his concern for her safety.
Now, he did nothing to preserve the letter or
the envelope for fingerprints, although he knew such
tests existed. His claim that he wasn't concerned with
determining who wrote it is implausible. He offered to
commit a federal crime in intercepting United States mail
at the hospital only because he wasn't going to contact
them because there was no letter waiting for delivery to
her husband.
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Now, he lied to Mrs. Tovar that the letter was

intercepted and destroyed because he knew there was no
letter. He never spoke with Deputy Knoy to warn him
because there was no letter on its way to Mrs. Tovar's
husband. He had no reason to warn Knoy even though, on
its face, one would have to assume he would do so
immediately.
Now, he demanded that she keep it quiet. And
days later, he reinforced that she not mention it to
anyone, particularly Knoy, since he knew that if the
deputy found out about it, an investigation might be
possible. He did not give her a copy of the letter and
never convincingly explained why he didn't.
Now, the text of the letter itself serves no
one's interest other than the judge because it's a false
statement.
And also, by looking at the letter and the
envelope, it's a bit of a head-scratcher because there
were several gratuitous details that seemed highly
questionable to be included by one who had the intent of
fomenting trouble for either Knoy or Mrs. Tovar.
It is, for example, implausible that the writer
would carefully include "Care of Tulare Regional Medical
Center" on the top of the letter. And writing "Sent this
to her judge" similarly, I think, is an unlikely detail.
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her about her husband's temper, whether there was any

past history of violence, although he had claimed that he
was very concerned for her safety.
The fact that the forensic analysis of his court
computer -- the fact that that analysis did not reveal
the anonymous letter is simply not dispositive because we
know that that analysis also didn't find other letters
that he admitted writing and he admitted writing on that
computer.
And now, his court reporter of more than
12 years saw an error in structure. As she stated to
Lisa Buehler, quote, "When Priscilla Tovar showed me the
letter, I remember saying, 'The punctuation, this is a
mistake the judge would make,'" close quote.
There are no other suspects as the author, and
none have surfaced in 20 months. In fact, the only
evidence that the judge did not write the letter is his
own testimony, and he simply is not credible at all.
Now, the Notice of Formal Charges states clearly
that the judge is charged with willful misconduct in
office as well as conduct prejudicial. And it provides a
time frame of mid September to mid November 2013 and
alleges a course of conduct over that period as
exemplified by subsequent facts and allegations contained
in the notice.
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Writing "Personal and Confidential" on the

envelope doesn't make any sense unless it was mailed to
the court, where somebody else could open it, but it was
sent to his house.
Now, the judge has shown a proclivity for
gratuitous language such as including "Working on
prescription orders for inmates" in his September 23rd
e-mail to the court supervisor, including "The red car"
in a text when he's contemplating suicide, and including
"I submitted a resignation letter and rescinded it"
during his November 15th staff meeting. And many of his
notes and texts also contain gratuitous details that I
think are part of his writing style.
Now, he knew of Mrs. Tovar's tattoos. They were
plainly visible.
It's also highly likely that he knew of the
other details contained in the letter from overhearing
conversations at the court. The inclusion of "J.K." in
the letter, I believe, is another red herring since
Jeremy Knoy's full name is spelled out in the body of the
letter, and the only "J.K." entry is just once as an
abbreviation at the very end.
Now, in the two meetings that he had with
Mrs. Tovar lasting well more than an hour on the 18th of
September, there's no evidence at all that he ever asked
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While clearly there are detailed allegations

described in that document, not every transgression or
ethical violation need be spelled out. The notice frames
this matter as a course of conduct undertaken during the
time period specified as exemplified by the allegations
contained in it.
It is the examiner's position that the judge's
course of conduct in this matter was prejudicial
misconduct involving bad faith, and in some instances,
the judge committed willful misconduct.
This analysis will be more thoroughly developed
in the post-hearing brief, but I wish to make a few
comments now.
First, as to prejudicial misconduct: The
standard is that it's conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office
into disrepute. It is -- prejudicial misconduct is
established when one would appear, to an objective
observer familiar with the facts, that the conduct in
question is prejudicial to public esteem for the judicial
office. And prejudicial misconduct occurs when a judge,
even acting in good faith in a nonjudicial capacity,
engages in conduct that adversely affects public regard
for the judiciary. It may also involve acts done in bad
faith in a nonjudicial capacity, and in that context,
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"bad faith" means a culpable mental state beyond mere

negligence consisting of either knowing or not caring
that the conduct being undertaken is unjudicial and
prejudicial to public esteem.
Because the public's esteem for the judiciary is
measured by the objective observer standard, the
subjective intent or the motivation of the judge is not a
significant factor in assessing whether prejudicial
misconduct has occurred.
And all the case cites and analysis will be
provided in the post-hearing brief.
Now, the record in this matter clearly
establishes that the judge engaged in an entirely
inappropriate workplace relationship with his subordinate
clerk.
At a minimum, his conduct was prejudicial
misconduct involving bad faith. Lavishing expensive
gifts and cash on an employee, obtaining access and using
that access to her bank account to manipulate and control
her, excessive text messaging after hours, lying to the
employee, directing her to lie to others, pressuring her
to obtain attention and a close personal relationship,
making the employee fearful with threats are all conduct
inimitable to the role of supervisor in a workplace, let
alone a judge.
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chambers, and he never gave her a copy nor did he give

her his copy.
I think we must, therefore, accept that the
first two prongs of the willful misconduct predicates are
satisfied, leaving the question of whether he was acting
in a judicial capacity.
Now, I acknowledge that there is no bright line
defining conduct that falls within the definition of the
faithful discharge of judicial duties. Analytically, the
determination of when a judge is acting in a judicial
capacity has proven to be fact based -- a fact-based
evaluation and somewhat elusive as a standard applicable
in all cases. Here, however, no such difficulty is
presented.
And of the two incidents, I submit the evidence
supports your finding that the judge committed willful
misconduct, first on September 18th, when he instructed
Mrs. Tovar to meet him in chambers to disclose the
letter; his reservation of the law library conference
room and directing his subordinate to meet with him again
over the lunch hour; his decision to ensure that the
letter be kept a secret and not reported to the Court or
law enforcement, placing the staff and the public at
risk; his intentional prohibition against her reporting
or disclosing the letter; his false claim of intercepting
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The evidence, I believe, convincingly

establishes that the judge either knew or did not care
that his conduct was unjudicial and prejudicial. Thus,
he acted in bad faith within the meaning as it has
developed.
I submit that there are two incidents in which
the judge committed willful misconduct. Now, willful
misconduct is unjudicial conduct that is committed in bad
faith by a judge acting in his or her judicial capacity.
So it's a three-pronged test.
There could be no doubt that the course of
conduct engaged in by the judge was unjudicial. Bad
faith is established when a judge acts for any purpose
other than the faithful discharge of judicial duties.
I contend that the judge authored the anonymous
letter, and he did so to manipulate Mrs. Tovar into
trusting him and depending on him. Such deception and
manipulation were unquestionably done in bad faith.
Even if you determine that he did not write the
letter, his handling of it also exemplifies bad faith.
He failed to report the letter to the Court. He failed
to warn Deputy Knoy of the danger it posed. He lied to
Mrs. Tovar about having the letter intercepted. And then
he used the letter as a tool to control and manipulate
her. He also kept a copy of the letter secured in his
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the letter by contacting her husband's employer; and his

failure to warn Deputy Knoy of the potential for a
physical confrontation.
Given that case law accepts the fact that judges
have some supervision over courtroom staff, his conduct
on this date was willful misconduct committed in bad
faith.
Similarly, his actions and conduct on
November 18th: When he handed a note to Mrs. Tovar in
open court with attorneys and staff present, instructing
her to read it on the spot, the note contained an implied
threat of criminal prosecution for extortion, designed to
intimidate and humiliate her and to obtain her silence
about his conduct toward her. This conduct was done in
his judicial capacity from the bench and committed in bad
faith.
I appreciate you making yourselves available for
closing arguments, and I respectfully submit that the
evidence in the record clearly and convincingly
establishes the violations contained in the Notice of
Formal Proceedings.
And I would like to reserve ten minutes for any
rebuttal after counsel speaks.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right, Mr. Harrigan.
Judge Dugan, do you have any questions?
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SPECIAL MASTER DUGAN: I don't.

SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: Judge Hanoian?
SPECIAL MASTER HANOIAN: I do.
And I'm wondering whether or not you would speak
to what your opinion is of the actions as it relate to
the exclusion of Deputy Ballantyne and -- from the
courtroom, the exclusion of Deputy Knoy from the
courtroom and asking Deputy Cibrian to leave the
courtroom.
Are they part of this?
MR. HARRIGAN: Well, those -- I would ask that a
finding be made as to that conduct but not a finding of
willful misconduct per se because that was not
specifically alleged in the notice.
But I will say this as it relates to Ballantyne:
He was -- this is an individual that was innocent. He
did nothing wrong. He did his job. He made a report
that -- when he was told to make a report.
And what the judge did was not only have him
removed from his courtroom once he saw him, and did so
from the bench, but then he banished him so he could
never be in his courtroom again. And I certainly think
that -- that a finding is appropriate as to that.
I'm not -- I don't have full recollection on the
Deputy Knoy matter. I do remember that he asked
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to her supervisor and in his judicial capacity.

SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right. Anything
further?
SPECIAL MASTER HANOIAN: Not from me.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right. Thank you.
Mr. Harrigan, yes, you may certainly reserve
that time.
We're going to take a very short break of
ten minutes. I have five minutes of 1:00. We'll be back
in session at five minutes after 1:00.
MR. HARRIGAN: Thank you.
(Recess taken.)
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right. Thank you,
everyone. Please be seated.
And the record should reflect that we are
present with all counsel who are here before the three
special masters and Judge Saucedo.
All right. Mr. Miller, if you would like to
proceed, sir.
RESPONDENT'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
MR. MILLER: Thank you. And good afternoon,
Justice Haller, and Justice Dugan, and Judge Hanoian.
Judge Saucedo and I have appreciated the opportunity to
present the facts and the evidence in this case as we see
them and also to take the opportunity to introduce
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Mrs. Tovar what he was doing there and that he wanted him
out and gone, but I don't know what the follow-up was. I
would have to deal with that in the post-hearing brief.
I'm sorry. The third one you mentioned was?
SPECIAL MASTER HANOIAN: Deputy Cibrian.
MR. HARRIGAN: Oh, Deputy Cibrian.
SPECIAL MASTER HANOIAN: Yes. November 18th or
somewhere -- somewhere in the November range.
MR. HARRIGAN: I mean, I think -- honestly, I
think it's a bit of a stretch to say he was acting in his
judicial capacity. I think that my recollection was
Cibrian and Tovar were talking in the courtroom. Court
had concluded. The judge came into the courtroom from
chambers hallway and told him to leave so he could talk
to Mrs. Tovar. That one has minimal context with, I
think, willful behavior in a judicial capacity.
There is one more, though, we would ask for a
finding on, which is: His behavior on the 20th and the
23rd of September, when he interfered with Mrs. Tovar's
attempt to communicate with her supervisor about her time
log. He kept her there, talking about what I believe was
only personal matters. He thereafter claimed they were
court matters that were discussed. And he followed up on
the 23rd with an e-mail to her supervisor, supporting her
work hours. I believe that was a false statement by him
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Judge Saucedo to you, who is here today. And his wife,

Teresa, is also here.
We appreciate the time that you all took to
listen to Judge Saucedo and Teresa and other witnesses
about his background and his story and all the live
character testimony that brought his story some
additional context.
And since we're dealing here with evaluating a
judge's alleged conduct and the serious allegations being
advanced by the Commission, it's all that much more
important to understand the type of person and judge
whose conduct you are considering. Indeed, as I stated
in opening, his background, especially in mentoring and
helping others, is directly relevant here.
I agree with the examiner's comments that this
is a factually complex case. It's an intense case with
factually intensive examination of many facts that are
disputed and testimony that's disputed. This case,
unlike the many that have proceeded to discipline under
the CJP that have involved relationships with clerks like
Steiner and Woodward and a few others, this does not
involve a consensual physical or romantic relationship at
all. It does not fit into the rubric of discriminatory
or a hostile work environment like we've seen in those
cases with improper jokes or improper contact or
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touching.
This simply involves interaction between a judge
and a staff member. Some of it is personal in nature,
much of it taking place outside the courtroom, but none
of it involves any matter pending before the Court.
These are hard cases to litigate and hard cases
to reconcile and hard cases to adjudicate. As a result,
in cases like this, where it involves a judge's job and
his reputation and his income, the standards of proof
here should be exactingly followed.
I've loosely described this case as sort of an
employment case wrapped inside a CJP proceeding, and I've
struggled, frankly, to find the compatibility, if any, of
these two concepts. It's like square pegs and round
holes.
In many ways, the disciplinary rules and canons
are an inapt way of measuring the interaction here. Much
of what is at issue is purely private, having nothing to
do with legal matters or cases pending before Judge
Saucedo or court administration. And what might or might
not be actionable in a civil setting or some other
setting has no bearing here.
In this proceeding, the sole inquiry is whether
judicial conduct, on or off the bench, clearly and
convincingly violates the code of ethics and, if so, the
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Phones were lost or what usually happens to them. And

the communications that Ms. Tovar testified that she
would have had with many others simply was not available.
And given the allegations about the number and
the content of text and e-mail communications in this
relevant time period and the intense scrutiny brought to
Judge Saucedo's activities and Ms. Tovar's every
communication, the inability to secure and present this
other testimony or evidence is highly prejudicial.
Judge Saucedo had no means to secure it until 14 months
after the investigation commenced, at which time it
was all disappeared or lost.
This was not a harmless oversight. It goes to
the core of this process, where every aspect of the
context and communications for the relevant time period,
45 days, is placed at issue. What we're dealing with
here, perhaps, was a fraction of the available data and
the available communications.
I submit if there was one text message between
Priscilla Tovar and any of her friends or colleagues on
the court that said something to the effect,
"Judge Saucedo is giving me all these gifts, and he's a
sap," this case would be very different, or it would not
exist at all.
You should be concerned about these
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measurement of that conduct.

I want to quickly go back to a concept that I
talked about in my opening because it continued to
concern me, and we have testimony from many witnesses
during the course of the case.
The point I made in opening and to which there
was testimony from a number of witnesses was the
availability of relevant evidence for this proceeding.
We heard from Ms. Tovar, Ms. Buehler, Jeremy Knoy,
Tessie Velasquez and Kim Werth, among others, that none
of them were asked to preserve any of the communications
or information that they had when this matter was first
opened up as an investigation in December of 2013.
Remember, this started as an AOC -Administrative Office of the Court -- investigation, and
they were given unfettered access to all the witnesses
here. I think eight in total. And except for Ms. Tovar,
none of them were asked to preserve any of the
information about communications that they had with
Ms. Tovar. And it was clear from the very beginning that
this case was going to revolve around those same types of
communications.
And what happened during the time that the AOC
was investigating this, and later the CJP, was all that
evidence disappeared. All of it's gone; not findable.
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circumstances, not as to the Commission's investigatory

procedures generally, but as to the fairness of a
proceeding where by no fault of Judge Saucedo, critical
evidence is missing, and he's being prosecuted on
something critically less than a complete record.
So as you weigh the evidence and you read the
briefing on this, I want you -- I urge you to take into
account what might be missing and how some of those other
communications may have had some bearing on the nature
and interpretation and the assessment of the
communications that are at issue here.
Burden of proof is an important concept to talk
about, and I want to spend a couple minutes on that.
The examiner has the burden of proof in this
case by clear and convincing evidence. He needs to
sustain the charges to a reasonable certainty. The Court
has described clear and convincing evidence as to be so
clear as to leave no substantial doubt and sufficiently
strong to command an unhesitating assent of every
reasonable mind. Evidence of a charge is clear and
convincing so long as there is a high probability that
that charge is true. Any reasonable doubt should be
resolved in favor of Judge Saucedo.
So in each of the allegations that are being
made here, whether it's a course of conduct being
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characterized as prejudicial conduct or it's instances of

willful misconduct, each has to be measured against the
clear and convincing evidence standard. And I'll get, in
a minute, to how that may apply to the different
allegations here.
Now, it was not clear at the beginning of the
examiner's case as to whether willful misconduct would be
at issue in this case. The Court may recall I made a
comment at the very beginning of the proceeding that the
examiner's brief only raised prejudicial misconduct as
part of the advocacy in their opening brief.
I do understand that the notice also contained a
provision about a prayer that this conduct at issue in
the case could be either willful or prejudicial, but at
that point in time, there was no indication as to what
would be presented.
Willful misconduct, to start with that because
now we've heard from the examiner that they believe that
there's instances of willful misconduct as the most
serious form of misconduct: Willful misconduct has to be
found to be unjudicial conduct by a judge acting in his
judicial capacity and in bad faith.
So I want to first follow up on an issue that
was raised by the examiner's counsel in his closing
remarks about whether the acts of Judge Saucedo were in a
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think, by far, the conduct is -- should be found not to

be in a judicial capacity.
Further, the CJP has not shown by clear and
convincing evidence that -- as it must -- that
Judge Saucedo was using his authority for improper ends.
CJP alleges that over the 45 days of interactions, that
it was designed by Judge Saucedo to create a closer or a
deeper relationship with Ms. Tovar. However, that was
not his intent. His intent was to help and assist her
based on the situation that was presented to him in
September.
Ms. Tovar had a financial circumstance with a
former boyfriend that she wanted out of. She had an
unreliable car. She was living paycheck to paycheck. He
didn't want a romantic affair or any closer or deeper
relationship with Ms. Tovar at all.
There was no evidence presented in the
examiner's case that Judge Saucedo used his office
outside work to try to influence her, gain any sort of
benefit. He didn't get her a better deal with AAA. He
didn't get a better deal with the car. There was no
other evidence of circumstances where Judge Saucedo
attempted to use the power or the prestige of his office
to get something that he was ordinarily not entitled to.
He was not using the office or the power of the office to
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judicial capacity. And I agree that this is not well

laid out in the precedent that we'll look at to try to
determine when conduct is or is not in a judicial
capacity, but we have some guidelines.
The Supreme Court gives great weight to the
location of a judge's conduct. When a judge is on the
bench, he's presumed to be in a judicial capacity. When
a judge is in chambers during normal working hours, he is
generally not thought to be acting in a judicial
capacity. But if a judge uses, through his authority or,
for improper means, his authority outside the court, then
on occasion, in a fact-specific inquiry, they may be
found to have acted in a judicial capacity.
Here, the facts are that the vast majority of
the actions that are put at issue in this case are not
within Judge Saucedo's judicial capacity. CJP's
allegations include mostly conduct outside the courtroom.
They were not related to a judicial proceeding or a case.
They took place outside of court hours. There were
visits to AAA. There were visits to the car dealerships.
There were visits to Larry's Repair -- Automotive Repair.
The texting was in the off hours. There were meetings
and discussions in -- over the lunch hour.
So when we're trying to determine whether this
was conduct that was done in the judicial capacity, I
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assist her. And while he has a supervisorial

relationship with her, that relationship was not a
factor, nor did he misuse that position at all.
This case is about the personal conduct and
personal interaction. It has nothing to do with the fact
that he was administering as a judge, nor do the
interactions have anything to do with his supervision of
Ms. Tovar. You heard testimony about Judge Saucedo and
Ms. Tovar working together. You heard about them
preparing for the next day's calendar or preparation of
minute orders.
However, the allegedly improper conduct here is
a hundred percent personal and away from the court. When
Ms. Tovar -- he could not fire Ms. Tovar. She had no
adverse employment decisions. He could not demote her,
and she was not penalized or singled out, or her position
was not changed.
Absent any of this evidence, absent any of this
evidence, the CJP has not met its burden by clear and
convincing evidence of showing that Judge Saucedo was
acting in a judicial capacity.
So I want to talk about the two, or perhaps
three, instances that the examiner raised in his closing
remarks that he thought constituted Judge Saucedo's acts
under judicial -- in a judicial capacity.
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One was using the library on September 18th to

speak with Ms. Tovar. That can hardly be characterized
as acting in a judicial capacity. The library is
available to the public. Anybody can go in there.
Anybody can reserve it. It does not take a judge to do
so. So the notion that he met with Ms. Tovar in a
library is not acting in a judicial capacity.
Examiner's counsel also cited, as another form
of acting in a judicial capacity, was November 18th, when
Judge Saucedo handed a note to Ms. Tovar. They were off
the record. There was no further continuing of court
business. Simply handed her the note. There was nothing
different than the contact they had had in the past,
where Judge Saucedo spoke with Ms. Tovar at court. It
didn't have to do with the case. He was not acting in a
judicial capacity at the time of that interaction.
And then last -- although I was not entirely
clear on this as to whether this would be put forth as an
example of acting in a judicial capacity -- there was the
events of September 20th and September 23rd, where
perhaps there was the insinuation that those actions by
Judge Saucedo were somehow in a judicial capacity. I
think the facts on those interactions are highly, highly
in doubt.
Judge Saucedo testified that there were
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husband.
She also expressed to Judge Saucedo that her
family had never been to Disneyland. It would be nice to
bring the whole family and her other family members to
go.
Judge Saucedo testified that in this context, he
saw Ms. Tovar as a daughter, not as a paramour or
somebody that he wanted to have an affair with.
Judge Saucedo wanted to help her.
You heard him -- testimony that Judge Saucedo
was an intense individual. You heard testimony about his
humble upbringing and that he was presented and -- when
he was presented with a situation he felt he could assist
on, he did so and did so in a very deliberate way.
So by Ms. Tovar's own testimony, on
September 18th, she was in a very difficult spot with
Deputy Knoy. She had a financial relationship with him,
the details of which were a little bit murky according to
the testimony. Sometimes she would pay him money.
Sometimes he would take care of it and then seek money
back from her.
Unfortunately, her husband was not aware of any
of the financial relationship. Her husband was also not
aware that on occasion, she would go to Jeremy Knoy's
house and visit him and visit his dog, and -- but she
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additional matters on the court calendar on

September 20th relating to release of prisoners and
dealing with medications rather than just the one. There
were court matters that they needed to deal with. They
were commencing another trial the following week.
And so the matters that took place that day,
while perhaps they may have been dealing with court
business, did not result in any sort of willful
misconduct by Judge Saucedo with respect to his handling
of that matter.
Willful misconduct also takes a showing of bad
faith. There was no evidence here that Judge Saucedo
committed any conduct that could be characterized as bad
faith. His intention was to help and assist Ms. Tovar.
The only way that bad faith could be found here
is that he concocted the whole thing by writing,
authoring and sending the anonymous letter. However, as
I'll get to a minute, that's not supported by the
evidence, let alone any clear and convincing evidence.
On September 18th, Judge Saucedo was presented
with a situation of a clerk who was in need. She had an
unreliable car that was causing her problems. She was
not getting to work on time. She had a financial
relationship with a former boyfriend that she wanted to
cut ties with. She was having marital problems with her
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didn't tell her husband about any of that.

Kim Werth and Tessie Velasquez, during the
trial, testified that -- they corroborated the fact
that -- testified that Ms. Tovar had raised continuing
marital issues between her and her husband with them.
The alleged bad faith here is that Judge Saucedo
intended on forcing her into a deeper, if not some sort
of a romantic relationship. That's the allegation and
not that he was demeaning toward her. The romantic
relationship was obviously not successful. At worst, it
was a failed attempt, and the inappropriate affair never
happened.
But she kept asking for and receiving assistance
time and time and time again. Ms. Tovar and
Judge Saucedo kept going with the relationship -friendly relationship that they had that didn't include
any romance or a deeper emotional relationship; just the
assistance that he was getting for her.
Further evidence that there was no bad faith and
no ill intentions was the fact that Judge Saucedo never
hid anything about his interaction with Ms. Saucedo over
the 45 days at issue here.
Judge Saucedo is a very public person. He's a
well-respected judge, former mayor of Lindsay, teaches a
class at College of the Sequoias, and he and his wife,
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Teresa, would often drive to work together.

If his intentions were to be amorous with
Ms. Tovar, the last thing he would want to do would be
seen around town with her. But to the contrary, they
were out in public a number of times together over that
45 days, hardly consistent with somebody that was
desirous of having some sort of an affair or romance.
When they went to Larry's Automotive, they were
together. They went to AAA on two occasions together.
They spoke with the agent there. Ms. Tovar went with him
to AAA, and they discussed the specifics of the
Disneyland trip with the representative there. They went
to the Dodge dealership together. They went multiple
times to the BMW dealership together.
So here there's no clear and convincing proof of
some corrupt purpose or knowledge that he is acting
beyond his judicial powers or that he's exceeding his
lawful power with a conscious disregard for the limits of
a judge's authority. None of that was proven in the
evidence in the case, let alone in a clearly and
convincingly way as it's required.
Prejudicial conduct is another form of conduct.
Here, the way that's defined is conduct that's
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings
the judicial office into disrepute. It includes an act
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circumstance.
I want to go through the facts.
Prior to September 18, 2013, Judge Saucedo and
Ms. Tovar had a cordial working relationship. They had
respected each other. They had worked hard in a
courtroom where Judge Saucedo was very demanding. He
would go above and beyond to help litigants that came
into his courtroom. He expected the same from his staff.
Early on, when Ms. Tovar or her family was
undertaking some fundraising, he gave her money. I
assume other people did in the courthouse as well. The
evidence also showed that Judge Saucedo was happily
married to his wife, Teresa, for 32 years. They had
three children. Ms. Tovar was married and had four
children.
September 17, 2013, Judge Saucedo received the
anonymous letter at his home and showed the letter to his
wife and decided it was a private matter; that he would
speak to Ms. Tovar the next day.
So what did Judge Saucedo know? What does the
evidence here prove that Judge Saucedo knew about the
contents of the anonymous letter?
Well, Judge Saucedo testified, and it wasn't
controverted, that he did not know that Ms. Tovar's
husband worked at the Tulare County Regional Medical
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that a judge undertakes in good faith that would appear

to an objective observer not to be -- not only to be
unjudicial conduct but conduct prejudicial to the
self-esteem -- the public esteem of the judicial office.
So the standard that's going to measure
Judge Saucedo's interaction with Ms. Tovar over these
45 days is what an objective observer would conclude
being fully aware of the facts. So let's examine the
conduct alleged by Judge Saucedo over this 45-day period.
CJP has to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that his conduct over those 45 days constituted
prejudicial misconduct. Again, the standard is that if
he undertakes something in good faith, but nevertheless
would appear to an objective observer to not only be
unjudicial conduct but conduct that's prejudicial to the
esteem of the office. CJP has not met its burden by
clear and convincing evidence.
The anonymous letter is, by the CJP's case, the
starting point. And CJP admits that they don't have any
direct evidence that Judge Saucedo authored or prepared
the anonymous letter. It's circumstantial evidence only.
And just by definition, one would have to conclude that
piecing together segments of circumstantial evidence
cannot be, or ever be, clear and convincing evidence
that's required by the ethical rules in this
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Center. He did not know that Ms. Tovar had been in some
sort of a romantic relationship with Deputy Knoy, and
there was no contrary evidence presented on that.
Judge Saucedo testified that he did not know
about her tattoos, was never involved in discussions
about her tattoos, nor did he see her tattoos. It was
not something that he would have involved himself in.
The Court had a policy that tattoos should be covered,
and Ms. Tovar testified that she usually followed that
policy if she knew that they were in trial. The only
visible tattoos that she had were on her feet.
Judge Saucedo had no information about
Ms. Tovar's Caesarian section scar. Multiple people in
the case testified that Judge Saucedo never used
profanity such as the profanity and lurid details that
were included in the anonymous letter.
Judge Saucedo did not know that Jeremy Knoy,
Deputy Knoy, is referred to as J.K.
And most importantly, the forensic evidence that
the CJP undertook here complicated the investigation, did
not find evidence of the anonymous letter anywhere on
Judge Saucedo's computer.
The way this was wrapped up by the examiner in
his closing -- examiner's counsel in his closing remarks
was that it was highly likely that Judge Saucedo knew the
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details because they were some things that were talked

about generally in or around the courtroom or in the
common area.
I submit that that hardly qualifies as clear and
convincing evidence that Judge Saucedo was aware of the
contents of that letter, and I submit that the evidence
that was presented here did not even come remotely close
to establishing otherwise.
Judge Saucedo, of course, testified he did not
write the letter. It was also a typewritten envelope.
Judge Saucedo testified he didn't even know how to
prepare a typewritten envelope.
The only evidence presented regarding the
mailing of the letter is that there was a mail slot or
mail slots somewhere in the courthouse, but that thought
was never completed in any of the evidence that was
presented in the case. The only thing that that possibly
does is show that there was about a million people within
that U.S. Postal Service region that could have mailed
that letter in any number of different ways, and it would
be postmarked as it was.
To the extent that there was any evidence
presented that Judge Saucedo had mailed that letter on
Sunday, the 15th, when he came back from his vacation and
went into his office, his wife, Teresa, was with him the
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who was to say that Ms. Tovar wouldn't take that letter
or take the fact of that letter and go right to HR with
it, in which case the whole scheme would have been
sidetracked from the very beginning.
So there is, in fact, no clear and convincing
evidence to a reasonable certainty that Judge Saucedo was
the author of the anonymous letter. Their circumstantial
evidence does not add up to anything.
Now, there's other parts of the conduct over the
next 45 days, and I want to address that.
For Judge Saucedo's part, everything he does -I hope you came to appreciate from his testimony and from
the other character references that testified on his
behalf everything he does, he does with vigor and does it
in a deliberate and organized way.
On the 17th -- September 17th, when he found the
letter, he knew that he had somebody in need, and he came
up with a plan of action and a way to help her.
Judge Saucedo, as he testified toward the end of the
hearing, admits that his actions, especially his texting
on occasion, was too familiar. At times he texted her
too much. But he admits that he provided gifts and money
to her, gave her money and a car, a Disney trip.
And -- but the most important thing, when we
assess this course of conduct over those 45 days, is what
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whole time, and she did not see him write or mail a
letter.
So the notion that Judge Saucedo wrote the
letter to orchestrate or start some entire scheme to draw
Ms. Tovar into some sort of a romantic or closer
relationship just doesn't make sense. Is it credible
that the letter was intended as a springboard for some
closer relationship? Did Judge Saucedo concoct this
anonymous letter about lurid details of a clerk, shared
it with her confidentially, and then give her gifts and
money under the guise of trying to help her in the hopes
that he would convince her to have some sort of an affair
or deeper relationship? There's no earthly plausibility
to that allegation.
If Judge Saucedo wanted to have an affair in
this day and age, there would have been a million
different ways to have done it discreetly and
nonpublicly. Yet any of his conduct here doesn't even
remotely suggest that that was what he was after. Yet
the Commission -- CJP makes a bold allegation that he
created and then mailed the letter to himself.
Judge Saucedo never acted in any sort of a
physical or intimate or romantic way with Ms. Tovar at
all. So the alleged scheme about the creation of the
anonymous letter doesn't hold water. And even if it did,
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role Ms. Tovar played in that. In virtually every

occasion during that 45 days, Ms. Tovar, according to her
testimony, either claimed that she did not want it or
resisted it, but she ultimately participated. And this
wasn't just, "You can talk to me," or "You can give me
cash or deposit cash." It was active, deliberate and
conscious participation on her behalf. She's a courtroom
clerk. She has ten years of experience. She's the
mother of four children. She's not a child. She
participated in these interactions over the 45 days
consistently.
She told Judge Saucedo about the condition of
the Ford Focus that she drove. She testified that she
didn't ask or command him to fix it, yet she did go with
him on two occasions to the automotive repair store and
accepted his offer to pay for it.
She was actively involved in the purchase of the
BMW. She looked online for cars. She went on multiple
occasions to the dealership to look at cars.
She was actively involved in the organizing of
the AAA trip. She provided the names of her family
members to AAA. She chose the dates for the trip. She
had to go with him to get the paperwork signed. She knew
what she was doing. This is hardly indicia of unwelcome
conduct by Judge Saucedo.
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And as we know, Ms. Tovar kept everything. She

kept the cash. Within two days of the $8,000 deposit
that was made into her account, she withdrew nearly all
of it. She never attempted to return the money. She
never changed her bank account. She always kept the same
phone number; never changed that. The flowers she got,
she took home. She even told her husband where the
flowers came from. She went and pick up the car from the
BMW dealership; got the keys. They went to Disneyland.
To an objective observer looking at all of this,
one would have to conclude that she was a willing
participant over those 45 days for the financial
assistance, the car, the trip, the flowers; that they
were not unwelcome. Or at least that's the signal that
she was sending.
Indeed, if you recall the testimony from
Kim Werth about her texts with Ms. Tovar on
September 30th, that Ms. Tovar's suspected -- and that
Ms. Tovar, on that very day, also suspected that it was
Judge Saucedo who probably wrote the anonymous letter.
And that day she snuck into Judge Saucedo's chambers
after hours, after confirming he was gone for the day,
and copied and photographed the anonymous letter. Yet
after that, after September 30th, for the next month,
Ms. Tovar continued to accept everything that was
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According to Exhibit 8A, which is the

recapitulation of the number of text messages captured or
sent between September 2, 2013 and November 3, 2013,
Judge Saucedo sent 461 text messages. But in the same
time frame -- this was omitted in the examiner's closing
remarks -- Ms. Tovar sent 249 text messages.
Was this a lot of texts? Perhaps. We don't
know the universe of the text messaging that Ms. Tovar
was undertaking at that time because we don't have
evidence of her other text communications with other
people. We know that she would text Kim Werth. She
would text her sister. She would text her husband. We
have no frame of reference to know if, by her custom and
practice and text usage during that time period, if the
text messages that she received from Judge Saucedo were
too much or too invasive.
We do know she was an active and willing
participant in a lot of those communications from
October 20, 2013 to November 3, 2013. Not a single day
passed when Ms. Tovar did not text Judge Saucedo.
What was the context of those texts? Well, she
told him how much money was in her savings account. She
told him that she would check on her bank account. She
asked for a four-seater car, not a two-seater car. She
also asked for additional tinting on the windows of the
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provided to her.
Ms. Werth testified that she told Ms. Tovar that
"You can't have it both ways." On October 1st, Kim Werth
said to Ms. Tovar, "You're sending mixed messages. You
can't complain that it's too much or you don't want it,
then turn around and accept or encourage it." Ms. Tovar
was warned of that precise behavior in a message that she
was sending. This was less than two weeks after the
interaction started on September 18th.
What does she do the very next day after
Ms. Werth warns her that she's sending mixed messages?
She makes arrangements with Judge Saucedo to go drop off
the car at Larry's Automotive, and he pays for the car.
So more mixed messages. Then over the next 30 days, she
participates and accepts and even encourages gifts and
money and interactions.
The evidence did not amount to clear and
convincing evidence of unwanted or unwelcome conduct by
Judge Saucedo during that time period.
We've spent a lot of time talking about the text
messages. And the evidence did show that on occasion,
Ms. Tovar would tell Judge Saucedo to stop sending text
messages, and he obliged. But then he asked if he could
text her, and not only did she permit the communication,
she responded and initiated her own conversations.
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car that was being purchased for her. Hardly somebody

that is trying to resist what was characterized as
unwelcome conduct.
On October 16th, Ms. Tovar claimed that she told
Judge Saucedo that she didn't want his help anymore. Yet
two days later, she accepts money in the bank account.
She doesn't return it. She starts next planning the trip
to Disneyland. And by the end of the month, she's
voluntarily test-driving cars at a BMW dealership. So
based on that and her continuing active and -- active
participation, Judge Saucedo moved forward to try to help
her.
There's an allegation that Judge Saucedo wanted
a romantic relationship. Judge Saucedo testified the
answer is absolutely not. He never asked for it. Never
wanted it. There's no evidence of it.
Ms. Tovar's testimony is different on virtually
every single conversation that the two had, but who was
more believable? Who was more credible?
Ms. Tovar testified on direct examination that
she didn't have any marital trouble, no financial
troubles, no current relationship with Deputy Knoy, no
complaints. There was nothing, according to her
testimony, that she had to fix or that needed to be
fixed.
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Ms. Tovar testified that in an early meeting

with Judge Saucedo on September 18th, she was embarrassed
about the letter but had no issues at all, did not need
or ask for assistance of any kind. That's what she was
trying to portray to this Court.
Then we heard from Ms. Werth and Ms. Velasquez
that Ms. Tovar raised virtually every single one of these
issues with them: her husband's affair; her continuing
financial relationship with Jeremy Knoy, visits with him,
paying him money; her car troubles; her financial
troubles; her issues about her body, self-esteem and
appearance. That testimony from Ms. Werth and
Tessie Velasquez was not challenged or contradicted at
all.
On the other hand, Judge Saucedo testified about
the fact that he raised, on September 18th, the very -she raised, on September 18th, the very same issues with
him: car, money, Knoy, vacation, body work. The
testimony of staff members supports Judge Saucedo's
version of those events.
At no time did Judge Saucedo ask for a romantic
relationship. The conversation at the dealership was
nothing more than people typically have about whether
they were going to buy -- whether the car was going to be
purchased or not. Judge Saucedo testified that he never
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You heard testimony from Ms. Tovar about an

incident where Judge Saucedo slammed a door in the
hallway. But you also heard from Judge Saucedo,
Ms. Werth and Ms. Velasquez, that -- they all testified
that Judge Saucedo never slammed a door. He didn't slam
a fist. He didn't use profanity. You heard from many
witnesses who testified about his calm demeanor.
There was many text messages that were sent back
and forth between Judge Saucedo and Ms. Tovar but only a
small portion of which were captured in the evidence
submitted before the Special Masters. There were, on
occasion, familiar and friendly exchanges between the
two.
It should be noted in these text messages,
Judge Saucedo didn't ask her about the money in the
savings account. She provided it without any question or
inquiry from him.
There were occasions which Ms. Tovar texted
Judge Saucedo first thing in the morning. A lot of
times, these were follow-ups to conversations that they
were having from the night before or about repairing the
car or about court matters.
Judge Saucedo and Ms. Tovar had a plan, and he
was trying to assist her. He was not aware of what body
sculpting was when he sent her that text. Ms. Tovar told
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had a discussion with Ms. Tovar about having a

relationship at the BMW dealership or anywhere else.
Ms. Tovar testified that Judge Saucedo gave her
a hug, and that offended her. Judge Saucedo testified
that she never complained about a hug. She gave
occasional hugs to people. That, in and of itself, is
hardly controversial or offensive conduct in the year
2013.
There's one text that Ms. Tovar writes to
Judge Saucedo asking if he is asking for an emotional
affair. His immediate response to that is "Absolutely
not." Not sure what an emotional affair is; those words
don't necessarily go together. But whatever it is, it
was clear that Judge Saucedo did not want an emotional
affair or a romantic affair.
Judge Saucedo did, on occasion, ask Ms. Tovar to
share the details of her life. He did tell her that he
thought of her as a special friend, not just an ordinary
friend. He was trying, perhaps inartfully, to explain
the differences between the relationships he had with
people. Language was far from perfect. It was awkward
and funky and old-fashioned and cumbersome. However, as
Judge Saucedo testified, if Ms. Tovar was offended by
that language, he was apologetic and remorseful. He
certainly never intended to upset her.
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him that her husband had made reference to her being out
of shape or needing work or something along those lines
and that she told Judge Saucedo that she was thinking
about body sculpting. He didn't initiate that topic.
According to the testimony of Deputy Knoy, Ms. Tovar had
been talking about body sculpting for years. According
to Ms. Velasquez, she even had something done. Ms. Werth
also affirmed that Ms. Tovar had discussed the idea of
body sculpting with her. This would be a common
conversation around the common area.
Ms. Tovar raised that issue with Judge Saucedo
by way of a complaint. Judge Saucedo was attempting to
be responsive to that. An objective observer who was
aware of all the facts about this conversation would not
find that the texts about body sculpting in this context
would be prejudicial to the public esteem of the office.
In later text messages, Judge Saucedo expressed
his feelings, and he would ask Ms. Tovar to express hers.
Testimony is that Judge Saucedo shows himself as a very
dedicated individual. He is all in on all occasions. He
indeed, during the testimony phase of this proceeding,
expressed remorse, and he was sorry and embarrassed for
sharing his feelings on occasion. He testified that at
times, he let his guard down, and he had feelings about
being off balance. Judge Saucedo acknowledges that these
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text messages were, on occasion, too familiar, too

personal, but he shouldn't be punished for his thoughts.
The purpose of the CJP is to protect the public
and not monitor every word or thought that judges have in
their private life. An objective observer, looking at
those texts, would certainly understand that they were
familiar and friendly, but an objective observer would
also not find the appearance of impropriety or some sort
of prejudice to the public esteem for the office.
Now, there was a series of events throughout the
weekend of November 2nd and 3rd that led up to
Judge Saucedo contemplating suicide on Sunday, the 3rd.
There were a number of things that were building up in
his life at that point in time, all of which came to a
culmination over that weekend.
Judge Saucedo had lost trust and confidence in
Ms. Tovar. He thought that -- all along, that they were
on the same page in terms of his mentorship and what he
was trying to do to help her and that she shared all of
that with her husband. The objective of Ms. Tovar and
Judge Saucedo's plan was to better her relationship with
her family so she could improve and improve at her job.
What Ms. Tovar said was that she was going to
talk to her husband, Lalo. And all of a sudden,
Judge Saucedo realized that there was a huge disconnect
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would go to Human Resources. He believes that at that

point in time, the money was the culmination of the prior
money that he had committed to give her. He paid the
money and wrote a note with extortion language.
Why did he write the note? Because he wanted it
done. Why did he include the language regarding
extortion? He was trying to make the point to her that
this was a serious matter and that the situation was done
and over. He paid the final amount and considered it to
be over.
Ms. Tovar took every penny of that money and,
within a day, had withdrawn all of it and given it to her
family, apparently used on the Disneyland trip. And this
is all part of the continuing mixed signals that
Ms. Tovar was giving to Judge Saucedo.
The Commission has not met its burden of proof
on clear and convincing evidence that that extortion note
or paying the $8,000 was somehow prejudicial or willful
misconduct. There was no bad faith on Judge Saucedo's
behalf writing the note or paying the demanded money. To
an objective observer looking at the entire 45 days of
this set of interactions between the two, an objective
observer would see the writing of that letter and the
payment of the $8,000 as not prejudicial conduct that
brings disrepute to the judiciary. An objective observer
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between the two. He knew and believed that he didn't do

anything wrong with respect to helping her, but his mind
took him elsewhere, and this led to a serious and
unfortunate moment in his life.
He texted Ms. Tovar and called her, testified
that she spoke with him on that day and told him to stop
calling and she would not say anything to anyone. But he
testified that he was able to snap out of it and return
to work the next day.
Ms. Tovar, Judge Saucedo and Kim Werth all
testified that the next day, they were back to business.
An objective observer would look at the entire content of
those events on November 3rd and November 4th and find
that these were an unfortunate moment in Judge Saucedo's
life, a moment of great mental and emotional private
feelings, but did not and could not bring some disrepute
to the public esteem of the office.
The events of November 18th and 19th: After the
interaction on November 3rd, Judge Saucedo and Ms. Tovar
had agreed that that would be the end of anything that
they were doing. Judge Saucedo thought that the whole
matter was over, yet Ms. Tovar came into his courtroom on
the 18th and demanded that he pay her $8,000.
Judge Saucedo testified that he thought that Ms. Tovar
demanded the money to be paid by November 20th or she
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would see that the inclusion of quoting the law in that

note would just go to signify the seriousness of the
situation and Ms. Tovar's demand.
There was a mention in the examiner's closing
remarks about supplying Judge Saucedo's brother's
telephone number. The testimony from Judge Saucedo on
that was it was only intended to provide her information
with respect to some medical issues that she or her son
were dealing with. The one time that -- the testimony
was that the one time that Ms. Tovar contacted the
brother, it was with respect to a medical issue and had
nothing to do with the brother providing support.
The flowers: Judge Saucedo testified that he
and Ms. Tovar spoke about the fact that he would give her
flowers, and he sought her permission to do so. He had
no idea when the brother had passed away; only that she
had raised it with him and it was considered to be an
emotional moment, so he responded to that by providing
her flowers. The fact that it was not done on the day
that he actually passed was information well beyond his
misunderstanding -- his understanding. This was simply a
gesture to provide some condolence to her with respect to
an issue that she had raised with him. This was a way to
assist Ms. Tovar and provide her with some strength.
Several canons of ethics that were alleged as
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part of the notice here and that were also included as

briefed in the examiner's brief: The canons that are
placed at issue here -- and we'll be sure to discuss
these in more detail, but I do think it's important to go
through these at some level now -- are Canon No. 1, "A
judge shall personally observe high standards of conduct
so that the integrity of the judiciary will be
preserved."
There is no evidence in this case that the
integrity -- the integrity of the judiciary was harmed or
impaired in any way. The Advisory Committee remarks that
attended Canon No. 1 say that "The basic function of an
independent, impartial and honorable judiciary is to
maintain the utmost integrity in decision-making and that
this code should be read and interpreted with that
function in mind."
The impropriety or the appearance of impropriety
should have some functional relationship to the judge's
judicial or adjudicative duties or the business of
judging.
Judge Saucedo's interactions with Ms. Tovar here
were not related to his ability to make decisions in a
judicial capacity. Most of the interactions took place
outside the courtroom. There's no evidence to show that
any of the interactions impacted, delayed or prejudiced
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some support.
Canon 2 in the Advisory Committee's commentary
discusses "A judge's obligation to promote public
confidence and the integrity of the judiciary in
connection with communications and commentary that the
judge may engage in regarding a case pending before the
judge."
The allegations before the Special Masters here
in this proceeding have nothing to do with any case
pending before a judge.
Canon 2B1: "A judge shall not allow family,
social or other relationships to influence the judge's
judicial conduct or judgment."
There's no evidence that this canon is even
applicable. There's no evidence to support the notion
that Ms. Tovar or any other individual was placed in a
special position to influence the judge. Judge Saucedo
assisted her by providing her with financial assistance.
However, there was no evidence to show that that
relationship with Ms. Tovar in any way influenced his
judicial conduct or judgment or the handling of any case.
Canon 3C5: "A judge shall avoid nepotism and
favoritism."
This canon is simply not applicable at all. It
relates solely to judicial appointments, not the
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any proceeding or matter before Judge Saucedo.

To the contrary, you heard from many judges in
Tulare County Courthouse that Judge Saucedo is a
hardworking and ethical and dedicated judge. You heard
from Judge Paden, the presiding judge, that Judge Saucedo
was somebody that can be counted on on all occasions.
Respondents would submit that Canon No. 1 has
not been violated by clear and convincing evidence -- by
proof of clear and convincing evidence in this case.
Canon No. 2 is another code of judicial ethics
that's been put at issue by the CJP. Canon No. 2A is "A
judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act
at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The
test for the appearance of impropriety is whether a
person aware of the facts might entertain a doubt that
the judge would be able to act with integrity,
impartiality or competence."
Judge Saucedo's conduct during the 45 days did
not result in his failure to avoid impropriety. A person
aware of the facts would not reasonably entertain a doubt
as to his ability to act impartially.
Judge Saucedo was attempting to assist a friend
in need with a personal matter, the handling of the
private, personal letter and then secondly, providing
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supervision of staff. The appointment power discussed in

3C5 means a judge's appointment of referees, mediators,
arbitrators, conflict counsel, grand jurors and the like.
The language about avoiding nepotism or favoritism
relates to the abuse of the appointment power, not
supervision or interaction with staff. And, of course, a
judge does not appoint a clerk. They are hired by the
County.
And even if it did apply in some way, shape or
form, there's no evidence of nepotism or favoritism of
Tovar in relation to others in this case.
The last is Canon 4G: "A judge shall not
practice law."
This arises out of the letter that Judge Saucedo
prepared relating to a criminal infraction by Ms. Tovar's
son. The letter was provided to her. Judge Saucedo
obviously never appeared or had any information about
that proceeding other than what was told to him by
Ms. Tovar. He didn't enter into an attorney-client
relationship with the son.
The evidence that was presented here showed this
was merely a goodwill gesture by Judge Saucedo to provide
some fatherly advice to Ms. Tovar's son about the
circumstances that he found himself in. Nobody ever
followed up with Judge Saucedo. The testimony was that
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the son didn't even read the letter.

So the question would be, under Canon 4G: Does
this constitute the practice of law? Well, an
attorney-client relationship was certainly never formed.
The two -- meaning Judge Saucedo and Ms. Tovar's son -never met. He did not make any further inquiry or follow
up with respect to the violation. He didn't prepare any
legal documents. Didn't even speak to the son at all
about the case. So I submit to you that that canon has
not been proven by clear and convincing evidence to have
been violated.
At the end of the testimony phase of this trial,
Judge Saucedo testified about things that he would do
differently and being remorseful about the way the
situation was handled. He's learned a lot from this
experience. And any judge that goes through what
Judge Saucedo had to go through here in a public
proceeding with these sorts of allegations cannot help
being affected. In a large way, he's already been
irremediably damaged and changed.
This process, including the intense
self-examination that comes with it, has humbled him.
He's sought assistance from his church. He's profoundly
apologetic for the entire chapter. Could he have done
things differently? Should he have handled things
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that HR would not be required to be involved in this sort

of inquiry.
Judge Saucedo also admitted that he was
remorseful about the fact that he told Ms. Tovar that he
had contacted the hospital when he didn't. His intention
was to make her feel better. It was improper, but he was
trying to correct a difficult set of circumstances.
Judge Saucedo also admitted mistakes about his
handling of the $8,000 and the letter citing the
extortion language. Did it rise to the level of
prejudicial misconduct or -- or willful misconduct?
Would it appear to an objective observer to be
prejudicial to the public esteem? Does the CJP meet
their burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence to
establish any of this? I would submit they did not.
A financial demand was made by Ms. Tovar, and a
threat to contact HR was made by her. Judge Saucedo was
fearful of what Ms. Tovar would tell HR and would it be
truthful. He admits remorse about how he handled that
circumstance. An objective observer may view sending
such a letter to a clerk to be prejudicial to public
esteem. Judge Saucedo should have given it to HR or his
PJ at that point.
Now, we know from handling these sorts of
matters, that issues about aggravation and mitigation are
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differently or better? Sure. He acknowledges this.

He was too familiar with his clerk. He sent too
many texts. The frequency of the communication was, at
times, improper. The language that he chose was
emotional, too heartfelt, too personal, but that's
Judge Saucedo.
He should have maintained a distance respectful
of the notion that this could be viewed in a light that
he did not intend. He has a good and huge heart. He
likes to help people, and this one got away from him.
He admitted, in examination, that he should have
turned the anonymous letter over to HR from the very
beginning. His intent was in a good place. He honestly
believed that it was a very private and personal matter
that involved Ms. Tovar, her husband and her family and a
former boyfriend. It was not related to anything going
on in the courts. There was no bad faith of his handling
the matter in that way. This was an improper action.
Did it give rise to prejudicial misconduct?
Would it appear to an objective observer to be
prejudicial to the self-esteem of the public office by
his not turning that over to HR? I submit no. An
objective observer could see that Judge Saucedo was
handling -- attempting to handle a very sensitive matter
in a private way. An objective observer could understand
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part of the landscape. There was no evidence anywhere

presented in this case of aggravation, not anything.
There was plenty of evidence of mitigation.
Judge Saucedo has no prior discipline and a perfect
record. The evidence both from Judge Saucedo and his
wife and others and the character witnesses that came
before the Court show that he's an incredibly passionate,
heartfelt, dedicated public servant. Not just a good
judge but a good person. Generous to a fault about his
time, he's compassionate. He believes in people when no
one else does, when others have given up.
Is he idiosyncratic? Too exuberant? Quirky?
Sure. He's all of those things when he's involved in
something that he's very passionate about.
Is he remorseful for his conduct? Yes. You
heard him explain that he made mistakes. He wishes he
could turn back time and bring a better, more balanced
judgment to the interaction. And you heard from him not
a day goes by that he doesn't think about it.
It's clear from all the testimony presented at
the hearing that Judge Saucedo is a dedicated and
hardworking and competent judge. He's respected by all.
He's earned the accolades of many that have worked with
him. He has every intent of continuing to serve the
people of Tulare County and wants to do so.
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My opening remarks talk about what the CJP

charge is and that it's charged with, ultimately, the
protection of the public. I submit that there's no
evidence here to show that the public should be protected
from Judge Saucedo. We have shown, via the character
witnesses here and the other 109 character references
that we included in Exhibit N show that he is an
extraordinary man. He has an incredible life story from
humble beginnings of a son of an undocumented migrant
farmer to a knock on the door of his family home that led
him to U.C. Berkeley, became a Stanford law graduate, had
a world of opportunities available for him, but he chose
to return to his roots and chose to return to public
service.
He was the Mayor of Lindsay and was appointed as
the County's first Hispanic judge. Every county needs
judges of color. Not only does he share the same
ethnicity as many of the people that come through his
courtroom, but he shares the same humble, poor
upbringing. In this way, he's an inspiration to his
community, surrounded by the many challenges that most
would find insurmountable, yet he persevered. Everyone
that testified before you agreed that he's a dedicated,
hardworking, knowledgeable and very committed judge.
He's a man committed to his community, family,
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SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right. Thank you

very much, Mr. Miller.
Do you have any questions?
SPECIAL MASTER DUGAN: I don't.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: Judge Hanoian?
SPECIAL MASTER HANOIAN: I do.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right.
SPECIAL MASTER HANOIAN: Back to the extortion
letter -- and I understand your position, if it is
legitimate, that there was demand for $8,000, and then
the letter was presented to her in open court, whether or
not that is exactly how it happened, my question is:
Didn't the judge have an obligation to report the very
fact of the extortion to someone; either his PJ, her HR
representative or the Sheriff's Department? Because if,
in fact, that is what happened, it sounds like it's a
crime to me.
MR. MILLER: He said as much. In his testimony,
he said that he should have handled that situation
differently.
SPECIAL MASTER HANOIAN: Well, didn't he have an
obligation, though, to report that immediately to his
presiding judge for guidance on how to proceed, were they
to proceed by way of either a personnel action against
the clerk or whether or not the Sheriff's Department
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friends, colleagues. You heard from a member of the

community who has known and admired Judge Saucedo since
high school, Don Tamaki, who was a classmate of his from
U.C. Berkeley.
You heard about Judge Saucedo's dedication to
the community and the farm workers. You heard from
Tyrone Wilson, a very passionate young man who
Judge Saucedo mentored on his own time, spending week
after week after week helping that young man pass the
Bar. He is, in and of himself, a success story.
You've heard from attorneys who've practiced
before Judge Saucedo and how he's helped out people that
appear before his Court.
It would be a tremendous loss if he was not able
to continue to serve the people of Tulare County. Many
would be worse off without him. To borrow a phrase from
one of the character witnesses, "Judge Saucedo is a man,
not a monster."
So when you compare 45 days of conduct at issue
in this case with the nearly 40 years of public service,
Judge Saucedo's hope, and my hope, is that you see
through the relatively tiny speck of time and measure
this judge by the entirety of his contribution to the
judiciary and to society as a whole. He's earned that.
Thank you.
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ought to be brought in because there's some criminal

aspect behind that?
MR. MILLER: Those were two means by which this
could have been elevated, yes. And Judge Saucedo
testified that that's -- those are some of the other
methods that he should have considered at that time about
that circumstance.
He knows that she came to him, demanded $8,000,
perhaps unconnected with any prior obligation or
commitment of his; wanted it within a couple of days.
Judge Saucedo obviously felt very strongly about what she
was doing; I think as part of that, prepared the note to
go along with it.
Should he have handled it differently? Should
he have gone to HR, PJ, law enforcement to report that or
have somebody investigate that conduct? I think that's
part of what he is saying.
SPECIAL MASTER HANOIAN: I guess I'm not -maybe I'm not being clear. It's not a suggestion.
Doesn't he have an obligation, a mandatory
obligation to report that?
MR. MILLER: I don't know that he has a
mandatory obligation to report that. It would depend on
how you characterize that conduct.
SPECIAL MASTER HANOIAN: Well, if a judge is
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being blackmailed, doesn't he have to take steps to

ensure that doesn't get accomplished? Isn't that what is
covered by the canons?
MR. MILLER: Perhaps. I think the notion of
some sort of a mandatory reporting in that circumstance
because he's dealing with this demand by his clerk? I
would say yes, he has some obligation to report it to
somebody who is going to take responsibility for those
actions.
And I think when he responded to that
circumstance and how he would view it differently now or
handle it differently now, that's what he was attempting
to say, is that this is something that should have been
handled in a much more official way, whatever those means
were.
SPECIAL MASTER HANOIAN: That's all I have.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right. Mr. Miller,
thank you very much.
It's 2:15. We've been going for almost an hour
and 15 minutes. We're going to take a very short break,
five minutes, let everybody just stand up and stretch.
And we'll be back in session at 2:20.
(Recess taken.)
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right. Then please
be seated. And the record may reflect that we are back
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SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: Judge Hanoian, any

questions?
SPECIAL MASTER HANOIAN: No.
SPECIAL MASTER DUGAN: No.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: Mr. Harrigan, one thing:
You have raised the specter in your initial remarks that
supervisory responsibilities that a judge may have over
staff can, in fact, constitute acting in a judicial
capacity.
From my point of view, I think that is something
that would be important for you to develop with points of
authority more fully in your briefing unless you wish to
speak to that issue at this point.
MR. HARRIGAN: No. I appreciate that point, and
I believe that was an intent on our part, and it will be
done.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right. Is there
anything further to be brought to the Special Masters'
attention at this point?
MR. HARRIGAN: Nothing from me.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right. Then these
matters are, in fact, concluded, which I believe then the
hearing is concluded, which will be important for
purposes of establishing deadlines that all of us must
work from at this point.
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in session with all counsel, with the Special Masters,

with Judge Saucedo.
And, Mr. Harrigan, for your rebuttal, sir.
MR. HARRIGAN: Thank you, Justice.
I actually only want to comment on two points.
One, it's been suggested that you cannot piece
together various parts of circumstantial evidence and
achieve a clear and convincing standard. I disagree with
that. There are many people who, for example, are in
federal prison who are only there because of
circumstantial evidence. There's nothing about
circumstantial evidence that is less admissible or
probative than direct evidence, and I'm sure you will put
things to the test as you review the case.
The other point I wanted to make was that there
could be some confusion about Priscilla Tovar and my role
as an examiner. I am not an apologist for
Priscilla Tovar. She is not my client, and -- but it's a
little uncomfortable, actually, to see a litigation
strategy that is framed on an inability to defend on the
facts and then seek to re-victimize a person who has gone
through what she's gone through. And what's important is
it's not her conduct at issue. It's his conduct. It's
what he did or did not do.
And that's all I have to say. Thank you.
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Am I correct in that, Ms. Henley?

MS. HENLEY: Mm-hmm.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: Is that a "yes"?
MS. HENLEY: Yes. I believe it starts with the
hearing being completed.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: Yes. All right. Then I
think we're all familiar with what our deadlines are.
And, Counsel, I wish to thank you again for your
professionalism in this.
Thank you to you, Judge Saucedo, for your
professionalism too, as well.
Then there being nothing further to bring to our
attention, these matters are concluded. All right.
Thank you, everyone.
(Time noted: 2:24 p.m.)

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COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA
)
) ss.
3 COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
)
________________________________)
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I, Sandra Lee Hockin, hereby certify:
7
I am a duly qualified Certified Shorthand
8 Reporter in the state of California, holder of
9 Certificate Number CSR 7372 issued by the Court Reporters
10 Board of California and which is in full force and
11 effect.
12
I am not financially interested in this action
13 and am not a relative or employee of any attorney of the
14 parties, or of any of the parties.
15
I am the reporter that stenographically recorded
16 the testimony in the foregoing proceeding and the
17 foregoing transcript is a true record of the testimony
18 given.
19
20 Dated: May 11, 2015
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