Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Volume Twenty-three
LUCIAN BLAGA
UNIVERSITY PRESS
December 2014
Contents
25
40
60
77
93
108
Book Reviews
126
127
131
136
Notes on Contributors
140
144
148
De interpretatione recta...
De interpretatione recta...:
Early Modern Theories of Translation
OANA-ALIS ZAHARIA
Dimitrie Cantemir University, Bucharest
Abstract
Translation has been essential to the development of languages and
cultures throughout the centuries, particularly in the early modern period
when it became a cornerstone of the process of transition from Latin to
vernacular productions, in such countries as France, Italy, England and
Spain. This process was accompanied by a growing interest in defining
the rules and features of the practice of translation. The present article
aims to examine the principles that underlay the highly intertextual early
modern translation theory by considering its classical sources and
development. It focuses on subjects that were constantly reiterated in any
discussion about translation: the debate concerning the best methods of
translation, the sense-for-sense/ word-for-word dichotomy a topos that
can be traced to the discourse on translation initiated by Cicero and
Horace and was further developed by the Church fathers, notably St.
Jerome, and eventually inherited by both medieval and Renaissance
translators. Furthermore, it looks at the differences and continuities that
characterise the medieval and Renaissance discourses on translation with
a focus on the transition from the medieval, free manner of translation to
the humanist, philological one.
Keywords: translation studies, early modern theory of translation,
classical translation theory, literal/ word-for-word translation, sense-forsense translation, medieval vs. humanist translation
7 De interpretatione recta...
9 De interpretatione recta...
And supposing that for our part we do not fill the office of a mere
translator, but, while preserving the doctrines of our chosen authorities,
add thereto our own criticism and our own arrangement: what ground have
these objectors for ranking the writings of Greece above compositions that
are once brilliant in style and no mere translations from Greek originals?
Perhaps they will rejoin that the subject has been dealt with by the Greeks
already. But then what reason have they for reading the multitude of Greek
authors either that one has to read? . . . If Greek writers find Greek readers
when presenting the same subjects in a differing setting, why should not
Romans be read by Romans? (Cicero 7-9)
11 De interpretatione recta...
and one of the most important mediators of the Roman writers legacy to
the Christian Middle Ages and the Renaissance. In his Letter 57, To
Pammachius, On the Best Method of Translating, St. Jerome invoked the
authority of both Cicero and Horace to advocate a sense-for-sense method
of translation in the case of non-scriptural texts:
For I myself not only admit but freely proclaim that in translating from the
Greek (except in the case of the holy scriptures where even the order of the
words is a mystery) I render sense for sense and not word for word. . . .
Horace too, an acute and learned writer, in his Art of Poetry gives the
same advice to the skilled translator: And care not with over anxious
thought / To render word for word. (St. Jerome 5)
Like Cicero, St. Jerome equated literalism with utter clumsiness and
claimed that a word-for-word translation rendered the meaning of the text
obscure and betrayed the original:
It is difficult in following lines laid down by others not sometimes to
diverge from them, and it is hard to preserve in a translation the charm of
expressions which in another language are most felicitous. . . . If I render
word for word, the result will sound uncouth, and if compelled by
necessity I alter anything in the order or wording, I shall seem to have
departed from the function of a translator. . . . If any one imagines that
translation does not impair the charm of style, let him render Homer word
for word into Latin . . . and the result will be that the order of the words
will seem ridiculous and the most eloquent of poets scarcely articulate. (5)
13 De interpretatione recta...
but one secured the true meaning of the text; consequently, Greek
originals would no longer be necessary.
All these theoretical assumptions about the best manner of
translating were inherited, though sometimes in an altered and
recontextualized form, by both medieval and Renaissance translators who
founded their own arguments about the art of translation upon the
theoretical precedents of Cicero, Horace, St. Jerome and Boethius.
15 De interpretatione recta...
end of the fourteenth century and the beginning of the fifteenth century
(Morini 8). One of the key texts of the new humanistic learning, published
in the 1420s, was Leonardo Brunis treatise De interpretatione recta, The
Right Way to Translate, which has been considered the first substantial
theoretical statement on translation since St. Jeromes letter to
Pammachius (Copenhaver 82). Bruni was the author of a popular Latin
history of Florence and of the biographies in Latin of Cicero and Aristotle.
He was also the translator into Latin of the Greek works of Plato,
Aristotle, Plutarch, Demosthenes and schines (Burke online).
Driven by the fact that he had been reprimanded for having
criticized the mistakes made by the previous translators of Aristotles
Nicomachean Ethics, Bruni drew a detailed list of the requirements and
qualities of a good translator. Stating that the first condition of a good
translation was that what is written in one language should be well
translated into another (82), Bruni emphasised the importance of
possessing thorough knowledge of the source and target languages and
revealed the methods for attaining such a high level of knowledge.
According to Bruni, a worthy translator must thoroughly read and
assimilate the works of all great philosophers, orators and poets; he has to
internalise them in order to be able to transform himself into the original
author with all his mind, will, and soul (83-84). Moreover, he has to have
a firm grasp of the target language too and be able to dominate it and
hold it entirely into his power (83). Furthermore, the translator should
possess a good ear so that he may be able to identify the harmony and
elegance of the text. Since all good writers combine what they want to
say about things with the art of writing itself, a good translator has to be
prepared to serve both masters (84). As Massimiliano Morini has noted,
the novelty of Brunis treatise resides in the fact that he demanded for
secular translation the same high standards that were commonly reserved
for the translation of the Bible (9).
Unlike previous translators, Bruni attached special importance to
the translators responsibility towards his readers and towards the author
of the original, which is why he felt entitled to censure and reprimand
those translators who made themselves guilty of countless and
unforgivable blunders (84). Given that each writer uses his particular
17 De interpretatione recta...
Erasmus states that he aimed to translate them verse for verse, almost
word for word (60), trying to preserve both the shape and the style of the
Greek poems. Maintaining that in translating the classics I do not
completely approve of that freedom Cicero allows himself and others to
excess, Erasmus strikingly echoes Boethiuss defence of literal
translation: the latter had argued that he preferred to sin through
excessive scrupulousness rather than through excessive license (60).
Juan Luis Vivess Versions or Translations (1531) is informed by
both Ciceros and Leonardo Brunis theories of translation. Vives
addresses several important and recurrent translation issues. First, he
distinguishes between three types of translation and discusses their
particularities: one in which only the sense is rendered, another in which
only the phrasing and the diction are considered, and finally a third in
which both the matter and the words are important, in which words bring
power and elegance to the senses (Vives 50). These three categories
seem to correspondent to the different types of texts translated, although
the categorization of the latter is rather vague. According to Vives, when
translating texts like the speeches of Demosthenes and Cicero, the
translator should attend to the dispositio of the text and the figures of
speech. Noting the inexorable linguistic and stylistic difference between
one language and another, Vives argues, following Cicero and quoting
Quintilian, that, in the case of texts written with only the sense in mind,
the translator should render the text freely and should be allowed to
omit or to add in order to improve the clarity of meaning (50).
Vives also echoes Luthers recently published Open Letter on
Translation (1530)1 which had stressed the idiomatic nature of language
and argued that one should translate as the usage dictated if that helped
the clear representation of meaning:
It is impossible to express the figures of speech and patterns characteristic
of one language in another, even less so when they are idiomatic, and I fail
to see what purpose would be served in admitting solecisms and
barbarisms with the sole aim of representing the sense with as many words
as are used in the original, the way some translations of Aristotle or Holy
Writ have been made. (51)
19 De interpretatione recta...
These first two points represent a reworking of Brunis ideas and reiterate
his insistence on the fact that translators should have perfect knowledge of
the two languages they are using and also understand thoroughly the
meaning and content of the work they are translating. The third point
places Dolet in the camp of those who favoured a sense-for-sense manner
of translation and evokes Horaces characterization of those who translate
word for word as being slavish translators. The fourth point recalls
Luthers and Vivess emphasis on the use of common language and
avoidance of adopting Latin words foolishly or out of reprehensible
curiousness (75). According to Dolet, the import of new words from
Latin and Greek, which are much richer than vernacular languages such as
French, Italian, Spanish or English, should take place only out of sheer
necessity. Still, the best practice remains to follow the common
language (75). The fifth and final rule invokes once more the authority of
Ciceros writings and refers to the observation of elocutio, that is, a
joining and arranging of terms with such sweetness that not alone the soul
is pleased, but also the ear is delighted and never hurt by such harmony of
language (75). Therefore, in order to serve the target language as
devotedly as possible, one has to combine intellectual competence with an
acute awareness of the manner in which the text is translated.
Joachim Du Bellays highly influential Dfense et illustration de la
langue franaise (1549), the manifesto of the famous literary group La
Pliade, constitutes in its turn the adaptation and appropriation of the
discourses on translation of its predecessors, notably Cicero, Bruni, Vives
and Dolet. Remarking on the poor state of the French language by
comparison to the copiousness and richness of Greek and Latin, Du Bellay
pleads for the paramount importance of cultivating the French language
which had been improperly tended to by his ancestors (in Weissbort &
Eysteinsson 77). Stating that translation, although a laudable thing in
itself, is not sufficient to raise the French vernacular to the heights and
elegance of more famous languages, Du Bellay suggests that the Roman
process of appropriating the Greek language and culture by means of
imitation should also be followed by the French men of letters (in
Weissbort & Eysteinsson 78-79). Being an extremely demanding goal, the
process of borrowing and imitating the Greek and Latin language should
be undertaken solely by skilful writers and translators who are able to
follow well the excellent qualities of a good author (79). Echoing both
Bruni and Vives, Du Bellay contends that in order to accomplish this aim
one has to transform oneself so as to penetrate to the secret, innermost
part of an author (in Weissbort & Eysteinsson 79). His insistence on the
attention that should be paid to what and how is being imitated echoes
once more Vives and Dolet, both of whom urged translators not to imitate
foolishly and hastily but responsibly.
All these principles of the humanist translation made their way into
England towards the beginning of the sixteenth century. The influential
presence of two of the most distinguished humanists Erasmus and Juan
Luis Vives2 in the English cultural milieu may have facilitated the
introduction of the humanist translation theories into England. Two of the
leading English translators into Latin, Laurence Humphrey and John
Christopherson, expressed their views on translation in theoretical terms
that were considerably informed by the translation discourse of the earlier
21 De interpretatione recta...
express faithfully the meaning of the text and to render its forms of speech
and harmony by imitating them so that the text should not be greatly
different from the source text (in Weissbort & Eysteinsson 103). The
four rules laid down by Christopherson echo the requirements made by
the earlier Italian and French humanists with their emphasis on rendering
the sense as well as the rhetorical features of the text. In order to support
his defence of the sense-for-sense translation in the case of texts other
than the Scriptures, where the order of the words should be kept due to the
sacredness of the text, Christopherson invokes St. Jeromes authority:
For although in translating the Scriptures the order of the words should be
retained, as St Jerome says, because it is a mystery: yet in the translation
of other Greek writings, on the same authority of Jerome (when he cites
and imitates Cicero), we should translate not word for word, but meaning
for meaning. (in Weissbort & Eysteinsson 103)
Defending his translation of the Bible, Luther makes a strong case for using the
natural and popular language of the common people in translations:
For one need not ask the letters of the Latin language how one ought to
speak German, the way these asses do, rather one should ask the mother in
her house, the children in the streets, the common man in the marketplace,
about it and see by their mouths how they speak, and translate
23 De interpretatione recta...
Works Cited
Binns, J.W. Intellectual Culture in Elizabethan and Jacobean England: The Latin
Writings of the Age. Leeds: Cairns, 1990. Print.
Bruni, Leonardo. On the Correct Way to Translate. Translation/History/
Culture: A Sourcebook. Ed. Andr Lefevere. London: Routledge, 1992.
81-85. Print.
Burke, Edmund. Leonardo Bruni. The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 3. New
York: Appleton, 1908: n.p. Web. 12 Nov. 2014.
Burke, Peter, and Ronnie Po-Chia Hsia, eds. Cultural Translation in Early
Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. Print.
Cicero, Tullius. De finibus bonorum et malorum. Trans. H. Rackham. London:
Heinemann; New York: Macmillan, 1914. Print.
- - -. De Oratore. Translation/History/Culture: A Sourcebook. Ed. Andr
Lefevere. London: Routledge, 1992. 46. Print.
Copeland, Rita. Rhetoric, Hermeneutics and Translation in the Middle Ages.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991. Print.
Copenhaver, Brian P. Translation, Terminology and Style in Philosophical
Discourse. The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy. 6th ed.
Eds. Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner. Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
2003. 75-110. Print.
Cummings, Robert. Recent Studies in English Translation, c. 1520-c. 1590.
English Literary Renaissance 37:2. English Literary Renaissance, 2007.
274-316. Print.
Delabastita, Dirk. If I know the letters and the language: Translation as a
Dramatic Device in Shakespeares Plays. Shakespeare and the Language
of Translation. Ed. Ton Hoenselaars. London: Thomson, 2004. 31-52.
Print.
Dolet, Etienne. The Way to Translate Well from One Language to Another.
Translation Theory and Practice: A Historical Reader. Eds. Daniel
Weissbort and Astradur Eysteinsson. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002. 73-77.
Print.
Erasmus, Desiderius. Letter to WilliamWarham. Translation/History/Culture:
A Sourcebook. Ed. Andr Lefevere. London: Routledge, 1992. 60. Print.
Hermans, Theo. Renaissance Translation between Literalism and Imitation.
Geschichte, System, Literarische bersetzung / Histories, Systems,
Literary Translations. Ed. Harald Kittel. Berlin: Schmidt, 1992. 95-116.
Print.
25 Talk of contracts
Abstract
This essay measures the extent to which gift-giving fails in an economy of
reciprocity. Reading James Joyces story A Mother in terms of
Derridas notion of the gift as absolute loss, I consider the implications
of an economy of loss for Joyces notion of sacrifice. Thus, I argue that
the absence of an economy of sacrifice integrating absolute loss
engenders the zero-sum game at the heart of Dubliners. I depart from
other readings of the short story in the context of an economy based on the
ideal of balanced reciprocity, since these versions deny the pure gratuity
of gift in its connotations of sacrifice and loss. While such theories form a
good starting point for analyzing the moral economy of Dubliners, they
tend to overlook the fact that the only means to counteract the paralysis
resulting from reciprocity is through the suspension of the economy of
exchange.
Keywords: Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, exchange, reciprocity,
paralysis, loss, profit, James Joyce, Dubliners, gift, class, usury
27 Talk of contracts
is work for nothing, work that unworks itself in the very performance of
the work. It is work that interrupts itself in the very working of the work
(129). However, agape is also spontaneous enjoyment of the work without
expectation of a reward (130). If spontaneous enjoyment is one of the
prerequisites of the gift, Mrs Kearneys positing the gift in contractual
terms kills the enjoyment. Enjoyment, as well as gift and sacrifice, is a
form of absence. Contract is a kind of presence the illusion of a
presence, in fact, given that return is not possible.
As Robert Bernasconi notes in The Logic of the Gift, for Derrida
what defines the gift is its difference from the object of exchange (256),
while for Levinas, gift is defined in terms of work, and work as departure
with no return (258). In opposition to Derridas notion, pure
expenditure or loss is not to be equated with gift as work, because the
goal of good works is to acquire merit. Good works oriented toward a
specific goal amount to work losing its absolute goodness. Gift, for
Levinas and Derrida, is gift only insofar as it is an interruption of order. In
this vein, Bernasconi talks about the interruptive logic of the gift:
Exchange, circulation and rationality are interrupted by the gift (259). A
gift without obligation or duty is differentiated from exchange the pure
morality that exceeds all calculation.
In reading A Mother as a break in the system of giving, one notes
that Mrs Kearneys giving is inscribed in a contractual, restricted
economy, centered around scarcity, in Georges Batailles terms, in which
lavish expenditure of time, energy and money is made with the
expectation of symbolic profit in return. Thus, the utilitarian end becomes
a mark of status, class and power, since power is exercised by the classes
that expend (120). On a scale of nobility of spending, gift giving ranks
high because it seeks to name a certain transgression of the limits of
economic reason itself (Shershow 83).
As a means of pointing out the different forms of giving
hypostasized by Mrs Kearneys investment, it might help to read the story
in four different stages. At only one of these stages does investment have
the potential (though it remains a missed opportunity) to be sacrificial, and
thus truly a gift. The first stage of the story focuses on the restricted
economy of exchange in the name of profit. Although the story forms a
29 Talk of contracts
31 Talk of contracts
33 Talk of contracts
variants of the exchange continuum: the ideal of pure charity (which is,
however, merely generalized reciprocity and gift exchange) and the
pragmatic medium of balanced reciprocity, in which each party gets equal
value from the other through the negative extreme of economic
exploitation (158). Neither of these variants implies the pure gratuity of
gift in its connotations of sacrifice or loss. Loss recalls the motif of
absence or interruption of the geometrical regularity of the gnomon,
indicating that the only means to counteract the paralysis resulting from
reciprocity is through the suspension of the exchange economy.
The paralysis at the core of Dublin is tightly connected not only to a
system of credit but to its inability to forego the strict equivalence of debt
and payment and thus to incur conscious and intentional loss that breaks
the equivalence. In A Mother, not just Mrs Kearney, but everyone else
functions by this strict equivalence of debt and payment that results in a
zero-sum game, the trope of which is the contract. The written contract is
an illusory attempt to contain the uncontrollable shiftiness of postagreement negotiations inherent in oral contracts. Joyce condemns usury
in Dubliners precisely because he is aware of the ills of a system of
exchange based on debtorship. Financial creditorship is a form of
incubism, in Osteens words, where the oppressive conditions of
debtorship end in obligation and poverty (158).
In a Bakhtinian reading of the story, Kershner draws attention to
Mrs Kearneys nominalism. For her, the language of the contract must be
the guarantor of its reality (129). She adheres to the illusion that the
reality outside her careful arrangements will be constrained by her staunch
belief in linguistic literalism (129) and its magical power to contain the
slipperiness of its own signifiers. (After all, the contract as we know it, not
having access to its exact wording, stipulates that Kathleen must play the
accompaniment for four concerts, and does not anticipate, through a
special clause, the consequences of one of the four concerts suspension.)
When spoken contracts enter into conflict with unspoken assumptions,
reciprocity results in the economic impossibility of a norm set up in order
to be breached. Mrs Kearneys view of the explicit contract is not
immediately obvious to everyone. For example, when presented with the
case, Mr Fitzpatrick did not catch the point at issue very quickly (Joyce
35 Talk of contracts
countered by the ones that sing well, and in the end the audience is
content. The verbal exchange between Mrs Kearney and Mr Holohan is
perfectly symmetrical, and so is the outcome. The lady gets the exact
payment for her daughters efforts (the equivalent of the two concerts for
which Kathleen played the accompaniment) and the gentleman gets public
approval for the way he has handled the matter, along with the satisfaction
of having won the case against an obstreperous woman. The rule
governing this world is expressed by the baritone, who remarks that he
can be at peace with all men once he has been paid his money (Joyce
147).
If in Dubliners all exchange depends on a psychic balance sheet,
the subjects constant negotiation between sacrifice and gain (Mickalites
123), this same exchange also works out a simulacrum of community
constructed on a system of mutual dependency. As previously shown, Mrs
Kearney is not the only one who operates in contractual terms. The entire
community is structured around the notion of perfect symmetrical
exchange. However, a community structured on exchange propagates a
model that legitimizes competition and, ultimately, domination.
Therefore, domination, along with the impossibility of perfect reciprocity
in exchange prevents the formation of a healthy community. And even
though reciprocity dictates a balanced exchange according to which each
party should receive an equal value, in practice this difficult ideal
becomes a norm that puts a strain on social behavior. As a mother, then,
Mrs Kearneys mission is to ensure a zero balance of her world, which
rests upon respecting the letter of the contract. Ironically, of course, she
does it at the expense of her daughters musical career. That reciprocity
does not fulfill its promise but, even worse, results in perpetual loss,
frustration, and deprivation, is simply in accord with the human condition
in a Dublin susceptible to decay, loss and deprivation.
Reciprocity as norm is reminiscent of Derridas aversion toward a
preconceived program or set of rules that undermine the unrequitability of
the gift. Reciprocity as the aim of exchange, similarly, paralyzes the event
of the gift, precisely because it tends to behave according to
predetermined rules and expectations, leaving no room for the event to
arrive, to come to pass: The moment the gift, however generous it be, is
infected with the slightest hint of calculation, the moment it takes account
of knowledge or recognition, it falls within the ambit of an economy: it
exchanges, in short it gives counterfeit money, since it gives in exchange
for payment (112). This is yet another reason for which Mr Kearney,
who has abstract value as male and is presented as an institution, large,
secure and fixed (Joyce 141), is rendered absolutely ineffectual. Mrs
Kearney attempts to totalize the unexpected, to leave no room for the
event of the gift to take place. This constant need to institutionalize human
connections by forcing them into a quid pro quo relationship results in the
perverse characteristic of Joyces Dublin: balanced reciprocity seldom
occurs, and gift-giving itself is subject to distortions by inequalities of
power. To break the paralyzing symmetry of exchange, the system must
suspend the straight-jacket circularity of payback, of giving and giving
back, of the one lent for every one borrowed, of that hateful form of
circulation that involves reprisal, vengeance, returning blow for blow,
settling scores (Osteen 102). Derridas economy of the gift that integrates
absolute loss is the equivalent of Montaignes economy of absolute
friendship that [loses] with truth, for it leaves nothing that is ones own,
given that economic bonds are undesirable in human interaction
(Montaigne qtd. in Epstein 252). In friendship, Montaigne argues, there is
no exchange of currency or goods because true friends cannot lend or
give anything to one another (Epstein 253). And if there is a kind of
giving, it is a giving that doesnt take away, but gives (Epstein 253), so
that it would be the giver who is obliged to the receiver for the gift of
receiving.
If the object/gift is the trace of the benevolent intention behind the
gift (the intention itself amounting to the gift), then Mrs Kearney is not
making a gift of her services at all, because her intention is not to give, but
to receive. In this case, the contract is, in extremis, undermined by the fact
that she is offering an empty gift, emptied of its beneficent intention. She
is offering a commodity in a competitive exchange game, in a struggle
between the defeated and the victorious (150), so that she ends up being
more a usurer than a donor, where the usurer is defined as a false donor,
a simulated benefactor, who acts as if he is giving, even though he
calculates and anticipates a return (149). As a false donor, Mrs Kearney
37 Talk of contracts
treads the fine line between donor and usurer. She pretends she sacrifices
a little extra out of generosity, while all the time calculating, at the back of
her mind, the extent to which her generosity will increase the return.
Ultimately, there is no intentionality of pure giving and more tragically
even, there is no space for the concretization of that intentionality either.
That intention never existed in the first place.1
Mrs. Kearneys innovation (or rather, perversity) is to have made
the intention itself into a commodity and to give it a computable,
calculable value. Jean-Joseph Goux defines intention as good will, an
invisible meaning concerning the soul (155). It is also interesting to note
the way Mrs Kearney is caught up in the materiality of beneficence, in the
fact that the gift represents the material sign of the intention. Trapped in
the sign and unable to get to the signified she cannot reach beyond the
material aspect of generosity. The material aspect of the intention, devoid
of sacrifice, is mere commodity, perfectly fitted to be quantified into the
logic of the market, or the usurer, and the exchange mechanism; the
excess of the intention, the soul of the gift, the signified, would upset the
reciprocity and would make return perfect circularity and symmetry
impossible, because there would never be a perfect return for the bodiless,
soul-like intention. The object-gift without the intention becomes, thus,
computable, and perfectly fit for exchange. When Mrs Kearney invests in
additional services and goods beyond the stipulation of the contract,
apparently out of beneficence, she has already calculated both the value of
the material gift/investment and that of her intention, of her volunteering
to go beyond the contract. Thus she takes no chances, and she ensures the
full length of her return. Having gone beyond the letter of the contract,
having sacrificed, she is going to get the return stipulated in the
contract, at the least, along with the satisfaction of putting her contractor
in debt; at the most, she will enjoy social recognition in addition to the
financial rewards. If there is an incalculable for Mrs Kearney, it is not the
incalculable that comes from the gift, loss, generosity, but from the
potential surplus, the surprise return that might exceed the expected return
and thus pleasantly thwart her initial calculations. In this case, Mrs
Kearney turns the Derridean incalculable on its head. The surplus,
unexpected gain becomes the site of perverse eventfulness of inverse
generosity. Mrs Kearney, however, has made the wrong bet, and she ends
up incurring both spiritual and material loss from the symmetric
exchange.
Finally, what she has completely missed is not her return, not even
the satisfaction of having made a gift, incurred a loss, feeling beneficent
or generous but something much more extensive that goes beyond her
and Kathleen and accounts for the paralysis: the encounter with the other.
Essentially paradoxical, the gifts only raison dtre is its orientation
toward the other. If gratitude mostly occurs on the level of the good will
(bona voluntas) as is generated from a well-disposed soul, then it is no
longer possible to lose . . . in an exchange of gifts (Goux 156). Giving
that is expected to return upon itself and its donor, circumscribed into a
mechanism of exchange, misses the relationship with the other and
ultimately the encounter with the self, which is only possible through
mediation. Moreover, Mrs Kearney is not paralyzed first and foremost in
her relationship with the others, alienated from her daughter and husband
as well as the rest of the artists but in her relationship with, and
understanding of, herself. Perhaps that accounts for her and her worlds
paralysis and inhibition: one can only give what one has oneself and
yet one cannot acquire ones self without the intermediation of otherness.
Because she does not have a self, Mrs Kearney is unable to give; because
she is unable to give, Mrs Kearney does not have a self. The ability to
give is thus akin to the desire for the other.
Note:
1
In Violence Slavoj Zizek talks about the catch of envy/resentment that not
only endorses the zero-sum game principle where my victory equals the others
loss (88-89) but it also implies a gap between the two, which is not a positive
gap (we can all win with no losers at all), but a negative one. If one has to choose
between ones gain and ones opponents loss, one prefers the opponents loss,
even if the loss is universal. It is as if the opponents eventual gain cancels out
ones own success. Zizeks illustration of the Slovene peasant who chooses the
option of resentment and personal loss, if it also involves the loss of his neighbor,
resembles the resolution of the contractual exchange between Mrs Kearney and
Mr Holohan, in which the former prefers to incur loss rather than allow for the
inequality of gain. In a more radical sense, in Violence Zizek discusses the
39 Talk of contracts
phenomenon in which the loss is absolute both to others and to self. Referring to
Higgs field, Zizek explains:
There are, however, phenomena which compel us to posit the hypothesis
that there has to be something (some substance) that we cannot take away
from a given system without RAISING that systems energy this
something is called the Higgs field: once this field appears in a vessel
that has been pumped empty and whose temperature has been lowered as
much as possible, its energy will be further lowered. The something
which thus appears is a something that contains less energy than nothing.
In short, sometimes zero is not the cheapest state of a system, so that,
paradoxically, nothing costs more than something. (213)
Works Cited
Bataille, Georges. Visions of Excess. Ed. and trans. Allan Stoekl. Minneapolis: U
of Minnesota P, 1985. Print.
Bernasconi, Robert. What Goes Around Comes Around: Derrida and Levinas on
the Economy of the Gift and the Gift of Genealogy. The Logic of the Gift.
Toward an Ethic of Generosity. Ed. Alan D. Schrift. New York:
Routledge, 1997. Print.
Booker, Keith. Ulysses, Capitalism and Colonialism: Reading Joyce after the
Cold War. Connecticut: Greenwood P, 2000. Print.
Derrida, Jacques. The Gift of Death. Trans. David Wills. Chicago: U Chicago P,
1995. Print.
Epstein, Nancy. Montaignes Essays. Metaphors of Capital and Exchange. The
New Economic Criticism. Ed. Martha Woodmansee and Mark Osteen.
New York: Routledge, 1999. Print.
Goux, Jean-Joseph. Seneca against Derrida: Gift and Alterity. The Enigma of
Gift and Sacrifice. Ed. E. Wyschogrod, J. Goux, and E. Boynton. New
York: Fordham UP, 2002. Print.
Joyce, James. A Mother. Dubliners. New York: Penguin, 1996. 136-149. Print.
Keenan, Dennis. The Question of Sacrifice. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2005.
Print.
Kershner, Brandon. Joyce, Bakhtin, and Popular Literature. Chapel Hill: U of
North Carolina P, 1989. Print.
Mickalites, Carey. Dubliners IOU: The Aesthetics of Exchange in After the
Race and Two Gallants.Journal of Modern Literature 30.2 (2007):
121-38. U of Florida. MLA International Bibliography. Print.
Osteen, Mark. The Economy of Ulysses. New York: Syracuse UP, 1995. Print.
Shershow, Scott Cutler. The Work & the Gift. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2005.
Print.
Zizek, Slavoj. Violence. New York: Picador, 2008. Print.
40
Abstract
This article, which brings together film, psychoanalysis, literature, and art,
focuses on the role of paintings in Martin Scorseses The Age of
Innocence (1993). Scorsese conveys the imprisonment of New York
aristocrats within the framework of social conventions and their evasions
of social restrictions through his employment of paintings. Because the
protagonists emotions are not revealed often, the director communicates
their dramas and actions with the help of the paintings they own or appear
next to. The paintings operate as Jacques Lacans Other, an entity that
watches over the characters to make sure they conform to its selfperpetuating rules. Scorseses use of paintings shows that the characters
perform for the Other and seek to maintain the status quo. While most
characters perform within a Lacanian symbolic order, their different
responses to a variety of paintings underscore the flexibility of the
symbolic order.
Keywords: Martin Scorsese, Jacques Lacan, Edith Wharton, The Age of
Innocence, adaptation, the Other, symbolic order, gaze, paintings,
performance, desire
significant change over the years. Archers son shows that the social
etiquette in his symbolic order differs from his fathers, who remains
frozen in his, a detail which indicates a historically-layered symbolic
order.
For Lacan, the mirror stage represents a fundamental moment in the
structure of subjectivity and the formation of the ego. The idealized image
in the mirror of the child, source of further identifications, produces a
contrast with his fragmented and uncoordinated body. The complete,
unified, and, more importantly, illusionary specular image triggers a
quixotic quest for an unattainable goal. Understanding that he cannot
reconcile the fragmented image with the unified one, the subject realizes
he is split. The symbolic dimension follows the mirror stage and refers to
the childs connection to language. After the moment of jubilation, the
child turns his head to the big Other, the adult (possibly the mother), and
asks her to acknowledge the image in the mirror. The Father, the symbol
of authority, blocks the childs free access to the mother and lays down
the law through language. This interdiction does not refer only to mothers;
in The Age of Innocence, for instance, the societal rules interdict the love
between Ellen Olenska (Michelle Pfeiffer) and Newland Archer because
he is engaged and she is his fiances cousin.
While the symbolic order is the realm of language and law, it also
encompasses the Other, a Lacanian concept that is difficult to define, yet
significant to the subjects entire life and development under the symbolic
order and, in this case, to Scorseses use of paintings. The Other
transcends the otherness of the imaginary and the mirror stage because it
resists identification. Instead, the Other represents the symbolic order and
becomes the site where speech occurs: the Other must first of all be
considered a locus, the locus in which speech is constituted (Psychoses
274). The subject has to learn from scratch the speech and law of the
Other when he enters the symbolic world; during this learning process, the
subject is shaped by the rules of the Other. A short comparison between
Archer and Beaufort reveals how the rules of the Other influence the
subject(s). While Archer belongs to an old family of gentlemen and
aristocrats, Beaufort only passes as a gentleman because he climbs the
social ladder through his intrepid business flair. Although the film does
not deal with these two mens upbringing, their different attitudes vis vis
conformity to social etiquettes uncover their association with different
families of the Other.
Although Lacan posits that the Other . . . is already there (Four
Fundamental Concepts 130), the Other loses its meaning and function if
the subject is absent. For instance, the Other without a subject is like a
theater stage with no actors. The subject personalizes the Other and makes
it present and active. Out of all the signifiers from the chain of signifiers,
only those significant to a subject will constitute the Other. The subject
could select his own group of the Other. In the film, Regina Beaufort
marries a rich businessman who is not an aristocrat; by accepting this new
social position, she changes both her chain of signifiers and her
husbands. When Regina Beaufort asks Mrs. Mingott to use her influence
and save Julius Beauforts honor, the matriarch refuses: But my name,
Auntie. My names Regina Townsend. And I [Mrs. Mingott] said, Your
name was Beaufort when he covered you with jewels, and its got to stay
Beaufort now that hes covered you with shame (The Age of Innocence).
Clearly, Regina chose to belong to a category of the Other different from
her familys. Scorsese neither introduces nor describes the historical
lineage of families such as Townsend or Beaufort; these families function
as a historical system that perpetuates itself and enforces rules and laws
even when the Other is absent or, as Lacan would say, inexistent.
Lacan writes a whole chapter on pictures in his study The Four
Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, a chapter which could explain
Scorseses use of paintings in his film and the subjects who gaze at them.
While the subject gazes at a painting, the painting gazes back at the
subject. Thus, the self-reflexive qualities of the gaze place viewers under
scrutiny as well. Because the objects or the subjects of the gaze return the
gaze, viewers become conscious of their own active contribution to what
they see. They look back at what they have seen, accept their role as
viewers, and place themselves and the object of their gaze on display. The
paintings that Scorsese chose to depict allude to a certain order, the
symbolic order in Lacanian terms, which they impose on the viewers
through their gaze. Thus, the Other represented in some of the paintings
from The Age of Innocence does not remain an inert Other or a set of
rigorous symbolic rules that wait for a subject to follow them, but it
becomes an active entity. Whereas this fluid entity imposes a set of rules,
its gaze also supervises that these rules are obeyed by the viewers. In this
way, the paintings stand both as the law and as law enforcers.
Other critics who have analyzed the role of painting in film such as
Brigitte Peucker and Angela Dalle Vacche have explored connections
between film and art. Examining film against its rival arts like painting
and literature, Peucker focuses on the human body, one fragmented by
close-ups to the extent to which the film itself becomes a fissured text
[that] brings with it an underlying fear of castration and of death (4).
Dalle Vacche contends that intertextuality and borrowing images from art
history function in two ways: either film is plagued by a cultural
inferiority complex and therefore obsessively cites other art forms, or it is
self-confident enough to move beyond this state of dependency and arrive
at the point where it can teach something new to art historians (3). I hope
to prove that the paintings in The Age of Innocence achieve the latter of
Dalle Vacches predictions. Not only do the paintings Scorsese uses or
borrows from Whartons novel reveal the intricate rules of New York
aristocracy, but they also guide its owners or viewers into following these
strict rules. Thus, the paintings become texts open to interpretation, and, at
the same time provide contexts in which viewers understand certain
characters and their relationships with New York society.
The paintings represent a medium which immortalizes the societal
rules of the Other for the subjects who have to obey them. The film
emphasizes different sets of paintings present in various New York
households and associates them with different characters who follow the
rules of the Other to a greater or lesser extent. New York aristocrats,
whose houses abound in family portraits, are more likely to reinforce old
rules and traditions; conversely, those households with more modern art
apply the rules of the Other more loosely. In many respects, the Other
resembles a script that guides the acts of performers such as Ellen, May,
and Newland. Ellen understands that New York society accepts her only if
she changes her performance to fit the New York elite Other; her
endeavor to renounce her independent way of living and the paintings on
her walls eventually fails. On the other hand, Mays performance vis vis
the script is consummate so that she becomes the script. Her framed photo
that shows her shooting with a bow and arrow and her hands modeled in
Paris dominate the Archers living room and dictate her rules over the
years. However, Newlands conflict revolves around his desperate
attempts to see himself as a whole in the mirror, an ideal possible only
with Ellens help, or to adhere to traditional rules. Although he cares
immensely about paintings, his performance does not escape the
conventions put forth in most of the paintings from New York households.
Interestingly, at the end of the film and after Mays performance and
death, Scorsese chooses different paintings for Archer and rearranges the
pieces of furniture in his house to suggest that the symbolic order of old
New York is alterable in time and susceptible to modification.
Nevertheless, old New Yorkers like Newland cannot adapt to a new set of
rules that, for example, his son Ted sets forth and remain frozen into
their adopted symbolic order.
Scorsese underlines the obsessive presence of the Other through
portraits that dominate the majority of the scenes with Archer at the
beginning of the film. Archer becomes more dignified in rooms with
portraits on walls because social etiquette and the inquisitorial gaze of the
Other require appropriate conduct. Whenever Scorsese places Archer
outside portraits and rigid rules namely, in scenes where Ellen Olenska is
present as well, he moves and speaks more freely and naturally because he
tries to find himself as a whole. His alienation and sense of estrangement
disappear when Ellen accompanies him.
When gentlemen, such as fellow lawyers or New York aristocrats,
accompany Archer, his behavior vis vis societal rules is impeccable. In
these situations, Scorsese shows Archer in drawing rooms, libraries, and
offices with many portraits of serious men and women who gaze gravely
at him. The room where Newland, Mrs. Archer, Janey, and Mr. Sillerton
Jackson dine is full of framed portraits of the Archer family ancestors on
the wall; the men and women in the portraits gaze suspiciously at the
people sitting at the table as if checking them out. Scorsese adds another
frame to the characters sitting at the table to suggest their imprisonment in
their own world and their incapacity to get out of the rules of the Other;
each character is framed by two candlesticks that delineate the space
link Ellen to the mirror stage. Scorseses depiction of her invites Archer to
investigate her face to face (like in the mirror) as if to recognize his Ideal-I
and identify with her. Both in Boston and at her house, Ellen appears right
after Archer scrutinizes her faceless paintings to participate in his
moments of happiness. Scorsese shows the jubilation associated to the
mirror stage, namely, the subjects feeling of whole constituted from all
the fragmented parts, with scenes where Archer venerates Ellen. Archer
kisses her hand, leg, neck, shoe, glove, or umbrella as if trying to arrange
together her body in one whole piece. Moreover, his love and euphoria at
the sight of Ellens body or its substitutes speak about his jubilatory
moment.2
Lacans mirror stage presupposes this moment of jubilation when
the Ideal-I is formed in the mirror; the subject and his reversed totalizing
image in the mirror lead to jubilation. A reversed image in Newlands
mirror (at least from a gender perspective) is Ellen. Scorsese punctuates
further this moment of jubilation by placing Newland and Ellen in the
center of the frame, silencing the voiceover and sometimes the music, and
isolating them from the other members of society. In doing that, Scorsese
creates a mirror stage effect as he underscores Archers and Olenksas
presence on the screen as subject and his own image. Their rendezvous
usually take place in rooms or open spaces that do not contain somber
portraits present in Mrs. Archers, van der Luydens, and Letterblairs
houses or anything else that may remind them of the Other. Isolating
Archer and Ellen on screen from the rest of New York society at the opera
or presenting them in enclosed spaces such as the carriage, Scorsese
emphasizes Archers moment of jubilation at his identification with his
ideal-I, Olenska. In the second scene at the opera, Scorsese uses lightening
to set them apart from the other spectators in the opera booth who remain
in darkness. The lovers enjoy these moments of privacy Scorsese provides
that are also moments of happiness and jubilation for Newland. Ellens
energetic and lively personality has a benefic effect on Archer who is
more relaxed and jocular around her.
The end of the film, however, finds Archer contemplating Ellens
windows thirty years after the symbolic order and the Other took over the
idealization of his mirror stage. When the promise of a mirror stage or
above and focuses on her dress; the voiceover explains that It was the
custom, in old New York, for brides to appear in their wedding dress
during the first year or two of marriage. But May had not worn her
bridal satin until this evening (The Age of Innocence). May wears her
wedding dress on this particular evening because she marries Archer for
the second time; at the opera, she celebrates her pregnancy and her victory
over Ellen Olenska. May subverts the patriarchal order by applying and
respecting the patriarchal rules and values; dressed as a bride, she
blackmails Archer and Ellen with her pregnancy. Although Mays dress is
altered by time and her soon-to-be pregnant figure, it represents
conventionality and commitment two values that patriarchy cherishes.
Miming conventionality, May disrupts it and becomes unconventional.
Villasur points out that Mays wedding dress is an impossible symbol in
itself: As a marker both of virginity and of Mays status as a newly
married woman, the bridal satin reveals the contradictory construction of
the female body in the Victorian society (Textures 86). Her white dress
becomes a symbol whose meaning is arbitrary; Mays unreadability and
whiteness stand for the literal signifier of the blankness her body and dress
deliver.
When Ellen leaves, Newland becomes aware of Mays performance
and of her connection to the community of the Other. Acting in
accordance with New Yorks conventions concerning marriage, May
wants Newland to choose between her and his mistress. This choice calls
to mind the example Lacan gives, which undermines the subjects
choices: Your money or your life! If I choose money, I lose both. If I
choose life, I have life without the money, namely a life deprived of
something (Four Fundamental Concepts 212). Choosing a life deprived
of love, Newland feels alienated and lonely. Interpreting Lacans
sentence, Paul Verhaeghe argues that the subject is divided between the
necessary loss of its own being on the one hand and the ever alienating
meaning in the Other on the other hand (176). Choosing the Other, the
result will be an ever more clear delineation of this loss (Verhaeghe
176).
After it becomes clear that Newland cannot join Ellen in Europe,
Scorsese depicts his life under the symbolic order and the gaze of the
Other. The camera pans slowly around the Newlands drawing room
showing each portrait, piece of furniture, or home decoration. The focus
on Mays photo in her archery costume and the marble sculpture of her
hands signal her presence in the room and in Newlands life even after her
death. A new generation is born in this very room, which relates directly
or more loosely to May and Newlands rules. Their son, Theodore, is
baptized in their drawing room under the gazes of his family members and
of the family portraits, while their daughter, Mary, announces her
engagement in this room. Mary follows more closely the rules of the
Other and marries the dullest and most reliable of Larry Lefferts many
sons. Ted, on the other hand, defies the rules of the Other in his family
and gets engaged with Julius Beauforts and Annie Rings daughter,
Annie, whose relatives were the favorite subjects of gossip in Old New
York.
As an architect, Ted redecorates the Archers drawing room and
replaces many of the family portraits and the furniture with more modern
furnishings. He also offers his father the unique chance to rebuild his life
by inviting him to Paris and to Madame Olenskas apartment. All these
changes demonstrate that Ted Archer adheres to another community of the
Other, different from his parents. His progressive way of life also
underscores the flexibility of the symbolic order which changes along
with its signifiers. While his son disregards old traditions, Newland
remains anchored in a rigid symbolic order that reinforces Mays
community of the Other. Like May, whose world of her youth had fallen
into pieces and rebuilt itself, Newland remains an old-fashioned
gentleman who is unable to embrace the worlds rebuilding. Responding
to his community of the Other, he chooses not to visit Madame Olenska.
Like many of the contemporary adaptations, Martin Scorseses The
Age of Innocence renders and intensifies the subtleties of its source text,
Edith Whartons 1920 novel. Scorseses visual adaptation of Old New
York aristocracy reveals his insistence on form and dcor; he envelops the
rapports between characters into rigorous etiquettes, opulent dinners,
luxurious furniture, and paintings. Scorseses use of paintings illuminates
the characters relations to the rules of their society; each New York
family owns a different set of paintings through which they impose certain
George Castellitto believes that some of the paintings that depict women,
actually serve to highlight the control that the women in the film either exert or
to which they succumb (26).
2
Kathy Hadley argues for Newlands blindness and inability to cope with reality
and contends that while he becomes obsessed with Ellens story, he has almost
no curiosity about his wifes (267).
3
The static shot of Ellens silhouette against a glorious sunset, luminous water,
golden lighthouse, and passing ship fuses actual perception with visual
convention; the frame itself turns into a canvas (Villasur, Classic Adaptations
12). Thus, Ellen is not going to turn around because Newland wants to preserve
her fictional, static image.
Works Cited
Castellitto, George. Imagism and Martin Scorsese: Images Suspended and
Extended. Literature Film Quarterly 26 (1998): 23-30. Print.
Hadley, Kathy Miller. Ironic Structure and Untold Stories in The Age of
Innocence. Studies in the Novel 2 (1991): 262-72. Print.
Lacan, Jacques. The Psychoses 1955-1956: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book
III. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Trans. Russell Grigg. New York: Norton,
1993. Print.
60
Abstract
Masculinity as a notion encompasses a number of identities, including
psychic and social ones. During the late Victorian and early Edwardian
period, masculinity as a construct underwent many changes, which
affected notions of work, property ownership, sexuality, as well as power
struggle with men-rivals and women. The concept of manliness became
a new moral code as well as a social imperative. Embracing this ideal was
a challenging and testing experience for many men as they negotiated
power, privilege and status in both the private and the public spheres of
life. The Edwardian age, a transitional time in British history, became
preoccupied with the consequences of the Boer Wars, gender formation,
imperial policy, economic changes and many other factors. This article
explores the paradigms of English masculinity and the construction of
male identity as a cultural signifier in Arthur Conan Doyles novel The
Hound of the Baskervilles and its Russian film adaptation by Igor
Maslennikov. Doyle contextualizes multiple facets of masculinity from
the normative to the transgressive, from the private to the public, as well
as from the effeminate to the manly as his characters are affected by the
anxieties and tensions of their society. After an in-depth analysis of
manhood in the novel, the focus of the article shifts to Maslennikovs
adaptation and its cinematic use of the literary text, as the film
interrogates masculine codes of behavior, relationships with women and
the male power struggle represented in the novel. The film becomes a
visual interpretation and a powerful enhancement of the narratives
tensions and concerns.
masculine identity (3). In the personal drama of many men, the social
drama of the age becomes illuminated in many works of fiction.
Arthur Conan Doyles The Hound of the Baskervilles (1901-02)
questions the codes of masculinity and English identity not only through
the characters of Sherlock Holmes and his companion Dr. John Watson,
but also through Sir Henry Baskerville, Jack Stapleton, Selden and other
characters. The inheritance of the Baskervilles estate is at the center of
the male power struggle. Unlike in the Victorian age, in the early
Edwardian period mens conduct was no longer governed by the
importance of ones rank, as the hereditary rank system gave way to one
in which economic factors were prevalent. Economic, social and political
changes determined status and authority codes for many men. When Sir
Charles Baskerville dies in the moors, not only is the inheritance of the
Baskerville Hall is at stake, but also the concept of the gentleman. The
estate goes to the young Sir Henry Baskerville, the Baronet, who arrives
from farming in Canada: there was something in his steady eye and the
quiet assurance of his bearing which indicated the gentleman (31, my
emphasis). The gentleman is a contested form of masculinity, and the
ideologies of chivalry and of the gentleman, negotiated in everything
from Idylls of the King to Great Expectations, contributed to the formation
of manliness, notes Joseph Kestner in Sherlocks Men (16). Aside from
the social component, more importantly, a gentleman remains a moral
ideal open to all who prove themselves worthy, suggests James Adams
(42). The Edwardian gentleman is defined not by birth but by conduct, it
is essential to separate a true gentleman from someone who just plays the
role of a gentleman (such as Stapleton in Doyles novel). A gentleman
commits to a life of work, displays devotion to a code of duty, to ones
family and country, and exhibits self-discipline and self-consciousness.
Seen at first as a foreigner, Sir Henry, nevertheless, is a gentleman who
possesses physical fortitude and moral integrity.
The Hound of the Baskervilles constitutes, according to Joseph
Kestner, a distillation of the Edwardian mind by demonstrating the
effects of the history of masculinity persisting to the modern age, from Sir
Hugo Baskerville to his descendant Sir Henry (Sherlocks Men 130). The
young Baronet is a thoroughly English man, a descendant of that long
line of high-blooded, fiery, and masterful men. There were pride, valor,
and strength in his thick brows, his sensitive nostrils, and his large hazel
eyes. . . . [he] was at least a comrade for whom one might venture to take
a risk with the certainty that he would bravely share it (Doyle 55-56). Sir
Henry possesses not only physical self-reliance but also moral integrity,
comradeship and bravery. Sir Henry indeed exemplifies the familiar
concept of manliness, including discipline, duty to England and Empire,
physical prowess and stamina, generosity of spirit and overall selfimprovement.
In the novel, Sir Henry is presented as a mature, strong, industrious
and brave man, very different from the double-faced Jack Stapleton, the
son of Rodger Baskerville, Sir Charless brother, a small, slim, cleanshaven, prim-faced man, flaxen-haired and lean-jawed (Doyle 64). He is
described by Watson as a naturalist, a creature of infinite patience and
craft, with a smiling face and a murderous heart (Doyle 19, 124).
Stapleton possesses secrets and undergoes a number of metamorphoses
similar to the butterflies he collects: after returning to England, he
acquires a new identity, changes his name to Vandeleur and becomes an
entomologist. His dark past fits his ancestors: Sir Hugo imprisons a
woman for his own pleasure and is later destroyed by the Hound.
Significantly, an animal in turn becomes a manifestation of human
aggression and violence. Critic Paul Ferguson suggests that Stapleton is
the reincarnation of the dead Sir Hugo down to the physical
resemblance (28). The villain Stapleton indeed becomes Hugo
Baskervilles throwback . . . both physical and spiritual (Doyle 138).
His atrocious crimes include murder, burglary and even incest. By
contrast, Sir Henry plans to modernize Baskerville Hall, bringing a row
of electric lamps and using the innovative power of Swan and Edison
(Doyle 58). He is the possibility for the amoral and villainous
Baskervilles to correct their defective predispositions to criminality, abuse
of authority and aberrant sexuality, suggests Joseph Kestner (Sherlocks
Men 123). Sir Henry as the heir is capable not only of modernizing the
estate but also of restoring Baskerville Hall to its moral stability and social
progress.
established when Sir Henry inherits the estate; however, his nervous
breakdown forces him to take a long journey . . . for the restoration of his
shattered nerves (Doyle 156). The status of an aristocrat cannot protect
Sir Henry and free him completely from the errors of his ancestors;
however, the hope of the young aristocracy restoring the stability of
masculinity, social order and English identity glimmers at the end of the
novel.
Women complicate the construction of masculinity in the novel;
they become simultaneously victimized and destructive. Sir Charles is
attacked and killed by the Hound when he goes to meet a woman. Mrs.
Barrymore, a heavy, solid person, . . . [with] . . . traces of . . . some deep
sorrow [that] gnaws . . . at her heart (Doyle 80), is related to the criminal
Selden. She almost kills Sir Henry when her brother dressed in Sir
Henrys clothes is attacked on the moor. Another woman, Miss Stapleton,
known as Beryl Garcia, is controlled by her husband Stapleton with no
reference to the ladys own wishes (Doyle 88). Dr. Watson immediately
sees her as exotic; therefore, as a foreign Other, she cannot be trusted:
she was darker than any brunette . . . in England. . . . There is something
tropical and exotic about her (Doyle 70, 76). Even when Beryl tries to
save Sir Henry, she is in turn, as Doyle puts it, tied up by her husband
(164). Finally, Laura Lyons, a woman of equivocal reputation (Doyle
106), is persecuted by the ruthless husband she cannot free herself from;
later she becomes Stapletons mistress as he promises her help but in fact
has lied to [her] in every conceivable way (Doyle 142). She may hold
the power of words being a typist but she becomes a tool in [a mans]
hands (Doyle 142). Female characters reveal the power of male
authority: they suffer physical and emotional abuse from men and at the
same time threaten and destabilize codes of masculinity. Women, with
their potential for being transgressive and dangerous, add to the anxieties
felt by men. Men dominate the narrative in The Hound of the Baskervilles
and function better without the company of women.
The narrative structure itself suggests the construction of masculine
identity in the novel. In a first person narrative, Dr. Watson frames the
story by retelling the events of first seven chapters (with other stories in
them) as well as including his letters to Holmes and diary notes. It is
essential that Dr. Watson exhibits masculine control over the narrative as
well as Holmes (Doyle 38); he becomes a man of action when he writes:
it would be indeed a triumph for me if I could run him to earth where my
master had failed. . . . I swore that it should not be through lack of energy
or perseverance that I should miss the chance which Fortune had thrown
in my way (Doyle 114-118). Watson may often be baffled by Holmess
deduction method, however, in this novel it is Watson who conducts the
investigation and Holmes intentionally yields the stage to Watson and
withdraws behind the scenes, according to James and John Kissane
(358). Nonetheless, the power game is temporary and when Holmes
reappears in Chapter 12, his explanation of the events leaves Watson raw
over the deception Holmes uses on him (Doyle 123). Holmess method
of solving crimes is based on codes of class, gender and ethnicity,
according to Rosemary Jahn, as he reinforces these codes and restores the
order (686).
The two men embody different masculinities (didactic, logical
Holmes versus simple, honest Watson) and become rivals in the
detective game. The detective game is a military campaign for Sherlock
Holmes, as Sir Henry sees him; he is a general who is planning a battle
(Doyle 139). Despite being born to be a man of action . . . to do
something energetic, Dr. Watson is not luminous but a conductor of
light, without being a genius he can stimulate intelligence in others
(Doyle 132, 6). Chapter 15 containing Holmess recounting of the events
once again highlights a striking difference in the two men and their
detective methods. The supernatural presence of the Hound complicates
the rational explanation of events; the mysterious Hound is the symbol of
the family curse, the animal becomes the supernatural creation of a human
master. Sherlock Holmes expunges the curse and restores reason; he
weighed every particle of evidence, constructed alternative theories,
balanced one against the other and made up his mind as to which points
were essential and which immaterial (Doyle 27). Holmess power of
observation reveals the obvious things which nobody by any chance ever
observes (Doyle 28). A master of disguise, the detective nonetheless
needs facts, and not legends or rumors (Doyle 132). Holmes saves Sir
Henry and in a sense England; Sir Henry becomes the new hope for the
Baskervilles to protect and safeguard the British masculinity of the 1900s.
The Hound of the Baskervilles success attracted numerous film and
television adaptations. The debate whether adaptation is indeed a process
of creating something new or whether it is an inferior imitation of the
existent form continues and it often takes the reductive form of the
statement, The movie simply was not as good as the book. Often films
do not convey the moral or aesthetic ideas of the novel; however, instead
of talking about loss in translation from novel to film, one should
consider what is gained in the process of adaptation as it is important to
differentiate between different media and modes of expression.
Adaptation is an extensive cinematic transposition of a particular
work or works and has to be studied not only as a product on its own but
also as a process of creation and reception, explains Linda Hutcheon (xiv,
7). John Ellis sees adaptations as works that prolong the pleasure of the
original work and repeat the production of a memory (4-5); adaptation
trades upon the memory of the novel, whether a memory from reading
or a general knowledge of the work (3). To make a successful adaptation a
director must make the text his/her own. Successful adaptations force
readers to rethink how a text operates contextually and theoretically.
There is also a dichotomous thinking that presumes a bitter rivalry
between film and literature, since film is often seen as a result of
anxiety of influence, where the adaptation becomes the Oedipal son
who slays the source-text as the Father, states Robert Stam in his
Introduction to Literature and Film (in Stam & Raengo 4). Some of the
grounds for hostility towards adaptations include the historical priority
of literature to film and the specific priority of novels to their
adaptations (Stam in Stam & Raengo 4). All films (not only adaptations
or remakes) are mediated through intertextuality and many adaptations
reveal that all of art is derivative on some level.
Stam goes on to foreground the extent to which the cinematic
adaptation of a novel is done though various filters, such as studio style,
ideological fashion, political and economic constraints, auteuristic
predilections, charismatic stars, cultural values (in Stam & Raengo 46).
The linguistic energy of literature is turned into the performative energy
Works Cited
Adams, James Eli. Dandies and Desert Saints: Styles of Victorian Masculinity.
Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1995. Print.
Bazin, Andre. Adaptation, or the Cinema as Digest. Film Adaptation. Ed.
James Naremore. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 2000. 19-28. Print.
Cahir, Linda C. Literature into Film: Theory and Practical Approaches.
Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2006. Print.
Clausson, Nils. Degeneration, Fin-de-Sicle Gothic, and the Science of
Detection: Arthur Conan Doyles The Hound of the Baskervilles and the
Emergence of the Modern Detective Story. Journal of Narrative Theory
35:1 (Winter 2005): 60-87. Print.
Doyle, Conan Arthur. The Hound of the Baskervilles. London: Penguin, 2001.
Print.
Dyer, Richard. Male Sexuality and the Media. Sexuality of Men. Eds. A.
Metcalf and M. Humphries. London: Pluto, 1985. 28-43. Print.
Ellis, John. The Literary Adaptation: An Introduction. Screen 23.1 (1982): 3-5.
Print.
Federico, Annette. Masculine Identity in Hardy and Gissing. London: Associated
UP, 1991. Print.
Ferguson, Paul. Narrative Vision in The Hound of the Baskervilles. Clues 1
(Fall/Winter 1980): 24-30. Print.
Frank, Lawrence. The Hound of the Baskervilles, the Man on the Tor, and a
Metaphor for the Mind. Nineteenth-Century Literature 54.3 (Dec. 1999):
336-72. Print.
Gilmore, David D. Manhood in the Making: Cultural Concepts of Masculinity.
New Haven: Yale UP, 1990. Print.
Haining, Peter. The Television Sherlock Holmes. London: Virgin, 1994. Print.
Hutcheon, Linda. A Theory of Adaptation. New York: Routledge, 2006. Print.
Jahn, Rosemary. Detecting Social Order. New York: Twayne, 1995.
Kestner, Joseph. The Edwardian Detective, 1901-15. Vermont: Ashgate, 2000.
Print.
- - -. Sherlocks Men: Masculinity, Conan Doyle, and Cultural History. Vermont:
Ashgate, 1997. Print.
Kissane, James, and John Kissane. Sherlock Holmes and the Ritual of Reason.
Nineteenth-Century Fiction. 17.4 (Mar. 1963): 353-62. Print.
Klein, Michael, and Gillian Parker. The English Novel and the Movies. New
York: Ungar, 1981. Print.
Livanov, Vasily. Interview. Lifestyle: A Russia Journal Publication 2.45 (24 Jan.
2000), n. p. Web. 1 Oct. 2014.
77 Performing Arabness
Abstract
This article deals with the dramatic art of stand-up comedy. It locates
Arab American stand-up comedy within a broader American humorous
tradition and investigates the way Arab American performers use this art
to negotiate and (re)construct their identity. The main question in this
article is the way Arab American stand-up comedians define their
relationship to the Arab and the western worlds in the process of
establishing their Arab American identity. Three humor theories the
relief theory, the incongruity theory, and the superiority theory are
deployed in the study to examine the representation of Arabness in
selected Arab American performances. The study argues that Arab
American comics minstrelize their own diasporic origin through
reinscribing a range of orientalizing practices in order to claim their
Americanness.
Keywords: Arab American, stand-up comedy, Maysoon Zayid, Ahmed
Ahmed, Dean Obeidallah, Aron Kader, humor, identity
79 Performing Arabness
81 Performing Arabness
race, ethnicity, and identity. If early American stand-up comedy rose out
of the Civil Rights era and the minorities quest for recognition in
America, Arab American stand-up comedy appeared after the traumatic
experience of 9/11 to question the Arab American identity and its location
within the American mosaic.
The question of defining the Arab-American identity in relation to
the Arab and American parts that precede and follow the hyphen is what
is going to be investigated in the remainder of this article. The three
theories of humor utilized in this analysis the relief theory, the
incongruity theory and the superiority theory are often regarded to be
the basic and central theories that explicate the function and mechanism of
humor. Although there are tens of studies that validate or refute these
different theories against one another, the three hypotheses are more
compatible than different and can be safely deployed simultaneously to
explain one humorous expression.
According to the relief theory, one of the major functions of humor
is to reduce stress. In The Physiology of Laughter, Herbert Spencer
argues that laughter is a physiological process in which quasi-convulsive
contractions of the muscles result from an uncontrolled discharge of
energy (7566). Humor, according to Spencer, is a way through which
nerve centers of tension discharge themselves. This relief aspect of humor
is highlighted by many philosophers, physiologists and psychologists
including Alexander Bain (The Emotion and the Will 1859), Anthony
Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury (An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and
Humour 1971), and Sigmund Freud (Humour 1927). Freud is often
regarded as making the strongest statement about humor from a
psychological perspective. He argues that humor has a rebellious (163)
nature in the way it challenges negative energy and helps overcome
distress and socio-cultural restrictions. He concludes:
The grandeur in it [humour] clearly lies in the triumph of narcissism, the
victorious assertion of the egos invulnerability. The ego refuses to be
distressed by the provocations of reality, to let itself be compelled to
suffer. It insists that it cannot be affected by the traumas of the external
world; it shows, in fact, that such traumas are no more than occasions for it
to gain pleasure. This last feature is a quite essential element of humour.
(162)
83 Performing Arabness
affect, but makes a jest. The expenditure on feeling that is economized
turns into humorous pleasure in the listener. (161-162)
85 Performing Arabness
Ahmeds performance about the airport check, the joke derives not only
from the realization that Ahmed is an American citizen but also from the
recognition that he is distant from the Arab stereotype. In this
performance, Ahmed is in effect saying, I am not a terrorist Arab; I am an
innocent Arab American, which makes me more in accord with America
than with my Arab origins. His marginalization is presented as rooted in
his Arabness, a defect he needs to uproot in order to create a unique Arab
American identity that is closer to the Western than the Arab. Mintzs
description of the function of stand-up comedy helps to explain this point:
Traditionally, the comedian is defective in some way, but his natural
weaknesses generate pity, and more important, exemption from the
expectation of normal behavior. He is thus presented to his audience as
marginal. Because he is physically and mentally incapable of proper
action, we forgive and even bless his mistakes. (74)
87 Performing Arabness
89 Performing Arabness
Even governors in the Middle East speak English with funny Arab
accents. Ahmed refers to the man who runs the city of Dubai as amir.
Although in Dubai he is referred to as a governor or a sheikh, the title
amir sounds more Hollywoodish and exotic. The amir of Dubai is very
proud of his seven-star hotel one of a kind in the world but when
asked by critics about the institition which awarded the hotel seven stars,
he answered stupidly in an Arab accent, Ehhhh, I gave it seven stars,
ehhhh (Ahmed Ahmed).
In performing their ethnicity, one may conclude, Arab American
stand-up comedians try to carve an Arab American identity which is
devoid of the western stereotypes of Arabs. However, in doing so, they do
not demolish the stereotype but rather make it exclusively valid for Arabs
who are made to be distant and different from Arab Americans. The
comic license of stand-up comedy is used to reduce the impact of the Arab
heritage on the Arab American identity, providing a new answer to the
whos who question and re-mapping the relationship between the Arab,
the American, and the Arab American. It is sort of identity alteration that
dissociates them from their Arab diasporic origin and brings them closer
to America. Instead of professing a hybrid identity and adopting a
discourse that challenges a common culture which defines Arab America
orientalistically, Arab Americans stage minstrelsy and, instead of being
whites in black faces lampooning black people, they show Arab faces on
stage lampooning Arab culture. In short, they verify their Arab American
identity through disparaging their Arabness.
Works Cited
Ahmed Ahmed. YouTube, 19 Sept. 2010. Web. 15 Nov. 2013.
Aita, Judy. Arab American Comics Use Laughter to Build Bridges: Fourth
Annual New York Comedy Festival Enjoys Success. Allied Media Corp.
Multicultural Communication, 20 Nov. 2006. Web. 10 Mar. 2013.
Alexander, Richard D. Ostracism and Indirect Reciprocity: The Reproductive
Significance of Humor. Ethology and Sociobiology 7 (1986): 253-270.
Print.
Amos, Deborah. But Seriously Folks, The Arab World is a Funny Place.
NPR.org, 5 May 2011. Web. 22 May 2013.
Aron Kader in Axis of Evil (Part1). YouTube, 8 July 2009. Web. 20 Dec. 2013.
Brodie, Ian. Stand-up Comedy as a Genre of Intimacy. Ethnologies 30.2
(2008): 153-80. Print.
Butcher, S. H., ed. The Poetics of Aristotle. New York: MacMillan, 1902. Print.
91 Performing Arabness
Cullen, Frank, Florence Hackman, and Donald McNeilly. Vaudeville, Old and
New: An Encyclopedia of Variety Performers in America. Vol. 1. New
York: Routledge, 2006. Print.
Daube, Mathew. Laughter in Revolt: Race, Ethnicity, and Identity in the
Construction of Stand-Up Comedy. Diss. Stanford University, 2009.
PQDT Open. Web. 21 Nov. 2013.
Freud, Sigmund. Humor. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological
Works of Sigmund Freud XXI. Trans. J. Strachey, et al. London: Hogarth
P, 1961. 160-66. Print.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Commonwealth
Ecclesiasticall and Civill. Ed. A.R. Waller. Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1904. Print.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar. Indiana: Hacket,
1987. Print.
Limon, John. Stand-up Comedy in Theory, or, Abjection in America. Durham:
Duke UP, 2000. Print.
Marks, Alexandra. Get Your Arab On: Comedians Chip Away at Ethnic
Fears. The Christian Science Monitor 14 Nov. 2006. Web. 15 Nov. 2013.
Maysoon Zayid Performs at ATFP Fifth Annual Gala. YouTube. ATFP, 26 Oct.
2010. Web. 15 Feb. 2014.
McIlvenny, Paul, Sari Mettovaara, and Ritva Tapio. I Really Wanna Make You
Laugh: Stand-Up Comedy and Audience Response. Folia, Fennistica and
Linguistica: Proceedings of the Annual Finnish Linguistics Symposium.
Ed. Matti K. Suojanen and Auli Kulkki-Nieminen. Tampere University
Finnish and General Linguistics Department Publications, 1993. 225-47.
Print.
Mintz, Lawrence E. Stand-up Comedy as Social and Cultural Meditation.
American Quarterly 37.1 (1985): 71-80. Print.
2008 New York Arab American Comedy Festival Stand Up Preview. YouTube,
22 Dec. 2007. Web. 23 Nov. 2013.
Parker, Bethany. Probing Question: What are the Roots of Stand-up Comedy?
Penn State 12 Sept. 2008. Web. 17 Dec. 2013.
Ramachandran, V.S, and Sandra Blakeslee. Phantoms in the Brain: Probing the
Mysteries of the Human Mind. New York: Harper, 1999. Print.
Salama, Vivian. Stand-up Diplomacy. Forward Magazine 1 Feb. 2008. Web.
20 Dec. 2013.
Sjobohm, Juan. Stand-Up Comedy around the World: Americanization and the
Role of Globalized Media. Malm University Electronic Publishing.
Malm hgskola/Konst, kultur, kommunikation, K3, 2008. Web. 18 Oct.
2013.
Spencer, Herbert. The Physiology of Laughter. The Bibliophile Library of
Literature, Art, and Rare Manuscripts-History, Biography, Science,
Poetry, Fiction, and Rare and Little-known Literature from the Archives of
the Great Libraries of the World. Vol XXII. Ed. Nathan Haskell Dole,
Forrest Morgan, and Caroline Ticknor. New York: International
Bibliophile Society, 1904. 7561-72. Print.
Abstract
Starting from the presupposition that art and art criticism in the United
States of America are closely linked and that the very meanings and
receptions of art works have been reflected by various writings in the field
of art criticism, this first part of a comprehensive study on the topic
attempts, on the one hand, to divide the historical evolution of American
fine arts and art criticism into several distinct periods, and on the other, to
evaluate the major directions of art criticism by considering its historical
periods as being markedly ideological or cultural, as the case may be.
Thus, considering the approximately 150 years of historical
accomplishments of art criticism in the United States, I will argue that the
starting point of American art criticism is visibly cultural, while the next
two periods are characterised by ideological art criticism, noting that the
ideological orientation differs in the two time frames. The fourth moment
in the evolution of art criticism marks the revival of the cultural, so that,
within the fifth, the postmodern art criticism could no longer grasp a clear
distinction between the cultural and the ideological. The present article
will focus on the first two important orientations in art criticism in the
United States, 1865-1900 and 1908-1940, respectively; a future study will
consider the remaining three periods, following this historicist approach of
art criticism in the United States.
Keywords: American art criticism, cultural art criticism, ideological art
criticism, temporal periodisation of art criticism
Preliminaries
A profound understanding of American art is not possible without
highlighting those specific features of art criticism that become a
Coda
Art criticism is, first and foremost, a type of narrative that translates
notable artistic events in a chronicle, reportage or short story; as such,
while not altogether lacking in theoretical value, art criticism can be
considered only the launching pad or the starting point for some
comprehensive theoretical reflections. The periodisation of American art
criticism used as a methodological guide is, in its turn, a theoretical
exercise applied to American art criticism. What remains to be done is to
provide a satisfying justification for the reasons underlying both the limits
of the time periods and my option for paradigmatic shifts in the focus on
American art criticism from the cultural to the ideological and vice-versa,
up to the point when, after 1980, these two dimensions characteristic of
American art criticism seem to become indistinguishable. This study has
dealt with American art criticism in the period 1865-1940; another one
will continue with the assessment of art criticism in the United States after
1940. Before providing arguments for the labels of cultural and
ideological attributed to each period in the evolution of American art
criticism, a distinction between the two concepts is needed.
I use the term cultural to denote a type of art criticism whose
goals are: aesthetic education in a broader sense, promotion of art for
large audiences, art patronage and artistic manifestations to popularise
arts, emphasis on the artists socio-professional status, as well as the status
of art as a cultural fact, the revealing of the correlations between artistic
productions and the dominant cultural trend of a certain period in the
evolution of art. By contrast, the ideological expression in art brings
forth not only relations between art and something outside its scope, but
rather a concern of art to become autonomous, to purify itself of the
content of its very object: for instance, the artistic avant-gardes at the
beginning of the 20th century put forward rather an ideological distance
from traditional art than an aesthetic view reacting to the social, economic
and historical events of the time (especially World War I).
Evidently, this distinction between cultural and ideological is one
deliberately oversimplifying, which means that each period in the
evolution of American art criticism draws preeminent attention to either
Recently, the attempt to bring together in one volume the most significant
contributions in American art criticism has been materialized in a critical
anthology entitled Brushes with History. Writing on Art from The Nation 18652001, edited by Peter G. Meyer. At any rate, the tradition of art criticism in The
Nation has brought remarkable contributions, from Russell Sturgis and Clarence
Cook, Kenyon Cox and William Coffin, Bernard Berenson and Frank Mather,
Paul Rosenfeld and Anita Brenner to Clement Greenberg, Harold Rosenberg,
Fairfield Porter, Max Kozloff, John Berger, Lawrence Alloway and Arthur Danto.
4
Arthur Danto synthetically expresses the tension between the aesthetic canon
defended by American artists and the new Pre-Raphaelite current in American art
that insisted on the necessary presence of a new artistic consciousness, which
would eventually influence the avant-garde movements. It goes without saying
that the American pre-Raphaelitism in the second half of the 19th century was a
collective epithet recurrent in the context of a new way of understanding and
practicing art in general: The art world, as we know it today, emerged in
Victorian times, and much of it was the product of the Pre-Raphaelite
Brotherhood, which more or less invented the idea of the hot artist, the art
movement, the breakthrough, the press release, the manifesto, the buzz of
sensational openings and the idea that art must be set upon a new path. It was
they who realized how important the support of a major critic could be in getting
their work talked about and acquired (Danto xxii).
5
The above-mentioned dispute between one of the pioneers of American art
criticism, Russell Sturgis, and W. J. Stillman was hosted by The Nation: the
former praised Ruskins writings, stating that good art should not be judged in
terms of whether or not it belongs to a traditional canon, but in agreement to the
authenticity of art for life; Stillman was opposed to the expressionist aesthetics of
the British art philosopher, arguing that he missed the meanings of genuine art.
Thus, the controversy between Sturgis and Stillman boiled down to the opposition
between expressivist and representationalist orientations of modern art
philosophies; at the end of the 19th century, art as mimetic representation was still
a canon of artistic expression that American Pre-Raphaelitism sought to disprove.
Stillman, the defendant of representationalism in art, thus denounced Ruskins
writings as dispersive, analytic, iconoclastic (22). As far as the PreRaphaelitism of the new orientation in American art is concerned, another
important art critic of the period, Kenyon Cox, wrote: He [Raphael our note]
became the law giver, the founder of classicism, the formulator of the academic
ideal . . . . As long as the academic ideal retained any validity, his supremacy
endured, and it was only with the definitive turning of modern art into the paths
of romanticism and naturalism that revolt became possible (Artist and Public
100), while Elizabeth Robins Pennell (the first woman who was turned art
criticism into a profession in America between 1890 and 1918) argued that What
is important in this very rapid sketch is to point out the part the Pre-Raphaelites
played in the revolt against Victorian vulgarity. For theirs was a revolt as truly as
the romantic movement, some twenty years earlier, had been in France. Ruskin,
the prophet, Madox Brown, the master, and Rossetti, Millais, and Holman Hunt,
Works Cited
Barnum, P.T. Mr. Barnum on Museums. Brushes with History. Writing on Art
from The Nation 1865-2001. Ed. Peter G. Meyer. New York: Nation,
2001. 7-10. Print.
Berger, John. The Cultural Snob. There Is No Highbrow Art. Brushes with
History. Writing on Art from The Nation 1865-2001. Ed. Peter G. Meyer.
New York: Nation, 2001. 256-61. Print.
Brenner, Anita. Frontiers of Machine Art. Brushes with History. Writing on Art
from The Nation 1865-2001. Ed. Peter G. Meyer. New York: Nation,
2001. 179-81. Print.
Cox, Kenyon. The International Art Exhibition. Brushes with History. Writing
on Art from The Nation 1865-2001. Ed. Peter G. Meyer. New York:
Nation, 2001. 109-10. Print.
- - -. Artist and Public and Other Essays on Art Subjects. New York: Scribner,
1914. Print.
Crunden, Robert M. American Salons: Encounters with European Modernism
1885-1917. New York: Oxford UP, 1993. Print.
Danto, Arthur. Introduction. Brushes with History. Writing on Art from The
Nation 1865-2001. Ed. Peter G. Meyer. New York: Nation, 2001. xxixxviii. Print.
Hafif, Marcia. The Critic Is (?) Artist. M/E/A/N/I/N/G. An Anthology of Artists
Writings, Theory, and Criticism. Ed. Susan Bee and Mira Schor. Durham:
Duke UP, 2000. 127-30. Print.
Hartley, Marsden. Dissertation on Modern Painting. Brushes with History.
Writing on Art from The Nation 1865-2001. Ed. Peter G. Meyer. New
York: Nation, 2001. 126-28. Print.
James, Henry. The Ruskin/ Whistler Trial Part I, II. Brushes with History.
Writing on Art from The Nation 1865-2001. Ed. Peter G. Meyer. New
York: Nation, 2001. 24-28. Print.
Jameson, Fredric. The Ideologies of Theory. London: Verso, 2008. Print.
Kuspit, Donald. The Critic Is Artist: The Intentionality of Art. Ann Arbor: UMI,
1984. Print.
108
Abstract
This article examines how instruments have changed the Crown of
Canada from 1867 through to the present, how this change has been
effected, and the extent to which the Canadian Crown is distinct from the
British Crown. The main part of this article focuses on the manner in
which law, politics, and policy (both Canadian and non-Canadian) have
evolved a British Imperial institution since the process by which the
federal Dominion of Canada was formed nearly 150 years ago through to
a nation uniquely Canadian as it exists today. The evolution of the
Canadian Crown has taken place through approximately fifteen discrete
events since the time of Canadian confederation on July 1, 1867. These
fifteen events are loosely categorized into three discrete periods: The
Imperial Crown (1867-1930), A Shared Crown (1931-1981), and The
Canadian Crown (1982-present).
Keywords: Imperial, the London Conference, the Nickle Resolution, the
British North America Act, Queen Victoria, Sovereignty, the Statute of
Westminster
Introduction
Of Canadian legal and governmental institutions, the Crown sits atop all,
unifying them by means of a single institution. This Crown has remained
both a symbol of strength and a connection to Canadas historical roots.
The roots of the Crown run deep and can be traced as far back as the
sixteenth century, when the kings of France first established the Crown in
Canada in Nouvelle-France. Both French and British kings and queens
have continuously reigned over Canada since 1534 approximately half a
millennium contributing to what has become known as one of the
worlds oldest monarchies. Remarkably, however, Canadian scholars, like
many Canadians, seldom concern themselves with the Crown as an
important institution. While it remains omnipresent in Canadian society,
and given recent renewed interest in the institution, it is hardly ever seen,
heard, or studied. How have legal instruments changed the Crown in
Canada from 1867 through to the present? How has this change been
effected? How truly Canadian is the Canadian Crown? How is it distinct
from the British Crown? This article traces the evolution of the Canadian
Crown through approximately fifteen discrete events that have taken place
since the time of Confederation on July 1, 1867. These fifteen events are
loosely categorized into three discrete periods: The Imperial Crown
(1867-1930), A Shared Crown (1931-1981), and The Canadian Crown
(1982-Present). We focus on aspects of law, politics, and policy (both
Canadian and non-Canadian) that have facilitated the evolution of the
Crown from a British Imperial institution to one that is distinctly
Canadian.
this conference and its finalization of the particulars of what the Canadian
state would soon look like, Queen Victoria gave royal assent to the British
North America Act (1867). Having obtained a constitution that was not
unlike that of Great Britain (Tidridge 42), Sir John A. MacDonald (18671873, 1878-1891) (often referred to as The Father of Canada) reportedly
stated to his Queen that he intended to declare in the most solemn and
emphatic manner our resolve to be under the sovereignty of Your Majesty
and your family, forever (emphasis added) (Tidridge 42).
After the London Conference came to a close and numerous
delegates returned to Canada, the Imperial Crown (through the Imperial
Parliament) continued to rule the Empire as a single unit. The Crown of
Great Britain was understood to be the same Crown as that of Canada, and
as that of the other realms. However, in 1892 the Canadian case of
Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. the Receiver General of
New Brunswick began to erode the understanding of the Imperial Crown
as a unitary institution (see Maritime Bank of Canada [Liquidators of] v.
New Brunswick [Receiver-General]). In Liquidators, the priority of the
Provincial Government over simple contract creditors was at issue
(Maritime Bank of Canada [Liquidators of] v. New Brunswick [ReceiverGeneral] 1). Maritime Bank was winding up business and the salient
question was posed: Was the provincial government entitled to payment
in full by preference over the noteholders (sic) of the bank, and if not, was
the provincial government entitled to payment in full over the other
depositors and simple contract creditors of the bank? (Maritime Bank of
Canada [Liquidators of] v. New Brunswick [Receiver-General] 1). As the
prerogative of the Crown was involved, a secondary question arose: Was
provincial property and revenue vested in the Crown-in-Right of Canada,
or in the Crown-in-Right of New Brunswick? (Maritime Bank of Canada
[Liquidators of] v. New Brunswick [Receiver-General] 5). After lengthy
litigation, the matter found itself before the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in London, and their Lordships eventually ruled that the
property was vested in the Crown-in-Right of New Brunswick (Maritime
Bank of Canada [Liquidators of] v. New Brunswick [Receiver-General]
8). In addition to being a significant case because it recognized that the
Crown was not a unitary instrument, the case also remains important
Great Britain (Smith 44). The recognition that independent states were
equal in status to Great Britain reaffirmed the understanding (as
demonstrated by Byng) of what the relationship between Canada and
Great Britain was earlier that year. However, it is possible that he was
actually following convention as to the power of dissolution (McWhinney
15-16). When the conference came to an end the Balfour Declaration of
1926 was issued. In this seminal document, Lord Balfour famously
summarized the agreement of the Conference, stating that
[the Commonwealth realms] are autonomous Communities within the
British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in
any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a
common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the
British Commonwealth of Nations. (McWhinney 3)
Conference in 1926 and drafted into the Balfour Declaration were carved
into law (Boyce 26-28). With the passing of this statute, Westminster
Parliament specifically renounced any legislative authority over the affairs
of independent states within the Empire, except as specifically provided
for in other statutes (i.e., certain changes to the British North America
[BNA] Act of 1867 still required the assent of Parliament in London)
(Boyce 26-28). Thus, while the Statute of Westminster did not cut all ties
between the Canadian Crown and the British Crown, it did mark the end
of the Imperial Crown within the realms. Replacing the Imperial Crown
was the idea that the Crown was an institution equally shared between the
Commonwealth realms of the Empire; no single state was seen as
subordinate to any other (including Great Britain) (Boyce 26-28). While
this idea was not a novel one (it was found in the Balfour report), the
importance of the Statute of Westminster was that it enshrined the idea
into legislation and marked the effective legislative independence of the
countries involved. The statute effectively established the benchmark for
the relationship between the Commonwealth realms and the Crown; it
continues to govern this relationship today.
Subsequent to the passing of the Statute of Westminster, King
Edward VIII abdicated the throne before he produced an heir; in turn,
British statutes such as the Act of Settlement in 1701 resulted in King
Edwards brother (Prince Albert, Duke of York) becoming King George
VI. At his Coronation in 1937, he became the first Sovereign to be asked
if he would govern the realms with respect to their particular laws and
customs (Tidridge 48). Two years afterward, George embarked on an
extensive tour of Canada, including a brief stop in the United States (US),
which marked the first time that a reigning Sovereign visited the US.8 In
accordance with the Balfour Declaration and the Statute of Westminster,
King George was styled King of Canada during his stay; in this
capacity, he addressed Canadian Parliament, gave Royal Assent to
legislation, and accepted the credentials of the new US ambassador to
Canada (Tidridge 48-49). In further demonstration of the principles of
equality among the independent states, which were part of the Empire, in
the middle of his Canadian tour the King briefly visited the US as King of
Canada, not of Great Britain (Tidridge 48-49). This further marked the
the responsibility of the head of state and all of the responsibilities are
those of the head of state (Smith & Jackson 32). Both Clarkson and Jean
failed to grasp the essence of the Letters Patent. They showed the
understanding that they transferred the office of head of state from the
office of the King, to the office of the Governor General. To be sure,
this was anything but the case. After 1947, the King continued to be the
head of state, while the powers of head of state were simply exercised by
the Governor General. No change was made to Canadas head of state.
While both of these events were rather embarrassing, neither were
they the least bit surprising as the former governments wanted to lead
people to believe that the Governor General was the head of state. In time,
they sought to ease Canada out of what they considered its colonial past.
However, there remained mistakes that PM Stephen Harper (2006present) was obliged to deny categorically, including the incorrectness of
the remarks made by the Governors General. He stated emphatically that
Queen Elizabeth and not Clarkson nor Jean were Canadas heads of state
during their respective tenures (Smith & Jackson 32). While these
incidents demonstrate the extent to which the Letters Patent have been
grossly misconstrued, they also help to underscore what they did not do.
With the Letters Patent, King George did not issue a blanket abdication
of the Sovereigns role in the Canadian state nor did he limit the Royal
Prerogative in Canada (Smith & Jackson 32). Rather, the Letters Patent
merely delegated authority from one institution (the King) to a
subordinate body (the Governor General). Just as legislatures have passed
enabling legislation delegating regulatory making power to third parties,
and then later revoked this power, the Letters Patent issued by the King
only permitted the delegation of some aspects of his authority to the
Governor General. While it is important to note that the Letters Patent did
not remove the Crown from the head of King George and place it on the
head of The Viscount Alexander (Governor General during that time), it is
similarly important to recognize that it did vastly expand the office of the
Governor General in very practical terms (Smith & Jackson 35-36).
Following the issuance of the Letters Patent, the Governor General was
able to exercise nearly all of the day-to-day powers of the Crown clear
across Canada. As a result of this development, the Governor General was
also able to function in almost all areas without approval from the
reigning Sovereign.
In 1952, Vincent Massey was appointed as the first Canadian-born
Governor General and served until 1959 (Monet 85). His appointment
marked a momentous step in the evolutionary path of the Canadian
Crown, which all subsequent appointees would mirror. Prior to his
appointment, Canadas Governor Generals were British. Despite their
background, nearly all became thoroughly imbued with the juvenescent
spirit of Canada as a young country and contributed significantly to the
development of Canadas national identity as well as its various
institutions of nationhood (Monet 85). During the same year as Masseys
appointment, King George VI died suddenly. In the wake of his death,
Princess Elizabeth (his eldest daughter) became Queen Elizabeth II. While
accession to the throne is automatic and does not require an act of
Parliament, the government traditionally issues a Proclamation9 regarding
the accession. The Queens accession led to Canadas Parliament passing
the Royal Style and Titles Act. These instruments made The Queen the
first monarch to be distinctly identified as the Sovereign of Canada,
officially labelling her Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace
of God of the United Kingdom, Canada and Her other Realms and
Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith
(Royal Style and Titles Act 2). As a development in the evolution of the
Canadian Crown, passage of this act was similar in intent to Canadas
formal declaration of war against Nazi Germany on September 10, 1939.10
In both circumstances, Canada previously relied on Imperial Parliament to
act on its behalf. However, by 1939, and again legislatively in 1953,
Canada eventually matured to a point as a country where its political
leadership felt obligated to assume the role of issuing the
proclamation/declaration on its own. As a result of Canadian Parliament
identifying The Queen as Canadas reigning Sovereign and Great Britain
declaring her Britains reigning Queen, the two countries (acting together)
showed the practical effect of both a long evolutionary process and the
passage of the Statute of Westminster. Canada was no longer the
possession of an Imperial Crown, but an equal realm of a shared Crown.
This became true of the other Realms as well.
England recently plunged the country into civil war and there was desire
to prevent the protestant throne (held by King William III and II, and
Queen Mary II) from falling back into the hands of a Catholic monarch
(Act of Settlement). While these changes to Crown succession are
significant in their own right, they also represent the true Canadian-ness of
the Canadian Crown as the Canadian values of prohibition against
discrimination on the basis of gender and religion permeated the
institution of the Crown of Canada. With this change, the Canadian
Crown embodies some of the values dearest to Canadian identity. After
the CHOGM, the Government of Canada introduced Bill C-53 to the
Commons. This bill, which became known as the Succession to the
Throne Act, was introduced in 2013, and assented to that same year. It
formally adopted the agreement made at the CHOGM, which legally
replaced male primogeniture with equal primogeniture.
Conclusion
Of all the Canadian institutions that contribute to Canadian identity across
time and geography, perhaps none have been as constant as the Crown.
From 1867 through to the present day, the Crown has been an everpresent institution from which authority flows to the judiciary, the
legislative bodies, and the executive government. While the presence of
the Crown has been constant, manifestation of the institution has evolved
greatly since Confederation. Though initially the Crown was a unitary
British Crown, worn by a British monarch, legislation, jurisprudence,
government policy, multilateral relations, conferences, declarations, and
the emergence of a Canadian identity have all slowly transformed the
Crown into a distinctly Canadian institution. As this article has shown, the
evolutionary process was certainly not one of simplicity. Rather, it was
fraught with intrigue and at times pure chance. The process of change,
moreover, did not occur quickly; nor did it always occur consciously. As
this article demonstrates, the evolution of the Canadian Crown can be
traced through approximately fifteen events that took place throughout
Canadas history. These fifteen events have loosely been categorized into
three separate periods with each forming the structure of this article: The
Sovereigns visited Canada prior to their ascension to the throne prior to this
though, including King George who entered into Canada as Prince Albert.
9
Note that the Proclamation is only a pleasant custom. It has nothing to do with
the Act, which is legislative (and important), and follows months later.
10
With the aim of asserting Canadas independence from the UK, which was
already established through the Statute of Westminster (1931), a formal
declaration of war as sought by means of the approval of the Federal Parliament
during the initial week of September 1939.
11
Lagasse and Bowdens Royal Succession and the Canadian Crown as a
Corporation Sole: A Critique of Canadas Succession to the Throne Act, 2013
(2014) 23 Constitutional Forum Constitutionnel 17 offers an outstanding
discussion on the Crown as a corporation sole (a legal incorporated office which
may only be occupied by a sole individual). This discussion is helpful for
understanding how one person (Her Majesty) may occupy two distinct, but
similar, offices concurrently.
12
Note that this is the last step, which directly affected the legal nature of the
Crown in Canada. Since Stephen Harper became Prime Minister of Canada in
2006, a renaissance of sorts occurred in Canada regarding the Canadian
Monarchy. Two branches of the armed forces have seen their Royal moniker
returned, Canadian embassies throughout the world must now displace a portrait
of Her Majesty the Queen, government buildings across Canada have seen similar
portraits reappearing, and invitations to members of the Royal family to visit
Canada have become more common. While this resurgence in loyalty to the
institution is welcome by this author, these events do not directly affect the nature
of the Crown as a legal institution in Canada, and thus an exploration of them
here is omitted for brevity.
Works Cited
Bloxham, Andy, and James Kirkup. Centuries-Old Rule of Primogeniture in
Royal Family Scrapped. The Telegraph 28 Oct. 2011. Web. 27 June
2014.
Bousfield, Arthur, and Garry Toffoli. Royal Observations: Canadians and
Royalty. Toronto: Dundurn P, 1991. Print.
Boyce, Peter. The Queens Other Realms: The Crown and Its Legacy in
Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Sydney: Federation P, 2008. Print.
Constitution Act, 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, Schedule B. 17 Apr. 1985. Print.
Government of Canada. Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor
General of Canada, (1947) C Gaz II, 1. 1980. Print.
Government of Canada. Parliament of Canada. Canadian Citizenship Act and
Current Issues. 1980. Print.
Government of Canada. Parliament of Canada. Citizenship Act R.S.C., 1985, c.
C-29. 1985. Print.
Reviews
126
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127 Reviews
129 Reviews
readers with instances that pre-date the 9/11 era although the distance
between these periods is exceptionally slim. There is an advantage to this
temporal proximity since all three circumstances are linked conceptually
and thematically. What is enticing about including this period is its
relationship with but incompatibility with actual war conditions (that is,
this period deals with potential lead-ups to and preparations for nuclear
war). The three foreign policy circumstances suggest a rather determined
equality with studies focusing on contemporary instances of US state
behavior, foreign policy, and interaction in world politics. Going
temporally deeper into the practice of American foreign policy would
build much more historical attention to the subject of womens bodies.
Managhan indirectly defends the position that her research takes when
speaking of the historical dimension. To look at woman as a figure and
something that potentially impacts the events that surround her requires
symbolic and metaphorical attention. This is precisely what is achieved
when Managhan re-reads the protesting female body (57). Examples of
such readings can undoubtedly be found in other periods but her review of
the 1980s serves a qualified function.
The third chapter, entitled (M)others, biopolitics and the Gulf
War, carries a pervading Foucauldian theme. This chapter presents a
stark disconnect between US foreign policy and its representation of
Americans, specifically of the female carrying the burdens of motherhood
as natural nurturer. Americans enacted, states Managhan, a
reinvigorated militarism that was told as a story about a nation that stood
firmly behind its troops (74). This chapter provocatively discusses the
context of motherhood: the transition to sensitive motherhood and its
relationship with the rise of US militarism during the time of the first Gulf
War. The late-1980s and the period of the Gulf War during the early1990s show continuity in the discourse of motherhood, which Managhan
describes as having stayed largely intact (88). The dawn of the age of an
intense and profitable cultural figure the so-called supermom
became an intricate aspect of the discourse of the modern liberal state.
Managhan revisits assumptions that are formative of her analysis earlier in
this book while engaging with the loss of citizen-subjects that the US
could not quite stomach during the course of operations in Iraq since 2003
(105). Grievances over dead soldiers in much larger (almost
unquantifiable) numbers remain a sinister feature of the most recent war
in Iraq. The very sensitive issue of loss, which can assume many forms,
has lasting effects on social structures. Thus a complex interplay between
presence and absence, states Managhan, illustrates the imperative to
support the troops functioned within the psychic life of the nation (107).
Managhan concludes by noting that the change of discursive events
and the emotional approach to conflict sanctioned by US foreign policy
retain strong normative grounding. These shifts were not accidental.
Managhans conclusion is positive for revealing the agential quality and
potential of those often considered merely existing within interminable
structure(s). But this conclusion presents numerous beginnings. Having
collapsed boundaries found between sovereign power and the maternal
body, Managhan has begun to address the interaction of domestic
conditions and performative forces at the level of the nation state; yet,
examinations of these specific foreign policy circumstances alone cannot
serve as the only means of illustrating how the maternal body has
strengthened or weakened American sovereignty. Dichotomizing
understandings of the relationship between the female body and the realm
of IR as well as that same body and the military state is productively
unsettling. This quality, in combination with the intriguing research
approach that informs this work, makes Gender, Agency and War an
essential read for interdisciplinary researchers, particularly those operating
within the fields of IR, feminist studies, and domestic and international
norms.
SCOTT NICHOLAS ROMANIUK
University of Trento
131 Reviews
133 Reviews
Although it does not set out to examine the cultures of resistance, past and
present, underlying gaybourhood certainly not in a manner evocative of
profiling the rockers, the hipppies, the punk, ravers or youth movements,
past and present the study does shed light on the various tight if indirect
articulations between old youth and the next youth, canonical and
liberated masculinity, forms of oppression and countercultural
emancipation. In this respect, it is one of the great merits of Ghazianis
book to reposit the question of transnational countercultures as fading
away in the twenty-first century. Urban change, Ghaziani stresses, is
inevitable, which does not prevent the reality of a vibrant queer culture
from continuing to manifest itself:
Everyday life in gay neighbourhoods moves in multiple directions; the
perspectives of one person will contradict what someone else says. We
will never be able to learn anything from this social noise if we simply ask
135 Reviews
Works Cited
DAndrea, Anthony. Global Nomads: Techno and New Age as Transnational
Countercultures in Ibiza and Goa. London: Routledge, 2007. Print.
Ghaziani, Amin. There Goes the Gayborhood? Princeton: Princeton UP, 2014.
Print.
Wilson, Janet, Cristina andru, and Sarah Lawson Welsh, eds. Rerouting the
Postcolonial: New Directions for the New Millennium. London:
Routledge, 2009. Print.
137 Reviews
and liberal ideas for example, and attempt to reconcile Christianity with
the rationalist and scientific thought that arose from the Enlightenment
(xiv).
Gruending begins with an exploration of the major fault line (i.e.,
religions denomination) in Canadian society dating as far back as the
Northwest Rebellion (xii). The following decades ushered in a wave of
Protestants and eventually peoples of multiple faiths. Faith and the
perception of religious necessity, that is the need to have religion and
politics intersect in order to have religious factors such as communities
support political life, were an overwhelming determinant of policy and
social interaction as a relatively small Canadian society underwent
colossal change. It is precisely through this process of tracing the
emergence of religious groups and voices that Gruending presents the
contemporary position of religion, public interest, domestic and foreign
policy, social (including political) hierarchies, and moral politics on
Canadas civic stage. The story is one without any determinable ending.
As Gruending states, there is no way to predict with any certainty which
faction will exert the greater political influence (xviii).
In each chapter, the author presents rich examples or condensed
cases regarding religious tensions set against situations that have afflicted
the country and its regions over time. The chapters are organized by
events that take the reader well beyond the national borders of Canada. It
would be difficult to write a book on the religious ideologies that
permeate Canadian public life (including its very active political sides)
without addressing social, religious, and politics currents circulating
beyond Canadas borders. This should be the case with any book
addressing the relationship between politics and religion in any other
country, especially due to the bridging attributes of different immigrating
ethnic groups and settled Diasporas. Thus the author has paid necessary
attention to what is happening in Canada and further abroad. Having
compiled these studies, Gruending has nicely connected them to broader
frameworks and reveals conflicting loyalties and religious friction as both
initiative and response in Canadian life. Canadians have astutely observed
edicts from the highest religious orders related to different religious
denominations, but in many ways this frustrated day-to-day practices of
Canadians in (other) societal facets:
Gruendings research does not mirror the findings of other research on the
subject of religion and politics with regard to Canada and its communities.
This observation comes not as a disappointment but rather a refreshing
and heuristically candid reflection of the drastic changes that have taken
place in Canada over recent years. Accordingly, much of the previous
research on these topics is shown to have become relatively outdated, as
political movements and activities to remedy Canadian public disunion
have gone unfulfilled or turned out to be half-baked policies and
enterprises to begin with. The greatest point of praise is therefore the
authors call for attention to inter-religious dialogue, respect, and
tolerance, which, he argues, are more important today than ever, within
countries and among them (225).
What comes as a slight disenchantment about this book is how it
comes across as a collection of blog entries. This should be apparent given
that the author writes a national award-winning blog that carries the same
name as this book. Nonetheless, the contents of this book are directly
related to the authors personal history and attachment to Canadas Prairie
Provinces (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta), and beyond, which are
part-and-parcel to the value of this online writings. Gruending was born in
St. Benedict, Saskatchewan. As an adult he immersed himself in matters
of both religion and politics. In 1997, Gruending put in his bid for the
New Democratic Party (NDP) as a candidate in the federal election (222)
but lost to the Reform Party candidate. He was also engaged in activities
in Canadas capital city, serving as director of information for the
Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops/ Confrence des vques
catholiques du Canada (CCCB/CECC) for four years prior to running in
the federal election of 1997 (223). Indeed, his experience takes him well
beyond Canadas Prairie region, and much of his personal experience and
interest resonates in his work.
139 Reviews
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