THE RUSI JOURNAL

Afghanistan
the change we need
des browne and stephen carter

The political questions in Afghanistan are difficult and complex. While the new US
approach has much to be commended, there is still cause for alarm. Legitimacy and
governance remain a massive challenge. Elections are a vital next step – but many
doubt the credibility of the coming vote. Effective institution-building is threatened by
an incoherent approach that does not grapple with the key issues, which are ultimately
political.

A
s the election in Afghanistan
approaches, the American
administration has begun imple-
menting a rational and overdue redirec-
tion of policy. While there is much in the
new strategy that is welcome, with the
most visible element being an increase
in funding and manpower, there remains
the question of how it will engage with
the difficult political questions that have
been present since 2001, and which have
been a more fundamental challenge for
the international and Afghan effort than
the lack of resources.
To judge by the statements coming
from the US government, they ‘get it’,
acknowledging the essentially state-
building and political elements of the
mission and talking up the limits of mili-
tary solutions. The UK government’s own
review of 29 April put particular stress
on complementing force with economic,
social and political progress. But while
the policy of the previous US adminis-
tration needed revision, its failures also
reflect the genuine difficulty of address-
ing these problems amid conflicting
priorities and tangled politics. The new
administration will find they confront
the same obstacles – especially in the
key areas of elections, governance and
institution-building, international coher-
ence and reconciliation with the insur-
gents. They may well do better than their
predecessors, but only if they are able to
face up to some thorny issues.
Some of the areas where the risk of
failure seems the greatest are explored
below. But one point is worth address-
ing straight away. During the review, the
argument was made widely that the US
needed to limit its ambitions, to jettison
unrealistic expectations of Afghanistan as
a ‘Swedish democracy’.1 This sentiment is
understandable, but flawed. Since 2001
the intervention has been characterised
by the regular subordination of account-
ability, legitimacy and institution-building
to shorter-term aims. Examples abound:
the initial ceding of large parts of the
post-Taliban political landscape to the
warlords, the promotion of a dominant
presidency and a weak parliament, the
failure in the 2005 polls to insist on margin-
alisation of candidates linked to armed
militias, the lack of transitional justice,
the tolerance of corruption, drug-dealing,
land-theft, and private jails, and ineffec-
tive investment in building up the police
and judicial system. These are among
the core reasons for the insurgency’s
comparative success: one need not
aspire to Swedish standards to under-
stand the practical impact of corruption,
political marginalisation, and lack of rule
of law. Durable stability is unlikely with-
out state-building – not as an academic
theory but as something that addresses
the concrete expectations of Afghans. To
suggest it is a luxury we cannot now afford
is to embrace a counter-factual logic, and
arguably the tactical path of the Soviet
intervention. Unless we make progress
on these issues, the bright new Ameri-
can policy risks being only superficially
different, a matter of more resources
into essentially the same strategy. That,
as its chief instigator would say, is not the
change we need.
Supporting Credible Elections
The most immediate focus for the new
American team must be the presiden-
tial election – and they are investing a
good deal of their credibility in it. Some
question whether they really matter that
much. To quote one Afghan American,
whoever wins will be seen as a stooge of
America anyway: one might as well make
sure they are a competent stooge. There
is also the insidious argument that as
Karzai is likely to win in any case, there is
little point in expending effort and politi-
cal capital on the quality of the election
process.
But this misses some important
points. Legitimacy, rather than just
democracy, is an important distinction.
But while a good election will not guar-
antee legitimacy, a process that is seen
as clearly fixed will all but ensure its
absence, and that matters in a counter-
insurgency. A process that is not credible
will also have a poisonous indirect effect
on the political environment, reduc-
ing any expectation of accountability
and strengthening the atmosphere of
subversion of any genuine pluralism of

© DES BROWNE AND STEPHEN CARTER JUNE 2009 VOL. 154 NO. 3 pp. 30–34 DOI: 10.1080/03071840903097613

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 Still the indispensible president, at least in Washington’s eyes: Afghan President Hamid Karzai shakes hands with an Afghan cadet during a graduation ceremony
at the National Military Academy of Afghanistan in Kabul. Photo courtesy of US Department of Defense.
control. That sort of politics is not just
toxic to effective governance, but a poor
basis from which to attempt to bring the
militants and their sympathisers into
the fold – undermining as it does any
sense that the government is capable
of conceding genuine political space. It
may make things messier, but no matter
who wins, a genuine campaign will be
healthy.
What is more, the elections will
have an effect in the battle for hearts
and minds not just in Afghanistan, but in
the countries that make up the alliance.
The prospect of thousands of troops
fighting to sustain a regime that is not
just widely undermined by corruption,
but also effectively unelected, is unthink-
able, and will have a deeply corrosive
effect on public support for the war. It is
not a narrative that fits with assurances
of a virtuous battle being steadily won.
President Obama is right to see it as a
critical danger.
If the elections genuinely matter,
there is already cause for serious alarm.
The registration process is showing credi-
ble evidence of fraud: many more women
than men have registered in Paktia, Logar
and Khost, some of the most conser-
vative and conflict-prone areas of the
country, a development which is gener-
ally agreed to be the result of abuses.2
There is widespread concern at the use
RUSI 154_3 Text June 2009.indd 31
of the benefits of incumbency to support
Karzai’s candidacy. More subtly, there is
a growing sense that the US, whatever
its protestations to the contrary, is effec-
tively backing Karzai’s re-election, which
is now considered a foregone conclu-
sion. Incumbency and perceptions of an
inevitable victory have greatly reinforced
Karzai’s ability to build coalitions and
divide his opponents – which, while a
usual part of Afghan politics, has been so
extensive as to significantly reduce the
competitiveness of the polls before they
even take place.
Although late in the day, the inter-
national community can still do some-
thing about this, if it acts resolutely and
fast. The reaction so far seems curiously
muted. US Special Representative Richard
Holbrooke has repeatedly stressed the
need for the polls to be credible, and his
appointment of veteran diplomat Tim
Carney to lead the US election team is an
indication that he is in earnest. But there
has been no strong public expression of
concern over the multiple danger signals
so far. Of course, there may be things
happening behind the scenes, but with
the election so close, there is an urgent
need to give a hard-edged practical
expression to statements of intent about
promoting a level playing field – and
to do so in a way which targets public
perceptions.
Much can be done to improve the
technical means of controlling fraud
– for example, accelerating the process
of making the Electoral Complaints
Commission fully operational; agree-
ing universally accepted procedures
for areas affected by violence to avoid
voting without the presence of observers
and agents; and reinforcing measures
like inking and re-registration at polling
stations to compensate for registration
fraud. One could also improve top level
oversight of the election management
process – perhaps by agreeing with the
candidates a credible independent inter-
national election expert to scrutinise
preparations and report with recom-
mendations at key points during the run
up to the vote.
But technical measures alone will
not achieve the critical goal of ensur-
ing the elections are perceived as cred-
ible. More political intervention is also
needed. This does not mean manipula-
tion of the process, but it does require
sending some clear political signals. First
and foremost, these must advertise the
international commitment to a serious
contest. On political use of government
resources or registration fraud, for exam-
ple, a diplomatic but strong public state-
ment backed up by action would begin to
rebuild credibility among Afghans who
are aware that abuses are going on. Most
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 afghanistan
importantly, action is needed to dispel
the idea of US favouritism. Legitimate,
discreet moves were made to encourage
candidates to run, but political theatre
matters in Afghanistan: until some overt
signals are made, Afghans will draw
understandable conclusions about the
real extent of American commitment.
Even at this stage, signals of this kind
could have a significant effect. The sense
among many international observers
that there is no obvious alternative to
Karzai involves an element of self-fulfill-
ing prophecy; prior to the American
backing he received in 2001, few would
have identified him as the indispensable
president.
One legitimate possible move would
be to form a ‘tea club’ of candidates
expected to get more than 5 per cent
of the vote – building on an established
practice to encourage regular contact of
serious contenders with key international
figures, while sending a clear message
that they are seen as such. There are
many other ways to make the point that
we are serious about a genuine elec-
tion, and genuinely not wedded to any
one candidate: the key thing is that the
international community sends a public
signal sooner rather than later, because
in the currency of Afghan politics few will
believe the message if we do not.
Getting to Grips with
Governance
Whatever the outcome of the election,
improving governance, institutions and
the rule of law will be a central chal-
lenge – arguably much more important
than the vote. The US administration is
putting more emphasis on these than
ever before. What that will mean in prac-
tice is still unclear: officials talk about
comprehensive approaches, of doing
more to support the better individual
governors, of reform of the Ministry of
Interior, of tribal justice mechanisms,
and of the ‘new compact’ with Karzai.
In practice the danger is that the
focus will be too technical, when what is
needed is to confront the political aspects
of the problem at every level. The most
concrete element that has emerged is
the proposal to send hundreds of new
US civilian advisers to ministries, local
government and the PRTs – the opera-
© DES BROWNE AND STEPHEN CARTER JUNE 2009
RUSI 154_3 Text June 2009.indd 32
tionalisation of the ‘high quality techni-
cal assistance and mentoring’ which is
the main response to governance issues
in the US strategy. It is also a signifi-
cant element of the British plan, which
proposes to double the number of UK
civilian experts. The emphasis on civilian
advisers perhaps reflects both the long
lead-time to recruit and deploy them,
and the less quantifiable nature of other
interventions on governance, particular-
ly those that involve the politics of indi-
vidual appointments. But while mentors
have a useful role to play in the right
context, they are at their most effective
in capacity-building and training. Their
most successful deployment to date has
been in support of the Afghan National
Army (ANA). Support for the police has
been less effective within an unreformed
Interior Ministry. Unless political aspects
of the problem are addressed, inserting
a few hundred foreigners, on short-term
contracts and without native familiar-
ity with their environment, will be at
best part of the solution to governance
issues.
There also seems to be a danger in
the dominant role of the military. There
is an emphasis on PRT-based advisers
leading local governance efforts, and
Pentagon officials already say the diffi-
culty of hiring enough qualified civilians
may mean directly using military person-
nel for some of the new posts.3 There
is nothing wrong with the military: it is
precisely its energy and resources that
have led to it playing a leading role. But
the risk is that governance becomes an
operational consideration, rather than
part of a broader and deeper reform,
politically engaging the government
from the top down as well the ground
up. That concern could apply to the new
American effort as a whole: for all the
talk of the limits of force and of civil-
military plans, with tens of thousands of
new troops, a massive expansion of the
ANA, and a leading role for the Pentagon
in areas ranging from police reform to
road-building, the risk is that in practice
the focus will be towards the military.
A good illustration of where the real
challenge lies is appointments policy,
where despite a proliferation of different
Afghan and international efforts – the
IDLG, the IARCSC, the Special Advisory
Board for Senior Appointments – prog-
ress has been disappointing.4 The key
issue here is not technical but the use
of every appointment from woleswal
(district governor) up as currency for
political patronage. That is not to say
that politics need be taken out of the
equation entirely, but that redressing the
balance between politics and institution-
building (so as to at least ensure some
minimum of honesty and competence
even where other factors are involved)
is dependent on a political intervention.5
A case in point is the appointment of
Arif Nurzai as head of a new body with
a budget of $69 million responsible for
reaching out to the insurgents – a deci-
sion that appears to have much less to do
with his capabilities or effective reconcil-
iation than with political considerations
within the Afghan administration. This is
the level at which action on governance
needs to bite: the new policy will have
teeth only when it begins to affect deci-
sions like this one. Given the budget
for the new agency largely came from
the US, the problem is not a lack of
levers.
The other key danger the new insti-
tution-building effort faces will be the
rising pressure for results (not least from
donor legislatures) and the consequent
lure of the short-term fix over long-term
solidity. The police are the best case in
point, particularly given their key role
in security and justice – often cited as
a central popular concern and an area
the Taliban conspicuously have devoted
resources to usurping in the battle for
legitimacy.6 The emphasis until now
has been on the relatively straightfor-
ward technical issues of training, equip-
ment and increased head-count above
the longer-term (and more politically
fraught) ones of internal reform and
governance – and on the relatively crude
role of the police as auxiliaries in the
fight against the Taliban rather than their
role in supporting the rule of law.7
The results have not been impres-
sive: a 2008 US Government Accountabil-
ity Office report found only 7 per cent of
ANP units were even partially capable.8
At each stage since 2001 there has been
a judgement that rising violence allowed
no time to invest in quality as well as
quantity;9 rather ad hoc solutions like the
24/06/2009 16:52:21:

Auxiliary Police have been favoured, and
failed. Now proposals for tribal militias
and a major increase in police numbers
again risk overshadowing efforts to
build up real institutional depth, while
the International Crisis Group reports a
continuing ‘lack of political will in Kabul
or foreign capitals to tackle the power-
brokers impeding reform’.10 It is worth
considering where we would be if we
had invested for the long-term from the
start.11
Finally, a long-term view would also
highlight the importance of working with
the Afghan government on constitutional
arrangements, particularly the possible
benefits of reducing the concentration
of power at the centre. More powers to
provincial councils, for example, might
help increase the political engagement
of the local elites and their stake in the
system, and help bring to bear the influ-
ence of tribal networks in support of
stability: more politics could mean less
war. (This is perhaps where one might
seek echoes of the tribal policy of the
Iraqi surge.) The US White Paper talks
of improving local capacity, but has less
to say on more basic issues.12 The UK
review goes rather further, stressing the
need to strengthen both ‘Afghan democ-
racy at all levels’ and ‘local government,
not least the traditional [A]fghan struc-
tures’.13
Strengthening International
Coherence
Bringing focus to what is still far too
often the strategic chaos of the multi-
lateral intervention is a major challenge
in its own right. The US White Paper
supported a ‘Contact Group’ and ‘region-
al security and economic cooperation
forum’, but again the question is wheth-
er new mechanisms will be combined
with heavy-weight political engagement
to generate a stronger consensus and
sense of urgency among international
actors, focus pressure for governance
and accountability, and turn the aware-
ness of the need for co-ordination into
greater practical willingness to be co-
ordinated. Obama, with a still-huge store
of political capital among the allies, is
uniquely placed to do this.
What this means in practice is a
review of the order that emerged from
RUSI 154_3 Text June 2009.indd 33
des browne and stephen carter
Bonn, with its division of thematic
nation-building responsibilities – and
of the country itself – into fiefdoms led
by individual countries. It also means
a stronger role for the UN as the body
responsible for organising co-ordina-
tion of the civilian effort. There are good
indications the US could be agreeable
to both. But neither UN Special Repre-
sentative Kai Eide, nor indeed President
Karzai, have so far been able to impose
coherence: that needs political leader-
ship from the top.
Aid policy will be a critical test of
this political will (not least because it
is an area over which the international
community has direct control). Despite
some positive innovations, like the
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
and other trust fund mechanisms, the
effort so far has been characterised by
practices widely acknowledged to have
undermined effectiveness. If the interna-
tional community is serious about seeing
the insurgency as a threat, this is a form
of self-induced sabotage. Afghanistan’s
donors need to decide where their
priorities lie. For the same reason, aid
programmes need to be re-designed to
put greater stress on creating jobs for
ordinary Afghans and investing in the
agriculture sector where most of them
work.14 Obama has spoken of sweep-
ing away the inequities of no-bid USAID
contracts: he should be ready to go much
further than this and to press his allies to
do the same. The UK has some claim to
leadership, with DfID among the stron-
gest promoters of the trust funds and the
new UK strategy including £30 million for
agricultural support and improved access
to credit for farmers.
Renewing Reconciliation
Alliance forming and breaking has been
standard procedure in Afghan warfare
since time immemorial, and reconcili-
ation was a key aim of the Bonn agree-
ment. But efforts until now have had a
conspicuous lack of success.15 Primarily
the responsibility of the Afghan govern-
ment – but with international partners
playing a significant role – the reconcili-
ation programme has been undermined
by competing interests, inconsistency
and a lack of will. The US administration
seems to have learnt the lesson, making
explicit reference to ‘convincing non-
ideologically committed insurgents to lay
down their arms, reject al Qaeda, and
accept the Afghan Constitution’;16 the
question is whether they will be able to
apply it.
Since the fall of the Taliban a number
of senior figures – people like Wakil
Mutawakil, Wasikh and Rahmatullah
Sangaryar – have defected only to find
themselves in Bagram or Guantanamo;
many others who had expected to be
able to integrate peacefully have instead
been harassed by the Afghan govern-
ment and security forces or international
military operations. Unsurprisingly, some
of those benefiting from Bonn have used
their influence to ensure old rivals stay
excluded.
A renewed reconciliation effort will
not succeed if it does not address these
political challenges. This includes the US
proposal to work through the IDLG and
local governors (some of who have done
much more to encourage recruitment
to the Taliban than the reverse) and Arif
Noorzai’s well-funded new agency. The
new effort must be co-ordinated by the
Afghan government, but it needs to estab-
lish a credible mechanism, able to tailor
its approaches to the individual dynam-
ics of different commander’s networks
and gain their trust by establishing clear
precedents, based on genuine accom-
modation. With the military surge likely
to unleash contrary pressures, it is espe-
cially important that reconciliation be an
integral tactic rather than something to
be pursued once the militants have been
‘softened up’. The reconciliation effort
also needs to stretch beyond Afghani-
stan to networks in Pakistan, to engage
with both the Afghan insurgents based
there and with local militants as part of
a separate Pakistani-led effort. And there
is work to be done to ensure other inter-
national players are more engaged, and
in particular that their security opera-
tions are aligned.
Conclusion
Some of the innovations emerging from
the US and UK review processes (notably
a reinforced military strategy based on
providing human security and reducing
civilian casualties; a better communica-
tions and propaganda effort; a further
33
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 afghanistan
building up of the ANA; and a greater
focus on Pakistan) are less dependent on
politics as such (even if they often have
a clear political aspect in a more ‘hearts
and minds’ sense). These seem well-
advised, and may well have an impact,
possibly a substantial one.
But the danger is that these changes,
and more generally the ramp-up in civil-
ian and material resources, will dominate
the focus of the revitalised international
and Afghan effort, and will not adequately
NOTES
1 A classified February 2009 report to
Obama from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
notably urged a shift in the military
mission away from nation-building
and towards more limited counter-
insurgency – although this was in the
context of other agencies like the State
Department taking on those duties
instead. Non-military commentators (like
Amitai Etzioni) have been more vocal in
calling directly for a limited approach.
2 See, for example, the observation
reports of the Free and fair Election
Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA),
<http://www.fefa.org.af/Eng_Pages/
Reports/VRPs.htm>. Also, ‘Afghan rights
chief fears vote fraud against women’,
Associated Press, 3 May 2009, <www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/30548237/>,
accessed 30 May 2009.
3 Private meeting with US government
officials, April 2009.
4 The IDLG is the Independent Directorate
of Local Government; the IARCSC is the
Independent Administrative Reform and
Civil Service Commission.
5 Martine Van Bijlert in particular
has done some interesting work
examining the tension between politics
and competence in government
appointments. Politics can arguably
be a legitimate criterion – for example
in helping bring Taliban supporters
into the fold – but the challenge is to
ensure a minimum underlying level of
competence and honesty as well. See
Martine Van Bijlert, ‘Between discipline
and discretion – Policies surrounding
senior subnational appointments’,
Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit,
May 2009, <www.reliefweb.int/rw/
rwb.nsf/retrieveattachments?
© DES BROWNE AND STEPHEN CARTER JUNE 2009
RUSI 154_3 Text June 2009.indd 34
confront issues that have been a central
cause of problems so far. Those issues
are largely political: technical approach-
es to them will not be enough on their
own. Dealing with them is hard-headed
self-interest rather than naïve idealism:
apart from anything else, it is a large part
of what sets us apart (morally, but more
importantly, practically) from the Soviet
path. If the new policy is to succeed in
Afghanistan, it cannot afford to ignore
this. ■
openagent&shortid=PSLG-7S2FFD&file=
Full_Report.pdf>, accessed 30 May 2009.
6 For a powerful exploration of the
role of justice in Taliban tactics see
Frank Ledwidge, ‘Justice and Counter-
insurgency in Afghanistan: a Missing
Link’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 154, No. 1,
February 2009), pp. 6–9.
7 International Crisis Group, ‘Reforming
Afghanistan’s Police’, 30 August 2007,
p. i.
8 ‘Afghanistan Security: Further
Congressional Action May Be Needed
to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan
to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan
National Security Forces’, Report to
Congressional Committee, Government
Accountability Office, June 2008, p.
32. In a presentation to the US House
of Representatives Subcommittee On
National Security And Foreign Affairs,
Congressman John Tierney summed
up the findings of the 2008 GAO report
on the 433 ANP units: ‘Zero are fully
capable, three percent are capable with
coalition support, four percent are only
partially capable, 77 percent are not
capable at all, and 68 percent are not
formed or not reporting’.
9 EUPOL, the EU Policing Mission to
Afghanistan, has arguably invested more
in quality over quantity, particularly in its
early work – but in such limited numbers
as to have little practical effect.
10 International Crisis Group, ‘Policing
in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a
Strategy’, December 2008, p. 1.
11 Nick Grono, ‘Success in Afghanistan: how
to define it, how to make it happen’,
speech at the European Policy Centre,
Des Browne is the UK Member of
Parliament for Kilmarnock and Loudoun,
and was Secretary of State for Defence
from 2006 to 2008.
Stephen Carter is an independent policy
analyst and political adviser who has
worked extensively on and in Afghanistan
and other post-conflict countries (notably
central Africa) since 2003. Prior to this he
worked as a journalist and broadcaster in
Russia and the UK.
April 2008, <http://www.crisisgroup.
org/home/index.cfm?id=5371&l=1>,
accessed 30 May 2009.
12 The White Paper setting out the
new American strategy talks of
‘building up competent provincial
and local governments’, but not of
strengthening provincial councils or
similar mechanisms. ‘White Paper of
the Interagency Policy Group’s Report
on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and
Pakistan’, US Government, April 2009.
13 Gordon Brown, speech on the strategy
on Afghanistan and Pakistan, 29 April
2009, <http://www.number10.gov.
uk/Page19166>, accessed 30 May 2009.
14 David Kilcullen, notably, has written
on the benefits of road-building and
employment-creation in counter-
insurgency in his book The Accidental
Guerrilla (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2009), and these seems to be
increasingly accepted in US doctrine.
See <http://smallwarsjournal.com/
blog/2008/04/political-maneuver-in-
counteri/> for a good summary of why in
Kilcullen’s words ‘roads ain’t roads’.
15 Recent estimates are that only twelve
of the 142 UN-listed senior Taliban
figures have so far reconciled. It is worth
noting that the Communist Najibullah
regime was highly effective at making
and breaking alliances – one reason for
its unexpectedly long survival after the
Soviet withdrawal. While more coherent
than many of the old jihadi networks,
the Taliban are subject to the same
dynamics of alliance-forming which have
been exploited successfully in the past.
16 US White Paper, ibid., p. 4.
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