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Hypatia, Volume 23, Number 3, Summer 2008, pp. 118-135 (Article)

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Seeing Oneself through the Eyes of the

Other: Asymmetrical Reciprocity and
Self-respect
Marguerite La Caze

Iris Marion Young argues we cannot understand others experiences by imagining

ourselves in their place or in terms of symmetrical reciprocity (1997a). For Young,
reciprocity expresses moral respect and asymmetry arises from peoples greatly varying life histories and social positions. La Caze argues there are problems with Youngs
articulation of asymmetrical reciprocity in terms of wonder and the gift. By discussing
friendship and political representation, she shows how taking self-respect into account
complicates asymmetrical reciprocity.

In her essay Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and

Enlarged Thought, Iris Marion Young argues that we cannot understand others
experiences simply by imagining ourselves in others place or in terms of symmetrical reciprocity, which is merely a projection of the selfs perspective onto
that of the other (1997a). She develops her idea of asymmetrical reciprocity
by drawing on the work of Emmanuel Levinas, Luce Irigaray, Hannah Arendt,
and Jacques Derrida. For Young, reciprocity expresses moral respect and means
that each acknowledges and takes account of the other without assuming
their perspective (1997a, 41). The asymmetry or lack of reversibility arises
from peoples different life histories and social positions, which vary by sex,
age, ability, and culture, for example.
Critics of Young have claimed that she argues people cannot understand each
other (Simpson 2001) or that she fails to recognize the significance of distinct
bodily existence to asymmetry (Stoller 2005). As I explain in the paper, the first
criticism misinterprets Young and the second is addressed in many of Youngs
Hypatia vol. 23, no. 3 (JulySeptember 2008) by Marguerite La Caze

Marguerite La Caze

119

other works. My view is that asymmetrical reciprocity is an important concept

for thinking about relations between self and other and has implications for both
ethics and political philosophy. However, I argue that there are some problems
with Youngs articulation of asymmetrical reciprocity in terms of wonder and the
gift, problems that center on her neglect of the difference between wonder and
respect and her neglect of the significance of self-respect. Using the examples
of friendship and political representation, I show how taking self-respect
into account complicates and refines the picture of asymmetrical reciprocity
because it prevents us from conceiving the asymmetry between people as selfsacrificial, an issue of special concern to feminists. Understanding friendship
as a spontaneous gift suggests that the other owes nothing to the self and there
can be no expectations. I contend that this conception implies a lack of selfrespect and destroys any idea of the commitment and responsibility essential
to friendships. In relation to political representation, I argue that self-respect
demands that we are reflective and critical of the experience and views that
we claim to represent as members of oppressed groups, as they may have been
shaped by oppression.
What Is Asymmetrical Reciprocity?
First, I wish to explicate Youngs concept of asymmetrical reciprocity. Her essay
begins from a critique of Seyla Benhabibs view that moral respect consists
in a symmetrical relation of reversibility, where we take the perspective of
the other by imaginatively representing their perspective to ourselves (1991,
32, 13637). While Young acknowledges that this imaginative process can
sometimes be useful, she believes problems arise if it is conceptualized as a
moral theory. Young criticizes symmetrical reciprocity on three grounds: that
it obscures difference, that it is impossible to reverse positions, and that it is
politically suspect (1997a, 4449). Her concept of asymmetrical reciprocity
involves thinking of relations with others in terms of gifts and dialogue where
we can take others perspectives into account by asking questions rather than
by imagining ourselves in their position.1
Young develops the idea of asymmetrical reciprocity by maintaining that
people should regard each other as irreversible, or not mirrors of each other,
which she believes is the image that the concept of symmetry between human
beings evokes. Instead, we should accept the differences of the other, adopt a
stance of moral humility, acknowledge that our relations with others are asymmetrically reciprocal, and not attempt to espouse their standpoint and speak on
their behalf (1997a, 49). Asymmetrical reciprocity is an attempt to understand
each other across difference without reversing perspectives or identifying with
each other. The idea is that we can take others views into account without
imaginatively occupying their position or putting ourselves in their place.2

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Emmanuel Levinass work in Otherwise than Being (1974/1998) is one source

of Youngs concept of asymmetrical reciprocity. She reads Levinas as saying that
prior to the comparisons that are necessary for justice, there is a moment of
respect for the particular embodied sensitivity of the person (1997a, 50).3 This
respect does not depend on comparison with ourselves or with third parties,
but acknowledges the others specificity and uniqueness. Young argues that
this relation is asymmetrical in the further sense that it is a gift to the other, a
conception of relationality I consider further on in the paper.
Luce Irigarays work is another source for Young. She takes Irigarays critique
of symmetry between the sexes in Speculum of the Other Woman (1985) and
her use of wonder in An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1993) to develop a similar
concept of the proper relation between self and other. Youngs interpretation
of Irigarays account in relation to communication is that speakers need a
respectful distance across which they can communicate, and she suggests that
the voice is a better image for communication than images of sight, which are
suggested by the concept of symmetry (1997a, 50).4 This distance or interval
involves differences in both history and position, Young argues. Different cultural groups, for example, have very different histories that other groups cannot
live. Differences in position, such as those of sex, age, or ability, mean that we
cannot substitute our position for someone elses.
Young discusses three revealing cases of nonsymmetrical differences in
contemporary life: between disabled and nondisabled people, between Native
and non-Native Americans, and between African Americans and non-African
Americans. In the first case, officials in Oregon concluded that the lives of
those with disabilities were less important than those of able-bodied people
and thus less deserving of reimbursement for certain treatments. This decision
was based on the results of a telephone survey where able-bodied people said
they would prefer to be dead than to have to use a wheelchair or be blind. In
the second example, groups of whites have taken on the practices of Native
American groups to the extent of using their sites for rituals.
The final example is more complex, referring to law professor Anita Hills
claim that she had been sexually harassed years earlier by her boss, Clarence
Thomas. On the one hand, men putting themselves in her place said she could
not have been harassed because she kept silent about it for a long time. On the
other hand, African American women said white feminists could not take her
standpoint either, since they could not understand the racial dimensions of
the case (1997a, 4144).5 Nor could white feminists take Thomass standpoint,
which contains both sexual and racial dimensions of irreversibility. In each case,
Young believes that what is occurring is a projection of the selfs perspective
onto that of the other. Moreover, in relations structured by oppression such as
these, those projections are likely to be damaging, as they will often involve
stereotypes and ideologies, Young argues.

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121

One concern about asymmetrical reciprocity may be that Young emphasizes

the difference between self and other too strongly. To some extent she addresses
problems concerning overemphasizing difference in her criticisms of Irigarays
account of wonder. Young believes that Irigarays notion of wonder is very
useful to suggest openness to new ideas and experiences. Irigaray appropriates
Ren Descartess notion of wonder as a nonjudgmental response to something
unfamiliar to express our ideal response to the difference of the other (Descartes
1649/1989). Young quotes Irigarays reworking of Descartes: This first passion
[wonder] is indispensable not only to life but also or still to the creation of an
ethics. Notably of and through sexual difference. This other, male or female,
should surprise us again and again, appear to us as new, very different from what
we know or what we thought he or she should be (1993, 74).
Young suggests, however, that understanding wonder this way could have
negative consequences. This concept of wonder is dangerous, she writes. It
would not be difficult to use it to imagine the other person as exotic. One can
interpret wonder as a kind of distant awe before the Other that turns their
transcendence into a human inscrutability. Or wonder can become a kind
of prurient curiosity. I can recognize my ignorance about the other persons
experience and perspective and adopt a probing, investigative mode toward
her. Both stances convert the openness of wonder into a dominative desire to
know and master the other person (1997a, 56). Instead, Young believes we
should cultivate a respectful stance of wonder.
I support Irigarays and Youngs view that wonder is an important ethical
response. However, I argue that Youngs suggestion that wonder needs to be
tempered means that wonder has to be united with respect. This is necessary
because wonder involves openness to the unfamiliar while respect involves
the acknowledgment of similarity or common humanity. Wonders openness
to the new and unfamiliar aspects of others must take place against a background of the familiar. Only insofar as we first recognize others as similar to
ourselves through respect can we be open without wonder becoming the kind of
exoticism or awe that Young warns against.
Following Descartes, I argue elsewhere that this respect for others is based
on proper self-respect, or generosit, that we extend to others (1649/1989,
104). For him, self-respect was the key to leading the good life because it draws
us to regard others appropriately. I take this to be a psychological argument
rather than a conceptual one, an approach I find more plausible, meaning
that we need self-respect in order to be the kind of people who will respect
others. This self-respect is not something based on esteem for our character
or achievements, but a more fundamental respect for our own humanity or
our own fundamental worth or dignity, to use a Kantian term (1996, 4: 435).
When we respect ourselves we both think and feel our own worth as persons,
and act with a sense of that worth. It also means that we believe we are worthy

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of consideration, of being treated decently at least, if not well, and of being

taken seriously by others.
When we respect others, we recognize this same humanity in them. Respect
for others also differs from esteem in not being based on comparisons with
others accomplishments or social status.6 I contend that both self-respect and
respect for others are compatible with wonder, with accepting others differences
from ourselves. Wonder responds to difference and respect responds to similarity.
Other emotional and moral responses, such as love, follow and develop from
these two. What I disagree with in Youngs account is the idea that wonder
alone can encapsulate respect. Wonder is a very important response to others,
yet it is respect and wonder together that provide a basis for thinking about
our ethical relations with others.7 Therefore, to develop a respectful stance of
wonder, both wonder and respect are needed.
My interpretation of wonder is one that focuses on its openness and nonjudgmental aspect, admittedly a difference from Irigaray who incorporates a sense
of appreciation that is implied by the French term admiration. I believe this is
also the best way to interpret Youngs use of wonder. Although she does not
strictly define wonder, her concerns about wonder becoming awe or curiosity
suggest certain limits on the connotations. This enables her account to avoid
the problems Marilyn Friedman claims Youngs account of wonder entails.
Friedman reads Youngs work on asymmetrical reciprocity in terms of wonders
possible connotations of reverence and attitudes that suggest acceptance
and approval (Friedman 2004, 223). If we interpret wonder in that way, we
seem committed to approving all differences we find in others. Understanding
wonder as openness and as nonjudgmental makes more sense of Youngs views
and enables a more fruitful approach to ethical and political questions.
An aspect of Youngs articulation of asymmetrical reciprocity that should be
clarified is whether the idea of a common humanity plays any role. I focus on
this question to show that my suggestions concerning respect are not entirely
incompatible with her view. She would agree, I believe, that in a sense, we
have a shared humanity, although not all commentators have interpreted her
work in this way. As I noted in the introduction, Lorenzo Simpson claims that
Young argues we cannot understand one another (Simpson 2001, 10410). He
believes this is because she mistakenly conflates understanding with empathic
identification and ignores our common humanity. Matutik defends Young
against Simpsons charge, stating I think all parties to this dialogue, as well as
Adorno, Levinas, Derrida, Sartre and Irigaray, by whom Young and Cornell are
in part inspired, would agree that, as humans, we share something primordial
in common. ... What we share can be a basic horizon, world-view, language
or understanding (Matutik 2003, 147).
Matutik is doubtless right about the first point; however, I think the second
point is a little odd as Young is specifically excluding such things as worldviews

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and understanding from what we share as humans, although she would probably
accept that groups may share things of this kind. What could link a common or
shared humanity would have to be something much more general, such as the
human condition or bodily existence, which can be contrasted with particular
social and political situations. A shared experience based on the human condition would be much more limited than one based on shared life histories and
backgrounds. However, this shared experience forms the basis for moral respect
and is thus more important than our particular backgrounds or lifestyles.
Youngs account can be interpreted as involving a notion of a shared humanity. Wonder as an asymmetrical response exists in the context of many similarities: People who are different in such social positionings are not so totally other
that they can see no similarities and overlaps in their lives, and they often stand
in multivalent relations with one another (1997a, 45). Of course, a range of
similarities and overlaps does not strictly imply something shared in common.
Yet Young would accept some form of this idea along with the idea of asymmetry
between all, given her phenomenological background. In Throwing Like a
Girl, she notes, I assume that at the most basic level, Merleau-Pontys account
of the relation of the lived body to its world as developed in the Phenomenology
of Perception, applies to any human existence in a general way (1990b, 144).
This basic level is contrasted with more specific modalities of existence, such
as the difference between womens and mens situations. We share a common
humanity or human condition with all and we also share many more specific
characteristics with other groups. In addition, Young holds that all kinds of
difference, not just those between the sexes, involve asymmetrical reciprocity.
She argues that Irigarays view of wonder, properly understood, can easily be
extended ... to any structured social difference, whether of sex, class, race,
or religion (1997a, 45). In all these cases, what she means by asymmetrical
reciprocity is that when we respond to the other, we do not expect them to
respond in exactly the same way as us or to be like us. Rather, we respond to
their differences as they respond to ours.
A further criticism of Young is that she does not take the importance of
distinct bodily existences sufficiently seriously. Silvia Stoller contends that she
fails to consider that this asymmetry already exists by virtue of the brute fact of
bodily existence, which does not require an established individual history, old
age, or even the acquisition of a status (2005, 23). However, Young discusses
bodily differences, particularly between the genders, in many of her essays
published in Throwing Like a Girl (1990b) and On Female Body Experience
(2005). She argues that in addition to consideration of lived bodily differences,
we must take into account sexual divisions of labor, normative heterosexuality,
and gendered hierarchies of power (2005, 1126). Young accepts that we are
in this situation of irreversibility in relation to every other human being, even
when their social positioning and history is very similar to ours (1997a, 45).

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Yet Stoller is correct in pointing out that Young emphasizes life history more
than bodily existence. What is really important about those with similar socially
structured differences is that, in these circumstances, our projections are less
likely to involve derogatory stereotypes, and we might be able to make some
assumptions about their interests. This is why Young focuses on social differences, and this distinction between asymmetries has implications for political
organization, as I show in the final section. However, Youngs neglect of the
importance of self-respect in her account of relations between self and other
becomes more obvious in her characterization of the gift, as I discuss next.
Should We See Ourselves as Others See Us?
Young acknowledges that we understand some of others experiences through
their similarity to ours, although she argues that there is always a remainder or
excess that we should acknowledge through moral humility. She distinguishes
her view of humility as an acknowledgment of a lack of knowledge from Laurence Thomass account of moral deference as an acceptance that the other
has knowledge I lack (1997a, 168n10). In asymmetrically reciprocal relations,
each person should respond to others with humility.
Young uses the relation of gift giving as a way of thinking about this kind
of reciprocity. Employing Jacques Derridas critique of Marcel Mausss view
that gift giving is a kind of exchange, she explores the ways in which gifts are
reciprocal yet asymmetrical. Derrida claims that Mauss, in discussing the gift
in terms of economics and exchange, has nothing to say about the gift as such
(1992, 24). This is because Derrida understands the gift as completely beyond
any economy or form of exchange: For there to be a gift, there must be no
reciprocity, return, exchange, countergift or debt (12).8 In that sense, gift
giving represents asymmetry. Here as elsewhere, Derrida speaks of the unconditional, pure, or true gift. He does not denythat gifts are exchanged but these
do not exemplify the particular surprise of the pure gift (147). Another way of
understanding Derridas view of the pure gift is that it is, like pure hospitality
or pure forgiveness, impossible.
However, I believe there is a subtle difference between Youngs account and
Derridas, which Young does not explicitly acknowledge. Derrida says there must
be no reciprocity, but Young says that gift-giving is basic to the generation of
normative structures in most societies, precisely because it establishes relations
of reciprocity: I give a gift to you, and you give a gift to me, or the opening is
made for you to give a gift to me (1997a, 54). Young does not want to think
of gifts as a mere exchange and they should be creative and distinctive; nevertheless, they create reciprocal ties between people and a pure gift is possible.
Her argument is that the structure of communication is similar to that of gift
giving and her example is a surprise present of quince marmalade. First, gifts,

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like communication, should not be thought of as a debt that must be repaid

in kind. Rather, we give a gift or present and it is simply accepted. If later the
other gives me a gift, then that is the beginning of a new asymmetrical relation
(1997a, 54). The second aspect of gift giving Young emphasizes is the interval or
gap in time between gifts, which also means that each gift is given as something
new and is the beginning rather than the end of something.
In my view, Youngs account of the gift is an improvement on Derridas,
since she allows that giving a present to someone who has given you a present
is not just a return or repayment of a debt but a new giving, and that this is a
genuine gift. Nevertheless, her description of gifts seems to focus on a special
kind of gift giving, what I would call spontaneous gifts. Since, for example, gifts
are exchanged at Christmas and many gifts are given for particular reasons, such
as for birthdays, anniversaries, weddings, housewarmings, and so on, all gifts
need not be understood as spontaneous. Also, these kinds of exchanges do
not need to be understood in a derogatory way, as somehow undermining the
sincerity or purity of the feelings behind the gift or of altering the nature of the
gift. Thus my view is that a pure gift that is exchanged is also possible.
Yet Young appears to be following Derrida on this point in not taking gifts
that involve exchange or commemoration as her example of a gift. Her view is
that our relation to the other is a gift in the sense that if we waited for the other
persons promise to reciprocate, the conversation could never begin (1997a, 50).
I take Young to mean that in treating relations as gifts, we have to trust, and
we are taking the risk of being rejected or being ignored. Yet if we never took
this risk we would have no genuine friendships. And it follows that if the other
responds to us, it is a form of gift to us. In that sense, if we take this gift notion
of friendship seriously, our friends owe us nothing, an implication I believe is
intended by Youngs analysis of friendship in terms of spontaneous gifts.
I find this image of the gift applied to the relation between self and other to
be both illuminating and limited. While this image seems reasonable if we view
it from the perspective of the self-thinking of the other, where the self desires
to be open and forgiving and generous, it seems unethical when viewed from
the self thinking of their own values. How can I say my friendship is a gift that
I can withdraw? That sounds egotistical and arrogant, and implies an ethical
asymmetry running even deeper than Young envisages.
Furthermore, thinking of friendship as a gift in this way raises the question
of whether we abandon our self-respect and conceptualize relations as selfsacrificial if we live this concept of friendship. I want to note that understanding
our relations with others only as spontaneous gifts emphasizes the responsibility
of self to others, but not of others to self. This means we do not hold others
accountable for their actions, even though we hold ourselves accountable, and
undermines our sense that we are of fundamental worth. Our claims for our own
self-respect and respect for others can overcome this problem and enable a true

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reciprocity in our relations with others. They are not in any way undermining
of our capacity for giving gifts; rather, self-respect enhances our capacity both to
give and to receive gifts. Confident of ourselves, we can afford to be generous,
and likewise, self-respect can make it easier to express gratitude for a gift. If we
lack self-respect, any such gratitude can feel like losing face. Self-respect is
also important to initiating friendships, as we need it to have the courage to
take the risk of such initiation.
I should note that gifts can also be used in manipulative ways, when they are
given specifically to create an obligation, to gain a favor in return, to make
someone feel small, or to insult them. These gifts are not in the spirit of friendship and do not exemplify the kind of commitments I have in mind.9 Gifts can
also be given thoughtlessly, without acknowledging the difference of the other.
In that sense, Derridas work is useful in making us suspicious about the nature
of gifts. Yet as I have argued he takes this suspicion too far, and Young adopts
that element in avoiding exchanged gifts in her model of the gift.
The problems with Youngs use of the gift model may also partly arise from
the influence of Levinas on her discussion, which introduces the self-effacing
and self-sacrificial elements. Some feminist interpretations of Levinass work
have found that ideal of self-sacrifice to be linked to the figure of the feminine.
For example, Sonia Sikka, in Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas, writes:
Levinas never depicts her [the woman] as one who is owed; she is always the
one who gives (2001, 109).10 Sikka also says that Levinass feminine tropes are
not linked to justice. Even if it is unfair to interpret Levinass view of women
and the feminine in this way, the unidirectionality of ethical responsibility and
relations with others remains and are pertinent to Youngs understanding of
relations as spontaneous gifts. Another way of interpreting Levinass influence
on Young is to consider that she has taken on Levinass conception of the ethical relation without also developing his parallel concerns with justice, which
are arguably relevant to personal relations.
Our relations with others involve commitments on both sides that should
be honored by both self and other. The neglect of this dual commitment is one
of the difficulties in seeing relationships as spontaneous gifts. All responsibility
and commitment is on the side of the self. One could say that there are always
two selves in a relation, so in that sense, responsibility and commitment are
reciprocal. However, if the relation is only seen as going in one direction, one
cannot have any expectations in relationships such as friendship. For example,
if a friend suddenly stops contacting you or does something unkind, it is part
of friendship to be able to at least ask why they have done so. This does not
mean that friendships cannot end; they can, for all kinds of reasons.11 It is just
that friendship builds up many expectations and commitments that mean that
they are not pure gift in Derridas sense.12 Taking away the notion of expectation in friendship destroys the continuity and responsibility that is essential to

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relationships and implies a lack of self-respect in relation to others. It is possible

to give of oneself, but we should not give in ways that undermine or destroy
self-respect in the sense that we may find ourselves unworthy of that respect
or act as if we were not worthy of either self-respect or the respect of others.
Thus, the notion of asymmetrical reciprocity needs to be supplemented with
an account of commitments in particular relationships that acknowledges the
importance of self-respect.
Benhabibs notion of the concrete other, where we respond to the individuality of the other in intimate relationships, (1992, 159) has some links to
what I am discussing here. However, in making this criticism of Youngs understanding of friendship and the gift, I am not suggesting a return to Benhabibs
understanding of reciprocity as constituted by reversibility (32). I do not believe,
for example, that commitments can be understood through imagining myself
in the others place, although that could be an important first step. Rather, the
commitment of friendship involves a responsibility on both sides to the other
that is not a relation of reversibility.
Further elements of Youngs description of relations, in particular her reliance on questioning as a fundamental mode of creating solidarity, raise similar
difficulties in relation to self-respect. In her account of communication, Young
suggests that questions play a crucial role in expressing our respect for and interest in the other, a kind of admission that we do not already know the others
perspective (1997a, 55). I agree with Young that questions can play this role, yet
one must also be careful not to allow questioning to become intrusive, invasive,
making the other uncomfortable.13 Such questioning can set up an unjust asymmetry, where by demanding to know everything about the other, I am refusing
to reveal myself. Thus I would argue that there have to be limits to this kind of
questioning and, to a certain extent, reciprocity. Respect limits our questioning
of the other. Young admits this point when she says that the other can always
remain silent, or tell only part of her story, for her own reasons (1997a, 56).
This limitation can be understood as acknowledging the others self-respect. I
take this statement to be an addition to her view of asymmetrical reciprocity.
Asymmetrical reciprocity shows us how we cannot fully know others. It is a
further point to insist that others need not reveal themselves to us. However,
one could argue that the stance of moral humility requires not only an admission that one cannot know the others perspective but also an acceptance that
the other does not have to tell us everything either. If we are humble, we will
not think we have some right to demand knowledge from them.
I believe that the claim we cannot fully know others is compatible with the
view that sometimes others, especially friends, can know me better than I know
myself. They can have a better sense of my desires, my motives, and my concerns and are thus often able to advise me on my decisions. The two views are
compatible because this knowledge is generally partial, related to one particular

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life question or issue. For example, my friend may see that I am rushing into an
inappropriate relationship and have deceived myself about my own feelings, yet
that does not mean they are experts on my total experience of life.
We should be clear concerning the nature of the humility that Young has in
mind. She says that the self-respect of the oppressed is likely to be undermined
by oppressors projections and fantasies if they attempt to reverse positions, one
of the dangers of symmetrical reciprocity (1997a, 48).14 While Young acknowledges that what we learn from others perspective on us is only one aspect of
our relations with others, the way she believes we should respond is by reflecting on the relations between perspectives. I agree with her on this point, but
I argue that there is a further issue concerning others views of us. Sometimes
we are surprised by how others see us, in both complimentary and derogatory
ways. At the same time as being flexible and adaptable we should be robust or
self-respectful enough not to conform to others ways of seeing us. On the one
hand, we need to take seriously others critical perceptions of us; on the other
hand, we have to be able to recognize and reject unfair perceptions. In the next
section, I explore the question of the political implications of Youngs work,
which also relate to this issue of self-respect.
Asymmetrical Reciprocity and Political Representation
What I have said so far concerning asymmetrical reciprocity suggests that there
can be degrees of understanding as well as degrees of legitimacy to claiming to
represent others, depending on the context. If I know someone really well and
they delegate to me, I may be able to make simple decisions for them, such as
ordering in a restaurant. In fact, whenever I get a present for someone I am
deciding what they will like. But even a close friend is unlikely to allow me to
make important decisions for her. This point brings us to the question of politics. When we elect someone to represent us, we are to a certain extent giving
her the authority to make decisions on our behalf, although we would like to
have some input into those decisions.15 Accepting asymmetrical reciprocity has
implications for our conception of political representation.
One of Youngs primary concerns is how we can make institutions, particularly political ones, more representative by being more inclusive of oppressed
groups. She notes that the perspectives and interests of the privileged should
be taken into account in decision making, but the privileged cannot take the
perspective of the oppressed, nor should the oppressed have to take the perspective of the privileged (1997a, 48). Some clues as to how Young connects
the ethical and political can be found in her comments on Arendts notion
of enlarged thought toward the end of her essay on asymmetrical reciprocity.
Here she argues that Arendt should be understood not as simply saying that we
should make judgments by putting ourselves in the positions of others or even

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by taking their interests into account, but also by considering the collective
social processes and relationships that lie between us and which we have come
to know together by discussing the world (1997a, 59).16 For Young, this is a
way of thinking about ethical and political judgment as democratic since it
acknowledges the plurality of perspectives. Reflection on these relationships
improves judgment. In addition to thinking about these webs of relationships
and processes, all the affected perspectives should have a voice, Young argues
(1997a, 59). This need to hear specific voices is a consequence of accepting
that others have experiences that I cannot represent imaginatively.
In another essay in Intersecting Voices, Young connects the lack of mirroring
between different others with the process of communicative democracy, her
version of deliberative democracy, where through discussion our preferences
come to be transformed (1997a, 67). She suggests that differently situated participants in democracy can use narrative, for example, to make their case for
better practices and demonstrate how different their experiences are (1997a,
72). The goal of discussion in communicative democracy is not necessarily
agreement or an outcome that includes everyones preferences but one that can
recognize unique needs and respond to them. In that sense, Youngs conception
of politics is one that reflects her concept of asymmetrical reciprocity. I believe
this concept could be instituted in politics provided that the complications I
have pointed out are incorporated, so respect and wonder are both expressed
and the need for self-respect is more fully recognized. We do not have to be
quite as humble, or humble in precisely the same way as Young suggests.
The concept of asymmetrical reciprocity keys directly into Youngs work in
Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990a) and Inclusion and Democracy (2000),
where she argues for direct political representation of oppressed groups.17 Hearing what others actually have to say about their own perspectives enables one to
take their perspective into account. This means they must have opportunities
to express their views. Importantly, Young believes that the perspectives of
oppressed groups have greater legitimacy than those of privileged groups: The
perspective of those who maintain privilege under an unjust status quo does
not have legitimacy in the same way as that of those who suffer the injustices
(1997a, 48). This point might seem to bring Young closer to the theorists of
standpoint epistemology, who argue that the oppressed have epistemically
privileged perspectives because they understand both their own situation and
that of oppressors (Hartsock 1985; Harding 1993, 1998).
Nevertheless, by examining her view more carefully, we can see that is not
in fact the case. Social perspectives are only one aspect of what we bring to
discussion. In Inclusion and Democracy, Young distinguishes between interests,
opinions, and perspectives, all of which she argues should be represented in
political processes. Interests are the means for achieving individual life prospects and organizational goals (2000, 134) and opinions are principles, values,

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and priorities as they relate to judgments about policies and ends (135). Social
perspective indicates the way that people who are differently socially located
have different interpretations, different knowledge, and different experiences
of events, institutions, and actions (136). Thus, unlike interests and opinions,
social perspectives do not dictate particular content or policies. As I suggested
earlier, we are closer to some perspectives than others, and as Young expresses
it, we have an affinity with how others understand their experience if we
share a social perspective.
However, there is some tension between the claim of privileged perspectives
and the claim that we are all equally opaque to each other simply because we
occupy different subject positions, both views that Young holds. Moral respect
in the general sense is respect for all, regardless of whether they are oppressed
or not, which she certainly accepts. Yet the notion of the greater legitimacy of
the perspectives of oppressed social groups suggests a different form of moral
respect that is a kind of respect for suffering.18 In a political context, the suffering of injustices is taken to represent a more legitimate perspective but not
because that perspective includes knowledge of the perspective of the privileged.
The situated knowledges Young speaks of involve different perceptions and
understandings from that of the privileged.
Young argues that specific representation for oppressed groups is important
because such groups are often disaffected and need to be brought into the
political process and because their perspective is needed to relativize the dominant perspective (2000, 144). She believes that expression of these situated
knowledges in political contexts can enlarge the understanding of everyone and
expand the sphere of interests (109, 11516). Thus although she cites several
standpoint epistemologists (115), Young rejects standpoint epistemologys
view of the basis of epistemic privilege and legitimacythat the oppressed
have insight not only into their own situation but also into the situation of the
oppressors. Instead, she argues that everyone has an understanding of their own
position and how it relates to that of others, to history, societys relations, and
to the environment (117). The experience of oppression gives an ethical and
political legitimacy rather than an epistemological one, an experience justice
requires taking into account in political processes. Including these perspectives
may not lead to consensus; it may expose further conflicts of interest.
While I believe that these arguments for representation for oppressed groups
are compelling, the issue of self-respect arises again here. An obvious point is
that members of oppressed groups need to have the self-respect to stand up for
their views in political contexts and not succumb to expectations and stereotypes. And Young would endorse this aspect of self-respect. Yet there is another
sense in which self-respect is important, as I suggested. Self-respect is a matter
of taking oneself seriously; and taking oneself seriously requires the possibility
of a critical perspective on the self as well as a kind of confidence in the self. It

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takes a certain sense of our worth to reflect critically on our own way of seeing
things. Looking from their (our) perspective, asymmetrical reciprocity suggests more than that we take seriously others perspectives. It suggests that we
examine our own perspective and think about the extent to which it has been
shaped by oppression. So political expression cannot be as simple as expressing
our experiences, because those experiences may bring about a damaging view
of self. Young concentrates on how the public space should be changed to be
more inclusive of the oppressed, for example, by recognizing narrative, greeting,
and rhetoric as legitimate means of political communication (1997a, 6074;
2000, 5280). My interest here is in how the oppressed reflect on their own
political expression and action.
I am not suggesting that it is only the oppressed who need to engage in
critical self-reflection. However, I believe there are significant issues oppression raises that should be addressed in political contexts. In her book, Burdened
Virtues (2005), Lisa Tessman articulates many ways in which oppression can
be morally damaging, by necessitating the development of virtues, such as
righteous anger, suitable in an oppressive situation, by making it difficult for
women and other oppressed groups to flourish and by making it hard to develop
other virtues. Talking about such damage and talking about some of the political
implications of deep oppression are risky. Yet it might be also be hazardous to
pretend such issues do not exist.
Such damaging views of the self can be reflected in the views expressed by
members of oppressed groups and how they treat other members of the group.
If I think I am of little worth, then I may not be able to express my views in
politically effective ways and those views themselves may be distorted by
oppression. Robin Dillon argues that self-respect is constituted by and reflects
prevailing forms of social and political life (1997, 244) and suggests that
political engagement could have an important role in developing self-respect.
I agree with this point; nevertheless, I also argue that we need to acknowledge
how damaged self-respect can affect political engagement. Self-respect involves
being able to criticize ones own perspective as well as not allowing others to
determine ones views.
This kind of damaging self-perceptions can take many forms. I may not only
have a low opinion of myself, I may also have a low opinion of other members
of my group. I may harshly judge or have too high expectations of others who
are oppressed. Reflection on the ways in which we are divided and conquered
in oppression could lead to a different understanding of our perspective. Perhaps
members of oppressed groups will be too eager to please privileged groups at
first. Or a legacy of persecution can also lead to an oppositional stance to every
suggestion. Thus a consideration of self-respect demands that we are critical
concerning the effects of oppression on our perspective. I do not take this point
to be an objection to Youngs recommendation of representation for oppressed

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groups, but an addition to it, and one she might accept. She advocates reflection
on the web of relations between groups and individuals, and self-reflection and
reflection on relations within groups is part of that process. One can see the
critical reflection I am advocating as a development of the special understanding
that we have of our own position.
Asymmetrical reciprocity is an extremely fruitful concept and an important
key to Youngs philosophical legacy. Understood as wonder, and combined with
self-respect and respect for all, it can generate ways of thinking about both our
personal relations with others and about issues of political representation. We
must bear in mind the distinction between the particular differences created by
oppression, differences that are based on bodily and cultural location and those
differences based on each individuals unique subject position. Any account of
asymmetrical reciprocity needs to acknowledge the significance of self-respect,
which is essential to our relations with others, and is illuminated by the example
of friendship and the gift. While our relations are asymmetrical, they also
involve commitments and responsibilities. Likewise, in taking asymmetrical
reciprocity to the arena of political representation, self-respect demands critical
reflection on the way our experiences are shaped by oppression.

Notes
I am very grateful to audiences at the Nordic Society for Phenomenology conference, University of Copenhagen, Australasian Association of Philosophy conference,
University of New England, University of Western Australia Philosophy Department,
Communicating Feminisms conference, University of Alberta, and Damian Cox for
fruitful discussions of my paper, and to anonymous readers for Hypatia for useful suggestions for improvements. I also thank the Australian Research Council for supporting
my research.
1. Psychologists working within the care perspective have also advocated dialogue
as a way to reach understanding (Belenky et al. 1997).
2. In my book The Analytic Imaginary (2002a) I discuss the ways in which many of
the images in analytic philosophy involve imaginative projection of this kind.
3. Levinas says that in communication there is a resignation ... at the risk of
misunderstanding (like in love, where unless one does not love with love, one has to
resign oneself to not being loved), at the risk of lack of and refusal of communication
(1974/1998, 120).
4. In La Caze 2005, I argue that distance and respect are essential to Irigarays
account of love.
5. Anita Hills accusations occurred in the context of Clarence Thomass nomination to the United States Supreme Court, to which he was confirmed.
6. Kant made this distinction between esteem and respect very clear in The
Metaphysics of Morals (1996, 6: 449). I discuss Kants views of respect in La Caze 2005.

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Dillon links esteem and respect through the idea of evaluative self-respect, which
involves a relation to ourselves as being worthy or trying to be worthy of respect (2004,
52, 65n9).
7. See La Caze 2002b for a more detailed argument for this view. Irigaray is aware
of the danger of exoticizing others, which she notes in 1993 (9798, 104).
8. Derrida goes so far as to say that if the donee gives back the same thing, for
example an invitation to lunch ... the gift is annulled (1992, 12).
9. For a range of analyses of the nature of gift giving, see Schrift 1997.
10. Sikka makes a similar point concerning wonder, that one can take dissimilarity
into account properly only on the basis of similarity (2001, 116). See Irigaray 1993
and 1991 and other essays, such as Perpich 2001 and Ziarek 2001, for sympathetic yet
critical readings of Levinas.
11. In Integrity and the Fragile Self, Cox, La Caze, and Levine (2003) discuss how
friendships involve integrity, and letting friendships drop easily is a sign of a lack of
integrity.
12. White notes that friendships involve commitment, even though commitments
may not be made explicitly (1999, 8182). Friedman argues that commitments in
friendship are both general moral commitments and commitments to particular people
(1993, 13441).
13. Of course, it may sometimes be important to make others uncomfortable,
because they need to grow and learn from that experience. However, I think we need to
understand and respect the conditions that would make this ethical.
14. See Dillon 1997 (22649) for an illuminating discussion of the ways in which
womens basal self-respect is often damaged by oppressive contexts. By basal self-respect
she means a more fundamental attitude to the self than self-respect related to status or
to character.
15. See Le Duff for a discussion of the distinctiveness of political representation
(1995, 4547).
16. Arendt discusses this idea in many of her texts; generally, for her, enlarged
thought involves abstracting from our own situations and imaginatively putting ourselves in others places (1982, 73). However, Young is able to find support for her
interpretation by focusing on other aspects of Arendts work, referencing The Human
Condition (1958/1998).
17. In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Young defines oppression as involving one
or more of the experiences of exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural
imperialism, and violence (1990a, 3965). Fraser criticizes Young for her focus on the
recognition of differences (1997). I discuss this criticism in La Caze 2006 and Young
responds in 1997b.
18. Social groups are defined by Young in terms of structure: A structural social
group is a collection of persons who are similarly positioned in interactive and
institutional relations that condition their opportunities and life prospects (2000, 97).

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