Civil Law 2014: Albanotes

CIVIL LAW 2014
Dean Ed Vincent S. Albano

1. ***
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad. (9a)
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1),
(4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive
Order 227)
a. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas [G.R. No. 186571 : August 11, 2010 | BRION, J.]
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in
favor of the Filipino spouse.
The provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse (Republic v. Orbecido). To maintain x x x that, under our laws,
[the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien
spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The
Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. The legislative intent is for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry (Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera).
2. ***
CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7
Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the

judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a
proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in
another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse
since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the
marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy
against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph
in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule
and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse. (Art 15 in
relation to Art 17)
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
(10a)
a. Quita vs. CA and Dandan [G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998. |
BELLOSILLO, J.]
Private respondent stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was
relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. that aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. The trial
court found that both were "Filipino citizens and were married in the
Philippines." It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in
California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. [SC] deduced
that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their
marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine
petitioners citizenship at the time of their divorce x x x Once proved
that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van
Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her
right to inherit from Arturo.
b. Llorente v. CA and Llorente [G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000. |
PARDO, J.]
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general
American law. There is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union
has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the
State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of
which the decedent was a resident. Second, there is no showing that the
application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York
State law. The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete
disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance
with the formalities of Philippine law is fatal.
ISSUE: May a will executed by a foreigner abroad be probated in the

Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in
the country where it was executed?
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners
abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in
the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects
in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an
alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where
he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
c. IN RE: In The Matter Of The Petition To Approve The Will Of

Ruperta Palaganas v. Palaganas [G.R. No. 169144 : January 26, 2011 |
ABAD, J.]
3. ***
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials
of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have, for their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
a. United Airlines, Inc. v. CA [G.R. No. 124110. April 20, 2001. |
KAPUNAN, J.]
According to the doctrine of lex loci contractus, as a general rule, the
law of the place where a contract is made or entered into governs with
respect to its nature and validity, obligation and interpretation. This has
been said to be the rule even though the place where the contract was
made is different from the place where it is to be performed, and
particularly so, if the place of the making and the place of performance
are the same. Hence, the court should apply the law of the place
where the airline ticket was issued, when the passengers are
residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in
such State by the defendant airline.
4.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage
to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of

Preliminary Injunction because respondents installation of a stationary
camera directly facing petitioners property and a revolving camera
covering a significant portion of the same property constitutes a
violation of petitioners right to privacy.
ISSUE: Is there a violation of petitioners right to privacy?
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code x x x protects an individuals right to
privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be
committed against him by other individuals. This provision recognizes
that a mans house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be
denied or even restricted by others x x x an individuals right to privacy
a. Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr (G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013 | DEL
CASTILLO, J.)
under Article 26 should not be confined to his house or residence as it

may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or
deny them access. The phrase prying into the privacy of anothers
residence, therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations
which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to
privacy x x x petitioners have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their property, whether they use it as a business office or as a residence
and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing
petitioners property or covering a significant portion thereof, without
their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy.
b. California Clothing, Inc v. Quiones (G.R. No.175822, October 23,
2013 | PERALTA, J.)
Petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between the
cashier and the invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt
to respondent. When they realized the mistake, they made a cash count
and discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price of the
black jeans was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was respondent
who failed to make such payment. It was, therefore, within their right to
verify from respondent whether she indeed paid or not and collect from
her if she did not.
ISSUE: Did the petitioner exercise their right to verify the payment made
by the respondent in good faith?
The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19, a person must, in
the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if
he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Good
faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the
individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking
an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Malice or
bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and intentional design
to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.
A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as

such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a
right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong
is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of
human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not
provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Corollarilly, Article 20 x x x speaks of the general sanctions of all other
provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the
c. Ardiente v. Spouses Pastorfide (G.R. No. 161921, July 17, 2013 |

PERALTA, J.)
standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to

another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for
its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21
of the Civil Code would be proper.
d. Pe vs. Pe (G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962| BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.)
The claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant,
being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby
causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy.The circumstances under which defendant tried to win
Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he
who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the
extent of making her fall in love with him x x x defendant not only
deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the
affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with
her x x x he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in
Article 21.
e. Velayo vs. Shell Company [G.R. No. L-7817. October 31, 1956. |
FELIX, J.]
Defendant taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency
proceedings were to be instituted by CALI if the creditors did not come
to an understanding as to the manner of distribution of the insolvent
asset among them, and believing it most probable that they would not
arrive at such understanding as it was really the case schemed and
effected the transfer of its sister corporation in the United States, where
CALIs plane C-54 was by that swift and unsuspected operation
efficaciously disposed of said insolvents property depriving the latter
and the Assignee that was latter appointed, of the opportunity to recover
said plane.
5. *
Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be
considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later
with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a)
a. Continental Steel Mfg Corp v. Voluntary Arbitrator Montao [G.R.

NO. 182836 : October 13, 2009 | CHICO-NAZARIO, J.]
Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when
it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article
42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.The rights
to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case
pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter's death
x x x while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who
have acquired juridical personality could die.
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it
is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an
intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within
twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)
Death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous
with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first
before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life.
No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the
mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death x x x the
unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As
Continental Steel itself defines a dependent as "one who relies on
another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the
power or aid of someone else." The CBA did not provide a qualification
for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must
have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such
qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense,
which includes the unborn fetus in the mother's womb.
FAMILY CODE
6. ***
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female;
and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under
any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.
(54a)
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly
authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar
general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or
religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to
the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable. (n)
absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases
mentioned in Article 32;
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10.
(56a)
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (109a)
Art. 26. (supra)
Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage shall not prescribe.
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. (n)
a. Nial v. Bayadog [G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000. | YNARESSANTIAGO, J.]
However there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code

wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which referring to
the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous
and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing
the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with
the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The
publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons
from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of
gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it
wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
x x x what nature of cohabitation is contemplated x x x to warrant
the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future
spouses from securing a marriage license x x x that five-year period
should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife"
where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to
validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration
of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States

demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in
the maintenance of which the general public is interested. This interest
proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic
"autonomous social institution" Specifically, the Constitution considers
marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of
family life which shall be protected by the State. This is why the Family
Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" and
case law considers it not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no

third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise x x x the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse x x x It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of
any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local
civil registrar.
b. Tecson-Dayot v. Dayot [G.R. NO. 175581 : March 28, 2008 | CHICONAZARIO, J.]
ISSUE: Is the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the
parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement,
effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license? YES.
x x x the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and
that the official x x x who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications
of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
x x x the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the

period of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that
the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is
but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if
there was no affidavit at all.
c. *** Republic v. Albios (G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013 |
MENDOZA, J.)
ISSUE: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring
American citizenship in consideration of $2,000 void ab initio on the
ground of lack of consent? NO.
LIMITED PURPOSE MARRIAGES are marriages where a couple
marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits.
The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together barely
five months before the celebration of their marriage. The falsity of
the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the
requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question x x x it cannot be
denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated
without the formal requisite of a marriage license. To permit a false
affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the
institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that
violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the
legitimization of a child. Another is for immigration purposes.
The CAs assailed decision was grounded on the parties supposed lack of
consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential
requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the
absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
A MARRIAGE IN JEST is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered
into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage
status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be
bound. Marriages in jest are void ab initio for a complete absence of
consent.
Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to
create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow
them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage
can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an
apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to
create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent
was, therefore, clearly present.
The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real
intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a
marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. There is no law
that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the
essential and formal requisites precribed by law are present, and it is not
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared
valid.
Hence, though the respondents marriage may be considered a
sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void
ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
d. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas [supra]
e. Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr (G.R. No. 201061, July 03, 2013 |
CARPIO, J.)
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a

license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary,
shall be void from the beginning. In this case, the marriage x x x was
solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no
marriage license was issued to them and that the purported Marriage
License did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local
civil registrar. The case clearly falls under x x x marriage void ab
initio. The marriage was also non-existent. Applying the general rules
on void or inexistent contracts (Article 1409, contracts which are
absolutely simulated or fictitious are inexistent and void from the
ISSUE: May a marriage be declared null and void ab initio and nonexistent at the same time? YES.
beginning. Thus, herein marriage is null and void ab initio and nonexistent.
f. Garcia v. Recio (G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001 | PANGANIBAN, J.)
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as
a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may
follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the
court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited
by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the
ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court
may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction
that reads: A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence
of bigamy. x x x the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted x x x Hence x x x no basis for the ruling of the trial court,
which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto
restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence
on this matter.
g. Fujiki v. Marinay (G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013 | CARPIO, J.)
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void

does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it
were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the
status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under
the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
evidence.
7. ****
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil

status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of
a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the
foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other
mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that [l]aws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad. This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity
in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating
to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the

circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
a. Republic v. Cantor (G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013 | BRION, J.)
ISSUE: Is there a wellfounded belief that respondent's husband is
already dead?
Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are (4) essential requisites
for the declaration of presumptive death:
That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid
down in Article 391, Civil Code;
That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
That the present spouse has a wellfounded belief that the
absentee is dead; and
That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
8. *
Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the
following grounds:
(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of;
(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense
or act complained of;
(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the
offense or act constituting the ground for legal separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal
separation; or
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription.
x x x the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse
and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under
the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one) x x x criteria for
determining the existence of a wellfounded belief under Article 41 x
x x respondent merely engaged in a passive search where she relied
on uncorroborated inquiries from her inlaws, neighbors and friends.
She failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are
insufficient to form a wellfounded belief that her husband was already
dead x x x whether or not the spouse present acted on a wellfounded
belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be
drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the
inquiries made by the present spouse.
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the
marriage bonds shall not be severed;
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and
liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net
profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which
shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2);
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse,
subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the
innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by
operation of law.
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
9. **
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid,
it must be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions
of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.
Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements,
the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be
voluntary or for sufficient cause. (190a)
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the final
judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant
of the decree of judicial separation of property. (191a)
Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the
voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of
gains, and for the separation of their common properties.
All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains,
as well as the personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and
notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the
creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest. (191a)
a. Partosa- Jo v. CA [G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992. | CRUZ, J.]
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial
separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which
carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed
by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply
with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage
settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at
least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
Article 128 of the Family Code provides that the aggrieved spouse may
petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds: 1.
Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2.
Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family
without just cause, even if said spouse does not leave the other spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent
never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and
without in the meantime providing in the least for ones family although
able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations,
duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The
physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private
respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute
abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal
property. Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of
the Family Code
The order of judicial separation of the properties in question is
based on the finding of both the trial and respondent courts that the
private respondent is indeed their real owner. It is these properties that
should now be divided between him and the petitioner, on the
assumption that they were acquired during coverture and so belong to
the spouses half and half. As the private respondent is a Chinese citizen,
the division must include such properties properly belonging to the
conjugal partnership as may have been registered in the name of other
persons in violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
10. **
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect,
between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts
which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing.
The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage. (133a)
a. Agapay v. Palang [G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997 | ROMERO, J.]
Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition
against donations between spouses now applies to donations between
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage,
for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to
be better than those in legal union.
x x x cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the

marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding
themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights
clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute
such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In this
jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of commonlaw relationship the stipulations between the parties, a conviction of
concubinage, or the existence of illegitimate children.
x x x since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia
said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public
conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and
b. Arcaba v. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael (G.R. No. 146683. November

22, 2001 | MENDOZA, J.)
patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.

Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila
and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by
Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family
Code.
11. **
Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate children of
either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by
the provisions of this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by
one spouse with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family may have been benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon
the community property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the
separate property of either spouse used by the family;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional or
vocational course, or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the
benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their
common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or
completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for selfimprovement;
(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under paragraph
(7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case
of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the
payment of which shall be considered as advances to be deducted from the share
of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the community; and
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be
groundless.
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate
children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be
governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by
both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon
the conjugal partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon
the separate property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional,
vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;
If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except

those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance with their separate properties. (161a, 162a, 163a, 202a-205a)
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the
benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their
common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or
completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for selfimprovement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to
groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties. (161a)
a. Ayala Investment & Development Corp vs. CA (G.R. No. 118305
February 12, 1998 | MARTINEZ, J.)
ISSUE: Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered
into by the husband in favor of his employer redounds to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership? NO.
(A) where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another
person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor,
that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the
context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be
inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to
the conjugal partnership.
12.
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other
The fact that on several occasions the lending institutions did not require
the signature of the wife and the husband signed alone does not mean
that being a surety became part of his profession. Neither could he be
presumed to have acted for the conjugal partnership. Article 121,
paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of
personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to
the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family. Signing as a
surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act
of administration for the benefit of the family.
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or

encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (206a)
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (165a)
a. Flores vs. Lindo, Jr [G.R. No. 183984, April 13 : 2011 | CARPIO, J.]
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without the written
consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without the
written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that
"the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors."
Petitioner still has a remedy under the law x x x a mortgage-creditor may

institute against the mortgage-debtor either a personal action for debt or
a real action to foreclose the mortgage x x x the remedies are alternative
and not cumulative.
13. **
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by
an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family
reside, and the land on which it is situated. (223a)
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
were executed October 1995. The Special Power of Attorney was
executed November 1995. The execution of the SPA is the
acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing
offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
(223a)
Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family;
and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the
relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and
who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. (226a)
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and
others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of
the building.
Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as
long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply
regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. (238a)
Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing family
residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. (n)
a. Spouses De Mesa vs. Spouses Acero [G.R. No. 185064 : January 16,
2012 | REYES, J.]
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of
exemption from execution, could be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed BEFORE the effectivity of the
Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family
home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;
Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially

constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by
operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded
to a family home under the Family Code.
The family homes exemption from execution must be set up and
proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public
auction x x x petitioners should have asserted the subject property
being a family home and its being exempted from execution at the time it
was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. For all intents and
purposes, the petitioners negligence or omission to assert their right
Second, family residences constructed AFTER the effectivity of the

Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family
homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted
and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have
abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under
Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon
the petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed
period and it is not the sheriffs duty to presume or raise the status of
the subject property as a family home.
b. Manacop v. CA [G.R. No. 104875. November 13, 1992. | MELO, J.]
ISSUE: Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the
money judgment aforecited? NO.
The exemption provided in Article 155 is effective from the time of the
constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein. In the present case, the residential
house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether
judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family
home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is
deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family
Code. It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to
have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution
for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not
state that the provisions x x x have a retroactive effect.
The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was
incurred at the time of the vehicular accident (1976) and the money
judgment arising therefrom was rendered (January 1988). Both
preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case
does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the
Family Code.
Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family
home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family
resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these
concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject
land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the
deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying
the same as a family residence 20 years back.
Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of
the family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if
the family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of the
heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot
transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel
the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual coowner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted
under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home. Set against
c. Arriola v. Arriola [G.R. NO. 177703 - January 28, 2008 | AUSTRIAMARTINEZ, J.]
the foregoing rules, the family home - - consisting of the subject

house and lot on which it stands - - cannot be partitioned at this
time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the
parties herein.
d. Joseph v Mendoza ???
14. *
Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second
paragraph of Article 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake,
fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. (255a)
a. Concepcion v. CA [G.R. NO. 123450 : August 31, 2005 | CORONA, J.]
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of
the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the
marriage of his parents is legitimate. Article 167 provides that the child
shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The
law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor
of legitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in

marriage, particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this
presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must
be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could
have enabled the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be
presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such
presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The presumption is
quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical
impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child.
Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the

husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never
became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the
legitimacy of her child.
The law, reason and common sense dictate that a legitimate status is
more favorable to the child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate child
enjoys a preferred and superior status. He is entitled to bear the
surnames of both his father and mother, full support and full inheritance.
On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the surname and
be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim support
only from a more limited group and his legitime is only half of that of his
legitimate counterpart. Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating the
discrimination against him), in the eyes of society, a 'bastard' is usually
regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to state, the
legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo favors his
interest.
15. **
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which
case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
a. Roces v. The Local Civil Registrar Of Manila [G.R. No. L-10598.
February 14, 1958. CONCEPCION, J.]
Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make of record the paternity of
an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the
certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the
mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child.
x x x filiation of ligitimate children shall be proved by any other means

allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a
record of birth or a parent's admission of such legitimate filiation in a
public or private document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof
of one's filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of
witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also
be utilized x x x
The baptismal certificates presented in evidence by private
respondents are public documents. Parish priests continue to be the
legal custodians of the parish records and are authorized to issue true
b. Heirs of Ignacio Conti vs. CA (G.R. No. 118464 December 21, 1998 |
BELLOSILLO, J.)
copies, in the form of certificates, of the entries contained therein. It may

be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of the
administration of the sacrament, but in this case, there were (4)
baptismal certificates which, when taken together, uniformly show that
xxx had the same set of parents, as indicated therein. Corroborated by
the undisputed testimony x x x such baptismal certificates have acquired
evidentiary weight to prove filiation.
c. Eceta v. Eceta [G.R. NO. 157037 : May 20, 2004 | YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.]
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2)
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no
further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated
not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
d. Potenciano v Mercado ??? ~ Art 834, NCC
16. ***
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of
the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other
provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.
(287a)
a. Grande v. Antonio (G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014 | VELASCO JR.,
J.)
Art. 176 was later amended (2004) by RA 9255 which now reads x x x
However, illegitimate children MAY use the surname of their father if
their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the
father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the
regular courts to prove nonfiliation during his lifetime x x x
x x x the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname
of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his
or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record
of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In
such a situation, the illegitimate child MAY use the surname of the
father. Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they
want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father
ISSUE: Does a father, upon his recognition of their filiation, have the
right to compel his illegitimate children the use his surname? NO.
(herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is

granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
illegitimate children.
The use of the word may in the provision readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the
surname of his illegitimate father. The word may is permissive and
operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.
17. *
Art. 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the
time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other, or were so disqualified only because either or both of them
were below eighteen (18) years of age, may be legitimated.
Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between
parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation.
As amended by : RA 9855
18. ***
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:
(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final
accounts rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse;
or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his
or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country adoptions as may be provided by
law. (28a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)
Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. (29a, E.
O. 91 and PD 603)
RA 8552: Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
x x x both husband and wife "shall" jointly adopt if one of them is

an alien. It was so crafted to protect Filipino children who are put up
for adoption. The Family Code reiterated the rule by requiring that
husband and wife "must" jointly adopt, except in the cases provided for
in Art 185. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife
is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses.
a. Republic v. Toledano [G.R. No. 94147. June 8, 1994 | PUNO, J.]
19. **
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9048 (2001) as amended by REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 10172 (2012)
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error
and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical
or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day
and month in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently
clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the
entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms
shall mean:
Clerical or typographical error refers to a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing
an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth, mistake in the entry of day
and month in the date of birth or the sex of the person or the like, which
is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, or status of the petitioner."
Section 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The
petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of
the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce.
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that by that
first name or nickname in the community: or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
ISSUE: May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex
appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex
reassignment surgery? NO.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities
for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a
right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.(NOTE: See
amended provision above RA 10172 ). RA 9048 does not sanction a
change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner's first name for his declared
purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the
public interest.
a. Silverio v. Republic [G.R. NO. 174689 : October 22, 2007 | CORONA, J.]
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such
change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use
of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true
and official name.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex
On the Ground of Sex Reassignment. Under RA 9048, a correction in
the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical
or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. There is no
such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. This is fatal to petitioner's cause.
20. Correction of Status
a. Republic vs. Coseteng- Magpayo [G.R. No. 189476 : February 02,
2011 | CARPIO MORALES, J.]
F: Claiming that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed
a Petition to change his name.
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF
NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including
(a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest. Respondent's reason for changing his name cannot be
considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.
x x x the mandatory directive under Section 3 of Rule 108 to implead

the civil registrar and the parties who would naturally and legally be
affected by the grant of a petition for correction or cancellation of
entries.
21. ***
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one's civil status
should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to
be cancelled or corrected, and "all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties
to the proceeding.
or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)

Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding
Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the
persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be
subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall
not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under
the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed
by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly
liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless
otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years. (As
amended by RA No. 6809 ; December 13, 1989)
a. Tamargo v. CA [G.R. No. 85044. June 3, 1992.| FELICIANO, J.]
The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its
parents commits a tortious act, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child
who is in their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words,
anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental
dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority.
No presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting
parents x x x could have arisen since [the minor] was not in fact subject
to their control at the time the tort was committed.
b. Libi v. IAC [G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992. | REGALADO, J.]
The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability
arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under
their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is
proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a
x x x the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by
a minor child who lives with them. This principle of parental liability is a
species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the
doctrine of "imputed negligence" x x x where a person is not only liable
for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others
with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible.
Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the
duties and responsibilities of parents their parental authority which
includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. Article
221 of the Family Code has x x x insisted upon the requisite that the
child, doer of the tortious act, shall have been in the actual custody of
the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage
family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the

provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to
damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or
over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and,
with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted
with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such
primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability
shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth
Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her
death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be
voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful
offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now,
without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents
and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. For
civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same
rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil
Code, as so modified.
Under Article 101 of the RPC, a father is civilly liable for the acts
committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9
years of age, who acts without discernment, unless it appears that there
is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits
the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal
liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, RPC). The idea is not to
leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to
the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority and
control. But a minor over 15 years who acts with discernment is not
exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to
the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that
case resort should be had to the general law, the Civil Code, which,
under Article 2180, provides that "The father and, in case of his death,
or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the
minor children who lived in their company." This provision covers not
only obligations which arise from quasi-delicts but also those which arise
from criminal offenses. To hold otherwise would result in the absurdity
that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or
mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her
son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal
intent.
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects x x x (3)
The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse,
subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
d. Bagtas v. Santos [G.R. NO. 166682 : November 27, 2009 | CARPIO, J.]
c. Salen v. Balce [G.R. No. L-14414. April 27, 1960. | BAUTISTA ANGELO,
J.]
Article 214 states that in case of absence or unsuitability of the parents,

substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. Article 216 states that in default of parents or a
judicially appointed guardian, the surviving grandparent shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the child.
In determining who has the rightful custody over a child, the child's
welfare is the most important consideration. The court is not bound by
any legal right of a person over the child x x x the child's welfare is
the supreme consideration.
e. Salientes v. Abanilla
QUISUMBING, J.]
[G.R. NO. 162734
: August 29, 2006
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is

withheld from a person entitled thereto x x x although the couple is
separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the
court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent,
both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child.
Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial
adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of
custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for
private respondent's petition for custody. But it is not a basis for
preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said
provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under
seven years of age.
f. David vs. CA (G.R. No. 111180 | November 16, 1995 | MENDOZA, J.)
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child
may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter,
but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the
Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise."
Under Art. 213, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been
shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child.
Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the
x x x the determination of the right to the custody of minor

children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married
to each other, are for some reason separated from each other. It
does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. In
the case of Salvaa v. Gaela, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus
is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor
daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of
her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man
against her will. Rule 102 1 makes no distinction between the case
of a mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to
the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate
child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is
deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private
respondent).
g. Silva vs. CA [G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997 | VITUG, J.:]
The fears expressed by respondent to the effect that petitioner shall be
able to corrupt and degrade their children once allowed to even
temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product of respondent's
unfounded imagination, for no man, bereft of all moral persuasions and
goodness, would ever take the trouble and expense in instituting a legal
action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. It can just be
imagined the deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of his children of
tender ages.
h. Beckett v. Judge Sarmiento, Jr. (A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326 : January 30,
2013 | VELASCO, JR., J.)
The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the
parent who was given custody suffers a future character change and
becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-examined and
adjusted x x x. To be sure, the welfare, the best interests, the benefit,
and the good of the child must be determined as of the time that either
parent is chosen to be the custodian. x x x in Dacasin v. Dacasin, a
custody agreement can never be regarded as "permanent and
unbending," the simple reason being that the situation of the parents
and even of the child can change, such that sticking to the agreed
arrangement would no longer be to the latters best interest. In a very
real sense, then, a judgment involving the custody of a minor child
cannot be accorded the force and effect of res judicata.
x x x it is necessary that every effort should be made toward a

compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in
the family and it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives
generates deeper bitterness than between strangers x x x these
considerations do not weigh enough to make it imperative that
such efforts to compromise should be a jurisdictional prerequisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to
the family is a party thereto, whether as a necessary or indispensable
one. It is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of
a stranger to the family Who just happened to have innocently acquired
some kind of interest in any right or property disputed among its
members should be made to depend on the way the latter would settle
their differences among themselves.
j. Kua v IAC ???
k. Siochi vs. Gozon [G.R. No. 169900 : March 18, 2010 | CARPIO, J.]
x x x among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the
conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending
spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned
by the conjugal partnership x x x Article 102(4) of the Family Code
provides that "[f]or purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the
i. Magbaleta vs. Gonong (G.R. No. L-44903 April 22, 1977 | BARREDO, J.)
said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of
the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution." Clearly, what is
forfeited x x x is the net profits of the conjugal partnership
property.
l. Grande v. Antonio (G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014 | VELASCO JR.,
J.)
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the
mother; hence, respondents prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental
authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children
also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the
following grounds:
(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act
complained of;
(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the
offense or act complained of;
(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of
the offense or act constituting the ground for legal separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal
separation; or
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription.
m. Bugayong vs. Ginez [G.R. No. L-10033. December 28, 1956. | FELIX,
J.]
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground

for legal separation or the conditional forgiveness or remission, by a
husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has
committed. Condonation. Is the forgiveness of a marital offense
constituting a ground for divorce and bars the right to a divorce. But it is
on the condition, implied by the law when not express, that the
wrongdoer shall not again commit the offense; also that he shall
thereafter treat the other spouse with conjugal kindness. A breach of the
condition will revive the original offense as a ground for divorce.
Condonation may be express or implied. The legal separation may be
claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where
both spouses are offenders, legal separation cannot be claimed by either
of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall
cause the dismissal of the petition.
The act of x x x persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that
she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his
cousin x x x and together they slept there as husband and wife for one
day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they
again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife all
these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court
ISSUE: Do the husbands attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights
despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him, amount to a
condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous acts?
than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that

there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. This
reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the
acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.
It has been held in a long line of decisions of the various supreme
courts of the different states of the U. S. that a single voluntary act of
sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the
offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation, especially
as against the husband.
n. Brown v. Yambao [G.R. No. L-10699. October 18, 1957 | REYES, J. B. L.,
J.]
Collusion in matrimonial cases is the act of married persons in procuring
a divorce by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted commission by
one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of agreement, to
defend divorce proceedings
The policy of x x x calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in
case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment
of marriages) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contact;
that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so
that its continuation or interruption cannot be made to depend upon the
parties themselves.
Action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one (1) year
from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within
five years from and after the date when such cause occurred. (Note that
this is a 1957 case)
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in
the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
22. ***
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
the cohabitation. (144a)

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only
the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the coownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the
last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in
bad faith. (144a)
a. Go- Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr. (G.R. No. 201061, July 03, 2013 |
CARPIO, J.)
x x x the words married to preceding the name of a spouse are
merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such
words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution
from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article
148 of the Family Code.
23. *
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward
a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that
no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.
This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise
under the Civil Code. (222a)
Art 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the
term "SUIT" that it refers to an action by one person or persons against
another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the
remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the
enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus
an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong x x x
excerpt from the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals
the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision
applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial
and involve members of the same family.
a. Vda. De Manalo v. CA [G.R. No. 129242. January 16, 2001. | DE LEON,

JR., J.]
The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration is a special

proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein
seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
b. Magbaleta vs. Gonong (supra)
PROPERTY
24. ***
Article 415. The following are immovable property:
(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or form
an integral part of an immovable;
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it
cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of
the object;
(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or ornamentation, placed in
buildings or on lands by the owner of the immovable in such a manner that it
reveals the intention to attach them permanently to the tenements;
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of
the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or
on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry
or works;
(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding places of
similar nature, in case their owner has placed them or preserves them with the
intention to have them permanently attached to the land, and forming a
permanent part of it; the animals in these places are included;
(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;
(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms part of the
bed, and waters either running or stagnant;
(9) Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and
object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast;
(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over
immovable property. (334a)
In Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., et al. v. The City of

New York, et al., a power company brought an action to review property
tax assessment. On the citys motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court of
New York held that the barges on which were mounted gas turbine
power plants designated to generate electrical power, the fuel oil barges
which supplied fuel oil to the power plant barges, and the accessory
equipment mounted on the barges were subject to real property
taxation.
Moreover, Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that "[d]ocks
and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and
object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast" are considered
immovable property. Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable
property by destination, being in the nature of machinery and other
implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to
meet the needs of said industry or work
b. Davao Sawmills vs Castillo
a. FELS Energy v The Province of Batangas
The machinery only becomes immobilized if placed in a plant by the

owner of the property or plant. Immobilization cannot be made by a
tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right. The
tenant, usufructuary, or temporary possessor acted as agent of the
owner of the premises; or he intended to permanently give away the
property in favor of the owner. Therefore, the machinery should be
considered as Personal Property, since it was not placed on the land by
the owner of the said land.
25.
Article 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land, building, or other
property on which it is found.
Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the property of another, or of the
State or any of its subdivisions, and by chance, one-half thereof shall be allowed
to the finder. If the finder is a trespasser, he shall not be entitled to any share of
the treasure.
If the things found be of interest to science or the arts, the State may acquire
them at their just price, which shall be divided in conformity with the rule stated.
(351a)
Article 439. By treasure is understood, for legal purposes, any hidden and
unknown deposit of money, jewelry, or other precious objects, the lawful
ownership of which does not appear. (352)
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works,
sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546
and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot
be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the
building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the
land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.
The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement,
the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)
Article 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another,
loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity. (362)
Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only
the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed
therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the
same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession
26. ***
Article 447. The owner of the land who makes thereon, personally or through
another, plantings, constructions or works with the materials of another, shall
pay their value; and, if he acted in bad faith, he shall also be obliged to the
reparation of damages. The owner of the materials shall have the right to remove
them only in case he can do so without injury to the work constructed, or without
the plantings, constructions or works being destroyed. However, if the landowner
acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may remove them in any event,
with a right to be indemnified for damages. (360a)
having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the
increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. (453a)
Article 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are
suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or
substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease
shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time.
Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the
improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He
shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is
necessary.
With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any
reimbursement, but he may remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage
is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain them by
paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished. (n)
a. Rosales vs Castelltort
Under Art. 448, the landowner can choose between appropriating the
building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay
the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that of
the structures, in which case the builder in good faith shall pay
reasonable rent. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions
of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the
principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and
not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner,
the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot
refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the
building to remove it from the land.
Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in
the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor
is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.
The good faith ceases or is legally interrupted from the moment defects
in the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or
by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner.
Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to

appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the proper
amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the possessor in good faith.
Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to
full reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it
also gives him right of retention until full reimbursement is made.
While the law aims to concentrate in one person the ownership of the
land and the improvements thereon in view of the impracticability of
creating a state of forced co-ownership, it guards against unjust
enrichment insofar as the good-faith builders improvements are
concerned. The right of retention is considered as one of the measures
devised by the law for the protection of builders in good faith. Its object
is to guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it permits the actual
possessor to remain in possession while he has not been reimbursed (by
b. Nuguid v CA
the person who defeated him in the case for possession of the property)
for those necessary expenses and useful improvements made by him on
the thing possessed. Accordingly, a builder in good faith cannot be
compelled to pay rentals during the period of retention nor be disturbed
in his possession by ordering him to vacate. In addition, as in this case,
the owner of the land is prohibited from offsetting or compensating the
necessary and useful expenses with the fruits received by the builderpossessor in good faith. Otherwise, the security provided by law would
be impaired. This is so because the right to the expenses and the right
to the fruits both pertain to the possessor, making compensation
juridically impossible; and one cannot be used to reduce the other.
27. *
Article 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the
charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a
contract to the contrary shall be void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proved. (393a)
Article 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. (n)
Article 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the coowners cannot demand a physical division of the thing owned in common, when
to do so would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended. But
the co-ownership may be terminated in accordance with article 498. (401a)
Article 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others,
make alterations in the thing owned in common, even though benefits for all
would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by one or
more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts
may afford adequate relief. (397a)
Article 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided
thing or right belongs to different persons.
In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed
by the provisions of this Title.
One who validly renounces an inheritance is deemed never to have possessed the
same. (440)
Article 534. On who succeeds by hereditary title shall not suffer the
consequences of the wrongful possession of the decedent, if it is not shown that
he was aware of the flaws affecting it; but the effects of possession in good faith
shall not benefit him except from the date of death of the decedent. (442)
Article 1138. In the computation of time necessary for prescription the
following rules shall be observed:
(1) The present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription by
tacking his possession to that of his grantor or predecessor in interest;
28.
Article 533. The possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the
heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in
case the inheritance is accepted.
(2) It is presumed that the present possessor who was also the possessor at a
previous time, has continued to be in possession during the intervening time,
unless there is proof to the contrary;
(3) The first day shall be excluded and the last day included. (1960a)
29. **
Article 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the
same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or which the owner has been unlawfully
deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain
its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. (464a)
a. Ledesma v CA
It is quite clear that a party who (a) has lost any movable or (b) has been
unlawfully deprived thereof can recover the same from the present
possessor even if the latter acquired it in good faith and has, therefore,
title thereto for under the first sentence of Article 559, such manner of
acquisition is equivalent to a title. There are three (3) requisites to make
possession of movable property equivalent to title, namely: (a) the
possession should be in good faith; (b) the owner voluntarily parted with
the possession of the thing; and (c) the possession is in the concept of
owner.
Undoubtedly, one who has lost a movable or who has been unlawfully
deprived of it cannot be said to have voluntarily parted with the
possession thereof. This is the justification for the exceptions found
under the second sentence of Article 559 of the Civil Code.
b. EDCA v Santos
One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the phrase

"unlawfully deprived" were to be interpreted in the manner suggested by
the petitioner. A person relying on the seller's title who buys a movable
property from him would have to surrender it to another person claiming
to be the original owner who had not yet been paid the purchase price
therefor. The buyer in the second sale would be left holding the bag, so
to speak, and would be compelled to return the thing bought by him in
good faith without even the right to reimbursement of the amount he had
paid for it.
c. Aznar v Yapdiangco
The lower court was correct in applying Article 559 of the Civil Code to
the case at bar, for under it, the rule is to the effect that if the owner has
lost a thing, or if he has been unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to
recover it, not only from the finder, thief or robber, but also from third
persons who may have acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief or
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership
over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private
respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a
matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by
the private respondents to the books.
robber. The said article establishes two exceptions to the general rule of
irrevindicability, to wit, when the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has
been unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the possessor cannot
retain the thing as against the owner, who may recover it without paying
any indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a public sale.
Under Article 559 of the new Civil Code, a person illegally deprived of
any movable may recover it from the person in possession of the same
and the only defense the latter may have is if he has acquired it in good
faith at a public sale, in which case, the owner cannot obtain its return
without reimbursing the price paid therefor. In the present case, plaintiff
has been illegally deprived of his car through the ingenious scheme of
defendant B to enable the latter to dispose of it as if he were the owner
thereof. Plaintiff, therefore, can still recover possession of the car even if
it is in the possession of a third party who had acquired it in good faith
from defendant B. The maxim that "no man can transfer to another a
better title than he had himself" obtains in the civil as well as in the
common law.
30. ***
Article 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) By the expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the
fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription. (513a)
Article 606. A usufruct granted for the time that may elapse before a third
person attains a certain age, shall subsist for the number of years specified, even
if the third person should die before the period expires, unless such usufruct has
been expressly granted only in consideration of the existence of such person.
(516)
a. Moralidad v Pernes
The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986 constitutes
the title creating, and sets forth the conditions of, the usufruct.
Paragraph #3 thereof states "[T]hat anyone of my kins may enjoy the
privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided,
however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof" (Emphasis
supplied). What may be inimical to the purpose constituting the usufruct
may be gleaned from the preceding paragraph wherein petitioner made
it abundantly clear "that anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the
aforementioned property should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation,
live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one another." That the
maintenance of a peaceful and harmonious relations between and among
We disagree with the CAs conclusion of law on the matter. The term or
period of the usufruct originally specified provides only one of the bases
for the right of a usufructuary to hold and retain possession of the thing
given in usufruct. There are other modes or instances whereby the
usufruct shall be considered terminated or extinguished. For sure, the
Civil Code enumerates such other modes of extinguishment:
kin constitutes an indispensable condition for the continuance of the

usufruct is clearly deduced from the succeeding Paragraph #4 where
petitioner stated "[T]hat anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the
wishes of the undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own."
In fine, the occurrence of any of the following: the loss of the atmosphere
of cooperation, the bickering or the cessation of harmonious relationship
between/among kin constitutes a resolutory condition which, by express
wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct.
From the pleadings submitted by the parties, it is indubitable that there
were indeed facts and circumstances whereby the subject usufruct may
be deemed terminated or extinguished by the occurrence of the
resolutory conditions provided for in the title creating the usufruct,
namely, the document adverted to which the petitioner executed on July
21, 1986.
31. ***
Article 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate
or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to
other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to
demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the
proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be
continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent
passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the
amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of
the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the
servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the
payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the
proprietor's own acts. (564a)
Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates,
established or maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered, should
either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may continue
actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is
divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of
them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed.
This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common
by two or more persons.
a. Bogo-medellin Milling Inc v CA
An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal
immovable property of another, by virtue of which the owner has to
refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do, something on his
property, for the benefit of another thing or person. It exists only when
the servient and dominant estates belong to two different owners. It
gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on the land but
Article 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
(565)
grants no title thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement is

an admission that the property belongs to another
In the absence of an express grant by the owner, or conduct by petitioner
sugar mill from which an adverse claim can be implied, its possession of
the lot can only be presumed to have continued in the same character as
when it was acquired (that is, it possessed the land only by virtue of the
original grant of the easement of right of way),[28] or was by mere
license or tolerance of the owners (respondent heirs).[29] It is a
fundamental principle of law in this jurisdiction that acts of possessory
character executed by virtue of license or tolerance of the owner, no
matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription
Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous
or discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised, not
according to the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of
the existence of such easements. Thus, an easement is continuous if its
use is, or may be, incessant without the intervention of any act of man,
like the easement of drainage;[38] and it is discontinuous if it is used at
intervals and depends on the act of man, like the easement of right of
way.[39]
The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is
exercised only if a person passes or sets foot on somebody elses land.
Like a road for the passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of right
of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous because the right is exercised
only if and when a train operated by a person passes over another's
property. In other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends
upon the act or intervention of man which is the very essence of
discontinuous easements.
The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not in any
way convert the nature of an easement of right of way to one that is
continuous. It is not the presence of apparent signs or physical
indications showing the existence of an easement, but rather the manner
of exercise thereof, that categorizes such easement into continuous or
discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an
easement into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a
right of way) and a window (which evidences a right to light and view)
are apparent easements, while an easement of not building beyond a
certain height is non-apparent
Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of way is continuous

and apparent and may be acquired by prescription under Article 620 of
the Civil Code, is erroneous. The use of a footpath or road may be
apparent but it isnot a continuous easement because its use is at
intervals and depends upon the acts of man. It can be exercised only if a
man passes or puts his feet over somebody else's land (4 Manresa 597;
Haffman vs. Shoemaker, 71 SE 198, both cited on p. 454, Vol. 2, 6th Ed.,
Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines). Hence, a right of way is not
acquirable by prescription (Cuaycong, et al, vs Benedicto, et al., 37 Phil.
781; Ronquillo, et al. vs. Roco, et al., 103 Phil. 84; Ayala de Roxas vs.
Case, 8 Phil. 197).
c. Positive and Negative
b. Abellana v CA
d. Cristobal v CA
To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the
preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must
be established. These are: (1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2)
that proper indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to
acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, in so far
as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest.[9] The burden of proving the
existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
e. S????????? vs CA WIDTH
f. Ramos v Gatchalian
The petitioner's position is not impressed with merit. We find no reason
to disturb the appellate court's finding of fact that the petitioner failed to
prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road except
through the Gatchalian Avenue. As borne out by the records of the case,
there is a road right of way provided by the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos
Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the
buyers of its lots. The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes
inconvenience to the petitioner when he uses it to reach the public
highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite. We
agree with the appellate court's observation that the petitioner should
have, first and foremost, demanded from the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos
Subdivision the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his
road right of way because it was from said subdivision that he acquired
his lot and not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents
Asprec. To allow the petitioner access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian
Avenue inspite of a road right of way provided by the petitioner's
subdivision for its buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows
petitioner a much greater ease in going to and coming from the main
thoroughfare is to completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently
maintained through the years regarding an easement of a right of way,
that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as
its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real,
not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it."
As defined, an easement is a real right on anothers property, corporeal

and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing
or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property,
for the benefit of another person or tenement.
Easements are
established either by law or by the will of the owner. The former are
called legal, and the latter, voluntary easements
Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is personal only to
Hidalgo since the annotation merely mentioned Sandico and Hidalgo
without equally binding their heirs or assigns. That the heirs or assigns
of the parties were not mentioned in the annotation does not mean that
it is not binding on them. Again, a voluntary easement of right of way is
g. Unisource Commercial Corp v Chung
like any other contract. As such, it is generally effective between the

parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.[25] Petitioner cites City
of Manila v. Entote[26] in justifying that the easement should bind only
the parties mentioned therein and exclude those not so mentioned.
However, that case is inapplicable since the issue therein was whether
the easement was intended not only for the benefit of the owners of the
dominant estate but of the community and the public at large.[27] In
interpreting the easement, the Court ruled that the clause any and all
other persons whomsoever in the easement embraces only those who
are privy to the owners of the dominant estate, Lots 1 and 2 Plan Pcs2672 and excludes the indiscriminate public from the enjoyment of the
right-of-way easement.
PRESCRIPTION
32. * Periods
a. A???? vs D????
Void Title; Imprescriptible
33. Cases; Inter vivos/ Mortis Causa
34.
Article 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not treasure, must return it to
its previous possessor. If the latter is unknown, the finder shall immediately
deposit it with the mayor of the city or municipality where the finding has taken
place.
The finding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for two consecutive weeks
in the way he deems best.
If the movable cannot be kept without deterioration, or without expenses which
considerably diminish its value, it shall be sold at public auction eight days after
the publication.
Article 720. If the owner should appear in time, he shall be obliged to pay, as a
reward to the finder, one-tenth of the sum or of the price of the thing found.
(616a)
Article 2171. The rights and obligations of the finder of lost personal property
shall be governed by articles 719 and 720.
a. Finders Keepers;
DONATIONS
35.
Article 725. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes
Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner having
appeared, the thing found, or its value, shall be awarded to the finder. The finder
and the owner shall be obliged, as the case may be, to reimburse the expenses.
(615a)
gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.

Article 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor
partake of the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall be governed by the
rules established in the Title on Succession. (620)
Article 729. When the donor intends that the donation shall take effect during
the lifetime of the donor, though the property shall not be delivered till after the
donor's death, this shall be a donation inter vivos. The fruits of the property from
the time of the acceptance of the donation, shall pertain to the donee, unless the
donor provides otherwise.
36. ***
Article 734. The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee. (623)
Article 737. The donor's capacity shall be determined as of the time of the
making of the donation. (n)
a. When donation perfected
37. ***
Article 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing.
An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the
document representing the right donated.
If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the
donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing. Otherwise, the donation
shall be void. (632a)
Article 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be
made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the
value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate
public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime
of the donor.
Article 1356. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have
been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are
present. However, when the law requires that a contract be in some form in
order that it may be valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a
certain way, that requirement is absolute and indispensable. In such cases, the
right of the parties stated in the following article cannot be exercised. (1278a)
Article 745. The donee must accept the donation personally, or through an
authorized person with a special power for the purpose, or with a general and
sufficient power; otherwise, the donation shall be void. (630)
Article 746. Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and of
the donee. (n)
a. Republic vs S?????
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified

thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
(633)
b. Lagazo vs CA
In the words of the esteemed Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, 14 "Like any
other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. The donation,
following the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected
only upon the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee."
Furthermore, "[i]f the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the
donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall
be noted in both instruments." 15
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its
absence makes the donation null and void.16 The perfection and the
validity of a donation are well explained by former Sen. Arturo M.
Tolentino in this wise:
. . Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee
by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a
public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance
may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance
does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another.
Solemn words are not necessary; it is sufficient if it shows the intention
to accept. But in this case it is necessary that formal notice thereof be
given to the donor, and the fact that due notice has been given must be
noted in both instruments (that containing the offer to donate and that
showing the acceptance). Then and only then is the donation perfected.
If the instrument of donation has been recorded in the registry of
property, the instrument that shows the acceptance should also be
recorded. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or
where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate
instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed
of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.
We find it difficult to sustain that the defendant-appellants have complied

with the condition of donation. It is not amiss to state that other than
the bare allegation of the defendant-appellants, there is nothing in the
records that could concretely prove that the condition of donation has
been complied with by the defendant-appellants. In the same breadth,
the planting ofpalay on the land donated can hardly be considered and
could not have been the school purposes referred to and intended by
the donors when they had donated the land in question. Also, the
posture of the defendant-appellants that the land donated is being used
as technology and home economics laboratory of the Rizal National High
School is far from being the truth considering that not only is the said
school located two kilometers away from the land donated but also there
was not even a single classroom built on the land donated that would
reasonably indicate that, indeed, classes have been conducted therein.
These observations, together with the unrebutted ocular inspection
report made by the trial court which revealed that the land donated
remains idle and without any improvement thereon for more than a
decade since the time of the donation, give Us no other alternative but to
conclude that the defendant-appellants have, indeed, failed to comply
with what is incumbent upon them in the deed of donation
c. Secretary Of Education vs Heirs Of Dulay
Anent the second issue, we reject the contention of the OSG that
respondents cause of action is already barred by prescription under
Article 764 of the New Civil Code, or four years from the non-compliance
with the condition in the deed of donation. Since such failure to comply
with the condition of utilizing the property for school purposes became
manifest sometime in 1988 when the DECS utilized another property for
the construction of the school building, the four-year prescriptive period
did not commence on such date. Petitioner was given more than enough
time to comply with the condition, and it cannot be allowed to use this
fact to its advantage. It must be stressed that the donation is onerous
because the DECS, as donee, was burdened with the obligation to utilize
the land donated for school purposes. Under Article 733 of the New
Civil Code, a donation with an onerous cause is essentially a contract
and is thus governed by the rules on contract
38. **
Article 764. The donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when
the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions which the former imposed
upon the latter.
In this case, the property donated shall be returned to the donor, the alienations
made by the donee and the mortgages imposed thereon by him being void, with
the limitations established, with regard to third persons, by the Mortgage Law
and the Land Registration laws.
This action shall prescribe after four years from the noncompliance with the
condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised
against the donee's heirs. (647a)
a. Central Philippine University v CA
This general rule however cannot be applied considering the different

set of circumstances existing in the instant case. More than a reasonable
period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of
the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to
make the donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed
to do so. Hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a term of the
obligation when such procedure would be a mere technicality and
formality and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an
unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits. 9 Moreover, under
Art. 1191 of the Civil Code, when one of the obligors cannot comply with
what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek rescission and the
court shall decree the same unless there is just cause authorizing the
fixing of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the court to
determine the period of the compliance, there is no more obstacle for the
court to decree the rescission claimed.
Finally, since the questioned deed of donation herein is basically a
gratuitous one, doubts referring to incidental circumstances of a
Thus, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature and
circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the general
rule provided in Art. 1197 of the Civil Code applies, which provides that
the courts may fix the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the
obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the
period for compliance therewith and such period has arrived. 8
gratuitous contract should be resolved in favor of the least transmission

of rights and interests.
b. *
Article 751. Donations cannot comprehend future property.
By future property is understood anything which the donor cannot dispose of at
the time of the donation. (635)
Article 1459. The thing must be licit and the vendor must have a right to
transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered. (n)
Article 744. Donations of the same thing to two or more different donees shall
be governed by the provisions concerning the sale of the same thing to two or
more different persons. (n)
c. Double Donation; governed by rules on double sale
PARTNERSHIP
79. 1789;1808*
80. 1801 1803**
81. 1804**
82. 1816; 1823 1824*
83. 1828; 1829; 1830***
ORTEGA VS CA
The birth and life of a partnership at will is predicated on the mutual
desire and consent of the partners. The right to choose with whom a
person wishes to associate himself is the very foundation and essence
of that partnership. Its continued existence is, in turn, dependent on
the constancy of that mutual resolve, along with each partner's
capability to give it, and the absence of a cause for dissolution
provided by the law itself. Verily, any one of the partners may, at his
sole pleasure, dictate a dissolution of the partnership at will. He must,
however, act in good faith, not that the attendance of bad faith can
prevent the dissolution of the partnership but that it can result in a
liability for damages.
In passing, neither would the presence of a period for its specific
duration or the statement of a particular purpose for its creation
prevent the dissolution of any partnership by an act or will of a
partner. Among partners, mutual agency arises and the doctrine
78. 1767**
SY VS CA
Article 1767 of the Civil Code states that in a contract of partnership
two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property or
industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits
among themselves.[ Not one of these circumstances is present in this
case. No written agreement exists to prove the partnership between
the parties. Private respondent did not contribute money, property or
industry for the purpose of engaging in the supposed business. There
is no proof that he was receiving a share in the profits as a matter of
course, during the period when the trucking business was under
operation. Neither is there any proof that he had actively participated
in the management, administration and adoption of policies of the
business.
of delectus personae allows them to have the power, although not

necessarily the right, to dissolve the partnership. An unjustified
dissolution by the partner can subject him to a possible action for
damages.
The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the relation of the
parties caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying
on, as might be distinguished from the winding up of, the
business. Upon its dissolution, the partnership continues and its legal
personality is retained until the complete winding up of its business
culminating in its termination. The liquidation of the assets of the
partnership following its dissolution is governed by various provisions
of the Civil Code; however, an agreement of the partners, like any
other contract, is binding among them and normally takes precedence
to the extent applicable over the Code's general provisions.
* 1797
AGENCY
[U]nder the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can be held

vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician providing care
at the hospital, regardless of whether the physician is an independent
contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have known, that the
physician is an independent contractor. The elements of the action
have been set out as follows: For a hospital to be liable under the
doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the
hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable
person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be
negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital;
(2) where the
acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must
84. 1869**
PROF. SERVICES INC VS AGANA
In
this
case,
PSI
publicly
displays
in
the
lobby
of
the Medical City Hospital the names and specializations of the
physicians associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil
and Dr. Fuentes. We concur with the Court of Appeals conclusion
that it is now estopped from passing all the blame to the
physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public
directory leading the public to believe that it vouched for their
skill and competence. Indeed, PSIs act is tantamount to holding
out to the public that Medical City Hospital, through its accredited
physicians, offers quality health care services. By accrediting Dr.
Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their qualifications,
the hospital created the impression that they were its agents,
authorized to perform medical or surgical services for its patients. As
expected, these patients, Natividad being one of them, accepted the
services on the reasonable belief that such were being rendered by
the hospital or its employees, agents, or servants.
QC CAPITAL MEDICAL CENTER VS NOGALES
In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an
independent contractor-physician. There is, however, an exception to
this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the
ostensible agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the
doctrine of apparent authority.
also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them;
and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital
or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
85. 1874; 1315; 1356*
PINEDA VS CA
The Civil Code provides that in a sale of a parcel of land or any
interest therein made through an agent, a special power of attorney is
essential. This authority must be in writing, otherwise the sale shall be
void. In his testimony, petitioner Adeodato Duque confirmed that at
the time he purchased respondents property from Pineda, the latter
had no Special Power of Authority to sell the property. A special power
of attorney is necessary to enter into any contract by which the
ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired for a valuable
consideration. Without an authority in writing, petitioner Pineda could
not validly sell the subject property to petitioners Duque. Hence, any
sale in favor of petitioners Duque is void
87. 1924; 1875***

SANCHEZ VS MEDICARD
For the purpose of equity, an agent who is not the efficient procuring
cause is nonetheless entitled to his commission, where said agent,
notwithstanding the expiration of his authority, nonetheless, took
diligent steps to bring back together the parties, such that a
sale was finalized and consummated between them. In order not
to prejudice its personnel, Unilab, through respondent Ejercito,
negotiated with respondent Dr. Montoya of Medicard, in order to find
mutually beneficial ways of continuing the Health Care Program. The
negotiations resulted in a new contract wherein Unilab shall pay
Medicard the hospitalization expenses actually incurred by each
employees, plus a service fee. Under the "cost plus" system which
replaced the premium scheme, petitioner was not given a commission.
It is clear that since petitioner refused to reduce his commission,
Medicard directly negotiated with Unilab, thus revoking its agency
contract with petitioner. We hold that such revocation is authorized by
Article 1924 of the Civil Code.
MEDRANO VS CA
The letter of authority must be read as a whole and not in its
truncated parts. Certainly, it was not the intention of Medrano to
expect the respondents to do just that (to negotiate) when he issued
86. 1317; 1403 (1); 1881; 1882; 1883; 1898; 1909; 1910; 1911***
BICOL SAVINGS BANK VS CA
The sale proscribed by a special power to mortgage under Article
1879 is a voluntary and independent contract, and not an auction sale
resulting from extrajudicial foreclosure, which is precipitated by the
default of a mortgagor. Absent that default, no foreclosure results.
The stipulation granting an authority to extrajudicially foreclose a
mortgage is an ancillary stipulation supported by the same cause or
consideration for the mortgage and forms an essential or inseparable
part of that bilateral agreement. The power to foreclose is not an
ordinary agency that contemplates exclusively the representation of
the principal by the agent but is primarily an authority conferred upon
the mortgagee for the latter's own protection. That power survives the
death of the mortgagor
88. 1919; 1927; 1930; 1800*

SEVILLA VS CA
It is the Court's considered opinion, that when the petitioner, Lina
Sevilla, agreed to (wo)man the private respondent, Tourist World
Service, Inc.'s Ermita office, she must have done so pursuant to a
contract of agency. It is the essence of this contract that the agent
renders services "in representation or on behalf of another. In the case
at bar, Sevilla solicited airline fares, but she did so for and on behalf
of her principal, Tourist World Service, Inc. As compensation, she
received 4% of the proceeds in the concept of commissions. And as we
said, Sevilla herself based on her letter of November 28, 1961, preassumed her principal's authority as owner of the business
undertaking. We are convinced, considering the circumstances and
from the respondent Court's recital of facts, that the ties had
contemplated a principal agent relationship, rather than a joint
managament or a partnership. But unlike simple grants of a power of
attorney, the agency that we hereby declare to be compatible with the
intent of the parties, cannot be revoked at will. The reason is that it is
one coupled with an interest, the agency having been created for
mutual interest, of the agent and the principal. It appears that Lina
the letter of authority. The clear intention is to reward the

respondents for procuring a buyer for the property. Before
negotiating a sale, a broker must first and foremost bring in a
prospective buyer. It has been held that a broker earns his
pay merely by bringing the buyer and the seller together, even if no
sale is eventually made. The essential feature of a brokers
conventional employment is merely to procure a purchaser for a
property ready, able, and willing to buy at the price and on the terms
mutually agreed upon by the owner and the purchaser. And it is not a
prerequisite to the right to compensation that the broker conduct the
negotiations between the parties after they have been brought into
contact with each other through his efforts. The case of Macondray v.
Sellner is quite instructive:
The business of a real estate broker or agent, generally,
is only to find a purchaser, and the settled rule as stated
by the courts is that, in the absence of an express
contract between the broker and his principal, the
implication generally is that the broker becomes entitled
to the usual commissions whenever he brings to his
principal a party who is able and willing to take the
property and enter into a valid contract upon the terms
then named by the principal, although the particulars
may be arranged and the matter negotiated and
completed between the principal and the purchaser
directly.
Notably, there are cases where the right of the brokers to recover
commissions were upheld where they actually took no part in the
negotiations, never saw the customer, and even some in which they
did nothing except advertise the property, as long as it can be shown
that they were the efficient cause of the sale.In the case at bar, the
role of the respondents in the transaction is undisputed. Whether or
not they participated in the negotiations of the sale is of no moment.
Armed with an authority to procure a purchaser and with a license to
act as broker, we see no reason why the respondents can not recover
compensation for their efforts when, in fact, they are the procuring
cause of the sale
Sevilla is a bona fide travel agent herself, and as such, she had
acquired an interest in the business entrusted to her. Moreover, she
had assumed a personal obligation for the operation thereof, holding
herself solidarily liable for the payment of rentals. She continued the
business, using her own name, after Tourist World had stopped
further operations. Her interest, obviously, is not to the commissions
she earned as a result of her business transactions, but one that
extends to the very subject matter of the power of management
delegated to her. It is an agency that, as we said, cannot be revoked at
the pleasure of the principal. Accordingly, the revocation complained
of should entitle the petitioner, Lina Sevilla, to damages.
LIM VS SABAN
Under Article 1927 of the Civil Code, an agency cannot be revoked if a
bilateral contract depends upon it, or if it is the means of fulfilling an
obligation already contracted, or if a partner is appointed manager of
a partnership in the contract of partnership and his removal from the
management is unjustifiable. Stated differently, an agency is deemed
as one coupled with an interest where it is established for the mutual
benefit of the principal and of the agent, or for the interest of the
principal and of third persons, and it cannot be revoked by the
principal so long as the interest of the agent or of a third person
subsists. In an agency coupled with an interest, the agents interest
must be in the subject matter of the power conferred and not merely
an interest in the exercise of the power because it entitles him to
compensation. When an agents interest is confined to earning his
agreed compensation, the agency is not one coupled with an interest,
since an agents interest in obtaining his compensation as such agent
is an ordinary incident of the agency relationship.
Guaranty and Surety
It is clear that excussion may only be invoked after legal remedies

against the principal debtor have been expanded. Thus, it was held
that the creditor must first obtain a judgment against the principal
debtor before assuming to run after the alleged guarantor, for
obviously the exhaustion of the principals property cannot even
begin to take place before judgment has been obtained. [37] The law
imposes conditions precedent for the invocation of the defense. Thus,
in order that the guarantor may make use of the benefit of excussion,
he must set it up against the creditor upon the latters demand for
payment and point out to the creditor available property of the debtor
within the Philippines sufficient to cover the amount of the debt. [38]
89. Distinctions**
90. 2056; 2058; 2059 ***
JN DEV. CORP VS PHIL GUARANTEE
Under a contract of guarantee, the guarantor binds himself to the
creditor to fulfill the obligation of the principal debtor in case the
latter should fail to do so. [34] The guarantor who pays for a debtor, in
turn, must be indemnified by the latter. [35] However, the guarantor
cannot be compelled to pay the creditor unless the latter has
exhausted all the property of the debtor and resorted to all the legal
remedies against the debtor. [36] This is what is otherwise known as the
benefit of excussion.
While a guarantor enjoys the benefit of excussion, nothing prevents

him from paying the obligation once demand is made on him.
Excussion, after all, is a right granted to him by law and as such he
may opt to make use of it or waive it. PhilGuarantees waiver of the
right of excussion cannot prevent it from demanding reimbursement
from petitioners. The law clearly requires the debtor to indemnify the
guarantor what the latter has paid. The benefit of excussion, as well
as the requirement of consent to extensions of payment, is a
protective device pertaining to and conferred on the guarantor. These
may be invoked by the guarantor against the creditor as defenses to
bar the unwarranted enforcement of the guarantee. However,
PhilGuarantee did not avail of these defenses when it paid its
obligation according to the tenor of the guarantee once demand was
made on it.
LOANS
EASTERN SHIPPING CASE NO LONGER RULE

IMPERIAL VS JAUCIAN
The records show that there was a written agreement between the
parties for the payment of interest on the subject loans at the rate of
16 percent per month. As decreed by the lower courts, this rate must
be equitably reduced for being iniquitous, unconscionable and
exorbitant. While the Usury Law ceiling on interest rates was lifted
by C.B. Circular No. 905, nothing in the said circular grants
lenders carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which
will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their
assets.[13] In Medel v. CA,[14] the Court found the stipulated interest
rate of 5.5 percent per month, or 66 percent per annum,
unconscionable. In the present case, the rate is even more iniquitous
and unconscionable, as it amounts to 192 percent per annum. When
the agreed rate is iniquitous or unconscionable, it is considered
contrary to morals, if not against the law. [Such] stipulation is
void.[15] Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if
there were no express contract thereon. [16] Hence, courts may reduce
the interest rate as reason and equity demand. We find no
91. 1956 ***

CB Circular No. 905 as amended by CB Circular 796
NACER VS GALLERY FRAMES
Thus, from the foregoing, in the absence of an express stipulation as
to the rate of interest that would govern the parties, the rate of legal
interest for loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and
the rate allowed in judgments shall no longer be twelve percent (12%)
per annum - as reflected in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines 40and
Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and
Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations
for Non-Bank Financial Institutions, before its amendment by BSP-MB
Circular No. 799 - but will now be six percent (6%) per annum
effective July 1, 2013. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the new
rate could only be applied prospectively and not retroactively.
Consequently, the twelve percent (12%) per annum legal interest shall
apply only until June 30, 2013. Come July 1, 2013 the new rate of six
percent (6%) per annum shall be the prevailing rate of interest when
applicable.
justification to reverse or modify the rate imposed by the two lower

courts.
ANGEL JOSE WAREHOUSING VS CHELDA ENTERPRISES
In simple loan with stipulation of usurious interest, the prestation of
the debtor to pay the principal debt, which is the cause of the contract
(Article 1350, Civil Code), is not illegal. The illegality lies only as to
the prestation to pay the stipulated interest; hence, being separable,
the latter only should be deemed void, since it is the only one that is
illegal. The principal debt remaining without stipulation for payment
of interest can thus be recovered by judicial action. And in case of
such demand, and the debtor incurs in delay, the debt earns interest
from the date of the demand (in this case from the filing of the
complaint). Such interest is not due to stipulation, for there was none,
the same being void. Rather, it is due to the general provision of law
that in obligations to pay money, where the debtor incurs in delay, he
has to pay interest by way of damages (Art. 2209, Civil Code).
L**** vs O***********
DEPOSIT
Article 1962, in relation to Article 1998, of the Civil Code defines a

contract of deposit and a necessary deposit made by persons in hotels
or inns. Plainly, from the facts found by the lower courts, the insured
See deposited his vehicle for safekeeping with petitioner, through the
latters employee, Justimbaste. In turn, Justimbaste issued a claim
stub to See. Thus, the contract of deposit was perfected from Sees
delivery, when he handed over to Justimbaste the keys to his vehicle,
which Justimbaste received with the obligation of safely keeping and
returning it. Ultimately, petitioner is liable for the loss of Sees
vehicle.
MAMARIL VS BSP
Anent Sps. Mamaril's claim that the exculpatory clause: "Management
shall not be responsible for loss of vehicle or any of its accessories or
article left therein"31 contained in the BSP issued parking ticket was
void for being a contract of adhesion and against public policy, suffice
it to state that contracts of adhesion are not void per se. It is binding
as any other ordinary contract and a party who enters into it is free to
reject the stipulations in its entirety. If the terms thereof are accepted
without objection, as in this case, where plaintiffs-appellants have
been leasing BSP's parking space for more or less 20 years, 32 then the
92. 1998 2004; 1754 **

DURBAN APARTMENTS CORP VS PIONEER INSURANCE
[The] records also reveal that upon arrival at the City Garden Hotel,
See gave notice to the doorman and parking attendant of the said
hotel, x x x Justimbaste, about his Vitara when he entrusted its
ignition key to the latter. x x x Justimbaste issued a valet parking
customer claim stub to See, parked the Vitara at the Equitable PCI
Bank parking area, and placed the ignition key inside a safety key box
while See proceeded to the hotel lobby to check in. The Equitable PCI
Bank parking area became an annex of City Garden Hotel when the
management of the said bank allowed the parking of the vehicles of
hotel guests thereat in the evening after banking hours.
contract serves as the law between them. 33 Besides, the parking fee
of P300.00 per month or P10.00 a day for each unit is too minimal an
amount to even create an inference that BSP undertook to be an
insurer of the safety of plaintiffs-appellants' vehicles.
YHT REALTY CORP VS CA
Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression
of public policy precisely to apply to situations such as that presented
in this case. The hotel business like the common carriers business is
imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are
bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests and security to
their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence
of the business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the public
to be negated or diluted by any contrary stipulation in so-called
undertakings that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by
hotel keepers on guests for their signature. Paragraphs (2) and (4) of
the undertaking manifestly contravene Article 2003 of the New Civil
Code for they allow Tropicana to be released from liability arising
from any loss in the contents and/or use of the safety deposit box
for any cause whatsoever.[40]
Evidently, the undertaking was intended to bar any claim against
Tropicana for any loss of the contents of the safety deposit box
whether or not negligence was incurred by Tropicana or its
employees. The New Civil Code is explicit that the responsibility of
the hotel-keeper shall extend to loss of, or injury to, the personal
property of the guests even if caused by servants or employees of the
keepers of hotels or inns as well as by strangers, except as it may
proceed from any force majeure.[41] It is the loss through force
majeure that may spare the hotel-keeper from liability. In the case at
bar, there is no showing that the act of the thief or robber was done
with the use of arms or through an irresistible force to qualify the
same as force majeure.
93. 2085
94. 2087; 2115 ***
CHU VS CA
A pacto commissorio is a provision for the automatic appropriation of
the pledged or mortgaged property by the creditor in payment of the
loan upon its maturity. The prohibition against a pacto commissorio is
intended to protect the obligor, pledgor, or mortgagor against being
overreached by his creditor who holds a pledge or mortgage over
property whose value is much more than the debt. Where, as in this
case, the security for the debt is also money deposited in a bank, the
amount of which is even less than the debt, it was not illegal for the
creditor to encash the time deposit certificates to pay the debtors'
overdue obligation, with the latter's consent.
VASQUEZ VS CA
The Court of Appeals pronounced in its Decision that the contract
between the parties is an equitable mortgage. Since the contract is
characterized as a mortgage, the provisions of the Civil Code
governing mortgages apply. Article 2088 of the Civil Code states:
PLEDGES AND MORTGAGES
The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of

pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them. Any stipulation to the
contrary is null and void.
This Court has interpreted this provision in the following manner:
The essence of pacto commissorio, which is prohibited by Article 2088
of the Civil Code, is that ownership of the security will pass to the
creditor by the mere default of the debtor The only right of a
mortgagee in case of non-payment of a debt secured by mortgage
would be to foreclose the mortgage and have the encumbered
property sold to satisfy the outstanding indebtedness.
The
mortgagors default does not operate to vest in the mortgagee the
ownership of the encumbered property, for any such effect is against
public policy, as enunciated by the Civil Code
95. 2088; 2112 **

96. 2089 ***
YAP VS DY
From the foregoing, it is apparent that what the law proscribes is the
foreclosure of only a portion of the property or a number of the
several properties mortgaged corresponding to the unpaid portion of
the debt where before foreclosure proceedings partial payment was
made by the debtor on his total outstanding loan or obligation. This
also means that the debtor cannot ask for the release of any portion of
the mortgaged property or of one or some of the several lots
mortgaged unless and until the loan thus, secured has been fully paid,
notwithstanding the fact that there has been a partial fulfillment of
the obligation. Hence, it is provided that the debtor who has paid a
part of the debt cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment of
the mortgage as long as the debt is not completely satisfied.
That the situation obtaining in the case at bar is not within the
purview of the aforesaid rule on indivisibility is obvious since the
aggregate number of the lots which comprise the collaterals for the
mortgage had already been foreclosed and sold at public auction.
There is no partial payment nor partial extinguishment of the
obligation to speak of. The aforesaid doctrine, which is actually
intended for the protection of the mortgagee, specifically refers to the
Applying the principle of pactum commissorium specifically to

equitable mortgages, in Montevergin v. CA,[27] the Court enunciated
that the consolidation of ownership in the person of the mortgagee in
equity, merely upon failure of the mortgagor in equity to pay the
obligation, would amount to a pactum commissorium. The Court
further articulated that an action for consolidation of ownership is an
inappropriate remedy on the part of the mortgagee in equity. The
only proper remedy is to cause the foreclosure of the mortgage in
equity. And if the mortgagee in equity desires to obtain title to the
mortgaged property, the mortgagee in equity may buy it at the
foreclosure sale. The private respondents do not appear to have
caused the foreclosure of the mortgage much less have they
purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. Petitioner, therefore,
retains ownership of the subject property. The right of ownership
necessarily includes the right to possess, particularly where, as in this
case, there appears to have been no availment of the remedy of
foreclosure of the mortgage on the ground of default or non-payment
of the obligation in question.
release of the mortgage which secures the satisfaction of the

indebtedness and naturally presupposes that the mortgage is existing.
Once the mortgage is extinguished by a complete foreclosure
thereof, said doctrine of indivisibility ceases to apply since,
with the full payment of the debt, there is nothing more to
secure. Nothing in the law prohibits the piecemeal redemption of
properties sold at one foreclosure proceeding. In fact, in several early
cases decided by this Court, the right of the mortgagor or
redemptioner to redeem one or some of the foreclosed properties was
recognized.
97. 2176; 2177; 2179; 2194 ***
98. 2180; Family Code 218; 219; 221
Vicarious Liability
Balce Deep Pocket Principle Parents are held vicariously liable
because they are the persons who are financially capable of satisfying
any judgment obligation
We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Code
which provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily
liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have
by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune x x x x If the
owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are
applicable."
Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is neither
applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship
between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has
no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasidelict; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither
prosper.
CASTILLEX VS VASQUEZ
Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The
phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean
that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business
or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is
acting within the scope of his assigned task. [5]
A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine
what is applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth
FGU INSURANCE VS CA
The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a
presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons
made
responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due
care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from
causing damage.[7] Yet, as correctly observed by respondent court, Art.
2180
is
hardly
applicable
because
none
of
the
circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under consider
ation. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was
only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was
no vinculum
juris between
them
as
employer
and
employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for
the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an employer of
the latter.
VILLANUEVA VS DOMINGO
This Court has consistently ruled that regardless of who
the actual owner is of a motor vehicle might be, the registered owner
is the operator of the same with respect to the public and third
persons, and as such, directly and primarily responsible for the
consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the
owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual
operator and employer being considered merely as his agent. We
believe that it is immaterial whether or not the driver was actually
employed by the operator of record. It is even not necessary to prove
who the actual owner of the vehicle and the employer of the driver is.
Granting that, in this case, the father of the driver is the actual owner
and that he is the actual employer, following the well-settled principle
that the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle
in contemplation of law, as regards the public and third person, and as
such is responsible for the consequences incident to its operation, we
must hold and consider such owner-operator of record as the
employer, in contemplation of law, of the driver. And, to give effect to
this policy of law as enunciated in the above cited decisions of this
Court, we must now extend the same and consider the actual operator
and employer as the agent of the operator of record.
99. 2183 *
AFIALDA VS HISOLE
This opinion, however, appears to have been rendered in a case where
an animal caused injury to a stranger or third person. It is therefore
no authority for a case like the present where the person injured was
the caretaker of the animal. The distinction is important. For the
statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable
for "any damages it may cause," and this for the obvious reason that
the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is
therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.
paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment or

enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether
or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph
covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of
the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth
paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the
scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former
in both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of
employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or
industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of
their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of
the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly,
employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions
which are beyond their office, title or designation but which,
nevertheless, are still within the call of duty. Under the fifth
paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or
industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees
within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish
the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff
must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting
within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was
committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to
interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision
of the employee
In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control
of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was
the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing
injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by
the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the
occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must
take the consequences.
100. 2185 ***
FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC CORP VS DELOS SANTOS
Under the New Civil Code, 9 unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if
at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Apparently, in the present case, Mejia's violation of the traffic rules
does not erase the presumption that he was the one negligent at the
time of the collision. Even apart from statutory regulations as to
speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care
and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the
conditions encountered10 which will enable him to keep the vehicle
under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full
stop to avoid injury to others using the highway
DAMAGES
The actual damages awarded by the trial court reduced by the Court
of Appeals should be further reduced. In People v. Duban,[51] it was
held that only substantiated and proven expenses or those that appear
to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or
burial of the victim will be recognized. A list of expenses (Exhibit J),
[52]
and the contract/receipt for the construction of the tomb (Exhibit
F)[53] in this case, cannot be considered competent proof and cannot
replace the official receipts necessary to justify the award. Hence,
actual damages should be further reduced to P78,160.00, [54] which
was the amount supported by official receipts.
MERCURY DRUG VS HUANG
With regard to actual damages, Art. 2199 of the Civil Code provides
that [E]xcept as provided by law or by stipulation one is entitled to
an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by
him as he has duly proved x x x. In the instant case, we uphold the
finding that the actual damages claimed by respondents were
101. Actual and Compensatory *

VICTORY LINER VS GAMMAD
The award of compensatory damages for the loss of the deceaseds
earning capacity should be deleted for lack of basis. As a rule,
documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim
for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception,
damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is selfemployed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
deceaseds line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2)
the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws.
supported by receipts. The amount of P2,973,000.00 represented cost

of hospital expenses, medicines, medical services and supplies, and
nursing care services provided respondent Stephen from December
20, 1996, the day of the accident, until December 1998.
102. Moral Damages *

MERALCO VS CA
petitioner's act in 'disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service
without prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an
independent tort. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an
intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering to private
respondent. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code
which provides that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. This is
reiterated by paragraph 10 of Article 2219 of the Code. Moreover, the
award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which provides
Petitioners are also liable for all damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. [16] The
doctors who attended to respondent Stephen are one in their
prognosis that his chances of walking again and performing basic
body functions are nil. For the rest of his life, he will need continuous
rehabilitation and therapy to prevent further complications such as
pneumonia, bladder and rectum infection, renal failure, sepsis and
severe bed sores, osteoporosis and fractures, and other spinal cord
injury-related conditions. He will be completely dependent on the
care and support of his family. We thus affirm the award
of P23,461,062.00 for the life care cost of respondent Stephen Huang,
based on his average monthly expense and the actuarial computation
of the remaining years that he is expected to live; and the
conservative amount of P10,000,000.00, as reduced by the trial court,
for the loss or impairment of his earning capacity, [17] considering his
age, probable life expectancy, the state of his health, and his mental
and physical condition before the accident. He was only seventeen
years old, nearly six feet tall and weighed 175 pounds. He was in
fourth year high school, and a member of the school varsity basketball
team. He was also class president and editor-in-chief of the school
annual. He had shown very good leadership qualities. He was
looking forward to his college life, having just passed the entrance
examinations of the University of the Philippines, De La Salle
University, and the University of Asia and the Pacific. The University
of Sto. Tomas even offered him a chance to obtain an athletic
scholarship, but the accident prevented him from attending the
basketball try-outs. Without doubt, he was an exceptional
student. He excelled both in his academics and extracurricular
undertakings. He is intelligent and motivated, a go-getter, as testified
by Francisco Lopez, respondent Stephen Huangs godfather and a
bank executive.[18] Had the accident not happened, he had a rosy
future ahead of him. He wanted to embark on a banking career, get
married and raise children. Taking into account his outstanding
abilities, he would have enjoyed a successful professional career in
banking. But, as Mr. Lopez stated, it is highly unlikely for someone
like respondent to ever secure a job in a bank. To his knowledge, no
bank has ever hired a person suffering with the kind of disability as
Stephen Huangs.
that wilfull injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding

moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances,
such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
LBC VS CA
Moral damages are granted in recompense for physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. 7 A corporation, being an artificial person and having existence
only in legal contemplation, has no feelings, no emotions, no senses;
therefore, it cannot experience physical suffering and mental
anguish. 8 Mental suffering can be experienced only by one having a
nervous system and it flows from real ills, sorrows, and griefs of
life 9 all of which cannot be suffered by respondent bank as an
artificial person.
We can neither sustain the award of moral damages in favor of the
private respondents. The right to recover moral damages is based on
equity. Moral damages are recoverable only if the case falls under
Article 2219 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 21. 10 Part of
conventional wisdom is that he who comes to court to demand equity,
must come with clean hands.
FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK VS AGO MEDICAL CENTER
A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because,
unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or
such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish
or moral shock.[40] The Court of Appeals cites Mambulao Lumber
Co. v. PNB, et al.[41] to justify the award of moral damages. However,
the Courts statement inMambulao that a corporation may have a
good reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the
award of moral damages is an obiter dictum.[42]
Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implies
damages.[45] In such a case, evidence of an honest mistake or the want
of character or reputation of the party libeled goes only in mitigation
of damages.[46] Neither in such a case is the plaintiff required to
introduce evidence of actual damages as a condition precedent to the
recovery of some damages.[47] In this case, the broadcasts are
libelous per se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
103.
104.
Exemplary Damages *
Special Laws *
Nevertheless, AMECs claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of

Article 2219[43] of the Civil Code. This provision expressly authorizes
the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other
form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the
plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person
such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form
of defamation and claim for moral damages.[44]
SUCCESSION
1. Article 777; Article 905; Article 1347; Article 1080; Article 870
Art. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent. (657a)
Art. 905. Every renunciation or compromise as regards a future
legitime between the person owing it and his compulsory heirs is void,
and the latter may claim the same upon the death of the former; but
they must bring to collation whatever they may have received by virtue
of the renunciation or compromise. (816)
Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men,
including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights
which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in
cases expressly authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy may likewise be the object of a contract.
(1271a)
Art. 1080. Should a person make partition of his estate by an act inter
vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does
not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, desires to keep any
agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail
himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering that the
legitime of the other children to whom the property is not assigned, be
paid in cash. (1056a)
Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the
estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void. (n)
2. 804-806
Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or

dialect known to the testator. (n)
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed
at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each
and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper
part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the
SUBSECTION 3. - Forms of Wills
will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every
page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and
that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof
in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it
shall be interpreted to them. (n)
a. AZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS|G.R. No. 122880, 12 April 2006 |

487 SCRA 119
JURAT vs. ACKNOWLEDGMENT: The case highlights the fundamental
difference between a jurat and an acknowledgment and based on the
distinction, the Court held that a notarial will that is not acknowledged
before a notary public is void, even if it was sworn to before a notary
public.
ISSUE IN THE CASE: Of note is the decision of the RTC which
admitted the will to probate notwithstanding the defects thereof (no
signature of witnesses at the bottom of the attestation clause, no
signature of the testator on the left margin of the second page of the
will, the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages
used upon which the will was written, and the lack of acknowledgment).
b. REYES vs. VDA. DE VIDAL | No. L-2867, 21 April 1952
Every will must be executed in a language known to the testator. While
this requirement is mandatory and, as a rule, must be proved during
probate proceedings, a failure to introduce evidence in this respect
DOES NOT necessarily justify the denial of probate. Under certain
conditions, knowledge of the language in which the will was written may
be presumed.
ISSUE IN THE CASE: the probative value of the testimony of the
instrumental witnesses must be noted, particularly when such testimony
is sought to be controverted by the testimony of an expert witness.
[Comment: The case included in the Outline is Sy vs. Reyes, but I cant
find the case related to articles 805-806.]
c. ICASIANO vs. ICASIANO | No. L-18979, 30 June 1964
Article 805 requires that each of the subscribing witnesses should sign
each and every page of the will on the left margin. This requirement is,
as a rule, mandatory and a failure to comply therewith is a fatal defect.
Icasiano holds that the failure of a witness to sign one of the pages of the
will through inadvertence or oversight (there being no bad faith or
fraudulent intent) can be cured by the presentation of a carbon duplicate
of the will which contains all the required signatures. This ruling is
based on the principle of liberal interpretation of the statutory
requirements for the formal validity of the will, provided that the need to
safeguard the genuineness and authenticity of the will is not
compromised. It is important, for the proper understanding of this case,
to differentiate a duplicate copy of a document from a duplicate-original
thereof.
d. ORTEGA vs. VALMONTE | G.R. No. 157451, 16 December 2005
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by

the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required
to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk
of Court. (n)
CORE ISSUES: (i) how to prove the fact of fraud in the making of the
will; and (ii) what constitutes a sound and disposing mind.
FRAUD: Fraud is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretence,
by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the
testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the
document which he executed, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in
consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to
make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made.
The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the
existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show
otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of
credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the
self-serving allegations of petitioners, no evidence of fraud was ever
presented.
The omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a
will.
WHAT CONSTITUTE SOUND AND DISPOSING MIND: The three
things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of
sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of;
(2) the proper objects of the testators bounty; and (3) the character of
the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that
the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to
identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his
shares in them, and even their locations. As regards the proper
objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as
sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some
relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no
showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes
irrelevant.
3. 808
a. ALVARADO vs. GAVIOLA, JR. | G.R. No. 74695, 14 September 1993

MEANING OF BLIND TESTATOR: A person unable to read the draft
of his will, either because of poor, defective or blurred eyesight must be
considered blind for the purpose of compliance with the additional
formalities prescribed in Article 808.
Inability to read by reason of illiteracy is included within the broader
concept of "blindness" for the purpose of the same article.
NOTA BENE: Alvarado makes a landmark exception to the rule of strict
compliance when it affirmed the probate order despite non-compliance
with the double reading requirement. How this decision will affect the
courts interpretation of the other formal requirements of the law
remains to be seen.
4. 810-811
Art. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice;
once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary
public before whom the will is acknowledged. (n)
subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines,

and need not be witnessed. (678, 688a)
Art. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at
least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the
testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such
witnesses shall be required.
In the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding
paragraph, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be
resorted to. (619a)
a. ROXAS vs. DE JESUS, JR. | No. L-38338, 28 January 1985
GENERAL RULE: Article 810 of the Civil Code requires, among others,
that a HOLOGRAPHIC WILL BE DATED.
EXCEPTION: While a complete date is generally required, an
incomplete date which sets forth only the month and the year of
execution, is not a fatal defect if it can be shown that there was no bad
faith, fraud, and undue and improper influence and pressure. Probate is
further justified if the genuineness of the handwriting of the testator is
proved, or otherwise admitted by the parties, and the only ground for
opposing probate is the technicality resulting from an incomplete date.
5. 830 & 834 in relation to 172
Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
(1) By implication of law; or
(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case
of wills; or
Art. 834. The recognition of an illegitimate child does not lose its legal
effect, even though the will wherein it was made should be revoked.
(714)
Art. 172. The wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband's consent except in cases provided by law. (1416a)
6. 854
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the

intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn,
cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express
direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the
estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due
execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or
obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court. (n)
insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation. (814a)
a. ACAIN vs. IAC | No. L-72706, 27 October 1987
SURVIVING SPOUSE COULD NOT BE PRETERITED: Even if the
surviving spouse is a compulsory heir there is no preterition even if she
is omitted from the inheritance for she is not in the direct line.
PRETERITION OF THE ADOPTED CHILD: Adoption gives to the
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate
child of the adopted and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the
adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited
in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow
were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that
they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of
preterition of the legally adopted child.
b. ROSALES vs. ROSALES | No. L-40789, 27 February 1987
A daughter-in-law is not a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law. This is
because of the absence of blood relationship between the two. The
surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the
parent-in-law.
c. VENT*** vs. COURT OF APPEALS Sister
7. 863
a. NUGUID vs. NUGUID | No. L-23445, 23 June 1966

GENERAL RULE: The area of inquiry of a probate court is limited to the
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY of the testator and the DUE EXECUTION
OF THE WILL.
EXCEPTION: If it should appear on the face of the will that the sole
disposition is intrinsically invalidity, and that nothing is gained from an
inquiry into extrinsic validity, then a probe into the testamentary
disposition and the consequential invalidation thereof is justified for
practical considerations. While Article 854 annuls merely the institution
of heir, the court is justified in declaring the entire will void if the only
testamentary disposition in the questioned will is the institution of the
universal heir. In such a case, the effect of the nullification of the
testamentary disposition would be the same as the nullification of the
will itself.
b. DY SEANGIO vs. REYES | G.R. No. 140372-72, 27 November 2006
ISSUES RESOLVED IN THE CASE:
Where the sole disposition of a purported will is the disinheritance of
a compulsory heir, the disinheritance is considered a property
disposition. Therefore, the document is must be considered a will
because it conveys property.
Art. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary

or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to
transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance, shall be
valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond
one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further, that
the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at the time of the
death of the testator. (781a)
The failure of the testator to institute an heir or to even mention by

name any of the compulsory heir, per se, does not constitute
preterition.
SUMMARY OF THE CASE: Segundos document, although it may
initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to
the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written,
dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose
mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument,
and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who
would succeed him in the absence of Alfredo.
c. ARANAS vs. ARANAS | G.R. No. L-56249 May 29, 1987
The Last Will and Testament shows that it was the intention and desire
of the testator to reward his nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful and
unselfish services by allowing him to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the
testator's third group of properties until Vicente's death and/or refusal to
act as administrator in which case, the administration shall pass to
anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas among his sons and upon Carmelo's
death, his sons will have the power to select one among themselves.
As a USUFRUCTUARY HAS THE RIGHT TO ENJOY the property of his
uncle with all the benefits which result from the normal enjoyment (or
exploitation) of another's property, WITH THE OBLIGATION TO
RETURN, at the designated time, either the same thing, or in special
cases its equivalent. This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the
properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual as there is a
limitation namely his death or his refusal.
8. 891
a. SUMAYA vs. IAC | G.R. Nos. 68843-44, 2 September 1991

The reversionary rights of the reservees may be lost to an innocent
purchaser of the reservable property. For the protection of the said
reservees, it is important that the reservable character of the property
must be properly annotated at the back of the title thereto. However,
even absent such annotation, if it can be shown that the third party
purchaser had actual or constructive notice of the reservable character
of the property, then the reversionary rights of the reservees shall be
upheld.
b. MENDOZA vs. DELOS SANTOS | G.R. NO. 176422 : March 20, 2013
TRANSMISSION: There are three lines of transmission in reserva
troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by
inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a
descendant called the prepositus. The second transmission is by
operation of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant or reservor,
also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is from the
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as
he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who
are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came. (871)
reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives within

the third degree from which the property came.
The lineal character of the reservable property is reckoned from the
ascendant from whom the prepositus received the property by gratuitous
title. Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on
reserva troncal is not applicable.
LIMITATION 3RD DEGREE: The petitioners are not relatives within
the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person
from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositus,
the one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon
whom the property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case.
Petitioners are Gregoria's fourth degree relatives, being her first
cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives
and are not reservees or reservatarios.
They CANNOT even claim representation of their predecessors
Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of
reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from whom the
reservable properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the
case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to
represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the
brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within the third
degree.
9. 902; 992
Art. 902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding
articles are transmitted upon their death to their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. (843a)
a. MADARCOS vs. DE LA MERCED | G.R. No. 39975, 30 June 1989

LEGAL HEIRS: The restrictive meaning refers to heirs called upon to
inherit by intestacy. However, the more liberal interpretation would
include any person called to succeed, either by virtue of a will, or by
intestacy.
CORE ISSUE IN THE CASE: Proper construction of the term "legal
heirs" as used in 119 of the Public Land Act which provides: Every
conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant,
his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of
conveyance.
The term "legal heirs" is used in 119 in a generic sense. It is broad
enough to cover any person who is called to the succession either by
provision of a will or by operation of law. Thus, legal heirs include
both testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether succession is
by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily
compulsory heirs but they maybe so if the law reserves a legitime for
them.
RESOLUTION OF THE CASE: Petitioners are legal heirs. Having been
decreed under the rules of intestacy as entitled to succeed to the entire
estate of the Catain spouses due to the absence of compulsory heirs,
they now step into the shoes of the decedents. They should be
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from

the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child. (943a)
considered as among the legal heirs contemplated by 119 as entitled to

redeem the homestead.
10. 494; 870; 1083 Will provides indivision of estate
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned
in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain
period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be
extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not
exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his coowners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership. (400a)
Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the
estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void. (n)
Art. 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the estate
unless the testator should have expressly forbidden its partition, in which
case the period of indivision shall not exceed twenty years as provided in
article 494. This power of the testator to prohibit division applies to the
legitime.
a. SANTIAGO vs. SANTIAGO | G.R. No. 179859 August 9, 2010

INDIVISION IS SUBJECT TO STATUTORY LIMITATION: It is clear
from testators will that he intended the house and lot in Manila to be
transferred in petitioners names for administration purposes only, and
that the property be owned by the heirs in common. But the condition
set by the decedent on the propertys indivisibility is subject to a
statutory limitation, particularly Articles 494, 870, and 1083 of the
Civil Code, which provide that the prohibition to divide a property in a
co-ownership can only last for twenty (20) years.
Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the indivision of a
property for more than 20 years, it would be contrary to public policy
to sanction co-ownership beyond the period expressly mandated by the
Civil Code.
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
1. 1174 (1942; 1979; 2147; 2148)
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership terminates when

any of the causes for which partnership is dissolved takes place, or when
the court finds for compelling reasons that division should be ordered,
upon petition of one of the co-heirs. (1051a)
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation

requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable. (1105a)
Art. 1942. The bailee is liable for the loss of the thing, even if it should
be through a fortuitous event:
(1) If he devotes the thing to any purpose different from that for which it
has been loaned;
(2) If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated, or after the
accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum has been
constituted;
(3) If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value,
unless there is a stipulation exemption the bailee from responsibility in
case of a fortuitous event;
(4) If he lends or leases the thing to a third person, who is not a member
of his household;
(5) If, being able to save either the thing borrowed or his own thing, he
chose to save the latter. (1744a and 1745)
Art. 1979. The depositary is liable for the loss of the thing through a
fortuitous event:
(1) If it is so stipulated;
(2) If he uses the thing without the depositor's permission;
(3) If he delays its return;
(4) If he allows others to use it, even though he himself may have been
authorized to use the same. (n)
Art. 2147. The officious manager shall be liable for any fortuitous event:
(1) If he undertakes risky
accustomed to embark upon;
operations
which
the
owner
was
not
(3) If he fails to return the property or business after demand by the

owner;
(4) If he assumed the management in bad faith. (1891a)
Art. 2148. Except when the management was assumed to save property or
business from imminent danger, the officious manager shall be liable for
fortuitous events:
(1) If he is manifestly unfit to carry on the management;
(2) If by his intervention he prevented a more competent person from
taking up the management. (n)
(2) If he has preferred his own interest to that of the owner;
a. FILESTATE vs. COURT OF APPEALS |G.R. No. 185798 January 13,

2014
The Asian financial crisis is not a fortuitous event that would excuse
petitioners from performing their contractual obligation; second, as a
result of the breach committed by petitioners, respondents are entitled
to rescind the contract and to be refunded the amount of amortizations
paid including interest and damages; and third, petitioners are likewise
obligated to pay attorneys fees and the administrative fine.
The Court did not generalize that the Asian financial crisis in 1997 was
unforeseeable and beyond the control of a business corporation. It is
unfortunate that petitioner apparently met with considerable difficulty
e.g. increase cost of materials and labor, even before the scheduled
commencement of its real estate project as early as 1995. However, a
REAL ESTATE ENTERPRISE engaged in the pre-selling of condominium
units is concededly a master in projections on commodities and currency
movements and business risks. The fluctuating movement of the
Philippine peso in the foreign exchange market is an everyday
occurrence and fluctuations in currency exchange rates happen
everyday, thus, not an instance of caso fortuito.
2. 1182 (1197)
Art. 1182. When the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the sole
will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall be void. If it depends
upon chance or upon the will of a third person, the obligation shall take
effect in conformity with the provisions of this Code. (1115)
Art. 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and
the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the
courts may fix the duration thereof.
The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon
the will of the debtor.
a. CATUNGAL vs. RODRIGUEZ | G.R. No. 146839 March 23, 2011

EFFECT OF NON-PERFORMANCE OF CONDITION: The Court has
distinguished between a condition imposed on the perfection of a
contract and a condition imposed merely on the performance of an
obligation. While failure to comply with the first condition results in the
failure of a contract, failure to comply with the second merely gives the
other party the option to either refuse to proceed with the sale or to
waive the condition.
PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE: Pursuant to Art. 1197, If the obligation
does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it can be
inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration
thereof. The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it
depends upon the will of the debtor. The courts shall determine such
period as may under the circumstances have been probably
contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the courts, the period cannot
be changed by them.
In every case, the courts shall determine such period as may under the
circumstances have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once
fixed by the courts, the period cannot be changed by them. (1128a)
3. 1191; 1381; 1383; 1385

Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones,
in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent
upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission
of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may
also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter
should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause
authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons
who have acquired the thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388
and the Mortgage Law. (1124)
Art. 1381. The following contracts are rescissible:
(1) Those which are entered into by guardians whenever the wards whom
they represent suffer lesion by more than one-fourth of the value of the
things which are the object thereof;
(2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the latter suffer
the lesion stated in the preceding number;
(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any
other manner collect the claims due them;
(4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been entered
into by the defendant without the knowledge and approval of the litigants
or of competent judicial authority;
(5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject to
rescission. (1291a)
Art. 1385. Rescission creates the obligation to return the things which
were the object of the contract, together with their fruits, and the price
with its interest; consequently, it can be carried out only when he who
demands rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore.
Neither shall rescission take place when the things which are the object
of the contract are legally in the possession of third persons who did not
act in bad faith.
In this case, indemnity for damages may be demanded from the person
causing the loss. (1295)
a. U.P. vs. DELOS ANGELES | G.R. No. L-28602. September 29, 1970
BREACH OF CONTRACT RESCISSION UNDER 1191: Where UP
and ALUMCO had expressly stipulated in the "Acknowledgment of
Art. 1383. The action for rescission is subsidiary; it cannot be instituted

except when the party suffering damage has no other legal means to
obtain reparation for the same. (1294)
Debt and Proposed Manner of Payments" that, upon default by the

debtor LUMCO, the creditor (UP) has "the right and the power to
consider the Logging Agreement as rescinded without the
necessity of any judicial suit," respondent Alumcos contention that it
is only after a final court decree declaring the contract rescinded for
violation of its terms that UP could disregard ALUMCOs rights under
the contract and treat the agreement as breached and of no force or
effect is untenable. In connection with Article 1191, it is NOT
always necessary for the injured party to resort to court for
rescission of the contract.
The act of a party in treating a contract as cancelled or resolved on
account of infractions by the other contracting party must be made
known to the other and is always provisional, subject to review by the
proper Court. If the other party denies that rescission is justified, it is
free to resort to judicial action in its own behalf, and bring the matter
to court. Then, should the court, after due hearing, decide that the
resolution of the contract was not warranted, the responsible party
will be sentenced to damages; in the contrary case, the resolution will
be affirmed, and the consequent indemnity awarded to the party
prejudiced.
WHEN JUDICIAL ACTION NECESSARY: Where the extrajudicial
resolution is contested, only the final award of the court of competent
jurisdiction can conclusively settle whether the resolution was proper or
not, unless attack thereon should become barred by acquiescence,
estoppel or prescription.
EFFECT OF UNILATERAL RESCISSION: In the case of abuse or error
by the rescinder, the other party is not barred from questioning in court
such abuse or error, the practical effect of the stipulation being merely
to transfer to the defaulter the initiative of instituting suit, instead of the
rescinder.
4. 1207; 1208 REP. GLASS vs. Q***
Art. 1208. If from the law, or the nature or the wording of the
obligations to which the preceding article refers the contrary does not
appear, the credit or debt shall be presumed to be divided into as many
shares as there are creditors or debtors, the credits or debts being
considered distinct from one another, subject to the Rules of Court
governing the multiplicity of suits. (1138a)
5. 1245: PHILIPPINE LAWIN BUS LINES vs. CA | G. R. No. 130972.
January 23, 2002
Art. 1245. Dation in payment, whereby property is alienated to the
creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money, shall be governed by the law
of sales. (n)
Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more

debtors in one and the same obligation does not imply that each one of
the former has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is
bound to render, entire compliance with the prestation. There is a
solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when
the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. (1137a)
a. DACION EN PAGO: Property is alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of

a debt in money. It is the delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing
by the debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance
of the obligation. It extinguishes the obligation to the extent of the value of
the thing delivered, either as agreed upon by the parties or as may be
proved, unless the parties by agreement, express or implied, or by their
silence, consider the thing as equivalent to the obligation, in which case the
obligation is totally extinguished.
Article 1245 of the Civil Code provides that the law on sales shall
govern an agreement of dacion en pago. A contract of sale is
perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds of the parties
thereto upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon
the price.
b. In this case, there was no meeting of the minds between the parties on
whether the loan of the petitioners would be extinguished by dacion en
pago. The Court cited the ruling in PNB v. Pineda that, where machinery
and equipment were repossessed to secure the payment of a loan obligation
and not for the purpose of transferring ownership thereof to the creditor in
satisfaction of said loan, no dacion en pago was ever accomplished.
6. 1278; 1279 DBP vs. UNION BANK | G.R. No. 191555
2014
January 20,
Art. 1278. Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their own
right, are creditors and debtors of each other. (1195)
Art. 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:
(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at
the same time a principal creditor of the other;
(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are
consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the
latter has been stated;
(3) That the two debts be due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
a. LEGAL COMPENSATION:
Compensation is defined as a mode of
extinguishing obligations whereby two persons in their capacity as
principals are mutual debtors and creditors of each other with respect to
equally liquidated and demandable obligations to which no retention or
controversy has been timely commenced and communicated by third
parties.
b. REQUISITES ARE PROVIDED UNDER ARTICLE 1279:
1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the
same time a principal creditor of the other;
2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are
consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the
latter has been stated;
3) That the two debts be due;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy,

commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the
debtor. (1196)
4) That they be liquidated and demandable;

5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy,
commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the
debtor.
c. RULE UNDER 1290 BY OPERATION OF LAW: When all the requisites
mentioned in Article 1279 are present, compensation takes effect by
operation of law, and extinguishes both debts to the concurrent amount,
even though the creditors and debtors are not aware of the compensation.
7. 1291; 1292 AJAX MARKETING vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No.
118585. September 14, 1995
Art. 1291. Obligations may be modified by:
(1) Changing their object or principal conditions;
(2) Substituting the person of the debtor;
(3) Subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. (1203)
a. NOVATION AS A MODE OF EXTINGUISHMENT: Extinguishment of an

obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation by a subsequent
one which extinguishes or modifies the first, either by changing the object
or principal conditions, or by substituting another in place of the debtor, or
by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor.
Novation is a juridical act with a DUAL FUNCTION: it extinguishes an
obligation and creates a new one in lieu of the old. It can be objective,
subjective, or mixed.
OBJECTIVE NOVATION occurs when there is a change of the object or
principal conditions of an existing obligation while SUBJECTIVE
NOVATION occurs when there is a change of either the person of the
debtor, or of the creditor in an existing obligation.
When the change of the object or principal conditions of an obligation
occurs at the same time with the change of either in the person of the
debtor or creditor a mixed novation occurs.
b. NOVATION WILL NOT BE ALLOWED UNLESS IT IS CLEARLY
SHOWN BY EXPRESS AGREEMENT, OR BY ACTS OF EQUAL
IMPORT: Novation is never presumed and it will not be allowed unless it
is clearly shown by express agreement, or by acts of equal import.
To effect an objective novation: The new obligation expressly declare
that the old obligation is extinguished, or that the new obligation be on
every point incompatible with the new one.
To effect a subjective novation by a change in the person of the
debtor: The old debtor be released expressly from the obligation and the
third person or new debtor assumes his place in the relation. There is no
novation without such release as the third person who has assumed the
debtors obligation becomes merely a co-debtor or surety.
8. 1315; 1316; 1318; 1319
Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that
moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has
Art. 1292. In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another

which substitute the same, it is imperative that it be so declared in
unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new obligations be on every
point incompatible with each other. (1204)
been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which,

according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and
law. (1258)
Art. 1316. Real contracts, such as deposit, pledge and Commodatum, are
not perfected until the delivery of the object of the obligation. (n)
Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established. (1261)
Art. 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A
qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.
a. ABS-CBN vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No. 128690. January 21,

1999
A CONTRACT UNDERGOES THREE STAGES: (a) preparation,
conception, or generation, which is the period of negotiation and
bargaining, ending at the moment of agreement of the parties; (b)
perfection or birth of the contract, which is the moment when the parties
come to agree on the terms of the contract; and (c) consummation or
death, which is the fulfillment or performance of the terms agreed upon
in the contract.
Contracts that are consensual in nature are perfected upon mere
meeting of the minds. Once there is concurrence between the offer and
the acceptance upon the subject matter, consideration, and terms of
payment a contract is produced. The offer must be certain. To convert
the offer into a contract, the acceptance must be absolute and must
not qualify the terms of the offer; it must be plain, unequivocal,
unconditional, and without variance of any sort from the proposal.
A qualified acceptance, or one that involves a new proposal,
constitutes a counter-offer and is a rejection of the original offer.
Consequently, when something is desired which is not exactly what is
proposed in the offer, such acceptance is not sufficient to generate
consent because any modification or variation from the terms of the offer
annuls the offer.
CASE AT BAR: ABS-CBN made no unqualified acceptance of VIVAs
offer. Hence, they underwent a period of bargaining. ABS-CBN then
formalized its counter-proposals or counter-offer in a draft contract.
VIVA through its Board of Directors, rejected such counter-offer. Even if
it be conceded arguendo that Del Rosario had accepted the counter-offer,
the acceptance did not bind VIVA, as there was no proof whatsoever that
Del Rosario had the specific authority to do so.
b. SORIANO vs. SORIANO [Comment: Apologies I cant find the case.]
Acceptance made by letter or telegram does not bind the offerer except
from the time it came to his knowledge. The contract, in such a case, is
presumed to have been entered into in the place where the offer was
made. (1262a)
9. 1314: Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be
liable for damages to the other contracting party.
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract
shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. (n)
a. SO PING BUN vs. CA | G.R. No. 120554 September 21, 1999
There is tort interference when during the existence of a valid contract,
a third person, to whom the existence of such contract is known,
interferes without legal justification or excuse. The elements of tort
interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the
part of the third person of the existence of contract; and (3) interference
of the third person is without legal justification or excuse. Petitioners
Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its
favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the
latters property right. Clearly, as correctly viewed by the appellate
court, these elements are present in the instant case.
10. 1324; 1479
Art. 1324. When the offerer has allowed the offeree a certain period to
accept, the offer may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance by
communicating such withdrawal, except when the option is founded upon
a consideration, as something paid or promised. (n)
Art. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price
certain is reciprocally demandable.
b. EQUATORIAL REALTY vs. MAYFAIR THEATER | G.R. No. 106063.

November 21, 1996
ART. 1324 speaks of an offer made by an offeror which the offeree may
or may not accept within a certain period.
The offer may be withdrawn by the offeror before the expiration of the
period and while the offeree has not yet accepted the offer. The offer
cannot be withdrawn by the offeror within the period if a
consideration has been promised or given by the offeree in exchange
for the privilege of being given that period within which to accept the
offer.
The consideration is distinct from the price which is part of the offer.
The contract that arises is known as OPTION (option contract).
ART. 1479, second paragraph:
Contemplates of an accepted
unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price within
(which) is binding upon the promisee if the promise is supported by a
consideration distinct from the price. That unilateral promise to buy or
to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is called an offer.
OFFER: A proposal to enter into a contract. To constitute a legal offer,
the proposal must be certain as to the object, the price and other
essential terms of the contract (Art. 1319).
c. BIBLE BAPTIST CHURCH vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No.
126454. November 26, 2004
OPTION CONTRACT IS AN ONEROUS CONTRACT: The Court
defined consideration as the why of the contracts, the essential reason
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a

price certain is binding upon the promissor if the promise is supported
by a consideration distinct from the price. (1451a)
11. 1356:
Art. 1356. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have
been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity
are present. However, when the law requires that a contract be in some
which moves the contracting parties to enter into the contract. The
definition illustrates that the consideration contemplated to support an
option contract need not be monetary. Actual cash need not be
exchanged for the option. However, by the very nature of an option
contract (Art. 1479), the same is an onerous contract for which the
consideration must be something of value, although its kind may vary.
RULE:
An option contract needs to be supported by a separate
consideration. The consideration need not be monetary but could
consist of other things or undertakings. However, if the consideration is
not monetary, these must be things or undertakings of value, in view of
the onerous nature of the contract of option. Furthermore, when a
consideration for an option contract is not monetary, said consideration
must be clearly specified as such in the option contract or clause.
d. SANCHEZ vs. RIGOS | G.R. No. L-25494. June 14, 1972
If the option is given without a consideration, it is a mere offer of a
contract of sale which is not binding until accepted. If, however,
acceptance is made before a withdrawal, it constitutes a binding
contract of sale even though the option was not supported by sufficient
consideration.
e. SERRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No. 103338. January 4, 1994
A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is
reciprocally demandable. An accepted unilateral promise to buy and sell
a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promisor if
the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price
(Article 1479). The first is the mutual promise and each has the right to
demand from the other the fulfillment of the obligation. While the second
is merely an offer of one to another, which if accepted, would create an
obligation to the offeror to make good his promise, provided the
acceptance is supported by a consideration distinct from the price.
f. VDA. DE QUIRINO vs. PALARCA | G.R. No. L-28269. August 15, 1969
In reciprocal contracts, the obligation or promise of each party is the
consideration for that of the other. As a consequence, the power to
rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the
obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
Article 1324 provides that when an offeror has allowed the offeree a
certain period to accept, the offer maybe withdrawn at anytime before
acceptance by communicating such withdrawal, except when the option
is founded upon consideration, as something paid or promised. On the
other hand, Article 1479 provides that an accepted unilateral promise to
buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the
promisor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the
price.
In a unilateral promise to sell, where the debtor fails to withdraw the
promise before the acceptance by the creditor, the transaction becomes
a bilateral contract to sell and to buy, because upon acceptance by the
creditor of the offer to sell by the debtor, there is already a meeting of
the minds of the parties as to the thing which is determinate and the
price which is certain. In which case, the parties may then reciprocally
demand performance.
G. E*ILO** vs. A**EL*
form in order that it may be valid or enforceable, or that a contract be

proved in a certain way, that requirement is absolute and indispensable.
In such cases, the right of the parties stated in the following article
cannot be exercised. (1278a)
12. 1390; 1397 KILOSBAYAN vs. MORATO | G.R. No. 118910. July 17,
1995
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even
though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a
contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated
intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
by
mistake,
violence,
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action
a. U.P. vs. PHILAB INDUSTRIES | G.R. NO. 152411. September 29,

2004
IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT: A contract implied in fact is one
implied from facts and circumstances showing a mutual intention to
contract. It arises where the intention of the parties is not expressed, but
an agreement in fact creating an obligation. It is a contract, the
existence and terms of which are manifested by conduct and not by
direct or explicit words between parties but is to be deduced from
conduct of the parties, language used, or things done by them, or other
pertinent circumstances attending the transaction.
TO CREATE CONTRACTS IMPLIED IN FACT, circumstances must
warrant inference that one expected compensation and the other to pay.
An implied-in-fact contract requires the parties' intent to enter into a
contract; it is a true contract. The conduct of the parties is to be viewed
as a reasonable man would view it, to determine the existence or not of
an implied-in-fact contract. The totality of the acts/conducts of the
parties must be considered to determine their intention. An implied-infact contract will not arise unless the meeting of minds is indicated by
some intelligent conduct, act or sign.
b. VDA. DE REYES vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No. 92436. July 26,
1991
VALIDITY OF ORAL PARTITION: Partition among heirs or
renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a
conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not involve
transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or
ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of
another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.
There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be
valid. The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and
registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same
time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The
object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others.
The intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed
formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors or the
rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it
is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for
distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided
by law.
in court. They are susceptible of ratification. (n)

Art. 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by
all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons
who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they
contracted; nor can those who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue
influence, or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon
these flaws of the contract. (1302a)
a. LEASE CONTRACT: A contract of lease may call for some form of
collaboration or association between the parties since lease is a
"consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative contract by which one
person binds himself to grant temporarily the use of a thing or the
rendering of some service to another who undertakes to pay some rent,
compensation or price.
b. PCSO MAY ENTER INTO EQUIPMENT LEASE CONTRACT WITHOUT
PUBLIC BIDDING: The question is whether the ELA is subject to public
bidding. In justifying the award of the contract to the PGMC without public
bidding, the PCSO invokes E.O. No. 301. E.O. No. 301, Sec. 1 applies only
to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment. It does
not refer to contracts of lease of equipment like the ELA. The provisions on
lease are found in 6 and 7 but they refer to the lease of privately-owned
buildings or spaces for government use, or of government-owned buildings
or spaces for private use, and these provisions do not require public
bidding. It is thus difficult to see how E.O. No. 301 can be applied to the
ELA when the only feature of the ELA that may thought of as close to a
contract of purchase and sale is the option to buy given to the PCSO. An
option to buy is not of course a contract of purchase and sale.
13. 1403 MCIAA vs. LOZADA | February 9, 2011
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are
ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has
been given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond
his powers;
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year

from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of
another;
(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual
promise to marry;
(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a
price not less than five hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and
receive part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of
them, of such things in action or pay at the time some part of the
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in
this number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be
unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum,
thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without
the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:
purchase money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made by
the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of the sale, of the amount
and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the purchasers
and person on whose account the sale is made, it is a sufficient
memorandum;
(e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for
the sale of real property or of an interest therein;
(f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.
(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a
contract.
14. 1409; 1410 URETA vs. URETA | G.R. No. 165748. September 14,
2011
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the
beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy;
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the
transaction;
a. GENERAL RULE: Under the rule on the Statute of Frauds, a contract for
the sale or acquisition of real property shall be unenforceable unless the
same or some note of the contract be in writing and subscribed by the party
charged. Subject to defined exceptions, evidence of the agreement cannot
be received without the writing, or secondary evidence of its contents.
b. APPLICATION:
The statute applies only to executory and not to
completed, executed, or partially consummated contracts.
RATIO: In executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud because
unless they may be in writing there is no palpable evidence of the
intention of the contracting parties. The statute has been precisely been
enacted to prevent fraud. However, if a contract has been totally or
partially performed, the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud
or bad faith, for it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits
already derived by him from the transaction in litigation, and at the same
time, evade the obligations, responsibilities or liabilities assumed or
contracted by him thereby.
c. CASE AT BAR: The agreement package between the government and the
private lot owners was already partially performed by the government
through the acquisition of the lots for the expansion of the Lahug airport.
However, the parties failed to accomplish the condition, the expansion of
the Lahug Airport. Be that as it may, the two groups of landowners can, in
an action to compel MCIAA to make good its oral undertaking to allow
repurchase, adduce parol evidence to prove the transaction. At any rate,
the objection on the admissibility of evidence on the basis of the
Statute of Frauds may be waived if not timely raised. Records tend to
support the conclusion that MCIAA did not, as the Ouanos and the Inocians
posit, object to the introduction of parol evidence to prove its commitment
to allow the former landowners to repurchase their respective properties
upon the occurrence of certain events.
(4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men;

(5) Those which contemplate an impossible service;
(6) Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal
object of the contract cannot be ascertained;
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the
defense of illegality be waived.
Art. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of
a contract does not prescribe.
a. CHARACTERISTICS OF VOID OR INEXISTENT CONTRACTS:
1) They produce no legal effects whatsoever in accordance with the
principle "quod nullum est nullum producit effectum."
2) They are not susceptible of ratification.
3) The right to set up the defense of inexistence or absolute nullity cannot
be waived or renounced.
4) The action or defense for the declaration of their inexistence or absolute
nullity is imprescriptible.
5) The inexistence or absolute nullity of a contract cannot be invoked by a
person whose interests are not directly affected.
b. IMPRESCRIPTIBLE: As the Deed of Sale is a void contract, the action for
the declaration of its nullity, even if filed 21 years after its execution,
cannot be barred by prescription for it is imprescriptible. Furthermore, the
right to set up the defense of inexistence or absolute nullity cannot be
waived or renounced. Therefore, the Heirs of Alfonso cannot be precluded
from setting up the defense of its inexistence.
c. Article 1412 is not applicable to fictitious or simulated contracts, because
they refer to contracts with an illegal cause or subject-matter. The article
presupposes the existence of a cause, it cannot refer to fictitious or
simulated contracts which are in reality non-existent. As it has been
determined that the Deed of Sale is a simulated contract, the provision
cannot apply to it.
15. 1412 BANCO FILIPINO
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may
recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the
performance of the other's undertaking;
(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover
what he has given by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of
what has been promised him. The other, who is not at fault, may demand
the return of what he has given without any obligation to comply his
promise. (1306)
Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists
does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be
observed:
d. Article 1412 of the Civil Code provides in part: If the act in which the
unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense,
the following rules shall be observed:(1) When the fault is on the part of
both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue
of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking.
e. CASE AT BAR: Banco Filipino cannot demand the reconveyance of the
subject properties in the present cases; neither can any affirmative relief be
accorded to one party against the other since they have been found to have
acted in pari delicto. As admitted by the Bank, it "warehoused" its branch
site holdings to Tala to enable it to pursue its expansion program and
purchase new branch sites including its main branch in Makati, and at the
same time avoid the real property holdings limit under 25(a)and 34 of the
General Banking Act which it had already reached.
f. The Bank cannot use the defense of nor seek enforcement of its alleged
implied trust with Tala since its purpose was contrary to law. An implied
trust could not have been formed because the purchase is made in violation
of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can
result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud.
ESTOPPEL
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as
against the person relying thereon.
PASION vs. MELEGRITO | G.R. No. 166558 | March 28, 2007

PRINCIPLES OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL sometimes called estoppel in pais
are part of our law by Art. 1432 of the Civil Code. Coming under this class is
estoppel by silence
Estoppel by silence arises where a person, who by force of circumstances
is under a duty to another to speak, refrains from doing so and thereby
leads the other to believe in the existence of a state of facts in reliance on
which he acts to his prejudice. Silence may support an estoppel whether
the failure to speak is intentional or negligent.
Inaction or silence may under some circumstances amount to a
misrepresentation and concealment of facts, so as to raise an equitable
estoppel. When the silence is of such a character and under such
circumstances that it would become a fraud on the other party to permit the
party who has kept silent to deny what his silence has induced the other to
believe and act on, it will operate as an estoppel.
CASE AT BAR: Petitioner had, by her silence, induced respondent to believe
that she did not have any interest on respondents property other than being
his tenant. Thus, respondent rightfully acted on this belief and filed the
forcible entry case only against petitioners sisters whom he thought were the
owners of the structure constructed on his land. Verily, to permit petitioner to
deny the fact that she does not own the structure would work to prejudice the
rights of respondent as the winning litigant in Civil Case No. 1243-99. Indeed,
petitioner is conclusively estopped from interposing her claim of ownership
against the writ of demolition issued to execute the decision in said case.
ILANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No. 104376 | February 23, 1994
Art. 1432. The principles of estoppel are hereby adopted insofar as they are not
in conflict with the provisions of this Code, the Code of Commerce, the Rules of
Court and special laws.
The Court sustained the appellate courts finding that private respondents
evidence to establish her filiation with and paternity of petitioner was
overwhelming, particularly the latters public acknowledgment of his amorous
relationship with private respondents mother, and private respondent as his
own child through acts and words, her testimonial evidence to that effect was
fully supported by documentary evidence. The Court thus ruled that
respondent had adduced sufficient proof of continuous possession of status of
a spurious child.
Article 172 of the Family Code is an adaptation of Article 283 of the Civil
Code. The legal provision provides that the father is obliged to recognize the
child as his natural child when the child has in his favor any evidence or
proof that the defendant is his father.
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that
practically covers all the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. Any
other evidence or proof that the defendant is the father is broad enough to
render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence
submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet
[the] requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough
under the last paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation
evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate
filiation.
MENDOZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No. L-31618 | August 17, 1983
Article 1437 of the Civil Code on ESTOPPEL INVOLVING IMMOVABLE
PROPERTY provides:
When in a contract between third persons concerning immovable property,
one of them is misled by a person with respect to the ownership or real right
over the real estate, the latter is precluded from asserting his legal title or
interest therein, provided all these requisites are present:
(1) There must be fraudulent representation or wrongful concealment of
facts known to the party estopped;
(2) The party precluded must intend that the other should act upon the
facts as misrepresented;
(3) The party misled must have been unaware of the true facts; and
(4) The party defrauded must have acted in accordance with the
representation.
The principle of estoppel rests on the rule that whenever a party has, by his
declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led the other to
believe a particular thing true and to act, upon such belief he cannot, in any
litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to
falsify it.
WHO CAN INVOKE: Estoppel can only be invoked between the person
making the misrepresentation and the person to whom it was addressed. It is
essential that the latter shall have relied upon the misrepresentation and had
been influenced and misled thereby.
Art. 1436. A lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the thing
leased or received, as against the lessor or bailor.
SANTOS vs. NSO | G.R. No. 171129 | April 6, 2011
CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS 2(b), Rule 131, ROC: What a tenant is
estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the
[Comment: There are several cases that cited the ruling in Ilano vs. CA, but it is
mainly a PFR case. I found a case citing Ilano regarding estoppel involving
movable property.]
commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that

is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that
relation, the presumption will not apply. Hence, the tenant may show that the
landlords title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is
not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title
paramount.
EXCEPTIONS: It does not apply if the landlords title has: (a) expired or (b)
been conveyed to another or (c) been defeated by a title paramount,
subsequent to the commencement of lessor-lessee relationship. If there was a
change in the nature of the title of the landlord during the subsistence of the
lease, then the presumption does not apply.
CASE AT BAR: While petitioner appears to have already lost ownership of
the property at the time of the commencement of the tenant-landlord
relationship between him and respondent, the change in the nature of
petitioners title, as far as respondent is concerned, came only after the
commencement of such relationship or during the subsistence of the lease.
This is precisely because at the time of the execution of the second and third
contracts of lease, respondent was still not aware of the transfer of ownership
of the leased property to China Bank. It was only in November 2003 or less
than two months before the expiration of said contracts when respondent
came to know of the same after it was notified by said bank. Thus, there was
a change in the nature of petitioners title during the subsistence of the lease
that the rule on estoppel against tenants does not apply in this case.
Petitioners reliance on said conclusive presumption must, therefore,
necessarily fail since there was no error on the part of the CA when it
entertained respondents assertion of a title adverse to petitioner.
Art. 1434. When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and
delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes
by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.
*MARTIN vs. REYES
TRUST
**EMILIA O'LACO vs. VALENTIN CO CHO CHIT | G.R. No. 58010| March
31, 1993
CASE AT BAR: A resulting trust was intended by the parties under Art. 1448
of the Civil Code. As stipulated by the parties, the document of sale, the
owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title, insurance policies, receipt of
initial premium of insurance coverage and real estate tax receipts were all in
the possession of respondent-spouses which they offered in evidence. As
asserted by respondent O Lay Kia, the reason why these documents of
ownership remained with her is that the land in question belonged to her.
Indeed, there can be no persuasive rationalization for the possession of these
documents of ownership by respondent-spouses for 17 years after the
Oroquieta property was purchased in 1943 than that of precluding its possible
Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate
is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having
the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter
is the beneficiary. However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child,
legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is
implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the
child.
sale, alienation or conveyance by Emilia O'Laco, absent any machination or

fraud. This continued possession of the documents, together with other
corroborating evidence spread on record, strongly suggests that Emilia
O'Laco merely held the Oroquieta property in trust for respondent-spouses.
TRUST: Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied.
Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of
the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention
to create a trust. Implied trusts are those which, without being express, are
deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are
superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity,
independently of the particular intention of the parties.
IMPLIED TRUSTS RESULTING and CONSTRUCTIVE:
Implied trust may either be resulting or constructive trusts, both coming
into being by operation of law.
Resulting trusts arise from the nature or circumstances of the
consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby
becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal
title for the benefit of another.
Constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to
satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise
contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of
confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not,
in equity and good conscience, to hold.
EXPRESS vs. IMPLIED TRUSTS CONCERNING IMMOVABLES: Unlike
express trusts concerning immovables or any interest therein which cannot be
proved by parol evidence, implied trusts may be established by oral
evidence. However, in order to establish an implied trust in real property by
parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the acts giving
rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic document. It cannot
be established upon vague and inconclusive proof.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST SUBJECT TO PRESCRIPTION: Once the
resulting trust is repudiated, it is converted into a constructive trust and is
subject to prescription.
A resulting trust is repudiated if the following requisites concur: (a) the
trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have
been made known to the cestui qui trust; and, (c) the evidence thereon is
clear and convincing.
***IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE vs. TAEZA | G.R. No. 179597 |

February 3, 2014
CASE AT BAR: Respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Bernardino Taeza, had
already obtained a transfer certificate of title in his name over the property in
question. Since the person supposedly transferring ownership was not
authorized to do so, the property had evidently been acquired by mistake.
The applicable provision of law in such cases is Article 1456 of the Civil Code.
IMPLIED TRUST: Those which, without being expressed, are deducible from
the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or which are superinduced
on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of
the particular intention of the parties. In turn, implied trusts are either
resulting or constructive trusts. These two are differentiated from each other
as follows:
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person

obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
CAEZO vs. ROJAS | G.R. No. 148788| November 23, 2007

CASE AT BAR: An intention to create a trust cannot be inferred from the
petitioners testimony and the attendant facts and circumstances. The
petitioner testified only to the effect that her agreement with her father was
that she will be given a share in the produce of the property. This allegation,
standing alone as it does, is inadequate to establish the existence of a trust
because profit-sharing per se, does not necessarily translate to a trust
relation. It could also be present in other relations, such as in deposit.
In EXPRESS TRUSTS AND RESULTING TRUSTS, a trustee cannot acquire
by prescription a property entrusted to him unless he repudiates the trust.
A trustee cannot acquire by prescription the ownership of property
entrusted to him, or that an action to compel a trustee to convey property
registered in his name in trust for the benefit of the cestui que trust does
not prescribe, or that the defense of prescription cannot be set up in an
action to recover property held by a person in trust for the benefit of
another, or that property held in trust can be recovered by the beneficiary
regardless of the lapse of time.
The rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule is that the
possession of a trustee is not adverse. Not being adverse, he does not
acquire by prescription the property held in trust.
The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held in
trust may possibly apply to resulting trusts as long as the trustee has
not repudiated the trust.
BURDEN OF PROOF; EXISTENCE OF TRUST; PROOF: Party asserting its
existence and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence
of the trust and its elements. The presence of the following elements must be
proved:
1) a trustor or settlor who executes the instrument creating the trust
2) a trustee, who is the person expressly designated to carry out the trust
3) the trust res, consisting of duly identified and definite real properties
4) the cestui que trust, or beneficiaries whose identity must be clear
The existence of express trusts concerning real property may not be
established by parol evidence. It must be proven by some writing or deed.
Art. 1454. If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure the
performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue
of law is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor
when it becomes due, he may demand the reconveyance of the property to him.
Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable

consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest
and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties.
Constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to
satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise
contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of
confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not,
in equity and good conscience, to hold. Unlike in express trusts and
resulting implied trusts, in constructive implied trusts, the trustee may
acquire the property through prescription even if he does not repudiate the
relationship. It is then incumbent upon the beneficiary to bring an action
for reconveyance before prescription bars the same.
ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE based on an implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the
property. The ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date of
registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title
over the property.
*MCIAA vs. LOZADA | G.R. No. 168770, 168812 | February 9, 2011

CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST: The right to repurchase in this case is referred to
as constructive trust, one that is akin to the implied trust expressed in Art.
1454 of the Civil Code, the purpose of which is to prevent unjust enrichment.
Constructive trusts are fictions of equity that courts use as devices to remedy
any situation in which the holder of the legal title, MCIAA in this case, may
not retain the beneficial interest. However, the party seeking the aid of
equitythe landowners in this instance, in establishing the trustmust
himself do equity in a manner as the court may deem just and reasonable.
CASE AT BAR: The Ouanos and the Inocians parted with their respective lots
in favor of the MCIAA, the latter obliging itself to use the realties for the
expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its end of the bargain, MCIAA can
be compelled by the former landowners to reconvey the parcels of land to
them, otherwise, they would be denied the use of their properties upon a state
of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation
was authorized. In effect, the government merely held the properties
condemned in trust until the proposed public use or purpose for which
the lots were condemned was actually consummated by the
government. Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is
the basis of the transfer of the property, then the lot owners Ouanos and
Inocians can demand the reconveyance of their old properties after the
payment of the condemnation price.
SALES
**Art. 1459. The thing must be licit and the vendor must have a right to transfer
the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered. (n)
**Art. 751. Donations cannot comprehend future property. By future property
is understood anything which the donor cannot dispose of at the time of the
donation. (635)
**Art. 1534. An unpaid seller having the right of lien or having stopped the
goods in transitu, may rescind the transfer of title and resume the ownership in
the goods, where he expressly reserved the right to do so in case the buyer
should make default, or where the buyer has been in default in the payment of
the price for an unreasonable time. The seller shall not thereafter be liable to the
buyer upon the contract of sale, but may recover from the buyer damages for any
loss occasioned by the breach of the contract.
The transfer of title shall not be held to have been rescinded by an unpaid
seller until he has manifested by notice to the buyer or by some other overt act
an intention to rescind. It is not necessary that such overt act should be
communicated to the buyer, but the giving or failure to give notice to the buyer
of the intention to rescind shall be relevant in any issue involving the question
whether the buyer had been in default for an unreasonable time before the right
of rescission was asserted. (n)
**Art. 1592. In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been
stipulated that upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon the
rescission of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee may pay, even
after the expiration of the period, as long as no demand for rescission of the
Contract to Sell vs. Contract of Sale
contract has been made upon him either judicially or by a notarial act. After the
demand, the court may not grant him a new term. (1504a)
NAGUIT vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No. 137675| December 5, 2000

COMMENT: The case is a CivPro case which provides remedies under 16,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (1) terceria to determine whether the sheriff
has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to the
judgment debtor or obligor and (2) an independent "separate action" to
vindicate their claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed
property.
A THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANT OR A STRANGER to the foreclosure suit, like
respondents herein, can opt to file a remedy known as terceria against the
sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on him an affidavit of his title
and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor. By the terceria, the officer
shall not be bound to keep the property and could be answerable for damages.
A third-party claimant may also resort to an independent "separate action,"
the object of which is the recovery of ownership or possession of the property
seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and
detention of the property despite the third-party claim. If a "separate action"
is the recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of
competent jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from the action in
which the judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing a
claim in the court that issued the writ. Both remedies are cumulative and may
be availed of independently of or separately from the other. Availment of the
terceria is not a condition sine qua non to the institution of a "separate
action."
**Art. 1484. In a contract of sale of personal property the price of which is
payable in installments, the vendor may exercise any of the following remedies:
LAFORTEZA vs. MACHUCA | G.R. No. 137552| June 16, 2000

CASE AT BAR: There was already a perfected contract. The condition was
imposed only on the performance of the obligations contained therein.
Considering however that the title was eventually "reconstituted" and that the
petitioners admit their ability to execute the extrajudicial settlement of their
fathers estate, the respondent had a right to demand fulfillment of the
petitioners obligation to deliver and transfer ownership of the house and lot.
CONTRACT OF SALE: A contract of sale is a consensual contract and is
perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing which
is the object of the contract and upon the price. From that moment the
parties may reciprocally demand performance subject to the provisions of the
law governing the form of contracts. The ELEMENTS OF A VALID
CONTRACT OF SALE under Article 1458 of the Civil Code are (1) consent
or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter and (3) price certain
in money or its equivalent.
CONDITION IMPOSED UPON THE PERFECTION OF CONTRACT vs.
PERFORMANCE OF OBLIGATION:
Failure to comply with the first
condition results in the failure of a contract, while the failure to comply with
the second condition only gives the other party the option either to refuse to
proceed with the sale or to waive the condition. Thus, Article 1545 of the
Civil Code states: Where the obligation of either party to a contract of sale is
subject to any condition which is not performed, such party may refuse to
proceed with the contract or he may waive performance of the condition. If
the other party has promised that the condition should happen or be
performed, such first mentioned party may also treat the nonperformance of
the condition as a breach of warranty.
(1) Exact fulfillment of the obligation, should the vendee fail to pay;
(2) Cancel the sale, should the vendee's failure to pay cover two or more
installments;
(3) Foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing sold, if one has been
constituted, should the vendee's failure to pay cover two or more installments. In
this case, he shall have no further action against the purchaser to recover any
unpaid balance of the price. Any agreement to the contrary shall be void. (1454A-a)
MAGNA FINANCIAL SERVICES vs. COLARINA| G.R. No. 158635|
December 9, 2005
CASE AT BAR: Based on the Complaint, petitioner preferred to avail of the
first and third remedies under Article 1484, at the same time suing for
replevin. The Court of Appeals justifiably set aside the decision of the RTC.
Perusing the Complaint, the petitioner, under its prayer number 1, sought for
the payment of the unpaid amortizations which is a remedy that is provided
under Article 1484(1) of the Civil Code, allowing an unpaid vendee to exact
fulfillment of the obligation. At the same time, petitioner prayed
that
Colarina be ordered to surrender possession of the vehicle so that it may
ultimately be sold at public auction, which remedy is contained under Article
1484(3). Such a scheme is not only irregular but is a flagrant circumvention
of the prohibition of the law. By praying for the foreclosure of the chattel,
Magna Financial Services Group, Inc. renounced whatever claim it may have
under the promissory note.
ARTICLE 1484(3) provides that if the vendor has availed himself of the right
to foreclose the chattel mortgage, he shall have no further action against the
purchaser to recover any unpaid balance of the purchase price.
Any
agreement to the contrary shall be void.
In all proceedings for the
foreclosure of chattel mortgages executed on chattels which have been sold
on the installment plan, the mortgagee is limited to the property included in
the mortgage.
BEATINGO vs. GASIS| G.R. No. 179641 | February 9, 2011

GENERAL RULE: The execution of a public instrument shall be equivalent to
the delivery of the thing that is the object of the contract. However, the
execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption
of delivery. It is deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual
possession of the land sold.
CASE AT BAR: Though the sale was evidenced by a notarized deed of sale,
petitioner admitted that she refused to make full payment on the subject
property and take actual possession thereof because of the presence of
tenants on the subject property. Clearly, petitioner had not taken possession of
the subject property or exercised acts of dominion over it despite her
assertion that she was the lawful owner thereof.
***Art. 1504. Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the seller's risk
until the ownership therein is transferred to the buyer, but when the ownership
therein is transferred to the buyer the goods are at the buyer's risk whether
actual delivery has been made or not, except that:
**Art. 1498. When the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution
thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the
contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be
inferred.
With regard to movable property, its delivery may also be made by the
delivery of the keys of the place or depository where it is stored or kept. (1463a)
(1) Where delivery of the goods has been made to the buyer or to a bailee
for the buyer, in pursuance of the contract and the ownership in the goods has
been retained by the seller merely to secure performance by the buyer of his
obligations under the contract, the goods are at the buyer's risk from the time of
such delivery;
(2) Where actual delivery has been delayed through the fault of either the
buyer or seller the goods are at the risk of the party in fault. (n)
RES PERIT DOMINO
DEFINITION: The thing is lost to the owner. This phrase is used to express
that when a thing is lost or destroyed, it is lost to the person who was the
owner of it at the time. Ownership is the basis for consideration of who bears
the risk of loss.
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE vs. PALILEO| G.R. No. 83432| May 20, 1991
DOUBLE SALE: In case of double sale of an immovable property, ownership
shall be transferred: (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person
who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the
person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
LANDS REGISTERED UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM: 51 of P.D. No.
1529 provides that the act of registration is the operative act to convey or
affect registered lands insofar as third persons are concerned. Thus, a person
dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to
determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the
burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or
certificate of title. Following this principle, the Court has time and again held
that a purchaser in good faith of registered land (covered by a Torrens Title)
acquires a good title as against all the transferees thereof whose right is not
recorded in the registry of deeds at the time of the sale.
LAND
REGISTRATION
MEANING OF
PHRASE "WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO A THIRD PARTY WITH A BETTER RIGHT": Under Act
No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is
"without prejudice to a third party with a better right." The phrase means that
the mere registration of a sale in ones favor does not give him any light
over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having
previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was
unrecorded.
Article 1644 of the Civil Code has no application to land not registered
under Act No. 496. Like in the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double
sale of the same unregistered land. The first sale was made by the original
owners and was unrecorded while the second was an execution sale against
the said original owners. The Court held that Article 1544 of the Civil
Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution
sale though the latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this
second sale was registered. It was explained that this is because the
purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriff s execution sale only steps into
**Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person
who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the
person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. (1473)
the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latters interest
in the property sold as of the time the property was levied upon.
MIRROR DOCTRINE: LUCENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No. 77468 |
August 25, 1999
GENERAL RULE: A purchaser may be considered a purchaser in good faith
when he has examined the latest certificate of title.
EXCEPTION: When there exist important facts that would create suspicion in
an otherwise reasonable man to go beyond the present title and to investigate
those that preceded it. Thus, it has been said that a person who deliberately
ignores a significant fact which would create suspicion in an otherwise
reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value. If the buyer fails to
take the ordinary precautions which a prudent man would have taken under
the circumstances, specially in buying a piece of land in the actual, visible and
public possession of another person, other than the vendor, constitutes gross
negligence amounting to bad faith.
Where, the land sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor,
the purchaser is required to go beyond the certificate of title to make inquiries
concerning the rights of the actual possessor. Failure to do so would make him
purchaser in bad faith.
LEASE
**Art. 1649. The lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the
lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. (n)
BANGAYAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS| G.R. No. 123581| August 29, 1997
CASE AT BAR: Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides that "contracts take
effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where
the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by
their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of
the lease contract reveal the intent of the parties to limit their lease
relationship to themselves alone. Paragraph 4 provides that "the leased
premises shall be used exclusively by her," referring to the late Teofista
Ocampo. Paragraph 5 prohibits Ocampo from directly or indirectly assigning,
transferring or conveying her right of lease over the leased premises or any
portion thereof under any circumstances whatsoever.
Ocampo's right of first option to buy the leased property in case of its sale
is but part of the right to lease said property from Lingat. The option was
given to Ocampo because she was the lessee of the subject property. It was a
component of the consideration of the lease. The option was by no means
an independent right which can be exercised by Ocampo. If Ocampo is
barred by the contract from assigning her right to lease the subject property
to any other party, she is similarly barred from assigning her first option to
buy the leased property.
*Art. 1652. The sublessee is subsidiarily liable to the lessor for any rent due
from the lessee. However, the sublessee shall not be responsible beyond the
amount of rent due from him, in accordance with the terms of the sublease, at
the time of the extrajudicial demand by the lessor.
**Art. 1650. When in the contract of lease of things there is no express

prohibition, the lessee may sublet the thing leased, in whole or in part, without
prejudice to his responsibility for the performance of the contract toward the
lessor. (1550)
Payments of rent in advance by the sublessee shall be deemed not to have

been made, so far as the lessor's claim is concerned, unless said payments were
effected in virtue of the custom of the place. (1552a)
WHEELERS CLUB vs. BONIFACIO| G.R. No. 139540| June 29, 2005
The sub-lessee is not liable to the lessor upon mere demand by the lessor on
the sub-lessee. The sub-lessee is primarily liable to his sub-lessor and only a
court order can extinguish or modify this primary liability if the sub-lessor
contests the pre-termination of the principal lease by the lessor.
Article 1652 of the Civil Code permits the lessor to proceed against the
sublessee for rent due from the lessee. However, this is only on a subsidiary
liability basis. There must be a judgment cancelling the lessees principal
lease contract or ousting the lessee from the premises before the sub-lessee
becomes subsidiarily liable.
**Art. 1654. The lessor is obliged:
(1) To deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in such a
condition as to render it fit for the use intended;
(2) To make on the same during the lease all the necessary repairs in order
to keep it suitable for the use to which it has been devoted, unless there is a
stipulation to the contrary;
(3) To maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the
lease for the entire duration of the contract. (1554a)
**Art. 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following
causes:
(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of
leases under Articles 1682 and 1687, has expired;
(2) Lack of payment of the price stipulated;
(3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract;
(4) When the lessee devotes the thing leased to any use or service not
stipulated which causes the deterioration thereof; or if he does not observe the
requirement in No. 2 of Article 1657, as regards the use thereof.
The ejectment of tenants of agricultural lands is governed by special laws.
(1569a)
MAMARIL vs. BSP| G.R. No. 179382| January 14, 2013

CONTRACT OF LEASE: The owners parked their 6 passenger jeepneys
inside the BSP compound for a monthly fee of P300.00 for each unit and took
the keys home with them. Hence, a lessor-lessee relationship indubitably
existed between them and BSP.
LESSORS OBLIGATION IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 1644:
The
obligation of the lessor is provided in Article 1654. In relation thereto, Article
1664 provides that the lessor is not obliged to answer for a mere act of
trespass which a third person may cause on the use of the thing leased; but
the lessee shall have a direct action against the intruder.
CASE AT BAR: BSP was not remiss in its obligation to provide Sps. Mamaril
a suitable parking space for their jeepneys as it even hired security guards to
**Art. 1657. The lessee is obliged:

(1) To pay the price of the lease according to the terms stipulated;
(2) To use the thing leased as a diligent father of a family, devoting it to the
use stipulated; and in the absence of stipulation, to that which may be inferred
from the nature of the thing leased, according to the custom of the place;
(3) To pay expenses for the deed of lease. (1555)
secure the premises; hence, it should not be held liable for the loss suffered by
Sps. Mamaril.
***Art. 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying
the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a
notice to the contrary by either party has previously been given, it is understood
that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but
for the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the
original contract shall be revived. (1566a)
CHUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No. 106573| March 27, 1995
CASE AT BAR: The contract provides that if "no written notice is received
from LESSEE of its intention to renew the contract," the contract terminates
at the end of the lease period. It is also stipulated therein that upon
termination of the period of lease and "unless LESSEE has indicated its
intention to renew the contract," the lessee has to surrender the leased
premises to the lessor. The notice must be given 30 days before the expiration
of the lease period, which was on August 30, 1989. The notice to renew dated
August 18, 1989 sent by petitioner and received by the lessor on August 22,
1989.
There is a difference between a waiver of the right to enforce a condition
stipulated in the contract and a waiver of the stipulation itself. The renewals
of the lease contract, in spite of the lack of or tardiness in giving the written
notices, were mere acts of tolerance on the part of the lessor.
NOTICE TO VACATE: Assuming that the provision Article 1670 is applicable
to petitioner's case, still that law does not require that the notice to vacate be
given before the lease expires. The notice required under said provision is
the one given after the expiration of the lease period for the purpose of
aborting an implied renewal of the lease.
PAROL EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE: There being no ambiguity in the
applicable provision of the lease contract, there is no basis to allow oral
testimony whether under the Statute of Frauds or the Parol Evidence Rule, to
prove that petitioner was given verbal assurance of a renewal of the lease and
"first priority to buy in case of sale of the leased premises.
SAMELO vs. MANOTOK SERVICES | G.R. No. 170509| June 27, 2012
IMPLIED NEW LEASE: An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will set
in when the following requisites are found to exist: a) the term of the original
contract of lease has expired; b) the lessor has not given the lessee a notice to
vacate; and c) the lessee continued enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days
with the acquiescence of the lessor.
NOTICE TO VACATE: Constitutes an express act on the part of the lessor
that it no longer consents to the continued occupation by the lessee of its
property. After such notice, the lessees right to continue in possession ceases
and her possession becomes one of detainer.
ARTICLE 1687 provides: If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is
understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from
month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and
from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily.
CASE AT BAR: Since the rent was paid on a monthly basis, the period of
lease is considered to be from month to month. A lease from month to month
is considered to be one with a definite period which expires at the end of each
month upon a demand to vacate by the lessor. When the respondent sent a
notice to vacate to the petitioner, the tacita reconduccion was aborted, and
the contract is deemed to have expired at the end of that month.
DIZON vs. MAGSAYSAY | G.R. No. L-23399| May 31, 1974

CASE AT BAR: The two-year term of the lease contract expired on April 1,
1951 without the parties' having expressly renewed their agreement.
Bernardo Dizon, however, continued to occupy the leased premises, paying
the same monthly rental of P100.00, which Ambrosio Magsaysay accepted.
MEANING OF "the other terms of the original contract" UNDER ART.
1670: "The other terms of the original contract" which are revived in the
implied new lease under Article 1670 are only those terms which are germane
to the lessee's right of continued enjoyment of the property leased.
Necessarily, if the presumed will of the parties refers to the enjoyment of
possession the presumption covers the other terms of the contract
related to such possession, such as the amount of rental, the date when it
must be paid, the care of the property, the responsibility for repairs. However,
no presumption may be indulged in with respect to special agreements which
by nature are foreign to the right of occupancy or enjoyment inherent in a
contract of lease.
DIZON vs. MAGSAYSAY | G.R. No. 70360| March 11, 1987

APPLICATION OF Article 1670: Article 1670 applies only where, before the
expiration of the lease, no negotiations are held between the lessor and the
lessee resulting in its renewal. Where no such talks take place and the lessee
is not asked to vacate before the lapse of fifteen days from the end of the
lease, the implication is that the lessor is amenable to its renewal.
FORMAL NOTICE TO VACATE: Where the lessor is unwilling in any event to
renew the lease for whatever reason, it will be necessary for him to serve on
the lessee a formal notice to vacate. As no talks have been held between the
lessor and the lessee concerning the renewal of the lease, there can be no
inference that the former, by his inaction, intends to discontinue it. In such a
case, no less than an express notice to vacate must be made within the
statutory 15-day period.
CASE AT BAR: Weeks before the deadline for the notice to vacate, the
petitioner had already communicated to the respondent its intention to
increase the rental. This increase had to be accepted by the respondent if he
wanted the lease to be renewed. In its letter to the respondent, the petitioner
again rejected the latters counter-proposal and declared that the increased
rental was "no longer negotiable." Since this was a reply to the respondents
letter of September 14, 1979, 14 it is obvious that the increase in rental was
notified to the respondent on an earlier date, and before the expiration of the
original lease. As of that date, the respondent was already being informed that
he would have to vacate the leased premises on August 31, 1979, unless he
was willing to pay the increased rental demanded by the lessor.

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CIVIL LAW 2014

Dean Ed Vincent S. Albano

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the

ISSUE: May a will executed by a foreigner abroad be probated in the

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

c. IN RE: In The Matter Of The Petition To Approve The Will Of

Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

under Article 26 should not be confined to his house or residence as it

A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

c. Ardiente v. Spouses Pastorfide (G.R. No. 161921, July 17, 2013 |

standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to

a. Continental Steel Mfg Corp v. Voluntary Arbitrator Montao [G.R.

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

However there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States

period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no

x x x the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil

dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

x x x cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

b. Arcaba v. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael (G.R. No. 146683. November

patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.

Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or

Petitioner still has a remedy under the law x x x a mortgage-creditor may

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

Second, family residences constructed AFTER the effectivity of the

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

the foregoing rules, the family home - - consisting of the subject

The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the

x x x filiation of ligitimate children shall be proved by any other means

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

copies, in the form of certificates, of the entries contained therein. It may

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

(herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is

x x x both husband and wife "shall" jointly adopt if one of them is

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

a. Republic v. Toledano [G.R. No. 94147. June 8, 1994 | PUNO, J.]

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

x x x the mandatory directive under Section 3 of Rule 108 to implead

CIVIL LAW :: Albanotes :: gmt 7

or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)