XIII.

Nesajjikaga sitters practice

Ud.7.8: Yassa siy sabbad sati,
Satata kyagat upatthit;

No cassa no ca e siy,
Na bhavissati na ca e bhavissati;
Anupubbavihri tattha so,
Kleneva tare visattikanti.
Parivara XV. Upali Pentads Section 6
V v. 131, 193
-Re-reading the Nettipakarana. Kaccayana gives an intriguing treatment of the Mahaparinibbanasutta's four mahapadesas.
Unlike all other interpreters, ancient and modern, he doesn't conceive them as having anything at all to do with appeals to
textual authority. "Conformity to sutta" for Kaccayana is conformity to the Dhamma's general thread of meaning, which is
the 4 ariyasacca.
-And "vinaya" in "conformity to vinaya" is taken not in the sense of monastic discipline or Vinaya Pitaka, but in the most
common sense that this term has in the Sutta Pitaka: raaga-vinaya dosa-vinaya moha-vinaya, "removal of attachment,
aversion and delusion".
-Then a third yardstick is given: "conformity to dhammataa", which Kaccayana identifies with paticcasamuppaada. This is
not found in the Pali Mahaparinibbanasutta but is present in the Sanskrit version and (if I remember right) four parallel
passages in the Chinese Agamas.
-So, on this reading a putative buddhavacana may be accepted as such if it conforms to two points of principle: the four
truths and paticcasamuppaada, and if it is effective in practice in bringing about the three removals.
-I think, for many reasons, it is the reading most likely to be faithful to the Buddha's intent
-The problem with all the textual authority interpretations is that in an age of oral transmission you simply couldn't put them
into practice without violating a cardinal injunction of the whole mahapadesa procedure.
-I mean the injunction not to play favourites...
"don't rejoice in..." "don't reject..."
-It also jives well with the Kalama Sutta
-After Buddhaghosa there come two attempts to harmonize the Paleo-Orthodox take on the mahapadesas with the
Sumangalavilasini's Neo-Orthodox interpretation (or rather the one of the six interpretations that Buddhaghosa himself
approved of).
-One attempt (the "Unified Interpretation", we might call it) combines them into a single rather unwieldy method.
-And the other (the "Non-Overlapping Magisteria Interpretation") treats the Paleo-Orthodox Netti approach as concerned
only with an individual's private verification, and the Neo-Orthodox with public demonstration.
-By the time of the Sinhalese Renaissance and the sub-commentaries the Unified Interpretation has become the de facto
official view
-At least in theory. But in practice it is the Neo that is always applied in textual argument.
-Note that the terms he uses for the yardsticks are sutta and vinaya, not dhamma and vinaya. And note the passage's fourth
scenario - this is a great group of monks. - Dhammanando
The Mahacattarisaka Sutta is unique in the idea of mundane/supermundane right view.
I should note that the designations 'mundane' and 'supramundane' for these two right view are actually from the
Petakopadesa and Nettipakarana, two early treatises on hermeneutics. At MN. 117 the distinction is expressed with the words
'ssava' and 'ansava', "accompanied by cankers" and "free of cankers" respectively.
In the suttas, the attainment of neither-perception-nor-non-perception is in fact often absent from insight related
contemplation of states of deep concentration(M I, 352 or M I, 436) and a discourse in the AN explicitly indicates the
penetration to liberating knowledge is only possible as far as there is an attainment of perception, yavata sannasaapatti,
tavata annapativedho (A, IV 426)
Dependent co-arising, the aggregates and not-self basically detail the process by which we construct our sense of self, i.e.,
our ego or identity, and, ultimately, how to utilize that process in more skillful ways.
-The aggregates themselves, for example, aren't simply descriptions of what constitutes a human being as some people
mistakenly thinkthey're one of the many ways of looking at and dividing up experience that we find throughout the Pali
Canon (e.g., aggregates, elements, six sense-media, etc.). But more importantly, they represent the most discernible aspects
of our experience on top of which we construct our sense of self in a process of, as the Buddha called it, "I-making" and
"my-making" (e.g., MN 109).
-In addition, the Buddha says that the five clinging-aggregates are not-self. He calls them a burden, the taking up of which is
"the craving that makes for further becoming" and the casting off of which is "the remainderless fading & cessation,
renunciation, relinquishment, release, & letting go of that very craving" (SN 22.22). The way I understand it, becoming
(bhava) is a mental process, which arises due to the presence of clinging (upadana) in the mind with regard to the fiveclinging aggregates, and acts as a condition for the birth (jati) of the conceit 'I am,' the self-identification that designates a
being (satta).
-Looking at it from another angle, there's rarely a moment when the mind isn't clinging to this or that in one or more of the
four ways (MN 11). Our identity jumps from one thing to another, wherever the clinging is strongest. Our sense of self is

something that's always in flux, ever-changing from moment to moment in response to various internal and external stimuli,
and yet at the same time, we tend to see it as a static thing. It's as if our sense of self desires permanence, but its very nature
causes it to change every second. See SN 12.61
-Change is, of course, a fact of nature. All things are in a perpetual state of change, but the problem is that our sense of self
ignores this reality on a certain level. From birth to death, we have the tendency to think that this 'I' remains the same. Now,
we might know that some things have changed (e.g., our likes and dislikes, our age, the amount of wrinkles we have, etc.),
but we still feel as if we're still 'us.' We have the illusion (for lack of a better word) that our identity is who we are, a static
entity named [fill in the blank], and we tend to perceive this as being the same throughout our lives.
-That said, the conventional use of personality is a function of survival, as well as convenience. However, clinging to our
personalities as 'me' or 'mine' is seen as giving continued fuel for becoming, i.e., a mental process of taking on a particular
kind of identity that arises out of clinging. Our sense of self, the ephemeral 'I,' is merely a mental imputation the product
of what the Buddha called a process of 'I-making' and 'my-making' and when we cling to our sense of self as being 'me' or
'mine' in some way, we're clinging to an impermanent representation of something that we've deluded ourselves into thinking
is fixed and stable. It becomes a sort of false refuge that's none of these things.
-These attachments, particularly our attachment to views and doctrines of self, keep us rooted in "perceptions and categories
of objectification" that continually assail us and our mental well-being (MN 18). Thus, with the presence of clinging, the
aggregates have the potential to become suffering (i.e., 'difficult to bear') when our sense of self encounters inconstancy.
That's why the Buddha taught that whatever is inconstant is stressful, and whatever is stressful is not-self.
-In order to break down the conceptual idea of a self (i.e., that which is satisfactory, permanent and completely subject to our
control) in relation to the various aspects of our experience that we falsely cling to as 'me' or 'mine,' we must essentially take
this [analytical] knowledge, along with a specific set of practices such as meditation, as a stepping stone to what I can only
describe as a profound psychological event that radically changes the way the mind relates to experience.
-This may be a bit of nonsense, but in one of the ways I like to look at it, the conventional viewpoint (sauti sacca)
explains things through subject, verb and object whereas the ultimate viewpoint (paraattha sacca) explains things through
verb alone. In essence, things are being viewed from the perspective of activities and processes. This, I think, is incredibly
difficult to see, but perhaps what happens here is that once self-identity view (sakkaya-ditthi) is removed, the duality of
subject and object is also removed, thereby revealing the level of mere conditional phenomena, i.e., dependent co-arising in
action.
-This mental process is 'seen,' ignorance is replaced by knowledge and vision of things as they are (yatha-bhuta-nanadassana), and nibbana, then, would be the 'letting go' of what isn't self through the dispassion (viraga) invoked in seeing the
inconstant (anicca) and stressful (dukkha) nature of clinging to false refuges that are neither fixed nor stable (anatta). And
without the presence of clinging in regard to the aggregates, they cease to be 'difficult to bear.'
Retro has a point. The text does not actually say "walking meditation". It simply says Pacime bhikkhave cakame
nisams.
Q: Does "cankama" really mean "walking meditation" or are various translators taking certain liberties here...?
I sense they may be bending something quite straight-forward and literal as "walking" to conform to their own "meditation"centric views on the Dhamma.
A: (AN 5.29 A iii 29)
The first translation [the composure attained by walking up & down is long-lasting] is therefore the most faithful and least
"embellished". However, I don't think it's doctrinally incorrect to "embellish" cakaa here to refer to walking meditation,
since mindfulness is recommended to be established in any of the 4iriypatha (postures of walking, standing, sitting, and
lying down), eg MN 10's 2ndkynupassan after mindfulness of breathing.
As for the cakadhigato sadhi, it's parsed as cakaa+adhigata sadhi. Adhigata= attained. Can't quite decide if
the cakadhigato is a bahubbhi compound or a instrumentive tappurisa. Probably the former, since it seems to function
as an adjective to qualify the sadhi.
-MN 70 (M i 477) Kt giri Sutta and AN 9.44 (A iv 452) Pavimutta Sutta tell us that to be liberated through discernment
one does so via at least the first jhna. Thus the arahant-s in SN 12.70 were able to attain at least the first jhna (in the
suttantika sense of jhna).
-The Pat isambhidmagga is an abhidhammika presentation, even if it is now included in the Khuddakanikya. It employs
the thought-world and terminology of the abhidhamma. (For example, the author of the Vimuttimagga often refers to
quotations from it as being from the abhidhamma.)
Q: In the Bahiya Sutta, Ven. Bahiya went from ordinary good wordling on a wrong path, to an Arahant within a discource.
He completed 4 maggaphalas and 37 factors of awakening within seconds. This example and others show us that the path
can be momentary.
A: Another sutta tells us that Ven. Bhiya had the capacity for sharp understanding (khippbhi). And as a dedicated
ascetic, it is quite probable that Bhiya was already at a high level of development with regard to ethical conduct (sla) and
concentration (samdhi). So I would suggest that Ven. Bhiya was already quite highly developed when he earnestly set out
to find the Buddha after being rebuked by the deva.
As I said, it is likely that he had a high level of development with regard to concentration (samdhi). What he lacked was
right view (sammdit t hi). Therefore his way of practice (pat ipad) wasn't conducive as a path to arahantship
(arahattamagga), and his samdhi wasn't sammsamdhi. The instruction he received from the Buddha enabled him to
discern right view, and with that the other seven components of the noble eightfold path quickly aligned.

Q: I'm not sure exactly what you're trying to say by the quotes since Venerable's words read to me almost as pure
abhidhamma - all the talk about illusion and mirage that sanna brings in - can this illusion be anything else than concepts,
which are essentially 'supplied' by sanna in commentarial speak? Nor do I quite understand why do you bring in the two
truths polemic.
A: The two truth theory and the dhamma theory are relevant to this whole concept (paatti) vs. ultimate realities
(paramattha dhamma-s) distinction. Contrary to Ven. Buddhaghosa, et al, Ven. n ananda seems to be more than happy to
treat all dhamma-s as concepts without recourse to these abhidhammika categories.
Q: Thanks for explaining Geoff, I maybe see where you're coming from now - I guess you were simply trying to point out
the specifics of Ven.Nyanananda's approach to the topic. That's cool, I guess we would agree that there are different
descriptions out there regarding the cognitive process and how it's experienced in insight - there's the abhidhamma
description, commentary, Ven.Buddhadasa, Ven.Nynanada, etc. Each of those might be using different terminology but my
guess is they are all speaking about the same thing - the cognitive process, from their own experience (I'd assume).
A: Unfortunately it isnt quite that simple. The concept (paatti) vs. ultimate realities (paramattha dhamma-s)
differentiation is predicated on the notion that a paramattha dhamma is sabhva and therefore is a real object referent,
whereas paatti is considered asabhva and is thus just a product of the mind without a real object referent. For example,
the idea of house is considered paatti because what one designates as a house can be further reduced to the paramattha
dhamma-s of (visible) form, the four mahbhta-s, etc..
-Now at first sight that seems reasonable enough I guess. But there are problematic consequences of this whole sabhva
business. Firstly, it imposes philosophical realism upon the Buddhadhamma. Secondly, because nibbna is considered to be
sabhva, i.e. a real object referent, this results in numerous troublesome consequences, not the least of which is the
implication that nibbna is some sort of metaphysical plane that truly exists out there. Moreover, it smuggles nibbna into
the all and consequently imposes conditional, fabricated limitations (e.g. sabhva) onto nibbna.
-This is why Ven. n ananda has gone to such great lengths in all of his published teachings to demonstrate that all of the
consequences of the paramattha/sabhva vs. paatti/asabhva differentiation are foreign to the sutta-s and are an intrusive
conceptual filter which actually distorts what the sutta-s are teaching regarding the deeper aspects of dhamma soteriology. In
short, the commentarial dhamma theory not only reroutes the path, it completely redraws the map.
A: There are numerous problems with the Visuddhimagga and At t hakath commentarial exegesis regarding jhna. The
most obvious of which are that the notions of paatti vs. paramattha and the subsequent notion of a counterpart sign
(pat ibhganimitta), as well as the notion that the counterpart sign is merely paatti, are all completely absent from the
thought-world of the Pl i Nikya-s.
Also, the commentarial exegesis doesnt seem to be very clear on just what the actual referent is for some of the
pat ibhganimitta-s. For example, in regard to npnasati the Visuddimagga 3.113 states: When a an extends the sign of
in-breaths and out-breaths, only a quantity of wind is extended, and it has a definite location, [the nose-tip]. So it need not
be extended because of the disadvantage and because of the definiteness of the location.
-And Visuddhimagga 3.119: Mindfulness of breathing ust be apprehended by touch.
-This seems to indicate that the parikammanimitta, uggahanimitta as well as the pat ibhganimitta could be paramattha.
But when we get to the descriptions of the pat ibhganimitta for npnasati we are told that:
It appears to soe like a star or a cluster of ges or a cluster of pearls, to others with a rough touch like that of silk-cotton
seeds or a peg ade of heartwood, to others like a long braid string or a wreath of flowers or a puff of soke, to others like
a stretched-out cobweb or a fil of cloud or a lotus flower or a chariot wheel or the oon's disk or the sun's disk.
-Here we have a laundry list of many possible pat ibhganimitta-s, most of which are mental images, but at least two of
which are still within the tactile domain of experience.
-Fortunately, in the sutta-s, all of the concomitant dhamma-s pertaining to jhna are definitely not paatti. Therefore one
can develop both samatha and/or vipassan as the means to enter jhna, as well as develop vipassan while remaining in any
of the four jhna-s. Thus the entire commentarial exegesis regarding jhna amounts to just another instance of a foreign,
intrusive, and unnecessary conceptual filter superimposed over the sutta-s, resulting in a rerouting of the path into various
paths, and thereby distorting the integral harmony of the noble eightfold path.
Q: I guess we'd agree there needs to be samma samadhi. So, if samma samadhi is there, that would mean that mindfulness,
and in particular, wisdom (as in "non-ignorance" mentioned in the suttas, as opposed to ignorance) are operative. If wisdom
is indeed operative, then my confusion is as follows:
1. Wisdom is essentially supposed to understand/see the anicca, anatta, etc, characteristics in anything that arises and falls.
2. Yet, the whole idea of one-pointedness in jhana is that attention is fixed on one object only for an extended period of time
(irrespective whether that's 2 hours, or just 2 seconds before vipassana starts inside jhana as you say)
3. So, if wisdom is present in jhana, and yet it doesn't understand/see that the object is in fact anicca (arising and falling on
multiple occasions during those 2 seconds or 2 hours), how would you explain why it doesn't see anicca?
A: Your 2nd and 3rd points don't necessarily follow from the 1st point. If that happens (i.e. #2 & #3), then the meditator has
strayed into wrong samdhi. Certainly, jhna as sammsamdhi includes samatha, vipassan, and pa. This is not only
stated in the sutta-s, it is also explicitly stated in the Dhammasa gan i. For example, in MN 111, anupadadhammavipassan
is employed to develop pa while remaining in jhna: There was the case where Sariputta quite secluded fro
sensuality, secluded fro unskillful qualities entered & reained in the first jhana: rapture & pleasure born of seclusion,
accopanied by directed thought & evaluation. Whatever qualities there are in the first jhana directed thought,
evaluation, rapture, pleasure, singleness of ind, contact, feeling, perception, intention, consciousness, desire, decision,
persistence, indfulness, equaniity, & attention he ferreted the out one after another. Known to hi they arose, known
to hi they reained, known to hi they subsided. He discerned, 'So this is how these qualities, not having been, coe into
play. Having been, they vanish.

A2: For example, a beginning meditator should firstly dispel the five hindrances using satipat t hna, etc., employing
whatever antidotes are effective. The abandoning of the hindrances is a necessary but not sufficient condition for entering the
first jhna. Then, by practicing npnasati (for example), until the mind has settled and the body is at ease, the beginner can
develop samatha without vipassan, by mindfully attending to the felt-sense of pleasure (sukha) when it arises. This need not
be a profound feeling of ptisukha to begin with. Just remaining attentive to the felt-sense of pleasure is enough for starters.
With constant practice aided by the five (or preferably eight) precepts, and much meditation retreat, this will eventually lead
to a "true, refined apperception of rapture and pleasure born of seclusion" (vivekajaptisukhasukhumasaccasa).
-By the time that ptisukha has arisen, the mental factors of both samatha and vipassan should be developed enough that the
meditator can remain simultaneously mindful and fully aware of both the apperception of ptisukha as well as the momentary
flux of that very apperception of ptisukha. Thus samatha and vipassan are developed to the degree that they can be
conjoined. At this point one has developed the necessary and sufficient conditions of the first jhna as sammsamdhi. Here
all the mental factors (the dhamma-s of vitakka, vicra, pti, sukha, cittekaggat, phassa, vedan, sa, cetan, citta, chanda,
adhimokkha, vriya, sati, upekkh, and manasikra) are working together in complete harmony.
Q: Does that mean the mind has two objects at the same time? Or perhaps these two are happening in quick succession? Or
its more the case of the two combining into one object of sorts? Or how exactly?
A: There is no fabricated mental phenomenon apart from the momentary flux of that mental phenomenon, and no
characteristic of momentary flux apart from a fabricated mental phenomenon.
Q: Or perhaps more fundamentally if you like - can I be aware of a sound and a sight at exactly the same time?
A: In the long history of early sectarian Buddhism, there were basically three general views posited regarding the process of
cognition: (1) every mind and mental factor have to arise consecutively and none can arise concurrently; (2) every mind can
arise with a number of concomitant mental factors (cetasika-s), but no two types of consciousness can arise concurrently; (3)
any number of the six consciousnesses can arise concomitantly (i.e. simultaneously) along with various concomitant mental
factors.
-The classical Theravda abhidhammikas accept the second view. But it's important to understand that the first two of these
views were developed in an academic environment, and have little to do with the actual phenomenology of experience and
more to do with the rhetoric of experience. They are largely based on the premise of the intentionality of all consciousness,
as well as philosophical realism. None of this is found in the sutta-s, where the six consciousnesses are mere nominal
designations. MN 38: Mahtan hsakhaya Sutta: Just as fire is classified siply by the condition in dependence on which it
burns a fire burning in dependence on logs is classified siply as a log fire... a fire burning in dependence on rubbish is
classified siply as a rubbish fire; in the sae way, consciousness is classified siply by the condition in dependence on
which it arises.
Q: E.g. if he is really saying what you think hes saying, then to me that goes directly against that SN sutta where the
Buddha quite clearly says that aggregates which are anicca, dukkha and anatta, are said to exist by the wise, which imo is the
same thing that the commentaries are saying on their own terms.
A: The sutta is SN 22.94 (S iii 138) Puppha Sutta. And the term translated as "it exists" is atthi, which doesn't have any
realist connotations whatsoever. It could well be translated as "it is." It is very far from the ontological and realist
implications of the commentarial "sabhva."
Q: This brings to a question of: why do you agree with one commentary over the other?
A: It's quite simple. The criteria is explicitly stated in the Mahparinibbna Sutta. The four great references (mahpades)
clearly explain that concerning issues regarding the clarification or authenticity of Dhammavinaya, the dhamma of the suttas and the rules of the vinaya are the sole authority. Any commentary or interpretation of dhamma needs to be verified by
tracing it back to the sutta-s.
-The Mahvihra claim that the dhamma referred to in the mahpades includes the Abhidhamma Pit aka, and that the
Abhidhamma Pit aka was spoken by the Buddha (excepting the Kathvatthu), cannot be sustained because the Abhidhamma
Pit aka, as well as the abhiddhamika exegeses now found in the Khuddakanikya, are all post-schismatic sectarian
compositions which couldn't have existed at the time of the Buddha's parinibbna.
-If the compositions of the Abhidhamma Pit aka, etc., were extant at that time, and were considered to have been spoken by
the Buddha, then (1) all of the early Nikya sects would have very similar abhidhamma compositions (just as they have very
similar sutta compositions); and (2) all of the early Nikya sects would have unquestionably considered their own
abhidhamma collections to have been spoken by the Buddha. Neither of these are the case. Therefore, it can safely be
concluded that the Abhidhamma Pit aka and the abhiddhamika exegeses now found in the Khuddakanikya are all postschismatic sectarian compositions.
Q: would I be correct in understanding that the main difference would be that in the dry insight case (though obviously not
quite so dry), the object of focus is not selected, so whatever arises at the instance is an object good enough, while in your
case, you in fact remain focused on pitisukha, right?
A: Right. But the preliminary mindful attention is directed towards the simple felt-sense of pleasantness/pleasure (sukha).
Ptisukha of the first jhna is far, far more pleasurable, expansive, etc.
Q: How exactly would you define the difference between the two cases - i.e. the difference between "mindfully attending" to
pitisukha in case of samatha only, and "simultaneously mindful and fully aware of both the apperception of ptisukha as well
as the momentary flux of that very apperception of ptisukha" in the case of samatha+vipassana? As I understand it, the main
difference is that in the first case you are not aware of what you call "momentary flux", right? Would that flux be equivalent
to the general characteristics maybe - like anicca or anatta?

A: For a beginner practicing in order to develop samatha, it's usually better to start off with just mindfully attending to the
simple felt-sense of pleasantness/pleasure (sukha) without attending to the characteristic of momentary flux. This
specifically refers to the characteristic of alteration while persisting (t hitassa aathatta), which is an aspect of the
impermanence of all fabrications (sakhra-s). BTW, in its sutta usage this should not be confused with the commentarial
theory of radical momentariness (khan avda).
Samatha at that preliminary stage of development is not yet sammsamdhi.
Q: This is a bit confusing to me, I mean if something is not sammasamadhi, then it can only be micchasamadhi, no? Or is
there a category in between, which is sort of neutral?
A: Sammsamdhi is samatha and vipassan developed to the stage of the first jhna. This doesn't mean that the
development of samatha and/or vipassan prior to the first jhna is wrong samdhi. They are just stages of preliminary
development. For example, if one takes the following excerpt from DN 2 to refer to the stages of samatha development after
the hindrances have been abandoned, yet prior to entering the first jhna where ptisukha is fully present, then it can be seen
how samatha leads to jhna: Seeing that [the hindrances] have been abandoned within hi, he becoes glad. Glad, he
becoes joyous. Joyful, his body grows tranquil (ptianassa kyo passabhati). His body tranquil, he is sensitive to
pleasure (passaddhakyo sukha vedeti). Feeling pleasure, his ind becoes concentrated (sukhino citta sadhiyati).
Q: Also, could you please say a bit more about the experience of the "characteristic of momentary flux"? I think i know what
experience you're trying to convey, but it would be good to be sure.
A: Prior to the arising of ptisukha, the inner felt-sense of the entire body is experienced as a continual flux of subtle
vibrational energy-sensations flowing throughout the whole body. It's important for awareness to be expansive enough so
that it can experience the entire body without it collapsing into attending to any specific tactile sensations. The body is calm
and the mind is wide open and at ease. By remaining aware in this way, ptisukha eventually arises spontaneously as waves
of universal bliss coursing throughout the body. It feels like passing through an invisible 'membrane' wherein all sense of
constriction is simply gone and the felt-sense of the body vastly expands along with waves of universal bliss.
-But no part of this experience is static. There is a vast, expansive flowing of waves of ptisukha (it's really beyond what can
be described in words to anyone who hasn't experienced it). Anyway, that's what I call the characteristic of momentary flux
of ptisukha.
Q: I find the perception of flux interesting, because it always pertains to an object or point of reference.
A: Indeed. Which is why it isn't the end of the path. One has to eventually see through all reference points.
Q: In other words, if we were talking of one of the channels of consciousness, we could say "X is changing", where X is
sound, or sight, or mind etc.
If the bracketing of one's perception were relating to things of a smaller range, we would say "Y is arising, Y is passing
away". What constitutes the X is a multiplicity of Y's.
For example, "sound is changing" (an example of X), could consist of many examples of Y... "person talking is arising and
passing away", "car sound is arising and passing away", "fan sound is arising and falling with great rapidity".
A: To me this seems unnecessarily reductionist (if I'm reading what you're saying accurately). The alteration while persisting
(t hitassa aathatta) of any sakhra (X) is what can be empirically experienced. Any further reduction of that sa khra into
a multiplicity of Y's arising and passing away throughout the experiential contact (phassa) of X, can at best, only be
designated based on inference. It can't be empirically discerned. (According to Karunadasa the commentaries also maintain
that radical momentary arising (uppda), duration (t hiti), and dissolution (bhaga) is only understood inferentially).
Q: In a practical sense, which level of flux (e.g. sum of Xs, X, or Y.... or in other words loka, consciousness-channel,
individual object of consciousness) is best to perceive if one wishes to uproot erroneous perceptions of self?
A: All of them. With regard to sakhra-s, the relative alteration while persisting (t hitassa aathatta) during any sensory
contact is the same for the momentary flux of the feeling, the apperception, and the sensory consciousness (even though this
flux cannot be quantified, i.e. the immediate experiential present cannot be measured). If there is an abrupt change in feeling,
for example, from pleasure to pain, even if we conventionally designate the sensory object as the same referent, something
has occurred even at the level of sensory consciousness which would be most accurately designated as a passing away of one
process of sensory cognition and the arising of another (which still doesn't entail radical momentariness).
-This is why designation is such a slippery snake at any level of reference, no matter how reductionist we choose to be. What
we designate as an object is just a phantom with no real referent that can ultimately be established. The same is true for all of
the dhamma-s of each of the aggregates. And the same is true for any experiential measurement of duration. The closer we
look, the more elusive the referent. Until eventually we see through the cruel game of tyrannical empiricism altogether....
Q: VISM XX,65 ... He considers thus: The eleents and the kinds of derived ateriality during the lifting up [of the foot]
all ceased there without reaching the shifting forward: therefore they are iperanent, painful, not-self. ... [other stages of
walking] ....
Thus forations keep breaking up, like crackling sesanu seeds put into a hot pan; wherever they arise, there they cease
stage by stage, section by section, ter by ter, each without reaching the next part: therefore they are iperanent,
painful, not-self.
A: I would consider this to be nothing more than conceptual proliferation. How is one to directly cognize or even infer the
cessation of the four internal elements based on the movements of the body? It isn't empirically possible, nor is it
inferentially valid. It is purely a conceptual filter which has no practical application.
A: When the mind has developed to the point of being fully present and silent there is no impediment of lapsing into
memory -- but this doesn't mean that one has seen through all possible reference points. This is why samatha or samdhi isn't
enough. One has to continually develop and refine vipassan from within samdhi. Hence, sammsamdhi.

Q: Of course, I'm not saying it is necessarily so, or that proliferation is a bad thing, just wondering what's your reasoning
behind it.
A: To approach this by way of experience: taste it yourself and see. Afterward you can superimpose whatever conceptual
filters that you wish. Or you might even be able to drop the cruel game of tyrannical empiricism altogether. BTW, according
to the discourses, mental proliferation is a bad thing.
A: It's not my intention to try to interpret your experience or tell you what you're experiencing. We each have to continually
refine our attention and apperception by seeing through and letting go of even subtle interpretations of our experience which
may no longer be relevant as the mind becomes increasingly present and silent.
Q: What are "reference points" - maybe different sorts of direct experience?
A: A reference point is an object support (ramman a). Part of the development of vipassan is to penetrate through and let
go of the increasingly subtle reference points which keep us stuck in unsatisfactoriness (dukkha). The "momentary flux of
ptisukha" is just another reference point.
Q: This is because imo, focusing on something can only be accomplished in the realm of memory. I.e. only when direct
experience is not payed attention (so there's no awareness of it either), only then can there be extended focus on something
(like a memory of pitisukha), because direct experience (one of the six consciousness) is no doubt happening all the time, so
it seems the only way to "ignore" it arising presently would be to focus on a memory of something.
A: I would suggest that there are no "things," merely processes.
Q: So, what you think happens between the direct experience of something and our perception of it
A: As long as there is contact, feeling and apperception arise together with consciousness. One can refine apperception and
eventually discern the empty, mirage-like nature of apperception and thereby realize dispassion towards empirical cognition
and liberation from the entire game of empirical cognition; but until one has done so all experiences are filtered through
apperception and there is no possibility of "direct experience" unmediated by apperception.
Q: On differentiating perversions from non-perversions with right view, might you be saying that this is done initially on an
inferential basis, rather than an experiential one?
A: Inference is employed to discern the impermanence, etc., of whatever is not present. Whatever is present is discerned as
either arising, altering while persisting, or passing away. AN 3.47
Here we have dhamma-s being born acquiring individuation, then aging, and finally ceasing. All in light-speed succession.
The entire formulation of what is supposedly ultimately real has no reality other than mere conceptual designation (paatti).
It references no ultimate location or basis of designation. This proposition of radical momentary individuation is no more
real than a unicorn. Sn 3.12: Dvayatnupassan Sutta:
Entrenched in nae and for,
They conceive that This is true.
In whatever way (worldlings) conceive it,
It turns out other than that.
For that is what is false about it.
Whatever is transitory certainly has a false nature.
But nibbna does not have a false nature.
That the noble ones truly know.
Through fully coprehending the truth,
They are without hunger, quenched.
In short, no dhamma can be individuated without two key links of dependent arising: consciousness, and name (i.e. intention,
attention, contact, feeling, apperception) & form. And these two links are what enable one to fabricate a world of ongoing
dissatisfaction. SN 35.116: Lokantagamana Sutta.
Q: What is the problem with that? How can mental event be unknowable?...
Also the mental states can be distinguished from each other. Like is different from dislike. Merit is different from demerit.
One of them always beneficial and another is always wrong. Is that so unbelievable? I find it harder to believe in some sort
of nothingness without any distinction between A and not-A, A and B, etc.
A: This is precisely the point. The individuation of phenomena requires apperceptive memory recognition (sa) and
conceptual designation (paatti) for differentiation. All such individuation is relational and conventional and therefore
phenomena cannot be ultimately established as truly existing things (sabhvasiddh), or the ultimate irreducible data of
objective existence independent of the cognitive process.
Q: The conceiving [in Sn 3.12] is either about philosophical theories, self view or jhanas
A: The excerpt from that discourse has much broader implications. Ud 3.10 (Ud 32) Loka Sutta:
This anguished world,
Afflicted by contact,
Speaks of a disease as self.
By whatever ters it conceives of (anything),
It turns out other than that.
Although becoing otherwise, the world is held by existence,
Afflicted by existence, yet delights in that very existence.

Where there is delight, there is fear.

What it fears is unsatisfactory.
This holy life is lived for the abandoning of that existence.
-Whatever ascetics or brahans say that eancipation fro existence is by eans of existence, all of the are not liberated
fro existence, I say.
-And whatever ascetics or brahans say that escape fro existence is by eans of non-existence, all of the have not
escaped fro existence, I say.
-When one relinquishes infatuation with all apperceptions and conceptual designations regarding both existence and nonexistence then it is possible to find peace.
Q: They do. Mind doesn't need to remain in "frozen" state for a long time. It is the fastest thing that changes with no simile
as to how fast it can change. The present moment ceases every moment and with more attention and the closer you look, the
shorter it really is.
A: Present moment is another completely conceptual designation with no locatable referent whatsoever. When you look
close enough it vanishes.
Ven. Sujato, The Mystique of the Abhidhamma:
-In the later abhidhamma, the treatment of time is dominated by a radical new theory, totally unlike anything in the suttas or
even the canonical abhidhamma, the theory of moments (khan avda). This postulates that time is constituted of a series of
discrete, indivisible units, rather like a series of billiard balls lined up on a table. Each unit, or moment, is infinitesimally
small, such that billions pass by in a lightning-flash. So while the suttas emphasize the length of time, the abhidhamma
emphasizes the shortness. This theory shapes the abhidhamma conception of a whole range of central doctrines. Thus
impermanence becomes, not simply being subject to birth and death, rise and fall, but the momentary dissolution of
phenomena one dhamma rises and ceases in an instant, leaving no trace of residue in the next. Samadhi becomes, not an
exalted, stable coalescence of mind, but a momentary samadhi running after the fluctuations of phenomena. The path
becomes, not a gradual program of spiritual development, but a path-moment, gone in a flash. And the mind itself becomes
just a series of mind-moments.
-Now it is quite possible to take this theory, compare it with the suttas, and refute it point by point. But here I would simply
like to point out what an implausible and useless idea it is. Quite obviously, time may be analyzed as finely as we wish, its
divisibility determined only by the sharpness of our analytical razor. Any unit of time has a beginning, a middle, and an end.
That beginning, too, has a beginning, a middle, and an end, and so on ad infinitum. There is simply no good reason to
postulate an ultimate substratum of time to which other strata can be reduced. This idea seems to derive some of its
impressiveness from its air of acrid, pessimistic, reductionist severity, which is often mistaken as a sign of really
uncompromising wisdom.
-The guiding objective for the formulation of the mind-moment theory would seem to be for exactitude of definition. So
while the Buddha spoke of the mind changing while it stands, the abhidhamma just speaks of standing. It is much easier
to define a static entity than a process evolving over time. This is why a butterfly collector wants to have his butterflies dead,
with a pin stuck through their heart and a little label underneath, not madly meandering about in the woods. The dead mind.
But the Buddha was not a butterfly collector, he was an observer of nature. He wanted us to watch the flight and flitter of the
butterfly, to understand how it behaves in its natural environment, and to follow it gently, delicately, quietly until it settles
down to rest and be still according to its nature which he called samadhi....
-Just what is going on here? Why postulate such an odd theory, raising so many pseudo-problems, and so contrary to the
suttas, to common sense, and to experience? What is occurring, I suggest, is that the domain of discourse has been shifted
from the empirical to the metaphysical. The suttas treat time in a straightforward, pragmatic, empirical terms birth, ageing,
and death, the changing states of the mind, the progressive development of spiritual qualities. The purpose, the sole purpose,
is to empower the practitioner to get a handle on this stuff of life, directing attention to the seat of the problem how our
attachments cause suffering, and how to find peace by letting go. But the abhidhamma aims to describe, not just the spiritual
problem and its solution, but the totality of existence. Inevitably, the subjective stance of the suttas becomes objectified, and
as the focus moves from meditation to study, the concepts in the books become imposed on reality; in fact, they become
reality itself. The quest for truth becomes a quest for definition, and reality becomes as neatly departmentalized as a
mathematical table. Ultimate reality becomes, not what you are experiencing now, but what you read about in abhidhamma
books.
-Find this hard to swallow? You might be interested to know that in contemporary abhidhamma circles it is, apparently, the
orthodox position that the series of mind-moments can only be directly seen by Buddhas, and perhaps chief disciples. This
is, admittedly, challenged by some, who claim it can be seen in meditation. In just the same way, a Christian meditator will
claim to see God, or a Hindu to see the universal Self. Seek and ye shall find. The very fact that such a controversy could
possibly arise is a sign how far we have drifted from the Buddhas pragmatic empiricism. This is bad enough; but even worse
when we realize that the theory in question made its appearance a millennium after the Buddhas time. This, for me, is as
good as an admission that the whole thing is mere metaphysical speculation. No wonder the abhidhammikas have been so
keen to father the canonical abhidhamma (and sometimes even the commentaries!) on the Buddha himself, despite massive
evidence to the contrary.
Q: My [possibly arbitrary] interpretation of the word "paramattha" with relation to dhammas is that it means that nothing
within the limitations of our experience (nama-rupa) can be simplified into anything beyond citta, cetasika, rupa and
nibbana. This seems like a phenomenological idea to me, as opposed to an ontological reification.
A: There is no soteriological reason for categorizing any dhamma-s as paramattha, except in reference to nibbna as the
highest goal or the highest good.

A: I have also read suttas which seem to suggest that we shouldn't conceptualize dhammas as if they are real, discrete
entities: Kalaka Sutta AN 4.24:
"When cognizing what is to be cognized, he doesn't construe an [object as] cognized. He doesn't construe an uncognized. He
doesn't construe an [object] to-be-cognized. He doesn't construe a cognizer.
Mulapariyaya Sutta MN1: The Blessed One said: "There is the case, onks, where an uninstructed run-of-the-ill person
who has no regard for noble ones, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhaa; who has no regard for en of
integrity, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhaa perceives earth as earth. Perceiving earth as earth, he
conceives [things] about earth, he conceives [things] in earth, he conceives [things] coing out of earth, he conceives earth
as 'ine,' he delights in earth. Why is that? Because he has not coprehended it, I tell you.
Q: One shouldn't cling to even ultimates. But this doesn't mean that they don't exist.
A: How do they exist? Do they exist as truly existing things (sabhvasiddh) as the commentaries maintain? Do they exist
as the ultimate irreducible data of objective existence independent of the cognitive process, as professor Karunadasa
suggests?
Q: Again, the problem is with clinging, not with external things in and of themselves.
A: Which is why the Buddha had no concern with the ontological status of any possible external things in and of themselves.
Q: Since it is the only moment that exists [the present], without it you wouldn't be able to read this or any other sentence.
A: What is the temporal duration of the present moment? If it exists, surely it must have a quantifiable duration which can be
measurable?
A: Ascertaining right view is essential to practice as it relates directly to the development of vipassan. Firstly, according to
the suttantika stages of gradual training, the development of vipassan has to eventually be conjoined with samatha in jhna.
This includes empirically and directly experiencing the momentary flux of ptisukha while remaining in jhna. Specifically,
this momentary flux is the characteristic of alteration while persisting (t hitassa aathatta). As such it is an aspect of anicca.
And so after emerging from the first or second jhna one can be confident that even this incredible, expansive, even euphoric
experience of non-sensual ptisukha is incapable of ever providing permanent happiness. It is impermanent, and therefore
unsatisfactory (dukkha) and not-self (anatt). It should be developed but not be clung to.
-Eventually, as the gradual training progresses, and along with it the development of vipassan and pa, one will have
renounced and relinquished enough acquisitions that they are able to drop all reference points and object-supports no
matter how refined and taste liberation. This is designated as a measureless mind (appamn acetasa) which is unestablished
(appatit t ha), featureless (anidassana), independent (anissita), etc.. In short, it has no object-support (ramman a).
-In sharp contrast to this suttantika development of gradual training, the Mahvihra commentarial tradition maintains that
the refinement and mastery of the non-sensual rapture, pleasure, equanimity, etc. of jhna isnt necessary. One can proceed
by engaging in vipassan as a self-sufficient alternative practice of right samdhi.
-Now this is where the commentarial view of paramattha vs. paatti has practical implications on how one develops along
the course of gradual training. In the context of npnasati, for example, according to the paramattha/paatti distinction,
the object of consciousness during jhna is the counterpart nimitta. This is considered to be paatti and therefore one cannot
develop actual vipassan while remaining in jhna. So jhna is, in this sense, marginalized.
-Also very relevant to how ones view has practical implications concerning the development of vipassan is the
commentarial theory of radical momentariness (khan avda). Instead of attending to the empirical alteration while persisting
(t hitassa aathatta) of the actual, refined apperception of rapture and pleasure born of seclusion
(vivekajaptisukhasukhumasaccasa) while remaining in the first jhna; the very adherence to the view of the theory of
momentariness superimposes a conceptual filter upon ones empirical experience, which in the context of vipassan is now
interpreted as a momentary samdhi. Here, instead of the empirical experience of alteration while persisting (t hitassa
aathatta), one interprets their experience in terms of rapid momentary arising (uppda), duration (t hiti), and dissolution
(bhaga).
-Moreover, by combining the theory of radical momentariness with the stages of insight gnosis found in the
Pat isambhidmagga, the commentarial tradition has embedded this theory into the very structure of the development of
vipassann a, as well as the noble path and fruition.
-And so as a result of ~600+ years of historical accretion (~2200 years of accretion if the modernist Burmese vipassan
interpretation of vipassann a differs in any way from the Visuddhimagga), we now find well intentioned practitioners
working themselves into something of an existential tizzy by interpreting their experience of the contemplation of
dissolution (bhangnupassann a) in terms of radical, momentary dissolution and cessation (this being just one example).
-Add to this that the Mahvihra commentarial tradition has no way of accurately accounting for the liberated mind of an
arahant, because for abhidhammika-s consciousness is always intentional it always has to have an object support.
Therefore nibbna was smuggled into the dhammyatana and dhammadhtu as the object of a supramundane, yet still
fabricated, mental consciousness. And the cognition of this ultimately existent unconditioned element must necessarily be
devoid of all other ultimately existent fabricated phenomena.
-None of the above mentioned Mahvihra commentarial developments can be supported by a careful and objective reading
of the Pl i sutta-s. If one is sensitive to the historical development of the Pl i tradition, and investigates these issues
objectively with an open-minded and unbiased approach, they should be able to see this for themselves. The commentaries
have not only rerouted the development of right meditation, they have completely redrawn the entire map. This has very
significant and practical implications for anyone practicing the dhamma. As Retro said on another thread:
-I accept there's something admirable about trying to find common ground, but from my perspective it's not just a case of
"rivaling terminology" but "rivaling views". That is, specific aspects of each set of views which are either explicitly or
implicitly incompatible.

-Earlier, Geoff quoted this, from Ven. n ananda's Concept and Reality In Early Buddhist Thought, p. 87: Lists of
phenomena, both mental and material, are linked together with the term "paccay" or any of its equivalents, and the fact of
their conditionality and non-substantiality is emphasized with the help of analysis and synthesis. Apart from serving the
immediate purpose of their specific application, these formulas help us to attune our minds in order to gain pa. Neither
the words in these formulas, nor the formulas as such, are to be regarded as ultimate categories. We have to look not so much
at them as through them. We must not miss the wood for the trees by dogmatically clinging to the words in the formulas as
being ultimate categories. As concepts, they are merely the modes in which the flux of material and mental life has been
arrested and split up in the realm of ideation....
-Now, what he is saying here, isn't just a question of terminology... it's a radically different concept of what a "dhamma" is.
(If accepted) it effectively renders the entire objective/standardised foundation upon which the Abhidhamma is built,
obsolete. It says that a dhamma is that which is "arrested and split up", formed (sankhata), conditioned by ignorance, by the
individual. It does not unconditionally exist, nor is it "ultimate", nor is it an objectively existing object which innocently
presents itself to the citta for investigation by panna... rather it is just that which the individual has ignorantly bracketed and
falsely attributed "thingness" to - no more, no less. In other words, dhammas are the product of ignorance. All those carefully
tabulated lists of dhammas are just mental constructions, conditioned by ignorance.
Q: Now for intellectual theorizers, where they use logic, concepts and convincing wordplay, of course all require recognition
& definition. But experience is one thing, and how we call it is another. Unfortunately a lot of logic (which may be
convincing!) is the latter, play with words.
A: As Ven. Bodhi, Ven. n a nanda, and others have pointed out, the commentarial authors are agile wordsmiths who have
seen fit to contrive fanciful etymologies and interpretations which stretch the limits of language to something of an extreme.
On the other hand, the few suttantika-s who Im familiar with are quite straightforward for the most part.
Q: The sort of analysis that you seem to find useful appears to me to be just dragging in philosophical baggage. I see
writings such as the Visuddhimagga extract I quoted above as practical advice, based on experience, not philosophical
positions.
A: To the contrary, the Visuddhimagga and the rest of the Mahvihra commentaries are steeped in philosophical baggage
which has nothing whatsoever to do with practical advice and serves no useful soteriological purpose. I personally wish this
weren't the case, but it is. How could this have happened? In Nibbna Sermon 01, Ven. n ananda offers some historical
developments pertaining to this question. The sutta-s, on the other hand, display an elegance and internal consistency which
is sadly lacking in the commentaries.
Q: The first description of mind-moments I know is given in Vimuttimagga (1st century CE). And the major Abhidhammika
works are medieval.
A: There are a few short references to the theory of momentariness in the main commentaries. Spk ii 266: Hence the
Ancients said: Arising was called birth and dissolution referred to passing away. Change referred to aging and endurance to
maintenance.
Thus each khandha has three characteristic marks called arising, aging and dissolution, of which it is said in the passage (A I
152): These are, monks, the three conditioned characteristic marks of the conditioned [khandha].
Tenhu porn uppdo jti akkhto bhago vutto vayoti ca aathattam jar vutt t hit ca anuplan ti evam ekekassa
khandhassa uppdajarbhagasakhtni tn i lakkhan n ti.
And Mp ii 252:
Origination is said to appear at the origination moments, aging at the subsistence moments and dissolution at the destruction
moments.
Uppdo ti jti vayo ti bhedo t hitassa aathattam nma jar uppddayo sakhatalakkhan nma tesu uppdakkan e
uppdo thnakkan e jar bhedakkhan e vayo.
-Also, cariya nanda (medieval period VbhAA.) cites the Abhidhamma Yamaka as canonical support for his understanding
of radical momentariness. The Yamaka does use the terms arising moment (uppdakkhan a) and dissolution moment
(bhagakkhan a), even if these terms do not necessarily entail interpreting khan a as radical momentariness in the Yamaka
itself.
A: No doubt, the abbhidhamma project was well-intentioned, but I would suggest that the entire enterprise was also illconceived. The very notion that all of the corners of samsaric cognition can be squared is to miss the point that samsaric
consciousness is deluded from the get-go, and therefore cant be unequivocally validated in terms of the individuation of
empirical particulars (whether as things or event-processes). This very process is itself part of the problem, not the solution.
-Moreover, attempts to account for liberated cognition in terms of the fabricated aggregates misses the point stated in many
sutta-s that such cannot be done. For example, the mind liberated through discernment is designated as measureless mind
(appamn acetasa) in a number of discourses (S iv 119, S iv 186, S iv 189, S iv 199, MN 38). Elsewhere it is designated as
unestablished (appatit t ha), and featureless (anidassana), and one thus liberated is said to be independent (anissita), etc.
-One of the most elegant and subtle aspects of the dhamma of the sutta portion of the Nikya-s is that it doesnt impose any
sort of fabricated view regarding the nature of the liberated mind. This is clear in the sense of measureless mind
appamn acetasa, being free from any sort of measurement pamn a.
-Once all mental designations (pannatti; also sakh, samann, etc.) are done away with, there is no way (and no need) for
defining liberation in any way at all. This is a freedom of absence. It is also non-proliferation (nippapanca: Dhammo
nippapancaratino, nyam dhammo papancrmassa papancaratino.), etc.

-This is what distinguishes the exquisite dhamma of the sutta-s from everything that came before the Buddha or after the
sutta corpus. Its unfortunate that virtually all commentators early abhidhamma, classical, and modern commentators and
all Buddhist doctrinal schools havent seen fit to follow the Buddhas wisdom on these points.
AA: All feeling (vedan) is designated as mental (cetasika; cf. MN 44). But the sutta-s differentiate between pleasure & pain
(sukha & dukkha) born of body-contact (kyasamphassaja) on the one hand (cf. SN 48.37), and happiness & unhappiness
(somanassa & domanassa) born of mind-contact (manosamphassaja) on the other (cf. SN 48.37). A noble disciple still
experiences bodily pain but no mental distress because of it (cf. SN 36.6: "He feels one feeling -- a bodily one, not a mental
one.").
Translating dukkha exclusively as either "pain" or "suffering" in the context of dukkha ariyasacca isn't very accurate. A
better translation is "unsatisfactoriness." This unsatisfactoriness is to be fully understood (dukkha parieyya), and consists
of:
In the context of the first noble truth, dukkha encompasses the following:
The unsatisfactoriness of pain (dukkhadukkhat):
birth (jti), aging (jar), illness (bydhi), death (maran a), sorrow (soka), lamentation (parideva), pain (dukkha), unhappiness
(domanassa), despair (upys)
The unsatisfactoriness of change (viparin madukkhat):
-association with what is unpleasant (appiyehi sampayogo)
-separation from what is pleasant (piyehi vippayogo)
-not getting what is wanted (yampiccha na labhati)
The unsatisfactoriness of fabrications (sakhradukkhat):
-the five clinging-aggregates (pacupdnakkhandh)
-Relevant to the discussion at hand is understanding that dukkha is not just "pain." Translating dukkha exclusively as either
"pain" or "suffering" in the context of dukkha ariyasacca isn't very accurate. A better translation is "unsatisfactoriness." This
unsatisfactoriness is to be fully understood (dukkha parieyya). From the above it is sa khradukkhat -- the
unsatisfactoriness of fabrications -- which is dukkha in an all pervasive sense. All fabrications are unsatisfactory because
they are impermanent. They are always becoming "otherwise." Dukkhadukkhat and viparin madukkhat, on the other
hand, are only experienced on certain occasions.
Also the Nettippakaran a: Herein, the world is, at one tie or another, soewhat free fro to the unsatisfactoriness of pain
as well as the unsatisfactoriness of change. Why is that? Because there are those in the world who have little sickness and
are long-lived. But only the nibbna coponent with no fuel reaining (anupdisesa nibbnadhtu) liberates fro the
unsatisfactoriness of fabrications.
-Contemplating samsra as an ongoing series of futile, hollow, and unsatisfactory repetitions of birth, sickness, pain, and
death motivates one to practice with diligence to a degree that a limited view directed toward merely ending the
unsatisfactoriness of this life cannot. The atheistic view that there is nothing after this present life entails the consequence
that everyone reaches a cessation of dukkha (of sorts) upon death. If everyone were to attain the fruition effortlessly, merely
by dying, then there would be no compelling motivation to fully engage in the integral practice of the dhammavinaya.
-The dhamma certainly includes rational thought, but goes well beyond any consensual egocentric rationality (whether
atheistic or theistic). The first steps to transcending the conventional rational mind appear when one develops samatha
sufficiently to be able to experience the rapture (pti), pleasure (sukha), and expansive mind (mahaggat citta) of jhna. This
opens up a whole new vista of experience not previously available, and displays the limitations of any previously held
conceptual views based on conventional rationality or normative empiricism.
-Beyond these refined meditative states, for the noble disciple who has attained any of the first three fruitions, there is no
more adherence to egocentric rationality, and for the arahant no adherence to the limitations of the rational mind at all.
-We all come to the dhamma with our unique life experiences and worldview. I acknowledge and respect that. I'm just
suggesting that it is prudent to keep an open mind regarding those aspects of the dhamma which may not resonate with our
present life experience or worldview. The path is a process of development and refinement of discernment, and what seems
quite coherent to the worldling may very well be seen as delusional when that same individual attains the fruition of stream
entry, etc.
And if we ever need a bit of help motivating us to get to the cushion and remain there, the sutta-s offer us some skillful
contemplations and themes for reflection: [AN 5.57], [AN 6.19], [AN 8.30]
Q: 1. Does a stream-enterer "experience" nibbana, of just "glimpse" it?
2. Is nibbana an object of consciousness (as in the Abhidhamma) or is it an absence of objects?
3. Does an arahant "experience" nibbana for a short time (like jhana etc) and then return to a more-or-less normal experience
(this would be the Abhidhamma view), or does he/she "remain in nibbana"?
A: Nettippakaran a 4.42, which is the first of nine examples of the mode of conveying ways of entry to the truths, explains
guidelines for how to comment upon the fruition attainments. A careful reading provides us with at least a conceptual map of
the four fruition attainments, and some appropriate designations to use to describe them. First, the Netti cites the verse from
Ud 7.1 Pat hamalakun d akabhaddiya Sutta, and then explains how this verse pertains to a non-learners liberation
(asekhvimutti), i.e. the arahant's fruition attainment, and then a learners liberation (sekhvimutti), i.e. the first three fruition
attainments, but specifically in terms of the fruition of stream entry.
A: There are numerous Theravda teachers and practitioners who don't subscribe to the (rather late) commentarial
interpretation of the paths and fruitions which rests on the theory of momentariness and the reification of nibbna as a

vacuum state (i.e. such as the attainment of cessation of apperception and feeling). I think you're probably already aware of
this, but for the sake of presenting an alternate perspective there's the following.... See Itivuttaka 43 (Iti 37).
-This fruitional liberation is realized through discernment of dependent arising in reverse sequence giving rise to dispassion,
etc., eventually culminating in gnosis of the complete elimination of passion, aggression, and delusion (i.e. nibbnan a) .
See: Nettippakaran a 4.42.
-Which for the non-learner (i.e. arahant) is experienced as unestablished consciousness (appatit t ha vin a), as in SN 12.38
(S ii 65): Cetansutta:
[W]hen one doesn't intend, arrange, or obsess [about anything], there is no support for the stationing of consciousness.
There being no support, there is no establishing of consciousness. When that consciousness doesn't land & grow, there is no
production of renewed becoing in the future. When there is no production of renewed becoing in the future, there is no
future birth, aging & death, sorrow, laentation, pain, distress, or despair. Such is the cessation of this entire ass of
suffering & stress.
-Which elsewhere is designated as a "measureless mind" (appamn acetasa, cf. S iv 119, S iv 186, S iv 189, S iv 199, & M I
270), or "featureless consciousness" (anidassana vin a), etc. DN 11 (D i 211) Kevad d hasutta:
Consciousness without feature,
Without end, luinous all around:
Here water, earth, fire,
And wind have no footing.
Here long & short
Coarse & fine fair & foul
Nae & for
Are all brought to an end.
With the cessation of consciousness
Each is here brought to an end.
-That is, vin assa nirodhena etth'etam uparujjhati: With the cessation of the stationing of consciousness [i.e. vin assa
t hitiy nirodhena] each is here brought to an end. Or as Ven. n ananda says: The vacant gaze [of an arahant] is, in fact, not
established anywhere (appatit t ham). It has no existence (appavattam) and it is objectless (anramman am).
Q: Footnotes 9 and 10 refer to a particular "very unusual kind of 'jhaana' or 'samaadhi'", which implies that it is not the
"normal state of the Arahant", but happens only during the awakening experience (though it can be re-entered later). Am I
interpreting this correctly?
A: I can't speak for Ven. n ananda, but yes, that is how I understand what he is saying. We can also look at what else he
says on the subject. In Concept and Reality he equates the experience of featureless/non-manifestative consciousness
(anidassana vin a) with the fruition-gnosis samdhi (aphala samdhi) of an arahant, which after first attainment can be
re-entered later as the arahant's meditation. AN 9.37 describes this samdhi as follows: Sister, the concentration whereby -neither pressed down nor forced back, nor with fabrication kept blocked or suppressed -- still as a result of release,
contented as a result of standing still, and as a result of contentent one is not agitated: This concentration is said by the
Blessed One to be the fruit of gnosis.
Q: So would it be correct to say that you (and presumably Ven Nanananda, judging from those passages) see the fruition
attainments as somewhat similar to the commentary versions (as far as that they are particular meditative states that are
attained at fruition and can be revisited), but you would differ on some of the details of the fruition itself?
A: I would not agree that the path of stream entry is one mind moment in duration. Ven. Kheminda has offered a detailed
survey of the relevant canonical sources on the subject in Path, Fruit and Nibbna. As for the first three fruition attainments
being meditative states that one can re-enter, as the thirty-seven factors of awakening are all supramundane (cf.
Pat isambhidmagga), then whenever one who has attained the fruit of stream entry, etc., develops satipat t hna or any of
the other factors of awakening, they are engaging in their respective fruition attainment.
Q: So, correct me if I am wrong, there is said to be cessation of the sense-spheres because what is called contact is
dependent upon the duality of the sense-faculty and it's object, a duality which is, though useful, ultimately papaca and
conceptualization.
A: Dependent arising in its forward sequence is always a description of deluded cognition. When rooted in ignorance and
craving, any experience automatically includes all of the first eleven links. That is, for the worldling there is always
ignorance, contact, craving, grasping, becoming, and birth, which is the birth of a "being" (satta). This sets up the problem of
separation and alienation -- i.e. the struggle for ego survival -- of "my being" in "the world." Whenever there is "a being" in
"the world" there is going to arise circumstances of "my being" vs. "the world". Thus the inevitability of dissatisfaction
(dukkhadukkhat: the unsatisfactoriness of pain; viparin madukkhat: the unsatisfactoriness of change; sakhradukkhat:
the unsatisfactoriness of fabrications), as well as pursuit of the eight worldly dhammas, etc., etc....
Q: This proliferation and conceptualization ends simultaneously with the culmination of the understanding of
impermanence, at which point the mind ceases to get caught up with or grasp onto anything, that is, becomes unestablished
and non-manifestive/non-proliferating, including the proliferation of self-identification and volitions of clinging and aversion
(which might all be summed up under "non-fashioning). When the duality which supports the notion of contact is gone, there
cannot really said to be contact, nor consciousness or the "loka" of the six sense spheres, though it isn't that they've literally
vanished.
A: I agree. When the four noble truths are fully penetrated, the entire deluded cognitive and conflicted affective edifice of
the forward sequence of dependent arising immediately falls like a house of cards.

-n avra may have been a bit off on a few details in some of his writings, but it's quite amazing how deeply he penetrated
the dhamma.
Q: So it is fetters which give rise to phenomena at the 6 sense bases
When fetters are broken/severely weakened sense impressions stop arising momentarily due to power of a special type of
samadhi (anantarika samadhi). This is the culmination point of saddha, viriya, sati, samadhi, panna.
A: I respectfully disagree with your realist interpretation. Sense impressions aren't the problem per se -- desire and passion
(i.e. craving) arising dependent upon contact -- is what binds the "internal" sensory sphere and the "external" sensory sphere
together. Thus, the solution is to relinquish all acquisitions and eliminate craving (third noble truth); then the very notions of
"internal" vs. "external" and "contact" are rendered void.
Q: To see and understand the four noble truths in completion, to see the third noble truth, the truth of cessation (nirodha
sacca) I think this must be perceived.
A: That which is the destruction of greed, hatred and delusion is nibbana. -- S.N. IV 251 and IV 321
That which is the destruction of greed, hatred and delusion is asankhata. -- S.N. IV 359 and S.N. 362
Q: To what extent is non-attention to "signs", as seems to be explained the passages by ven. n ananda you've quoted,
necessary for total dukkhanirodha, for the fruition of arahantship? I can understand how such a thing might occur, but it also
seems to me that there is no harm in sa continuing to do it's thing and perceive objects, though the individual would know
that such perceptions are impermanent and selfless and so be liberated from any potential dukkha in regards to perception,
and yet it does not necessarily need to switched off into animitta-mode.
A: The "sign" that must be abandoned with regard to any phenomenon is the sign of permanence (cf. Pat isambhidmagga).
The apperception of impermanence and signs of permanence are mutually exclusive. They cannot occur together.
Q: In defence of void...AN 9.34 PTS: A iv 414
A: Not all arahants are liberated both ways. SN 12.70 and AN 4.87 tell us of arahants liberated through discernment who
don't have any of the formless attainments. Without mastery of the formless attainments one cannot attain the cessation of
apperception and feeling.
Moreover, the attainment of the cessation of apperception and feeling (or any other vacuum state "attainment" of any
duration that one might posit as asakhata) cannot be synonymous with nibbna because these states are impermanent. One
enters them and one exits them. On the other hand, the complete elimination of passion, aggression, and delusion -- i.e.
nibbna -- is a not-conditioned (asakhata) attainment which is irreversible. The other three fruitions are irreversible also,
each with their respective degree of liberation.
Q: Note how Ven sariputta says that even the slightest sanna, the slightest arising is dukkha.
A: There can be no gnosis (n a) without sa.
Q: While I agree that person may experience magga- phala citta and progress up the path without fruition absorptions....
A: This is all commentarial jargon. The only fruitional samdhi mentioned in the sutta-s is the aphala samdhi of an
arahant.
Q: Absence cannot be impermanent, except conceptually.
A: Even the commentaries admit that cessation of apperception and feeling is not asa khata (cf. Kathvatthu).
Q: Does the attainment of right view without effluents occur in the moment of Nibbana (or some other ariyan att/ainment)?
Is it simultaneously the cause of unbinding and a result? (in that one is "nibbanized" through right view and fully possessed
of right view in Nibbana) [MN117]
A: Whenever one is engaged in supramundane right view there is no generation of mental effluents at that time. "Super
mundane right view" means that this view is not associated with effluents and a mind that recognizes the supermundane right
view has no tendency to develop mental effluents.That doesn't necessarily mean that the person has attained Nibbana and
destroyed all tendencies of mental effluents once and for all. A person's mind which recognized with the super mundane right
view is noble as such views do not promote effluents (asava) as long as mind is attended to this view.
Q: On the other hand, the view with effluents is still the right view but it encourages asava. Views that "there is something
offered", "there is a mother and a father", "there is this and the other worlds" are all right views as they direct the mind
towards moral conduct, direct the mind towards sila and dhana, well being of society, human value systems etc. but they are
not associated with "letting go of the self view". They entertain the self view thus, while being right view, are not factors of
the path to Nibbana.
A: One who has attained the fruition of stream entry has abandoned identity view (sakkyadit t hi), i.e. self-view
(attnudit t hi), but still hasn't abandoned craving for existence (bhavatan h), which includes craving for a high birth, i.e.
desire for form existence (rparga). [AN 10.13] [MN 118]
Q: The suttas support the commentarial (visuddhimagga/mahasi sayadaw) understanding of the sotapanna state for example
(and the path to get there). See below how a sotapanna perceives insight knowledges in line with the purifcations and the
insight knowledges.
A: According to the Mahvihra tradition standardized by Ven. Buddhaghos a the path of stream entry is merely one mind
moment in duration, followed by two or three fruition mind moments. This doesn't accord with the sutta-s or the
Abhidhammapit aka.

A: This sustaining in my opinion is made more difficult by the institutional descent of what is a state of freedom into
categorisation and signs indicating status. Stream winner and once returner etc language represents the institutionalisation of
the Buddha Dhamma. Its essential radical liberation is rendered less scary by imagined classifications..like prize winning
marrows at the local county show.
A: The Kathvatthu and the Visuddhimagga maintain that the cessation of apperception and feeling (savedayitanirodha),
which is also called cessation attainment (nirodhasampatti) is neither supramundane nor not-conditioned (asa khata). Cf.
Visuddhimagga 23.52:
As to the question: Is the attainent of cessation fored or unfored, etc.? It is not classifiable as fored or unfored,
undane or supraundane. Why? Because it has no individual essence. But since it coes to be attained by one who attains
it, it is therefore perissible to say that it is produced, not unproduced.
-The cessation attainment (nirodhasampatti) is neither fabricated (sa khata) nor not-fabricated (asa khata), but it is
produced (nipphanna) and not unproduced (anipphanna). Therefore it has no correspondence with the asa khat dhtu.
Moreover, there is no occurrence of consciousness during the cessation attainment, therefore no perception or knowledge.
This is why the cessation attainment plays no direct role in the attainment of the supramundane paths and fruitions.
-It also can't be designated as the same as nibbna because, as the Visuddhimagga points out, the cessation attainment
requires mastery of the four formless attainments before it can be entered. Since there are arahants who haven't developed
the formless attainments, they are incapable of attaining the cessation of apperception and feeling. Nevertheless, they are
fully liberated through discernment.
Q: And those arahats with 4 jhanas - I think they can see nibbana directly in "emptiness" or "signless" concentration (that is they have it as an object of mind), but they don't "dwell in it", because in this last case there is no consciousness (in
particular - perception) to observe, to look at, to cognize. Suttas support these both variants of "experiencing nibbana".
A: The Nikya-s and the Abhidhammapit aka are both in agreement that there can be no gnosis (n a) without simultaneous
concomitant perception (sa).
A: All four main Nikya-s define right concentration (sammsamdhi) as the four jhna-s (D ii 313, M iii 252, S v 10, A ii
25). AN 3.88 (A i 235) lists the four jhna-s as the training of heightened mind (adhicittasikkh). SN 48.10 (S v 198) lists the
four jhna-s as the faculty of concentration (samdhindriya) as practiced by a noble disciple (ariyasvaka). AN 5. 14 (A iii
11) lists the four jhna-s as the strength of concentration (samdhibala) as practiced by a noble disciple (ariyasvaka).
Moreover, SN 12.70 (S ii 121) and AN 4.87 (A ii 87) both state that there are arahants who don't have the formless
attainments. And of 500 arahants mentioned in SN 8.7 (S i 191), only 60 are said to be liberated both ways (i.e. have mastery
of the formless attainments).
-Also, in the Dhammasagan i, where the distinction is made between mundane form sphere jhna (rpvacarajjhna) and
formless sphere jhna (arpvacarajjhna) on the one hand, and supramundane jhna (lokuttarajjhna) needed for all four
paths on the other hand, supramundane jhna is defined exclusively as the four jhna-s (or five by dividing the first jhna
into two).
-In none of these instances are the four formless attainments or the cessation attainment ever mentioned in the context of
right concentration as a component of the noble eightfold path. Thus your equating nibbna with the cessation of
apperception and feeling is unsustainable, since it is entirely possible to realize nibbna without ever experiencing the
cessation attainment.
Q: Stream entry is not an attainment; it a letting go arising out of insight, vipassana. From that there is no need to add the
real potential of the corruption of credentials to ones practice, which is very much in keeping with the Buddhas teachings.
A: Indeed, the point of stream entry is to let go of identity view.
A: The other issue is, of course, that self-assessment of ones progress and self-proclamation of ones attainment are all too
easily corrupted by subtle, unrecognized defilements as well as simply misunderstanding what one has experienced, and
certitude is no guarantee that the experience - with which one is identifying - is what one might imagine that it is. We
humans have the greatest capacity for self-deception. There is a radical reason why the Buddha taught us to let go, not to add
on.
AA: 'Empty village' (sua gma) stands for the six internal sense media. If a wise, competent, intelligent person examines
them from the point of view of the eye, they appear abandoned, void, & empty. If he examines them from the point of view
of the ear... the nose... the tongue... the body... the intellect, they appear abandoned, void, & empty. [SN 35.197 (CDB SN
35.238)]
-The dhamma is a way, a path coursing away from dissatisfaction and toward authentic liberation. Thus there's always a
question of the skillfulness of a presentation, which is informed by the speaker's and the listener's view, and offers the
possibility of further informing the listener's view. When we move away from the noble eightfold path embedded in the
canon in search of understanding, the possibility arises of encountering self-limiting interpretations either rooted in a desire
to set boundaries of orthodox definition not evident in the canon itself, or the opposite desire to discard much if not
everything that's not explicitly stated in the suttas (or beyond this, discarding whatever we deem unacceptable in the suttas as
well). Either of these moves, if accepted uncritically, can impose conceptual filters upon what we acknowledge as the
possible interpretation of our own experience (i.e. view) as well as the path components to be implemented in our practice.
-We only need to look at the widespread contemporary emphasis on a path of training and development which doesn't fully
embrace the integration of non-carnal joy and pleasure (nirmis pti and sukha), which the discourses tell us are integral
sweet fruits of the ascetic life, or alternatively, the uncritical rejection of everything not supposedly uttered by the Buddha, to
begin to recognize some of the consequences of accepting self-limiting interpretations of what the noble path "should be.

-There is no need to accept the theory of radical momentariness to clearly see for oneself the alteration while persisting
(t hitassa aathatta) of mental fabrications.
-And by extension, specifically regarding physical processes, if there is no alteration in the circulatory system or the central
nervous system of the body (for example) then you are very likely either (i) dead, or (ii) soon to be dead. And even a dead
body undergoes a process of decomposition.
-Alteration or change or flux is common to all physical things on both micro and macro levels.
-I mean that the entire notion of inherently existent things is rooted in ignorance. This is why one has to penetrate
conditioned arising in reverse sequence in order to eliminate the view that things have inherent existence. And an arahant has
done just that. Therefore an arahant can use conventional language without forgetting that s/he is merely employing nominal
designations.
-Notions of truly existent things are nothing more the ignorant reification of designations with no ultimately established
referents.
-The entire path is just the skillful employment of practice injunctions in order to eliminate craving and ignorance. There is
no ontology to be established. In fact, conceiving in terms of existence and non-existence is a significant part of the problem,
and not the solution.
-And on a related note, I quit thinking in terms of vdas and ynas a long time ago. I consider everything other than the
suttas of the Nikyas and gamas to be a series of endnotes to the teachings of the ascetic Gotama. Some of these endnotes
are more informative than others. Many just wander off into thickets of views.
-Ven. n avra was one of the first people in a very long time to question the authority and validity of the received
commentarial tradition. IMO this was intellectually honest and necessary. He offered much in order to begin to clear the
path. But it was just a beginning. He wasn't always 100% correct and his approach and writing style are not straightforward.
A diligent, disinterested practitioner can accept Ven. n avra's pioneering contributions while also seeing that it's now
possible to approach the dhamma even more directly.
There is no need to suggest that feelings, perceptions, or thoughts "endure unchanged for at least a certain interval." AN
3.47: Monks, these three are fabricated characteristics of what is fabricated. Which three? Arising is discernible, passing
away is discernible,alteration (literally, other-ness) while staying is discernible. Also SN 35.93
-There also is no reason to read the commentarial theory of radical momentariness into these passages either.
-But a pleasant feeling (sukha vedan) or a painful feeling (dukkha vedan) alters even while it is being experienced. It
doesn't remain static. And also the thought, "This is painful." There is no stasis that can be experientially discerned when
these phenomena are occurring. And when one refines one's perception (sa) to where one is aware of this alteration, then
the alteration of perception is also discernible.
-The point of anicca is to say that all experiences are comprised of all three aspects, not that all three aspects are experienced
at the same time.
-The dhamma is concerned with soteriology not ontology. All of the practice injunctions included in the three aggregations
of ethical conduct, meditation, and discernment have the four noble truths as their underlying thematic structure. In MN 28
(M i 184) Mahhatthipadopama Sutta we find Venerable Sriputta comparing the four noble truths to an elephants footprint.
-Specifically, all practices lead towards and culminate in the full realization of the third noble truth: the cessation of
unsatisfactoriness. As SN 45.91 (S v 38) Pcnaninna Sutta.
-Moreover, these noble truths are epistemic. They are the undeceptive knowledge of unmistaken cognitions. They are not
ontological realities. There is no need for ontological commitments, i.e. there is no need to establish phenomena as truly
existing. All such proofs and refutations are quite irrelevant and are rooted in unskillful adherence to views.
-I've already addressed the inappropriateness of applying realist ontology to the Buddha's dhamma a number of times on this
thread and elsewhere. There is no need whatsoever to impute substantial existence onto phenomena as they are experienced.
It's a complete sidetrack; an infatuation with views.
- I think that if we are to draw any comparisons between the dhamma and western philosophy the most appropriate
comparison might be with some aspects of first-person phenomenological description. That is, Husserl's method of
phenomenological description where one attends to the contents of one's conscious experience while setting aside (i.e.
bracketing) the question of the ontological existence of the contents of this experience altogether. Of course, there's no need
for any further comparison beyond this general methodological framework. I'm not suggesting that we attempt to read
Husserl or Merleau-Ponty into the dhamma....
-Impermanence has no soteriological utility except as this concept relates to impermanent phenomena (as phenomena are
experienced). Apperception/recognition of impermanence (aniccasa) involves attending to an appearance of
impermanence (anicckra). This appearance of impermanence is recognized via a sign/representation (nimitta).
-Phenomena arise according to specifically assignable conditionality (idappaccayat):
When this is, that is.
From the arising of this comes the arising of that.
Therefore, phenomena aren't utterly non-existent.
Phenomena cease according to specifically assignable conditionality (idappaccayat):
When this isn't, that isn't.
From the cessation of this comes the cessation of that.
-Therefore, phenomena aren't ultimately existent.

-Moreover, the individuation of phenomena requires apperceptive memory recognition (sa) and conceptual designation
(paatti) for differentiation. (Magic of the Mind 63)
-And how are you going to establish the objective validity your momentary thing "that maintains its characteristic nature as it
is undergoing subtlest change"? If you rely on any criterion or measurement (pamn a) based on deluded worldly cognitions,
then all you will ever "prove" is that deluded worldly cognitions are deluded. Not a valid source for establishing the unerring
validity of any supposed objective truth-claims. Sn 3.12 Dvayatnupassan Sutta:
Entrenched in nae and for,
They conceive that This is true.
In whatever way (worldlings) conceive it,
It turns out other than that.
For that is what is false about it.
Whatever is transitory certainly has a false nature.
-If, on the other hand, you attempt to employ any criterion or measurement (pamn a) in order to try to establish liberated
cognitons, then you will also be at a loss because there are no means of measurement which can be used as reference points
to validate a measureless cognition (appamn acetasa). SN 6.7 (S i 148) Koklika Sutta.
-Better to practice satipat t hna and begin to relinquish notions of objective truth-claims about theories of radical
momentariness.
Q: My impression from listening to Ven Nananada's Nibbana Sermons is that, though his angle is certainly conceptual
proliferation, being fooled by the movie or the magic show, he seems careful not to fall into nihilism by specifically denying
the existence of anything in particular. It seems to me that to say that there is only proliferation would be nihilism. Am I
misreading Ven Nananada's message?
A: I think you're reading him accurately. It's not that there is only proliferation (papaca); it's that phenomena (dhamma-s)
do not need to be (and indeed cannot be) established as ultimately existent ontological realities.
-The individuation of particular dhamma-s requires the concoitant engagement of consciousness (vin a) and name
(nma: vedan, sa, phassa, cetan, manasikra) specific to whatever dhamma is being cognitively individuated. Thus, all
such individuation of particulars is fabricated, relational, and conventional.
-A thorough understanding of this process of individuation exposes the proble of deluded cognition, and when the problem
is thoroughly discerned one can then begin to abandon unskillful processes and develop skillful mental factors such as
saddh, pmojja, pti, passaddhi, sukha, samdhi. Beyond this, one begins to clearly see the futility of fabricated processes
altogether. As this clear seeing (vipassan) develops, disenchantment (nibbid) arises. Then dispassion (virga) arises. Then
as these qualities continue to develop, eventually the path results in liberation through discernment (pavimutti) and one
realizes the gnosis of elimination (khayen a) of the influxes (sava-s), also referred to as the elimination of craving
(tan hakkhaya) as a shorthand expression.
-All of this is developmental and soteriological. The path doesn't require establishing philosophical theories and proofs of
valid cognition (pamn a) or ultimately existent objects. From the perspective of the early Pl i dhamma all of this sort of
theorizing is just more proliferation (papaca). Nothing needs to be philosophically established beyond the status of mere
designation (paattimatta). This in no way entails nihilism because the dhammavinaya isn't a philosophical head trip; all
components of path praxis are to be fully engaged and developed (bhvan).
-Cetan is volitional intention, the will-to-do, the intentional directing of the mind. It is functional choice. Just because a
particular mind-stream doesn't have all of the optimal requisite causes and conditions in place to always make the most
optimally efficacious choice doesn't mean that cetan isn't functional choice.
-Contact is concomitant with volitional intention. The path includes developing fundamental attention (yoniso manasikra),
right effort (sammvyma), and right exertion (sammappadhn), which condition desire (chanda), volitional intention
(cetan), and so on. Functional choice isn't independent of other causes and conditions -- it operates within the same
conditioned mind-stream. But it does operate, and it does so in consort with desire and attention, etc. Hence there is no need
for Cartesian notions of free will or Upanis adic notions of a permanent, unchanging Self for there to be functional choice. In
fact, these non-Buddhist systems are not sustainable precisely because of the interdependence of phenomena: i.e. an
unchanging agent cannot engage in actions, etc.
These phenomena are quite clearly differentiated and defined in the Pat isambhidmagga npnassatikath:
How is it that he trains thus: 'Experiencing pti, I will breathe in;' he trains thus: 'Experiencing pti, I will breathe out'?
What is pti?...
Any joy (pti), gladness (pojja), delight (odan), joyfulness (paodan), shining irth (bhsa pabhsa), felicity (vitti),
elation (odagya), satisfaction (attaant), and ental uplift (cittassa), is pti....
How is it that he trains thus: 'Experiencing sukha, I will breathe in;' he trains thus: 'Experiencing sukha, I will breathe out'?
Pleasure (sukha): there are two kinds of pleasure, bodily pleasure and ental pleasure.
What is bodily pleasure?
Any bodily well-being, bodily pleasure, well-being and pleasure felt as born of body contact, welcoe satisfactory feeling
born of body contact, is bodily pleasure.
What is ental pleasure?
Any ental well-being, ental pleasure, well-being and pleasure felt as born of ental contact, welcoe pleasant feeling
born of ental contact, is ental pleasure.
-And as jhna factors, Pet akopadesa 7.72.

-What most worldlings unquestioningly take to be "real," due to ascribing significance to the contents of deluded cognition,
is nothing more than deluded cognition. Learners and arahants have understood deluded cognition to be false and have
abandoned it (or are in the process of abandoning it in the case of learners). In this way they develop a "measureless mind."
Seeing through the limitations of signs and symbols and language, they realize that there is no need -- and no possible way -of trying to pin down this measureless freedom of absence by using signs and language. There is no point in attempting to
construct and systematize a valid "reality." They've done what was needed to be done. The teachings they offer diagnose the
problems of deluded cognition and point out the ways to unravel and eventually abandon passion, aggression, and delusion.
And this path is as relevant today as it was 2500 years ago. It's quite amazing -- awe inspiring.
-The beating of your heart is just the beating of your heart. How you relate to your body is what is important. This can be
done either with appropriate attention (yoniso manasikra) or inappropriate attention (ayoniso manasikra). Appropriate
attention, conjoined with mindfulness, full awareness, concentration, and discernment attends to unsatisfactoriness, the
origin of unsatisfactoriness, the cessation of unsatisfactoriness, and the way leading to the cessation of unsatisfactoriness
(dukkha, dukkhasamudaya, dukkhanirodha, and dukkhanirodhagminpat ipad). Using this framework one comprehends
arising, passing away, allure, drawbacks, and escape with regard to all phenomena experienced. Or one can pursue
frameworks of inappropriate attention. Some of the unskillful types of inappropriate attention have already been indicated.
-Attempting to establish an "objective reality" is, at best, an unnecessary and superfluous line of investigation, and at worst,
the extreme of "everything exists," which is an assumption dependent upon deluded cognitions. See AN 4.24 Kl akrma
Sutta.
-There is no need and no value in constructing an "objective reality" or proving "valid cognitions." The practitioner simply
needs to set aside such speculations and return to the practice of the four applications of mindfulness.
-The Abhidhammapit aka doesn't define conditioned phenomena as paramattha dhamm or paramattha sabhva. The former
does occur once in the Kathvatthu but it's hardly a ringing endorsement for how this notion of paramattha dhamma later
came to be applied and interpreted. Moreover, even someone like Karunadasa admits that the later bhidhammika treatises
present a realist view. As Ven. n ananda has repeatedly pointed out, this view isn't supported by the suttas or earliest strata
of abhidhamma.
-Either you have failed to understand Ven. n ananda's commentaries already posted on this thread, or you disagree with
them. At any rate, the problem with your assertions are this: deluded cognitions are deluded and are therefore of no value in
ascertaining what is or isn't objectively real. An arahants cognitions are measureless and therefore there are no worldly
criteria for establishing an objective basis for such cognitions. A learner's cognitions are also designated as measureless when
engaged in practice. Thus there are no objective means for establishing what you are trying to propose. It's a fruitless line of
investigation. It would be far more beneficial to practice the applications of mindfulness
-I was just paraphrasing the professor's own words. Karunadasa's The Dhaa Theory: Philosophical Cornerstone of the
Abhidhaa: What eerges fro this Abhidhaic doctrine of dhaas is a critical realis, one which recognizes the
distinctness of the world fro the experiencing subject yet also distinguishes between those types of entities that truly exist
independently of the cognitive act and those that owe their being to the act of cognition itself.
-He goes on to say that "a dhamma is a truly existent thing (sabhvasiddha)." This is a completely realist view. And the
inevitable consequence entailed by this realist view, wherein all conditioned dhammas are "truly existing things," is that path
cognitions and fruition cognitions of each of the four paths and fruits must occur within an utterly void vacuum state
cessation, which is considered to be the ultimately existent "unconditioned." This is described by Jack Kornfield:
In Mahasis odel, enlightenentor at least strea-entry, the first taste of nirvanacoes in the for of a cessation of
experience, arising out of the deepest state of concentration and attention, when the body and ind are dissolved, the
experience of the ordinary senses ceases, and we rest in perfect equaniity. We open into that which is unconditioned,
tieless, and liberating: nirvana.... But there are a lot of questions around this kind of oent. Soeties it sees to have
enorously transforative effects on people. Other ties people have this oent of experience and arent really changed
by it at all. Soeties theyre not even sure what happened.
-This notion of path and fruition cognitions is not supported by the Pli canon. Moreover, there are now numerous people
who've had such experiences sanctioned by "insight meditation" teachers, and who have gone on to proclaim to the world
that arahants can still experience lust and the other defiled mental phenomena. Taking all of this into account there is no
good reason whatsoever to accept this interpretation of path and fruition cognitions. Void vacuum state cessations are not an
adequate nor reliable indication of stream entry or any of the other paths and fruitions.
-Realism has nothing to do with rejecting conditionality/causality. It has to do with the objective status one proposes with
regard to form and formless phenomena. By the criteria Karunadasa presents he is quite correct in his assessment that the
later bhidhammika interpretation of the dhamma theory is a realist view.
-This is a consequence of a realist view: If all conditioned phenomena are truly existent impermanent things, and nibbna is
a truly existent permanent thing, then nibbna can only be cognized as an utter void completely independent of these socalled truly existent impermanent things.
-I think it's important to remember that references to the deathless are pointing to the absence of passion, aggression, and
delusion. The Thai forest style of teaching of Ajahn Chah which emphasizes simply being "that which knows" (poo roo: "the
one who knows") can lead to this freedom of absence, where there is no identity, no need to grasp changing conditions to try
to confirm our existence (which includes relinquishing the need to hold tightly to dhamma "views" as well).
-One has to be careful with such descriptions which may seem to be pointing to some sort of truly existent "unconditioned
ground." Nibbna is the extinguishment of the mental outflows (sav). The liberated mind is measureless (appamn a). This
isnot a "state of oneness with all of existence." It's an absence of identification (anattat). It's non-indicative (anidassana),

unestablished (appatit t ha), and not-dependent (anissita). None of these adjectives entail any sort of metaphysical "ground of
being" or "unconditioned absolute." They are all negations. An arahant has simply "gone out."
Q: I think Alan is referring to going beyond the eight jhana, ie absence of sanna and vedana, and this being referred to
(correctly in my opinion, if it occurs following a vipassana process of breaking the fetters) as nibbana.
-Moreover, only arahants who are liberated both ways can experience cessation attainment (nirodhasampatti). Arahants who
are liberated through discernment do not. Therefore it is not accurate to equate nibbna with nirodhasampatti.
-Nibbna is the realization of the noble truth of the cessation of unsatisfactoriness (dukkhanirodha ariyasacca), which is not
synonymous with nirodhasampatti. DN 22: And what is the noble truth of the cessation of stress? The remainderless fading
& cessation, renunciation, relinquishment, release, & letting go of that very craving [for sensual pleasure, craving existence,
craving non-existence].
-Your interpretation of the supramundane paths and fruitions is not supported by the Pli Tipit aka. This has already been
pointed out on this thread. Your interpretation of fruition attainment isn't supported by the Pli Tipit aka either.
-The cessation of unsatisfactoriness (dukkhanirodha) is the cessation of craving (tan h), not the cessation of phenomena. DN
22: And what is the noble truth of the cessation of stress? The remainderless fading & cessation, renunciation,
relinquishment, release, & letting go of that very craving.
-What craving? Craving sensual pleasure (kmatan h), craving existence (bhavatan h), and craving non-existence
(vibhavatan h). There is no canonical support for your interpretation of nibbna or saupdisesa nibbnadhtu (nibbna
element with fuel remaining).
-The lack of canonical support for your interpretation of nibbna has nothing to do with me or my practice, or anyone else's
practice. Blackout cessations are just another passing experience (or non-experience). Just one more thing to be let go of.
Certainly not a sign of stream entry. Such experiences are experienced by all sorts of yogis including those practicing nonBuddhist systems. Thus, they have nothing to do with the correct engagement of vipassan.
-The non-arising (anuppda) and non-continuance (appavatta), etc., which happens at the time of change of lineage
(gotrabhu), i.e. when one enters the noble paths, is the non-arising and non-continuance of the fetters, mental outflows, and
underlying tendencies specifically abandoned on each noble path, and not the non-arising and non-continuance of the the
supramundane jhna factors themselves. If there are no supramundane jhna factors and no concomitant gnosis, there is no
noble path and no possibility of liberation from fetters. See: the Pat isambhidmagga.
How is it that the discernment of contemplating what is cut off is gnosis of liberation (vimuttin a)?
-Also, it's worth mentioning that there is no canonical support for the notion that the noble path consists of two or three mind
moments.
-All feeling (vedan) is designated as mental (cetasika; cf. MN 44). But the suttas differentiate between pleasure & pain
(sukha & dukkha) born of body-contact (kyasamphassaja) on the one hand (cf. SN 48.37), and happiness & unhappiness
(somanassa & domanassa) born of mind-contact (manosamphassaja) on the other (cf. SN 48.37). A noble disciple still
experiences bodily pain but no mental distress because of it (cf. SN 36.6: "He feels one feeling -- a bodily one, not a mental
one.").
-Well, as far as I'm concerned we shouldn't assume anything. Kamma is somewhat of a slippery subject, and I don't think it's
helpful to theorize too much about it. But kamma has somehow landed us in our current familial, social, and cultural
situation. These quite specific conditions that we have been born into influence us. But as for how it all "works," I have no
idea.
-This relates to whether the term sav should be interpreted and translated as "influxes" or "outflows." Interpreted as
influxes would include the influx of social and cultural views that any person -- regardless of time or place -- is embedded in.
These need to eventually be confronted, challenged, and eliminated. This process undermines consensual worldviews, and
they will eventually cease to "flow out" as conceptual proliferations.
-Well, it seems to be the opinion of a number of Pli translators that sava means "to flow" and some are of the opinion that
this should be interpreted as "to flow in." This is based on a survey of flowing-type metaphors found throughout the canon.
So, do views flow in, and if they do, then from where? I'm just offering a suggestion that the sources of views can include
social and cultural worldviews learned from family, friends, school teachers, religious teachers, etc.
-It has always seemed more intuitive to me to consider the sava-s as "outflows" (effluents). But maybe this influx + outflow
double entendre is worth considering? No one is born and raised in a complete vacuum. I'd suggest that this is the "negative"
consensual delusion side of "interdependence."
-I think the four sava-s are general categories. The sava of views is said to be eliminated upon stream entry, thus this
category would include any wrong views associated with identity view, and so on. I find that the ten fetters offer a more
precise treatment of the same phenomena to be eliminated. Anyway, MN 02 goes into the practical details regarding how to
work with the sava-s.
-If the jhna factors are not present then it isn't supramundane path or fruition attainment either. This blackout emptiness
notion is the inevitable consequence entailed by a realist view of dhamma, wherein all conditioned dhammas are considered
to be "truly existing things," and therefore path cognitions and fruition cognitions of each of the four paths and fruits must
occur within an utterly void vacuum state cessation, which is considered to be the ultimately existent "unconditioned." This
notion of path and fruition cognitions is not supported by the Pli canon. It's largely based on an unsustainable interpretation
of the first chapter of the Pat isambhidmagga. Also, there is nothing specifically Buddhist about utterly void vacuum state
cessations. In fact, precisely this type of stopping the mind is the goal of some non-Buddhist yogic traditions. Therefore, this
contentless absorption cannot be equated with Buddhist nibbna. Moreover, there are now a number of people who've had
such experiences sanctioned by "insight meditation" teachers, and who have gone on to proclaim to the world that arahants
can still experience lust and the other defiled mental phenomena. Taking all of this into account there is no good reason

whatsoever to accept this interpretation of path and fruition cognitions. Void vacuum state cessations are not an adequate nor
reliable indication of stream entry or any of the other paths and fruitions.
-Just to add: Such blackout states are neither form sphere jhna, nor vipassan, nor supramundane jhna accompanied by
gnosis (n a ) which arises when one enters the noble path. This supramundane gnosis is the understanding that all
phenomena are signless, desireless, and empty. It arises from contemplating the signlessness of all phenomena. The
Pat isambhidmagga states:
Gnosis of contemplation of the signlessness of form... feeling... recognition... fabrications... consciousness... etc., is signless
deliverance because it liberates from all signs.
-Firstly, nibbna isn't a "state." Secondly, nibbna is the cessation of passion, aggression, and delusion. For a learner it is the
cessation of the fetters extinguished on each path. The waking states where "suddenly all sensations and six senses stop
functioning" are (1) mundane perceptionless samdhis, and (2) cessation of apperception and feeling. Neither of these are
supramundane and neither of these are synonymous with experiencing nibbna.
-Well, to be precise, the state wherein one experiences the extinguishment (nibbna) of fetters appropriate to each path and
fruition, is supramundane jhna (lokuttarajjhna). And this state must necessarily arise with the concomitant jhna factors
and other mental factors such as attention (manasikra) and apperception (sa), as well as gnosis (n a). Without the
presence of these mental factors there can be no gnosis and therefore no path attainment or fruition attainment.
-The Kathvatthu and the Visuddhimagga both maintain that the cessation of apperception and feeling is not not-conditioned
(asakhata) and is not supramundane (lokuttara).
-Nibbna is the extinguishment of fetters. To be precise, the state wherein one experiences the extinguishment (nibbna) of
fetters appropriate to each path and fruition, is supramundane jhna (lokuttarajjhna). And this state must necessarily arise
with the concomitant jhna factors and other mental factors such as attention (manasikra) and apperception (sa), as well
as gnosis (n a). Without the presence of these mental factors there can be no gnosis and therefore no path attainment or
fruition attainment.
-There are three gateways to supramundane liberation: the signless, the desireless, and the emptiness deliverances. The
signless deliverance is realized by beginning with the contemplation of impermanence (aniccnupassan).
-This corresponds with what is taught in the Pat isambhidmagga, where the contemplation of impermanence is said to result
in entrance to the signless.
-It's worth noting here that signlessness pertains to seeing the signlessness of phenomena, what Ven. n ananda sometimes
refers to as seeing throughthe object. With the arising of this supramundane gnosis, objects no longer represent anything of
significance. And it is this gnosis which is truly liberating. It can't be shaken by any sensory experience because the
signlessness of all experience has been fully understood. There is no need whatsoever to slip into a blackout cessation.
-Blackout cessations are just another passing experience (or non-experience). Just one more thing to be let go of. Certainly
not a sign of stream entry. There is no "silver bullet" or "panacea" experience. Life-long dedication and unwavering
commitment to practice is what is required.
-This type of blackout cessation is experienced by all sorts of yogis including those practicing non-Buddhist systems. Thus,
it has nothing to do with the correct engagement of vipassan. The cessation of unsatisfactoriness (dukkhanirodha) is the
cessation of craving (tan h), not the cessation of phenomena. DN 22:
And what is the noble truth of the cessation of stress? The remainderless fading & cessation, renunciation, relinquishment,
release, & letting go of that very craving.
The canon tells us that it is the cutting off and full extinguishment (parinibbna) of the first three fetters. See the
Pat isambhidmagga.
-The way to get there is the noble eightfold path, which is to be developed. The elimination of passion, the elimination of
aggression, the elimination of delusion is the fruition of the path, which is to be realized. "Nibbna" is a figurative term
relating to this elimination using the metaphor of fire and fuel. Both the path and the fruition are sufficiently defined and
explained in the canonical teachings. Thus, in the context of the realization of nibbna there's really no need for appeals to
ineffability.
-The suttas define and describe the goal in sufficient terms. The difficulty in this discussion relates to whether one accepts
what the canon states about the fruition of the path, or alternatively, accepts much later commentarial interpretations of the
"path-moment" and "fruition-moment" as re-interpreted by a few 20th century Burmese monks. Without sufficient common
ground for discussion there isn't much possibility of meaningful dialogue.
-The canon repeatedly, explicitly, and unequivocally defines nibbna as the elimination of passion, aggression, and
delusion. This is the goal of practice. Beyond the attainment of this goal, early Pl i Buddhism has nothing to say. SN 48.42
Un n bhabrhman a Sutta:
-There are two reasons why the Buddha had nothing to say about any matters beyond the attainment of this goal. The first is
that any view regarding the postmortem existence or non-existence of an awakened arahant is not conducive to actually
attaining the goal. It does not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, calmness, direct gnosis, full awakening,
nibbna. It is considered a fetter of view (dit t hisamyojana). MN 72 Aggivacchagotta Sutta.
-The other reason, as suggested by the Buddhas exchange with the brhman a Un n bha already mentioned, is that there is
no way to describe or designate or define anything beyond the attainment of this goal.
-The most elegant and subtle aspect of the dhamma expounded in the Nikyas is that it doesnt impose any sort of
metaphysical view regarding the nature of the liberated mind. This is clear in the sense of the liberated, measureless mind
appamn acetasa, being free from any sort of measuring pamn a.
-It is precisely this which differentiates early Buddhism from every other religious and secular worldview, and also separates

early Buddhism from virtually every later strata of Buddhist exegesis both ancient and modern. Its unfortunate that most
authors of Buddhist commentary havent seen fit to heed the Buddhas advice on this point.
-The nihilist version of Buddhist exegetical interpretation errs through mistaken reductionism. This thesis posits that an
arahant is nothing more than the aggregates, and therefore, because the aggregates cease without remainder at the time of the
arahants death, the arahant is likewise terminated. This reductionism errs because there are explicit statements in the
discourses which tell us that an arahant cannot be measured even while alive, and specifically, cannot be measured using the
criteria of the aggregates. Since this is the case, there is nothing whatsoever that can be posited about the postmortem
existence or non-existence of the arahant. Language and logical inference dont apply to that which cannot be qualified or
measured. There is no criteria for measurement.
-Here is how the path is developed according to the canon: dissatisfaction (dukkha) faith (saddh) gladness (pmojja)
joy (pti) tranquility (passaddhi) pleasure (sukha) meditative composure (samdhi) gnosis & vision of things
as they are (yathbhtan adassana) disenchantment (nibbid) dispassion (virga) liberation (vimutti) gnosis of
elimination (khayen a).
-This developmental path sequence is found in SN 12.23 (S ii 29) Upanisa Sutta. This same developmental sequence, or
significant portions of it, is also presented in Vin i 294, D i 73, D i 182, D i 207, D i 214, D i 232, D i 250, D iii 241, D iii
279, D iii 288, M i 37, M i 283, S iv 78, S iv 351-8, S v 156, S v 398, A i 243, A iii 21, A iii 285, A v 1-6, A v 312, A v 315, A
v 317, A v 329, A v 333.
-Non-percipient attainments (asaasampatti) are wrong samdhis entered by worldlings, either intentionally, due to
misunderstanding the dhamma, or unintentionally. It's a mistake to equate this type of non-percipient state with the noble
paths and fruitions. Moreover, if one were to die while experiencing this non-percipient attainment the only possible result of
this would be rebirth as non-percipient being (asaasatta) without any functional mind or mental faculties. This is
considered to be an inappropriate and inopportune plane (akkhan a bhmi), because there is no possibility of practicing
dhamma either within the non-perceptive absorption or as a non-percipient being reborn in such a realm. Both as a practice
and a samsric realm it arrests any possibility for mental development (bhvan).
-The Pl i Tipit aka explicitly states -- in both the Suttapit aka and Abhidhammapit aka -- that the noble path and fruition
cognitions must include perception (sa). Therefore this notion of the noble paths and fruitions being devoid of perception
is not the Pl i dhamma. It is the path of a deficient vehicle (hnayna) which should be avoided.
-A non-perceptive attainment (asaasampatti) and a non-percipient being (asaasatta) are not the same as any of the four
formless attainments nor the cessation of perception and feeling.
Ajahn Amaro:
Ive known people, particularly those who have practiced in the Theravda tradition, who have been taught and trained that
the idea of meditation is to get to a place of cessation. We might get to a place where we dont feel or see anything; there is
awareness but everything is gone. An absence of sight, sound, smell, taste, touch, the bodyit all vanishes. And then these
students are told, This is the greatest thing. Thats what there is to look forward to. The teacher encourages them to put
tremendous hours and diligence into their meditation. When one of these students told her teacher that she had arrived at that
kind of state, he got really excited. He then asked her, So what did it feel like? and she said, It was like drinking a glass of
cold water but without the water and without the glass. On another occasion she said, It was like being shut inside a
refrigerator.
This is not the only way of understanding cessation.... When we stop creating sense objects as absolute realities and stop
seeing thoughts and feelings as solid things, there is cessation. To see that the world is within our minds is one way of
working with these principles. The whole universe is embraced when we realize that its happening within our minds. And in
that moment when we recognize that it all happens here, it ceases. Its thingness ceases. Its otherness ceases. Its substantiality
ceases.
This is just one way of talking and thinking about it. But I find this brings us much closer to the truth, because in that
respect, its held in check. Its known. But theres also the quality of its emptiness. Its insubstantiality is known. Were not
imputing solidity to it, a reality that it doesnt possess. Were just looking directly at the world, knowing it fully and
completely.
So, what happens when the world ceases? I remember one time Ajahn Sumedho was giving a talk about this same subject.
He said, Now Im going to make the world completely disappear. Im going to make the world come to an end. He just sat
there and said: Okay, are you ready?... The world just ended.... Do you want me to bring it back into being again?
Okay...welcome back.
Nothing was apparent from the outside. It all happens internally. When we stop creating the world, we stop creating each
other. We stop imputing the sense of solidity that creates a sense of separation. Yet we do not shut off the senses in any way.
Actually, we shed the veneer, the films of confusion, of opinion, of judgment, of our conditioning, so that we can see the way
things really are. At that moment, dukkha ceases.
-Of course, conventionally speaking, people exist. Simplistic reductionism cannot account for dynamic systems such as
biological systems or mind-streams or sentient beings. An ordered, functioning system cannot be reduced to the sum of its
parts. A living cell cannot be reduced to the molecules which comprise it. A complex living organism cannot be reduced to to

the cells which comprise it. In the context of a mind-stream, a healthy functioning ego cannot simply be reduced to the
aggregates which comprise it (or more precisely, from which it emerges). Why? Because there are pathological mind-streams
which have all of the same component parts (i.e. feeling, apperception, contact, attention, intention, desire, etc.), yet a
healthy, functional ego (which is a dynamic system) doesn't emerge from these component parts. This is why many
contemporary insight meditation teachers have recognized that no significant progress can be made by employing the path of
gradual training unless the student is in good mental health. Hence the well known phrase: "You have to be somebody before
you can be nobody."
-Can jhnic concentration penetrate things as they really are? Do we have to come out of jhna in order to practice
vipassan? Is concentration the same as absorption? If jhnic concentration is the same as being absorbed by our object of
focus then yes, we must leave jhna to practice vipassan. But, when we become absorbed into our object of focus, what we
are practicing is "wrong" jhna. When we practice "right" jhna we will be able to see things as they really are.
Using the English word "absorption" to denote the deep concentration in the jhna is very misleading. There are many
mental factors in any jhna and the meditator is quite aware of them. When you are aware of these mental factors you are not
absorbed into them, but conscious of them or mindful of them. If you are absorbed in the subject you will not understand,
nor remember anything. Bhante G
Q: What is concentration on the signless?
A: The Pl i is animitto samdhi. There are three samdhis mentioned in the Sa gti Sutta and a few other suttas: emptiness
samdhi (suat samdhi), signless samdhi (animitt samdhi), and undirected samdhi (appan ihit samdhi). The status
and place of these samdhis isn't clearly spelled out in the suttas, but it's clear that they are fruitional meditations and not to
be equated with any of the four formless attainments or the attainment of the cessation of apperception and feeling. In
addition to the suttas already posted, MN 43 Mahvedalla Sutta describes the signless liberation of mind (animitt
cetovimutti) and emptiness liberation of mind (suat cetovimutti):
The development of undirected samdhi (appan ihit samdhi) is described in SN 47.10
In the Abhidhammapit aka Dhammasagan these three samdhis are equated with supramundane jhna (lokuttarajjhna).
Also, in the Pat isambhidmagga these supramundane jhnas are designated in terms of three contemplations
(suatnupassan, animittnupassan, appan ihitnupassan), three abidings (suat vihra, animitt vihra, appan ihit
vihra), and three deliverances (suat vimokkha, animitt vimokkha, appan ihit vimokkha). It's said that the
contemplation of impermanence (aniccnupassan) results in the signless deliverance, the contemplation of
unsatisfactoriness (dukkhnupassan) results in the undirected deliverance, and the contemplation of selflessness
(anattnupassan) results in the emptiness deliverance.
-Suat samdhi is listed a few times in the suttas, along with signless samdhi (animitt samdhi), and undirected samdhi
(appan ihit samdhi). For example, SN 43.4:
And what onks, is the path leading to the not-fabricated? The eptiness sadhi (suat sadhi), the signless sadhi
(aniitt sadhi), the undirected sadhi (appan ihit sadhi). This is called the path leading to the not-fabricated.
-The development of suat samdhi is the same as the development of the emptiness liberation of mind (suat
cetovimutti). MN 43 Mahvedalla Sutta.
-These terms (suat, animitt, and appan ihit) are presented in more detail in the Abhidhammapit aka and the
Pat isambhidmagga. The Dhammasagan mentions entering and abiding in emptiness as one of the alternate designations
of supramundane jhna (e.g. lokuttaram jhnam ... pat hamam jhnam upasampajja viharati suatam), where calm
(samatha) and liberating clear seeing (vipassan) are coupled together and balanced within jhna. And as already mentioned,
the Pat isambhidmagga makes frequent use of this triad (suat, animitt, and appan ihit), where the method of
development of emptiness deliverance is stated in exactly the same terms as the above excerpt from MN 43 regarding the
emptiness liberation of mind.
-Stated simply, these various designations related to suat samdhi are the supramundane development of the
recognition/contemplation of selflessnesss (termed anattasa in the suttas and anattnupassan in the
Pat isambhidmagga).
Q: How does one take sunnata as an object?
A: The object-support here is the unification of mind and mental factors which are presently occurring. And what one
recognizes is the absence (emptiness) of a self amongst these presently occurring phenomena (dhammas) or apart from these
phenomena. First, there is the recognition of impermanence (aniccasa); then the recognition of unsatisfactoriness in what
is impermanent (anicca dukkhasa); then the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory (dukkha anattasa).
For example, AN 7.49 (ATI 7.46, PTS A iv 46).
A: The Visuddhimagga uses the Pat isambhidmagga terminology. In the Pat isambhidmagga the triad is referred to as three
contemplations (suatnupassan, animittnupassan, appan ihitnupassan), three abidings (suat vihra, animitt
vihra, appan ihit vihra), and three deliverances (suat vimokkha, animitt vimokkha, appan ihit vimokkha). It's said
that the contemplation of impermanence (aniccnupassan) results in the signless deliverance, the contemplation of
unsatisfactoriness (dukkhnupassan) results in the undirected deliverance, and the contemplation of selflessness
(anattnupassan) results in the emptiness deliverance.
-The suttas prescribe the means to be employed, and describe the stages of the path to be developed. But we have to take up
the practice injunctions and follow them with persistence and commitment before they will bear any fruit. And here teachers
are helpful. Nevertheless, the onus is on each of us to compare what teachers say with what is presented in the canon, in
order to check the veracity of these sayings and interpretations with the dhamma and vinaya. See DN 16

-There are three levels of discernment: discernment obtained through listening (sutamay pa), discernment obtained
through reflection (cintmay pa), and discernment obtained through meditative development (bhvanmay pa). All
three need to be engaged and refined. SN 20.7 n i Sutta.
-Part of the instruction is to pay no attention to thoughts or emotional 'storms' as they arise in the mind and to maintain
continuity of awareness of the anicca characteristic of vedana (sensation). Thoughts will come and go, but one should never
try and stop them or force them out. The other thing Goenkaji advises is to not to 'roll' in fantasies of the future or memories
of the past. By 'roll' he means indulge. Thoughts come and go but the idea is not to engage with them. The reason is that if
your mind is pre-occupied with some scenario in your mind you've lost the continuity of awareness of physical sensation.
-The way n a is used in a Buddhist context, it is usually considered as the knowledge/gnosis which arises as a result of
pa. Thus, it is fruitional. There are three levels of discernment (pa): discernment obtained through hearing (sutamay
pa), discernment obtained through reflection (cintmay pa), and discernment obtained through meditative
development (bhvanmay pa). There are many types of n a mentioned in the suttas and canonical bhidhammika
treatises. These knowledges are obtained through the engagement and refinement of the three types of pa.
-It all depends upon the context, but usually n a is considered the insight knowledge which results from practice, i.e. which
results from discernment obtained through meditative development (bhvanmay pa). These types of n a include the
gnosis and vision of things as they are (yathbhtan adassana), the gnosis of nibbna (nibbnan a), gnosis of elimination
[of the sava-s] (khayen a), and so on.
-There are a number of related terms derived from the verb root - (to know):
sa: recognition, apperception, perception, cognition
vin a: consciousness, cognition
pa: discernment
n a: gnosis, knowledge
abhi: higher gnosis; six types of higher gnosis (chalabhi)
-Having emerged from all signs, consciousness which is non-indicative (vin a anidassana) is not experienced in terms of
"the allness of the all." (MN 49). The "all" being the twelve yatanas (SN 35.23), which are to be abandoned (SN 35.24).
Thus, just like all fabricated dhammas, the twelve yatanas and the six types of contact and the six types of consciousness
are merely designations (paattimatta) demonstrating the unsatisfactoriness of deluded cognition. They are not to be taken
as "the given."
-When all acquisitions have been released (i.e. sabbpadhipat inissagga) there is no need to designate "contact." Udna 2.4
(Ud 12):
Contacts ake contact
Dependent on acquisition.
Where there is no acquisition,
What would contacts contact?
-In canonical abhidhamma terms, when one who has entered the stream is abiding in supramundane jhna they discern the
signlessness of phenomena which is equivalent to the reverse sequence of pat iccasamuppda. The penetration of
pat iccasamuppda in both forward sequence (anuloma) and reverse sequence (pat iloma) eliminates adherence to any
mistaken views of existence and non-existence. When one who's entered the stream has developed supramundane jhna
sufficiently they realize the fruition of stream-entry (sotpattiphala) which is the complete termination of the first three
fetters (samyojan).
-When we are talking about the noble paths and fruitions we employ designations, but these are merely designations
(paattimatta). Whether the cognitions of the paths and fruitions attend to signs (i.e. when engaged in the supramundane
applications of mindfulness) or discern the signlessness of phenomena (supramundane jhna), those path and fruition
cognitions are measureless (appamn a) and have measureless object-supports (appamn ramman a) and are non-indicative
(anidassana), cf. Abhidhamma Vibhaga. Thus, they are all unincluded (apariypanna). And so, although we can employ
designations such as "contact," etc., these designations are not ultimately established (paramatthasiddhi). They are merely
designations (paattimatta) employed for the purpose of explaining the path leading to the cessation of unsatisfactoriness.
The raft is for crossing over, not for constructing philosophical systems.
Q: Might you happen to have at hand a sutta that expresses or implies the bifurcation of mindfulness and jhana into mundane
and supramundane?
A: The basic distinction is given in MN 117, and developed in the Abhidhammapit aka such as the Vibhaga, etc.
Q: What do you or your textual source mean by "supramundane"?
A: It's a translation of lokuttara, which is defined in the Pat isambhidmagga Treatise on the Supramundane as follows:
-What dhaas are supraundane?
-The four applications of indfulness, the four right endeavors, the four pathways of achieveent, the five faculties, the five
strengths, the seven factors of awakening, the eightfold path, and the four noble paths, the four ascetic fruitions, and
nibbna.
-In what sense are they supraundane?
-They cross fro the world, thus they are supraundane. They cross over fro the world, thus they are supraundane.
-Conditioned arising in its forward sequence is always a description of deluded cognition. When rooted in ignorance and
craving, any experience automatically includes all of the first eleven links. That is, for the worldling there is always
ignorance, contact, craving, grasping, becoming, and birth, which is the birth of a "being" (satta). When the forward and
reverse sequences of conditioned arising are penetrated the entire deluded cognitive and conflicted affective edifice of the

forward sequence of dependent arising immediately collapses like a house of cards.

-This sets up identity and alienation -- i.e. the struggle for ego survival -- of "my being" in "the world." Whenever there is "a
being" in "the world" there is going to arise circumstances of "my being" vs. "the world."
-Does one really require someone to establish oxygen as a truly existent entity in order to breathe? How did sentient beings
on this planet know how to breathe before oxygen was identified as a chemical element? Does one really need someone to
tell them to breathe? If they do then here's a book calledBreathe! You Are Alive. But I doubt that the author felt compelled to
establish oxygen as a truly existent entity in order to discuss the subject.
-The purpose of the path is for not-clinging, not for developing views on the ontological status of dhammas.
-There is no "the void" to be perceived. Any perception of a "the void" has nothing to do with nibbna. Nibbna is the
termination of very specific fetters, underlying tendencies, and outflows. This termination occurs in supramundane jhna
where the jhna factors are very much present.
Q: As I understand it, it is not that our bare experience itself is said to be "merely ideation", this is just talking about the
designations placed upon it.
A: The individuation of particular dhammas requires the concomitant engagement of consciousness (vin a) and name
(nma: vedan, sa, phassa, cetan, manasikra) specific to whatever dhamma is being cognitively individuated. Thus, all
such individuation of particulars is fabricated, relational, and conventional. Particular dhammas are not simply given to
awareness, they are learned, individuated, apperceived, and attended to.
-A thorough understanding of this process of individuation exposes the problem of deluded cognition, and when the problem
is thoroughly discerned one can then begin to abandon unskillful processes and develop skillful mental factors such as faith,
gladness, joy, tranquility, pleasure, concentration, etc. (saddh, pmojja, pti, passaddhi, sukha, samdhi). Beyond this, one
begins to clearly see the futility of fabricated processes altogether. As this clear seeing (vipassan) develops, disenchantment
(nibbid) arises. Then dispassion (virga) arises. Then as these qualities continue to develop, eventually the path results in
liberation through discernment (pavimutti) and one realizes the gnosis of elimination (khayen a) of the outflows
(sava-s), also referred to as the elimination of craving (tan hakkhaya) as a shorthand expression.
-All of this is developmental and soteriological. The path doesn't require establishing philosophical theories and proofs of
valid cognition (pamn a) or ultimately existent objects. From the perspective of the early Pl i dhamma all of this sort of
theorizing is just more proliferation (papaca). Nothing needs to be philosophically established beyond the status of mere
designation (paattimatta). This in no way entails nihilism because the dhammavinaya isn't a philosophical head trip; all
components of path praxis are to be fully engaged and developed (bhvan).
-If the absence of consciousness was an indication of the development of insight then unconscious beings would have
developed insight and the state of deep, dreamless sleep would be the same as nibbna. This is even more extreme than the
view of the brahmin Parsariya who taught a method of development (bhvan) wherein "one does not see forms with the
eye, nor hear sounds with the ear." The Buddha dismissed such development in MN 152 as follows:
If that were the case, Uttara, then a blind an would have developed faculties and a deaf an would have developed
faculties, according to the words of the brahin Parsariya. For a blind an does not see fors with the eye, and a deaf
an does not hear sounds with the ear.
-Your notion of the noble paths and fruitions is not supported by the Pli canon. If cognition and the jhna factors are not
present then there is no supramundane path or fruition attainment. There is no gnosis of elimination (khayen a) without
gnosis (n a ).
-The Pat isambhidmagga is clear that entrance into the supramundane path occurs after correctly engaging contemplation of
release (pat inissaggnupassan), not after contemplation of cessation (nirodhnupassan).
-What is a degeneration of the dispensation is mistaking momentary experiences for adequate indications of stream-entry.
The only adequate and reliable indication of the fruition of stream-entry is the complete termination of the first three fetters.
-The Pat isambhidmagga is the canonical source for the so-called "insight-gnoses" (vipassann a-s). The noble path arises
through contemplating the signlessness of the aggregates, not from the utter absence of mental processes. If there is no mind
and mental factors present then there is no path or fruition.
-AN 9.36: "As far as the perception-attainments (sasampatti) go, that is as far as gnosis-penetration (apat ivedha)
goes." Again, if there is no mind and mental factors present then there is no path or fruition.
-The Abhidhammapit aka is part of the Pl i canon. Lokuttarajjhna occurs in this Pit aka in the context of attaining the noble
path of stream-entry and the other noble paths and fruitions. The Dhammasa gan Cittuppdakan d a Lokuttarakusala
Suddhikapat ipad:
When at a certain tie one develops supraundane jhna, which leads out, which goes to decrease (of rebirth), to
abandonent of wrong views, to the attainent of the first stage (i.e. sotpattiagga), quite secluded fro sensual
pleasures, secluded fro unskillful phenoena, he enters and reains in the first jhna, which includes directed thought and
evaluation, as well as joy and pleasure born of seclusion, and with difficult practice and slow acquisition of gnosis, then at
that tie there is contact, there is feeling, there is apperception, there is volitional intention, there is directed thought, there
is evaluation, there is joy, there is pleasure, there is singleness of ind, there is the faculty of faith, there is the faculty of
energy, there is the faculty of indfulness, there is the faculty of concentration, there is the faculty of discernent, there is
the ind-faculty, there is the joy-faculty, there is the life-faculty, there is right view, there is right resolve, there is right effort,
there is right indfulness, there is right concentration, there is the strength of faith, there is the strength of energy, there is
the strength of indfulness, there is the strength of concentration, there is the strength of discernent, there is the strength of
conscience, there is the strength of shae, there is no greed, there is no hate, there is no delusion, there is no avarice, there
is no aversion, there is right view, there is conscience, there is shae, there is bodily cal, there is ental cal, there is

bodily lightness, there is ental lightness, there is bodily pliability, there is ental pliability, there is bodily workableness,
there is ental workableness, there is bodily proficiency, there is ental proficiency, there is bodily uprightness, there is
ental uprightness, there is indfulness, there is full awareness, there is saatha, there is vipassan, there is exertion, there
is non-distraction.
What at that tie is the faculty of discernent? That which at that tie is discernent, thorough understanding,
investigation, coprehensive investigation, dhaa-investigation, consideration, discriination, direct discriination,
erudite intelligence, proficiency, refined intelligence, discriinative exaination, reflection, coparative exaination,
breadth of knowledge, wisdo that destroys defileents, penetrative wisdo, vipassan, full awareness, discernent like a
guiding goad, faculty of discernent, strength of discernent, discernent like a sword, discernent like a tower,
discernent like light, discernent like radiance, discernent like a torch, discernent like a jewel, non-delusion, dhaainvestigation, right view, awakening factor of dhaa-investigation, a path factor, knowledge included in the path this at
that tie is the faculty of discernent.
What at that tie is vipassan? That which at that tie is discernent, thorough understanding, investigation,
coprehensive investigation, dhaa-investigation, consideration, discriination, direct discriination, erudite
intelligence, proficiency, refined intelligence, discriinative exaination, reflection, coparative exaination, breadth of
knowledge, wisdo that destroys defileents, penetrative wisdo, vipassan, full awareness, discernent like a guiding
goad, faculty of discernent, strength of discernent, discernent like a sword, discernent like a tower, discernent like
light, discernent like radiance, discernent like a torch, discernent like a jewel, non-delusion, dhaa-investigation,
right view, awakening factor of dhaa-investigation, a path factor, knowledge included in the path this at that tie is
vipassan.
-The same is said with regard to the resultant supramundane jhna after stream-entry has been attained. Also, the Vibha ga
Satipat t hnavibhaga:
Here a onk, at a certain tie develops supraundane jhna, which leads out, which goes to decrease (of rebirth), to
abandonent of wrong views, to the attainent of the first stage (i.e. sotpattiagga), quite secluded fro sensual
pleasures, secluded fro unskillful phenoena, he enters and reains in the first jhna, which includes directed thought and
evaluation, as well as joy and pleasure born of seclusion, and with difficult practice and slow acquisition of gnosis, and that
which at that tie is indfulness, recollection, right indfulness, the indfulness factor of awakening, the path factor, and
what belongs to the path -- this is said to be the application of indfulness. (Also) the reaining phenoena associated with
the application of indfulness.
The Pat isambhidmagga is part of the Suttapit aka, and as already mentioned, it is the canonical source for the insightgnoses. The Pat isambhidmagga includes in the stages of insight-gnosis the stage of contemplating the signlessness of the
mind and mental factors. This is the supramundane jhna of stream-entry:
Gnosis of conteplation of the signlessness (aniittnupassann a) of feeling... recognition... fabrications...
consciousness... etc., is signless deliverance because it liberates fro all signs.
And:
What is the ultiate eaning of eptiness [as it relates to] all kinds of eptiness, which is the terinating of occurrence in
one who is fully aware?... Through the conteplation of signlessness one who is fully aware terinates the occurrence of
signs.
It's essential to develop this vipassan directly seeing the signlessness of all phenomena because the fetters occur in relation
to phenomena. And the cessation of unsatisfactoriness also has to occur in relation to phenomena. This is the only way that
liberation is possible. DN 22 Mahsatipat t hna Sutta.
-According to the Pat isambhidmagga the contemplation of impermanence (aniccnupassan) culminates with gnosis of the
contemplation of signlessness (animittnupassann a) and results in the signless deliverance (animitt vimokkha):
When he gives attention as iperanent his ind eerges fro the sign; his ind enters into the signless.... Gnosis of
conteplation of the signlessness of for... feeling... recognition... fabrications... consciousness... etc., is signless
deliverance because it liberates fro all signs.
-The only reason that I'm using abhidhamma terminology in this discussion is because you use the system of vipassann a s. And the source of the vipassann a-s is the Pat isambhidmagga. And to understand the Pat isambhidmagga one has to
also understand the Abhidhammapit aka. Your reliance on the system of vipassann a-s on the one hand, and your
unwillingness to acknowledge the bhidhammika sources of this system on the other hand, is extremely idiosyncratic.
-An arahant can be liberated through discernment (pavimutta) without ever attaining the cessation of apperception and
feeling.
-The Abhidhammapit aka is in line with the dhammavinaya.
-This elimination occurs in the four stages of stream-entry, etc. Moreover, an arahant liberated through discernment does not
attain the formless attainments or the cessation of apperception and feeling. MN 70 Kt giri Sutta.
Q: Stilling of aggregates for a moment, occurs at stream entry- Ven Nanananda writes
A: Ven. n ananda is specifically referring to sakhras connected to the influxes/outflows (savas). This is in keeping with
the canonical texts. Moreover, his teacher, Ven. n rma, states that the supramundane path-consciousness of stream-entry
is supramundane jhna which includes the presence of the jhna factors. In his Seven Stages of Purification & the Insight

Knowledges he states:
At whatever oent he attains the supraundane path, that path-consciousness coes to be reckoned as a jhna in itself,
since it has soe affinity with the factors proper to jhnas, such as the first jhna. What are known as transcendental
editations in Buddhis are these supraundane levels of concentration within the reach of the pure insight editator.
-This is in keeping with the Dhammasagan , where the supramundane jhna which occurs at the moment of stream-entry
includes the jhna factors and the five faculties and various other sa khras necessary for the presence of right view and the
other components of the noble path.

-Nibbna is a negation. It means extinguishment. With the fruition of each of the four paths one knows the termination of the
fetters which are eliminated by that path. This termination is nibbna appropriate to that path. The Pat isambhidmagga:
-How is it that the discernment of the termination of continuance in one who is fully aware is gnosis of full extinguishment
(parinibbna n a)?
-Through the stream-entry path he terminates identity view (sakkyadit t hi), doubt (vicikicch), and mistaken adherence to
rules and duty (slabbataparmsa).... This discernment of the termination of continuance in one who is fully aware is gnosis
of full extinguishment....
-He causes the cessation of identity view, doubt, and mistaken adherence to rules and duty through the stream-entry path.
And so on for the fetters which are terminated on the remaining three paths. The once-returner path terminates the gross
fetters of desire for sensual pleasure (kmacchanda) and aversion (vypda/bypda). The non-returner path terminates the
secondary fetters of desire for sensual pleasure (kmacchanda) and aversion (vypda/bypda). The arahant path terminates
the fetters of passion for form [existence] (rparga), passion for formless [existence] (arparga), conceit (mna),
restlessness (uddhacca), and ignorance (avijj).
-Well, the general sense what these expressions are getting at is to let go of and abandon what has already been appropriated,
which is the five clinging aggregates (pacupdnakkhandh). In the context of the four noble truths -- which is the metastructure of the entire dhamma -- the five clinging aggregates are the truth of unsatisfactoriness. The truth of
unsatisfactoriness is to be fully understood (dukkha parieyya). Craving, which is the origin of unsatisfactoriness, is to be
abandoned (dukkhasamudaya pahtabba). The cessation of craving, which is the cessation of unsatisfactoriness, is to be
realized (dukkhanirodha sacchiktabba). And the path, which is the way leading to the cessation of unsatisfactoriness, is to
be developed (dukkhanirodhagminpat ipad bhvetabba).
-And so, while someone may at times need to actively reject the occurrence of conflicted mental qualities or the impulsive
urge to engage in unskillful actions, this is not really the more "advanced" meaning of letting go. The more advanced or
mature development would be of not picking up in the first place, as you suggest.
-I would add that just suppressing unwanted urges or conflicting emotions (kilesa-s) is not a very effective tool in the long
term. Whatever is being suppressed has a tendency to leak out in other ways -- sometimes quite unexpected ways. Therefore,
at some point we have to acknowledge and begin working directly with those undesirable aspects of ourselves. Working
directly with the underlying factors which fuel our habitual thoughts and actions. This takes a lot of commitment and
dedication to the process of actually walking the path in a realistic way. In short, we have to be very honest with ourselves if
we want to be authentic. This is where a teacher can be an invaluable aid. The simple fact of the matter is that we are not
always in the best position to be able to recognize and acknowledge the sources of our own difficulties. We're often too close
and too involved in the habitual patterns to be able to see our own biases operating. But with the help of a skillful teacher,
and plenty of time on the cushion, we can learn to see how our mind works with a more panoramic perspective.
-Well, the Pl i Tipit aka is the Theravda Canon. And it's the Theravda Canon for a reason. The treatises of the
Khuddakanikya and the Abhidhammapit aka present the parameters of the Theravda as a unique doctrinal school (vda).
These are the "baseline" doctrines which distinguish the Theravda from the other Sthaviravda and non-Sthaviravda
schools. To dismiss most or all of these Canonical doctrinal teachings is to reject the Theravda as a vda. When this is done
we often see the Suttapit aka -- usually without a comprehensive survey of the entire Suttapit aka -- being used to justify all
sorts of pet theories. This creates a wild west situation where almost anything goes. Just find a sutta or two to justify one's
pet theory and this makes one's interpretation is just as valid as any other.... This is quite an ill-conceived and unfortunate
approach to Buddhist hermeneutics.
-This isn't to say that text critical analysis is entirely unjustified. But to limit text critical analysis just to the sutta strata of
received tradition and use this methodology to dismiss the abhidhamma strata of received tradition is problematic for a
number of reasons. It fails to acknowledge just how indebted we all are to the entirety of the canonical, para-canonical, and
commentarial texts for our understanding of Pl i as a language. It also implies (and is sometimes explicitly stated) that the
compilers of the Abhidhammapit aka had already lost the realization of the dhamma within one or two hundred years of the
Buddha's parinibbna. These are just two of many faults and dubious assumptions which could be mentioned. IMO the bar
should be set higher.
-It's also worth mentioning that the Theravda Abhidhammapit aka actually accords with the sutta strata of teachings nicely.
In general, it is more conservative and therefore closer to the suttas than is the case for the extant Sthavira Sarvstivda
treatises, etc.
-If we approach the Abhidhammapit aka as a prescriptive and descriptive aid to help clarify practice and textual
interpretation of suttas, and not as a closed system of ultimate truth which marginalizes the suttas as being of lesser
importance, then this combination of canonical Vinayapit aka, Suttapit aka, and Abhidhammapit aka offers us a very
workable and valuable set of teachings to guide our practice.

-The commentaries and the Visuddhimagga are not canonical. Moreover, the commentaries do not present a homogeneous
doctrine. It's not uncommon to find multiple opinions presented regarding a particular canonical passage, etc. It's also not
uncommon to find quite dubious etymologies of particular terms and an obvious lack of understanding of canonical
metaphors, and so on. This is due to the commentaries being authored by people separated from the historical, geographical,
and cultural situation of the early Buddhist community. This has been well documented by a number of translators and
scholars. Therefore, while the commentaries are also important, they aren't of the same caliber as the Tipit aka.
-Issues of inconsistencies and dubious interpretations present in the commentarial literature have been noted by various
teachers, translators, and scholars, largely based on quite reasonable readings of the different historical strata of texts. But
there is still plenty of middle ground between the two extremes of dogmatic allegiance to every commentarial word an letter
on the one hand, and dogmatic wholesale rejection of all commentary on the other. As was already mentioned in the post
which Robert quoted at the start of this thread: "The commentaries and the Visuddhimagga are not canonical. Moreover, the
commentaries do not present a homogeneous doctrine. It's not uncommon to find multiple opinions presented regarding a
particular canonical passage, etc. It's also not uncommon to find quite dubious etymologies of particular terms and an
obvious lack of understanding of canonical metaphors, and so on. This is due to the commentaries being authored by people
separated from the historical, geographical, and cultural situation of the early Buddhist community. This has been well
documented by a number of translators and scholars. Therefore, while the commentaries are also important, they aren't of the
same caliber as the Tipit aka."
-The underlying structure of the eighteen insight-n a-s as presented in the Pat isambhidmagga can be traced to the suttas.
They are termed "contemplation" (anupassan) and "gnosis of contemplation" (anupassann a) in the Pat isambhidmagga,
and are either termed "recognition" (sa) or "contemplation" (anupassan) in the suttas. The most well known sutta source
is the fourth tetrad of the npnassati Sutta: contemplation of impermanence (aniccnupassana), contemplation of
dispassion (virgnupassana), contemplation of cessation (nirodhnupassan), contemplation of release
(pat inissaggnupassana). Other suttas expand on this structure:
AN 10.60 (PTS A v 108): Recognition of impermanence (aniccasa)
AN 7.49 (ATI 7.46, PTS A iv 46)
AN 7.95 (PTS A iv 145)
SN 46.71 (PTS S v 132, CDB 1620)
AN 7.49 (ATI 7.46, PTS A iv 46): Recognition of unsatisfactoriness in what is impermanent (anicca dukkhasa)
AN 7.96 (PTS A iv 146)
SN 46.72 (PTS S v 132, CDB 1620)
AN 10.60 (PTS A v 108): Recognition of selflessness (anattasa)
AN 7.49 (ATI 7.46, PTS A iv 46): Recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory (dukkha anattasa)
AN 7.97 (PTS A iv 146)
SN 46.73 (PTS S v 133, CDB 1620)
AN 7.98 (PTS A iv 146): Recognition of decay (khayasa)
AN 7.99 (PTS A iv 146): Recognition of passing away (vayasa)
AN 10.60 PTS A v 108: Recognition of dispassion (virgasa)
AN 7.100 (PTS A iv 146)
SN 46.75 (PTS S v 133, CDB 1621)
AN 10.60 (PTS A v 108): Recognition of cessation (nirodhasa)
AN 7.101 (PTS A iv 146)
SN 46.76 (PTS S v 133, CDB 1621)
AN 7.102 (PTS A iv 146): Recognition of release (pat inissaggasa)
-A standard version in a practice context is the last tetrad of MN 118 npnassati Sutta: contemplation of impermanence
(aniccnupassan), contemplation of dispassion (virgnupassan), contemplation of cessation (nirodhnupassan),
contemplation of release (pat inissaggnupassan).
Cf. the eighteen insight-n a-s as presented in the Pat isambhidmagga:
-Thus, the Pat isambhidmagga is just an elaboration of suttanta materials. Of course, what the Pat isambhidmagga presents
is not the same as the Visuddhimagga, which again reformulates these 18 contemplations and interprets phenomena
according to the theory of radical momentariness. And it's possible that modern Burmese based interpretations of the insightgnoses may not fully reflect what is presented in the Visuddhimagga.
-I think that they are meant to be instructions even at the Pat isambhidmagga stage of commentary. They are meant to be
learned, then experientially contemplated and recognized, and then personally known. So developmentally we would have:
contemplation (anupassan) recognition (sa) gnosis (n a).
-This correlates to the more standard three stages of discernment (pa): discernment obtained through hearing (sutamay
pa), discernment obtained through reflection (cintmay pa), and discernment obtained through meditative
development (bhvanmay pa). The first two comprise theoretical levels of discernment where one hears the teachings
and reflects on them. This reflection is the beginning of internalizing the meaning of what has been heard. But for
discernment to be liberating the process of internalization must deepen through meditative development. This level is direct
experiential discernment.
-It's far less problematic to regard "luminosity" as a metaphor. SN 1.13 Natthiputtasama Sutta:
Natthi pasam bh.
There is no radiance comparable to discernment.
-AN 4.141-4

Of course, this probably won't stop people from opting for literal interpretations of the "light" of discernment. But any
"light" that one perceives is necessarily conditioned, impermanent, unsatisfactory, and not-self. It is to be abandoned along
the way, not taken up as the fruition of the path.
-Some people think that nibbna should be experienced as a mind lit up with light. Some people think that nibbna should be
experienced as an utter blackout. But in each case, these are teporary experiences. They come and go. But nibbna is the
complete and irreversible elimination of passion, aggression, and delusion. As such, nibbna is a metaphorical
"extinguishment" of these metaphorical "fires" and this extinguishment doesn't come and go. Moreover, if discernment were
synonymous with a light nimitta (or however one wants to describe the phenomenology of a mind lit up with light), then
discernment would be absent when this light is absent and noble disciples and arahants would be without discernment most
of the time.
-In terms of how they function. Consciousness cognizes, discernment discerns. Discernment can liberate, consciousness
cannot.
-IMO panna as "discernment" is a better translation than "wisdom," which is more akin to n a in most contexts.
Ven. Anlayo, Fro Craving to Liberation: Excursions into the Thought-world of the Pli Discourses:
A prominent antidote to sloth-and-torpor, mentioned on frequent occasions in the Pli discourses, is the development of
"perception of light," lokasa, together with mindfulness and clear comprehension (e.g. DN I 71). Some discourses
associate the expression "perception of light" with a mind that is "open," vivat a, and "uncovered," apariyonaddha, by day
and by night, and indicate that such "perception of light" will lead to knowledge and vision (DN III 223). This suggests the
expression "perception of light" to refer to the development of mental clarity.
-Such a way of understanding finds support in the Vibhaga, which glosses "perception of light" as a perception that is
"open," vivat a, "pure," parisuddha, and "clean," pariyodta (Vibh 254).
-From a suttanta perspective I don't think that we can ever equate an arahant with the aggregates. SN 22.36: Bhikkhu Sutta.
-An arahant is utterly free from classification/reckoning (sa khayavimutta) in terms of form, feeling, recognition,
fabrications, and consciousness. The only classification schemes that I've ever seen in the suttas regarding an arahant are the
six sense spheres and six faculties. And there isn't any specific correlation ever made in the suttas between the sense spheres
and faculties on the one hand, and the aggregates on the other.
-Pat iccasamuppda has to be understood in both forward and reverse sequence. That is dhamma. The forward sequence
beginning with ignorance is no longer applicable when ignorance has been eliminated.
-Not irrational at all. Non-apperceptive absorptions are states wherein there is no possibility of development. If one isn't
already at a very advanced stage then by entering non-apperceptive absorptions one is arresting any possibility of
development. Thus, it is very prudent to heed the commentarial tradition's advice and extinguish as many levels of fetters as
possible before engaging in any non-apperceptive samdhi.
Q: Sure; however, the principle of conditionality conditioned co-production is what underlies the whole of the Dhamma.
A: Sure. But somewhere in the Aguttaranikya there is a sutta which explains that with the remainderless passing away and
cessation of ignorance there is no longer a fabricated body, voice, or mind conditioned by which pleasure or pain arise
internally. My guess would be that this means that an arahant doesn't generate either kusala or akusala kamma -- all actions
would then be kiriya.
It's AN 4.171 Cetan Sutta: In all these states, onks, ignorance is involved. But with the coplete fading away and
cessation of ignorance, there is no longer that body, speech or ind conditioned by which pleasure and pain ay arise in
oneself. There is no longer a field, a site, a base or a foundation conditioned by which pleasure and pain ay arise in
oneself.*
Ven. n apon ika's endnote:
*This refers to an arahant. Though he too engages in bodily, verbal, and mental activity, the volition responsible for these
activities does not produce any kamma-result.
Q: I would offer a slightly different take on the anumiyati in SN 22.36. I suspect the "measuring" needs to be understood in
the context of absence of the anusayas with respect to the Aggregates. The anusayas only "anuseti" when the cetasika
vedanas come into play, as a sequel to vedana. But the total absence of anusayas in an arahant does not logically entail the
disappearance of the Aggregates.
A: Ven. n ananda gets it. The aggregate scheme is mere designation (paattimatta). The classical Mahvihra two truth
hermeneutic is deeply flawed -- resulting in either an eternalistic or nihilistic view. We also see variations on these extremes
playing out all over this forum and amongst many Theravda teachers as well. The aggregates are not to be taken as "the
given." Nor is contact. With the elimination of passion, aggression, and delusion the mind is measureless (appamn acetasa).
There is no criterion or measurement (pamn a) which can be used as a reference point to define a measureless cognition. SN
6.7 Koklika Sutta
-In evocative terms, one who is awake is deep (gambhra), boundless (appameyya), and fathomless (duppariyogl ha) -utterly free from any reference to specifically fabricated consciousness (vin asakhayavimutta). "Gone" (atthagata), the
measureless mind is not dependent (anissita) on any findable support, and therefore, is untraceable (ananuvejja) here and
now. MN 22 Alagaddpama Sutta.
-Elsewhere this non-abiding mind is designated as "unestablished consciousness" (appatit t ha vin a). Ven. n ananda
gets it.
-The all is to be abandoned. The path is to be developed in order to abandon the all. The path is entirely 100% fabricated for
that specific purpose. The raft is for crossing over, not for carrying around once crossed over, and certainly not for
constructing philosophies.

-The scheme of dependent origination is itself a sort of "wholesome" papaca which, at the end of the path, also has to be
released. And though the arahant can choose to interact with the world and make use of conventional conceptualizations, the
yoke that would bind his mind to them are cut off.
Q: The question is what is meant by the non-abiding mind/unestablished consciousness.
A: Well, I'll defer that question to the arahants. SN 6.7 Koklika Sutta:
What wise an here would seek to define
A easureless one by taking his easure?
He who would easure a easureless one
Must be, I think, an obstructed worldling.
-One can talk about an arahants experience in terms of phenomenological description, but I'm not sure what purpose it would
serve? Historically, it's lead to numerous thickets of views. Better to develop the path and then taste the fruit for oneself. The
gnosis and vision of liberation (vimuttin adassana) -- non-referential inner peace (ajjhattasanti) -- is to be individually
experienced (paccatta veditabba). The path is to be developed to this end.
-Sure, an arahant has a body. But an arahant is also utterly freed from reference/classification/reckoning in terms of form
(rpasakhayavimutta). The same is the case for the other aggregates.
Q: Where may I encounter this consciousness that is unestablished?
A: If you follow the noble eightfold path to its fruition and thereby eliminate passion, aggression, and delusion, then you'll
have your answer.
Also, SN 12.64: "Where consciousness does not become established and come to growth, there is no decent of name-andform." (Yattha appatit t hitam vin am avirl ham, natthi tattha nmarpassa avakkanti.) Ven. Bodhi's endnote:
The present
passage is clearly speaking of the arahant's consciousness while he is alive. Its purport is not that an "unestablished
consciousness" reains after the arahant's parinibbna, but that his consciousness, being devoid of lust, does not "becoe
established in" the four nutrients in any way that ight generate a future existence.
-As for my rendering of "unestablished" (appatit t ha) as an adjective for a "consciousness which does not become
established," this is in keeping with the sense of the above from Ven. n ananda. One could designate it as mentalconsciousness (manovin a), as per MN 38: "[W]hen consciousness arises dependent on the mind and mind-objects, it is
reckoned as mind-consciousness." This is what the early bhidhammikas have decided, adding that said mentalconsciousness is classified within the unincluded level (apariypanna bhmi). That's fine by me, but doesn't really convey
the full meaning of Ven. n ananda's interpretation of SN 12.64 and Udna 8.1 (PTS Ud 80).
Q: As much as I find a lot to admire in Ven N's expositions (particularly his take on Nama-Rupa), I'm afraid his views on
"unestablished consciousness" are quite "out there". The suttas simply refer to "where consciousness is not established" and
that gets papancized into an "unestablished consciousness". But to be fair, he might actually be just speaking of some special
samadhi, and not to the "normal" consciousness of an Arahant.
A: It isn't only in the context of fruition-gnosis samdhi (aphala samdhi). SN 12.64: "So too, monks, if there is no
passion for the nutriment of edible food, or for the nutriment of contact, or for the nutriment of volitional intention, or for the
nutriment of consciousness, if there is no delight, if there is no craving, consciousness does not become established there and
come to growth." But if you want to define an arahant in terms of the aggregates -- disregarding the repeated injunctions in
the suttas not to -- then that's fine by me. If anything smells of papaca here, that would be it.
-In brief, when all acquisitions have been released (i.e. sabbpadhipat inissagga) there is no need to designate "contact."
Udna 2.4 (Ud 12):
Contacts make contact
Dependent on acquisition.
Where there is no acquisition,
What would contacts contact?
-Both Ven. n ananda and Ven. n avra have understood this correctly.
-The path has been fabricated in order to reach the fruition, not to speculate about the fruition.
-I'm not insisting on anything. There isn't really any advantage to this entire line of investigation. I personally consider Ven.
n ananda and Ven. n avra's interpretations to be reasonable and appropriate in the current climate of mainstream
Theravda philosophical realism. Thus, it's something of a countermeasure -- just as Ngrjuna was a countermeasure to
similar trends in antiquity. To paraphrase Ven. n ananda, it's too bad that Ngrjuna's followers had to turn it into a Vda.
It's possible that some of n avra's followers are trying to do the same. I don't see the point.
-I think that there are numerous sutta references to the awakened mind which explain what is not the foundation of an
arahant's experience. Firstly, by way of training: The seen is merely the seen (dit t hamatta). The heard is merely the heard
(sutamatta). The sensed is merely the sensed (mutamatta). The known is merely the known (vitamatta). Ud 1.10 Bhiya
Sutta.
-Secondly, the absence of specific fabrication (abhisa kharoti) or volitional intention (abhisacetayati) towards either
existence or non-existence. MN 140 Dhtuvibhaga Sutta.
-And thirdly, consciousness which is unestablished (appatit t ha vin a). SN 22.53 Upaya Sutta.
-As for the qualm that this last passage refers to the death of an arahant, the phrase: "Unexcited, he personally attains
complete nibbna. He discerns that, 'Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, done is what had to be done, there is nothing
further here,'" is the standard paricope referring to the time of awakening, i.e. a statement of the attainment of arahant
fruition (e.g. DN 15, MN 105, etc.), and not the time of death of an arahant.
The above passages referring to the cognition of an arahant are succinctly presented in AN 4.24 Kl akrma Sutta.
-Well, I'd suggest that this amounts to measuring and classifying the arahant in terms of the aggregates. Also, the aggregate
scheme isn't necessary to account for awakened experience. And as I've previously mentioned, the suttas do not use the
aggregate classification when referring to the Buddha or an arahant. They use the faculties classification. The suttas never
equate the aggregates with the sense spheres or the faculties. Given the definition of the fabrications aggregate as volitional

intention pertaining to the six objects (e.g. SN 22.56 Updnaparivatta Sutta), there may be good reason for this. MN 140
Dhtuvibhaga Sutta. Also see SN 22.79 Khajjanya Sutta.
-This is what I've been saying -- the sutta which defines saupdisesa nibbnadhtu refers to the faculties, not the aggregates.
The suttas in the Samyuttanikya which describe the Buddha's experience of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, etc., refer to
the faculties, not the aggregates. I'm not interested in hanging my hat on any thesis based on the omission of the aggregate
scheme in these contexts, but it's worth noting. SN 12.61 Assutavantu Sutta. When the underlying tendencies and outflows
have been eliminated upon awakening there is gnosis of elimination (khayen a). After this there are no underlying
tendencies associated with an arahant's mind-stream.
-The Pli of the first sentence(MN140) is: so neva tam abhisakharoti na abhisacetayati bhavya v vibhavya v.
bhava: existence
vibhava: non-existence
v: or
The translation is mine. Compare the sense of the above with Ud 3.10 Loka Sutta:
Although becoing otherwise, the world is held by existence,
Afflicted by existence, yet delights in that very existence.
Where there is delight, there is fear.
What it fears is unsatisfactory.
This holy life is lived for the abandoning of that existence.
-Some translators translate bhava as "becoming," which highlights the point that existence is a process without any fixed
entity. There is nothing wrong with translating it as such, but I prefer to translate the term as "existence." As the 10th link of
conditioned arising (pat iccasamuppda) bhava is clearly defined in a number of suttas as the three realms: sensual existence,
form existence, and formless existence (kmabhava, rpabhava, arpabhava).
-The forward sequence of conditioned arising is always a description of deluded cognition and the consequence of deluded
cognition, which is unsatisfactoriness (dukkha). As DN 22 explains, craving sensual pleasure (kmatan h), craving existence
(bhavatan h), and craving non-existence (vibhavatan h) are the origin of unsatisfactoriness (dukkhasamudaya), and the
cessation of unsatisfactoriness (dukkhanirodha) is the elimination of that very craving.
-Ven. Bodhi is following Ven. n amoli's use of "being" in the translated edition of the Middle Length Discourses. In his
subsequent translation of theConnected Discourses of the Buddha Ven. Bodhi translates bhava as "existence."
-The point that I was trying to make in the last post was that deluded cognitions always conceive in terms of existence or
non-existence, and that this is part of the problem which creates and re-creates a "world" and a "self." It's due to craving
existence and grasping that consciousness is established and comes to growth. Of course, craving non-existence isn't
acceptable either. Both of these mistaken compulsions are entwined within thickets of views which reify a self and objectify
a world. In short, we are held captive by our infatuation with the very things that captivate us.
-As MN 140 Dhtuvibhaga Sutta explains, an arahant doesn't form any specific fabrication or volitional intention towards
either existence or non-existence:
-Conceiving in ontological terms is ineffective and only reinforces underlying tendencies.
-This is the type of analysis which has no basis in the canon, and which leads to your problematic version of "The
Unconditioned." The classical Mahvihra two truth hermeneutic is deeply flawed -- resulting in either an eternalistic or
nihilistic view. We see numerous variations on these extremes playing out all over this forum and amongst many Theravda
teachers as well. The aggregate scheme is mere designation (paattimatta). The aggregates are not to be taken as "the
ultimately existent given." With the elimination of passion, aggression, and delusion the mind is measureless
(appamn acetasa). There is no criterion or measurement (pamn a) which can be used as a reference point to define a
measureless cognition.
Q: "vin am anidassanam" = consciousness (is) not manifest = consciousness ceased.
A: As for anidassana, in this context I'm liking the translation as "non-illustrative" or "non-indicative." "Non-illustrative" in
the sense of the term as used in MN 21 Kakacpama Sutta: kso arp anidassano, the sky is formless and non-illustrative.
"Non-indicative" in the sense of the term as used in the Abhidhammapit aka, where the applications of mindfulness. etc., are
said to be anidassana. The sense here being that they are not indicative of defilements, and so on. See also Nanananda
Sermon 7
-Ven. Thnissaro's latent fire theory really cannot be sustained. The fire metaphor most commonly refers to the three fires of
passion, aggression, and delusion. If the Indian Buddhist understanding of fire was really that an extinguished fire goes into
a "latent state," then these three fires could re-combust within an arahant's mind as long as there is fuel remaining (i.e.
saupdisesa nibbnadhtu: nibbna element with fuel remaining). Of course, this would render nibbna quite meaningless.
-As for the view expressed there, I'd suggest that it's far more skillful to follow the advise of the Buddha as recorded in the
Pl i Canon. This will safeguard against engaging in pointless mental proliferation (papaca). Suttanipta 5.6:
[Upasiva:] He who has reached the end: Does he not exist, or is he for eternity free fro dis-ease? Please, sage, declare this
to e as this phenoenon has been known by you.
[The Buddha:] One who has reached the end has no criterion by which anyone would say that for hi it doesn't exist.
When all phenoena are done away with, all eans of speaking are done away with as well.
- is nothing whatsoever that can be posited about the postmortem arahant. Language and logical inference don't apply to that
which cannot be qualified or measured. There is no criteria for measurement.
-What is being referred to is the lucidity, clarity, and suppleness of mind. When one meditates a lot the mind can become
incredibly lucid and clear. This vivid presence of mind can be mistaken for an unchanging quality. But the mind must
necessarily change along with its perceptions. If the mind didn't change along with its perceptions then either:
(a) the mind would forever be frozen exclusively perceiving one unchanging object, or
(b) the mind would continuously perceive every single object cognized.
-If we take visual consciousness for example: If you turn your head from right to left (with eyes open), your entire visual

field changes as your head moves. When your head is to the left you are no longer cognizant of what was cognized in the
beginning position to the right. Therefore, both (a) and (b) above are refuted, and we can correctly discern that visual
consciousness changes along with its perceptions. And what is true for visual consciousness is also true for the other five
consciousnesses. There can be no unchanging, permanent consciousness.
- is impermanent. Therefore, any qualities of consciousness are also impermanent.
Q: What if the eyes are open but there is no "contacting"? Is this possible and if yes then how should such a state be
described in conventional terms?
A: Yes it's possible. MN 28 Mahhatthipadopama Sutta.
For sensory consciousness to "arise" there needs to be samannhra: "corresponding engagement." This is generally
considered to be attention (manasikra). Someone can be lost in thought, or reading a book, or meditating, and not hear nor
see things presently occurring around them, because there is no corresponding engagement or act-of-attention.
-The terms used in the Bhiya Sutta are: merely the seen (dit t hamatta), merely the heard (sutamatta), merely the sensed
(mutamatta), merely the known (vitamatta).
F-rom a suttanta perspective, when all acquisitions have been released (i.e. sabbpadhipat inissagga) there is no need to
designate "contact." Udna 2.4 (Ud 12):
Contacts ake contact
Dependent on acquisition.
Where there is no acquisition,
What would contacts contact?
-The abhidhamma schools however, explain all cognitions in terms of contact -- including supramundane cognitions. The
necessity of attention and apperception in the cognitive process is one of the reasons why most abhidhamma schools (except
for the Yogcra) only allow for one of the six types of consciousness to occur at any given time. Thus, even if one's eyes
and ears are "open," most of what one experiences occurs through mental-consciousness (manovin a). This is the case
even when engaging a visible form or a sound or a tactual object, etc. There is a momentary occurrence of the bare object via
the corresponding sense consciousness, and then the mind adverts to mental consciousness to ascertain the characteristics of
what is being perceived. But this doesn't mean that the eye-faculty stops functioning and one cannot see.
-I agree with your reasoning on the preferability of the word "ontological" in this sense.
Ontology doesn't mean a decision has been made about existence or non-existence, only that one is investigating and
enquiring with respect to that particular framework.
It's a framework with no relevance to dukkha and nirodha, and is merely a cause for papanca.
Questions of "soul" and "no soul", prevalent in Theravada, are also ontological frameworks.... the Buddha's Dhamma says
only that all phenomena experienced are not-self. That is sufficient - anything more is speculative, unverifiable, outside loka
and not connected with the goal.
-The same dhammas, with the appropriate emendations, are said to be present when attaining the noble path (or fruition) via
the second, third, or fourth supramundane jhnas. Moreover, the only criterion which is both an adequate and reliable
verification of stream entry or any of the other paths and fruitions is gnosis of the termination of specific fetters in one's
mind-stream. This cannot happen without the presence of perception (sa) and discernment (pa). The cessation of the
five sense faculties doesn't indicate anything.
-I'm not suggesting that one has to enter the paths fro jhna. The Pat isambhidmagga indicates that one can attain the first
noble path without prior mastery of jhna. What I'm saying is that, according to the bhidhammika analysis, the noble paths
and fruitions are supramundane jhna, complete with all of the concomitant jhna factors, other path factors, and so on.
-According to the Pl i dhamma the attainment of cessation of perception and feeling (savedayitanirodha) is only
correctly engaged by non-returners and arahants, who are not susceptible to rebirth as an unconscious being. Anyone other
than a non-returner or arahant will only be able to attain a non-percipient attainment (asaasampatti), which is considered
to be an inappropriate absorption for the reasons already mentioned in this thread. The development of the layavijna
theory isn't directly related to this soteriological issue.
-The development of discernment pertaining to the four noble truths requires a far more precise and complete experiential
understanding and path of training than is generally acknowledged by the advocates of the "one-mind-moment" or "onemindless-moment" noble path. Discerning that "everything which arises is subject to cessation" is just the beginning of
discernment, and anyone who can observe the occurrence of a thought can readily begin to see this: a thought arises, remains
for a certain duration, and then ceases.
-What is also necessary for discernment to actually develop into liberating gnosis is a sustained, dedicated, experiential
penetration of the origin of unsatisfactoriness. Specifically, craving sensual pleasure, craving existence, and craving nonexistence (kmatan h, bhavatan h, and vibhavatan h). And what is further required in order to develop an intimate
understanding of how craving actually operates, is the experiential understanding and discernment of volitional intention
(cetan). Not merely a theoretical understanding -- what is required is clearly seeing how these fabrications function in real
time in our mind-stream: How do craving and volitional intention interact? How do these processes result in
unsatisfactoriness? How can I begin to develop disenchantment and dispassion pertaining to the various things which trigger
craving? How can I begin to ease up on and let go of this insatiable infatuation with the propagation of creature comforts,
habitual emotions, and self-confirming thought patterns? In short, how can I skillfully develop all of the constituents of the
noble eightfold path in order to realize the cessation of craving sensual pleasure, craving existence, and craving nonexistence?
-And IMO, the only way to do this is to rely on the actual teachings of the Buddha. This includes the integral development of
ethical conduct, meditative composure, and discernment as described in the discourses. And we can't develop this precise,

experiential discernment of the four noble truths with a momentary "lights out" path, or any other one moment path. And it's
quite likely that we can't develop this precise, experiential discernment of the four noble truths by merely engaging in the
observation of change through a conceptual filter of "radical momentariness." Such notions of the path are an anemic and
pale substitute for the noble eightfold path of the Pl i dhamma. We shouldn't be content with claims of any momentary
"blip" panaceas resulting in ariya attainment. A far more comprehensive view and practice is required.
Q: 1) So you saying the point a putajjana becomes a stream entrant IS a momentary thing. Yes?
A: Not a "momentary thing." Rather, a process which arises on a specific occasion.
Q: This sutta tells me that it is not mere designation, that there is specific experience (at least in it's absence) which can
'identified' as nibbana. You are of the position that there is no such 'thing' (mind the reification) and that it is merely the
ceasing of the three poisons - but with that stance, the above sutta/statement doesn't make sense to state.
A: There is no need to read this sutta as indicating some sort of absolute reality or any other type of absolute "otherness."
The terms refer to the reverse sequence of conditioned arising (pat iccasamuppda): not-born (ajta) = cessation of birth
(jtinirodha), not-become (abhta) = cessation of becoming (bhavanirodha), not-made (akata) = cessation of craving and
cessation of clinging (tan hnirodha & updnanirodha), not-fabricated (asakhata) = cessation of volitional fabrications
(sakhranirodha), which refers to the the calming of all specific fabrication and volitional intention mentioned in MN 140
Dhtuvibhaga Sutta.
-In the Dhammacakkappavattanasutta we have a very clear statement of the third noble truth. Having first said that the
second noble truth is craving, the Buddha goes on to define the third noble truth in these words: Tassyeva tan hya
asesavirganirodho cgo pat inissaggo mutti anlayo (E.g. at S V 421).
-This is to say that the third noble truth is the complete fading away, cessation, giving up, relinquishment of that very
craving. That it is the release from and non-attachment to that very craving. In other words it is the destruction of this very
mass of suffering which is just before us.
-In the suttas the term tan hakkhayo, the destruction of craving, is very often used as a term for Nibbna..... Craving is a form
of thirst and that is why Nibbna is sometimes called pipsavinayo, the dispelling of the thirst. To think that the destruction
of craving is not sufficient is like trying to give water to one who has already quenched his thirst.
Q: How do we know the attainment of the cessation of feeling & perception is available only to non-returners and arahants?
A: It's stated in Visuddhimagga Chapter 23:
Herein, (i) What is the attainent of cessation? It is the non-occurrence of consciousness (citta) and its concoitants
(cetasik) owing to their progressive cessation. (ii) Who attains it? (iii) Who do not attain it? No ordinary en, no streaenterers or once-returners, and no non-returners and Arahants who are bare-insight workers attain it. But both nonreturners and those with cankers destroyed (Arahants) who are obtainers of the eight attainents attain it.
-The attainment of cessation (nirodhasampatti) is the same as the attainment of cessation of perception and feeling
(savedayitanirodhasampatti). It is only non-returners and arahants who can attain the eight attainments (the four jhnas
plus the four formless attainments) who can properly engage in the cessation attainment. This chapter also differentiates
between the fruition attainments of the noble paths (phalasampatti) and the cessation attainment (nirodhasampatti). It then
goes on to say that the attainment of cessation is neither supramundane (lokuttara) nor not-fabricated (asa khata).
-Terms such as totality (kasin a), immeasurable (appamn a), and expansive (mahaggat) are used in the descriptions of
various samdhis throughout the discourses to indicate the expansiveness of jhna. MN 127 Anuruddha Sutta explains the
meaning of expansive mind-liberation (mahaggat cetovimutti) and indicates the way of development:
-The commentary states that this is an instruction for developing the earth kasin a of varying sizes. It says that the expansive
mind-liberation (mahaggat cetovimutti) refers to kasin a jhna:
He covers the are the size of one tree root with the whole representation (kasin aniitta), and he abides resolved upon that
totality representation, pervading it with the expansive jhna (ahaggatajjhna).
-There's plenty of emphasis on emptiness in the Theravda canon. There are entire discourses on emptiness: MN 121, MN
122, SN 35.85, SN 22.95, and entire canonical commentaries on emptiness, such as the Pat isambhidmagga Suatkath.
-And also entire discourses on teaching by the middle (majjhena dhamma): SN 12.17 Acelakassapa Sutta (Also SN 12.15,
SN 12.35, SN 12.48, SN 22.90, etc.)
-The conditioned arising of the path is not a rarely taught model in the canon, where the path is entirely a developmental
model. This is most fully presented in a number of suttas in the Dghanikya and Majjhimanikya. It's also found in the
Samyuttanikya, the Aguttaranikya, the Vinayapit aka, the Dhammasagan , the Vibhaga, and the Pat isambhidmagga.
-Here is how the path is developed according to SN 12.23 Upanisa Sutta:
dissatisfaction (dukkha) faith (saddh) gladness (pmojja) joy (pti) tranquility (passaddhi) pleasure (sukha)
meditative composure (samdhi) gnosis & vision of things as they are (yathbhtan adassana) disenchantment
(nibbid) dispassion (virga) liberation (vimutti) gnosis of elimination (khayen a)
-This developmental model is also given in AN 11.1 Kimatthiya Sutta, AN 11.2 Cetankaran ya Sutta, and in the
Vinayapit aka, such as Vin. 5.366. It's also embedded within the standard seven factors of awakening:
mindfulness (sati) dhamma-investigation (dhammavicaya) energy (viriya) joy (pti) tranquility (passaddhi)
meditative composure (samdhi) equanimity (upekkh)
-And the seven factors of awakening are embedded within the developmental model of the four jhnas. The path cannot be
developed without committed and sustained cultivation of all these conditioned factors of awakening.

-Disenchantment arises from clearly seeing the futility of worldly concerns and the unreliability of all fabricated phenomena.
This leads to dispassion. Thus, dispassion is even more fruitional than disenchantment. Dhammapada 273: The best of
dhaas is dispassion.
-The experience of dispassion is visceral, deep, and profound. Discernment at this stage of the path is fully present and
naked. There is a directness and clarity of understanding which engenders confidence. We become confident that our practice
won't be easily shaken by any unexpected bumps on the road. We are able to handle situations which previously created
emotional upheavals and moments of uncertainty or hesitation. And when difficult situations do arise we know that we have
the necessary insight and skills to work with whatever presents itself.
-"Direct knowledge" is abhi. The phrase from MN 77 Mahsakuludyi Sutta is this:
Tatra ca pana me svak bah abhivosnapramippatt viharanti.
And thereby many disciples of mine abide having reached the consummation and perfection of direct knowledge.
-This phrase is repeated at the end of each set of various topics, i.e. the four applications of mindfulness, the four right
endeavors, and so on, including the four jhnas, the mind-made body, etc. Therefore, it isn't a specific instruction for the
development of the mind-made body.
-The commentary to MN 77 Mahsakuludyi Sutta says that the term abhivosnapramippatta refers to the attainment of
arahantship.
Q: Isn't concentration one kind of mindfulness?
A: Translating samdhi as "concentration" doesn't cover the full range of the term. The Pli noun samdhi is related to the
verb samdahati, which means "to put together," "to join," "to combine," "to collect," and the past participle of the same
verb, samhita, meaning "collected," "composed." Thus, samdhi indicates "collecting" one's mind, and specifically in the
context of sammsamdhi, the mind composed in meditation. It is this composed mental unification which is termed
singleness of mind (cittekaggat). This meditative composure can be vast and expansive.
Q: when the mind is concentrated then it seems more likely that one could be mindful of the entirety of the expereince...so
isn't it possible that during concentration one could have the most perfect expression of mindfulness?
A: Yes. And this is why the fourth jhna includes the purity of mindfulness (satiprisuddhi).
Q: The need for "vipassana jhanas" only arose because the commentarial tradition shifted the sutta jhanas to "samatha
jhanas". In other words, it's a counterpoint, a reaction intended to balance an earlier offset.
A: Yes, the suttanta usage of singleness of mind and jhna has a wider application and is more inclusive than samatha jhna.
Q: Do I understand correctly the argument against samatha jhna being that one can't have insight in the jhna itself?
A: Well, the common understanding of commentarial Theravda is that insight cannot occur within samatha jhna. But as
I've often discovered, the "common understanding" of commentarial Theravda can be incomplete or misleading, failing to
account for the full picture as found in the canonical, para-canonical, and post-canonical sources.
-I haven't done a complete survey of all commentarial sources on this subject (it would require reading all of the relevant
At t hakath & Tk texts). But from what I have read it seems that there can be insight within samatha jhna, but one still
has to emerge from that meditative attainment prior to entering supramundane jhna. This subject deserves further textual
research, including a comparison with Sarvstivda Abhidharma sources.
Q: Why not? If Insight does not require concomitant thought, then why someone can't have direct insight while in samatha
jhna, and think about the insight and what it means only after emergence from samatha jhna?
A: This is accurate and accords with the canonical sources.
-Numerous suttas in the Nikayas talk about all the jhanas and bases as "attainments with residues of volitional formations"
(Sankhra-vasesasampatti). This is such a common observation that Bhikkhu Bodhi also makes this comment in Note #233
of his translation of the Connected Discourses (2000:792). These suttas state that the jhanas and bases are the "successive
pacification of volitional formations." The base of neither perception nor non-perception, being the subtlest, is called "an
attainment with a small residue of volitional formations." Even the Visuddhimagga explains these passages as meaning that
all four of the mental functions, including intention, remain in all these states (337-338).
-The evidence is overwhelmingly compelling that Visuddhimagga is the oddball in claiming that vipassana is to be practiced
after jhanas. Such evidence comes from etymological, philological/textual evolutionary, nikaya-comparative perspectives.
-The Vimuttimagga is less restrictive in its treatment of jhna than the Visuddhimagga. However, I think Dr. Chu is primarily
referring to the numerous non-Pli commentaries, which are quite explicit in including vipassan as a mental quality
employed in jhna. (When it comes to Nikya school commentarial opinions and interpretations I don't see any reason to
privilege what remains of Tmraparnya Theravda over other Sthaviravda schools. They were all basing their
interpretations on very similar redactions of discourses.)
-The developmental path is about abandoning hindrances and eliminating outflows (savas). There is a spectrum of
meditative states which can aid in this. But there is no good reason to maintain that jhna is an entirely passive state. There is
an important distinction to be discerned between the refinement of volitional intention and the absence of volitional
intention. The former is much more conducive to developing and using an optimal samdhi at least until the attainment of
the non-returner path. Inert meditative states are not ideal for training in heightened mind or heightened discernment. They
all too easily become cocoons for zoning out.
-This idea is found in the Pat isambhidmagga npnassatikath.
-From the perspective of designation (paatti), since the in-breath, out-breath, and gap between breaths are not the same
object, the mind attending to each of these objects is nominally distinct.
SN12.61.
At any rate, the dhamma isn't dualism or monism or any other philosophical trip -- all of which are manifestations of mental
proliferation. Understanding the four noble truths and developing the noble eightfold path puts an end to mental
proliferation.

Q: See the anicca in all sankhara (incl. papanca), see the dukkha in that which is anicca, see anatta in that which is dukkha...
abandonment, dispassion, cessation.
A: Indeed. Sustained recognition of impermanence will eventually shred all philosophical views.
Q: Now for my next stupid question, is the imperturbable, as its used above, the steadyness of samadhi that allows one the
platform from which to do the looking?
A: Yes, I'd say that's accurate. In the suttas, the "imperturbable" usually refers to the fourth jhna or the formless attainments.
Cf. MN 106, endnote #1.
-As samdhi deepens the main spheres of focus and mental engagement are the mind sensory sphere (manyatana) and the
mental phenomena sensory sphere (dhammyatana). Insight at this stage consists of seeing the subtlest recognition of
impermanence of the mind and concomitant mental factors present. This subtle level of change is indicated in SN 35.93
Dutiyadvaya Sutta:
-The mind is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise; phenomena are impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise.
Thus this dyad is moving (calaceva) and wavering (byathaca), impermanent (aniccam), changing (viparin mi), becoming
otherwise (aathbhvi).
-"Loathsomeness" isn't the best translation of asubha. "Unattractiveness" is better, for the reasons already given. In practice,
it's the recognition (sa) of the undesirable aspects of the human body. AN 10.60 Girimnanda Sutta:
-And as AN 7.49 informs us, the purpose of the practice is to develop equanimity or dislike regarding the body, and thereby
abandon lust for sexual intercourse. AN 7.49 Dutiyasa Sutta.
-Equanimity (upekkh) is the optimal mental quality to be developed by this practice, and dislike (pt ikulyat) is a stage
leading to equanimity. Pt ikulyat is related to the term pat ikkla (pat i+kla, lit. "against the slope") which has
connotations such as "inclining away," "disagreeable," "impure," etc. The commentaries highlight the recognition of impurity
(pat ikklasa) and attention to impurity (pat ikklamanasikra).
-Let's be clear here. Ven. n a nanda has explicitly referred to the commentarial era two truth theory as a "deviation fro the
original position at the coentarial level." He also calls the well-known commentarial verse quoted by Buddhaghosa in
support of the two truth theory a "nave defense" of said theory.
-And so this criticism of the commentarial hermeneutic -- which is what it is -- isn't just "an opinion" that's been fostered
here on DW by a few fervent "sutta-only" types. It's been a part of the contemporary Theravda discussion since the
publication of C & R in 1971. It's a rather important issue occurring within contemporary Theravda which probably
shouldn't be dismissed lightly. And at some point a practitioner has to decide which interpretation of the dhamma they are
going to use. In this particular case, I don't really see how one can have it both ways. To try to regard the two truth theory as
merely a nominal distinction undermines the very purpose of the interpretation that it attempts to impose.
-Those "simpler bits" are also conventional and not ultimate things in any way, shape, or form. The entire path uses
conventional designations from start to finish, and it's misguided to assume that those conventions represent a real
substratum of experience (i.e. an "ultimate reality") independent of those conceptual categories themselves. The culmination
of cognitive liberation occurs when those categories are also transcended during supramundane meditation.
-It's probably also worth mentioning that Buddhaghosa also gets it right, although not without a bit of waffling due to the
cumbersome two truth hermeneutic. Relying on the path sequence outlined in the canoncial Dhammasa gan , he explains in
Visuddhimagga, Chapter 21, the awakening factors, path factors, and jhna factors of the path attainment for the first three
types of practitioners, which develops from the stage of equanimity about fabrications:
According to governance by insight, the path arisen in a bare-insight worker, and the path arisen in one who possesses a
jhna attainent but who has not ade the jhna the basis for insight, and the path ade to arise by coprehending
unrelated fabrications after using the first jhna as the basis for insight, are paths of the first jhna only. In each case there
are seven awakening factors, eight path factors, and five jhna factors. For while their preliinary insight can be
accopanied by happiness and it can be accopanied by equaniity, when their insight reaches the state of equaniity
about fabrications at the tie of eergence it is accopanied by happiness.
-Ven. n rma also gets it. The path-cognition of stream-entry is a supramundane jhna which must include the presence
of the jhna factors, and so on. In his Seven Stages of Purification & the Insight Knowledges he states:
At whatever oent he attains the supraundane path, that path-consciousness coes to be reckoned as a jhna in itself,
since it has soe affinity with the factors proper to jhnas, such as the first jhna. What are known as transcendental
editations in Buddhis are these supraundane levels of concentration within the reach of the pure insight editator.
Q: At least a couple modern translators have suggested that a more accurate (less essentialist) translation of
yathbhtan adassana would be something like "knowledge and vision of things as they have becoe." The point is to
emphasize the the process of becoming and not some sort of static reality. In the suttas, yathbhtan adassana leads to
disenchantment and dispassion.
A: I'm looking at the compound and I want to baby-talk the phrase as follows:
yath-bhta-n a-dassana
{according to-becoming} <-- knowing-seeing
Experiential knowledge of becoming(-ness?)
-Is it the case that the object in the English translation, "things", is altogether absent in the Pali compound? In other words,
does English convention require an object that isn't required in Pali, in this case? Does -ness offer a viable alternative?
-Contemporary Theravda is primarily an ordination lineage which includes proponents of a variety of different dhamma
interpretations. This includes some proto-mdhyamikas such as n ananda and probably some post-nagarjunian
mdhyamikas as well.

-Indeed. What we are talking about here is phenomenological description. And description is always going to be an
approximation of (actual) non-conceptual experience. And so the issue is: What is the most accurate phenomenological
description? There's no doubt that what we experience is momentary. In sutta terms: moving (calaceva), wavering
(byathaca), impermanent (aniccam), changing (viparin mi), becoming otherwise (aathbhvi). When the scholar-monks
began to articulate this in terms of theories of momentariness they came up with a few different descriptions of
momentariness, e.g two different versions in Pli Theravda, plus those of their Sautrntika and Yogcra contemporaries.
-This can be remedied for most people. As already mentioned, it's important to elevate your hips above your knees (when
sitting in the cross-legged posture). When that is done, then it's a matter of adjusting the pelvis. The pelvis rotates forward
and backward like a large flat bowl (with the bottom of the bowl analogous to the bottom of the pelvis bones). When the
pelvis is in the correct position the spine will align like a slightly curved stack of coins (in a slight "S" curve with your body
facing <-- way). Then the shoulders will also be aligned, and when it's just right, your skeleton will be well aligned, and your
muscle mass will be full supported by your skeleton. Basically, all of your muscles will be able to relax like meat hanging on
a rack. When the pelvis and spine and shoulders are correctly aligned then your body can deeply relax, which in turn, allows
your mind to settle inwardly. (It's easier to work with someone in person to make these adjustments, but hopefully you can
make the appropriate adjustments. It makes a world of difference.)
-In defense of the Pat isambhidmagga, the instruction it offers is merely a starting point for the profound practice of
npnassati. It's one way of beginning attention training, which can and should be developed further according to the sutta
descriptions of whole body jhna energy flow.
-MN 111, AN 9.36, DN 2, and numerous other discourses demonstrate that this isn't so. All four of these developments of
samdhi intersect with jhna at some point.
-There's really no possible way at arriving at a (hypothetical) original meaning. Thus, I've relied on various commentaries to
help clarify and define Pli terms as well as interpret sutta passages. IMO, sensitivity to the historical development of ancient
commentary offers a coherent and pragmatic method of interpretation.
-The noble paths and fruitions cannot be attained nor cognized without perception (sa). Also, translating asa khata as
"the Unconditioned" can be very misleading. There is no Unconditioned Ground in the Pli dhamma. SN 43.1: And what,
onks, is the not-fabricated (asakhata)? The eliination of passion, the eliination of aggression, the eliination of
delusion: this is called the not-fabricated.
And Vibhaga 184:
What, there, is the not-fabricated coponent (asakhat dhtu)? The eliination of passion, the eliination of aggression,
the eliination of delusion: this is called the not-fabricated coponent.
-The Pli dhamma isn't a theistic religion or an essentialist philosophy. Therefore, there is no reason to capitalize terms such
as nibbna or asakhata or the deathless (amata) or the dhamma (in the context of the teaching itself). The only terms which
should be capitalized in English translation are proper nouns (personal names, place names, text names, sutta names)
according to the conventions of the English language.
Q: Ud 8.3
A: There is no need to read this sutta as indicating some sort of absolute reality or any other type of absolute "otherness."
The terms refer to the reverse sequence of conditioned arising (pat iccasamuppda): not-born (ajta) = cessation of birth
(jtinirodha), not-become (abhta) = cessation of becoming (bhavanirodha), not-made (akata) = cessation of craving and
cessation of clinging (tan hnirodha & updnanirodha), not-fabricated (asakhata) = cessation of volitional fabrications
(sakhranirodha), which refers to the the calming of all specific fabrication and volitional intention mentioned in MN 140
Dhtuvibhaga Sutta.
-Also, Visuddhimagga, Chapter 16:
[Q] Is the absence of present [aggregates] as well nibbna?
[A] That is not so. Because their absence is an ipossibility, since if they are absent their non-presence follows. [Besides, if
nibbna were absence of present aggregates too,] that would entail the fault of excluding the arising of the nibbna eleent
with result of past clinging left, at the path oent, which has present aggregates as its support.
Q: What is unsatisfactory about 'Fabrications?'
A: They are impermanent and fabricated. They become otherwise and fall apart.
-Well, for example, by stating "suffering due to formations" it basically posits formations as a cause, and suffering as the
result - two (relatively) distinct issues. But with "suffering which is formations", it is saying that there is one issue or event,
namely formations which itself is suffering.
-Now, without obviously going to the extremes of positing realist type identity or absolute difference, this is quite relevant
for the issue of causality and thus the path. If formations are themselves suffering, then the formations themselves must have
a cause, which is to be removed; putting the focus on that cause. But if it is a causal relation, ie. due to, then we just remove
formations and thus eradicate the cause.
-Further permutations can be made through, say, genitive relationships, ie. the suffering of volitional formations. Perhaps
then the solution would be one of dissociation, ending the possessive relationship rather than the thing itself.
-Sarvstivda, Sautrntika, and Yogcra bhidharmikas consistently define vitakka & vicra as two types of "mental
discourse" (manojalpa, lit: "mind-talk"). For example, Vasubandhu defines vitakka as "mental discourse which investigates"
(paryes ako manojalpa) and vicra as "mental discourse which reflects" (pratyaveks ako manojalpa). Vitakka is considered to
be coarse (cittsyaudrikat) and vicra comparatively more subtle (cittsyasks mat). Compare with the Theravda
Pet akopadesa, which gives a detailed word analysis of these terms in the context of the jhna formula:
Vitakka is like a text-reciter who does his recitation silently. Vicra is like hi siply conteplating it (anupassati). Vitakka
is like non-coprehension (apari). Vicra is like full coprehension (pari). Vitakka is the analytical understanding of
language(niruttipatisabhid)
and the analytical understanding of knowledge (patibhnapat
isabhid).
Vicra is

the analytical understanding of dhaa (dhaapatisabhid)

and the analytical understanding of

eaning (atthapatisabhid).
Vitakka is the ind's skill in pleasantness. Vicra is the ind's skill in endeavor. Vitakka is

about this being skillful, this unskillful, about this to be developed, this to be abandoned, this to be verified. Vicra is like the
abandoning, the developent, the verification.
Q: That seems to suggest that the discursive thinking is part of Jhana (as per the texts you have cited). My question,
originally to Retro, if that is so - what does that mean in actual practice? How does one maintain vitakka and vicara and not
subside into papanca?
A: By keeping the mind on topic with the aids of appropriate effort (vyma) and mindfulness (sati) and plenty of consistent,
repeated practice (bhvan). It's also worth noting that some meditation subjects (e.g. Buddhnussati, brahmavihr,
asubhasa, etc.) are more conducive to sustained mental repetition of phrases than others (npnassati, pat hav kasin a,
etc.).
-There are a number of questions that the Buddha indicated should remain unanswered/undeclared. In fact, there's an entire
samyutta on this subject in the Samyuttanikya: SN 44 Abykatasamyutta.
-What Ven. Thnissaro translates as "themeless concentration of awareness" (animitta cetosamdhi) in MN 121 is related to
the signless samdhi we discussed in that other "Concentration on the Signless" thread. And as I mentioned on that thread
these vipassan samdhis and supramundane samdhis aren't systematized in enough detail in the suttas to really have any
indication of what they originally referred to. Therefore, it's prudent to rely on the Pat isambhidmagga, the
Abhidhammapit aka, and the commentaries to fill in the details. The commentary to MN 121 says that in this context
animitta cetosamdhi refers to vipassan samdhi (vipassancittasamdhi) which is without any sign of permanence, etc. The
commentary says that the next section of the sutta where the outflows are known to be abandoned refers to reflexive
vipassan (pat ivipassan).
-Well, the thing is, there are a few instances of terminology where there isn't enough content in the suttas themselves to
ascertain what the term or phrase is really referring to. As I mentioned on that other thread, this is the case for the mentions
of the signless samdhi (animitt samdhi). For example, MN 121 is a one-off sutta. It contains passages and phrasing which
are unique to this sutta alone. So either: (i) we set this apparently important sutta* aside because we consider its use of the
term animitta cetosamdhi in this context to be too obscure to understand in any usable sense; (ii) we interpret it willy-nilly
to fit our fancy (the "wild west" scenario); or (iii) we look to to other later canonical sources and the early commentaries to
see what they have to say on the issue, and then determine as best we can if what they have to offer is reasonable in the
context of what we do know from all other sutta sources on related or similar issues.
-We know from MN 43 Mahvedalla Sutta that the signless liberation of mind (animitt cetovimutti) is defined as follows:
What is the signless liberation of ind? There is the case where a onk, through not attending to all signs, enters and
reains in the signless concentration of ind. Friend, this is said to be the signless liberation of ind.
-This is all the info we get, and of course, this definition raises the obvious questions: What does it mean to "not attend to all
signs"? How do I do this?
-It's a free world and we are all free to choose whichever of the above options we consider viable in order to help us answer
these questions. Personally, I consider the Pat isambhidmagga to be both reasonable and usable in this instance. For
example, it offers the following:
When he gives attention as iperanent his ind eerges fro the sign; his ind enters into the signless.... Gnosis of
conteplation of the signlessness of for... feeling... recognition... fabrications... consciousness... etc., is signless
deliverance because it liberates fro all signs.
-And so here we learn that the signless deliverance, which is similar in wording to the "signless liberation of mind" defined
in MN 43, is a samdhi resulting from the contemplation of impermanence, i.e. abandoning all signs of permanence as the
commentary to MN 121 says. Okay, to me this seems reasonable and usable and gives meaning to a passage that would
otherwise remain forever obscure.
-As you know, there are many suttas which list the four jhnas and then the four formless attainments and sometimes also the
cessation of recognition and feeling. IMO this format is a standardized template. It allows for all possible variations in
practice.
-So with MN 121 for example, it first lists (i) the pre-jhna practice of the recognition of wilderness; (ii) the jhna practice of
the recognition of earth, which can cover the development of all four jhnas; (iii) the practice of the four formless
attainments which can be developed from the fourth jhna; and (iv) the signless concentration, which according to the
sources already quoted, refers to vipasssan. Here vipassan can either be engaged from within any of the jhnas or first
three formless attainments, or after emerging from any of the jhnas or formless attainments (depending on how you
interpret the relationship between jhna and vipassan).
-And so in practice, one doesn't have to follow the standardized template in a rigid linear order. The vipassan practice
resulting in the signless concentration can be engaged from the basis of any of the jhnas or first three formless attainments
(again, depending upon the depth of your jhna absorption), or after emerging from the fourth formless attainment.
-In this way the standardized formulas of the suttas can be expanded horizontally to account for the dynamics of real life
practice.
-Firstly, the phrase uttari anussa dhaa is a figurative expression. Secondly, while the Pli termanussa does mean
"human," the term uttari has a range of connotations including: over, beyond; additional, further, transcendent, etc. And so
the phrase uttari anussa dhaa is better understood as figuratively expressing a dhamma which is "above average," i.e.
"beyond [the experience of] the [average] human." Since most human beings are not meditators, they aren't experienced in
these refined meditative states.
And here's how the early para-canonical Pet akopadesa defines and explains these two jhna factors:

-Here, for fulfilling non-passion he thinks the thought of renunciation. Here, for fulfilling non-aggression he thinks the
thought of non-aversion. Here, for fulfilling non-delusion he thinks the thought of harlessness.
-Here, for fulfilling non-passion he is secluded fro sensual pleasures. Here, for fulfilling non-aggression and fulfilling nondelusion he is secluded fro unskillful phenoena. And so he enters and reains in the first jhna, which includes directed
thought and evaluation, as well as joy and pleasure born of seclusion.
This entire section is a word-commentary on the first two jhna factors of the first jhna formula. And that's exactly how it's
used in the Vimuttimagga where these same descriptions and similes are given explicitly in the context of describing the
jhna factors of the first jhna.
-Buddhist meditation is far more diverse, dynamic, and multidimensional than you seems willing to admit. Not only is this
diversity evident in the textual records of the Suttapit aka, the Abhidhammapit aka, and the commentaries, it's also evident in
the methods taught by the teachers of the Thai forest tradition, the Burmese Vipassan tradition, and every other Buddhist
meditative tradition. Meditation is a tool to calm the mind so that dhammas can be seen clearly, leading to discernment and
dispassion. It isn't an end in itself.
-And the entire path is provisional from beginning to end. It's up to each individual to walk the path and figure out how to
make the necessary adjustments to their personal situation as they go along. --The path isn't going to develop in precisely the
same way for any two people. Trying to pin down meditation in the most restrictive terms possible by interpreting the texts
in the most extreme terms possible in order to attempt to somehow disprove or discredit other well tested modes of practice
displays a fixation that's rooted in a fiction. The path is more inclusive than that.
-Just to add a couple of definitions from the Pli texts which may help inform the discussion. The Dhammasa gan offers the
following: The mindfulness which on that occasion is recollecting, calling back to mind; the mindfulness which is
remembering, bearing in mind the opposite of superficiality and of obliviousness; mindfulness as faculty, mindfulness as
power, right mindfulness.
The Milindapaha explains sati as follows:
What, Ngasena, is the characteristic ark of indfulness?
Noting and keeping in ind. As indfulness springs up in the ind of the recluse, he repeatedly notes the wholesoe and
unwholesoe, blaeless and blaeworthy, insignificant and iportant, dark and light qualities and those that reseble
the thinking, These are the four foundations of indfulness, these the four right efforts, these the four bases of success,
these the five controlling faculties, these the five oral powers, these the seven factors of enlightenent, these are the eight
factors of the noble path, this is serenity, this insight, this vision and this freedo. Thus does he cultivate those qualities that
are desirable and shun those that should be avoided....
How is keeping in ind a ark of indfulness?
As indfulness springs up in the ind, he searches out the categories of good qualities and their opposites thinking, Such
and such qualities are beneficial and such are harful. Thus does he ake what is unwholesoe in hiself disappear and
aintain what is good.
-I don't see much support for the notion of sati being "bare attention" or "bare awareness" in the suttas or commentaries.
There are other terms which designate this type of mental function such as attention (manasikra) or awareness
(sampajaa).
-Yes, these are all related mental functions. Sati has become something of a catch-all term used to designate manasikra,
sampajaa, vipassan, and even samdhi. But when we have sati being used in combination with these other mental
functions, it's appropriate to differentiate them. I would also suggest that bare awareness as a mode of practice is a somewhat
advanced level of practice requiring prior attention training and remembrance of what is skillful and unskillful and so on.
-Without an ongoing ability to remember what we are doing we cannot function in the world, and there can be no meaningful
observation of presently occurring phenomena
-It's more subtle than this. Sati in this sense is the remembrance of what one is doing as they are doing it from moment to
moment. Sampajaa is the full awareness of what is being experienced from moment to moment. Satisampajaa requires
recognition (sa) of what is occurring as it occurs within the context of individuated particulars (i.e. phenomena which
have been previously learned and can therefore be identified). None of these mental functions require thoughts.
-Yes, but the question is: Is this alone an effective way to develop and maintain skillful mental qualities? Or should the
satipat t hn be interpreted to indicate a more specific training regimen? That is, one picks one of the meditation subjects as
object support (i.e. kynupassan), then abandons carnal joy and pleasure and develops non-carnal joy and pleasure (i.e.
vedannupassan), and recognizes the difference between limited and afflicted states of mind vs. expansive states of mind
(i.e. cittnupassan), and engages in the appropriate categories of phenomena to (a) abandon any further occurrences of
hindrances, and (b) develop insight (i.e. dhammnupassan).
-Remembrance is quite central to the development of satipat t hna. This pertains to the common refrain encountered
throughout the Satipat t hna Sutta(s), which demonstrates that the practice of satipat t hna involves more than present
moment awareness.
-SN 47.42 informs us on how this arising and disappearance of the body, feelings, mind, and dhammas is to be understood.
-Again, the noun sati is related to the verb sarati, which means "to remember." This meaning is retained in all of the Pli
texts which define sati and give instructions of the development of satipat t hna.
-"Present moment awareness" is vin a. The gist of what you are attempting to argue for is that sati doesn't mean sati,
rather, sati means vin a.
-But I would add that "perception" isn't the best translation of sa. "Recognition" is better. Secondly, sa is also a
fabrication (sakhra). Thirdly, the recognition of impermanence (aniccasa) would be more accurately phrased as the
recognition of the absence of permanence. Similarly, the recognition of unsatisfactoriness (dukkhasa) is the recognition

of the absence of satisfactoriness in that which is not permanent. And the recognition of selflessness (anattasa) is the
recognition of the absence of a permanent and satisfactory self in that which is not permanent and not satisfactory.
-As I've already mentioned to Dukkhanirodha, "present moment awareness" is vin a. Specifically, the five sensory
consciousnesses. It isn't sati. Sati functions to direct awareness away from the five strands of sensual pleasure and place,
develop, & maintain awareness within the domain of any one of the four satipat t hnas.
-Are you suggesting that this is an injunction to simply sit wallowing in passion and other defilements? I don't think it is. SN
47.6 Sakun agghi Sutta.
-We have to remember that sammsati is an integral member of a group: the aggregate of meditative composure
(samdhikkhandha). This group also includes right effort (sammvyma) and right meditative composure (sammsamdhi).
And as the Vibhaga informs us, the function of remaining ardent within the sammsati instruction, means applying
appropriate effort and exertion as one practices. Therefore, sammsati isn't so passive as Ven. Anlayo would have us
believe.
-Sa is a mental process. As is n a and all other mental phenomena. And as Sn 4.13 tells us, an arahant doesn't follow
views (na dit t hisri) and isn't tied even to gnosis (napi n abandhu). Also, AN 4.24 Kl akrma Sutta.
-Regarding sa, SN 22.95 Phen apin d pama Sutta: Recognition (sa) is like a mirage.
-Regarding the entire complex of name-and-form (nmarpa), Sn 3.12: Dvayatnupassan Sutta:
Whatever is transitory certainly has a false nature.
-To remedy desire for sensual pleasure (kmacchanda, also rga) we are instructed to attend to, develop, and maintain
recognition of an unattractive object (asubhanimitta). AN 1.2 Nvaran appahn avagga.
-Sati is even more fundamental than this. In terms of sati as memory, it's what allows for context and the continuity of
experience. In terms of practice it is both calling to mind (apilpana) as well as keeping in mind (upaggan hana). Cf.
Milindapaha.
-In commentarial terms, regarding sati's characteristic (lakkhan a), property (rasa), manifestation (paccupat t na), and basis
(padat t na), the Vism. adds the following (Ch. 14.141):
By eans of it they reeber (saranti), or it itself reebers, or it is just ere reebering (saran aatta), thus it is sati.
Its characteristic is not floating [away fro the object]; its property is not losing [the object]; its anifestation is guarding
the state of being face to face with an object; its basis is strong noting or the satipat thnas
of the body and so on. It should

be seen as like a post due to its state of being firly set in the object, and as like a gatekeeper because it guards the gate of
the eye and so on.
(In the Vism. apilpana is interpreted differently than in the older Milindapaha, but that isn't germane to this discussion.)
-My point was that right sati only arises with skillful types of consciousness. "Presence of mind" is an insufficient definition.
-No, I'm not saying that. Sa is not the same as pa. But there can be no pa without sa. BTW, the followers of
Buddhaghosa's system also accept that the three characteristics are known by inferential cognition (anumnan a) Why?
Because the three characteristics are universals (i.e. smaalakkhan a) and not unique particulars (i.e. salakkhan a). The
latter are cognized by direct perception, the former are not.
Q: Oh, dear, "bare attention." I wonder what kind of response this would have gotten had this been put out there without Ven
Nanananda's name. The practice he is describing is Burmese vipassana. This talk by Ven Nananada is, for me, an excellent
capper to this rather fruitless thread. Thanks for finding and sharing this.
-And here we have a highly sophisticated translator giving us: "the factors are `sati (mindfulness)."
-That is, by accelerating the mental noting in such a way as not to get caught in the net of perception or sa. In other
words, to stop short at bare awareness. It is by such a technique that one can get an insight into the back stage workings
of consciousness. Really good stuff.
A: While Ven. n a nanda has been a pioneer in challenging some of the assumptions of classical Theravda, it's well known
that his teacher Ven. n rma had trained in Burmese Vipassan, and it's quite clear that n ananda was never able to
extricate himself from these assumptions.
For example, Karunadasa's The Dhaa Theory:
As the own-characteristic (salakkhan a) represents the characteristic peculiar to each dhamma, the universal characteristics
(smaa-lakkhan a) are the characteristics common to all the dhammas. If the former is individually predicable, the latter
are universally predicable. Their difference goes still further. As the own-characteristic is another name for the dhamma, it
represents a fact having an objective counterpart. It is not a product of mental construction (kappan) but an actual datum of
objective existence and as such an ultimate datum of sense experience. On the other hand, what is called universal
characteristic has no objective existence because it is a product of mental construction, the synthetic function of mind, and is
superimposed on the ultimate data of empirical existence....
The difference between the particular characteristic and the universal characteristic is also shown in the way they become
knowable (eyya), for while the particular characteristic is known as a datum of sense perception (paccakkha-n a), the
universal characteristic is known through a process of inference (anumnan a).
There may be some bhidhammikas who disagree with this interpretation. But since I don't posit truly established unique
particulars it isn't my cross to bear.
"Rise and fall" as it's used in the suttas has nothing to do with the theory of momentariness -- i.e. the arising and
disappearance of discrete momentary dhammas. This theory wasn't introduced into Theravda until much later. Rather, in the
suttas the contemplation of rise and fall (udayabbaynupassin) is decribed in MN 122: Such is for, such its origin, such
its passing away. Such is feeling, such its origin, such its passing away. Such is recognition, such its origin, such its passing
away. Such are fabrications, such their origin, such their passing away. Such is consciousness, such its origin, such its
passing away.
-We are being instructed to experientially understand and attend to each of the aggregates as they are present, and also reflect

upon their conditional origin and cessation by giving thorough attention to specific conditionality (idappaccayat). This is
further explained in SN 22.57 Sattat t hna Sutta.
-It's important to understand that it is the noble eightfold path which is the way leading to the cessation of the aggregates,
and that our engagement with this path involves comprehending both the allure and drawbacks of the aggregates. After
having recognized that the drawback in each case is that they are impermanent and cant be relied upon, we can come to
discern the escape from the aggregates, which consists of subduing and abandoning desire and passion for these bodily and
mental processes.
The Burmese Vipassan of Mahsi Saydaw and Saydaw U Pan d ita,et al, is at a minimum, predicated on at least three
related propositions: (i) the primary function of sati is bare awareness; (ii) reality is actually comprised of discrete
momentary dhammas which rise and fall in rapid succession, and therefore the recognition of impermanence requires
directly perceiving the individual characteristics of these discrete momentary dhammas via bare awareness; and (iii) reality
and truths pertaining to reality are objectively established through epistemological realism.
-Ven. n ananda significantly contributed to questioning and criticizing the historicity and veracity of the third proposition,
but continued to tacitly accept and employ the second proposition in his analysis, and to explicitly acknowledge and employ
the first.
-And although these theories were first introduced in the commentaries and became dominant in the sub-commentarial texts,
they aren't to be found in the suttas and have been criticized by a number of scholars and scholar-monks for not accurately
representing the teachings contained in the suttas.
-So if you weed out the realist epistemology, the theory of radical momentariness, and the wrong view that the noble path
attainment is the cessation of all formations, what are you left with that is especially meaningful and coherent?
-It isn't a question of existing moments, it's a question of existing discrete momentary dhammas. And the latter are indeed
claimed to truly exist by the realist commentators. It's the basis of their epistemology.
-It's the theory of radical momentariness (khan avda) which posits the momentary origination (uppda), subsistence (t hiti),
and dissolution (bhaga) of discrete momentary dhammas.
-On account of the suttas, such as SN 12.61: It would be better for the uninstructed run-of-the-ill person to hold to the
body coposed of the four great eleents, rather than the ind, as the self. Why is that? Because this body coposed of the
four great eleents is seen standing for a year, two years, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, a hundred years or
ore. But what's called 'ind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness' by day and by night arises as one thing and ceases as another.
-There is a major difference between alteration and change (aathatta & viparin ma) on the one hand, and the theory of
discrete momentary dhammas rising and falling in rapid succession, on the other. David Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy:
A Historical Analysis:
-The theory of iperanence in Buddhis has been generally isunderstood because it cae to be confused with a later
theory known as the 'doctrine of oents' (ksanavada/ kanavada), which was forulated fro a logical analysis of the
process of change (parinaa) by the later Buddhist scholars belonging to the scholastic (abhidhaa) tradition....
-It is significant that the Abhidhaa pitaka of the Theravadins akes no ention of either the theory of atos or the
theory of oents. They are certainly not found in either the Pali Nikayas or the Chinese Agaas. In his coentary on the
Dhaasangani, Buddhaghosa akes a very iportant reark regarding the theory of oents. He says: "Herein, the
continued present (santatipaccuppanna) finds ention in the coentaries (atthakatha) ; the enduring or long present
(addhapaccuppanna) in the discourses (sutta). Soe say that the thought existing in the oentary present
(khanapaccuppanna) becoes the object of telepathic insight" (DhsA, p. 421). According to this stateent, it was 'soe
people' (keci) who spoke about the oentary present; it was found neither in the discourses nor in the coentaries
preserved at the Mahavihara which Buddhaghosa was using for his own coentaries in Pali. This ay be taken as
substantial evidence for the view that the doctrine of oents was not found in Theravada Buddhis as it was preserved at
the Mahavihara in Sri Lanka. In the sae way, the theory of atos was for the first tie suggested by Buddhaghosa.
-I think it means that dependent on a sense sphere and sense object coming together, the corresponding consciousness arises.
When attention is averted elsewhere, that specific consciousness ceases. Furthermore, during the duration of this experience
that specific consciousness undergoes change and alteration. This duration is relative to the attention given to the object of
consciousness and is therefore not subject to any fixed momentary limit.
There's no basis for reading it as referring to the khan avda interpretation.
-The noble path is for terminating specific sakhras which are the causes of dukkha, not for inducing the "cessation of
material process noted and the mental process noting them." This latter type of cessation is irrelevant in the context of
Buddhist soteriology. It has nothing to do with realizing the noble path attainment.
-The specific sakhra which is the origin of dukkha is craving (tan h): craving sensual pleasure, craving existence, and
craving non-existence (kmatan h, bhavatan h, and vibhavatan h). SN 56.11 Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta.
-But before we can terminate these cravings we have to begin with the first path where we eliminate the fetters of identity
view (sakkyadit t hi), doubt (vicikicch), mistaken adherence to rules and duty (slabbataparmsa) and associated
underlying tendencies. The Pat isambhidmagga:
-Therefore, the cessation of dukkha progresses sequentially with the cessation of very specific fetters pertaining to each of
the four noble paths. The state wherein one experiences the extinguishment (nibbna) of fetters appropriate to each path and
fruition, is supramundane jhna (lokuttarajjhna). And this state must necessarily arise with the concomitant jhna factors
and other mental factors such as attention (manasikra) and apperception (sa), as well as gnosis (n a). Without the
presence of these mental factors there can be no gnosis and therefore no path attainment or fruition attainment.
-Not to mention the dubious practice of attending to the continual "dissolution" (bha ga) of momentary nma and rpa.
Never mind the fact that the idea of the continual "dissolution" of momentary nma and rpa is never attested to in the suttas

and has nothing to do with the instructions found in the Satipat t hna Suttas and is introduced through the power of
suggestion on the part of the vipassan teacher and later confirmed as an actual and true perception of the impermanence of
reality.
-I know you were. And "momentary dhammas rising and falling in rapid succession" is a conceptual fiction.
-If one attends to the recognition of the thought for its entire duration one can inferentially know that it underwent alteration
and change (aathatta & viparin ma) during this duration, and then ceased. This duration is relative to the attention given
to the object of consciousness, in this case a thought, and is therefore not restricted to any fixed momentary limit.
-The immediate present has no temporal duration. Duration is always a relationship between two different times, such as the
present and the past. This is the case whether the duration is .0005 nanoseconds or 5 days. And since duration cannot exist in
the immediate present, there is no reason to privilege the concept of an extremely short duration over other lengths of
duration. All durations are relative. Duration is the alteration of what persists
-Consciousness can only occur in the present.
The doctrine of momentariness is merely an intellectual superimposition. A mind moment is an arbitrary concept which
impedes clear seeing.
-BTW some Buddhists recognized the arbitrariness of momentary duration and eliminated the sub-moment of duration from
their doctrine of momentariness. This was the model accepted by various Sautrntika and Yogcra commentators, and was
adopted by the Theravda commentator cariya nanda as well. But this version has it's own difficulties. Without duration,
the mind would arise and pass away simultaneously. As an analogy, it would be like trying to jump up in the air and fall
down at the same time.
Q: The question is: how exactly this bhvanmay pa occur ?
A: Dependent upon a sense sphere and sense object coming together, the corresponding consciousness arises. When attention
is averted elsewhere, that specific consciousness ceases. Furthermore, during the duration of this experience that specific
consciousness undergoes change and alteration. This duration is relative to the attention given to the object of consciousness
and is therefore not restricted to any fixed momentary limit.
-This is known via discernment obtained through meditative development. Based upon this, one comes to understand
impermanence, and so on. All of this is recognized based upon prior learning, and can be described conventionally, with no
recourse to any two truths theory or theory of momentariness.
-The idea of a determinate reality comprised of discrete momentary dhammas is a product of too much unchecked ideation.
The alteration of what persists (t hitassa aathatta) doesn't entail a theory of discrete momentary dhammas. Neither does
DO.
-It means that the alteration of what persists can be discerned (t hitassa aathatta payati). SN 22.37 nanda Sutta.
-If a mind moment can't be objectively established, yet one still insists that there is indeed such a real entity then they are
subscribing to a worldview that is based on the notion of truth as constituted by a correspondence between our concepts and
stateents, on the one hand, and the features of an independent, deterinate reality, on the other hand.
-Real entities = paramattha dhammas subject to momentary origination (uppda), subsistence (t hiti), and dissolution
(bhaga), which are objectively established as real (bhvasiddha). That is, they are not merely nominally designated based
on selective recognition (sa)
-There's no need for a pseudo-impermanence doctrine of momentariness nor the Visuddhimagga presentation of insightknowledges.
-Change is not the same as discrete dhammas subject to momentary arising, subsistence, and dissolution.
-Momentariness is pseudo-impermanence with no demonstrable basis. If you want to affirm a doctrine of momentariness
then the onus is on you to show how this "experience" is veridical and established by direct perception.
-The contemplation of rise and fall (udayabbaynupassin) as it's taught in the suttas pertains to understanding specific
conditionality (idappaccayat). See SN 22.57 Sattat t hna Sutta and SN 22.5 Samdhi Sutta.
-If you were to follow the sutta exposition, concentration (samdhi) is used to develop singleness of mind (cittekaggat)
pertaining to one object basis (ramman a), such as the breath or the recognition of unattractiveness, etc. The relationship
between the development of the four applications of mindfulness (catunna satipat t hn bhvan) and integral meditative
composure is presented in SN 47.4 Sla Sutta.
-The mental qualities of remaining ardent (tp) and fully aware (sampajna), which are standard in the descriptions of
integral mindfulness, are here directly related to remaining unified (ekodibht), with a limpid mind (vippasannacitt),
composed (samhit), with singleness of mind (ekaggacitt). All of these latter terms indicate the onset of integral meditative
composure.
-So to develop the applications of mindfulness, first one picks one of the meditation subjects as object support (i.e.
kynupassan, such as mindfulness of breathing, or recognition of the unattractiveness of the 31 body parts, or cemetery
contemplation, etc.), then abandons carnal joy and pleasure and develops non-carnal joy and pleasure (i.e. vedannupassan),
and recognizes the difference between limited and afflicted states of mind vs. expansive states of mind (i.e. cittnupassan),
and engages in the appropriate categories of phenomena to (a) abandon any further occurrences of hindrances, and (b)
develop insight (i.e. dhammnupassan).
-Change and alteration of what persists do not entail the "constant perishing of phenomena" or "incessant dissolution." To
arrive at this latter conclusion requires belief in a view of discrete dhammas subject to momentary arising, subsistence, and
dissolution.
-Ledi Saydaw, A Manual of the Excellent Man:
In the ultiate sense, however, new psychophysical phenoena arise only after the old phenoena have perished, which is
death. This constant perishing of phenoena is also called cessation (nirodha) or dissolution (bha ga). It is only when one
discerns the ultiate truth of this cessation of phenoena that one gains insight.
-Mahsi Saydaw, The Great Discourse on the Anattalakkhan a Sutta:

The yog perceives that all the nas, rpas which anifest theselves at the oent of seeing, hearing etc., are
undergoing instant dissolution and are, therefore, transient.... When the yog coes to the bha ga stage, during the interval
of one cycle of rising and falling, nuerous oents of dissolution will be seen to flit by. The aterial body of rising and
falling, being subjected to incessant dissolution is indeed not peranent.
-And one doesn't have to look too far to find this view spelled out in detail. For example, the Visuddhimaggamaht k:
[Conditioned dhaas] individual essences (sabhva) have rise and fall and change. Herein, conditioned dhaas' arising
owing to causes and conditions, their coing to be after non-existence, their acquisition of an individual self (attalbha), is
'rise'. Their oentary cessation when arisen is 'fall'. Their changedness due to aging is 'change'.
-So here we have discrete momentary dhammas acquiring individual selves, then aging, then dying. In other words, the
"constant perishing of phenomena."
-Actually, according to this view the mind attends to a completely new and different object each moment. For example, take
the mundane experience of listening attentively to a song as it plays. In terms of conventional designation one can describe
this song as undergoing alteration and change as it plays. But according to the view of radical momentariness, each moment
of attentive listening requires a new and different object. So instead of listening to "a song" there are now how many "songs"
or "sub-songs" or "pieces of song"? 100 thousand?... 100 million?... 100 trillion?... Is this not arbitrary? How could it not be?
(a) adhering to the idea of a direct perception of momentary dissolution without accepting the existence of discrete,
momentary dhammas is nonsensical; (b) the doctrine of momentariness is itself arbitrary with no demonstrable basis; and
therefore both are untenable views.
-How would one directly perceive the limits of perception when perception is itself constrained by its own limitations? And
how would one correctly differentiate between this veridical perception and any number of adventitious phenomena that can
be perceived as side effects of samdhi? Having experienced various kinds of adventitious occurrences myself, such as a
perceptual strobing effect, or incessant dissolution, or the momentary cessation of awareness, etc., I don't consider any of
these experiences to be a reliable basis for insight, especially since one is just as prone to experience many other more stable
mental nimittas as side effects of samdhi.
-Fortunately, all of this is easily avoided by basing insight into impermanence on pragmatic empiricism, just as we find in
the suttas, where there is nothing esoteric, mysterious, or hidden about impermanence. Your body will surely die. My body
will surely die. Death could occur at any time. And mental processes are subject to even greater change, alteration, and
passing away than the body. Conventional description offers a more meaningful, pragmatic, and therefore useful reference,
using a clearly demonstrable basis for designation.
-In this way there is no need for inducing painful sensations in order to recognize dukkha, or perceptions of incessant
dissolution in order to recognize impermanence, or any other adventitious experiences. One can get on with developing the
noble eightfold path.
-The mind is highly susceptible to the power of suggestion as well as the urge towards confirmation bias and other cognitive
biases. This is why insight has to proceed further to deconstruct the sa embedded in experience itself. This is the
progression from right view to no view, where no experience is special.
-Cognitions are classified in terms of sense faculty and object. MN 38 Mahtan hsankhaya Sutta:
-And there also has to be the corresponding engagement or "act-of-attention" (samannhra) for any of the six
consciousnesses to arise. MN 28 Mahhatthipadopama Sutta.
-Now if internally the eye is intact but externally forms do not come into range, nor is there a corresponding engagement,
then there is no appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness. If internally the eye is intact and externally forms
come into range, but there is no corresponding engagement, then there is no appearing of the corresponding type of
consciousness. But when internally the eye is intact and externally forms come into range, and there is a corresponding
engagement, then there is the appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness.
-Change and alteration of what persists does not entail momentariness.
Momentariness is already an abstraction. It doesn't matter at all how short a duration you wish to ascribe to a mind moment,
it's still an abstraction that has no demonstrable basis.
-There is in-breath, out-breath, and pause in between. These three are different objects. Since citta cannot arise without an
object, the citta is different in all these 3 cases. Patisambhidamagga
"Sign, in-breath, out-breath, are not object Of a single cognizance; One knowing not these three ideas Does not obtain
developent. [171]
Sign, in-breath, out-breath, are not object Of a single cognizance; One knowing well these three ideas Can then obtain
developent.-pg 171"
-This offers a clearly demonstrable and therefore identifiable basis of designation for both the object and the cognition. All
designated within the framework of conventional discourse, just like the suttas are. No need for a theory of momentariness.
No need for a theory of two truths.
-Right view is important. It's the forerunner of the noble path and integral to practice. It is more comprehensive than just
practical advice. It orients and informs all aspects of discernment, ethical conduct, and meditation. Moreover, the historical
development of Theravda views and commentary isn't rocket science. In fact, compared to other Buddhist schools, the first
1000+ years of Theravda Buddhism is pretty straightforward. It's not all that difficult nor time consuming in this day and
age to learn the fundamental teachings thoroughly as well as the basic commentarial additions. Is this a high standard? I'd
suggest that dhamma practice requires a standard of excellence.
-Right view begins with intellectual understanding. It doesn't end with intellectual understanding.
-Understanding is based on discernment obtained through hearing (sutamay pa), discernment obtained through
reflection (cintmay pa), and discernment obtained through meditative development (bhvanmay pa). The first
two comprise theoretical levels of discernment where one hears the teachings and reflects on them. This reflection is the

beginning of internalizing the meaning of what has been heard. But for discernment to be liberating the process of
internalization must deepen through meditative development. This level is direct experiential discernment.
-If one wants to explore analytical understanding in greater detail there is the analytical understanding of language
(niruttipat isambhid), the analytical understanding of knowledge (pat ibhnapat isambhid), the analytical understanding of
dhamma (dhammapat isambhid), and the analytical understanding of meaning (atthapat isambhid). Understanding all four
requires intellectual rigor.
-Beyond this there is the explanation of dhammas in terms of characteristic (lakkhan a), property (rasa), manifestation
(paccupat t na), and basis (padat t na). Again, this system of analysis requires intellectual rigor.
-Burmese Vipassan is a modern interpretation of the Visuddhimagga and post-Visuddhimagga commentaries and treatises
pertaining to the insight knowledges, which in some cases at least, introduces novel interpretations of this material. Add to
this that the insight knowledges as found in the Visuddhimagga are an interpretation of the Pat isambhidmagga, which
introduce novel ideas not found in the Pat isambhidmagga. Add to this that the Pat isambhidmagga itself introduces novel
ideas not found in the suttas. The culmination of all these novel additions results, in some cases at least, in unwarranted
divergences from what is found in the suttas or even the canoncial Abhidhamma. This has been demonstrated to be the case
with textual support and point by point reasoning on numerous occasions.
-Every vedan is an experience of either bodily or mental pain (dukkha) or pleasure (sukha) or neither-pain-nor-pleasure
(adukkhamasukha). There is no generic "vedan" other than these experiences.
-The distinction is between carnal pleasure (sensual desire) and the non-carnal pleasure of jhna. The former is a hindrance;
the latter is to be developed as part of the path.
-In order to understand the recognition of anatta (anattasa) it's important to understand the object of negation. Anatta is
negating the notion of a permanent Self which is not subject to affliction/dis-ease. It is not negating the utility of healthy,
functional developmental processes with conditional self-agency (attakra). Take SN 22.59 for example, as it is a central
teachings on anatta. The Self which is being negated in SN 22.59 is a Self which would be: 1. permanent, 2. Satisfactory and
3. not subject to affliction/dis-ease
-This "Self" is refuted: a permanent, satisfactory Self which is not prone to old age, sickness, and death. As SN 22.59.
-What is not negated is the developmental processes which are conditions for happiness or unhappiness, etc. In fact, there is
great emphasis in Buddhism on learning to develop wholesome, skillful (kusala) developmental processes which lead to
happiness and joy, and learning to abandon unwholesome, unskillful (akusala) developmental processes which lead to
unhappiness, confusion, and conflicted emotions. This is why many contemporary insight meditation teachers have
recognized that no significant progress can be made by employing the path of gradual training unless the student is in good
mental health. Hence the well known phrase: "You have to be somebody before you can be nobody."
-Anatta is a recognition (anattasa) of the absence of self, and not a self-view (attadit t hi; attnudit t hi).
-MN2 is talking about mistaken ideas of possession due to the conceits of superimposing a subjective perspective. It is not
saying that the appropriate recognition of the absence of self is a self-view.
-What's being indicated here is the erroneous assumption of a personal subject who has no self. Thus, a mistaken view of
personal existence is still functioning as the basis for inappropriate attention. Discernment hasn't successfully eliminated this
subjective perspective -- the habitual filter of a separate observer.
-The Abhidhammapit aka and the Pat isambhidmagga, etc., classify the path and fruition cognitions and associated mental
factors as well as nibbna as unincluded (apariypann bhmi). That is, they are not included in the sensual sphere
(kmvacar bhmi), the form sphere (rpvacar bhmi), or the formless sphere (arpvacar bhmi). But the path and
fruition cognitions and associated mental factors are still fabricated (sa khat). The only dhamma that is not-fabricated
(asakhat) is nibbna.
-In Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities, Steven Collins correctly understands that any imposition of a Vedic theory of
latent fire in the interpretation of Buddhist discourse only serves to fill in intentional silences with the views of the
commentator who resorts to this interpretation, and thereby necessarily diverges from the radical message of the Buddhist
discourses themselves. Moreover, any view asserting an analogy to the latent fire theory will result in rendering Buddhist
soteriology impossible:
-In the ajority of uses of fire-iagery in Buddhist texts the fires which go out or go down like the sun, are -- like the three
fires of Greed, Hatred, and Delusion -- precisely what ust be wholly eliinated for release to be possible. If these fires
siply return to their "priitive, pure, invisible" state, then according to Buddhist logic and psychology, their invisible
existence and potential reappearance would ake release ipossible.
-To concretize the fire-iage into a conceptually specific doctrine ... is an exaple of what the last chapter described as
filling Buddhist silences, vocalizing their eaning. Scholars who do this often have their own account of what Buddhis
ust really ean, one which is divergent with the discourse of Buddhis itself.
-The discourses offer specific meditation subjects for working with the hindrances. There is also a very ancient tradition
where the meditation teacher and student assess the students temperament and disposition, and the student is given a specific
meditation subject on this basis. For example, if the student has a predominantly passionate, lustful disposition then the
meditation subject of an unattractive object (asubhanimitta) is given as the student's main meditation practice. If the student
has a more aggressive, impatient type of personality then loving-kindness (mett) is given as the students main meditation
practice, and so on.

-Generally speaking, the cultivation and development of whichever meditation subject is taken up will lead to the
suppression of the hindrances and the appearance and strengthening of the jhna factors. This developmental process is
nicely explained in SN 46.3:
-The developental process is similar regardless of one's chosen meditation subject: By attending to the object-support, in
this case the breath, the hindrances are starved of their cognitive and affective nutriments, and the jhna factors are
stabilized.
-In terms of ethod, this is taught in brief in the Pat isambhidmagga npnassatikath and in detail in the Vimuttimagga,
the Visuddhimagga, and numerous contemporary texts and dhamma talks pertaining to npnassati.
-Optimally, we can begin to learn to maintain appropriate attention and mental composure in all four postures. AN 4.12 Sla
Sutta:
-The Pli term is sa. It can also be translated as "apperception" or even "cognition" in some contexts.
Insight is a process that develops over time. The purpose is to develop disenchantment and dispassion towards bodily and
mental phenomena by understanding that all phenomena are empty of self or what pertains to a self (cf. SN 35.85).
-Anatta isn't a thing. Therefore, anattasa is not the perception of the presence of something. It's the recognition of
the absence of a permanent, unchanging self. Similarly, the recognition of impermanence (aniccasa) would be more
accurately phrased as the recognition of the absence of permanence. The recognition of unsatisfactoriness (dukkhasa) is
the recognition of the absence of satisfactoriness in that which is not permanent. And again, the recognition of selflessness
(anattasa) is the recognition of the absence of a permanent and satisfactory self in that which is not permanent and not
satisfactory.
Just a light nimitta. I get the same, especially the latter part of your description of it "washing over me." It's very easy to get
attached to such experiences, but they are adventitious and impermanent like anything else.
Light nimittas are just adventitious side-effects of the development of samdhi that occur for some people. And although
some teachers emphasize using the occurrence of light nimittas, these phenomena are not essential for samatha.
-SN 48.40 Uppat ipt ika Sutta states that the pain faculty (dukkhindriya) ceases completely in the first jhna, the
unhappiness faculty (domanassindriya) ceases completely in the second jhna, the pleasure faculty (sukhindriya) ceases
completely in the third jhna, and the happiness faculty (somanassindriya) ceases completely in the fourth jhna.
-SN 48.37 Dutiyavibhaga Sutta informs us that the pleasure and pain faculties are born of body contact (kyasamphassaja),
whereas the happiness and unhappiness faculties are born of mind contact (manosamphassaja).
-Taking all of the above passages into consideration we can deduce that the non-carnal joy (nirmis pti) of the first jhna is
mental pleasure (cetasika sukha, i.e. somanassa) born of mind contact, and the non-carnal pleasure (nirmis sukha) of the
first jhna is bodily pleasure (kyika sukha) born of body contact.
-Abhidhammapit aka generally uses the term asakhat dhtu, and defines this term exactly as nibbna and asa khata are
defined in the suttas. For example, the Abhidhamma Vibhaga 184:
What, there, is the not-fabricated component (asa khat dhtu)? The elimination of passion, the elimination of aggression,
the elimination of delusion: this is called the not-fabricated component.
-Consciousness (vin a) is the bare awareness of a sense object (i.e. visible form, sound, odor, taste, tactile sensation,
mental object).
It helps to understand what one means by the term "emptiness." For Theravda, emptiness can refer to phenomena as empty
of self or what pertains to a self; or it can refer to the supreme emptiness (aggasuat) of nibbna as empty of passion,
aggression, and delusion; or it can refer to ultimate emptiness (paramatthasuat) as the nibbna component with no fuel
remaining (anupdisesa nibbnadhtu).
For Yogcra, emptiness primarily refers to the non-appearance of entities apprehended (grhya) and an apprehender
(grhaka).
The setting aside of the ten undeclared questions doesn't pertain to the issue of the next world. Involvement with the former
is a fetter of views, while the latter is a right view (sammdit t hi) and a true dhamma (saddhamma), because there actually is
a next world and this can be known by arahants with the appropriate higher knowledges. MN60
-The supramundane aspects of the paths and fruitions are really only systematically explained in the exegetical parts of the
Tipit aka. Thus, it's prudent to look there to see how apparent aberrations in sutta accounts are resolved. The most relevant
systematic canonical analyses can be found primarily in the Pat isambhidmagga, the Dhammasagan , and the Vibhaga,
with the help of their commentaries. (Much of Part III of the Visuddhimagga is basically Buddhaghosa's commentary on the
Pat isambhidmagga.)
-In all of these sources it's clear that the four jhna model is preferred (pretty much exclusively). Some scholars have
suggested, with reference to both the extant Chinese translations of the gamas and the Vibha ga (which is considered an
early exegesis), that the four jhna model predates the nine sampatti model, and that the latter may have been imported into
the canon due to early Jain and other Saman a influences.
Samdhi makes discernment (pa) possible because it's through samdhi that phenomena become apparent. SN 35.97
Pamdavihr Sutta:

Well, the ariya stages are some of the least formulated and least explained aspects of the sutta strata of material, and
probably the most open to interpretation.
Translating nibbid as "revulsion" is just as problematic as translating dukkha as "suffering." Neither carries the full range of
meaning in the context of Buddhist insight. Moreover, if nibbid isn't associated with joy or equanimity it's likely not very
skillful or liberating. There's a distinction to be made between cultivating insight and cultivating hindrances.
-Nibbna is probably one of the most misunderstood terms in contemporary Buddhism. The noble paths and fruitions
are always cognitions arising with concomitant mental factors. Attaining a noble path entails the arising of these
supramundane sakhras and the non-arising (anuppda), non-continuance (appavatta), cessation (nirodha),
and extinguishent (nibbna) of fetters, mental outflows, and underlying tendencies which are terminated by that particular
path. And attaining the fruition of that path entails the full extinguishment (parinibbna) of those same fetters, etc.
-For example, when one attains the fruition of stream-entry then any sa khras which would arise in the future for a
worldling are completely terminated and cease forever. When one attains the fruition of a once-returner then any sa khras
which would arise in the future for a stream-entrant are completely terminated and cease forever. When one attains the
fruition of a non-returner then any sakhras which would arise in the future for a once-returner are completely terminated
and cease forever. And finally, when one attains the arahant fruition then any sa khras which would arise in the future for a
non-returner are completely terminated and cease forever.
-Why is this so? Because in each case the causes and conditions for future arising are eliminated with the fruition of each
noble path. This is the whole point of conditioned arising (pat iccasamuppda) -- it occurs and ceases to occur due to specific
conditionality (idappaccayat). Phenomena arise according to specific conditionality. Therefore, phenomena arent
ultimately existent.
-The Vism. developmental stages are a synthesis of MN 24 Rathavinta Sutta, the Dhammasa gan , and the
Pat isambhidmagga n akath (along with some things from the At t hakath and a few of Buddhagosa's own ideas). The
noble paths arise within the stage of purification by knowledge and vision (n adassanavisuddhi) right after the knowledge
of change of lineage (gotrabhun a). This is explained in Chapter 22 of the Vism.
-IMO the Pat isambhidmagga n a kath (which is the source for the insight-knowledges in the Vism.) was originally
composed as a treatise explaining Theravda doctrine and theory. Hence the use of the term "n a." It is more of a
pedagogical treatise than a meditation manual. This was then later understood as a good working model for describing how
to develop insight as a method, eventually giving rise to the Vism.
-The cattri ariyasaccni don't exist as anything other than theoretical doctrinal statements apart from the minds that realize
them. Thus, it seems accurate to emphasize that they are truths to be realized by cognitions rather than realities that exist
independent of cognitions.
-You know that tilakkhan a, smaalakkhan a, etc., are commentarial terms not found in the suttas.
SN 56.20 Tatha Sutta:
Thus, the cattri ariyasaccni are unerring and the knowledge that directly realizes the cattri ariyasaccni is unmistaken.
IMO the only correspondence required is that between a liberating cognition (i.e. citta + n a) and a soteriologically useful
mental object (i.e. ariyasacc). This way, the problems of strong correspondence theories of truth entailing ontological
realism are avoided as well as the undesirable consequences of coherence theories.
Yes, and my concern with translating saccni as "realities" is that it can easily lead to a similar entanglement in thickets of
philosophical realism.
Drowsiness can arise because one actually needs sleep. This is true. But often times this isn't the case. What can occur,
especially at a particular stage in one's practice, is that during sitting meditation the mind begins to calm down a bit from it's
habitual restlessness, and then, because it's not used to remaining in this calmness with wakeful clarity, the mind begins to
lapse into dullness, followed by drowsiness. This is the hindrance of lethargy and drowsiness (thnamiddha). If one just gives
in to this drowsiness then this can impede further development. Therefore, remedial practices should be used to refresh the
mind in order to remain awake, calm, and clear.
In the section on the four noble truths in DN 22 Mahsatipat t hna Sutta, craving for each of the six kinds of sense objects is
listed right after the six kinds of recognition (sa) and the six kinds of intention (cetan), and right before the six kinds of
thought (vitakka) and the six kinds of evaluation (vicra).
I don't think it's ever explicitly stated in the suttas as such, but the suttas weren't compiled for the purpose of systematic
exposition.
Faith (saddh) along with discernment (pa) are faculties (indriya) and strengths (bala) which are to be developed as
requisites of awakening (bodhipakkhiy dhamm). There is a whole spectrum of reasonable, intelligent saddh that doesn't
resort to what is pejoratively referred to as "blind faith," but is still faith in something which is beyond the sphere of certain
confirmation via our current perceptions. Primarily, faith requires believing in the awakening of the Buddha. SN 55.37.
-It's worthwhile being intellectually honest and vigorous enough to look at just how much of our motivation at any given
moment is influenced by beliefs. In the context of practice, first of all, one has be motivated to actually engage in the ethical
and contemplative training and then choose to go for refuge in the three jewels instead of one's own delusional thoughts and
emotions. Then one has to at the very least tacitly accept the premise that craving sensual pleasure, craving existence, and
craving non-existence is the origin of suffering, in order to be willing to begin to abandon habitual actions, and so on. This is

no small thing. Thus, without developing faith and going for refuge in the three jewels there is no connection with the noble
eightfold path. SN 48. 44 Pubbakot t haka Sutta:
And it's only with the attainment of stream-entry that one's faith becomes confirmed, unshakable confidence
(aveccapassda).
Both feeling and thinking have their place. The former is a frame of reference for stationing and developing mindfulness,
which will eventually lead to insights. But more specifically, insight arises through the direct observation of phenomena
(including feeling), that is, primarily through direct, non-conceptual perception.
-This part is quoted from the Pat isambhidmagga n akath. With a little help from other passages from the Psm. and the
commentary we can unpack what these terms are referring to.
-Arising (uppda) means arising with previous kamma as condition. Continuance (pavatta) means continuance with kamma
as condition. Sign (nimitta) means the sign of aggregates with kamma as condition. Accuulation (yhana) means the
accumulation of kamma for future rebirth. Rebirth-linking(pat isandhi) means rebirth-linking for future
appearance. Destination (gati) means the destination of future birth. Generation (nibbatti) means the generation of the five
aggregates, etc. Re-arising (upapatti) means the arising of kamma-result for the one who has been reborn. Birth (jti) means
birth with becoming (bhava) as condition. Aging (jara) means aging with birth as condition, etc. The sign of external
fabrications (bahiddh sakhranimitta) means the sign of fabrications associated with specific defilements, fetters,
underlying tendencies, and outflows.
-Their cessations are indicated by the terms non-arising (anuppda), non-continuance (appavatta), signless (animitta), nonaccumulation (anyhana), non-rebirth-linking (appat isandhi) non-destination (agati), non-generation (anibbatti) notrearising (anupapatti), not-born (ajti), not-aging (ajara) without sickness (abydhi), death-free (amata), sorrowless (asoka),
without lamentation (aparideva), without despair (anupysa), cessation (nirodha), and extinguishment (nibbna).
-It's important to keep in mind here that the noble paths and fruitions are always cognitions arising with concomitant mental
factors. Attaining a noble path entails the arising of these supramundane minds and metal factors and the non-arising
(anuppda), non-continuance (appavatta), ... cessation (nirodha), and extinguishment (nibbna) of fetters, mental outflows,
and underlying tendencies which are terminated by that particular path. And attaining the fruition of that path entails the full
extinguishment (parinibbna) of those same fetters, etc.
-For example, when one attains the fruition of stream-entry then any cognitions and mental factors which would arise in the
future for a worldling are completely terminated and cease forever. When one attains the fruition of a once-returner then any
cognitions and mental factors which would arise in the future for a stream-entrant are completely terminated and cease
forever, and so on, for the other two paths and fruitions.
-Extinguishment (nibbna) is an absence. This is implied in Ud 8.1 by the long list of negations, which include stating that
there is no object (anramman a). However, some difficulties arose when the commentators were trying to systematically
explain how there can be knowledge of nibbna, and in so doing, posited nibbna as a real existent with its own nature
(sabhva).
-As an analogy, when there is no pot on the table one can know that there is no pot on the table via direct perception. But this
doesn't mean that there is an existent "non-pot" or the presence of a "potless" thing that one perceives as the absence of a pot.
Or in terms of the fire metaphor found in the suttas, when a fire goes out one can know that the fire has been extinguished
via direct perception. But this doesn't entail that there is an existent "extinguishment" (i.e. a "non-fire") or the presence of an
"extinguished" thing that one perceives as the absence of fire. Which are nicely elaborated upon in the Pat isambhidmagga
Suatkath.
-For Sarvstivda & Sautrntika commentators nirvn a is considered to be an analytical cessation (pratisamkhynirodha),
which is a disjunction from impure dharmas that occurs through correct analysis, which is a specific type of praj. Thus,
there are as many analytical cessations as there are defilements to be terminated in an individual mental continuum. In
addition, sautrntikas consider an analytical cessation to be just a conceptual designation (prajapti) which doesn't refer to an
entity that is substantially existent. It is a non-implicative negation (prasajyapratis edha), i.e. a negation that doesn't imply the
presence of some other entity.
I think the sautrntikas probably got it about right.
-Don't imagine you can do goodness knows what during the day, then sit that night and attain jhana. Everything we do leaves
an impression, a kind of subtle (or not-so-subtle) vibration, in the mind, and it is this mind we are trying to let become calm,
still, steady. So unless we care for & guard the mind throughout all our activities during the day, how is it going to grow
calm and steady that night, or the next morning, when we sit meditation? Even watching a movie can leave so much residual
garbage in the mind that, ime, a mind even approaching stillness becomes, well, challenging... (One begins to appreciate
why eight precepts are required on meditation retreats.)
-Yes, the four satipat t hnas are kind of like four "layers" of experience (so to speak) which we can learn to attend to and
explore through mindfulness and full awareness. For example, if one's practice is mindfulness of breathing, there is always
feeling occurring along with the breath, as well as mind, and the various groupings of dhammas listed under the fourth
satipat t hna. With practice, we can learn how to skillfully relate to feelings as they occur. We can learn how to appreciate
the spacious quality of mind that's available when we are relaxed and present. And we can learn how to work with the
hindrances when they occur, and so on. There's considerable depth to these four "layers" of experience that can be explored
and developed as we expand our enthusiasm and commitment to practice. And this commitment can extend into every aspect
of our life, eventually bringing the simplicity of full awareness to every situation.
Q: One is incapable of speaking or hearing in the first Jhana, according to several different discourses.

A: Stopping speaking doesn't entail being incapable of speaking. As for hearing, this is only mentioned as such in the
Kathvatthu, and pertains to the placement of attention, not the non-fucntioning of the ear faculty. There are suttas and
commentaries which suggest limiting the latter to the formless attainments.
Q: Are the tetrads a basic instruction of using vipassana and samatha simulatanously?
A: As always, it depends upon whom you ask or where you look for clarification. According to the Pat isambhidmagga
npnassatikath, yes. According to the Visuddhimagga, no.
Q: I think it's clear that the vitakka and vicara of Jhana are not "everyday" thoughts or concepts.
A: Right. The Pet akopadesa lists the jhna factor of vitakka as pertaining to the thought of renunciation, the thought of nonaversion, and the thought of harmlessness. Cf. MN 19.
Q: However, you're probably right that to say they are completely non-conceptual is a somewhat restrictive definition.
However, it is definitely the falling away of any thought that characterizes the second Jhana, correct?
A: Yes, again the Pet akopadesa informs us that it's with the second jhna that one if free from the weariness induced by
vitakka & vicra. This explanation is also likely derived from MN 19.
-When one emerges from the cessation attainment the mind contacts either signlessness, undirectedness, or emptiness (just as
with the contemplation of impermanence, etc.), and inclines towards nibbna. MN 44.
Visuddhimagga 23.50 comments as follows:
Towards what does the ind of one who has eerged tend? It tends towards nibbana. For this is said: 'When a bhikkhu has
eerged fro the attainent of the cessation of perception and feeling, friend Visakha, his consciousness inclines to
seclusion, leans to seclusion, tends to seclusion' (M.i,302).
I think the most straightforward way to look at the common forward sequence of pat iccasamuppda inthe context of
practice is to see that the link offeeling is where the path intersects with it. For example, MN 38 Mahtan hsankhaya Sutta.
-Thus, the four applications of mindfulness and the rest of the path factors intersect with the link of feeling. In this way one
develops sla, samdhi, & pa through the applications of mindfulness and the other 33 requisites of awakening in order to
attain the four noble paths, terminate the fetters, and ultimately bring the entire forward sequence of pat iccasamuppda to an
end.
-Just to add a bit about how the reverse sequence of pat iccasamuppda occurs in terms of the four noble paths (stream-entry,
etc.)....
-When one attains the fruition of stream-entry then any aggregates (consciousness, name & form), etc. which would arise in
the future for a worldling (in connection with the first three fetters and related outflows) are completely terminated and
cease.
-For example, Nettippakaran a 4.42 quotes the verse from Ud 7.1 Pat hamalakun d akabhaddiya Sutta, and then explains how
this verse pertains to a learner's liberation (sekhvimutti), i.e. the first three fruition attainments, but specifically in terms of
the fruition of stream entry:
Above, below, everywhere released,
He does not see that I a this.
Thus liberated, he crosses the flood
Not crossed before, for no further renewal of existence.
[Learners liberation: Sekhviutti]
-He does not see that I a this. This is the eradication of identity-view (sakkyaditthi).
That is the learners liberation
(sekhviutti). That itself is the learner's five faculties. This is the way of entry by faculties.
-Those sae learner's five faculties are knowledge (vijj). With the arising of knowledge [there is] the cessation of
ignorance; with the cessation of ignorance, the cessation of volitional fabrications; thus the whole of dependent arising.
This is the way of entry by the aspects of dependent arising.
-That sae knowledge is the discernent aggregate (pakkhandha). This is the way of entry by aggregates.
-That sae knowledge is included in fabrications. These fabrications, [which in this case are] free fro ental outflows and
are not factors of existence, are coprised within the dhaa eleent (dhaadhtu). This is the way of entry by eleents.
-That dhaa eleent is included in the dhaa sphere (dhayatana), which [in this case] is free fro ental outflows
and not a factor of existence. This is the way of entry by spheres.
-It is one liberated by eans of the learners liberation and the non-learners liberation (sekkhya ca viuttiy asekkhya ca
viuttiy) whocrosses the flood not crossed before, for no further renewal of existence.
-Because in each case the causes and conditions for future arising are eliminated with the fruition of each noble path. This
is the whole point of conditioned arising (pat iccasamuppda) -- it occurs and ceases to occur due to specific conditionality
(idappaccayat)
Q: Arahant's consciousness is no longer fixated (appatittha) on any perceptual image (nimitta) of the six sense doors, so the
Arahant can experience Nibbana at will.
A: Yes, this also correlates quite well with some of the more enigmatic passages in suttas such as Udna 8.1-4, SN 12.64,
MN 49, DN 11, etc.
Q: The experience of Nibbana is beyond the six sense spheres, so during it six senses cease.
A: And we need to be careful here as to what is meant. There are a number of suttas which explicitly state that there is a
perception of cessation, nirodhasa (AN 10.60), which is a samdhi (AN 10.6), and which is likely equivalent to the
perception of "bhavanirodho nibbna" (AN 10.7), and also related to aphala samdhi, which is a perception attainment as
well (AN 9.37).

-With regard to the realization of nibbna, what is calmed and abandoned is "any specific fabrication or volitional intention
towards either existence or non-existence" (MN 140). Said another way, this is the absence of wavering or agitation (Ud 8.4),
and so on.
-"Seeing" (passati, disv, etc.) a form via the eye (e.g MN 38: cakkhun rpam disv) is an occurrence of eye-consciousness.
-I'd suggest that what should concern us here is how processes function moreso than what things are. The purpose is entirely
soteriological, using provisional, conventional language throughout. In the context of the aggregates, what primarily needs to
be understood is how seeing forms, hearing sounds, cognizing ideas, etc., gives rise to feeling, which in turn gives rise to
craving, aversion, or numbing out. And then, after seeing this, how we can begin to let go of craving, aversion, etc.
An arahant still experiences the six spheres. MN 121:
'And there is only this odicu of disturbance: that connected with the six sensory spheres, dependent on this very body
with life as its condition.' He discerns that 'This ode of perception is epty of the effluent of sensuality... becoing...
ignorance. And there is just this non-eptiness: that connected with the six sensory spheres, dependent on this very body
with life as its condition.' Thus he regards it as epty of whatever is not there. Whatever reains, he discerns as present:
'There is this.' And so this, his entry into eptiness, accords with actuality, is undistorted in eaning, pure superior &
unsurpassed.
-Again, there's no point in conflating the nibbnadhtu with fuel remaining and the nibbnadhtu with no more fuel
remaining. The Nettippakaran a:
[O]nly the nibbnadhtu with no fuel reaining (anupdisesa nibbnadhtu) liberates fro the unsatisfactoriness of
fabrications (sakhradukkhat).
Also see the Pat isambhidmagga Suatkath.
Also, Visuddhimagga, Chapter 16:
[Q] Is the absence of present [aggregates] as well nibbna?
[A] That is not so. Because their absence is an impossibility, since if they are absent their non-presence follows. [Besides, if
nibbna were absence of present aggregates too,] that would entail the fault of excluding the arising of the nibbna element
with result of past clinging left, at the path moment, which has present aggregates as its support.
-I don't regard it as a contradiction. The faculties are functional processes, not static, unchanging things. The eye, ear, nose,
tongue, body, and mind faculties of a worldling, stream-entrant, once returner, and non-returner have ceased for the arahant,
and the arahant has no attachment to any present occurrence of the faculties. Therefore, s/he has attained the nibbnadhtu
with fuel remaining. Itivuttaka 44:
Also, directed thought and evaluation of the first jhna do have a subtle disturbing effect on the mind and body. The
Pet akopadesa:
In the case of the first jhna ... there is directed thought and evaluation [which still] disturb the ind, and the body [still]
gets tired there, and when the body gets tired the ind is harassed....
-A middle way approach:
(a) The aggregates are designations that designate aggregations of dhammas.
(b) Dhammas are designations designated on the basis of mere appearances as they appear to unimpaired minds.
(c) All teachings and path structures are provisional expedients, oriented towards lessening and eventually eliminating
defilements and fetters.
This paattimatta interpretation has the advantage of not requiring ontological commitments while still accepting the
appearances of functional things and the utility of conventional path language and terms.
-I think there's no need to place too much emphasis on a phrase [vin am anidassanam] that only occurs twice in the entire
Suttapit aka. According to the commentaries this phrase refers to a consciousnessof nibbna.
-Ven. n ananda has probably explored this phrase in more detail than most, and I generally agree with his analysis.
However, he misinterprets at least one of the two commentarial explanations and sets up a bit of a straw man argument
against the commentary. Recourse to the sub-commentary would have prevented this misinterpretation.
-Not all arahants are liberated both ways. Arahants liberated through discernment do not attain the formless attainments, and
therefore do not attain the cessation of perception and feeling. Nevertheless, they have realized nibbna and are fully
liberated.
-I mention it because non-percipient attainments don't terminate fetters. Therefore, there's no reason to equate a nonpercipient attainment or the attainment of cessation of perception and feeling with nibbna.
-At any rate, there are a number of suttas which give a complete explanation of the path and awakening without ever
mentioning the formless attainments or the attainment of the cessation of perception & feeling. Moreover, even when the
nine meditative attainments are given, such as the the sequence from AN 9.47 to AN 9.51, the cessation of perception &
feeling isn't equated with nibbna. The relevant phrase in this case being "and having seen with wisdom, his taints are utterly
destroyed." This seeing with wisdom and elimination of savas occurs after one has emerged from the attainment of the
cessation of perception & feeling.
-There are other pathways to arahantship given in the suttas which don't involve attaining the cessation of perception and
feeling. The Theravda has never accepted that the cessation of perception and feeling is not-conditioned (asa khata)

because that would mean that there are two not-conditioned dhammas, and that a produced meditative state is notconditioned, and that the cessation of perception and feeling would have the same liberating role as the supramundane paths
and fruitions, and so on. This is a specific point of controversy in the Kathvatthu, where all of these alternatives are rejected
(see Points of Controversy, pp. 190-91).
-The arahant path and fruition can occur after emerging from the attainment of cessation of perception and feeling, provided
that one is first able to attain the cessation of perception and feeling. When one emerges from the cessation attainment the
mind inclines towards nibbna. MN 44.
Visuddhimagga 23.50 comments as follows:
Towards what does the ind of one who has eerged tend? It tends towards nibbna. For this is said: 'When a bhikkhu has
eerged fro the attainent of the cessation of perception and feeling, friend Visakha, his consciousness inclines to
seclusion, leans to seclusion, tends to seclusion.'
I would suggest that the notion of consciousness existing outside the realm of time is itself meaningless. Consciousness is
designated according to the particular condition dependent upon which it arises. If there are no such conditions, there is no
basis for designating the existence of any consciousness whatsoever. MN 38 Mahtan hsankhaya Sutta:
Q: Doesn't this view completely disregard vin am anidassanam (consciousness without feature)?
A: Not at all. Conventionally speaking, nibbna is considered an object of mental perception. AN 10.6.
-This same meditative state is called the perception of cessation (nirodhasa) in AN 10.60. There's no need to posit some
sort of dimension existing outside time and space to account for vin am anidassanam or Buddhist liberation. The very
assertion of such things is contrary to the answer given in SN 48.42 (and elsewhere):
-Any view regarding the postmortem existence or non-existence of an awakened arahant is not conducive to actually
attaining the goal. It does not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, calmness, direct gnosis, full awakening, nibbna.
It's considered a fetter of view (dit t hisamyojana).
-There have been and continue to be monastics and scholars -- both ancient and modern -- who don't consider the
Kathvatthu to be canonical. As for the former, in the beginning of the Atthaslin, Buddhaghosa attempts to argue at length
for why the Kathvatthu should be included in the Tipit aka, even though there were others who thought that it should not
(whom he refers to as "Vitan d avd," which may be a pejorative name referring to the monks of the Abhayagirivihra).
-And in recent times, there have been a number of scholars who have suggested, based on internal linguistic, thematic, and
structural evidence, that the Kathvatthu is a composite text that was expanded over a considerable length of time, and
therefore the text as we now have it can't be attributed to Moggaliputtatissa in the third century BCE.
-The four great references set a standard for excluding new ideas that would not be supported by the sutta and vinaya
materials. They don't establish criteria for commenting upon and developing what is already present in these collections,
whereas the Pat isambhidmagga, the Pet akopadesa, and the Nettippakaran a do.
-There are a number of valid reasons to carefully consider and use the Pat isambhidmagga, the Pet akopadesa, and the
Nettippakaran a. Firstly, Theravda Buddhism is a living tradition and these texts establish important Theravda doctrines
and interpretive methods. And beyond this, these texts offer other perspectives for looking at the suttas and pursuing research
into sutta passages which one might not have thought of otherwise. This in itself is an invaluable asset.
-The suttas are not a comprehensive, systematic presentation of the dhamma, and there is no evidence that they were ever
meant to be. Moreover, there is no evidence that the suttas were ever meant to be understood without recourse to further
commentary (oral, then later, written commentary). The four great references don't address these issues at all.
-The suttas are not a comprehensive, systematic presentation of the dhamma, and there is no evidence that they were ever
meant to be. Moreover, there is no evidence that the suttas were ever meant to be understood without recourse to further
commentary (oral, then later, written commentary).
-The only advantage of excluding the rest of the Tipit aka and trying to rely exclusively on the suttas is that this allows one
to pursue and develop any novel pet-theory that they wish. Theories that appeal to the notion of a more pristine pre-Tipit aka
"Early Buddhism" are speculative, and such speculations only exist in people's imaginations.
-The Theravda tradition is the only Buddhist tradition that has managed to retain and transmit it's entire Tipit aka, well
edited and preserved in an Indic language. Without the significant efforts of Theravda monastics we'd now be trying to
piece together the dhammavinaya from fragmentary collections of different schools, much of which is only available in
Chinese translation. Moreover, the Theravda offers the best opportunity to continue to introduce and maintain monastic
Buddhism in the West. Preservation, translation, and engagement with the entire Tipit aka is an important part of this
transmission.
-The arahant path and fruition can occur after emerging from the attainment of cessation of perception and feeling, but even
among arahants it's a path less traveled. The suttas tell us that in the Buddha's day there were more arahants liberated through
discernment than those who were liberated both ways etc., and there's no reason to think that this situation changed later. E.g.
SN 8.7 Pavran Sutta, informs us that of 500 arahants present on that occasion, 60 had triple knowledge, 60 had the six
higher gnoses, 60 were liberated both ways (ubhatobhgavimutt, meaning jhnas & formless attainments), and the rest were
liberated through discernment (pavimutt). Liberation through discernment doesn't require the development of the
formless attainments or the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling.
-Moreover, for stream-entry, etc., the supramundane path arises immediately after a desire sphere cognition (kmvacara
citta) conjoined with appropriate developmental qualities and knowledge.

-What the recognition of anatta negates is a permanent, unchanging Self. This recognition doesn't preclude the use of
pronouns as expedient conventional expressions.
-All instructions are expedient conventional expressions.
-Anatta has been misrepresented both in the direction of over-negation and in the opposite direction of under-negation.
Again, anatta negates a permanent, unchanging Self, not the impermanent, changeable, developmental self-structure that is a
necessary part of healthy psychological development. No aspect of this latter developmental structure is a permanent
unchanging Self. Therefore, no part of it should be grasped at or clung to as a means of salvation.
Like I said previously, if you're not concerned with continued birth and death in samsra then there are more reasonable
paths to follow than the path of renunciation. This may be why Kumrakassapa spends the entire discourse of DN 23 Pysi
Sutta trying to convince the prince Pysi to abandon his view that there is no next world, which is considered a wicked view
(ppaka dit t higata). And of course, the denial of the next world also renders the Buddha's teachings on kamma untenable as
well, because not all results of actions have corresponding consequences in this life.
Personally, I'm not interested in your interpretation as it is clearly a wrong view according to MN 60, MN 117, DN 1, DN 2,
DN 23, etc. [rebirth]
Dhammanando:
[T]here is no possibility of leaping from a state in which wrong view ("there is nothing given, nothing offered...etc.") is ever
liable to arise to ariyan right view. Rather, wrong view must be dislodged and the only cause that can effect this is the arising
of mundane right view ("there is what is given, there is what is offered...etc."). In effect this means that high attainment in
Dhamma is out of the question for those who remain skeptical, agnostic or non-committal regarding the affirmations that
constitute mundane right view.
-Kammic efficacy and rebirth are part of mundane right view. To reject or doubt rebirth is to suppose that there are some
causes that don't yield effects specifically, that there can be ignorance and craving that will not issue in further becoming.
Those of such a view have not understood the conditionality of dhammas even at the intellectual/pariyatti level. To not
understand this is to not understand the four noble truths, the three characteristics, or anything else that is of decisive
importance in the development of pa.
BTW, while no version of Buddhist epistemology maintains that concepts & thoughts are a substitute for non-conceptual
awareness, they do accept the role of inference (anumna) in orienting one towards right view concerning conditionality.
Even Ngrjuna acknowledges that without using conventions the ultimate can't be taught, and without the ultimate,
liberation can't be achieved. Your penchant for anti-intellectualism leaves little room for the stages of discernment obtained
through hearing (sutamay pa) and discernment obtained through reflection (cintmay pa) -- both of which are
important for learning how to integrate a developmental path.
-It's probably more precise to say that sati arises together with volitional intention (cetan) and other mental factors. Thus,
mindfulness, volitional intention and attention (manasikra) work in concert to focus the mind. These concomitant mental
factors can occur in any of the four postures, including sitting on a cushion with one's legs crossed, etc.
-Given that MN 128 is the only sutta that mentions an obhsanimitta and rpanimitta in that context, and given that the
commentaries and the Vimuttimagga consider that MN 128 is primarily about the development of the divine eye, and not
jhna per se, there's no reason to tie MN 128 to other uses of the term "nimitta" in the suttas or to the development of jhna,
unless one thinks that a mental image as a counterpart representation (pat ibhganimitta) is a necessary prerequisite for
developing jhna. And not even the Visuddhimagga makes that claim.
-Using a prepared kasin a man d ala is an effective method for developing samatha. And it seems that light nimittas, etc., are
important for developing the divine eye. However, although light nimittas, etc., can and often do occur when developing
samatha, such phenomena aren't necessary for attaining jhna, and I'm not aware of any Buddhist tradition that says
otherwise.
-BTW, AN 8.64 explicitly connects the perception of light and the seeing of forms to seeing devas, i.e. the development of
the divine eye.
Q: The action denoted by the present tense saanupassati looks to me to be a very ruminative activity. How is that supposed
to happen in the 2nd jhana onwards, as presented in AN 4.124, when vitakka and vicra have disappeared?
A: Vitakka & vicra aren't necessary, sa is.
Yes. More specifically, the assertion that discernment is only developed through meditation (bhvan) fails to account for the
developmental process by which discernment is initially obtained through hearing (sutamay pa) and through reflection
(cintmay pa). To fully account for the development of discernment through gradual training these other modes of
development need to be included and accounted for.
And integral to this developmental process are the three kinds of valid knowledge. These are listed by Steven Collins
in Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities:
Indian philosophy acknowledges three common "means of knowledge" (pramn a):
(i) pratyaks a (Pali paccakkha), perception or experience,
(ii) anumna, inference or logical proof, and
(iii) abda (Pali sadda) or ruti (Pali suti), verbal testimony (=scriptural authority; in Buddhism often Buddha-vaccana, the
Word of the Buddha, or some equivalent).

-In terms of scriptural authority there are many suttas where physical birth, death, and rebirth are explicitly stated. In the SN
there are entire samyuttas largely devoted to rebirth (e.g. Samyutta 15, 29, 30, 31, 32).
-In terms of inferential knowledge, there are passages such as the following from SN 42.11 where one is instructed to
develop inference regarding both the past and the future following from direct perception.
-And related to this, SN 12.34 gives a comprehensive analysis of pat iccasamuppda including analysis of past and future
conditions:
-Other discourses that include consideration of future results are MN 41, MN 46, MN 135, MN 149, SN 12.33, SN 22.5, SN
22.9, SN 22.10, SN 22.11, AN 4.232, AN 8.33, AN 8.35, AN 8.36, etc.
The use of scriptural authority, inference, and reasoning (yutti) are also recommended for developing discernment pertaining
to pat iccasamuppda and rebirth in the Visuddhimagga (Ch. 17), the commentary on the Vibha ga (Ch. 6) and the subcommentary on DN 15. And in non-Pli Buddhist sources there are a number of treatises explaining direct perception and
inference.
As you suggest, the same passages occur in DN 2. A relevant section:
He drenches, steeps, fills, and pereates this very body with the joy and pleasure born of seclusion so that there is no part of
his whole body that is not pereated by joy and pleasure born of seclusion.
The commentary explains these phrases as follows:
-This very body: this body born of action [i.e. born of kaa]. He drenches: he oistens, he extends joy and pleasure
everywhere. Steeps: to flow all over. Fills: like filling a bellows with air. Pereates: to touch all over.
-His whole body: in this onks body, with all its parts, in the place where acquired [aterial] continuity occurs there is
not even the sallest part consisting of skin, flesh, and blood that is not pereated with the pleasure of the first jhna.
Compare the underlined portion of AN 9.37:
Sister, the concentration that does not lean forward and does not bend back, and that is not reigned in and checked by
forcefully suppressing [the defilements] -- by being liberated, it is steady; by being steady, it is content; by being content,
one is not agitated. The Blessed One said this concentration has final knowledge as its fruit.
With the underlined portion from SN 22.53, 54, & 55:
When that consciousness is unestablished, not coming to growth, nongenerative, it is liberated. By being liberated, it is
steady; by being steady, it is content; by being content, he is not agitated. Being unagitated, he personally attains nibbna. He
understands: 'Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this
state of being.'
It seems that we are dealing with a very specific, liberational samdhi in both cases. Specifically with regard to the content
of AN 9.37, the likely samdhi is explained in AN 10.6:
"Here, nanda, a bhikkhu is percipient thus: 'This is peaceful, this is sublie, that is, the stilling of all activities, the
relinquishent of all acquisitions, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, nibbna.' It is in this way, nanda, that
a bhikkhu could obtain such a state of concentration...."
-This samdhi is probably equivalent to the perception of "bhavanirodho nibbna" described in the next sutta, AN 10.7, and
the perception of cessation (nirodhasa) described in AN 10.60, and in this way is related to the aphala samdhi of AN
9.37.
Q: I would not disagree with you when you equate the sadhi from AN 10.6 with AN 10.7s bhavanirodho nibbna
perception.
But I think its quite a stretch to equate the na sakhraniggayhavritagato sadhi from AN 9.37 with the AN
10.6 sadhi... The sadhi from AN 10.6-7 is mentioned only one other time, in AN 11.7
A: AN 11.7, 8, 9 (NDB numbering) are all related to AN 10.6, and AN 10.7. For example, AN 11.8.
-Given that the subject matter in all of these suttas is concerned with specific perception attainments, and that nanda is one
of the main characters in all but one of these discourses, and that they are all located in the AN, and that the commentaries
see similar parallels, there's good reason to include AN 9.37 in this group.
Q: Its precisely your identifying the aphala sadhi with the AN 10 and AN 11 sadhis that I find unsustainable.
Although AN 10.6 suggests that a means into the AN 10/AN 11 samdhi is the eta santa formula, it is amply clear that
such a sadhi is an attainment accessible only to arahants. This much comes from AN 11.10, where the same sadhi is
described as being attained "by the excellent thoroughbred of a man (bhadr purisjny). From AN 3.139 (PTS
numbering), we know that this specimen is one who has savna khay, standard coding for the arahant.
-So, how does one make the leap and identify AN 9.37s aphala sadhi (concentration which has gnosis as its fruit)
with the AN 10 and AN 11 concentrations which are the fruit of awakening? Ven T tries to circumvent this problem by
reading the interrogative kiphalo as a genitivetappurisa, instead of the more natural bahubbhi . But as the placement of the
non-agitation pericope demonstrates, the aphala sadhi gives rise to non-agitation, which is the precursor to
awakening, not the sequel thereto. I dont think the redactors could have made such a silly mix-up.
A: According to the commentary AN 9.37 is referring to the arahant fruition samdhi (arahattaphalasamdhi) and AN 10.6 is
referring to the post-awakening fruition attainment samdhi (phalasampattisamdhi). But even if one were to relegate the
AN 9.37 samdhi to the arahant path instead of the fruition, the arahant path attainment and fruition attainment are both

supramundane jhnas which take cessation as object.

Related to this, the Nettippakaran a classifies the "not reigned in and checked by forcefully suppressing" samdhi as
vipassan:
Herein, any sadhi that is presently pleasant and any sadhi that has a future pleasant result are saatha. And any
sadhi that is noble and non-carnal, and any sadhi that is not practiced by lowly persons, and any sadhi that is
peaceful and sublie, gained by full tranquilization, attained to unification, and not reigned in and checked by forcefully
suppressing [the defileents], and any [sadhi of which one is aware] 'I enter this sadhi indfully and I eerge fro it
indfully', are vipassan.
-Be that as it may, this group of suttas does help to illustrate the different perceptual operations that occur with different
modes of practice. A jhna which examines an object-support (ramman panijjhna), a jhna which examines characteristics
(lakkhan panijjhna), and a supramundane jhna (lokuttarajjhna) each engage in a different perceptual operation.
-In sutta terms, a jhna which examines an object-support includes, for example, the actual refined perception of joy and
pleasure born of seclusion (vivekajaptisukhasukhumasaccasa). A jhna which examines characteristics
(lakkhan panijjhna) includes, for example, the perception of impermanence (aniccasa). And a supramundane jhna
includes the perception of cessation (nirodhasa).
-If I were to analyze the pericope you brought up, I would differentiate the segment, "it is not reigned in and checked by
forcefully suppressing [the defilements]" (AN 3.101) as indicating either a jhna which examines an object-support or a
jhna which examines characteristics; that segment with the addition of the segment, "by being liberated, it is steady; by
being steady, it is content; by being content, one is not agitated" (AN 9.37) as indicating the arahant supramundane path
attainment; and the segment, "being unagitated, he personally attains nibbna. He understands: 'Destroyed is birth, the holy
life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being'" (SN 22.53) as indicating the
arahant supramundane fruition attainment. This last segment could even be further subdivided and differentiated.
-However, this type of textual analysis is speculative and too closely allied with conceptual realism and other cognitive ills to
be of much value.
The Pat isambhidmagga npnassatikath includes both the mental body (nmakya) and the form body (rpakya) under
the third step of mindfulness of breathing:
How is it that he trains thus 'I shall breathe in acquainted with the whole body', he trains thus 'I shall breathe out acquainted
with the whole body'?
[Analysis of the Object of Conteplation]
-Body: there are two bodies: the ental body and the aterial body.
-What is the ental body? Feeling, perception, volition, contact, attention, and entality are the ental body, and also what
are called cognizance forations: these are the ental body.
-What is the aterial body? The four great entities and the ateriality derived by clinging fro the four great entities, inbreath and out-breath and the sign for anchoring [indfulness], and also what are called body forations: this is the
aterial body.
-How is he acquainted with these bodies? When he understands unification of cognizance and non-distraction through long
in-breaths, his indfulness is established (founded). By eans of that indfulness and that knowledge he is acquainted with
those bodies. When he understands unification of cognizance and non-distraction through long outbreaths, ... through short
in-breaths, ... through short out-breaths, his indfulness is established (founded). By eans of that indfulness and that
knowledge he is acquainted with those bodies.
-Rapture and pleasure can only arise concurrently with conscious awareness.
-The same section goes on to include both samatha & vipassan:
He cobines saatha through its eaning of non-distraction. He cobines vipassan through its eaning of conteplation.
He cobines saatha and vipassan through their eaning of single function (taste). He cobines coupling (yuganandha)
through its eaning of non-excess.
-Anyone who relies on the jhna theory of Ven. Brahmavamso (as well as many people who rely on the Visuddhimagga
jhna descriptions without a careful study of all relevant older material) is going to have a very different understanding of
what jhna is, than someone who relies on the Tipit aka as canonical authority and has also studied other early paracanonical Pl i and other Sthaviravda treatises.
-For example, in The Jhnas Ven. Brahmavamso describes singleness of mind as follows:
One-pointedness describes the indfulness that is so sharply focused on a inute area of existence. It is one-pointed in
space because it only sees the point source of bliss, together with a sall area surrounding the bliss caused by the first jhna
wobble.
-But the canon offers a much different understanding of singleness of mind (citta ekagga, cittekaggat). Singleness of mind
is possible in any state which has discarded the five hindrances and therefore has nothing to do with being "sharply focused
on a minute area of existence." For example, AN 4.12 Sla Sutta:
If while he is walking, standing, sitting, or reclining, a onk is free fro greed and ill will, fro sloth and torpor, fro
restlessness and worry, and has discarded doubt, then his will has becoe strong and ipregnable; his indfulness is alert
and unclouded; his body is cal and unexcited; his ind is concentrated and collected (sahita citta ekagga).
And also, differing from Ven. Brahmavamso's jhna, the canon describes the mind in jhna as vast and expansive. MN 127
describes the expansive liberation of mind (mahaggat cetovimutti), which is a synonym for the mastery of jhna, as follows:

And what, householder, is the expansive liberation of ind? Here a onk abides resolved upon an area the size of the root of
one tree, pervading it as expansive: this is called the expansive liberation of ind. Here a onk abides resolved upon an
area the size of the roots of two or three trees, pervading it as expansive: this too is called the expansive liberation of ind.
Here a onk abides resolved upon an area the size of one village, pervading it as expansive ... an area the size of two or
three villages... an area the size of one ajor kingdo... an area the size of two or three ajor kingdos... an area the size
of the earth bounded by the ocean, pervading it as expansive: this too is called the expansive liberation of ind.
Moreover, MN 111, the Pat isambhidmagga, and the Dhammasagan are all canonical authorities which support
developing vipassan within jhna. MN 111 informs us that in the first seven attainments phenomena are differentiated and
known as they occur. It's not vipassan of phenomena that had passed, ceased, and changed, it's vipassan of phenomena one
by one as they occurred:
tyssa dha anupadavavatthit honti; tyssa dha vidit uppajjanti, vidit upatthahanti,
vidit abbhattha

gacchanti.
these phenoena were defined by hi one by one as they occurred; known to hi these phenoena arose, known they were
present, known they disappeared.
-This is a description of vipassan of phenomena one by one as they occurred (anupadadhammavipassan). But according to
Ven. Brahmavamso's jhna, there can be no comprehension within jhna. In The Jhnas Ven. Brahmavamso states:
When perspective is reoved, so is coprehension. Thus in jhna, not only is there no sense of tie, but also there is no
coprehension of what is going on.
-This lack of comprehension precludes any differentiation and knowing of phenomena one by one as they occur in jhna. For
Ven. Brahmavamso this differentiation and knowing of mental factors is impossible within jhna. He continues:
Furtherore, the ultra-stillness of indfulness in jhna freezes the activity of ind called coprehension to the extent that,
while in jhna, one can hardly ake sense of one's experience. The landarks of jhna are only recognized later, after
eerging and reviewing.
-Therefore, according to Ven. Brahmavamso, the MN 111 statement that "these phenomena were defined by him one by one
as they occurred," would be impossible. This passage would have to be discarded for all of the first seven attainments and
replaced by the passage describing the final two attainments:
so tya sapattiy sato vutthahati.
so tya sapattiy sato vutthahitv
ye dha att niruddh viparin at te dhae

saanupassati 'eva kirae dha ahutv sabhonti, hutv pativent'ti

He eerged indful fro that attainent. Having done so, he conteplated the phenoena that had passed, ceased and
changed, thus: 'So indeed, these phenoena, not having been, coe into being; having been they vanished.'
-But in the sutta this passage only pertains to the final two attainments. In the final two attainments phenomena cannot be
differentiated and known as they occur because apperception isn't sufficiently engaged.
-And not only is this the case for MN 111, but also the Pat isambhidmagga, the Dhammasagan , the Mahvibhs , and the
Abhidharmakoabhs ya (i.e. all major Indian Theravda/Sthaviravda texts), as well as the detailed Sautrntika and
Yogcra texts all maintain that vipassan can and should optimally be developed within jhna. For example, the
Dhammasagan section on Rpvacarakusala lists the mental factors engaged in an optimally skillful rpvacarajjhnacitta
on that specific occasion, specifically, at that time. This list includes sammdit t hi, sammsati, sampajaa, samatha, and
vipassan:
-What at that tie is saatha? That which at that tie is stability of ind, steadfastness of ind, thorough steadfastness of
ind, unshakableness, non-distraction, iperturbability, calness of ind, faculty of concentration, strength of
concentration, right concentration. This at that tie is saatha.
-What at that tie is vipassan? That which at that tie is discernent (pa), thorough understanding, investigation,
coprehensive investigation, investigation of phenoena, consideration, discriination, direct discriination, erudite
intelligence, proficiency, refined intelligence, discriinative exaination.... This at that tie is vipassan.
-Taking the canonical Pl i treatises into consideration, as well as the numerous major non-Pl i Abhidharma treatises, there
is nothing whatsoever unusual about the inclusion of vipassan here. The Sarvstivda *Mahvibhs (Apidamo
dapiposha lun) states:
In the four dhynas, aatha and vipayan are equal in strength, and thus they are naed a pleasant dwelling.
The Abhidharmakoabhs ya:
Sadhi is in fact excellent: it is a dhyna filled with "parts," which goes by the eans of the yoke of aatha and
vipayan [that is to say, in which aatha and vipayan are in equilibriu], that is tered in the Stra "happiness in this
world" and "the easy path," the path by which one knows better and easily.
The Yogcrabhmistra:
Furtherore, only by depending on the dhynas and the access concentration preceding the first dhyna, the incopletely
attained concentration, can one ake the [initial] breakthrough to the noble truths. The forless attainents are
inadequate. What is the reason? In the state of the forless attainents, the path of aatha is superior, whereas the path of
vipayan is inferior. The inferior path of vipayan is incapable of attaining the [initial] breakthrough to the noble truths.
The *Tattvasiddhistra (Chengshih lun), the *Prakaran ryavcastra (Xianyang shengjiao lun), and the
*Mahprajpramitopadea (Dazhi du lun) all make similar statements to these.
-As happens in every case, all of these references are completely incompatible with Ven. Brahmavamso's jhna theory.
The real question is the optimal development of the noble eightfold path. The noble eightfold path presented in the Pl i
Tipit aka and early para-canonical sources such as the Pet akopadesa and the Nettippakaran a always include the coupling of

calm (samatha) and clear seeing (vipassan) at some stage of the noble path. These two mental factors are mutually
conditioning, each serving to strengthen the other when skillfully employed within jhna.
Q: Also according to the Yuganaddha Sutta ( AN 4.170) Four Ways to Arahantship
A: I'll stick with the canonical Dhammasagan and Pat isambhidmagga in order to further clarify this sutta. The
Dhammasagan Cittuppdakan d a Rpvacarakusala Catukkanaya lists the mental factors engaged in an optimally skillful
rpvacarajjhnacitta on a specific occasion, specifically, at that time. This list includes sammdit t hi, sammsati,
sampajaa, samatha, and vipassan:
-What at that tie is saatha? That which at that tie is stability of ind, steadfastness of ind, thorough steadfastness of
ind, unshakableness, non-distraction, iperturbability, calness of ind, faculty of concentration, strength of
concentration, right concentration. This at that tie is saatha.
-What at that tie is vipassan? That which at that tie is discernent (pa), thorough understanding, investigation,
coprehensive investigation, investigation of phenoena, consideration, discriination, direct discriination, erudite
intelligence, proficiency, refined intelligence, discriinative exaination.... This at that tie is vipassan.
-The same is said regarding supramundane jhna in the Lokuttarakusala Suddhikapat ipad section, with the appropriate
additions. Also, the Pat isambhidmagga Yuganaddhakath is the canonical commentary on this sutta, where the coupling of
samatha and vipassan are again said to occur together upon attainment of the noble path. This is the same as what is
presented in the Dhammasagan Cittuppdakan d a Lokuttarakusala Suddhikapat ipad.
The Pat isambhidmagga Yuganaddhakath is the canonical commentary on this sutta, where the coupling of samatha and
vipassan are said to occur together upon attainment of the noble path. This is the same as what is presented in the
Dhammasagan Cittuppdakan d a Lokuttarakusala Suddhikapat ipad.
Dhammasagan 1027:
-What phenoena are expansive (ahaggat)?
-There are skillful and neither-skillful-nor-unskillful phenoena of the for sphere (rpvacar) and the forless sphere
(arpvacar), the feeling aggregate, recognition aggregate, fabrications aggregate, and consciousness aggregate; these
phenoena are expansive.
-As for the Kathvatthu controversy, it doesn't entail accepting Ven. Brahmavamso's jhna theory either. The sense faculties
don't blackout every time one engages in thought. The six consciousnesses are nominal designations. As MN 38
Mahtan hsankhaya Sutta tells us, "Consciousness is reckoned by the particular condition dependent upon which it arises."
And so there is a difference between simply attending to a mental object (nimitta) via mental consciousness, and the formless
attainments wherein the mind is totally isolated from the five sense faculties. In commentarial terms, attending exclusively to
a cognitive representation/mental object already occurs at the stage of access samdhi. Thus, the engagement is exclusively
that of the apperception of the counterpart representation via mental consciousness. The difference between access samdhi
and and the first jhna is the degree of stability of the jhna factors. The difference between the first jhna and the formless
attainments is indicated in both the Vimuttimagga and the Visuddhimagga when they discuss the formless attainments and
mention Al ra Klma not seeing or hearing the five-hundred carts passing by when abiding in a formless attainment.
-Yes, the seven factors of awakening are a model of the conditioned process explaining how right mindfulness, right
effort/right exertion, and right samdhi are to be developed and integrated, optimally culminating in the purity of
mindfulness (fourth jhna).
-But dhamma-vicaya as a factor of awakening is also considered to be synonymous with discernment (pa), right view
(sammdit t hi), clear seeing (vipassan), and awakening (bodhi). This is stated in the Mahniddesa and the
Abhidhammapit aka. Therefore, dhamma-vicaya is said to be present at the time of attaining the noble paths and fruitions.
Q: Besides disagreeing with Ajahn Thanissaro's translation/interpretation of "vitakketv" and "vicretv", it should be clear
from MN 117 that the vacisankhara fall within the Sammasankappa definition in MN 117. They are forms of cetana, as MN
117 demonstrates, and not limited to cetana that initiates speech, but all possible movement of the mind that manifest as
"thoughts" (takko), "application of mind" (vitakka), "intention" (sankappa), "absorption" (apanna), "fixing of mind"
(byappan) etc etc etc in MN 117.
A: None of those terms are synonymous with cetan or manasikra.
Q: If you demand a lexical/orthographic equivalence between sankappa and cetana, that's your prerogative. I follow Ven
Analayo in simply looking at the functional definitions in MN 117 and MN 78. Since it is clear from MN 78 that kammas
originate from sankappa, there is no need to devise some convoluted denial of the equivalence of sankappa to cetana.
A: The fallacious equivalence that you are trying to establish is this: vitakka is the same as sa kappa, therefore vitakka is the
same as cetan. This isn't possible because in MN 111 Ven. Sriputta differentiates between vitakka and cetan as distinct
dhammas. These dhammas are also differentiated in the Abhidhammapit aka.
Q: We stick with what the Buddha presents as His abhisanirodha and anupubbanirodha scheme.
A: Neither the suttas, nor the Theravda, Sarvstivda, or Sautrntika authors require the attainment of cessation of
apperception and feeling for awakening to occur. Moreover, for the Theravda the cessation attainment is only possible for
non-returners and arahants (and it is not considered supramundane). Anyone who is a worldling or a stream-attainer will fail
to attain the cessation attainment and slip into a non-apperceptive samdhi. This is a dangerous state to cultivate because it
can lead to rebirth as a non-percipient being.
Q: But, you have a rather bizarre way of reading the Dhammasangani's "nanasampayutta" which does not entail
concomitance; looks like your backreading a Commentarial concept into the Dhammasangani. Your reading entails
"nanasahagata" and the only reason why you're re-writing the Abhidhamma is because you need some affirmation for the
possibility that dhamma-vicaya can be contemporaneous with the jhanas.
A: I merely wrote "concomitant" instead of "associated." My mistake. At any rate, the Dhammasa gan Cittuppdakan d a
Lokuttarakusala Suddhikapat ipad explicitly equates the discernment faculty (paindriya) with the dhamma-discrimination

factor of awakening (dhammavicayasambojjhaga) as a supramundane dhamma at the time of attaining the noble path via
supramundane jhna. And the Mahniddesa equates awakening (bodhi) with gnosis of the four paths (catsu maggesu n a),
the faculty of discernment (paindriya), the strength of discernment (pabala), the dhamma-discrimination factor of
awakening (dhammavicayasambojjhaga), investigation (vmams), clear seeing (vipassan), and right view (sammdit t hi).
No back reading of anything.
-The Dhammasagan clearly allows for vipassan to be concomitant with rpvacarajjhna. I've never said otherwise.
-Vipassan doesn't require vitakka and/or vicra. It requires apperception (sa), which is functional in all four jhnas.
-The Visuddhimagga also states that only non-returners and arahants can attain the cessation of apperception and feeling.
The suttas and the commentaries both state that arahants who are liberated through discernment do not. Therefore it is not
accurate to equate nibbna with nirodhasampatti. Cf. MN 70 Kt giri Sutta:
And what, onks, is the person liberated through discernent? There is the case where a certain person does not reain
touching with his body those peaceful liberations that transcend for, that are forless, but having seen with discernent
his ental outflows are ended. This is called a person who is liberated through discernent.
-And AN 4.87 Saman amacala Putta Sutta:
The eighth deliverance of the eight deliverances (at tha
viokkh) is the cessation of apperception and feeling
(savedayitanirodha). Arahants who are liberated through discernent do not attain this cessation.
-Kmasaanirodha doesn't require that "all the five senses are totally shut down." Attending to a mental object (nimitta) in
rpvacarajjhna doesn't require that "all the five senses are totally shut down." There is a difference between attending to a
mental object via mental consciousness, and the formless attainments wherein the mind is totally isolated from the five sense
faculties. In commentarial terms, attending exclusively to a cognitive representation/mental object already occurs at the stage
of access samdhi. Thus, the engagement is exclusively that of the apperception of the counterpart representation via mental
consciousness. The difference between access samdhi and and the first jhna is the degree of stability of the jhna factors.
The difference between the first jhna and the formless attainments is indicated in both the Vimuttimagga and the
Visuddhimagga when they discuss the formless attainments and mention Al ra Klma not seeing or hearing the fivehundred carts passing by when abiding in a formless attainment.
-It's quite nonsensical to insist that a corresponding reading cannot be applied to the Dhammasa gan 's treatment of
rpvacarajjhna associated with gnosis.
-Are you suggesting that there is insight without the apperception of impermanence (aniccasa), or the apperception of
unsatisfactoriness in what is impermanent (anicca dukkhasa), or the apperception of selflessness (anattasa), or the
apperception of passing away (vayasa), or the apperception of dispassion (virgasa), or the apperception of cessation
(nirodhasa), or the apperception of release (pat inissaggasa), or the apperception of elimination (khayasa).
-Are you suggesting that there is no possibility of developing vipassan of phenomena one by one as they occur
(anupadadhammavipassan) while abiding in jhna? Are you suggesting that MN 111 and the Dhammasa gan and the
Vibhaga are wrong to include apperception in their analyses of dhammas occurring in jhna? MN 111 informs us that in the
first seven attainments phenomena are differentiated and known as they occur. It's not vipassan of phenomena that had
passed, ceased, and changed, it's vipassan of phenomena one by one as they occurred: "These phenomena were defined by
him one by one as they occurred; known to him these phenomena arose, known they were present, known they disappeared."
-It is also possible to develop vipassan while abiding in jhna. MN 111 describes this, as does the Abhidhammapit aka. Of
course, if one is abiding in a non-perceptive attainment then there is no possibility of apperception or insight.
Q: How can there be panna without thought, without mental words, without discursive conception? Can one "know" without
differentiating? Can one differentiate when there is no vitakka as kusala sankappa to move the mind?
A: One who practices sammsamdhi instead of asaisamdhi learns the difference between apperception (sa) and
thought (vitakka). It is apperception which differentiates, not thought.
-And this relates to the main issue: Meditation which is specifically Buddhist is qualified by the presence of vipassan. This
is explicitly stated in the Theravda, Sarvstivda, and Sautrntika treatises already cited in this thread. And this is why the
Mahvihra commentarial tradition can maintain that rpvacarajjhna is not essential for awakening. Jhna devoid of
vipassan isn't an essential dhamma of Theravda or Sthaviravda Buddhism.
Are you now suggesting that supramundane jhna occurs without dhammavicaya? That too, would be quite impossible. The
presence of dhammavicaya, just like the presence of sammdit t hi, etc., does not require vitakka or vicra.
Q: Then please describe exactly how someone contemplate the dhamma inside jhana. Do you suggest that we use vitakka
and vicara , or sanna ?
A: Sa. Sa is necessary for discernment obtained through meditative development (bhvanmay pa).
Q: Mindfulness is brought to onepointedness in jhana ( samma samadhi). Where did it say samadhi is expansive.
A: The Dhammasagan details a number of different jhnas, including the kasin a jhnas, the brahmavihra jhnas, the
asubha jhnas, and so on. All of these jhnas are capable of expansive development. Terms such as totality (kasin a),
immeasurable (appamn a), and expansive (mahaggat) which are used in the descriptions of these samdhis indicate the
expansiveness of jhna. MN 127 explains the meaning of expansive mind-liberation and indicates the way of development.
-The Dhammasagan (1027) states that this expansiveness is distinctive of the mind engaged in jhna: What phenoena are
expansive (ahaggat)? There are skillful and neither-skillful-nor-unskillful phenoena of the for sphere (rpvacar)
and the forless sphere (arpvacar), the feeling aggregate, recognition aggregate, fabrications aggregate, and
consciousness aggregate; these phenoena are expansive.

Q: Do you assert that one can vipassati without the Dhammavicayasambojjhanga?

A: This is clearly indicated in the Dhammasagan . Without the discernment faculty (paindriya, where
dhammavicayasambojjhaga and vipassan are said to be subsets), being able to function in the absence of vitakka and
vicra there would be no possibility of J2-J4 path attainment. The Dhammasa gan Cittuppdakan d a Lokuttarakusala
Suddhikapat ipad lists both the discernment faculty and vipassan as separate supramundane dhammas occurring at the time
of attaining the noble path via supramundane jhna and abiding in that path attainment via resultant supramundane jhna.
And as also already mentioned, the Mahniddesa equates awakening (bodhi) with gnosis of the four paths (catsu maggesu
n a), the faculty of discernment (paindriya), the strength of discernment (pabala), the dhamma-discrimination factor
of awakening (dhammavicayasambojjhaga), investigation (vmams), clear seeing (vipassan), and right view
(sammdit t hi).
-There is no possibility of attaining or abiding in the four jhnas without apperception, just as there is no possibility of
attaining or abiding in the four jhnas without feeling. Just because the aggregates are impermanent, unsatisfactory, and
selfless doesn't mean that they aren't to be engaged for meditative development. There's no possibility of developing the path
otherwise.
-The kasin a jhnas, the brahmavihra jhnas, the asubha jhnas, and so on, cover the four jhnas. Developed within the
context of the noble eightfold path they are all sammsamdhi.
Q: Mahaggatam Cetovimutti refers to a different meditation. Only Adukkhamasukhaya cetovimutti refers to the first four
jhanas.
A: Not so. I've already provided the reference to the Dhammasa gan which explains mahaggat in the context of jhna. The
term cetovimutti is used in different ways in different contexts (e.g. mett cetovimuti, adukkhamasukh cetovimutti, etc. Cf.
Bhante G. A Critical Analysis of the Jhnas, p. 355) where it often refers to meditative attainments realized through the
development of calm (samathabhvan). AN 2.32 Vijjbhgiy Sutta:
When cal (saatha) is developed, what purpose does it serve? The ind is developed. And what is the benefit of a
developed ind? Passion is abandoned.... Defiled by passion, the ind is not released.... Thus, onks, fro the fading away
of passion there is liberation of ind (cetoviutti).
-This use of mahaggat cetovimuti refers to jhna attainment. These terms as they relate to the jhnas are standardized in the
Abhidhammapit aka.
-Vipassan has to occur and be present as a supramundane dhamma whenever there is path attainment. It doesn't matter if it's
the first jhna, second jhna, third jhna, or fourth jhna path attainment.
-The understanding that the noble path is attained at once, designated as "one moment," is a canonical Theravda doctrine
which is stated in the Pat isambhidmagga. This doctrine doesn't entail adherence to a theory of radical momentariness; nor
does the understanding of concomitant dhammas entail adherence to a theory of radical momentariness.
Q: Do you assert that one can vipassati without the Dhammavicayasambojjhanga?
A: No. And both vipassati and the dhamma-investigation awakening factor are multifaceted. They take on different levels of
meaning at different stages of insight.
Q: There are different types of cettavimutti. Each refers to a particular meditation. Not all qualify as the four jhana in Samma
Samadhi. You are using the name and description of one type of meditation to describe another. There is obviously a mix up.
A: In both the Abhidhammapit aka and the At t hakath mahaggata citta and mahaggat cetovimutti are understood to refer
to jhna. The commentary on MN 127 specifically says that mahaggat cetovimutti refers to kasin a jhna:
He covers the are the size of one tree root with the kasin aniitta, and he abides resolved upon that totality sign, pervading it
with the ahaggatajjhna.
-The same applies to the more expansive totalities. And also in the commentary to the Satipat t hna Sutta the mahaggata
citta is understood to refer to the expansive mind abiding in jhna. Thee is no reason to interpret these suttas differently.
-It is sammsamdhi which enables the mind to attend to phenomena without strenuous suppression of defilements. Sense
restraint (indriya samvara) plays an important role in this regard. And as the following sutta informs us, when the mind is
concentrated, phenomena become apparent. Due to phenomena becoming apparent, one is designated as 'one who abides
diligently.' SN 35.97 Pamdavihr Sutta.
-There is no direct one-to-one correspondence between the three worlds (lokas) and the three spheres (avacaras) as
classification schemes of related phenomena. A human being who abides in jhna is still in the kmaloka, but his or her mind
and mental factors are not engaged with any phenomena which would give rise to sensual pleasure (kma). This can lead to
rebirth in the rpaloka. Thus, the mind and mental factors (cittacetasik) of rpvacarajjhna are similar to the mind and
mental factors of deities abiding in the rpaloka, but abiding in rpvacarajjhna doesn't mean that one has entered the
rpaloka.
-It means that vipassan is a profound subject with many subtleties that are difficult to communicate and are therefore not
found in suttas or books. The suttas point the way, but it's up to each individual to carry out the practice injunctions and
directly realize the dhamma for him or herself. It's much more than just thinking about dhammas. Your suggestion that
vipassan should require engagement in discursive thought fails to appreciate the subtleties of the process. At advanced
stages of vipassan, the clear seeing becomes reflexive (pat ivipassan), which means that the meditating mind directly
discerns the process of knowing itself. This requires a highly refined samdhi, one in which the reflexiveness of the mind
and cognitive factors becomes apparent. Comprehension is essential.

Q: The Sangiti Sutta points out that :" By the attainments of the first jhana, kamasanna ( perception of five sense objects &
sense desires ) cease (niruddh)" That, IMHO, is the plain and simple meaning of km in the vivicc'eva kmehi formula of
1st Jhana.
A: Yes, this was already addressed. The seclusion from kmehi in the jhna formula refers to both the objects of sensual
pleasure (vatthukm) and the defilements of sensual pleasure (kilesakm). In commentarial terms, the form portion of the
"whole body" experienced in jhna is mind-produced form which pervades the physical body. The Dghanikyat k:
Mind-produced for (cittajarpa) suffuses every area where there is kaa-produced for (kaajarpa).
-This subtle felt-sense of the body being pervaded by pleasure (J1 & J2) and by equanimity (J3 & J4) is a part of the
phenomenology of jhna as an experience.
Q: It's true that " permeating the body" mentioned in the jhanas refers to the mental body rather than the physical body,
because the perception of five sense objects & sense desires, perception of the things of the kama loka have been left behind
in jhana.
A: Yes, but it's important to understand that what is designated as the mental body is not a disembodied experience. The
experience of the whole body (sabba kya) still includes a refined experience of the body. Pet akopadesa 7.72.
-Well, I doubt that there is only one pathway to ptisukha. Therefore, there isn't just one phenomenological description of the
experience of ptisukha. Experientially speaking, ptisukha can certainly arise as waves of universal bliss coursing
throughout the body. It can feel like passing through an invisible "membrane" wherein all sense of constriction is simply
gone and the felt-sense of the inner body vastly expands along with waves of universal bliss. This ptisukha can begin in the
chest area, or the solar plexus, or the forehead area, or along the lower spine, etc. It can feel like one's entire being is
saturated with waves of cosmic deva-like love, or immeasurable universal compassion, or simply "bliss." It can be
accompanied by light nimittas of different description (size, color, etc.). And it can certainly be characterized as "heavenly"
or "divine." Anyone who has experienced this will understand the correlation between the jhnas and the cosmological
brahma-worlds (brahmlakokas). But if one absorbs into any experience of ptisukha to the point of loss of comprehension
then that is indulgent -- it no longer serves as an optimal condition for mental development (bhvan). And such indulgence
can certainly be addictive. It can impede development whereby one gets stuck in a habitual pattern of "blissing-out."
Q: this body/kaya is also incapable of establishing phassa with jhanic pitisukha
A: Kyapasda rpa is spread throughout the whole body, and can be a mental object (dhammramman a) directly cognized
by mental consciousness (manovin a). In fact, all five sensorial forms (pasdarpa) can be mental objects directly
cognized by mental consciousness. This is how mental consciousness can directly cognize a light nimitta when one's eyes are
closed without the occurrence of eye-consciousness, and can directly cognize the inner body being saturated with ptisukha
without the occurrence of body-consciousness. Moreover, the phenomenology has already been established by the
Pet akopadesa and the Dghanikyat k. The Pet akopadesa 7.72:

The twofold bodily and ental pain does not arise in one steadied in directed thought and evaluation, and the twofold bodily
and ental pleasure does arise. The ental pleasure thus produced fro directed thought is joy, while the bodily pleasure is
bodily feeling.
-The Dghanikyat k:
Mind-produced for (cittajarpa) suffuses every area where there is kaa-produced for (kaajarpa).
Q: Those who claim that Jhana is a nice pleasant feeling and perception of the body forget that kyavieyy phot t habb
belongs to the km and the Buddha specifically identifies jhanic sukha as "having nothing to do with km" (MN 36.32).
Worse, those who identify jhanic pleasure as pleasurable phot t habb /tactility conveniently forget the Buddha's admonition
in MN 66 against cultivating such "a filthy pleasure, a coarse pleasure, an ignoble pleasure", in contrast to the "sambodhi
sukha" that are Jhanic sukha (MN 66.19 - 21).
A: Not only is your understanding of sensual pleasure and the strands of sensual pleasure mistaken, now you're
demonstrating that you have no experiential knowledge of the subject at hand. The ptisukha that I'm talking about has
nothing whatsoever to do with kma. They are completely different planes of experience. In comparison to the ptisukha of
jhna, even the most ecstatic kma is gross -- a violent psychosomatic seizure. For anyone who's experienced both, there's no
possibility of thinking that the ptisukha of jhna and kma induced pleasure are even remotely similar.
Q: I think the attachment to Jhana is not attachment to sambodhi sukha, but possibly the attachment to the kamagunas which
are mistaken for jhanic sukha.
A: Again, it's quite apparent that you don't know what you're talking about. The ptisukha of jhna can definitely become an
object of deep attachment. Especially for anyone who has a predisposition for addiction. It's far better than any drug. And if
one knows how to induce it, it's free. It can be so utterly blissful that theist yogis think it's union with god. In terms of the ten
fetters, any attachment to the four jhnas is included under the fetter of passion for form (rparga).
-I have never conflated kmagun with km. In accord with MN 38 Mahtan hsankhaya Sutta, a phenomenon is reckoned
by the particular condition dependent upon which it arises. Km (plural) as mental defilements, refers to the diversity of
sensual pleasures (kmnam vemattat). AN 6.63 Nibbedhika Sutta:
And what is the diversity of sensual pleasures? Sensual pleasure with regard to fors is one thing, sensual pleasure with
regard to sounds is another, sensual pleasure with regard to odors is another, sensual pleasure with regard to flavors is
another, sensual pleasure with regard to tactual sensations is another. This is called the diversity of sensual pleasures.

Singular vs. plural makes no difference. Km are either objects or defilements which arise in dependence upon those
objects. All of which are merely designated for the sake of classification. Moreover, as Nettippakaran a 4.22 states:
The five strands of sensual pleasure are the proxiate cause (padatthna)
of passion for sensual pleasure. The five faculties

with for are the proxiate cause of passion for for. The sixth sense sphere is the proxiate cause of passion for
existence.
-Thus, if one is not attending to the five kmagun as there is no proximate cause for the occurrence of passion for sensual
pleasure (kmarga) with regard to any of those five kmagun as. The five faculties (eye-, ear, nose-, tongue-, and body-)
don't serve as a proximate cause for the occurrence of sensual pleasure. It's also worth mentioning that the five faculties
(pacindriyni) are not "shut off" in jhna, as they are the proximate cause for attachment to rpvacara phenomena (i.e.
rparga).
Q: Where in the suttas or Abhidhamma is it stated that there's this ghostly Commentarial "kyapasda rpa" present in
Jhana?
A: Nothing "ghostly" about it. In canonical terms, pasdarpa refers to the first five of the six internal sense spheres
(ajjhattikni yatanni) and the first five of the six sense faculties (indriyas). The point is that mental consciousness can
directly cognize these five internal sense spheres. If this were not so there would be no possibility of congizing light nimittas
or the inner felt-sense of the body. Neither of these phenomena arise in dependence upon contact between the internal and
external sense spheres of the eye/form or body/tactual sensation.
Q: Essentially, the kamagunas are all forms, sounds, smells, tastes and tactilities.
A: The Buddha wasn't interested in substance metaphysics.
-It's the place to discuss the strands of sensual pleasure (kmagun). MN 150 Nagaravindeyya Sutta informs us that one
practicing for the removal of passion resorts to a remote location where there are none of the five strands of sensual pleasure
to contact and delight in.
-The passage from MN 150 includes anyone who is practicing for the removal of passion, aggression, and delusion, not just
arahants who are already free from passion, aggression, and delusion, and are free of the three types of craving.
-Moreover, if the forms, etc., of the wilderness were strands of sensual pleasure, then it would be completely inappropriate
for Mahkassapa (Thag 18) to find this scenery delightful (manorama), enjoyable (ramma), and beautiful (rucira). It would
also be inappropriate and inadvisable for MN 121 to state that the practitioner's "mind enters into that apperception of forest
and acquires confidence, steadiness, and decision," as this apperception and other concomitant mental factors arise in
dependence upon the visible sensory sphere consisting of "the ridges and hollows, the rivers and ravines, the tracts of stumps
and thorns, the mountains and irregular places." As an object-support for developing calm (samatha) in the course of
attaining jhna, these forms cannot be strands of sensual pleasure. If they were, any concomitant pleasure and happiness
which would arise in dependence upon these sensory objects would be inappropriate and not worth development (bhvan).
-SN 3.12 Pacarja Sutta confirms that the very forms, sounds, odors, flavors, and tactual objects which are agreeable to one
person, are disagreeable to another.
-In SN 36.19 Pacakaga Sutta the Buddha tells Ven. nanda that whatever pleasure or happiness arises in dependence on
the five strands of sensual pleasure is called sensual pleasure. MN 66 Lat ukikopama Sutta states that this sensual pleasure is
a "filthy pleasure, a worldly pleasure, an ignoble pleasure. And I say that this pleasure is not to be cultivated, not to be
developed, not to be pursued, that it is to be feared."
-Itivuttaka 72 informs us that renunciation is the escape from sensual pleasures.
-The distinction between the five strands of sensual pleasure and the appropriate objects to be employed for mental
development is indicated in SN 47.6 Sakun agghi Sutta, which clearly differentiates between the five strands of sensual
pleasure and the four applications of mindfulness (satipat t hn). In this discourse one is instructed to avoid wandering into
the range of the five strands of sensual pleasure and instead remain in one's own proper range of the four satipat t hnas:
Q: The way you're conflating the English translations of SN 36.19, MN 66 and SN 47.6 introduces misleading readings of
"sensual pleasure", when the Pali draws a clear distinction between kamaguna and kamasukha.
A: As per usual, your qualms have nothing to do with what I posted. I have never once conflated "strands of sensual
pleasure" with "sensual pleasure."
The Mahniddesa clearly qualifies vatthukm with manpika:
Katae vatthuk? Manpik rp anpik sadd anpik gandh anpik ras anpik photthabb;
attharan

pvuran dsids ajelak

hatthigavssavalav
kukkutaskar

khetta vatthu hiraa suvan n a

ganigaarjadhniyo ratthaca
janapado ca koso ca kotthgraca,
ya kici rajanya vatthu vatthuk.

-For your interpretation to be correct, there would be no need to qualify rpa, etc., with manpika. But if you want to think
all forms, etc., are strands of sensual pleasure, then that's fine by me.
Q: The fact that the next passage can identify "sabbepi kmvacar dhamm" as a "vatthukm" should give you a good
indication of what the redactors thought about the universal potential of ANYTHING to provoke desire, and not just the
pleasing ones.
A: That passage is also qualified by "tan hvatthuk tan hraan kanyatthena
rajanyatthena
adanyatthena
k

ie vuccanti vatthuk."
-The problem with universals is that they are abstractions. An individual mind-stream only ever experiences unique clusters
of phenomena at any given time. And even within the same mental continuum, no two experiences are exactly the same.
-And quite specifically, it is entirely contingent upon a cognition being accompanied by lobha (kma, raga, abhijjh, tanh)
that its particular object can meaningfully be designated as vatthukma.

Q: "Chanda" is that inclination of the mental function to always seek phassa, be it phassa based on pleasant things, painful
things or neutral things.
A: Chanda can be either skillful or unskillful. Kma is never regarded as skillful.
Q: I'm wondering if all distractive thoughts are quietened in one who has attained the 1st absorption -- no pumping up of any
undirected thoughts at all from entering such absorption to withdrawing?
A: I'd suggest that it's far better to continue practicing and developing samdhi, rather than wondering about these types of
questions. If you're able to commit to renunciation and solitude, then the mind will calm and vipassan will lead to
disenchantment and dispassion. When the mind is calm and clear everything else can fall into place.
A: What I said above requires differentiating between (1) the contents of the Pli Abhidhammapit aka, and (2) the Pli
commentarial (At t hakath) and sub-commentarial (Tk), etc., interpretations of the Abhidhammapit aka and the
Suttapit aka. The vast majority of available resources and studies on the Abhidhamma don't make this differentiation.
Therefore, to do so you would need to read the Abhidhammapit aka texts themselves and form your own conclusions.
-The Abhidhammapit aka texts don't explicitly make statements that entail metaphysical realism. The Abhidhammapit aka
doesn't even refer to conditioned phenomena as paramattha dhamm or paramattha sabhva. The former does occur once in
the Kathvatthu but it's hardly a ringing endorsement for how this notion of paramattha dhamma later came to be applied and
interpreted.
-However, the Pli commentaries and other post-canonical treatises are closer to Vaibhs ika tenets in many respects than
even to Sautrntika tenets (e.g. in the Visuddhimagga Buddhaghosa explicitly argues against nibbna being just a
designation). Therefore, one would be rather hard-pressed if attempting to reconcile this strata of post-canonical commentary
with Madhyamaka.
-As for English language translations, most of the seven Abhidhammapit aka texts have been translated and published by the
Pali Text Society. I would recommend reading U Thit t ila's translation of the Vibhaga first, followed by U Kyaw Khine's
translation of the Dhammasagan (not published by PTS).
-An arahants consciousness is not dependent (anissita) on any findable support, and therefore, is untraceable (ananuvejja)
here and now. MN 22 Alagaddpama Sutta
-Elsewhere this non-abiding mind is designated as consciousness which is not established (appatit t ha vin a). SN 22.53
Upaya Sutta:
When that consciousness is not established, not increasing, not concocting, it is liberated. Being liberated, it is steady. Being
steady, it is content. Being content, he is not excited. Unexcited, he personally attains complete nibbna. He discerns that,
Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, done is what had to be done, there is nothing further here.
-In a number of discourses (e.g S i 148,. S iv 119, S iv 186, S iv 189, S iv 199, and M i 270) an arahants mind is designated
as a measureless mind (appamn acetasa).
-And SN 22.79 Khajjanya Sutta makes it clear that the fabricated phenomena of form included within the form aggregate
primarily pertain to the body of a living human being:
-MN 62 Mahrhulovda Sutta offers the full definition of the four form elements as follows:
-Whereas discernment of the five aggregates is primarily concerned with investigating the aspects of the body and mind that
we usually identify with and take as our self, discernment of the twelve sensory spheres and eighteen components extend this
investigation further in order to see how we habitually create a world of individuated particulars, populated with people,
places, and things. Unquestioningly accepting this scenario, we continually attempt to grasp onto those things which we like
and want to hold dear, and push away all of the things which we dislike and consider problematic for one reason of another.
-By investigating the twelve sensory spheres and learning to simplify our view, we can dismantle the diversity of our mental
proliferations into these twelve spheres. Instead of seeing a manifold world of particular things, we can simplify our seeing.
There is just the eye and the form sensory sphere. All that we ever see is simply the form sensory sphere. Everything else is
added by our conditioned perspective. The same is true for the remaining pairs of sensory spheres. The Buddha called these
twelve sensory spheres the all. SN 35.23 Sabba Sutta
-The eighteen components are useful for understanding conditioned phenomena in that they help to illustrate how our
experience arises through conditions, as well as illustrating how dissatisfaction arises. The experiential identification of these
eighteen components is essential if we want to begin to break down our experience into these basic phenomenological
processes. The eighteen components are listed in MN 115 Bahudhtuka Sutta.
-Using this framework we can begin to understand how our experience is constructed from these components. When a sense
faculty, a sensory object, and a corresponding sense consciousness come together there is contact (phassa). From contact
arises feeling (vedan), experienced as either pleasant, painful, or neutral. From feeling arises craving (tan h). If the feeling
is pleasant it gives rise to craving as This is good, I want this. If it is painful it gives rise to aversion as This is no good, I
dont want this. And if it is neutral it gives rise to indifference. These contingent processes are described in MN 148
Chachakka Sutta.
-The Buddhas insight into this situation involves seeing that these eighteen components which make up all of our dualistic
sensory experiences are impermanent, changing, always becoming other than they were. This impermanence means that they
are not dependable. And because they are impermanent and unreliable, they are unsatisfactory (dukkha) in that they will
never bring any lasting happiness. And because they are impermanent, unsatisfactory, and occur conditionally, they are notself (anatta) in that there cant be found any permanent, fully autonomous agent or controller within any of the eighteen
components. This is expressed in SN 35.93 Dutiyadvaya Sutta:
-Again, this is why the Buddha exhorts us to develop dispassion towards these phenomena and abandon them. We are
instructed to not conceive (maati) of anything in terms of these phenomena which are always becoming otherwise. SN
35.31 Pat hamasamugghtasappya Sutta:

-Noble disciples (ariyasvakas) have penetrated conditioned arising in both forward and reverse sequence. Having discerned
conditioned arising in forward sequence they no longer cling to notions regarding non-existence (lit. it is not). Having
discerned conditioned arising in reverse sequence they no longer cling to notions regarding existence (lit. it is). In this way
they let go of adherence to any and all ontological views. SN 12.15 Kaccnagotta Sutta.
-Reality is a relative notion, the value of which depends entirely upon the significance one ascribes to the objects, contents,
or processes of perception. The forward sequence of conditioned arising beginning with ignorance is a diagnosis of deluded
cognition, and an illustration of how such delusion is always associated with craving, clinging, and dissatisfaction. The
Buddha exhorts us to see the delusion clearly for what it is, and in this way proceed to abandon all infatuation and distress
regarding its manifold colorful and dramatic representations.
What most worldlings unquestioningly take to be real, due to ascribing significance to the contents of deluded cognition, is
nothing more than deluded cognition. Learners and arahants have understood deluded cognition to be false and have
abandoned it (or are in the process of abandoning it in the case of learners). In this way they develop a measureless mind.
Seeing through the limitations of signs and symbols and language, they realize that there is no need and no possible way
of trying to pin down this measureless freedom of absence by using signs and language. There is no point in attempting to
construct and systematize a valid reality. Theyve done what was needed to be done. The teachings they offer diagnose the
problems of deluded cognition and point out the ways to unravel and eventually abandon passion, aggression, and delusion.
Thoughts are just thoughts. Designations help to show the way leading to the cessation of unsatisfactoriness. But there is no
need to create any sort of world out of these designations. Creating a world is part of the problem, not the solution. Sn
3.12 Dvayatnupassan Sutta:
When the four noble truths are fully penetrated when one has fully comprehended the truth of cessation the entire
deluded cognitive and conflicted affective edifice of the forward sequence of conditioned arising immediately falls like a
house of cards. Thus, the arahant cant be measured (na pamn ameti). SN 35.188 Dutiyasamudda Sutta.
The Recognition of Impermanence (Aniccasa)
When one thoroughly knows
The rise and fall of the aggregates,
He attains joy and gladness.
For those who know, that is death-free.
Dhammapada 374
The recognition of impermanence is explained in AN 10.60 Girimnanda Sutta as follows:
Now what, nanda, is the recognition of impermanence? Here, nanda, a monk, gone to the wilderness, to the root of a tree,
or to an empty place, discriminates thus: Form is impermanent, feeling is impermanent, recognition is impermanent,
fabrications are impermanent, consciousness is impermanent. Thus he abides contemplating impermanence with regard to
the five clinging-aggregates. This, nanda, is called the recognition of impermanence.
This is expanded upon in SN 22.102 Aniccasa Sutta:
And how, onks, is the recognition of iperanence developed and cultivated so that it exhausts all passion for sensual
pleasure, exhausts all passion for existence, exhausts all ignorance, exhausts and uproots all conceit of I a? Such is
for, such its origin, such its passing away. Such is feeling, such its origin, such its passing away. Such is recognition, such
its origin, such its passing away. Such are fabrications, such their origin, such their passing away. Such is consciousness,
such its origin, such its passing away.
This recognition of impermanence is also called the contemplation of rise and fall (udayabbaynupassin) in MN 122. In
both of these discourses we are being instructed to experientially understand and attend to each of the aggregates as they are
present, and also reflect upon their conditional origin and cessation by giving thorough attention to specific conditionality
(idappaccayat). This is further explained in SN 22.57 Sattat t hna Sutta.
-Its important to understand that it is the noble eightfold path which is the way leading to the cessation of the aggregates,
and that our engagement with this path involves comprehending both the allure and drawbacks of the aggregates. After
having recognized that the drawback in each case is that they are impermanent and cant be relied upon, we can come to
discern the escape from the aggregates, which consists of subduing and abandoning desire and passion for these bodily and
mental processes. The method of contemplation to be reflected upon and then discerned in meditative composure is further
explained in SN 22.5 Samdhi Sutta.
-The development of discernment includes understanding that the passing away of the aggregates results from not seeking
delight in the aggregates, not welcoming and not remaining attached to them. This again emphasizes that its our engagement
in, and development of the noble eightfold path which leads to the cessation of the aggregates. It also highlights the
importance of frequently reflecting upon how specific conditionality pertains to our practice: When this isnt, that isnt.
From the cessation of this comes the cessation of that.
Alteration and Change (Aathatta & Viparin ma)
The recognition of impermanence requires the development of agile and refined discernment. And discernment requires skill
in the analytical understanding of phenomena (dhammapat isambhid) which necessarily includes knowing and
comprehending what is occurring as it occurs in ones mind-stream (vin asota). To this end, AN 4.41 Samdhibhvan
Sutta instructs us on how to develop meditative composure which leads to mindfulness and full awareness.
And what, monks, is the development of meditative composure that, when developed and cultivated, leads to mindfulness
and full awareness? Here, monks, feelings are known to a monk as they arise, known as they are present, known as they
disappear. Recognitions are known to him as they arise, known as they are present, known as they disappear. Thoughts are
known to him as they arise, known as they are present, known as they disappear. This, monks, is the development of
meditative composure that, when developed and cultivated, leads to mindfulness and full awareness.

AN 7.38 Pat hamapat isambhid Sutta adds that one who is endowed with knowing feelings, recognitions, and thoughts as
they arise, are present, and disappear will soon realize analytical understanding (pat isambhid) for himself through direct
gnosis.
-The subtlest recognition of impermanence pertains to the fluctuations of presently occurring fabrications. Its important to
understand that this recognition of impermanence attends to an object, and is therefore none other than a refinement of the
recognition of that object through the development of discernment. SN 22.37 nanda Sutta.
-In the context of meditative composure, the recognition of impermanence and change pertaining to the object-basis
(ramman a) occurs when the development of clear seeing (vipassanbhvan) is conjoined with the development of calm
(samathabhvan). For example, when engaging in mindfulness of breathing, the breath is the object-basis being attended to,
and is the cause (nimitta) for the development of meditative composure (samdhi). As previously mentioned, the breath isnt
a static, unchanging thing. Its in continual flux, changing from moment to moment as we breathe. And as the breath
fluctuates and changes (viparin meti), the mind and mental factors which are attending to the breath also fluctuate and
change. As the breath moves, the mind also moves.
-Its precisely because of the subtlety of the breath, and the interdependent relationship between the breath and the mind, that
the breath is considered to be one of the best objects to attend to for the development of meditative composure. When our
breathing is coarse, the mind reflects this. When our breathing is subtle and fine, the mind attending to the breath is likewise
subtle and fine. And this is why the breath is also one of the most suitable objects to attend to for the development of clear
seeing. As the mind attends to the breath and both become more and more refined and subtle, this process offers an ideal
situation for simultaneously developing clear seeing pertaining to these progressively subtle fabrications.
-And this same development of meditative composure, mindfulness, and full awareness is to be continued without
interruption in each of the four jhnas. MN 111 Anupada Sutta informs us that this is the clear seeing of phenomena one by
one as they occur (anupadadhammavipassan):
-Now Sriputtas clear seeing of phenoena one by one as they occurred was this:
-Whatever phenoena there are in the first jhna: directed thought, evaluation, joy, pleasure, singleness of ind, contact,
feeling, recognition, intention, ind, desire, decision, energy, indfulness, equaniity, and attention; he analyzed these
phenoena one by one as they occurred. Known to hi they arose, known they were present, known they disappeared. He
discerned, So this is how these phenoena, not having been, coe to arise. Having been, they vanish.
-Regarding those phenoena, he reained unattracted, unrepelled, independent, detached, free, dissociated, with a ind rid
of barriers.
-Just as the breath fluctuates and changes as its being experienced, the mental factors occurring within jhna also undergo
continual alteration and change. The concomitant jhna factors of joy and pleasure fluctuate even while being experienced.
They dont remain static. There is no stasis that can be experientially discerned when these phenomena are occurring. And
when one refines ones discernment (pa) to where one is aware of this alteration, then the alteration of recognition
(sa) is also discernible.
-While abiding in jhna, we can clearly see the subtlest recognition of impermanence of the mind and concomitant mental
factors present in jhna. This subtle level of change is indicated in SN 35.93 Dutiyadvaya Sutta:
The ind is iperanent, changing, becoing otherwise; phenoena are iperanent, changing, becoing otherwise.
Thus this dyad is oving (calaceva) and wavering (byathaca), iperanent (anicca), changing (viparin i), becoing
otherwise (aathbhvi).
-Consciousness is reflexive meaning that consciousness can be fully aware of the mental factors present without any need
to step back and engage in a separate cognitive process in order to do so. As the development of clear seeing matures, clear
seeing becomes reflexive. The meditating mind directly discerns the process of knowing itself. This requires a highly refined
meditative composure, one in which the reflexiveness of the mind and cognitive factors becomes apparent. Comprehension
is essential for this development and refinement of the mental factor of vipassan. The soteriological purpose of integral
meditative composure (sammsamdhi) as part of the noble path is just this mental development (bhvan) which culminates
in gnosis. AN 7.49 Dutiyasa Sutta.
-In practice, we need to be able to recognize this absence of self in our immediate experience: When seeing, there is the
coming together of visible form, the eye, and visual consciousness. When hearing, there is the coming together of sound, the
ear, and auditory consciousness. When touching, there is the coming together of tactual sensation, the body, and tactile
consciousness. When thinking, there is the thought, the mind, and mental consciousness. These processes arise simply
through contact. When a sense faculty and a sensory object make contact, the corresponding sensory consciousness arises.
This entire process occurs through specific conditionality (idappaccayat). There is no independent, fully autonomous agent
or self controlling any of this.
An independent, autonomous self would, by definition, be:
1. permanent
2. satisfactory
3. not prone to dis-ease
4. fully self-determining (be in complete autonomous control of itself)
-Thus, what is being negated is a permanent, satisfactory self which is not prone to old age, sickness, and death. As SN 22.59
Pacavaggiya Sutta (abridged) states.
-By engaging in sustained, dedicated contemplation we find only impermanent processes, conditionally arisen, and not fully
self-determining. First we clearly see that all conditioned phenomena of body and mind are impermanent. Next we come to
see that whatever is impermanent is unsatisfactory in that it can provide no lasting happiness. Then we realize that all
impermanent, unsatisfactory phenomena of body and mind are not-self they cant be the basis for a self, which by
definition would be permanent and (one would hope) satisfactory. This relationship between the recognition of
impermanence, the recognition of unsatisfactoriness, and the recognition of selflessness is illustrated in the following
diagram.

-With the recognition of selflessness there is an emptying out of both the subject and object aspects of experience. We
come to understand that I-making and mine-making with regard to the mind and body as well as all external
representations is deluded. When the recognition of selflessness is fully developed there is no longer any reification of
substantial referents to be experienced in relation to subjective grasping. Whatever is seen is merely the seen (dit t hamatta).
Whatever is heard or sensed is merely the heard (sutamatta) and merely the sensed (mutamatta). Whatever is known is
merely the known (vitamatta). This is explained in Ud 1.10 Bhiya Sutta.
-When there is no self to be found ones experience becomes very simple, direct, and uncluttered. When seeing, there is the
coming together of visible form, the eye, and visual consciousness, thats all. There is no separate seer. The seer is entirely
dependent upon the seen. There can be no seer independent of the seen. There is no separate, independent subject or self.
-This is also the case for the sensory object. The seen is entirely dependent upon the eye faculty and visual consciousness.
There can be no object seen independent of the eye faculty and cognition. This is the case for all possible sensory objects.
There is no separate, independent sensory object.
-The same holds true for sensory consciousness as well. Seeing is entirely dependent upon the eye and visible form. There
can be no seeing independent of the eye and cognition. This is the case for all possible sensory cognitions. There is no
separate, independent sensory consciousness.
-Its important to understand this experientially. Lets take the straightforward empirical experience of you looking at this
screen right now as an example. Conventionally speaking, you could describe the experience as I see the computer screen.
Another way of describing this is that theres a seer who sees the seen. But look at the screen: are there really three
independent and separate parts to your experience? Or are seer, sees, and seen, just three conceptual labels applied to
this experience in which the three parts are entirely interdependent?
-The seer, seen, and seeing are all empty and insubstantial. The eye faculty, visible form, and visual consciousness are
all interdependent aspects of the same experience. You cant peel one away and still have a sensory experience there is no
separation. AN 4.24 Kl akrma Sutta.
-Sensory consciousness cant be isolated as separate and independent. Nor can any of these other interdependent phenomena.
Even the designations that we apply to these various phenomena are entirely conventional, dependent designations. But this
doesnt mean that we should now interpret our experience as being some sort of cosmic oneness or unity consciousness or
whatever one may want to call it. That's just another empty, dependent label isnt it? The whole point of this analysis is to see
the emptiness of all referents, and thereby stop constructing and defining a self.
The purpose of correctly engaging in the contemplation of selflessness is stated in AN 7.49 Dutiyasa Sutta:
-Here we get to the heart of the matter, which is one of the most subtle aspects of the Buddhadhamma. Simply stated: when
ignorance ceases, belief in self simultaneously ceases. And when there is no self to be found, then there is no self to die or
take birth. This right here is death-free. And it is precisely this that the Buddha is declaring when he says to Mogharja:
-When one completely abandons the underlying tendencies which give rise to mistaken apprehensions of a self any and
all notions of I am then there is no self to die. This stilling of the currents of conceiving over ones imagined self, and
the resulting peace that is empty of birth, aging, and death, is straightforwardly presented in MN 140 Dhtuvibha ga Sutta.
- Truly, a sage at peace is not born, does not age, does not die. In this way, when ignorance ceases, the entire complex of
conditioned arising bound up with dissatisfaction also ceases. When all traces of I-making and mine-making are
abandoned through the fully integrated threefold training of ethical conduct, meditation, and discernment, just this is
dispassion (virga). Just this is cessation (nirodha). Just this is extinguishment (nibbna). Just this is without outflows
(ansava). Just this is not-born (ajta), not-become (abhta), not-made (akata), not-fabricated (asa khata), endless (ananta),
indestructible (apalokita), and yes, death-free (amata). It is freedom (mutti).
The Recognition of Dispassion (Virgasa)
The best of dhaas is dispassion.
Dhaapada 273
-With sustained and dedicated commitment to the recognition of impermanence, the recognition of unsatisfactoriness in what
is impermanent, and the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, we will eventually begin to realize the gnosis
and vision of things as they are (yathbhtan adassana). And it is precisely this discernment into all facets of our
experience which leads to disenchantment, which in turn gives rise to dispassion. The recognition of dispassion is explained
in AN 10.60 Girimnanda Sutta.
-At this stage of our development a profound and deep transition begins wherein we come to really understand and directly
experience the utter futility of craving and clinging. Sustaining and further developing this weariness with regard to all
fabricated things leads to complete disenchantment (ekantanibbid), dispassion (virga), cessation (nirodha), peace
(upasama), direct gnosis (abhi), awakening (sambodha), and the full extinguishment (parinibbna) of the three
metaphorical fires of passion, aggression, and delusion. Therefore, this transitional stage, beginning with the onset of
knowing and seeing things as they are, is extremely important because its completely transformational. Its at this mature
stage of practice that we start to really understand the dhamma at the gut level of experience. We begin to intuit and even
taste freedom, and understand just what authentic freedom entails.
-This transformation begins with the experience of disenchantment (nibbid). Thus, its necessary to understand what
disenchantment means. The Pl i term nibbid is related to nibbindati, which is derived from the negative prefix nis-,
meaning not, and the verb root vindati, meaning to find. And so nibbindati means without finding, and carries the
connotations of becoming weary of and turning away from. When we clearly see each and every experience as
impermanent, unsatisfactory, and empty, we no longer find satisfaction in fabricated things. We grow weary of trying to
propagate and seek delight in worldly comforts and worldly concerns. This sense of weariness is expressed in Dhammapada
277-279:
All fabrications are iperanent.
Seeing this with discernent

One grows weary of unsatisfactoriness.

This is the path to purity.
All fabrications are unsatisfactory.
Seeing this with discernent
One grows weary of unsatisfactoriness.
This is the path to purity.
All phenoena are not-self.
Seeing this with discernent
One grows weary of unsatisfactoriness.
This is the path to purity.
-This weariness with what is unsatisfactory is disenchantment, which arises due to knowing and seeing things as they are.
We begin to feel the hollowness of engaging in affairs which arent directly related to the development of the path. Even
before disenchantment has fully matured into dispassion we start to sense and feel superficial entertainments and superficial
conversations as being hollow, and quite pointless. This beginning stage of experiencing disenchantment can be confusing at
times, and somewhat unsettling. The things that we once pursued and delighted in are now, at times, seen as pale and anemic.
This can be disorienting. All the messages in the world are telling us to continue heading in the old familiar direction, but
there is a gnawing feeling that that habitual direction will never lead to genuine happiness. At this point its helpful often
necessary to have the guidance of an experienced teacher to assist us in working through these conflicting desires and
messages.
-Also, for disenchantment to actually be transformational and liberating it needs to be moistened and enriched with kindness,
compassion, empathy, and equanimity. Without awakening and embodying these qualities we will not be able to successfully
face the remaining challenges which will inevitably confront us as we work through these latter stages of profound
transformation.
-But with time and patient endurance, continuing to learn and develop our practice in the arena of everyday experience,
disenchantment will lead to dispassion. The experience of dispassion is visceral, deep, and profound. It isnt some weak
intellectual head-trip. Discernment at this stage of the path is fully present and naked. There is a directness and clarity of
understanding which engenders confidence. We become confident that our practice wont be easily shaken by any
unexpected bumps on the road. We are able to handle situations which previously created emotional upheavals and moments
of uncertainty or hesitation. And when difficult situations do arise we know that we have the necessary insight and skills to
work with whatever presents itself. We come to understand just why the Buddha said that Dispassion is the best of
dhammas.
-The development of meditative composure and discernment which sustains disenchantment, and the concomitant
development of a measureless mind, is explained in MN 38 Mahtan hsankhaya Sutta and also MN148 Chachakka Sutta
The Recognition of Cessation (Nirodhasa)
For who there is neither a far shore,
Nor a near shore, nor both,
Who is free fro distress, without ties,
Hi I call a brhan a.
Dhaapada 385
-When the recognition of dispassion is fully developed and realized, and with no self to be found, nothing to be identified
with, one realizes the gnosis and vision of liberation (vimuttin adassana). This is non-referential inner peace (ajjhattasanti).
This is the full recognition of cessation. AN 10.60 Girimnanda Sutta:
-This is the complete absence of agitation (calita natthi). Ud 8.4 Nibbna Sutta:
There being no agitation, there is tranquility. There being tranquility, there is no inclination. There being no inclination,
there is no coing or going. There being no coing or going, there is no passing away or arising. There being no passing
away or arising, there is neither a here nor a beyond nor a between-the-two. Just this is the end of unsatisfactoriness.
-This is the calming of all specific fabrication and volitional intention. MN 140 Dhtuvibha ga Sutta:
-This is the freedom of absence which is revealed through the complete recognition of selflessness. Ud 1.10 Bhiya Sutta.
-This is noble liberation which is the elimination of craving and clinging. MN 106 nejasappya Sutta.
-There is no more seeking of any kind. There is no more personal agenda. There is no identifying with any phenomena or
turning anything into a fixed reference point. There is no here nor beyond nor between-the-two.
-The awakened mind is measureless (appamn acetasa), free from any sort of measuring (pamn a). In evocative terms, an
awakened one is deep (gambhra), boundless (appameyya), and fathomless (duppariyogl ha). Utterly free from any
reference to specifically fabricated consciousness (vin asakhayavimutta). Gone (atthagata), the measureless mind is
untraceable (ananuvejja) even here and now. It doesnt abide in the head, or in the body, or anywhere else for that matter. It
doesnt have size or shape. Its not an object or a subject.
-Just as the sky is formless and non-illustrative, the measureless mind is non-illustrative and non-indicative (anidassana).
This effortless clarity is unmediated by any specific fabrication or volitional intention. It is unaffected knowing: The seen is
merely the seen (dit t hamatta). The heard is merely the heard (sutamatta). The sensed is merely the sensed (mutamatta). The
known is merely the known (vitamatta). But there is no you there. Of course, this liberating gnosis and vision cant
adequately be pointed out or indicated by words alone. It is to be individually experienced (paccatta veditabba).
The Recognition of Release (Pat inissaggasa)

Dry up what was before.

May there be nothing after.
If you do not grasp anything in the iddle,
You will wander caled.
Suttanipta 5.11, Jatukan n in avapucch
-Like all of the developmental qualities of the path, the recognition of release is progressive, becoming more and more
effective and subtle as our practice develops. In the process of the development of discernment, the recognition of release
follows naturally after the recognition of impermanence, the recognition of dispassion, and the recognition of cessation. For
example, MN 37 Cl atan hsakhaya.
-The recognition of release involves letting go (vossagga), which is also the result of the seven factors of awakening. Thus,
the standard refrain weve seen repeated for each of the factors of awakening: Dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and
cessation, resulting in letting go, is directly related to the recognition of release.
Dhammapada 89:
Those whose ind is thoroughly well-developed
In the factors of awakening,
Who release grasping,
Enjoy non-clinging,
Brilliant, free of outflows
They, in the world, have copletely gone out.
-The fruition of the path is to be cooled (stibhta), satisfied (nicchta), completely gone out (parinibbuta) here and now.
Indeed. It's all too easy for identification and naming to lead to metaphysical views or one sort or another. Whenever we
identify with anything, that identity becomes fabricated and conditioned by that very act of selective recognition,
identification, and naming. Thus, the meditative composure of the noble path makes use of letting go as the object
(vossaggramman a).
There are numerous instances where the early Thai forest masters sound much like Chan patriarchs. For example, Ajahn
Mun:
The ind is soething ore radiant than anything else can be, but because counterfeits passing defileents coe and
obscure it, it loses its radiance, like the sun when obscured by clouds. Don't go thinking that the sun goes after the clouds.
Instead, the clouds coe drifting along and obscure the sun.
So editators, when they know in this anner, should do away with these counterfeits by analyzing the shrewdly, as
explained in the strategies of clear insight. When they develop the ind to the stage of the prial ind, this will ean that
all counterfeits are destroyed, or rather, counterfeit things won't be able to reach into the prial ind, because the bridge
aking the connection will have been destroyed. Even though the ind ay then still have to coe into contact with the
preoccupations of the world, its contact will be like that of a bead of water rolling over a lotus leaf.
Ajahn Dune:
Mind is the knowing. You have to establish indfulness there.
Mind and the knowing are the sae. There is no difference. All the differences perceived are due to wrong thinking, not
understanding, not knowing ignorance. Not understanding/isunderstanding (ignorance) leads us to create unending
kaa.
When the ind sees the (pure) ind, everything will be destroyed. Defileents (kilesa) and cravings (tanha) will be
destroyed, ended.
[Student:] When all defileents and cravings are destroyed, is that the stage of arahants? Is the ind still there?
[Ajahn:] The ind is still there. But there is no ore ipurity, no ore defileents or ental fabrications.
True dhaa (saddhaa) is this (pure) ind. True dhaa has never been created. It will not be destroyed. True dhaa
has always been there even when we are ignorant. True dhaa is also not created when ignorance is destroyed, when we
are enlightened.
(Pure) ind is true dhaa that has always been, and will siply be like this. It does not change. When there is wisdo
(panna), ignorance (avijja) will be destroyed. When the ind sees ind, all kilesa ceases.
Ajahn Chah:
When the ind transcends conditions, it knows the unconditioned. The ind becoes the unconditioned, the state which no
longer contains conditioning factors. The ind is no longer conditioned by the concerns of the world, conditions no longer
containate the ind. Pleasure and pain no longer affect it. Nothing can affect the ind or change it, the ind is assured, it
has escaped all constructions. Seeing the true nature of conditions and the deterined, the ind becoes free.
This freed ind is called the unconditioned, that which is beyond the power of constructing influences. If the ind doesn't
really know conditions and deterinations, it is oved by the. Encountering good, bad, pleasure, or pain, it proliferates
about the.

And also:
Now, exaining the true nature of the ind, you can observe that in its natural state, it has no preoccupations or issues
prevailing upon it. It's like a piece of cloth or a flag that has been tied to the end of a pole. As long as it's on its own and
undisturbed, nothing will happen to it....
The purpose of the practice, then, is to seek inwardly, searching and investigating until you reach the original ind. The
original ind is also known as the pure ind. The pure ind is the ind without attachent. It doesn't get affected by indobjects. In other words, it doesn't chase after the different kinds of pleasant and unpleasant ind-objects. Rather, the ind is
in a state of continuous knowing and wakefulness - thoroughly indful of all it is experiencing. When the ind is like this,
no pleasant or unpleasant ind-objects it experiences will be able to disturb it. The ind doesn't 'becoe' anything. In other
words, nothing can shake it. Why? Because there is awareness. The ind knows itself as pure. It has evolved its own, true
independence; it has reached its original state. How is it able to bring this original state into existence? Through the faculty
of indfulness wisely reflecting and seeing that all things are erely conditions arising out of the influence of eleents,
without any individual being controlling the.
There is a quite well known transcription of a tape recording by Ajahn Dune, which apparently is of him reading a
translation of Huangbo Xiyun (Huangbo's teachings were translated into Thai by Ajahn Buddhadasa, not directly from the
Chinese but from the English translation of John Blofeld):
All Buddhas and all beings in the world are nothing but the single citta. Outside this single citta nothing at all exists. The
single citta, free fro the conventional self, is soething that was not ade and is soething, which cannot be destroyed. It
is not a thing with color, such as green or yellow and has neither for nor appearance. It is not included in existing things
or non-existing things. One cannot have the view that it is soething new or old, longer short, large or sall because it is
beyond all liitations, beyond all easuring, beyond labels, beyond leaving a trace and beyond all coparisons.
This single citta is before our very eyes but when we use reason to conceive of it as a "thing" or "self", try it! We will
iediately be istaken. It is like eptiness that is without liitation and cannot be conceived or easured.
The single citta, this alone is Buddha. There is no difference between Buddha and all worldly beings except that worldly
beings cling to the various worldly fors causing the to search for "Buddha Nature" (Buddha Bhava) externally. That very
search akes the iss "Buddha Nature". This is like using Buddha to search for Buddha or the citta to search for the citta.
Even though they ay try as hard as they can for a full eon, they will never achieve "Buddha Bhava".
They do not know that if they stop thinking and conceiving and cease their confusion due to this searching "Buddha" will
appear before their eyes because the citta, itself, is Buddha.
Compare with the beginning of Huangbo's Chung-ling Record:
All Buddhas and all sentient beings are no different fro the One Mind. In this One Mind there is neither arising nor
ceasing, no nae or for, no long or short, no large or sall, and neither existence nor non-existence. It transcends all
liitations of nae, word and relativity, and it is as boundless as the great void. Giving rise to thought is erroneous, and any
speculation about it with our ordinary faculties is inapplicable, irrelevant and inaccurate. Only Mind is Buddha, and
Buddhas and sentient beings are not different. All sentient beings grasp for and search outside theselves. Using Buddha
to seek Buddha, they thus use ind to seek Mind. Practicing in this anner even until the end of the kalpa, they cannot
attain the fruit. However, when thinking and discriination suddenly halt, the Buddhas appear.
A: I think it's important to remember that references to the deathless are pointing to the absence of passion, aggression, and
delusion. The Thai forest style of teaching of Ajahn Chah which emphasizes simply being "that which knows" (poo roo: "the
one who knows") can lead to this freedom of absence, where there is no identity, no need to grasp changing conditions to try
to confirm our existence (which includes relinquishing the need to hold tightly to dhamma "views" as well).
Q: it does seem to me that those monks you have quoted are all pointing to a one mind experience as the experience of the
"deathless". This would seem to be in conflict with what I've read.
A: One has to be careful with such descriptions which may seem to be pointing to some sort of truly existent "unconditioned
ground." Nibbna is the extinguishment of the mental outflows (sav). The liberated mind is measureless (appamn a). This
isnot a "state of oneness with all of existence." It's an absence of identification (anattat). It's non-indicative (anidassana),
unestablished (appatit t ha), and not-dependent (anissita). None of these adjectives entail any sort of metaphysical "ground of
being" or "unconditioned absolute." They are all negations. An arahant has simply "gone out."
There is no "deathless." That is a bad translation (of amata) leading to an objectification/reification of the idea of awakening.
With awakening, there is no more rebirth, one is free fro death.