Sari sari vs.

Piglas-kamao

FACTS : In December 1990, Mariko Novel Wares, Inc. (petitioner) began its
retail outlet operations under the name Sari-Sari in the basement of
Robinsons Galleria in Quezon City. Among its employees were: Head
Checker Ronnie Tamayo, Checker Jose del Carmen, Section
Heads Jocylene Padua,Vicky Bermeo,
and
Elizabeth Matutina (respondents), all of whom were assigned at the
Robinsons Galleria branch. Respondents organized a union known
as Piglas Kamao (Sari-Sari Chapter). At the time of the formation, the
officers of the union were respondents Ronnie Tamayo, President; Jose del
Carmen, Vice-President; and Jocelyne Padua, Secretary.Respondents claim
that petitioner, through its President, Rico Ocampo, interfered with the
formation of the union.
RATIO : Effect of Non-Verification by All Parties
Section 1 of Rule 65[29] in relation to Section 3 of Rule 46[30] of the
Rules of Court requires that a petition for review filed with the CA should be
verified and should contain a certificate of non-forum shopping.
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that
the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and
correct, not merely speculative.[31] On the other hand, the rule against forum
shopping is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to
pursue simultaneous remedies in differentfora, as this practice is detrimental
to orderly judicial procedure.[32]
A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the
requirements for Verification and noncompliance with those for Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping. As to Verification, non-compliance therewith does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective; hence, the court may order a
correction if Verification is lacking; or act on the pleading although it is not
verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the
Rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be
served.[33]

A pleading which is required by the Rules of Court to be verified may

be given due course even without a verification of the circumstances
warranting the suspension of the rules in the interest of justice. [34] When
circumstances warrant, the court may simply order the correction of unverified
pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order
that the ends of justice may thereby be served.[35] Moreover, many authorities
consider the absence of Verification a mere formal, not jurisdictional defect,
the absence of which does not of itself justify a court in refusing to allow and
act on the case.[36]
In the case at bar, respondent Jose del Carmen shares a common interest
with the other respondents as to the resolution of the labor dispute between
them and the petitioner. They collectively sued the petitioner for illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practices and have collectively appealed the NLRC
decision. Similarly, there is sufficient basis for Jose del Carmen to speak on
behalf of his co-respondents in stating that they have not filed any action or
claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, nor is there any
other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same
issues. Thus, even if only respondent Jose del Carmen signed the
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, the rule on substantial compliance
applies. The CA therefore did not commit any error in entertaining the appeal
of the respondents.
MEDIAN CONTAINER CORPORATION VS. METROPOLITAN
BANk
Facts : Respondent filed a complaint for sum of money against
petitioner for failure to settle the amount of more than P5,000,000
representing the outstanding balance of loans contracted by MCC.
Petitioner questions the certificate of non-forum shopping filed by
respodent which was signed by a certain Atty. Alexander P. Mendoza
on May 28, 2003. Petitioner claims that Atty. Mendoza was only
given authority to execute the certificate only on June 3, 2003. The
trial and appellate court denied petitioners motion to dismiss.

Issue/s: W/N respondent failed to comply with the proper procedure

on the verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
Held/Ratio: NO. Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional,
requirement. It is simply intended to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct, and that the pleading
is filed in good faith. That explains why a court may order the
correction of the pleading if verification is lacking, or act on the
pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are
such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in
order to serve the ends of justice.
As for the required certification against forum shopping, failure to
comply therewith is generally not curable by its submission
subsequent to the filing of the petition nor by amendment, and is
cause for its dismissal. A certification against forum shopping signed
by a person on behalf of a corporation which is unaccompanied by
proof that the signatory is authorized to file the petition is generally
likewise cause for dismissal. In several cases, however, this Court
relaxed the application of these requirements upon appreciation of
attendant special circumstances or compelling reasons.
In the case at bar, simultaneous with the filing of the complaint,
Metrobank submitted both a certification of non-forum shopping and
proof that Atty. Mendoza who signed it on its behalf was authorized
to do so. The proof of authorization of Atty. Mendoza was dated later
than the date of his signing of the certification of non-forum shopping,
however, thus giving the impression that he, at the time he affixed his
signature, was not authorized to do so. The passing on June 3, 2004
of a Board Resolution of authorization before the actual filing on June
23, 2004 of the complaint, however, is deemed a ratification of Atty.
Mendoza's prior execution on May 28, 2004 of the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping, thus curing any defects thereof.
Remitere vs. Yulo
FACTS: Gregorio Remitere was declared the registered owner of two
questioned Lots by then CFI of Negros Occidental. When he died,

CFI appointed his wife as administratrix of his estate, among which

are the two lots in question. During this period, the provincial sheriff
of Negros Occidental, conducted a public auction sale over the said
parcels of land, and on the same day, he issued a deed of sale in
favor of Mariano Yulo. This lead to a series of cancellations of the
Certificate of Titles and finally to the registration of the TCT by virtue
of deeds of sales in the name of Remedios Montinola Vda. de Yulo.
Hence, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants and the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The complaint prayed that
the defendants be ordered to reconvey the two lots in question to the
plaintiffs and that the defendant Register of Deeds be ordered to
cancel the certificates of titles in the name of the defendant and to
issue new ones in the names of the plaintiffs. The defendantsappellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that
the complaint does not state a cause of action (and, that even
assuming that a cause of action exists, the same has already
prescribed.) The lower court dismissed the complaint precisely on
the grounds relied upon by the defendants-appellees. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUE: WON the complaint states a cause of action.
RULING: NO SC held that no ultimate facts which may constitute the
basis of plaintiffs rights which had been violated are alleged. Neither
are there allegations of ultimate facts showing acts or omissions on
the part of the defendants which constitute a violation of the rights of
plaintiffs. Hence, the lower court had correctly ruled that the
complaint in the present case does not narrate facts that constitute a
cause of action.
The lack of a cause of action as a ground for dismissal must appear
on the face of the complaint, and to determine whether the complaint
states a cause of action, only the facts alleged therein, and no other,
should be considered. It is not stated anywhere in the complaint why
the sale at public auction was absolutely void, nor were there stated
any particular facts or circumstances upon which the alleged nullity
of the sale or transaction is predicated. The averment that "the public

sale . . . was and still is absolutely a void sale, and certainly did not
pass titles and ownerships of said lots, starting from its primitive
owner, now being represented by the plaintiffs herein, as surviving
heirs thereto, until it reaches the possession by the defendants is
a conclusion of law or an inference from (or conclusion of) facts not
stated in the pleading.
A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of
action or defense asserted, as distinguished from a mere conclusion
of fact, or conclusion of law. An allegation that a contract is valid or
void, as in the instant case, is a mere conclusion of law.
Not being statements of ultimate facts which constitute basis of a
right of the plaintiffs, nor are they statements if ultimate facts which
constitute the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendants that
violated the right of the plaintiffs the allegations of the complaint in
the present case have not fulfilled the requirements of the rules of
court that the complaint should contain a concise statement of the
ultimate facts consulting the plaintiffs cause or causes of action.
Philippine Stock Exchange vs. Manila banking corporation
FACTS:
Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Trazo
Namarco vs. Federation of United Namarco Distributors
Bungcayao Sr. vs. Fort Ilocandia
Calibre Traders Inc. vs. Bayer Philippines
Facts: This is petition for review on certiorari assails the July 31,
2002 Decision and the December 19, 2003 Resolution of the CA that
denied petitioners action for damages against respondent Bayer
Philippines Inc. and instead granted the latters counterclaim for
P1,272,103.07, representing unpaid purchases of Bayerphil s
products. Calibre Traders, Inc. was one of Bayerphils
distributors/dealers of its agricultural chemicals within the provinces

of Pangasinan and Tarlac. Their last distributorship agreement was

effective from June 1989 to June 1991. However, Bayerphil stopped
delivering stocks to Calibre on July 31, 1989 after the latter failed to
settle its unpaid accounts in the total amount of P1,751,064.56. The
parties had a disagreement as to the entitlement and computations
of the discounts of Calibre. It withheld the payment to Bayerphil and
compelled the former to reconcile its accounts. In a letter dated
August 16, 1989, Calibre requested Bayerphil for a reconciliation of
accounts. It enumerated the following claims that amounted to
P968,265.82. Calibre sent follow-up letters dated September 17,
October 13, and November 16, 1989.
On September 29, 1989, Bayerphils credit and collection officer,
Leon Abesamis, conferred with Calibres General Manager Mario
Sebastian. The attempt to settle failed. Again, on October 27, 1989,
Bayerphils Sales Manager of the Agro Division, Vidal Lingan, met
with Sebastian. The results of their discussion were put in writing.
Bayerphils explained that there are some claims in the form of
rebates should not be granted to the petitioners, save those which
have valid justifications. Respondents assert that they are fair to the
petitioners in dealing with their claims, as they granted their requests.
Bayerphils offered to grant Calibres claims so that they may finally
settle its unpaid accounts totaling to P934,086.92 by a reply dated
November 24, 1989. Bayerphils gave a deadline on or before
December 8, 1989. Respondent conditioned on the premise that
failure to remit the said amount through a bank shall be a cause for
the cancellation of the respondents offer. In his December 8, 1989
letter, Sebastian expressed discontent in Bayerphils refusal to credit
his claims in full and underscored the alleged inaction of Bayerphil in
reconciling Calibre s accounts. This was followed by a demand letter
requiring Bayerphil to pay the sum of P10,000,000.00 for the
damages it had allegedly caused to Calibre. Bayerphil replied,
reminding that Calibre owed it P1,272,103.07 as of December 31,
1989.
Accusing Bayerphil of maliciously breaching the distributorship
agreement by manipulating Calibres accounts, withholding discounts

and rebates due it, charging unwarranted penalties, refusing to

supply goods, and favoring the new distributors/dealers to drive it out
of business, Calibre, on March 14, 1990, filed a suit for damages,
before the RTC of Pasig. Calibre prayed for P8,000,000.00 actual
damages, representing alleged actual losses and profits;
P2,000,000.00 award as alleged damage to its goodwill and
business reputation; P3,500,000.00 as exemplary damages; and,
attorneys fees of P1,500,000.00. In its Answer with Counterclaim,
Bayerphil denied its alleged wanton appointment of other distributors
and maintained that Calibre filed the damage suit to avoid paying its
overdue accounts. Considering that those purchased on credit
remained unpaid, Bayerphil had to refuse to further supply Calibre
with its products. Bayerphil thus prayed for the collection of
P1,272,103.07, with interest of 14% per annum accruing daily and
compounded monthly from the date of default (as provided in the
dealership agreement); P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages; and, P
200,000.00 attorneys fees and costs of suit. Bayerphil also moved
that Mario Sebastian and his wife Minda (Sebastians) be impleaded
as co-defendants.
Calibre opposed Bayerphils motion to implead the Sebastians and
moved to strike out the counterclaim, reasoning that the spouses are
not parties in its suit against Bayerphil and thus are not the proper
parties to the counterclaim. Bayerphil contended that both causes of
action arose from the same contract of distributorship, and that the
Sebastians inclusion is necessary for a full adjudication of
Bayerphils counterclaim to avoid duplication of suits. In its October
24, 1990 Resolution, the trial court rejected Calibres arguments and
granted the motion to implead the Sebastians as co-defendants in
the counterclaim
The spouses then filed their answer to Bayerphils counterclaim and
raised the issue that the counterclaim against them is permissive,
and since Bayerphil failed to pay the required docket fees, the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the counterclaim. On December 6,
1993, the trial court rendered judgment favoring Calibre and
dismissing the Counter-Complaint of the defendant against Spouses

Mario and Minda Sebastian. CA reversed the RTCs decision and

favored Bayerphil s counterclaim. Later, the appellate court denied
the MR of the petitioner.
ISSUE: WON the relief granted to Bayerphils counterclaim is proper
HELD: Yes, the grant of the respondents counterclaim is proper
RATIO: A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or other
relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing party,
which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected
with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
plaintiffs complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the
jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction, and will be barred x x x if not set up in the answer to the
complaint in the same case. Any other claim is permissive. [The]
Court has already laid down the following tests to determine whether
a counterclaim is compulsory or not, to wit: (1) Are the issues of
fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the
same? (2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
(3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim? and (4)
Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the
respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial
duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court? The
fourth test is the compelling test of compulsoriness.
Bayerphils suit may independently proceed in a separate action.
Although the rights and obligations of the parties are anchored on the
same contract, the causes of action they filed against each other are
distinct and do not involve the same factual issues. We find no
logical relationship between the two actions in a way that the
recovery or dismissal of plaintiffs suit will establish a foundation for
the others claim. The counterclaim for collection of money is not

intertwined with or contingent on Calibres own claim for damages,

which was based on the principle of abuse of rights. Both actions
involve the presentation of different pieces of evidence. Calibres suit
had to present evidence of malicious intent, while Bayerphils
objective was to prove nonpayment of purchases. The allegations
highlighting bad faith are different from the transactions constituting
the subject matter of the collection suit. Respondents counterclaim
was only permissive. Hence, the CA erred in ruling that Bayerphils
claim against the petitioners partakes of a compulsory counterclaim.
The rules and jurisprudence do not require that the parties to the
counterclaim be the original parties only. In fact, the presence of third
parties is allowed, the only provision being their capacity to be
subjected under the courts jurisdiction. As regards the nature of the
claims of the parties, neither is it required that they be of the same
nature, only that they arise from the same transaction or occurrence.
All along, Bayerphil has never evaded payment of the docket fees on
the honest belief that its counterclaim was compulsory. It cannot be
gainsaid that the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to
afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Rules on the payment of filing fees have already been
relaxed. It is a settled doctrine that although the payment of the
prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its nonpayment x x x should not result in the automatic dismissal of the
case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable
prescriptive period. The prescriptive period therein mentioned
refers to the period within which a specific action must be filed. It
means that in every case, the docket fee must be paid before the
lapse of the prescriptive period. In accordance with the
aforementioned rules on payment of docket fees, the trial court upon
a determination that Bayerphils counterclaim was permissive, should
have instead ordered Bayerphil to pay the required docket fees for
the permissive counterclaim, giving it reasonable time but in no case
beyond the reglementary period. Considering the foregoing
discussion, we find no need to remand the case to the trial court for
the resolution of Bayerphils counterclaim

Considering that the counterclaim is permissive, respondent

Bayer Philippines, Inc. is ORDERED to pay the prescribed
docket fees with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Decision
Planters Development Bank v LZK Holdings & Development Co
Young vs. Sy
FACTS: This case originated from 2 petitions. 1 regarding the
supplemental complaint, 2 regarding the non-suit (not related to the
topic). NOTE: The case didnt say how case number 1 initiated it just
jumped to the supplemental complaint. So assuming procedurally
petitioner filed a complaint then she filed a supplemental complaint.
Lili Dy Young the mother of Genalyn D. Young caused an
extrajudicial partition which adjudicated an unregistered parcel of
land solely in the latters favor is unenforceable. She contends that,
since at the time of the execution she was only 15 years old and no
court approval had been procured. This was due to the fact that the
mother obtained a loan from spouses Sy and mortgaged the subject
property. The property was foreclosed and sold to the Sys through
auction. Hence the cases.
(Jumping to the supplemental complaint) The problem arose
when the petitioner filed a motion to admit supplemental complaint.
The supplemental complaint invoked her right, as co-owner, to
exercise the legal redemption. In comparison to the original
complaint which is to enforce unenforceability.
RTC and CA: Both the RTC and the CA dismissed her complaint.
They ruled that the supplemental complaint constituted a substantial
amendment of the original complaint because of the relief prayed for
and the causes of action were different from the original complaint
which is prohibited.
Issue: WON the dismissal of the supplemental complaint filed by the
Petitioner was proper?

Held: It was improper.

RATIO: In this case, the consolidation of title over the subject
property in the name of respondent Manuel Sy and the issue as to
whether it precluded petitioner as alleged co-owner from exercising
the right of legal redemption, are new matters that occurred after the
filing of the original complaint. The relief prayed for in the
Supplemental Complaint, which is the exercise of the right of legal
redemption accorded to co-owners of property, is germane to and
intertwined with the cause of action in the Complaint for the
nullification of the "Second Supplemental to the Extrajudicial
Partition" on the ground that it lacked the approval of a guardianship
court.
The petitioner's right to redeem the property is dependent on the
nullification of the partition which is the subject of the original
complaint. Unless the partition is nullified or declared without any
force or effect, the petitioner will not be considered a co-owner of the
property and, consequently, she will be unable to exercise any right
of legal redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code granted to
co-owners of property.
The right of legal redemption as co-owner is conferred by law and is
merely a natural consequence of co-ownership. Hence, the
petitioner's cause of action for legal redemption as embodied in her
Supplemental Complaint stems directly from and is an extension of
her rights as co-owner of the property subject of the Complaint.
Furthermore, the evidence required to prove petitioner's right of legal
redemption in the Supplemental Complaint will be exactly the same
evidence required to prove the nullification of the partition in the
Complaint.
If a separate action is filed for the subject covered by the
Supplemental Complaint, there will be multiplicity of suits. Should a
separate complaint be filed before the nullification of the partition, the

same would be dismissed for being premature pending the resolution

of the Complaint for nullification.

Section 6, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 6. Supplemental Pleadings. - Upon motion of a
party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such
terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental
pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought
to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto
within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the
supplemental pleading.

As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to

bolster or add something to the primary pleading. A supplement
exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it
supplements. Moreover, a supplemental pleading assumes that the
original pleading is to stand and that the issues joined with the
original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. It is but
a continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up new facts
which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the
same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original
complaint.

The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records

new facts which will enlarge or change the kind of relief to which the
plaintiff is entitled; hence, any supplemental facts which further
develop the original right of action, or extend to vary the relief, are
available by way of supplemental complaint even though they
themselves constitute a right of action.

In Leobrera v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court ruled that when the

cause of action stated in the supplemental complaint is different from
the causes of action mentioned in the original complaint, the court
should not admit the supplemental complaint; the parties may file
supplemental pleadings only to supply deficiencies in aid of an
original pleading, but not to introduce new and independent causes
of action. However, in Planters Development Bank v. LZK Holdings
and Development Co., the Court held that a broad definition of
causes of action should be applied: while a matter stated in a
supplemental complaint should have some relation to the cause of
action set forth in the original pleading, the fact that the supplemental

pleading technically states a new cause of action should not be a bar

to its allowance but only a factor to be considered by the court in the
exercise of its discretion; and of course, a broad definition of "cause
of action" should be applied here as elsewhere.