PEOPLE v.

CHEN TIZ CHANG

G.R. Nos. 131872-73. February 17, 2000
Before the Court is an appeal by Chen Tiz Chang and Chen Jung San, also known as Willy Tan
challenging the October 16, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Branch
95) in a Criminal Case finding them guilty of illegal possession and sale of shabu and sentencing
each of them to two counts of reclusion perpetua.
HELD:
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, it must be shown that (1) the accused is
in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug, (2) such
possession is not authorized by law and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug. Here, as in Boco, the prosecution witnesses were able to establish these elements.
We are not persuaded by the argument that the samples examined were not taken from the drugs
seized. On the contrary, the testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses fairly established that
the shabu taken from the appellants is the same substance examined by the forensic chemist and
later presented as evidence in court. Verily, the presumption of regularity must prevail over
appellants unfounded allegations and speculations. Appellants behavior during the entrapment
showed that there was conspiracy between them and a third person who got away with the buybust money. It is an established rule that direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it
may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime, all of which indubitably point to or indicate a joint purpose, a concert of action and a
community of interest.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MELCHOR CABALQUINTO G.R. No. 167693, 19

September 2006, Tinga, J. (En Banc) Henceforth, the Court shall withhold the real
name of the victim-survivor, i.e., the woman or child-victim of violence, and shall
use fictitious initials instead to represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances
of the victimssurvivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise
their identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household members,
shall not be disclosed. Melchor Cabalquinto was charged with having raped his then
eight-year old daughter, AAA, on two (2) occasions. He denied the charge and
averred that the cases filed against him were the offshoot of frequent quarrels
between his common-law wife, ABC, and his brother. He claimed that there were
material inconsistencies between the testimonies of AAA and ABC. The trial court
convicted Cabalquinto of two (2) counts of rape. Taking into account the qualifying
circumstances of the victims minority and her relationship with Cabalquinto, it

imposed upon Cabalquinto the death penalty on both counts. This was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution has proved the guilt of
Cabalquinto beyond reasonable doubt HELD: The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The fact that the statements of AAA and ABC differ
on some minor details does not in any way affect their credibility or detract from the
integrity and truthfulness of their declarations AAA was but eight (8) years old when
the rapes happened. A child of her tender years cannot be expected to be able to
recount the details of her torment with exactitude. On the other hand, ABC must
have also been so devastated by what she witnessed her husband was doing to
their daughter that she might have perceived things differently from AAA. Persons
who witness an event may perceive it from different points of reference, hence, they
may have different accounts of how the incident took place. What is important is
that their testimonies reinforce each other on the essential facts and that their
versions corroborate and substantially coincide with each other to make a
consistent and coherent whole. It is improbable that a victim of tender years,
especially one unexposed to the ways of the world as AAA must have been, would
impute a crime as serious as rape to her own father if it were not true. As regards
ABC, no mother would possibly wish to stamp her child falsely with the stigma that
follows a rape only to get back at Cabalquintos brother. Her zeal in prosecuting the
case demonstrates her yearning that the law may do her daughter justice. The
penalty should be amended, in view of Republic Act No. 9346 Carnal knowledge of a
woman under 12 years of age is rape, and is qualified when the offender is a parent
of the victim, in which case, the death penalty shall be imposed. In this case, the
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were properly alleged in the
Informations, proven during trial and not refuted by Cabalquinto. However, in view
of Rep. Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should instead be
imposed. Resolution dated February 14, 2006, A.M. No. 99-7-06-SC in In Re Internet
Web Page of the Supreme Court In a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, the
mother of a child abuse victim expressed anxiety over the posting of full text
decisions of the Court in child sexual abuse cases on its Internet Web Page. She
submitted that confidentiality and the best interest of the child must prevail over
public access to information. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) commented
that the posting of the full text of decisions in child abuse cases on the Supreme
Court Web Page violates the right to privacy of the aggrieved parties. According to
the OSG, the fact that the aggrieved child may have consented, through a parent or
guardian, to a public hearing of the case does not negate the expectation of privacy
which the child may later invoke because child victims cannot be presumed to have
intended their initial agreement to extend beyond the termination of their case to
the posting of the decision reached by the Court on the Web Page. Moreover, such
an expectation of privacy is reasonable. Short of withdrawing the full text of
decisions in such cases from the Web Page, the OSG proposed that the Court
instead replace the material information, such as the name of the child-victim, in its
decisions. In this case and henceforth, the Court shall withhold the real name of the
victim-survivor, i.e., the woman or child-victim of violence, and shall use fictitious
initials instead to represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victimssurvivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise their

identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household members, shall

not be disclosed.

People vs. Cabalquinto

G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006

(Criminal Law, Republic Act 7610, Republic Act 9262)

FACTS

Cabalquinto was accused of raping his eight-year old daughter seven times. He was
found guilty of by the Regional Trial Court for rape on two counts and was sentenced
to suffer the penalty of death. The victim testified that her father had raped her
seven times since her mother left for abroad. A medical certificate and the
testimony of the mother further supported the charge. But the defense pointed out
some inconsistencies between the testimony of the victim and her mother on
certain circumstances of the alleged rape events. The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court and also ordered payment of damages.

ISSUE

Is Cabalquinto guilty of rape?

RULING

Affirmed.

Supreme Court meticulously and painstakingly examined the records as well as the
transcripts of stenographic notes and found no cause to overturn the findings of fact
and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

The mothers testimony that she witnessed the act of rape corroborates the victimdaughters account. The inconsistency between the testimony of AAA and her
mother pertains merely to a circumstance that is of little consequence to the
question of whether rape was actually committed. Whether the victim cried out or

not does not discount rape. It should be emphasized that the victim was only eight
years old when she was raped. A child of her tender years cannot be expected to be
able to recount the details of her torment with exactitude.

Carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is rape as defined under Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code, and is qualified when the offender is a parent of the
victim, in which case, the death penalty shall be imposed as provided under the
Death Penalty Law. In this case, the qualifying circumstances of the victims
minority and her relationship with the accused as the latters daughter were
properly alleged in the Informations, proven during trial and not refuted by
Cabalquinto. However, in view of Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole should instead be imposed.

The accused is sentenced, in each of the criminal cases reviewed, to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count, P75,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count.

Moral damages, separate and distinct from the civil indemnity, are automatically
granted in rape cases. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed to
deter fathers with aberrant sexual behaviors from sexually abusing their daughters.

NOTA BENE

What was notable in this case was the Supreme Courts pronouncement, in relation
to Republic Act 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act) and Republic Act 9262 (Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004), on the confidential nature a rape trial.
According to the Court, these laws uniformly seek to respect the dignity and protect
the privacy of women and their children. The Court thus withheld the real name of
the victim, and used fictitious initials instead to represent her.

PEOPLE vs. GENOSA, G.R. No. 135981, January 15

2004.
People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein.
During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed
and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that

every time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever
beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the
killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was
able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The
information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by
beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying
that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of
his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine
her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts
reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme
Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial
court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome
plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the battered woman syndrome, Dra. Dayan and Dr.
Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme
Court as part of the records.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the battered woman syndrome as constituting self
defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the
battered woman syndrome.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without
concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with
men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it
occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence,
which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the
tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman
syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least
two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering
episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual
fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to
save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily
immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the
former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of selfdefense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly
established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly characterizing the
relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant
failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar
pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of
the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.
Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on
ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus,
the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful
aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and
unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present
case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between
the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw
from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased
his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended
altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in
favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as
passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the
batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her
psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power
without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally
produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is
committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by
a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following
requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of
mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of
time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the
killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a
quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be
said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order
to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and
deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any
defense that might be put up by the party attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation.
The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact
that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid
emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of
her unborn child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the presence
of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty
hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from
custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other
lawful cause.

NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence
Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx.
Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur
any criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"

OLIVARES VS CA

FACTS:
Isidro Olivares was charged with violation of RA 7610 for touching the breast and kissing the lips of
Cristina Elitiong, a 16-year old high school student employed by the former in making sampaguita
garlands during weekends. The trial court found him guilty; affirmed by the CA. Petitioner now
alleges that his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was
violated for failure to allege in the information the essential elements of the offense for which he is
being charged.
Issue: WON Olivares can be charged with violation of RA 7610.
Held:
Yes.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 are as follows:

1.

The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2.
The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
3.

The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

The first element obtains in this case. It was established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner
kissed Cristina and touched her breasts with lewd designs as inferred from the nature of the acts
themselves and the environmental circumstances. The second element, i.e., that the act is performed
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, is likewise present.
Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct
under the coercion or influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused because she
was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct. Furthermore, it is
inconsequential that the sexual abuse occurred only once. As expressly provided in Section 3 (b) of
R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. It must be observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is
captioned as Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse because Congress really intended to cover
a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct, not
necessarily for money or profit. The law covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of
sexual abuse.

As to the contention that the minority of Cristina was not properly alleged in the information, the SC
ruled that: Petitioner was furnished a copy of the Complaint which was mentioned in the information,
hence he was adequately informed of the age of the complainant.
Amployo vs. People

GR 157718

Facts:
Alvin Amployo was charged with violation of RA 7610 for touching, mashing and playing the
breasts of Kristine Joy Mosguera, an 8 year old Grade 3 pupil without her consent. Amployo
contends that the element of lewd design was not established since: (1) the incident happened at 7am,
in a street near the school with people around; (2) the breast of an 8 year old is still very much
underdeveloped; and (3) suppose h intentionally touched her breast, it was merely to satisfy a silly
whim. He also argues that the resultant crime is only acts of lasciviousness under Art 336 RPC and
not child abuse under RA 7610 as the elements thereof had not been proved.
Issues:
WON lewd design was established; WON Amployo violated RA 7610.
Held:
*Before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor below 12
years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in
addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610.The first element
is lewd design.
The term lewd is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene;[12] it is characterized by or
intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is
necessarily a mental process the existence of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such
intention,i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence
of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental
circumstances. What is or what is not lewd conduct, by its very nature, cannot be pigeonholed into a
precise definition.
Lewd design was established. Amployo cannot take refuge in his version of the story as he has
conveniently left out details which indubitably prove the presence of lewd design. It would have
been easy to entertain the possibility that what happened was merely an accident if it only happened
once. Such is not the case, however, as the very same petitioner did the very same act to the very
same victim in the past.
*The first element of RA 7610 obtains. petitioners act of purposely touching Kristine Joys breasts
(sometimes under her shirt) amounts to lascivious conduct.
The second element is likewise present. As we observed in People v. Larin,[24] Section 5 of Rep.
Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in
which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation. As case law has

it, intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. As to the third element, there is no dispute that
Kristine Joy is a minor, as she was only eight years old at the time of the incident in question.
People vs. Abadies

July 11, 2002

Facts:
Jose Abadies was charged with four counts of violation of RA 7610 for committing acts of
lasciviousness upon her 17 year old daughter, Rosalie, by kissing, mashing her breasts and touching
her private parts. Trial Court found him guilty. Abadies asserts that he was impliedly pardoned by
Rosalie in not immediately telling her mother about the incidents.
Issue: WON ABadies is guilty of violating RA 7610.
Held:
Yes.
Complainants failure to disclose about her misfortune to her mother does not destroy her
credibility. Complainant explained that she did not tell her mother about her ordeal because she was
afraid of the accused. Thus, although accusedwas not armed nor did he threaten complainant, his
moral ascendancy over her is a sufficient substitute for the use of force or intimidation as required by
Art336 RPC (elements of acts of lasciviousness).
As to the implied pardon, such will not hold. The supposed pardon cannot be implied from the fact
that the complainant did not immediately reveal to her mother her defloration. It was her fear of
accused which restrained complainant from reporting the incidents to her mother. Moreover, Article
344 of the RPC and Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that the
pardon must be express and cannot be based on hazy deduction.

People vs. Jimenez

GR 137790-91

Facts:
Jaime Jimenez was charged with two counts of lascivious acts against his 12 year old daughter Joana
by inserting his finger to her private part, thereby violating RA 7610. The RTC found Jimenez guilty
and sentenced him on each count to reclusion perpetua, among others. Jimenez now argues that the
penalty should not have been increasd from reclusion temporal (medium) to reclusion perpetua
(maximum) considering that both criminal prosecutions failed to allege the special circumstance of
relationship of the victim and the accused.
Issue:
WON the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of reclusion temporal is proper.
Held:
Yes.
Under R.A. No. 7610, 31, however, relationship is not a qualifying but only an ordinary generic
aggravating circumstances and, therefore, although it was not alleged in the information can
nevertheless be taken into account in fixing the penalty for the crime because it was
proven. Accused-appellant fails to distinguish a generic aggravating circumstance from a qualifying
circumstance. A generic aggravating circumstance provides for the imposition of the prescribed
penalty in its maximum period, while a qualifying circumstance changes the nature of the crime.
It is clear from the provisions of RA 7610 Sec. 31 that the nature of the crime does not change
when the circumstance of relationship is present. The law simply provides that the penalty
prescribed should be imposed in its maximum period when such circumstance is present, thus
making the circumstance of relationship merely a generic aggravating circumstance. The trial court,
therefore, correctly sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count of lascivious conduct committed against his daughter.