NEYPES

vs
. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 141524September 14, 2005469 SCRA 633
CORONA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyanceand/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private
respondents. Later, inan order, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground of
prescription. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998
and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July
1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which
petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five dayslater, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice
of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.On August 4, 1998, the court a quo
denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed
eightdays late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for re
consideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition
for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of
appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed
their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run
only on July 22, 1998since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court
denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998,
only five days had elapsedand they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On
September 16, 1999, the CAdismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal
should have been reckoned from March3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998
order dismissing their complaint. According tothe appellate court, the order was the final order
appealable under the Rules.
Issues:
I. Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period
toappeal the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order
dismissing theMotion for ReconsiderationII. Whether or not petitioners filed their notice of appeal
on time.
Held:
I.
The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be deemed
as thefinal order. In the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court
declared petitioner non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt
of the order of dismissal, he filed anomnibus motion to set it aside. When the
omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period toappeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibusmotion.
He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed for having been
filed outof time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15

days after the dismissalof his complaint since this was the final order that was
appealable under the Rules. The SC reversedthe trial court and declared that it was
the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint
which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.This
pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.
where the SCagain considered the order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration as the final order whichfinally disposed of the issues involved in the
case. Based on the aforementioned cases, the SCsustained petitioners view that the
order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsiderationwas the final order
contemplated in the Rules.II. Yes. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days withinwhich to file the notice of appeal in
the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to
Rule40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45 but does not apply to Rule 64(Review of
Judgments and FinalOrders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit) because Rule 64is derived from the Constitution. It is likewise
doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases. Thenew rule aims to regiment
or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution.This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of
the Rules which states thatthe appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. The useof the disjunctive word or signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from another. Itshould, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in
theabove provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days
from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which
we already determined to refer tothe July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new
trial or reconsideration.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES et al. v. HONORABLE RAMON S. CAGUIOA et al.

536 SCRA 193 (2007), EN BANC

Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A) No. 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
which created the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone (SBF) and the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA). Section 12 of R.A No. 7227 of the law provides that no taxes, local and national, shall
be imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to the law, Indigo Distribution
Corporation, et al., which are alldomestic corporations doing business at the SBF, applied for and were
granted Certificates of Registration and Tax Exemption by the SBMA.
Congress subsequently passed R.A. No. 9334, which provides that all applicable taxes, duties, charges,
including excise taxes due thereon shall be applied to cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented
liquors and wines brought directly into the duly chartered or legislated freeports of the Subic
Economic Freeport Zone. On the basis of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334, SBMA issued a Memorandum
declaring that, all importations of cigars, cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines into the
SBF, shall be treated as ordinary importations subject to all applicable taxes, duties and charges, including
excise taxes.
Upon its implementation, Indigo et al., sought for a reconsideration of the directives on the imposition of
duties and taxes, particularly excise taxes by the Collector of Customs and the SBMA Administrator.
Their request was subsequently denied prompting them to file with the RTC of Olongapo City a special
civil action for declaratory relief to have certain provisions of R.A. No. 9334 declared as unconstitutional.
They prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and preliminary mandatory injunction. The same was subsequently granted by Judge Ramon
Caguioa. The injunction bond was approved at One Million pesos (P1,000,000).
ISSUES:
Whether or not public respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
in jurisdiction in peremptorily and unjustly issuing the injunctive writ in favor of private respondents
despite the absence of the legalrequisites for its issuance
HELD:
One such case of grave abuse obtained in this case when Judge Caguioa issued his Order of May 4, 2005
and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 11, 2005 despite the absence of a clear and
unquestioned legal right of private respondents. In holding that the presumption of constitutionality and
validity of R.A. No. 9334 was overcome by private respondents for the reasons public respondent cited in
his May 4, 2005 Order, he disregarded the fact that as a condition sine qua non to the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction, private respondents needed also to show a clear legal right that ought to be
protected. That requirement is not satisfied in this case. To stress, the possibility of irreparable damage
without proof of an actual existing right would not justify an injunctive relief.
Indeed, Sections 204 and 229 of the NIRC provide for the recovery of erroneously or illegally collected
taxes which would be the nature of the excise taxes paid by private respondents should Section 6 of R.A.
No. 9334 be declared unconstitutional or invalid.
The Court finds that public respondent had also ventured into the delicate area which courts are cautioned
from taking when deciding applications for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Having
ruled preliminarily against the prima facie validity of R.A. No. 9334, he assumed in effect the proposition
that private respondents in their petition for declaratory relief were duty bound to prove, thereby shifting
to petitioners the burden of proving that R.A. No. 9334 is not unconstitutional or invalid.
In the same vein, the Court finds Judge Caguioa to have overstepped his discretion when he arbitrarily
fixed the injunction bond of the SBF enterprises at only P1million. Rule 58, Section 4(b) provides that a
bond is executed in favor of the party enjoined to answer for all damages which it may sustain by reason
of theinjunction. The purpose of the injunction bond is to protect the defendant against loss or damage by
reason of the injunction in case the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to it, and the
bond is usually conditioned accordingly.
Whether this Court must issue the writ of prohibition, suffice it to stress that being possessed of the power
to act on the petition for declaratory relief, public respondent can proceed to determine the merits of the
main case. Moreover, lacking the requisite proof of public respondents alleged partiality, this Court has
no ground to prohibit him from proceeding with the case for declaratory relief. For these reasons,
prohibition does not lie.

The Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 &
202623, 27 November 2013
FACTS:
The Province of Aklan (Aklan) and Jody King Construction and Development Corp. (JKCDC)
entered into a contract for the design and construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal

(Phase I) in Malay, Aklan. In the course of construction, Aklan issued variation/change orders for
additional works, whichagreed upon by the parties.
Aklan entered into a negotiated contract with JKCDC for the construction of Passenger Terminal
Building (Phase II) also at Caticlan Jetty Port in Malay, Aklan. JKCDC made a demand for the
total amount of P22,419,112.96 covering the items which Aklan allegedly failed to settle. JKCDC
then filed a civil case with the RTC of Marikina City (RTC) against Aklan for the collection of
said amount. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment against Aklan. The RTC later
ruled in favor of JKCDC (RTC Decision). Since Aklans motion for reconsideration of the RTC
Decision was filed out of time, a writ of execution was later issued. The sheriff served notices of
garnishment on Land Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank and Development Bank
of the Philippines at their branches in Kalibo, Aklan for the satisfaction of the judgment debt from
the funds deposited under Aklans account. Said banks, however, refused to give due course to
the court order, citing the relevant provisions of statutes, circulars and jurisprudence on the
determination of government monetary liabilities, their enforcement and satisfaction.
Aklans Notice of Appeal was denied by the RTC (RTC Order). Aklan moved for
reconsideration of the RTC Order, which was also denied by the RTC.
Aklan filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) to assail the writ of
execution. The CA dismissed said petition, on the ground, among others, that the issue on the
execution of the RTC decision had been rendered moot by Aklans filing of a petition before the
Commission on Audit (COA).
Aklan also filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA to assail the denial of its Notice of Appeal.
The CA dismissed said petition and ruled, among others, that Akla was estopped from invoking
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction of the COA as it only raised it after Aklans Notice of Appeal
was denied and a writ of execution was issued against it.
ISSUE:
Does the COA have primary jurisdiction over JKCDCs money claims against Aklan?
HELD:
YES. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No.
1445, it is the COA, which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government
agencies and instrumentalities. Section 1 of Rule VIII and Section 1 of rule II of COAs 2009
Revised Rules of Procedure also provide, among others, that the COA shall have original
jurisdiction over money claim against the Government, and exclusive jurisdiction over money
claims due from or owing to any government agency, respectively.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must
first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even
if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought
to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the
case without prejudice.
JKCDC sought to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly owed by Aklan, a local
government unit. As JKCDCs collection suit was against a local government unit, such money
claim should have been first brought to the COA. The RTC should have suspended the
proceedings and referred the filing of the claim before the COA.
ISSUE:
Are there exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?
HELD:
There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as: (a) where there
is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative
act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or
official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is
relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where
judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
(h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto
proceedings.
None of the foregoing circumstances are applicable to this case.
ISSUE:
Is Aklan estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction before the CA, after the denial of its
notice of appeal?
HELD:

No. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority
to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body
of special competence. All the proceedings of the court in violation of the doctrine and all orders
and decisions rendered thereby are null and void.
Since a judgment rendered by a body or tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case is no judgment at all, it cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any
obligation. All acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect and the
void judgment can never be final and any writ of execution based on it is likewise void.
KJCDCs belated compliance with the formal requirements of presenting its money claim before
the COA did not cure the serious errors committed by the RTC in implementing its void decision.
The RTC's orders implementing its judgment rendered without jurisdiction must be set aside
because a void judgment can never be validly executed.

G.R. No. 174908, June 17, 2013

DARMA MASLAG, Petitioner, v. AND ELIZABETH MONZON, WILLIAM GESTON, REGISTRY
OF DEEDS OF BENGUET, Respondents.

FACTS:
7

In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of original
certificate of title (OCT) against respondents Elizabeth Monzon (Monzon), William Geston and the Registry of
Deeds of La Trinidad, Benguet. The Complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La
Trinidad, Benguet.
After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT over petitioners property.
It ordered her to reconvey the said property to petitioner, and to pay damages and costs of

suit. Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.
After going over the MTC records and the parties respective memoranda, the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet,
Branch 10, through Acting Presiding Judge Fernando P. Cabato (Judge Cabato), issued its October 22, 2003
10

Order, declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over petitioners cause of action. It further held that it will
take cognizance of the case pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal

15

from the RTCs May 4, 2004 Resolution.

Petitioner assailed the RTCs May 4, 2004 Resolution for reversing the MTCs factual findings
that the MTC Decision be adopted.

16

and prayed

Respondents moved to dismiss petitioners ordinary appeal for being the improper remedy. They asserted
that the proper mode of appeal is a Petition for Review under Rule 42 because the RTC rendered its May 4,
2004 Resolution in its appellate jurisdiction.

18

The CA dismissed petitioners appeal. It observed that the RTCs May 4, 2004 Resolution (the subject matter
of the appeal before the CA) set aside an MTC Judgment; hence, the proper remedy is a Petition for Review
under Rule 42, and not an ordinary appeal.

19

20

Petitioner sought reconsideration.

She argued, for the first time, that the RTC rendered its May 4, 2004
Resolution in its original jurisdiction. She cited the earlier October 22, 2003 Order of the RTC declaring the
MTC without jurisdiction over the case.
The CA denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs findings that it has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case; that the Complaint states no cause of action; and
that petitioners Araceli and Arnel have no legal capacity to sue in behalf of the other
heirs of Severino.
RULING:
the RTC declared that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case based on the
supposition that the same is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus, following Section 8, Rule 40 of the
Rules of Court, it took cognizance of the case and directed the parties to adduce further evidence if they so
desire. The parties bowed to this ruling of the RTC and, eventually, submitted the case for its decision after
they had submitted their respective memoranda.
We cannot, however, gloss over this jurisdictional faux pas of the RTC. Since it involves a question of
jurisdiction, we may motu proprio review and pass upon the same even at this late stage of the
proceedings.

25

26

In her Complaint for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of OCT, petitioner claimed
that she and her father had been in open, continuous, notorious and exclusive possession of the disputed
property since the 1940s.
As a relief, petitioner prayed that Monzon be ordered to reconvey the portion of the property which she
claimed was fraudulently included in Monzons title. Her primary relief was to recover ownership of real
property. Indubitably, petitioners complaint involves title to real property. An action "involving title to real
property," on the other hand, was defined as an action where "the plaintiffs cause of action is based on a
claim that [she] owns such property or that [she] has the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession,
27

enjoyment, or disposition of the same."

Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real
property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed
28

value of the subject property.

34

There are two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on issues of fact and law.
The first mode
is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 in cases where the RTC exercised its original jurisdiction. It is done
by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. The second mode is a petition for review under Rule 42 in
cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction over MTC decisions. It is done by filing a Petition for

Review with the CA. Simply put, the distinction between these two modes of appeal lies in the type of
jurisdiction exercised by the RTC in the Order or Decision being appealed.
Thus,the CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of appeal should have been a Petition for Review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.

SPOUSES SABITSANA vs. MUERTEGUI

FACTS:
In 1981, Garcia sold his lot to Juanito Muertegui. The land was the occupied by Juanitosfather
and brother and they paid real property taxes over the land from 1980 up to 1998.
In 1991, Garcia sold the sale land to the Muerteguis family lawyer, Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. he also
paid real property taxes in 1992, 1993 ,1999.
When Juanitos father passed away, his heirs applied registration and coverage of the land
under the Public Land Act but Atty. Sabitsana apposed this claiming that he is the owner of the
lot sought to be registered.
Muertegui, Jr. filed for quieting of the title and preliminary injunction against Sabitsana. However,
Sabitsana insisted that the RTC where the action was filed does not have jurisdiction over the
case since the subject matter involves title to or interest in a parcel of land which the
assessed value is merely P 1,230.00.
The RTC found in favor of the Muerteguis and declared the DOS of 1981 valid and preferred
while that entered by Garcia and Sabistana are VOID and of no legal effect. It declared further
that Sabistana was a buyer in God faith.This decision was appealed to the CA.
The CA affirmed the RTCs decision in toto. The instant appeal was likewise denied.Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the RTC has Jurisdiction over the case in view of the fact that the assured value of the
subject land was only 1,2340.oo
HELD:
Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title Under Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court, an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the
appropriate RTC.

Due to Sabitsanas letter-opposition to respondents application for registration, said respondent

was prompted to prevent a cloud fro" being cast upon his application for title by obtaining a
declaration of his rights. This, thus, is an action for declaratory relief, w/c falls within the RTCs
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 60 of ROC. This is true regardless of the value of property in
question.
ANCHOR SAVINGS BANK (FORMERLY ANCHOR FINANCE AND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION) vs. HENRY H. FURIGAY, GELINDA C. FURIGAY, HERRIETTE C.
FURIGAY and HEGEM C. FURIGAY
G.R. No. 191178; March 13, 2013; Mendoza
Action: Petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
ASB filed a verified complaint for sum of money and damages with application for replevin
against Ciudad Transport Services, Inc. (CTS), its president, respondent Henry H. Furigay; his wife,
respondent Gelinda C. Furigay; and a John Doe.
While that case was pending, respondent spouses donated their registered properties to their
minor children, respondents Hegem G. Furigay and Herriette C. Furigay. Claiming that the donation of
these properties was made in fraud of creditors, ASB filed a Complaint for Rescission of Deed of
Donation, Title and Damages against the respondent spouses and their children.
The RTC ruled that the action for rescission had already prescribed. The CA found that the action
of ASB had not yet prescribed, but was premature and dismissed the case.
Issue: Is the action of ASB to file a complaint for rescission of Deed of Donation premature that warrant
dismissal?
Ruling: Yes.
The remedy of rescission is subsidiary in nature; it cannot be instituted except when the party
suffering damage has no other legal means to obtain reparation for the same.
Consequently, following the subsidiary nature of the remedy of rescission, a creditor would have
a cause of action to bring an action for rescission, if it is alleged that the following successive measures
have already been taken: (1) exhaust the properties of the debtor through levying by attachment and
execution upon all the property of the debtor, except such as are exempt by law from execution; (2)
exercise all the rights and actions of the debtor, save those personal to him (accion subrogatoria); and (3)
seek rescission of the contracts executed by the debtor in fraud of their rights (accion pauliana).
A cursory reading of the allegations of ASBs complaint would show that it failed to allege the
ultimate facts constituting its cause of action and the prerequisites that must be complied before the same
may be instituted. ASB, without availing of the first and second remedies, that is, exhausting the
properties of CTS, Henry H. Furigay and Genilda C. Furigay or their transmissible rights and actions,
simply undertook the third measure and filed an action for annulment of the donation. This cannot be
done.

While, the four-year prescriptive period for action of rescission commences to run neither from
the date of the registration of the deed sought to be rescinded nor from the date the trial court rendered its
decision but from the day it has become clear that there are no other legal remedies by which the creditor
can satisfy his claims. In this case, the action is premature.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Swedish Match v The Treasurer of the City of ManilaGR No. 181277Date: July 3, 2013
Ponente: Sereno, CJ.
Facts:
This is a Petition for Refund of Taxes with the RTC of Manila in accordance with Section 196 of
the Local Government Code (LGC)of 1991. The petitioner says that it had been religiously
paying its taxes based on Section 14 of Ordinance No. 7794 or the ManilaRevenue Code (as
amended by Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011). However, it was still taxed based on Section 21 of
the same code.
RTC denied the petition because of the failure of the petitioner to plead the latters capacity to
sue and to state the authority of Ms.Beleno, who had executed the Verification and Certification
of Non-Forum Shopping. It also denied it on the ground that Section 14and 21 pertained to
taxes of a different nature and, thus the elements of double taxation were wanting in this
case. CTA affirmed thedecision.Petitioner points out that Section 21 is not in itself invalid, but
the enforcement of this provision would constitute double taxation ifbusiness taxes have already
been paid under Section 14 of the same revenue code. Petitioner further argues that
since OrdinanceNos. 7988 and 8011 have already been declared null and void in Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. City of Manila, all taxescollected and paid on the basis of these
ordinances should be refunded.The respondent also argues that Sections 14 and 21 pertain
to two different objects of tax; thus, they are not of the same kind andcharacter so as to
constitute double taxation. Section 14 is a tax on manufacturers, assemblers and other
processors, while Section21 applies to business subject to excise, value-added, or percentage
tax. Respondent posits that under Section 21, petitioner ismerely a withholding tax agent of the
City of Manila.
Issue:
WON the imposition of tax under Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code constitutes double
taxation in view of the tax collected andpaid under Section 14 of the same codeRatio:
Yes.The Court used the holding in The City of Manila v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc to
justify that taxation under Sections 14 and21 would result to double taxation. Here, it was
elaborated that Section 143(a) of the LGC: said municipality or city may no longer subject the
same manufacturers, etc, to a business tax under Section 143(h) of the same Code. SECTION
143(h) may be imposedonly on businesses that are subject to excise tax, VAT or percentage tax

under the NIRC, and that are not otherwise specified inpreceding paragraphs. In the same
way, businesses such as respondents, already subject to a local business Tax under Sectio
n14 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 [which is based on Section 143(a) of the LGC], can no longer be
made liable for local business tax under Section 21 of the same Tax Ordinance [which is based
on Section 143(h) of the LGC.]
Thus, since petitioner has already been paying under Section 14, it should not be subjected to
the payment of taxes under Section21. Further, the Court agreed with petitioner that Ordinance
Nos. 7988 and 8011 cannot be the basis for the collection of businesstaxes because Coca-Cola
already ruled that these ordinances were null and void.Hence, payments made under Section
21 must be refunded in favor of petitioner.Petition is GRANTED.

In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA
633, 644, the Court declared that a party-litigant should be allowed a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt
of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration, so as to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules of
Court and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should
be counted.