PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RESPONDENCE

The right to privacy of communication and correspondence allows persons to correspond and
communicate with each other without the State having a right to pry into such correspondence and
communication. Any evidence obtained in violation of the above-mentioned right is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceedings.
Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986)
FACTS:
Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon offered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed
against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a
telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money.
Since Atty. Gaanan listen to the telephone conversation without complainants consent, complainant
charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).
ISSUE:
W/N an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that are used to
overhear a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of communication between 2
parties using a telephone line.
HELD:
NO.An extension tel. cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph, or other devices
enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of
a telephone line. This section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by
the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and
their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a tel. conversation. The tel. extension in
this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.
Thus in the case of doubt as in this case, on WON an extension tel. is included in the phrase "device or
arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension tel. A perusal of the
Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment,
persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in
order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage
over the tel. users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with
the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature.
Socorro D. Ramirez, vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and Ester S. Garcia, G.R. No. 93833,
September 28, 1995
Facts:
A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trail Court alleging that
the private respondent, Esther S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted
and humiliated her in a hostile or furious mood and in a manner offensive to dignity and personality,
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim
transcript of the event and sought morals damages, attorneys fees and other expenses of litigation. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner.
Discussion on tape:
Ester was alleging that Socorro was only admitted to the Hotel industry because Socorro,
claimed that their parents are related and thus giving her a higher leverage when she was
interviewed for her work now. . Ester then further added that if Socorro would ask for a
certification she would not be given since the latter was applying for a work in the United
States.
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As a result of the petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping
the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for
violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit or penalize wiretapping and other
relevant violations of PRIVATE COMMUNICATION , AND OTHER PURPOSES.
Issue:
Whether petitioner violated the privacy of communication, as defined in Republic Act 4200, Section 1?
Ruling:
Petition was DENIED. Petitioner clearly violated RA 4200 Section 1, Section 1 . It shall be unlawful for any
person, not authorize by all parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape record, or however otherwise described.
Salcedo-Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 111 (1994)
Facts:
On May 2 1990, private respondent Raphael S. Ortanez filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for
annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo Ortanez, on
grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversation between petitioner and unidentified person.
The tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the
military to wiretap his home telephone. Said trial court however, still admitted such evidence.
A petition for certiorari was then filled by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing the admission in the
evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes. The Court of Appeals affirmed said decision by the Trial
court. That is why petitioner filed a motion for review.
Issue:
Whether respondent violated RA 4200? And whether the cassette tapes are admissible to the evidence for
the said annulment of marriage due to lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the
petitioner?
Ruling:
Respondent violated RA 4200 entitled, An Act to prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violation of Communication, and for other purposes. Court of Appeals erred in making said tapes
admissible in the case. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the phone conversations allowed to
recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes are inadmissible under Philippine law. (The
other party was invoking the applicability of American Jurisprudence).
Violations made: Republic Act No. 4200 entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes expressly makes such
recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of RA No. 4200 are as follows:
Section 1:It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. . .
Section 4: Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained,
obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be
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PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE

admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions
of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties
to the telephone conversations allowed to recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is
mandatory under RA No. 4200.
Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned RA in Section 2 thereof imposes a
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and up to six (6) years for violation of said act.
In re: Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987)
Facts:
Atty. Wenceslao Laureta was counsel for Eva Maravilla-Ilustre in a case involving the estate of Ilustres
deceased aunt Digna Maravilla. The estate dispute had been brought before the Supreme Court several
times already and it had been decided that Ilustre had no right to inherit from such estate. As she was very
disappointed by the dismissal of her case through a minute resolution, she wrote several letters addressed
to the Justices of the First Division of the SC in connection with the performance of their judicial functions
and threats to publicize the injustice she experienced from the members of the SC, etc. True to her threats,
Ilustre filed a case against the Justices before the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman). Atty. Laureta, for his
part, circulated copies of the complaint to the press and a headline was even published making it appear
that the Justices were charged with graft and corruption. Now, SC charged Ilustre with contempt and Atty.
Laureta was under disciplinary proceedings.
Ilustre, in her answer, contended that the letters addressed to the individual Justices were private in
character and were never meant for anybody, much less the Supreme Court en banc, "there (being) a
constitutional mandate affording protection to privacy of communications;"
Issue:
WON there was a violation of the privacy of communication
Held: Respondents' reliance on the "privacy of communication" is misplaced. Letters addressed to
individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial
record and are a matter of concern for the entire Court.
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)
Facts:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and
private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting
cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Issue:
Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable apply
even to the spouse of the aggrieved party
Held:
The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the
privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of
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PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE

communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from
the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication;
quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to
do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
Waterhouse Drug Corp. vs. NLRC, GR No. 113271, October 16, 1997
Facts:
Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation (hereafter WATEROUS).
Catolico received two memorandums from Co, WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager, warning her
not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the company's accounts and not to negotiate with
suppliers of medicine which would impair the companys control of purchases, because he is not
authorized to do so. She did not deny her responsibility, however, she contended that those were just "due
to negligence" and a fellow employee obtained the medicines in bad faith;
The control clerk, Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung
Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.purchasing overpriced medicines and that a check was paid same to her. But
Catolico denied having received it and that she is unaware of the overprice. However, upon conversation
with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was
actually received by her. As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana (if she opened the
envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her talagang ganyan, bukas.) It appears that
the amount in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico.
Co, through a Memorandum, informed Catolico, to explain her reported irregularity and also informed that
she would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company; Catolico requested
access to the alleged file for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation.
She emphasized the following defenses:
1.) She protested Saldaas invasion of her privacy when Saldaa opened an envelope addressed her;
2.) The check she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a refund of overprice;
3.) the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and
Cos secretary;
But then, the Supervisor issued a memorandum notifying Catolico of her termination grounded on her act
of dishonesty detrimental to the interest of the company and she is are hereby terminated effective March
8, 1990. Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal
dismissal, and illegal suspension.
The Labor Arbiter declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement, as it would
not be to the best interest of the parties. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the
ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolicos dismissal from her employment.
It found that petitioners evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of
complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared that the
check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution;
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari
PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS:
1.) petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving commissions from YSP, or probably from other
suppliers, and that the check issued to her was not the first or the last.
2.) that Catolico occupied a confidential position and that Catolicos receipt of YSPs check, aggravated
by her propensity to violate company rules, constituted breach of confidence.
3.) Contrary to the findings of NLRC, Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain her side of the
controversy.
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4.) Anent the third ground, petitioners submit that, in light of the decision in the People v. Marti,[21]
the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of
ones person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagreed with the NLRC's
decision, (sic) the incident involving the opening of envelope addressed to private respondent does not
warrant the application of the constitutional provisions;
Issue:
Whether or not Catolico's right to privacy has been violated. (Constitutional)
Held:
**** As regards to labor violations:
Catolico was unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and valid
cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the
dismissal is unjustified;
* Court's contentions on the alleged issues:
a. petitioner's evidence does not establish that there was an overcharge;
b. Catolicos dismissal was based on hearsay information. Estelita Reyes ( from Accounting Dept. of
YSP) never testified nor executed an affidavit relative to this case;
c. check used in paying the overpriced medicines (Voren tablets) was never presented in evidence, nor
was any receipt from YSP offered by petitioners.
d. The two purchase orders of voren tablets do not indicate overcharge because difference in price may
then be attributed to the different packaging used in each purchase order.
e. Despite the memorandum warning Catolico not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine, there was no
proof that she ever transacted, or that she had the opportunity to transact, with the said suppliers
Hence, Catolicos dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify
an employees dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the
termination of employment; and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence must
rest on substantial grounds and not on the employers arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion.Besides,
Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of employees the term trust and
confidence is restricted
*****As regards the constitutional violation:
Declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of
the Constitution. The contention that Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches
and seizures perpetrated by private individuals and that the citizens have no recourse against such
assaults are not true, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED
Ople vs Torres, GR. No. 127685, July 23, 1998
Facts:
On December 12, 1996, then President FIDEL V. RAMOS issued Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM.
The AO seeks to have all Filipino citizens and foreign residents to have a Population Reference Number
(PRN) generated by the National Statistics Office (NSO) through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY and
the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons
seeking basic services.
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The AO was questioned by Senator Ople on the following grounds:
1.

The establishment of the PRN without any law is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative
powers of the Congress of the Philippines;

2.

The appropriation of public funds for the implementation of the said AO is unconstitutional since
Congress has the exclusive authority to appropriate funds for such expenditure; and

3.

The AO violates the citizens right to privacy protected by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.

Held:
1.

The AO establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and
liberty of every Filipino citizens and foreign residents and therefore, it is supposed to be a law
passed by Congress that implements it, not by an Administrative Order issued by the President.
Administrative Power, which is supposed to be exercised by the President, is concerned with the
work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It
enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official
conduct of his agents. Prescinding from the foregoing precepts, AO 308 involves a subject that is
not appropriate to be covered by an Administrative Order. An administrative order is an ordinance
issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of the
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The subject of AO 308 therefore is
beyond the power of the President to issue and it is a usurpation of legislative power.

2.

The AO likewise violates the right to privacy since its main purpose is to provide a common
reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies through the use of BIOMETRICS
TECHNOLOGY. Biometry is the science of the application of statistical methods to biological facts; a
mathematical analysis of a biological data. It is the confirmation of an individuals identity through a
fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. Through the PRN, the government
offices has the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic
linkage of the files of every citizen. The data, however, may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a
covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.
More importantly, it does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy. As
technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases.The measure of
protection granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more
widely accepted.

Further, the AO does not even tells us in clear and unequivocal terms how these informations gathered
shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data and under what circumstances
and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of
the information. The computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. YET,
THERE ARE NO CONTROLS TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INFORMATIONS. WHEN THE ACCESS CODE OF
THE CONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE PARTICULAR COMPUTER SYSTEM IS BROKEN, AN INTRUDER, WITHOUT
FEAR OF SANCTION OR PENALTY, CAN MAKE USE OF THE DATA FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE, OR WORSE,
MANIPULATE THE DATA STORED WITHIN THE SYSTEM.
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. In the case at bar,
the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the
people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will
facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent
will fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating
dossier against unsuspecting citizens. The court close with the statement that the right to privacy was not
engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
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~ The petition is hereby granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

MARYNETTE GAMBOA VS P/SSPT. MARLOU CHAN and P/SUPT. WILLIAM FANG, GR No. 193636,
July 24, 2012
FACTS:
Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275) creating the
Zearosa Commission (Commission) which was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups
(PAGs) in the country in view of eliminating and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon
conclusion of its investigation, the Commission submitted a confidential report to the Office of the
President.
Marynette Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Gamboa alleged that the Philippine
National Police Ilocos Norte (PNP) conducted surveillance operation against her and her aides, and
classified her as a PAG coddler. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Commission, causing her inclusion in the Reports enumeration of
individuals maintaining PAGs.
Gamboas association with PAG was published and released in the different forms of media, publicly
tagging her as a PAG coddler. Alleging that her right to privacy was violated, Gamboa filed a petition before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the issuance of writ of habeas data to destroy the unverified reports from
the PNP data base and restrain PNP from forwarding baseless reports against her. The RTC ruled that the
inclusion of Gamboa in the report violates her right to privacy. However, the RTC dismissed Gamboas
petition for writ of habeas data saying that Gamboa failed to establish the source of the information.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the forwarding of information or intelligence report by the PNP to the Commission
was an unlawful act that violated petitioners right to privacy
2. Whether or not resort to petition for writ of habeas data was proper
HELD:
Clearly, the right to privacy as enshrined in the Constitution is considered a fundamental right that must
be protected from intrusion or complaint. However, the right to privacy is NOT ABSOLUTE Therefore, when
the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are required to weigh both
notions. In these cases, ALTHOUGH CONSIDERED A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY MAY
NEVERTHELESS SUCCUMB TO AN OPPOSING OR OVERRIDING STATE INTEREST DEEMED LEGITIMATE AND
COMPELLING.
Forwarding of information or intelligence report gathered by the PNP to the Commission is not an intrusion
of petitioner's right to privacy. The state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on
the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against
her was pursuant to a lawful mandate.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not
recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of one police force that
is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police
commission.
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Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a
legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of
dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the powers
and functions accorded to the Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals
suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. One of those individuals
is herein petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report listing
her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding
of information by the PNP to the Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right
to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence
regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these
notorious groups. Moreover, the Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the
fulfillment of the formers mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter. The fact
that the PNP released information to the Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without
affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right
to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence gathering and investigation.
Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update
information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the
field. Thus safeguards were put in place to make sure that the information collected maintained its
integrity and accuracy.
Also, Gamboa's petition for writ of habeas data is not proper. In this case, Chan and Fang admitted the
existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the
media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish
that PNP was responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to
her to address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the
writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper. Finally, the Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove
through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and
her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, Chan and
Fang sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal
cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she
failed to overcome. It is clear that the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far
outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and
forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the
privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
*Remember: HABEAS DATA is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated and threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individuals or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding
the person, famil, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should contain:
a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty
or security of the aggrieved party;
c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of
the database or information or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and
f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.

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