Turkey: Secularism vs.

Islamism
Key issues
1. What is Kemalism and what are the key tenets of Turkish secularism?
2. What expressions of Islam have emerged in Turkey and do they pose a threat
to the secular principles of the state?
3. Is there a growing secular/Islamist divide in the country and, if so, what are its
expressions?
Timeline of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi/Justice and Development
Party)

Founded in 2001.
2002 10 days before the general elections, Turkey's chief prosecutor, Sabih
Kanadolu asked the Constitutional Court to close the AKP, accusing them of
abusing law and justice.
2002 landslide victory in the elections. Abdullal Gl becomes Prime Minister.
2003 constitutional amendment that enables Erdoan to become PM.
2007 early election called where AKP gained 46.6% of the votes (share of
votes increased, but number of seats decreased).
2008 saw a second closure trial, attempting to ban the AKP and 71 of their
members from politics for 5 years. The party was not banned, but state
funding for the party was reduced.
2011 won 49.8% of the popular vote.

Main issues
Islamic Revivalism in Turkish Politics
Turkish politics always been influenced by deep cultural rifts and clashes - major
historic divide between positivist-secular versus the Islamic revivalists - Turkish
voters overwhelmingly identified with the right wing ideologies of Islamic revivalism
and Turkish ethnic nationalism (Kalaycioglu)
voting behaviour studies found that ethnicity and religion emerged as two most
important determinants of party preference (Kalaycioglu)
Turkey society attracted by Islamic revivalism - large proportion of population are
religious (mainly Sunni Islam) - Society possessed 'a desire to end what they
considered to be the unjust and even immoral practises of the lay governments that
fuelled political corruption in the country.'(Kalaycioglu)
ideological pristine Islamic revivalism has failed to attract much popular support or
stay in power thus party members diluted ideology with ideas of economic
liberalism and EU orientated foreign policy (Kalaycioglu)

Religion had never completely been relegated to private sphere

Crisis of Secularism in Turkish Politics
Gol's Main argument the real issue at stake is not the assumed clash of secular
and Muslim identities but the complex of interdependence between Islam, secularism
and democracy in Turkey.
This concern predominantly comes from the army, the CHP (Peoples Republic
Party) and the Kemalist elite which have accused the AKP of antisecularism. This is
based on the fear that the AKP have a hidden Islamist agenda, which derives from
two assumptions.
1. Islam is incompatible with secularism and democracy.
2. There is a clash of Muslim and secular identities. (Gol 2009)
Gol argues that there has been an increase in the public visibility of Islam, such as
head scarves. He argues that for many AKP voters the party also represents the
need for personal freedom to express their religious identity, which is marginalised
and excluded in the public sphere.
4 levels which the reexive character of the public visibility of Islam in Turkey has
operated
a) State control of religion has led to the repression of Islam and suppression of
Muslim identity
b) Any attempt to bring Muslim identity into the public was viewed as
reactionary by the secular system.
c) Secular Turks were politically constructed as the new social reactionaries
against the increased public visibility of Islam.
d) Religious conservatives reected this secularist reaction back upon
themselves by increasing their support for the AKP as the true representative
of Muslim-selves. (Gol 2009)
AKP took advantage of the fact that the constitution lacked definition of secularism wanted to interrupt secularism in a way that would allow religious attire and over turn
court rulings against wearing of the Turban.
AKP attempt to rewrite part of constitution allowing Students to wear Turban in
university argued it was not a political symbol
At the same time public prosecution drew up an indictment to request a political ban
of the AKP and its seventy one members from the constitutional court on the grounds
that it had begun to act as a focal point for anti-secular activities in the country, which
is a violation of the constitution and the Political Parties Act (Kalaycioglu)

Court agreed however did not ban the party -Constitutional court put a financial
sanction upon the party withheld half of the aid the AKP would receive from the
State budget.
Drop in popularity of Turban issue after 2007 considered a lack of religious liberty
as opposed to attack upon secular principles of the state.
Voters beginning to focus upon economic problems of country as opposed to
religious practise matters particularly such high unemployment rates also other
issues such as security and political instability - also social welfare such as
healthcare and education thus overarching voting concerns in Turkey are quite
secular
On the issue of headscarves it is argued by Gol that this is a policy to protect the
rights of women irrespective of their clothing and is a sign of the the complex
interdependency between secularism and democratisation in a Muslim context
Turkey will continue to face tensions and stresses due to its mismatch between its
political-legal system and its tradition and custom based society operating in part
under the weight of Sunni Muslim values and orientations. (Kalaycioglu)
AKP's Domestic Policy
Economic Growth
Failure of moderate left and right to sort issues of price inflation, corruption,
economic redistribution voter shifted further right - also voter disengaged with CHP
due to high levels of corruption
The AKP realised that the economy was more important than religion in Turkish
politics. Both Turkish and Western economists agree that the AKP has achieved
economic stability in Turkey through
1. A decrease in inflation.
2. Economic growth.
3. Securing foreign investment. (Gol 2009)
Gol argues that the AKPs success comes from their economic success, not a
population which supports an Islamist agenda stating that more favourable views of
the AKP government were linked to the economic growth experienced since 2002.
Focus upon increasing economic growth - ensure EU membership - Success of
growth due to focus upon stability in domestic and foreign relations
Despite this the secularists argue that Guls ascent to the highest position in Turkey
was part of the AKPs hidden agenda to Islamise state institutions. Gul has made
speeches affirming his commitment to the Turkish Constitution and secularism
arguing that one can be both Muslim and secular. (Gol 2009)

'Democratic Opening '

(Also known as 'Kurdish Opening') government preferred democratic opening to
fend off opposition charges that it was catering to separatism, national unity plan.
(Somer and Liaras 2010)
Some changes to constitution:

an amendment that would allow for the president to be elected separately

allow president to serve for two five terms
Changes that allow parties seat with 5% of vote - previously was 10% previously led to many coalition governments and instability - wanted to
prevent nationalist parties from gaining seats

Abortive openings were attempted in the early 1990s, in 1999 and, by the AKP itself,
in 2005. - However they shook Turkeys self-image as a monolithic nation and the
dominant social and political perceptions sceptical of the public expression of ethniccultural differences. They also produced some important legal-institutional changes
such as the abolition of the death penalty and the legalization of broadcasting in
Kurdish.
Earlier attempts at Kurdish opening had led to discussion of Kurdish issue in
academia and also in public life - led to change in public perceptions
The demands of some Kurdish nationalists, such as constitutional recognition as a
separate nation or amnesty for imprisoned Ocalan, go beyond the recognition of
Kurdish ethnic-cultural rights....Because they raise the question of sovereignty as
both a symbol and a political boundary, national rights are more controversial and
politically harder to address than ethnic-cultural rights are. (Somer and Liarias
2010)
Turkey has also been slow in legislating and implementing a variety of ethniclinguistic rights such as education and broadcasting in Kurdish, which have become
standard practice in advanced democracies(Somer and Liarias 2010)
Kurdish broadcasting was legalised in 2002, the completion of all regulation and the
removal of all restriction only became possible in 2009, despite the start of accession
talks with the EU starting four years earlier;
Hope of EU accession facilities Kurdish opening in two ways:
1. insofar as Turkeys membership prospects are credible, this diminishes the
likelihood that Turkish Kurds would pursue secession.
2. EU encourages both the Turkish state and Kurdish nationalists to shun violent
means and provides standards and examples of how to meet ethnic-national
demands short of violent separatism.

Thus why the Kurdish opening occurred when it did - there were less demands for
independence domestically from the Kurds and internationally.
Turkey no longer enforces the view of the country as a homogenous melting pot
The societys ethnic, cultural and regional heterogeneity is more or less recognized
as de facto pluralism (Somer and Liarias 2010)
Relations with Kurdish Population
The war with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), which continues to launch attacks
on Turkish security forces and civilians within Turkey, as well as from neighbouring
Iraq, has caused the deaths of up to 40,000 people since 1984. -Period of relative
peace when PKK leader was imprisoned in 1999 -Armed struggle began again 2004
coincided with a major period of democratisation in the country although only
some of the reforms addressed the Kurdish question(Somer and Liarias 2010)
There has been an effort to address the grievances of the Kurdish community in
Turkey and a recognition that the solution has to be through political and economic
reforms, not military efforts. (Larabee 2010)
Reaping the benefits of its image as the anti-establishment party, AKP seemed to
carry the favour of the Kurdish electorate in both the July 2007 general election and
a follow-up constitutional referendum that established direct election of the president.
The AKP then declared itself the real representative of the countrys Kurds.(Somer
and Liaras 2010)
Kurdish support for the AKP fluctuates 2007 elections they won most of the cities in
the Kurdish region, but in municipal elections the party lost out badly to the
Democratic Society Party (main pro-Kurdish party) - led to Kurdish opening (Larabee
2010)
AKP's Foreign Policy
Turkey faces a new series of threats
a)
b)
c)
d)

The rise of Kurdish nationalism and separatism.

Sectarian violence in Iraq, which could spill over into neighbouring countries.
The possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran.
Weak and fragmented Lebanon, which has links to Syria and Iran.

Since 2002, the AKP government has been heavily influenced by the doctrine of
Strategic Depth and the core idea of the doctrine is that a nation's value in
international relations depends on its geostrategic location - particularly focused
upon relations with neighbours. (Larrabe 2010)
Debate about whether increased relations with MENA damages Turkey's western
orientation

Relations in Middle East - questions over whether it is the 'islamisation of Turkish

foreign policy'
Decline in power of Military - has this led to softening of Turkish FP? (Larabee 2010)
Relations with EU and West
European Union
Larrabee argues that because Turkey has strengthened its ties with the Middle East
and Caucasus, have coincided with growing problems in Turkey's relations with
Europe.
Ziya Onis labelled 2002-05 the Golden Age of Europeanization in Turkey where the
AKP pushed through a series of important economic and political reforms that paved
the way for the EU's decision in December 2004 to open accession negotiations with
Turkey.
EU members hesitant about Turkey's membership due: 1. Large population (over 70
mil) would then become second largest member, 2. low economic development, 3/
large investment necessarily in Turkey's infrastructure and agriculture, 4. because of
its Muslim culture and religion, is not really European. (Larabee 2010)
'There has been a loss of enthusiasm for and commitment to EU membership on
Turkey's part but also a visible slowdown in Turkey's reform process. The prospect of
EU membership provided an important incentive for the AKP's reform efforts in
200205, but as the perception that membership was possible began to weaken, so
too did the incentive for the AKP to give domestic reform a high priority. (Larabee
2010)
Turkey's growing involvement in the Caucasus and Caspian region is driven in part
by energy concerns. The Russian invasion of Georgia and the RussianUkrainian
gas conflict in early 2009 have underscored the need for Europe to shore up its
energy security by diversifying its suppliers, and have given a boost to the EU's
interest in the construction of the Nabucco project, which would transport Caspian
gas to Europe via a pipeline that would run from Turkey through Romania, Hungary
and Austria...if successful, the pipeline will enhance Turkey's role as an important
regional actor and make Turkey a key cog in Europe's effort to achieve energy
independence. (Larabee 2010)
United States
Despite the end of the Cold War Turkey's cooperation is needed to achieve US
policy goals. -Turkey depends on US support as it did during the Cold War-, at the
same time, Turkey's geostrategic role and interests have expanded. Turkey now has
stakes in various regions it did not have two decades ago. (Larabee 2010)

During the Bush administrations USTurkish relations sharply deteriorated, largely

as a result of the US invasion of Iraq which led to serious strains in relations and a
sharp rise in anti-American sentiment among Turks - However Obama has made
revitalising relations with Turkey an important foreign policy priority. (Larabee 2010)
Turkey played part in WOT - involved in intervention in Afghanistan (Kalaycioglu)
Relations with MENA Countries
Syria and Iran - Previously troubled relations with the countries- however 2004, Iran
and Turkey signed a security cooperation agreement which branded the PKK a
terrorist organisation, allowed for cooperation to protect borders and coordination of
intelligence.
Energy sources has also been an important factor Iran is Turkeys second largest
supplier of natural gas. The US has strongly criticised the deals over gas, however
the AKP has gone ahead, arguing that Turkey needs to diversify its sources of
supply in order to avoid becoming too dependent on one supplier. (Larabee 2010)
Irans potential nuclear plan have caused problems, because although Turkey does
not want to see a nuclear Iran, Erdogan has accused the West of applying a double
standard by singling out Iran's nuclear programme for criticism while remaining silent
about Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. In addition to this they have
expressed strong reservations about imposing sanctions on Iran, calling for
intensified diplomatic efforts to resolve the problem. (Larabee 2010)
Historically strained relations with Syria, such as in Oct 1998 when Turkey
threatened to invade Syria if they did not stop supporting the PKK. Since then the
relationship has improved (article written before the Syrian revolution)
a) April 2009 joint military exercises.
b) Sept 2009 both countries agreed to abolish visa requirements.
c) Trade has increased and was estimated in 2009 to be $4 billion. (Larabee
2010)
Israel - Soured relations- due to increasing relations with Iran and Syria - also Turkey
critical of policy of Israeli officials including the strikes against Gaza in 2008/9 particularly poor relations with Netanyahu government
Stance that the Palestinian cause is at heart a moral issue and this has helped
increase Turkey's stature and credibility in the Arab world.
Kurdish Regional Government- Larrabee argues that one of the most important
changes in foreign policy is the countries relations with the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG). Since late 2008, the AKP government began to intensify such
contacts.

They have oil pipelines which flow from northern Iraq into Turkish ports, which
contributes to Turkey's ambition to become an important energy hub between the
Caspian and Middle East. (Larabee 2010)
However there are still disagreements over Kirkuk and whether it should be
controlled by the KRG or Baghdad Turkey fears that if the KRG take control it
would enable the Iraqi Kurds to finance an independent Kurdish state. (Larabee
2010)
Sources
F. S. Larrabee, Turkeys New Geopolitics, Survival. Vol. 52, No. 2 (April-May 2010),
pp.157-180
A. Gol, The Identity of Turkey: Muslim and Secular ,Third world quarterly. Vol. 30,
No. 4 (2009), pp.795-811
KALAYCIOGLU, E. Democracy, Islam and Secularism in Turkey, BROWN, N.J. and
E. EL-DIN SHAHIN (Eds) The Struggle over Democracy in the Middle East,
Routledge: pp154-184
SOMER M. and E. G. LIARAS, (2010) Turkeys New Kurdish Opening: Religious
Versus Secular Values, Middle East Policy, 17(2) pp 152-165