(NATO Advanced Research Workshop On Fight, Samuel PDF

FIGHTING TERRORISM IN THE LIBERAL STATE
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Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics Vol. 9
ISSN: 1574-5597
Fighting Terrorism in the

Liberal State
An Integrated Model of Research, Intelligence and
International Law
Edited by
Samuel Peleg
Department of Political Science and Strategic Dialogue Center,
Netanya College, Israel
and
Wilhelm Kempf
Department of Psychology, University of Konstanz, Germany
Amsterdam Berlin Oxford Tokyo Washington, DC

Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division
Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal
State: An Integrated Model of Research, Intelligence and International Law
Konstanz, Germany
1516 April 2005
2006 IOS Press.

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Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State

S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2006
2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
Introduction:
Terrorism and the Open Society
A Question of Balance
Samuel PELEG
Department of Political Science and Strategic Dialogue Center at Netanya College,
Israel
In June 1974, I was staying with my Aunt and Uncle during my summer vacation. They
lived in northern Israel, in the sleepy little town of Naharya. At the age of 16, it was the
farthest away from home that I could go. On the fifth night of my visit, at around
2:00 a.m., we were violently awakened by a barrage of bullets and the deafening blasts
of hand grenades. We were all terribly frightened and felt totally helpless. The
onslaught lasted for about 30 minutes, and then suddenly everything fell ominously
silent. At dawn, we learned how fortunate we had been: The attack on the apartment
house was the work of a terrorist band that had crossed over the border from Lebanon
earlier that night. My relatives building had been randomly selected, simply because it
was located near the shore. The terrorists continued wounding and killing the residents
of the ground floor until Israeli Special Forces moved in, surrounded them and ended
their rampage. That was my first encounter with the phenomenon of terrorism but not
my last.
On March 4, 1996, a beloved teaching assistant and former student, Taly Gordon,
was killed by a suicide bomber, along with 19 other innocent persons who happened to
be present in a central shopping mall in Tel Aviv. The terrorist was a Palestinian artist
from Gaza who belonged to Islamic Jihad. Four months earlier and three kilometers
away, I had attended a peace rally that ended with the assassination of Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin. Only an hour before the murder, my wife, our small daughter and I had
passed very close by the spot where the Jewish extremist who killed Rabin was
patiently waiting for his opportunity. I may even have seen him. He had not appeared
the least bit suspicious either to us or to the hundreds of security personnel who were
guarding the area. These examples illustrate my personal acquaintance with the nature
of terrorism: indiscriminate, ruthless and unexpected. Lurking in the shadows like a
ferocious beast, terrorism is aggressive and vicious. To its prey, it does not matter
whether the beast is hungry or has a right to kill. From the victims point of view, any
lethal assault is depraved, senseless and criminal.
Nevertheless, however clearly and unambiguously terrorism is captured in these
personal recollections, it is still a highly perplexing and confusing phenomenon.
Scholars and practitioners are constantly debating the nature of terrorist activities in
various parts of the world. The anti-terrorist effort is notoriously faltering and
indecisive, and global cooperation against terrorism is reprehensibly inadequate. These
shortcomings are especially conspicuous in liberal states, where insidious, ruthless and
indiscriminate terrorism exploits the liberty and vulnerability of the open society.
Terrorism appears to flourish and attract attention by striking at the soft underbelly of
vi
democracy. The accessibility of targets and the silent collaboration of the media,
which exploit the sensationalism of terrorist attacks for commercial advantages, play
into the hands of terrorists. This is the dilemma of terrorism in the liberal state: Should
democratic liberties be curtailed for the sake of greater security? Isnt the restriction of
civil liberties a triumph for terrorism? If a golden path must be found, combating
terrorism without sacrificing human rights and freedoms, where does such a path lead?
Such questions inspired the April 2005 NATO Advanced Research Workshop,
which was held at the University of Konstanz in southern Germany. This volume
presents the outstanding contributions of participants at that gathering. It consists of
papers by 18 leading scholars and practitioners of the war against terrorism from four
continents and nine countries. They include philosophers, political scientists,
psychologists, criminologists, jurists, sociologists, historians, computer analysts,
intelligence analysts and law enforcement officers. This remarkably varied range of
participants yielded a fascinating meeting and a noteworthy, often provocative
collection of papers. The great diversity enriched our undertaking with a variety of
philosophies, perspectives, and understandings. It brought together a plurality of
cultures, norms and experiences to afford an exhilarating mixture of definitions and
approaches. The workshop benefited greatly from the open-mindedness and
forbearance reserved for those unique occasions where a diverse group of persons is
present. The complex and varied nature of the contributions is reflected in this
collection.
Terrorism and counter-terrorism are in many ways mirror images of each other,
and their names reflect that notion quite well. They are both violent activities that
attempt to influence political developments and situations: the former in the direction
of change, instability and disorder, the latter in the opposite direction of the status quo,
stability and order. They both vie for an attentive audience and for the legitimacy of the
critical mass. The challengers aspire to convince the population of the callousness
and brutality of their government, while the authorities in turn strive to portray their
opponents as ruthless criminals and malefactors. Both parties try to win the hearts and
minds of the people. This struggle is waged on all political fronts, whether aimed at the
members of a tribe, the citizens of a nation or world public opinion. It is relevant and
meaningful on every level. While counter-terrorism marches under the banner of law
and morality, terrorism defies the law and attempts to recast morality in its own terms.
While the former boasts of order and stability, the latter proclaims justice and equality.
The papers in this book illustrate this balanced dichotomy between terrorism and
counter-terrorism against the background of the liberal state. This is a unique
battlefield, where the tactical advantage is seemingly conceded to terrorists, who are
free to exploit the liberties of the open society, while the authorities are constrained by
those very rights and freedoms. They work under the constant scrutiny of the free
press, public opinion, the political opposition, human rights organizations and the
guardians of legal codes. But, as already pointed out, they have only an apparent
advantage, which is forfeited the more depraved and indiscriminate terrorism becomes.
Then terrorists begin to lose their popular support, and the authorities begin to win
citizens trust in their efforts to restore tranquility. Thus, it really boils down to a
question of balance: of how to establish the delicate equilibrium of combating terrorism
while preserving the liberties of the open society. This book begins with this question
and becomes increasingly complex as it tackles the different aspects and dimensions of
this dilemma.
vii
The layout of the chapters follows the logic of the terrorism counter-terrorism
dichotomy. The first entries grapple with the notion of terrorism, its elusive and
problematic definition, its structural preconditions, motivations and incentives. The
next three chapters juxtapose terrorism with counter-terrorism and emphasize the
movement countermovement dynamics between them. This is presented via three
case studies from three different corners of the globe. Then, counter-terrorism is
introduced through communications and media, international law and foreign policy
analyses. As in the terrorism section, both sympathetic and critical views are expressed,
conveying a sense of the wide gamut of approaches to this sensitive topic. Finally, the
practical and programmatic portion of the book is laid out. The three chapters of this
section illustrate analytical and adaptive models for countering terrorism while
minimizing the loss of the liberties of the democratic state. Thus, the book returns full
circle and offers an equilibrant to the predicament of terrorism in the liberal state.
My opening chapter challenges the widespread perception of terrorism as
irrational, indiscriminate and improvised. Instead, I show that terrorism is a deliberate
and premeditated activity that is sometimes intentionally made to seem pathological
and irrational. The suggestiveness of, Dont offer any resistance, we are ruthless
fanatics who wont stop at anything, might serve terrorists by intimidating the
authorities and deterring citizens from cooperating with the police, but it can also
benefit a State that resorts to harsh retaliatory measures against terrorists, who dont
listen to reason. Nonetheless, to portray terrorism as irrational is misleading and
should be avoided. Unless terrorism is comprehended and countered rationally, it
cannot be defeated.
Egyptian philosopher Hassan Hanafi delves into the anatomy of terrorism and
turns it on its head. He demonstrates logically and eruditely the vagueness and
ambiguity of the term terrorism in contrast to the clarity and consistency it is
ordinarily perceived and understood to possess. His view is that, terrorism as a term is
already a pre-judgment. It has a moral connotation. The problem is resolved
beforehand, even without the necessary effort to understand. It is a partial perception
which works against the objective analysis of socio-political phenomena. Lack of
communication and reciprocal demonization between the West and the Arab world are
responsible for the current gulf between terrorists and the targets of terrorism, or in
Hanafis words, the victimizers and the victims. To bridge the chasm separating the
two cultures, a dialogue between equal partners must be promoted, because so far,
the stumbling block in the Euro-Arab dialogue is the discrepancy between the
European economic agenda and the Arab political agenda.
In a similar fashion, Mokhtar Benabdallaoui does not consider terrorism in the
conventional sense. He relates it to the larger concept of violence and maintains that in
different contexts violence changes its meaning and its legal and moral status. But
despite its complex, protean nature, terrorism, the extreme form of violence, should be
condemned in all its forms, including, and above all, state terrorism, which is often
thought to complement and support the law. Nevertheless, concludes the author, the
eradication of global terrorism should not be pursued by pointing a finger at a specific
religion or culture, or by invoking cultural Darwinism. The best way to counter the
phenomenon is by constructing a more just and interdependent world society,
composed of autonomous and free governments and societies with the appropriate
means to promote new values.
viii
Dealing more with the perpetrators of terrorism than with the act itself, Anne
Speckhard calls attention to the unique and devastating phenomenon of suicide
terrorism. In a detailed and insightful study of suicide terrorism, one of the first of its
kind, the author describes the motivations and rewards that induce young persons to
become suicide bombers. The individual, psychological and social conditions that
underlie and support these tragic choices are objectively depicted in order not only to
better understand this most devastating form of terrorism, but more importantly, to find
ways of opposing it. Speckhard offers some valuable proposals following her in-depth
analysis and a series of rare interviews with prospective suicide-bombers. She argues,
among other things, that religious leaders must begin to stand up to the manipulation
of Islam by Jihadist militants, and those who do speak out ought to be supported (if
quietly) by the West. The prevention and gradual reduction of the threat posed by
suicide terrorism must address its root causes. She asserts further that, Repressive
governments must be encouraged and pressured to reform, so as to open the way for
economic growth and increased opportunities for the frustrated, disillusioned and often
well-educated youth who constitute the most explosive sector of the societies from
which suicide terrorism comes.
General Mansour Abu Rashid, a former Director of the Jordanian Military
Intelligence Department, discusses issues from the pure practitioners perspective.
After discussing several practical difficulties in the conceptualization of terrorism and
counter-terrorism, he turns to the pragmatic and programmatic questions of what can be
done about terrorism. In a succinct and realistic manner, Abu Rashid enumerates what
should be done on various levels political, economic, ideological and informational.
He concludes that: fighting the contemporary wave of terrorism requires a multibranched, multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional response. Although the traditional
instruments police and intelligence services are the most critical, they are
inadequate to meet the extent and emerging challenge of terrorism. Finally, the
General adds a counter-intuitive argument, which resonates well with his extensive
experience: an effort to institutionalize the war on terror should avoid trying to
achieve greater intelligence-sharing. This oft-cited goal is best handled through
bilateral intelligence channels.
Abu Rashids contribution structurally links terrorism and counter-terrorism and
also relates to three further papers which do this using illustrations from three
distinctive case studies: the Palestinian-Israeli, the Spanish-Basque and the RussianChechnyan. In the first of the three, Eitan Alimi analyzes the revealing case of the
Tanzim (Arabic for organization). In the second Intifadah (20002004), or uprising of
the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation, this militant faction of the Palestinian
armed forces was at the forefront of violent assaults against the Israelis. Although
regarded by Israeli Intelligence as a terrorist group, some of its leaders were previously
committed supporters of the Oslo peace initiative. Alimi expands the theoretical
approach to comprehending terrorism by embedded his case study in the larger
framework of collective action and social movement theory. Such an approach, Alimi
believes, will shed more light on the radicalization of the formerly non-extremist
Tanzim and in addition supply counter-terrorism with fresh new insights to improve on
the ways it has been conducted so far. Radicalization in general, and the resort to
violence and terrorism in particular, can be better understood in the context of internal
organizational dynamics, or in the authors terms, the milieu of the SMO (social
movement organization). The study of counter-terrorism would benefit from viewing
ix
a terrorist organization as one actor in the overall field of actors a social movement,
and from furthering the analysis of the internal dynamics within the movement.
Thereby, perceptiveness, discernment and pragmatism in understanding terrorism and
counter-terrorism would be best served.
Juan Aviles introduces the Spanish case, specifically the fight against the Basque
separatist terror group ETA. The author poses the question of how to characterize the
indiscriminate killing of civilians during armed conflict. This is a hybrid situation
between the killing of civilians in peacetime, which is clearly terrorism, and the killing
of army and police personnel during violent conflict, which is more like guerrilla
warfare. However, ETA terrorism falls in the middle, for it also attacks (though not
exclusively) civilian targets in the midst of an ongoing conflict with the Spanish
government. Additionally, in an age of protracted, low-intensity conflicts, does the
struggle constitute a war or an anomaly in a time of peace? How to characterize ETA
then: terrorist group? guerrilla movement? paramilitary unit, or perhaps a band of
committed freedom fighters? This is not simply an exercise in semantics, but rather a
serious question of how to defeat Basque extremists and with what means: legal,
political, military or diplomatic. Ultimately, Aviles concludes that recognizing ETA as
a political actor and permitting its political arm to participate in Basque elections was a
mistake. Another mistake was that the Spanish authorities resorted to undemocratic
measures in their campaign against ETA. This was counter-productive and hurt the
interests of the State. One of the biggest challenges, perhaps the most crucial, in
fighting terrorism in an open society is waging efficient counter-terrorism without
abandoning the principles of the democratic State.
A Russian and an Armenian scholar introduce the problem of terrorism in
Chechnya. Vorkunova and Hovhannesian argue that terrorism challenges order and
stability by ultimately creating the conditions for chaos and uncoordinated
activities. It is conceived to include systems of disorder at all levels of human
activity. They call attention to the expansion of the official Russian approach to
terrorism as the Chechnyan terrorist campaign began to take its toll on the Russian
people. From the rather limited and narrow Article 205 of the Russian Criminal Code
to the Russian Federation Federal Law On the Fight Against Terrorism, adopted on
June 25, 1998, the scope of counter-terrorism has widened in direct proportion to the
growing menace of Chechnyan terrorism. The authors point to the amalgam of
traditional and modern motives in Chechnyan terrorism which render it extremely
brutal and ruthless. Bolstered by intense Islamic fervor, this terrorism represents a
formidable challenge to the newly founded democracy in Russia. However, as the
authors poignantly stress, counter-terrorism in that region is still very cumbersome and
handicapped by mutual suspicions and fears for economic, environmental and genetic
security, the breakdown of the traditional system of values and the traditional way of
life in the South Caucasus.
The last part of the book concentrates on counter-terrorism and its challenges
before the background of the open society. This section focuses on analytical models
for combating terrorism in democracies without sacrificing civil liberties. Dealing
again with the delicate issue of finding a balance between the necessity to oppose
terrorism and the need to preserve the spirit of liberty, this section brings to the fore the
legal perspective. Two experts on international law, one Israeli and the other German,
present two contrasting viewpoints on that controversial subject, whose differences are
quite apparent when juxtaposed. Barry Feinstein, in a carefully reasoned study of the
States right to defend itself against terrorism, positively evaluates and justifies
counter-terrorism as a form of preemptive strike. He draws heavily on international law
when he asserts that, [b]eyond the responsibility of a State for all acts conducted
within its territory which violate the rights of another State, as well as for any resulting
violations of the other States sovereignty, it moreover must actively prevent such acts
and violations. Of course, if there are other alternatives to the use of force against the
threat of terrorism, they must be chosen. But if there are none, the State thereby
attacked is indeed permitted to exercise force to protect itself pursuant to its inherent
right of self-defense according to Article 51 of the UN Charter. But then, an obviously
pragmatic, but also moral, question arises: when to launch a pre-emptive strike? What
are the justifiable grounds to initiate counter-terrorism, or should anti-terrorism efforts
be exclusively reactive? Must States threatened by terrorism wait for a clear and
present danger to arise, or for a threat of considerable consequence? Feinstein rejects
this latter alternative. He believes that counter-terrorism is applicable not only in
situations where a threat is imminent, but also in those cases where the danger is more
remote, but nevertheless real, if the intent of the terrorist to attack has been
demonstrated in the past.
Berthold Meyer is less willing to condone pre-emptive measures. He earnestly
questions whether increasing security is a suitable means to protect liberty. In an
illuminating survey of German Law and German security measures taken after 9/11,
Meyer concludes that German leaders neglected their most critical obligation: to defend
freedom and civil liberties. By shifting the balance between security and democracy in
favor of security, and by relying too heavily on stockpiles of paragraphs on suspicion
and presumed intentions to act, rather than on actual and demonstrated infringements of
security, the German Law on Terrorism, known as Security Packet II, fails to embody
the spirit of democracy. The criteria for when to apply the strict Law are the tests of
sufficient probability and life experience. Using such criteria is, in the authors words,
treading on shaky ground. Meyers own recommendations are clear: there must be
stricter and more demanding standards for action, even, and especially, when emotions
and sentiments are strongly aroused. The usefulness of any countermeasure against
terrorism must be evaluated before its implementation, and new security legislation
should expire after two years unless extended. This is the only way, warns Meyer, to
prevent civil rights from being permanently limited.
Wilhelm Kempf and Lubna Nadvi also offer reservations and admonitions against
excessive counter-terrorist measures. Their perspectives differ from the previous
writers and reflect their respective research disciplines, psychology and political
science. Kempf examines and criticizes the overly ambitious and overly aggressive
trends of post-9/11 counter-terrorism. He points out that, outrage at war is
transformed into outrage at the enemy, which does not serve democracies well. The
reprehensible attacks of September 11, 2001 could, he proposes, have been adequately
dealt with using strong legal, economic and diplomatic means, but instead the United
Stated chose a policy of extreme force. The author attributes this response to Americas
threatened pride in its world leadership. The vulnerability of the US triggered a
natural impulse that American self-confidence needed to be restored and strength
needed to be demonstrated by fighting back. This was the wrong approach to counterterrorism not only because it is irrational, but also because it is counter-productive and
self-defeating. The US launched an all-out war against an elusive enemy and
committed its armed forces to a protracted campaign that has provoked animosity and
xi
resentment in many parts of the world. Enormous amounts of energy and resources
were invested by the American government in convincing its people of the legitimacy
of the war. Such efforts can easily deceive the public, cautions Kempf, who concludes
that, Fighting terrorism exclusively by military means bears the danger that the values
of democracy will gradually be reduced to a mere facade.
Nadvi also addresses the reaction to 9/11. She asks whether the war against
terrorism that had been unleashed by a range of governments on militant insurgents is
actually curtailing terrorist activities, or whether their actions are simply serving to
inflame further violent militancy. Nadvi insightfully points to the futility of the
vicious cycle of terrorism from below and terrorism from above, or insurgent terrorism
and State terrorism. The two forms of terror nourish and draw energy from each other.
The only way to escape the predicament of this chaotic global security situation is for
global civil society to step in and create a space for constructive engagement where
the public can demand accountability from both governments and non-state militants
who are essentially responsible for the chaos that is being unleashed on civilian
populations. This is a fresh and ambitious approach to the task of countering
terrorism. Since governments are incapable of fulfilling this mission, civic networks,
grass-root movements and NGOs must come together at global summits and coordinate
a plan of action to prevent, or at least to reduce the prospects of global terrorism.
The final three contributions offer practical approaches for combating terrorism in
the liberal State. Eitan Hadar, a computer scientist, Irit Hadar, a management
information systems analyst, and Alexander Bligh, a well-known political scientist with
a strong military intelligence background, propose instructive and thought-provoking
models to supply encompassing solutions for the shifting balance of security and
freedom. The Hadars contribution consists of two complementary papers: one presents
an archetypical model of an adaptive global intelligence system for detecting and
warning against developing terrorist activities, while the other supplements and
strengthens the model by adding the human aspects that may impact the process of
building and using the system, the challenges and risks derived from them, and possible
solutions. Both writers share a similar point of departure the need to explore better
collaboration against international terrorism not only across cultures, political systems
and borders, but also across intelligence agencies. Eitan Hadar pinpoints the
weaknesses of past endeavors in this demanding area: conventional collaboration
technologies do not provide enough flexibility to achieve these ambitious goals. These
systems must adapt to rapid changes within a dynamic environment. [and] current
centralized systems are inadequate. He then goes on to suggest a remedy in the form
of a peer-to-peer network using a decentralized grid of computers that collaborate with
one another on a geographically distributed computational platform. Each terminal, or
each node of the grid supplies specific and unique information that is rapidly
combined into a concrete whole of relevant material on terrorism. This is a vision
which focuses on the network language and on the interface definition of the
systems boundaries and architecture. If adopted and implemented, this model could
contribute enormously to the war against terrorism.
Irit Hadar offers a perspective to further improve the model. She calls attention to
the human aspects involved in designing and developing artificial intelligence systems
and complex computer grids. This is an opposite orientation to the previous entry:
instead of mechanizing human collaboration, Irit Hadars vantage point is to try to
humanize or personalize machines. This is crucial to the enhancement of the model,
xii
because a consideration of the cognitive processes of decision-makers, the associations

and fears of leaders and the stigmata, prejudices and social motivations of analysts
incorporated into the design of the hardware may enrich the system with human
subtleties and sensitivities. The intricate situations that counter-terrorism must face can
be dealt with in a significantly better way if human aspects are prudently integrated
into the mechanism.
Alexander Bligh combines analytical skills with an understanding of intelligence
services and their needs to devise a standardized model for anti-terror agencies to share
information and jointly act on their information. Bligh starts where the Hadars leave
off: he develops the Hadars rudimentary prototype and adds preemptive and punitive
dimensions. His elaborate model purports to break down each terrorist incident into its
smallest elements, endeavoring through appropriate software to find associations and
commonalities among certain actions and their stages. Thus, details are combined to
create an inclusive scenario of terrorism. This clearinghouse of information, in the
authors words, will enable law enforcement agencies, on a regular basis, to classify
the degree of risk and operate within the imperatives of all pertinent laws. With such
precise means of identifying and combating terrorism, the excessive and
disproportionate face of counter-terrorism, which has deleterious effects on democracy
and liberty, could be avoided or at least minimized.
In the concluding paper, I attempt to shed some light on the new arena and the new
actors of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the post-9/11 world. The most crucial step
on the road to successful counter-terrorism is the precise identification of the
phenomenon of terrorism and its perpetrators. Terrorism has changed in the last two
decades since the war in Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution. It has grown in range,
intensity and cruelty. It has become more global, destructive and relentless. New actors
have assumed the roles of perpetrators. Instead of socialist, communist or Anarchist
revolutionaries, on the one hand, or fanatical nationalists and vehement de-colonizers,
on the other, the new terrorists are cut from a different cloth: they are messianic
fundamentalists, and their cause is redemption on their own terms. Counter-terrorism
must espouse new tools and new understandings in order to come to grips with such a
formidable enemy. My paper introduces revitalization movements, such as Al-Qaeda,
which must discredit the prevailing system in the most fundamental manner. Its
leaders should discount and denounce every aspect of the current regime, focusing
chiefly on the issues pertaining to the groups predicament. This partly answers the
de-contextualized why-do-they-hate-us quandary in the wake of the terror attacks on
New York and Washington. This pathetically nave question illustrates the unsettling
effects of terrorism. It challenges conventional wisdom and forces a reconsideration of
taken-for-granted truths. Ignorance frustrates pre-emptive capability, and awareness is
overwhelmed by surprise. If terrorism breeds and spreads through ignorance and
surprise, then awareness and preparedness must become key features of counterterrorism.
xiii
Contents
Introduction: Terrorism and the Open Society A Question of Balance
Samuel Peleg
Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures

Samuel Peleg
The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of Whom?

Hassan Hanafi
September 11 and the Need for a Social Science Research Agenda

Wilhelm Kempf
Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Collective Action Perspective for
Analyzing the Tanzim
Eitan Y. Alimi
14
20
Experiencing Terrorism in Spain: The Case of ETA

Juan Aviles
40
Combating Terrorism Through International Law

Barry A. Feinstein
48
Violence and Terrorism: The Sense and Its Names

Mokhtar Benabdallaoui
83
Fighting Terrorism by Tightening Laws: A Tightrope Walk Between

Protecting Security and Losing Liberty
Berthold Meyer
88
Peer Networks of Collaborating Intelligent Software Agents: Modular

Infrastructure for Adaptive Distributed Intelligent Systems
Eitan Hadar
98
The Impact of the Human Aspects in Designing Collaborative Information

Technology Systems
Irit Hadar
108
A Practitioners Thoughts About Terrorism

Mansour Abu Rashid
113
The Role of Business in the UK Policing Counter-Terrorist Effort

Jeff Fouhy
122
An Analytical Model of Anti-Terror Cross-Border Cooperation

Alexander Bligh
124
Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies

Olga A.Vorkunova and David Hovhannesian
134
xiv
The War Against State Terrorism: Reframing the Debate on Global

Terrorism
Lubna Nadvi
154
Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and

Their Senders
Anne Speckhard
158
The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game

Samuel Peleg
176
Subject Index
193
Author Index
197

IOS Press, 2006
Contemporary Modern Terrorism:

Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures
Samuel PELEG
Israel
Abstract. This article sets the tone for the entire book. It introduces terrorism as a
political term: It is an act intended to influence politics. As such, it is a calculated
and premeditated initiative, which is carried out with purposive motivations.
Consequently, terrorism is not a spontaneous caprice or a whimsical impulse but a
rational deed, which has a goal, chosen means and a fit between them.
Counterterrorism, therefore, must severe this crucial link between goals and means
and render terrorism less attractive to its prospective perpetrators.
Keywords. Political terrorism;
participation; deprivation; ideology
rationality;
stress-seekers;
messianism;
Introduction
We must put an end to this madness, vowed British Prime Minister Tony Blair after
the July 7, 2005 terror attack on London, which claimed the lives of 59 people and
injured many more. But this was no madness. This was a premeditated, cold-blooded
and vicious assault on one of the most vibrant symbols of the open society. London
was not attacked by mentally deranged outcasts that awful morning, but rather by a
team of rational and calculating human bombs with a mission: to disrupt the everyday
routines of a democracy. The British capital, like every other thriving, bustling city that
cherishes its freedoms, was a very propitious stage for the perpetrators atrocities.
Taking advantage of their freedom to move about at will carrying deadly explosives
without the risk of being stopped and searched, the terrorists found it easy to deliver
destruction into the very heart of the metropolis.
Blairs statement was typical of the immediate responses to despicable and
indiscriminate terrorism. It is consoling to assume that rational persons do not commit
morally depraved crimes, since they weigh the costs and benefits of their actions and
are guided by some form of moral code. This perspective contrasts the reasonable and
sensible against the inexplicable and insane. The most comforting way to cope with
incomprehensible savagery is to quarantine the perpetrators in the category of the
criminally insane and stamp them with the all-encompassing label of mad fanatics.
Such a demarcation serves two purposes: it isolates and excludes the bad guys from
normal society, and it protects the good guys, people such as we. Such an
understanding actually undermines the struggle against terrorism, however, because it
abandons a thorough analysis of the background and motivation of terrorism for the
sake of a fleeting reassurance that we are all right. It trades the insecurity of
S. Peleg / Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures
regarding terrorism as logically patterned behavior for the reassuring preference for
viewing terrorism as pathological and deviant. Labeling terrorism as abnormal
exonerates society for maltreating its pariahs and excuses policymakers for their
failings. This is a colossal misunderstanding.
Characteristics of Political Terrorism

There are reasons why people commit terrorism. The reasons usually involve political,
ideological or social meanings and orientations. In their condemnation of terrorism,
many analysts and policymakers often overlook that the perpetrators always have an
ultimate objective and a designated target. The ultimate objective is to bring about
political change; the chosen target can be anyone seen as blocking this desired change,
or anyone perceived as responsible for an unacceptable status quo. The indiscriminate
character of modern terrorism, as opposed to, for example, the selective nature of 19th
century terrorism1, is explained using the distinction that has been developed between
two types of victims: the innocent, or immediate victim, and the ultimate victim. The
former can be a crowd of shoppers in a shopping mall, or the passengers on a bus,
whereas the latter are usually policymakers and power elites [2]. The growing
psychological effect of terrorism, improved technologies of violence and the distance
of political leaders from society have led to differences among victims: the more
spectacular the act of terrorism, the more rapid the governmental response. A
government is regarded as incompetent when it does nothing to ward off the threat of
terrorism or when, through its countermeasures, it aggravates the plight of those who
initiated a challenge to order and stability. Increasing mistrust of and delegitimization
of the system result, coupled with a harsh doctrine that provokes true believers to
draconian action. Such action is often translated into political terrorism [3].
The decision to opt for terrorism may be based on three grounds:
1. Terrorism may be indicative of extremist groups that can ideologically justify
violence and are disillusioned with all other channels of expression.
2. Terrorism is one of the most effective ways to disrupt the status quo or to
block the emergence of an alternative, unacceptable state of affairs. Terrorism
puts governments on the spot, since it challenges their capacity to govern.
Thus, it compensates perpetrators for their lack of military capability to
change their situation. Hence, terrorism makes a groups power to act appear
much greater than it really is, as Gideon showed with his few warriors against
the Midianites.
3. By its nature, terrorism is more easily diffused across borders than any other
type of politically oriented violence. It requires secrecy, commitment, loyalty,
confidence, and willingness to sacrifice oneself for the cause. But these are
precisely the traits that often appeal to disheartened, humiliated selfproclaimed world redeemers. Traditionally, becoming a terrorist has meant
joining a marginal group or organization of radical activists, identifying with
their goals and methods of operation, and accepting their norms, principles,
moral codes and rules of behavior. When this was the case, this transformation
1
For an excellent comparison of ancient, old and modern terrorism see Walter Laqueurs The Age of
Terrorism [1].
meant a total break with a terrorists previous way of life and the absorption of
his individual self into the collective identity of the group. Political extremists
who decide to act and become terrorists see themselves not as lone assassins,
but rather as representatives of a vigorous constituency. The attempt to
stigmatize them as loners, madmen, psychopaths or socio-paths distorts the
fact that many potential political terrorists flourish under the auspices of a
protecting identity group, be it ethnic, religious or national, and are buoyed up
by the camaraderie and esprit des corps of a group.
What is it that prompts young, idealistic individuals who are dissatisfied with the
socio-political situation surrounding them to try to change the status quo by joining a
radical and violent group? We can distinguish between the push of individual
psychological attributes and the pull of the organizational incentives and benefits that
terrorist groups promise their potential recruits. A combination of pushes and pulls
is responsible for the final matching of the terrorist organization and its recruits. The
internal psychological need to become a terrorist stems from discontent and
disenchantment with the existing state of affairs. A sense of revolt and defiance of
materialistic and accepted reality is accompanied by profound contempt for monetary
values, luxuries or the culture of consumption. The worldview of a potential terrorist is
dichotomous: it is comprised of a sense of the opposition between good and evil: the
unfair status of the top-dogs who oppress the underdogs without there being any
intermediate gray tones or circumstances to mitigate the sharp contrast [5]. Potential
terrorists are so convinced of their self-righteousness that they are totally insensitive to
the suffering and injustice they themselves wreak in their quest to create a perfect
society.
Many terrorists do not personally suffer from inequality and poverty. On the
contrary, they often come from middle-class families and tranquil social environments.
They first encounter social injustice when they grow up and leave home, begin their
university education and become aware of social and political instability in the world.
Others are not attracted as much by a concern for social justice as by the thrill of action,
the excitement and constant danger of being pursued day and night; psychologists call
these individuals stress-seekers [6]. A similar reason for joining a terrorist group is to
escape from boredom or the dull routines of everyday life. Others are intoxicated by the
mystique and the aura of heroism and romanticism surrounding terrorism. They enjoy
the sense of power and the advantage of being unexpected, unpredictable, and always
initiating. The young terrorist or freedom fighter expects to enjoy eternal glory in
exchange for joining the good fight; he hopes to achieve martyrdom or sainthood if he
dies carrying out a dangerous mission.
The organization provides an alternative framework or family for disenchanted
youth. Being part of a group offers a sense of belonging and an opportunity for
camaraderie, friendship and participation in a common fate. Such reassuring
experiences diminish the recruits insecurities vis--vis a hostile environment and
bolster his belief in the righteousness of his chosen path. Social status is also
guaranteed by joining a terrorist group, especially if the organization is popularly
perceived as expressing the anguish of a large, persecuted group, as in the cases of the
Irish Republican Army or the various factions of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization. In these cases, the terrorist has no need to break with his own social
background, since that very milieu may have led to his recruitment by a terrorist group
in the first place. The young terrorist or freedom fighter has the prospect of achieving
eternal glory by joining the struggle; he can hope for martyrdom or sainthood if he
perishes in the course of performing his destructive duty.
Another distinction relevant to what makes terrorists tick is between rational and
irrational motives for joining terrorist groups. The rational terrorist is the goal-oriented,
calculating activist who makes a careful cost-benefit calculation of the risks and
incentives before choosing a course of action. The rational terrorist needs material or
other tangible incentives in order to become an active member of the militant group:
large salaries, respected status and a luxurious life-style. Terrorists in this category act
more like mercenaries or professional assassins than deeply committed idealists.
Money and security can raise the appeal of terrorism: if the risk of being caught is
offset by financial compensation or reduced by diplomatic immunity or safe passage
through certain territories, then the advantages of the terrorist act overshadow the
potential risks. Though tangible incentives are the easiest to comprehend, intangible
rewards such as eternal bliss in paradise and enhanced social status for ones family
are, in the social and religious environments where they are ardently believed in, no
less rational. The terrorist, in this case, sacrifices a transitory this-worldly life for an
immensely better eternal one.
On the one hand, rational participation in terrorism is inspired by purposive
incentives such as consecrating the deed and glorifying the end, which justify the
terrorist act as a necessary means, regardless of its seemingly depraved nature. The
greater the dedication, and the greater the sense of potential fulfillment, the more likely
it is that a recruit will rationally choose to participate in terrorist groups. On the other
hand, irrational terrorism is often the act of emotional, spontaneously radical
individuals. Such activists neither possess a burning commitment to a cause or an
ideology, nor are they usually motivated by material incentives. They act instead in
response to sudden, unexpected mood swings and outbursts of hatred and the desire for
vengeance. Sometimes the yearning for esteem and acceptance by peers drives them to
commit the most depraved atrocities. These two motivations of terrorism co-exist in
many identity groups, thus both escalating their struggle and making it more effective.
The leadership can be perceived as rational because it devises goals, weighs options
and makes choices. The rank-and-file may be seen as emotional, driven by religious,
ethnic or patriotic zeal, and bound together by the fellowship of the group. The leaders
and adherents complement each other: the former derive their authority to make
rational decisions from the devotion of their followers, while the latter gain deference
and meaning through the ideology and tasks delegated to them by their leaders.
Terrorists are well aware that they are crossing a point of no return in the strategy
of the struggle and that incremental tactics of escalation are virtually impossible to
adopt once the ultimate weapon has been employed. But they seem to relish the
shocking impact of their deeds and utilize the immediate, short-term success of their
audacity to strengthen their faltering spirits. Thus, many terrorist factions are
characterized by unbounded ruthlessness and the small size of the group. Belonging to
a factional, close-knit group supports the secrecy and efficiency that foster terrorism.
To choose terrorism as a course of action, a recruit has to hold passionate convictions
of the right sort, and must develop a profound disdain for any potential hindrance. He
also has to believe that a better future is possible, even imminent, and that human effort
may expedite motion toward this future. A passionate certitude of a cataclysmic

redemption that justifies any means is archetypal of messianic thought patterns2.
Composite Profile of Political Terrorism

From the aforementioned, a quintessential description of political terrorism may be
drawn. Its major characteristics include:
1. Political Terrorism Is Intentional and Rational. It is rational not in a logicalmoralistic sense, but rather in a functional-strategic sense, meaning that it
chooses goals and selects means which are conceived as appropriate to those
goals. Political terrorism is not an incomprehensible undertaking, but rather the
coherent and organized work of resolute perpetrators.
2. Political Terrorism Is Primarily a Political Act. In addition to being criminal
and illegal, it is also an attempt to exert political influence on behalf of people
who, in the terrorists view, have been neglected and abused. Terrorists as
political actors who challenge the status quo [7], and who use their weapons as
negotiation tactics [8], are often underemphasized in analyses.
3. Political Terrorism Is Mostly About Change. Terrorism is instigated in
response to dissatisfaction with or fear of an existing or impending social and
political reality. Thus, the professed objective of extremists is to undermine
routine daily life and to disrupt expected agendas. Political terrorists are
frequently visionaries who aspire to swift and decisive changes in the human
condition (preferably in their groups own condition). They abhor moderate
change and incremental reform and inexorably sanctify their means with the
justness of their cause. There have been, throughout history, political terrorists
who acted in the name of preserving the status quo, but these were rare and far
less significant, because the State and its agents of social control were more
effective in achieving their ends [9, 10]3.
4. Political Terrorism Is a Form of Political Participation. Engaging in the
exertion of power and influence and attempting to change the political agenda
are evidence of a set of independent political preferences and a desire to
2
Messianism is not innately and necessarily a religious phenomenon. By definition, the major attribute of
the concept is comprehensive apocalyptic and traumatic change for large populations. In order to be a true
believer and survive the apocalypse, one must follow the directives and edicts of those in the know. While
it is true that by its nature religion is more akin to notions such as boundless faith, miraculous circumstances,
vast changes, and infallible, divine leadership, secular ideologies like Marxism, Maoism, or Nazism are also
messianic in nature. They boast a monopoly of the truth, they demand unquestioning loyalty, and they
promise a swift and limitless change for the better for those who support them. It is, thus, no wonder that
such very different persons as Vladimir Lenin the fierce Russian revolutionary and Sayyid Qutb the
precursor of revived Islamic fundamentalism saw themselves as vanguards of the revolution.
3
Terrorist groups that organize to stave off change and protect the status quo are sometimes affiliated
with governments, but not necessarily. The Vende uprising of peasants in Western France against the
revolutionary government in Paris was a local initiative aimed at restoring the Monarchy and overthrowing
the radical regime, but the members organized because of their own economic and religious interests [7].
Similarly, Gush Emunim, the extremist religious group of Jewish settlers on the West Bank, organized in
order to thwart the prospects of the Middle East peace process. Although they reaffirmed the policy
tendencies of the right-wing Shamir government at the time, they did not act in the name of that government
[3]. Hence, terrorism in the name of the status quo ought to be distinguished from state terrorism, or
terrorism from above, in which the government officially and directly employs the means of terrorism to
pursue its policies [11].
5.
6.
7.
8.
realize them and to benefit others with their advantages. In other words, it
means the terrorist wants to participate in decision-making processes and
wants to influence their outcomes. Terrorism is therefore a channel to direct
participation in politics. It is a criminal and destructive channel, and yet
nevertheless an effective means.
Political Terrorism Is the Weapon of the Weak. This dictum stems from the
ironic truth that the success of the political terrorist ultimately depends on the
good will of his victims. The terrorists accomplishments are not measured by
the number of buses blown up or by the number of airplanes hijacked. They
are judged by the political change they are intended to expedite. This change
hinges upon governmental compliance with the terrorists wishes. When
change can be brought about from below, regardless of, or despite a
governments response, terrorists become revolutionaries.
Political Terrorism Challenges the Existing Order and Confronts the
Government. To be against the status quo means to be against the existing
order. At the two extremes of the political philosophy spectrum stand order
and justice [12]. Order calls for maintaining and preserving an acceptable
today; justice dictates a progression toward a better tomorrow. This dichotomy
pits not only order and justice against each other in opposing and
uncompromising positions, but also pits challengers (i.e., terrorists) against the
guardians of the status quo (i.e., governments). There is an inherent
incompatibility between political terrorists and governments.
Political Terrorism Is a Collective Undertaking. Terrorism draws strength
from a group ethos. It is a spirit of all for one and one for all which favors
qualities such as self-sacrifice, total commitment and unconditional loyalty
among extremists. The members of the terrorist movement, group, or cell4
encourage and inspire one another. They become a surrogate family for
individuals who have joined them and perhaps thereby severed all ties to their
former way of life. This is particularly true of Islamist terror groups, which
clearly designate themselves as an alternative community, nation or
family and demand that their followers repudiate any ties to nonbelievers. Although lone perpetrators often carry out many terrorist attacks,
these actors usually act for, and are embraced by, a group.
Political Terrorism Is Sustained by Community Deprivation. Through group
spirit and resolve, activists draw strength from their sense of belonging to a
community. Whether it is a religious, national, ethnic or class spirit, the
solidarity and cohesion that typify many terrorist groups emerge from the
feeling that their identity and destiny are inextricably linked with their core
community.
4
Terrorist movements, groups or cells do not merely differ in size. There are also ideological
considerations here: revolutionaries have always attempted to recruit the masses for their cause in order to tilt
the balance of power in the state. Thus, they have always written and spoken about movements, even when
their followers were few; for incitement purposes, they had to claim to be leading a movement. In the 1960s
and 1970s, the tactics used to bring about socio-political change were modified due to the repeated failures of
attempted revolutions. The ideal of the urban guerrilla became popular, and with it, the tactic of the strike in
the middle, which was advocated by Guevara and Debrais. Urban guerrilla efforts necessitated smaller
operating units, hence terrorist groups. Finally, the term terrorist cell is an expression that originated in the
anarchist terrorist tradition. The anarchist disdain for structure and hierarchy led anarchist theorists and
adherents to activism in small and minimally structured units, hence, in terrorist cells [13, 9, 14].
Political Terrorism Is Guided by Ideology. Terrorists experience a profound

sense of conviction and belief. They adhere to strict precepts that are anchored
in a consistent worldview and a fervent ideology. Ideology, with its clear
explanation for the ills of the present and its utopian solutions for the future,
supplies the energy that galvanizes terrorists to adopt frightening methods.
10. Political Terrorism Espouses a Messianic Aura. Following Rapoports ideas,
it seems that political terrorists are on a mission to make the world a better
place. Some may even perceive them as modern day crusaders who are willing
to sacrifice their own welfare for the benefit of others. Their image as moved
by values and steadfast commitments wins them sympathy and support, and
sometimes provisions and material sustenance. Terrorists set out to proselytize
the public and convince it of the justice of their cause [15]. Due to the
spectacular nature of their deeds, they enjoy a permanent captive audience
[16].
Ultimately, political terrorism is more complex than it was formerly given credit
for being. The above discussed characteristics point to a composite profile that should
be studied carefully if this phenomenon is to be countered effectively. These
characteristics of political terrorism can be realized in different ways, and their
consequences can be diversely appreciated. They must be heeded if terrorism is to be
defeated in the 21st century. The specific type of terrorism which currently occupies
the global agenda is the radical Islamist brand. It is a vicious and relentless kind of
terrorism, for it combines all the above-discussed characteristics with an unyielding
and uncompromising ideology. This ideology must be carefully analyzed and
understood if the battle against modern terrorism is to be won.
9.
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Laqueur, W. (1987). The age of terrorism. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987.
Wilkinson, P. (1986). Terrorism and the liberal state (2nd edition). New York: New York University
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Peleg, S. (1997). They shoot Prime Ministers too, dont they? Religious violence in Israel: Premises,
dynamics and prospects. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 20, 227-247.
Peleg, S. (2002). Zealotry and vengeance: Quest of a religious identity group. Lanham, MD: Lexington
Books.
Galtung, J. (1971). A structural theory of imperialism. Journal of Peace Research, 8(2), 81-117.
Crenshaw, M. (1986). The psychology of political terrorism. In: Hermann, M. (ed.). Political
psychology. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Thornton, T. (1964). Terror as a weapon of political agitation. In: Eckstein, H. (ed.). Internal war. New
York: Free Press.
Oberschall, A. (1973). Social conflict and social movement. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Rule, J. (1988). Theories of civil violence. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Arendt, H. (1968). On violence. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
Bull, H. (1995) The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics (2nd edition). New York:
Columbia University Press.
Brinton, C. (1965). The anatomy of revolution. New York: Vintage Books.
Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in movement (2nd edition). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hoffer, E. (1951). The true believer: Thoughts on the nature of mass movements. New York: Harper
and Row.
Heymann, P. (1998). Terrorism and America: A commonsense strategy for a democratic society.
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

IOS Press, 2006
The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of

Whom?
Hassan HANAFI
Department of Philosophy at Cairo University, Egypt
Abstract. To condemn or to understand? / Victimizers and victims / Terrorism or

resistance? / Terrorism of the mutual image / Dialogue between equal partners.
Keywords. Authoritarian state, state terrorism, fundamentalism, globalization,
dialogue of cultures, regional co-operation
To Condemn or To Understand?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
It is easy to condemn, but difficult to understand. Condemning without

understanding results from blindness, presuppositions and the power of
arrogance. It may backfire into an infinite spiral of violence which works
against dialogue and conflict resolution.
To understand is not to justify. Understanding is the first step toward changing
the roots of terrorism. To understand comes first, to change, second. Changing
the roots of violence is a part of conflict resolution which works by
eliminating the sources of conflict.
Using the term terrorism is already a pre-judgment. It has a moral connotation.
The problem is resolved beforehand, even without the necessary effort to
understand. It is a partial perception which works against the objective
analysis of socio-political phenomena. A more impartial word is violence,
including counter-violence, primary and secondary violence, oppressive and
liberating violence, visible and invisible violence, state and individual
violence, etc., common distinctions in Latin American socio-political
literature.
Global war against terrorism is a kind of counter-terrorism. Punishment is
never a solution to crime. That is why capital punishment, namely the death
penalty, doubles the crime of homicide, because not only the victim, but also
the victimizer, is killed. Instead of a single crime sacrificing one human soul,
there are two crimes, sacrificing two human souls.
Global war against terrorism and global war against hegemony may be of the
same order of magnitude. The question is: what is the cause and what is the
effect? A linear notion of causality belongs to religious thinking, presupposing a primary cause, while a circular notion of causality is more
scientific.
H. Hana / The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of Whom?
6.
Terrorism, or more precisely violence, cannot be theoretically understood

without being existentially lived. It is not a matter of a theoretical analysis, but
rather of an existential drama. It is a matter of life and death for the terrorized.
7. Science is not the gathering of intelligence. This is the function of intelligence
agencies, usually linked to state power. Science is motivated by the search for
Truth, namely the laws of reality. Espionage and superstitious techniques
are not part of the methodology of science. The assault on privacy is a crime
and a violation of human rights. It is usually linked to break-ins, surveillance
and residence confinement.
8. Terrorism is not only a problem of security, but also a problem of justice.
When forms of injustice prevail, terrorism emerges in an effort to create a
more just world, even by using evil means.
9. Scholars do not work for institutions such as ministries of defense, or even for
alliances such as NATO. Scholars are motivated by an interest in knowledge.
They can make the military and security force more aware of the limitations of
their approaches. Surely knowledge minimizes risks by revealing more
horizons of conflicts and reasons for tension. Science may also create weapons
of mass destruction and lead to the use of atomic weapons in wars against
people in the name of the war against terrorism.
10. The Liberal State is not the only form of state. Terrorism is practiced by both
liberal states and authoritarian states. Authoritarianism causes more terrorism
than liberalism. In authoritarian regimes dialogue yields to violence.
Divergences of views lead to power struggles and civil wars. If the Liberal
State is identified with the model of the European State, then fighting
terrorism means defending Europe against its enemies. National experiences
are not just those of Spain and America. Both of these countries, as victims of
terror, are Western states, while the victimizers in both cases were Muslim.
Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya and Kashmir are also victims, and the
West, the USA and Russia are their victimizers. Israel and India, although
located in Asia, like Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan , etc., act in the
manner of Western cultures. The West is not a geographical site, but rather a
worldview, namely that of hegemony.
Victimizers and Victims

1.
2.
It has become very common to look at terrorism from the perspective of the
victim, not from that of the victimizer, as if terrorism were a one-way street,
not a two-way street, blaming the victims, not the victimizers, hearing the cry
of pain, but not seeing the needle, pointing the finger at the weak, not at the
strong. This creates, in small nations or in individuals, a great sense of
frustration against the cocalization, namely the Americanization or the
Westernization of the World.
The New World order may be the victimizer of small nations, leading
dissident groups or individuals to use violence against the symbols of power in
modern times, such as the WTO, the GATT, the Pope, and even making
threats against the UN system, which is often misused by the Great Powers.
Globalization as a new form of hegemony is the crux of this new world that
10
3.
4.
5.
arose in the fifties and the sixties: decolonization, liberation movements,

national struggles, the Third World emerging in the bi-polar World.
Big Powers, especially the Western ones, are also part of the New World
Order: The Group of Eight, most industrial countries, the European Union,
allied to the USA, and sometimes France, are returning to their colonial
history, as in the case of Darfour in Sudan, championing the UN resolution to
try war criminals, with the exception of those of the USA, before the
International Court of Justice. Russia invades Chechnya to fight the
Chechnyan national movement for independence, which is called separatism.
Israel occupies all of Palestine, half in 1948, the other half in 1967. India,
playing the Big Power in Asia, occupies Kashmir and rejects the
implementation of a UN resolution concerning the right to self-determination
of the Kashmiri people.
The sole Big Power in the uni-polar system is a source of state terrorism, the
invasion of Afghanistan under the pretext of fighting terrorism, of Iraq under
the pretext of seeking weapons of mass destruction. Now it is threatening Iran
under the same pretext, Syria under the pretext of its sheltering terrorist
groups, and Sudan to save the people of Darfour from genocide. The Big
Power sometimes manipulates the UN System and sometimes violates it.
State Terrorism is also practiced internally by the "New Nation State." It was
at the beginning the outcome of the national liberation movement. It became at
the end a source of oppression. It became an Army and Police State,
controlling education, information, political institutions and civil society.
Terrorism or Resistance?
1.
2.
3.
4.
It is glorious on the epistemological level to define terrorism. Given the

specificities of different national experiences, it is hard to standardize a
definition which does not take into consideration all the different kinds of
terrorism.
There is no one stereotyped definition of terrorism. It depends on the
perspective, the commitment of the scholar and his attitude to life. There is no
one simple, unilateral and sole definition of terrorism, because it is a complex
phenomenon. Terrorism cannot be defined as a fixed essence, but is rather a
changing relationship. It refers to two sides, that of the terrorist and that of the
terrorized. The operational definition is based on major distinctions.
Terrorism is an expression of a strong sense of frustration and feelings of
injustice. If the two sides of the equation, that of the terrorist and that of the
terrorized, are not equal in power, to create a fair struggle the weak side will
use any means it possesses to compensate for its weakness. Power is not only
physical, but also moral. It is not only destruction, but also persuasion, or
more precisely, dissuasion. Nuclear weapons are created as a force of
dissuasion to deter the other side from using them.
In the case of equal power, the struggle between two opposed sides is called
battle, conflict, hostilities, or even war. Where there is a power imbalance, the
weak side empowers itself by any means it has, including martyrdom, socalled suicide-bombing, or terrorism, to resist the stronger side.
5.
6.
11
A sense of frustration arises in the face of double-standard judgments. The

Palestinian is a terrorist, not the militarized settler. The PLO is a terrorist
organization, not the Likud party or the state of Israel. Hamas and Jihad are
terrorist movements, while the state of Israel is a terrorist state. Iraqi resistance
against American occupation is terrorism, while the American invasion of Iraq
is not.
Therefore, individual terrorism is a myth used to justify state terrorism as a
reality. Both pretend to be self-defensive mechanisms against the
transgression of the other side and a legitimate self-defense against the
aggression of the other.
Terrorism of the Mutual Image

1.
2.
3.
4.
Visible terrorism is a concrete expression of the invisible form, which is more

serious and does not need security forces. This is the terrorism of the mutual
image which each side, the terrorist and the terrorized, the victimizer and the
victim, creates of the other. Each partner is known as such, but constructed as
an image which includes one real thread and many invented ones. An image is
a construct made up of perceptions, motivations, interests, power struggles,
historical
accumulations,
misunderstandings,
misconceptions
and
misapprehensions. Over time, images became realities and are completely
substituted for them. Bloodshed on both sides is the outcome. The power of
information contributes to this transformation.
The Muslim World has been identified as the terrorist per excellence. The
mass media even identify terrorism, a socio-political phenomenon, with Islam
itself, as an essence and a culture. All of its history in centers such as
Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Qayrawan, Fs and in the magnificent Andalusia,
Grenada, Cordoba and Seville has been reduced to 11 September in
Washington and New York and the Madrid train bombings.
Terrorism is a sign of underdevelopment, because it solves conflicts by means
of violence, not by negotiation. Terrorism against the other is also directed
against the Self in suicide bombings. Muslim societies become number one
in the number of political prisoners, torture, violations of human rights,
political dictatorship, discrepancies between poverty and wealth. The statuses
of women, minorities and NGOs are very deplorable. The question is how an
argument de facto becomes an argument de jure. If it does, then racism,
arrogance, Nazism, fascism, war and persecution will be arguments de facto
against the love thy neighbor of Jesus, an argument de jure.
Given the centrality of Europe in modern times over the past five centuries,
Eurocentrism has given the European consciousness a certain arrogance,
intertwined with skin color and race. The ideals of the Enlightenment have
made Europe a model per excellence of modernism. The West creates, and the
Rest transfers. This center and periphery dichotomy created in the West a
superiority complex, and in the Rest an inferiority complex. Superiority is
intertwined with supremacy and hegemony, while inferiority is linked to the
Semitic mind, to a primitive mentality and a pense sauvage. The
12
5.
6.
American question: Why they do hate us? is a real question, since 5% of the
worlds population owns and consumes 75% of the worlds wealth and goods.
This situation has placed the victim, who is labeled a terrorist, permanently on
the defensive, in defense of his own history, culture and personality. He needs
some present respect and historical recognition, according to the Hegelian
dialectic of master and slave. The acts of violence which erupt from time to
time are the sigh of the oppressed, a self-affirmation in an unjust world.
Violence aims sometimes at alleviating the suffering of the marginalized, so
that the center will have an equal partner.
The victim is constantly being scrutinized, looked at under the microscope,
objectified and reified as an object of study. How many international
conferences there are, held even by NATO, on terrorism, fundamentalism,
violence, reform, the other, democratization, civil society, minority rights,
human rights, gender in the Muslim World, etc. Violence is a kind of a revolt
of the object desiring to be a subject, a rejection of reification in an effort to
rediscover ones own subjectivity, from the object to the subject, from the
observed to the observer, from Orientalism, where the West is the subject and
the Rest is the object, to Occidentalism, where the Rest is the subject and the
West is the object.
Dialogue between Equal Partners

1.
2.
3.
4.
To fight terrorism in the liberal state and to create an integrated model of

research on counter-terrorism is to lay the groundwork for a dialogue between
equal partners. The stumbling block in the Euro-Arab dialogue is the
discrepancy between the European economic agenda and the Arab political
agenda.
This equal dialogue is a manifestation of the dialogue of cultures, not of a
clash of civilizations. A dialogue between the victim and the victimizer on
equal terms substitutes arguments for bombs, the power of persuasion for
military power. The honorable thing to do is to discuss, to convince or to be
convinced. Using physical violence, minimum violence by the victimized and
maximum violence by the victimizer, is a sign of weakness. Moses did not
succeed, but Jesus did.
A double standard in judgment and action is one of the major factors which
arouses in the victimized, who is labeled a terrorist, a sense of outrage. The
bombing and killing of innocent people in Northern Ireland, in the PaysBasque, by the ETA in Spain and neo-Nazis in Germany, the extreme right in
Italy and right-wing extremists in the USA, are not counted as terrorism.
Organized crime in the USA, the Mafia in Italy or Russia, are likewise not
considered forms of terrorism.
Europe is an equal partner of the Arab World around the Mediterranean Basin.
The two shores, North and South, have had relations throughout history. When
the North is strong, it overflows its borders, as it did during the Greco-Roman
period, and the present European hegemony. When the Southern shore is
strong, it overflows into the North, as happened in the period of strong Islamic
culture, especially in Spain. The North played the master twice in classical and
5.
6.
13
modern times, and the South played the role of disciple twice in the same two
periods. The South played the role of master once, in the era of Islamic
civilization peaking in Andalusia, and with the recognized Islamic resurgence
now a second time. Europe did acknowledge its role as disciple one time, in
late Scholasticism and on the eve of modern times. Can it acknowledge the
role of disciple now, in the time of the eclipse of the West, after God is dead
and Man is alive, and man is also dead and nobody is alive?
Terrorism may be a symptom of the West winds eclipse and the East winds
rise, a crossroads in world history. When the Earth moves, earthquakes follow.
Signs of the European malaise can be seen in: Feyerabends Farewell to
Reason and Against Method, Spenglers Untergang des Abendlands, Husserls
Krise der europischen Wissenschaft, Schelers Umsturz der Werte, Toynbees
Western Civilization on Trial, Paul Hazards crise de la conscience Europenne,
Bergsons la machine faire des dieux. Postmodernism, deconstructionism,
skepticism, agnosticism and nihilism are also symptoms.
Advanced research workshops must renew the agenda from fundamentalism
to post-fundamentalism, from the war on terrorism to avenues of peace, from
Globalization to Inter-dependence and regional co-operation. The current
agenda in international scholarship is really obsolete. The world is changing
due to the nature of things, while the agenda is fixed by ideologies, because of
the fixed stereotyped images that each partner has constructed of the other.
The destruction of these mutual images is one of the ways of ending the myth
of terrorism.
14

IOS Press, 2006
September 11 and the Need for a Social

Science Research Agenda
Wilhelm KEMPF
Department of Psychology at the University of Konstanz, Germany
Abstract. Comparing US propaganda strategies after September 11 with those of

the Gulf War and the Bosnia Conflict the paper argues that targeted propaganda
measures were not needed in order to plant military logic in the public mind. All
that was needed was a lack of understanding of the terror attack and its pseudoexplanation in terms of groundless hate. It was this mind-set, which rejected any
analysis of the conflict sources, which ruled out any resolution other than the
elimination of the enemy, and which even denied his most essential human rights.
And it is this mind set, which threatens to reduce democracy to a pure faade, to
destroy its credibility and to produce even more hatred against the Western world.
Keywords. Propaganda, military logic, peace logic, human rights, human dignity,
democracy
So great are the psychological resistances to war in modern times, that every war must
appear to be a war of defense against a menacing, murderous aggressor [1]. In this
process, propaganda plays an important role. The aim of pro-war propaganda is to get
people to strongly and personally identify with the goals of the war and to manipulate
their entanglement in the conflict in order to reorganize their hierarchy of values so that
winning the war is at the top, and all other values like truth, ethical considerations
and individual rights are only subservient to this goal.
In order to win public support for war, it is necessary to produce a mindset where
there is a delicate balance between the experience of threat and confidence in winning
the conflict. Typical features of this mindset are its Zero-Sum orientation and the
designation of force as an appropriate means of conflict resolution. It is characterized
by cognitive factors like
x idealization of own rights and goals,
x denial of the opponents rights and demonizing his intentions,
x rejection of a peaceful settlement of the conflict,
x demonizing the opponents actions and emphasis on his dangerousness,
x denial of possibilities for cooperation,
x denial of superordinate rights and goals and
x justification of own sides actions and emphasis on own strength.
And it has emotional consequences, like
x mistrust of the enemy,
x feelings of being threatened,
x denial of a threat to the opponent: If he behaves well, he has nothing to fear!
x Confidence in winning: Good will prevail over Evil!
W. Kempf / September 11 and the Need for a Social Science Research Agenda
15
Due to the overall cognitive and emotional mindset, outrage at the war is
transformed into outrage at the enemy [2].
The idea underlying traditional propaganda strategies was to transmit propaganda
messages from the top on down and to unify society in its struggle against an enemy.
As Lasswell [1] put it: Civilian unity is not achieved by the regimentation of muscles.
It is achieved by a repetition of ideas rather than movements. The civilian mind is
standardized by news not by drills. Propaganda is the method by which this process is
aided and abetted. Accordingly, the traditional means of propaganda are:
x Restrictive methods like censorship to suppress information that might reduce
patriotic spirit.
x Supportive methods like the fabrication, selection and exaggeration of
information that might strengthen it.
And the professional credo is: Truth is only raw material. Lies are merely a
technical, not a moral problem. If no lies are needed, so much the better.
And lies are not needed if the propagandist manages to get the public personally
engaged in a conflict. This was the beginning of psychological propaganda techniques
that build upon:
x Polarization of identification suggestions [3].
x Production of a specific motivational logic [3]
x Immunization of the propaganda message against criticism with measures
like: harmonization of referential levels [3], double-bind communication (cf.
Reimann, 2002), and two-sided messages [4].
The idea behind these techniques is: to get the public emotionally involved and
then wait for those escalation-oriented changes in the cognitive representation of
conflict that we can observe whenever a person, a group or a society is involved in
competitive conflicts and that are due to the logic of the win-lose model underlying
competitive conflicts [2].
Psychological preparation for war is a time consuming process, however: in the
case of the Gulf War, it took 6 months, in the case of the Bosnia Conflict 6 years but
in case of the War on Terrorism it took only 6 weeks. In order to get the US public to
support the Gulf War, it was necessary to construct a complex motivational logic that
included a specific interpretation of the past, assessment of the present and promise for
the future [5].
Interpretation of the past: The appeasement policy towards Adolf Hitler caused the
Second World War and a world catastrophe. If Hitler had been stopped early enough,
the war could have been avoided. The same goes for Saddam Hussein. If he is not
stopped now, right after the invasion of Kuwait, he will go on to attack the whole
Persian Gulf area.
Assessment of the present: The collapse of socialism and the triumph of Western
democracy are just the right moment to restore the position of the UN and to show
terrorist states that no gains can be had through violence. Economic sanctions would
work too slowly. While the world was waiting, Iraq might build nuclear weapons or
might attack with chemical weapons.
Promise for the future: After the war, a New World Order will be established
where the rights of small nations will not be allowed to be trampled on and where the
rules of international justice will be respected. The alternative scenario would be the
world's oil reserves ending under the control of a nuclear-armed Iraq, and dictators
everywhere would be encouraged.
16
Based on this motivational logic, the right balance between threat and confidence
could be established rather easily, and even more so, since most average citizens didnt
know much about Iraq or Saddam Hussein, and human rights organizations, as well as
pacifist groups, had already been opposed to Saddam Hussein during the war between
Iraq and Iran (1980-1988), at a time when Saddam Hussein was still an esteemed ally
of the United States.
In former Yugoslavia, the situation was much more complicated [6]: Serbia, which
had been part of the anti-German alliance during two world wars, was holding on to
socialism. This was not in accordance with the interests of the European Union.
German and Austrian diplomacy supported the struggle for independence in Slovenia,
Croatia and Bosnia. As these countries were ready to open their economy to the
European market, this coincided with EU interests as well.
Croatia and Bosnia had collaborated with the Nazis during World War II, however,
and their current leadership was rather suspect: In his book Wastelands of Historical
Reality, Croat President Tudjman had made statements that could easily be interpreted
as anti-Semitic, and in his book The Islamic Declaration, Bosnian President
Izetbegovic openly advocated creating a fundamentalist Islamic state.
Although the Bosnia Conflict involved a similar motivational logic as the New
World Order concept, this was not sufficient to unite the European nations against
Serbia and to get the United States involved. In order to produce the necessary balance
between threat and confidence, propaganda could not simply take sides against the
Serbs, but differences in the media images of the three ethnic groups developed
gradually and were mainly due to the different roles in which the groups were
portrayed by the media. The most positive role was constructed for the Muslims, who
were depicted as least confrontational and most often in a defensive position. Both
Serbs and Croats, on the other hand, were portrayed more as aggressors.
Although the military logic on the Serbian side was the least reported, the negative
image of the Serbs resulted from other factors, however. First, Serbian actors were
covered by the media twice as often as each of the other groups, and Serbian behavior
was depicted as most confrontational. Second, Serbian rights and intentions were given
little attention, and as possibilities for cooperation between the Serbs and their
opponents were accentuated, confrontational Serbian behavior appeared to be even less
justified. Third, the press stimulated the least outrage about the opponents of the Serbs
and rather downplayed the suffering on the Serbian side. Fourth, incentives for social
identification with Serbian victims were extremely low, and there was even a
considerable amount of dehumanization of Serbian victims.
While it is not surprising that the international media portrayed the Muslims in a
defensive role and assigned the Serbs the role of evil-doers, the really striking move
was to get the Croats out of the line of fire, and even more so, since the Croats placed
the greatest emphasis on military logic and rejected the logic of peace more decisively
than the other parties. Both the Croat emphasis on military logic and the rejection of
peace logic by the Croats could seemingly be justified, however, by giving the highest
priority to their rights and intentions, as well as by the rejection of cooperative
alternatives.
Nonetheless: although the international press reported quite unequally about the
three ethnic groups, the coverage was quite ambiguous about all three of them. The
press identified itself with none of the Bosnian war parties, but rather with the
international community, which had a problem with the ethnic groups in Bosnia.
17
In doing so, the media supported a policy of peace enforcement (by military
intervention) rather than a policy of peacemaking (by third-party mediation efforts).
The more deeply the international actors got involved in the conflict, the greater was
the media sympathy for them. The more they managed to stay in a neutral position, the
more they were criticized, and the more negative was their press coverage.
In the case of the Afghan War, things were completely different, and far less
propaganda was needed to persuade the public to support the war. In order to
understand this, we must be aware that the emotional and motivational correlates of
warfare are not only a consequence of the respective cognitive mind set, but also that
the cognitive correlates result from emotional entanglement in the conflict. There is a
circular relationship between emotions and cognitions, and each influences the other
[7].
In the case of the Afghan War, the publics emotional entanglement in the conflict
was the greatest possible from the start. All that was necessary in order to motivate the
public to support the war was to identify the enemy, to justify military action as an
appropriate response and to make victory appear probable.
The attacks of September 11 were certainly criminal acts of horrendous
proportions, the threat was real, and it could be experienced first hand by anybody.
Thousands of innocent people were killed in the heart of the USA, and as life is the
most essential human right, there was no need to idealize US rights and goals. There
was also no need to demonize the attack: that it was a brutal act of terrorism was selfevident. And there was no need to emphasize the opponents dangerousness: The threat
was real, and what happened on September 11 could have happened anywhere.
As a criminal act, the terrorist attack of September 11 could have been dealt with
on the basis of international law. The Taliban could have been persuaded to turn over
Osama Bin Laden to a neutral country, and an independent court could have tried him.
Terrorist organizations all over the world could have been fought by police operations
subject to control by courts, and the struggle against terrorism could have been fought
in compliance with the democratic principle of the division of power. Perhaps this is
what critics like the German author Gnter Grass or German President Johannes Rau
were thinking of when they called for a civilized response to the terrorist acts.
Obviously, however, such a civilized response was not on the political agenda. The
events of September 11 were not only a terrorist attack against the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon, they were also a symbolic act that humiliated the US by
demonstrating what had been unimaginable before: the vulnerability of the American
homeland.
In a situation like this, it was only a natural impulse that American self-confidence
needed to be restored and strength needed to be demonstrated by fighting back.
Fighting back needed to be justified, however. It could not look like pure vengeance,
and to accomplish this, the attack had to be seen as more than criminal and humiliating.
By interpreting the attack as an attack against civilization in general, the planned war
could be made to seem like a sort of civilized police operation employing all available
means, including armed force, which would add to the expectation of victory. And as
every nation in the world was given a choice between unconditional solidarity with the
US or being regarded as part of the terrorist network, the war presumably would not
threaten any civilized country either.
18
One month after the terrorist attack, on October 11, 2001, US President George W.
Bush [8] came to the climax of this interpretation and even aggravated it by expressing
an inability to understand what had happened and why:
How do I respond when I see that in some Islamic countries there is vitriolic
hatred for America? Ill tell you how I respond: Im amazed. Im amazed that theres
such misunderstanding of what our country is about that people would hate us. I am
like most Americans, I just cant believe it, because I know how good we are.
The rest of the mind set that was needed to gain public support for the War against
Terrorism was due to pure automatism: outrage at violence was replaced by outrage at
the enemy, literally anyone could be suspected of anti-Americanism, any negotiations
with the Taliban could be rejected, and higher-order rights could be denied: Any state
which did not cooperate with the USA would be a legitimate target. Any sort of
peaceful settlement of the conflict had to be rejected, and the entire mind-set turned
into a zero-sum game where warfare was the only acceptable option.
Naturally, these are all traditional propaganda contents, and the media were
saturated with them. Targeted propaganda measures were not needed to plant them in
the public mind. All that was needed was a lack of understanding of the terror attack of
11 September and its pseudo-explanation in terms of completely groundless hate,
through which the initially still unknown enemy was demonized, the US idealized, and
the search for possible conflict causes became taboo.
Nonetheless, it can be assumed that George W. Bushs statement was not a
deliberate propaganda message. It sounds like the honest words of a somewhat simpleminded man facing an unbelievable excess of violence against his own people,
expressing what millions of people felt at this moment. People who never gave much
thought to other people in some distant corner of the world, to whom our wealth and
abundance is their poverty and starvation, our liberties destroy their culture, and our
way of life is an insult to their concept of honor.
Nonetheless, these words were destined to set the world on fire. They declared
total war, rejected an analysis of the sources of conflict, ruled out any resolution other
than the elimination of the enemy and even denied his most essential human rights.
That the US government later decided that thousands of imprisoned suspected or actual
Al-Qaeda terrorists were neither combatants (otherwise they would have been entitled
to the protection of the Geneva Conventions) nor criminals (otherwise they would have
been entitled to the protection of American criminal law), but rather belonged to a third
category without rights or claims to respect for their human dignity, was merely the
logical consequence. For words like these are also words suitable to destroy the socalled civilized world from within. And all this, without calls for revenge, without
enthusiasm for war in the true sense of the word and out of the pure necessity of
dealing with the emotional burden imposed by the terror of September 11.
Even if President Bush is right, and there is this vitriolic hatred against the US and
Western civilization in some corners of the world, fighting terrorism exclusively by
military means bears the danger that the values of democracy will gradually be reduced
to a pure facade. The US concentration camp at Guantanamo and the torture of Iraqi
prisoners of war offer alarming signals that point in this direction. And the more
Western democracy loses its credibility, the more hatred will increase.
Wiping out the roots of hatred can only be accomplished on the basis of cultural
change, and it is not only those societies where this hatred is present, it is our own
societies as well that need to progress in the direction of more respect for others. How
19
this cultural change can be stimulated by an open intra- and intercultural discourse,
what sort of input the media can provide in order to stimulate such a discourse and how
the media can offer a platform for this discourse are among the questions that urgently
need to be put on the research agenda.
There is no need to say that the aim of such an agenda cannot be to justify
terrorism. The aim must be to understand the roots of terrorism. And these roots cannot
be found in the Islamic culture per se. They need to be searched for in the Western
world as well, and particularly in the interaction between the two.
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
Lasswell, H.D. (1927). Propaganda technique in the World War. London: Kegan Paul.
Kempf, W. (2002). Conflict coverage and conflict escalation. In: Kempf, W., Luostarinen, H.(eds.).
Journalism and the New World Order. Volume II: Studying war and the media. Gteborg: Nordicom,
59-72.
Luostarinen, H. (2002). Propaganda analysis. In: Kempf, W., Luostarinen, H.(eds.). Journalism and the
New World Order. Volume II: Studying war and the media. Gteborg: Nordicom, 17-38.
Reimann, M. (2002). Communication disorders in conflict coverage. In: Kempf, W., Luostarinen,
H.(eds.). Journalism and the New World Order. Volume II: Studying war and the media. Gteborg:
Nordicom.
Kempf, W., Reimann, M., Luostarinen, H (2001). New World Order rhetoric in American and
European media. In: Nohrstedt, S.A., Ottosen, R. (eds.). Journalism and the New World Order. Vol. I.
Gulf War, National News Discourses and Globalization. Gteborg: Nordicom, 125-148.
Kempf, W. (2002). Escalating and deescalating aspects in the coverage of the Bosnia conflict A
comparative study. In: Kempf, W., Luostarinen, H., (eds.). Journalism and the New World Order. Vol.
II. Studying war and the media. Gteborg: Nordicom, 227-258.
Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ed.) (2003). Constructive conflict coverage.
A social psychological approach. Berlin: regener.
Weiner, B. (2001). What Bush should have said. (www.antiwar.com) (23.05.02).
20

IOS Press, 2006
Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A

Collective Action Perspective for
Analyzing the Tanzim
Eitan Y. ALIMI
Department of Political Science at the Hebrew University, Israel
Abstract. An attempt is made to re-contextualize the study of political terrorism

by embedding it within the larger phenomenon of Collective Action. It is
suggested that a process-sensitive analysis of the interplay among the components
of Collective Action (action context, action target, action means and action agent)
can be beneficial for gaining insights into the study of group risks for political
terrorism. The case of the conflict between the Tanzim and the Israeli forces is
used to illustrate how processes within, between and outside the conflict parties
affected the Tanzim members decision to employ political terrorism. Based on the
analysis, several implications for counterterrorism are offered.
Keywords. Tanzim, contentious politics, Intifada, political opportunities,
repression
Decision-makers, terrorism specialists and the general public have been forced by
recent events to acknowledge the unsettling reality that terrorism is, always has been,
and always will be instrumental: planned, purposeful, and premeditated a perennial,
ceaseless struggle [1] (pp. 313-4). In the face of the devilishly-planned, horrendous
airborne attacks on US targets on September 11, 2001, it is no longer possible, nor is it
responsible, to dismiss political terrorism as solely the result of innate human
aggressive propensities or of psychopathic, twisted ideas, as some terrorism researchers
still argue [2, 3].
Our responsibility, as well as the responsibility of decision-makers, is to ask not,
Why do they hate us? but rather, What have we done to provoke such deeds?
Terrorism is here to stay precisely because it is no less the product of human relations
and interactions than the product of twisted minds and fanatical obsessions. As argued
by Peleg, the capacity for violence might be inherent in men. However, the
likelihood of an actual outburst of collective violence hinges upon how badly systems
violate the socially-derived expectations of certain groups in the populace [4] (p. 28).
The cost of continuing to shut our eyes and cling to the easier question of, Why do
they hate us? has long been too great to accept. In suggesting such a shift, I am by no
means implying that we should seek an answer in self-incrimination or expiation.
Rather, I am seeking a deeper understanding of terrorism and ourselves what
Honderich [5] calls a practical moral inquiry, an acknowledgment of our responsibility,
whether or not we feel guilty for what has gone wrong.
In his illuminating radical treatment of collective violence [6], Charles Tilly picks
up on an earlier, brief treatment of the subject [7] and writes the following, I still think
that terror is a recurrent political strategy adopted by a wide variety of actors rather
E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim
21
than a creed, a separate variety of politics, or the work of a distinctive class of people
The word terror appears nowhere in [my] typology Terror always refers to
someone elses behavior The roll call makes clear that terror consists of a single
partys conflict strategy rather than a causally coherent category of collective violence
terror is a strategy not a creed [6] (pp. xii, 19, 233, 237).
I concur with Tilly and suggest an expansion of our epistemology, namely, to
incorporate a Collective Action perspective (hereinafter: CA) into the analysis of
political terrorism, seen here as an extreme form of CA. Political terrorism develops
during episodes of collective action, a radicalization process by a segment within a
given movement, claims the Zionist right-wing organization Israel Freedom Fighters
(LeHI). The growing attraction to and fascination of the abnormality of the deed and
the attempt to treat political terrorism as sui generis has had the unintended
consequence of decontextualizing the phenomenon under study. Recontextualizing
political terrorism may be beneficial to our endeavor to learn more about this
doubtlessly unusual phenomenon. Just as our knowledge and understanding of CA
significantly broadened when it was no longer treated as the actions of a madding
crowd, so is it possible to learn more about the shift to political terrorism when we no
longer perceive it as solely the behavior of the psychopath or the fanatical true
believer [8]. Concomitantly, I would further suggest that an analysis of the shift to
political terrorism using the theoretical tools of CA has the potential for generating
additional insights into the study of counter-terrorism.
In fact, I will argue that we should understand terrorist groups in terms of their
location in larger fields of actors: social movements the agent of CA. For clarity, I
perceive collective action as a political phenomenon that involves (1) the agent of CA
(a social movement), (2) that engages in contentious politics as the means of CA, (3)
targeted always, but not exclusively, against authorities (the target of CA) and, (4)
embedded within a structure of conflict, that is, the context of CA. As we will see, the
shift towards political terrorism by one actor a group-at-risk within a larger
movement is usually the result of how the various components interact and mutually
affect each other.
In proposing the incorporation of the CA perspective into the analysis of the shift
to terrorism, this paper draws on Tillys recent treatment of political collective
violence, which offers a less value-laden approach for understanding variation in the
form, salience, and coordination of outright damage to persons and objects. As I shall
attempt to show, the shift to terrorism has to do more with developments and processes
within, between, and outside the parties involved in the politics of contention than with
innate aggression and/or ideological creed a relational approach to the study of
contentious politics. This paper draws also on a recent treatment of Islamic Activism, a
collection of essays edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz [9] which adopts a social
movement theory approach to the analysis of Islamic-oriented contention,
demonstrating how theoretical tools borrowed from the SM perspective repertoire help
to de-Orientalize movements such as Hamas or contentious episodes such as the Shia
uprising in Bahrain in 1994-1998.
Finally, in suggesting that a CA framework is an effective tool for providing
additional insights into the shift to political terrorism and the study of counterterrorism, I shall be drawing on my own work on the Palestinian Intifada, specifically
the case of the Fatah Tanzim (the organization). The Tanzim is defined by the IDF
Spokesperson Department as a terrorist organization. Yet, many other institutions do
22
not see the Tanzim as a terrorist organization, a fact that only pinpoints the relativity in
defining terrorism and underscores the problematic aspect of viewing terrorism as a
creed or as a separate variety of politics. As I will try to show, the classification of the
Tanzim as a terrorist group without an attempt to understand the reasons for the shift
from a non-violent mode of action to a violent mode of action is both misleading and
detrimental to any genuine effort at countering terrorism.
In attempting that, this paper will follow along two interrelated lines. First, I will
discuss three aspects in the study of CA, demonstrating the relevancy of these aspects
to a better understanding of the Tanzim in general and its shift to terrorism in
particular. I will then proceed to specify several implications for countering terrorism
that are suggested by the analysis of the Tanzim.
In this part of the paper, I will discuss several aspects in the study of Collective
Action, showing their usefulness to the study of the Tanzims shift to political
terrorism. In accordance with Tillys relational approach, I will focus on three such
aspects: within the agent of collective action, outside the agent of collective action, and
between the agent and the target of CA.
Two points of clarification are in order. First, while perceiving these three
processes as deeply interwoven and mutually affecting each other in pushing a group
towards political terrorism, I shall nonetheless treat them as analytically distinct in
order to simplify my argument. Second, due to considerations of length, I have decided
to incorporate the analysis of the context of CA (action-context) into the analysis of
each of the three aspects. A systematic analysis of the shift to political terrorism must
be attentive to dynamics and changes in the structure of the conflict in which the parties
involved are embedded.
Social Movement: The Agent of Collective Action

An ongoing underdeveloped theme in the literature is the tendency to focus on the
Social Movement Organization (SMO), instead of viewing a social movement as a field
of actors [10, 11, 12]. In line with my suggestion to distinguish between the agent and
the phenomenon of Collective Action, I suggest further to avoid treating a social
movement, and a terrorist group, for that matter, as a monolithic entity or as a unified
whole. In fact, I suggest viewing a terrorist group as part of a social movement: a
collective actor, comprising people, beliefs, social locations and actions in pursuit of
political goals. This collective actor consists of various actors (individuals and/or
organizations) that interact formally and informally with one another and mutually
affect each others strategy. The extent to which these actors collaborate, and the types
of interaction they engage in, depend on social organization, a sense of commitment,
shared beliefs and solidarity. A terrorist group is an actor within a social movement.
The study of Collective Action has already acknowledged the conceptual and
empirical shortcomings in treating a movement as a unified whole what McCarthy
and Zald labeled SMO, rather than as a field of actors. In the second edition of his pathbreaking The Strategy of Social Protest, Gamson made reference to this shortcoming,
for which he was responsible in part, when discussing the difficulties a social
movement faces in achieving standing in mainstream news media. Reflecting on the
first edition of Strategy, Gamson writes, By using the social movement organization
as the unit of analysis, Strategy fails to illuminate the dynamics among a set of
23
challengers in the same broad movement. Challengers sometimes complement and

sometimes undercut each others strategies, but one can understand this process only at
a more aggregate level of analysis [13] (p. 160).
To view a social movement as a field of actors that do not necessarily hold the
same ideology, strategy, preferable modes of action and goals has considerable
implications for the analysis of collective action. Heeding the internal dynamics,
balance of power and division of labor within a movement can be beneficial in
understanding a movements strategy and tactics of contention. For example, how does
the mode of action employed by one actor affect other actors within the movement?
My analysis of the Intifada [14, 15] describes a complicated sociopolitical setting
within which various groups and organizations compete for power within the
authoritative setting of the Palestinian Authority and under the overarching Israeli
military occupation. The Tanzim became a central player in this complex setting.
Focusing exclusively, however, on the Tanzim without examining the dynamics among
various arms within the Tanzim, its relationships with other groups and actors in the
Palestinian movement, and in isolation from the power structure within which it has
evolved and operated, would provide a somewhat artificial analysis and, consequently,
an overly simplistic understanding of the group.
Essentially, the Tanzim is an integral part of the Palestinian movement as
consolidated during the run-up to the 1987 Intifada and as developed thereafter. While
not named as such during the 1987 Intifada, the Tanzim actually consists of grassroots
activists who played a central role in the initiation and conduct of the 1987 uprising. Its
formation was the result of internal relationships within the movement, especially as
developed during the aftermath of the 1987 Intifada and the institutionalization of a
portion of the movement, i.e., the establishment of a Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in
June 1994.
Intifada researchers share the argument that the formation of the Tanzim should be
seen in the context of Arafats attempt to channel and focus the passions of many
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip away from Islamist groups during the
aftermath of the 1987-1992 Intifada [16]. True, the first half of the 1990s witnessed the
growing popularity and political influence of the Islamic camp, primarily of Hamas.
The reasons for this are numerous, some of which are rooted in the painstaking
achievements made by non-Islamic factions within the Palestinian movement already
during, but mainly in the wake of the 1987 cycle of contention.
During the first years of the 1987 Intifada, the two rival camps managed to
maintain a general consensus vis--vis the primary goal of the Palestinians. However,
as the first signs of political achievements unfolded (especially the commencement of a
dialogue between Arafat and the US), Hamas was quick to reject any recognition and
acceptance of what had become the Madrid talks of October 1991. Indeed, the actual
process of peace talks and preparation for self-rule generated a renewal of clashes
between the respective Hamas and Fatah-led PLO factions. Between July and August
1992, numerous confrontations broke out between the parties, leading the editor of the
daily al-Shaab to state, What is happening is frightening. It threatens not only the
Intifada, but our whole social framework [17].
The challenge posed by Hamas, for example to the Fatah-led PA, was translated
into systematic attempts at undermining the Oslo Accords through the use of numerous
suicide bombings, which resulted in dozens of Israeli deaths and hundreds of injuries
between early 1994 and 1996. As Arafats difficulties in delivering the promise of Oslo
24
increased (difficulties for which Hamas was partly responsible), Hamass power
increased significantly. The gradually faltering Oslo, as a result, had made the
alternative presented by Hamas attractive in the eyes of growing numbers of
Palestinians [15]. In that context, Arafats decision to form the Tanzim was truly a way
to reassert his control over the hearts and minds of the Palestinian populace in the
occupied territories.
The formation of the Tanzim, then, may have been Arafats counterweight to the
growing influence of Islamic forces. As it turned out, however, Arafats grand scheme
did not bear the expected fruits. While originally the Tanzim was designed to counter
the Islamic forces, and some even argue that the Tanzim provided Arafat with a tool for
combating Israel without risking international condemnation for violating signed
agreements, it seems that the Tanzim turned on its own creator, developing its own
agenda and goals [18]. Thus, instead of countering Hamas, the Tanzim under the
leadership of Marwan Barghouti grew closer to Hamas.
This was already apparent during late 2000, the first months of the 2000 al-Aqsa
Intifada, which was aimed against both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. In the case
of Hamas, the challenge to the PA is already understandable. An expression of this is
found in an interview given by Hamas spokesperson in Hebron Abdel Khaleq alNatshe to the Palestine Times in April 2000. When asked about Hamass relations with
the PA, al-Natshe responded, The Palestinian Authority is our oppressor, but again we
dont like to accentuate this too much, since our conflict is with Israel.
In the case of the Tanzim, the PA was not perceived as an outright oppressor, and
Arafat was unequivocally proclaimed to be sacred: the indisputable leader of the
Palestinian people. Yet, it seems that the convergence between Hamas and the Tanzim,
coupled with the latters growing autonomy and influence, raised serious concerns
amongst Arafat and PA officials. In an interview with the Israeli daily Haaretz,
following the conclusion of the Sharm al-Sheikh summit (October 2000), Barghouti
contended that the current Intifada would not stop with an order, as it did not start
with an order insinuating that the street might not obey Arafat, should he announce
a cease-fire with Israel and a halt to the Intifada [19] (p. 468). Alarmed by these
developments, Arafat made attempts to undermine Barghoutis power by encouraging
rivalries, such as indirectly supporting Barghoutis rival for the leadership of the
Tanzim, Hussein al-Sheikh, or limiting the flow of funds to Barghoutis grassroots
forces [19] (p. 52). Yet, it became clear that the Tanzim and the Islamic forces had
gained the upper hand in setting the pace and tone of the situation, enjoying widespread
popularity among the Palestinian populace.
An expression of the convergence between the Tanzim and Hamas can be found in
a statement drafted by the National and Islamic Forces (NIF) to President Arafat on
January 13, 2001, during the preparations for what became the Taba Talks. The NIF
was a coalition formed by the Tanzim and Hamas and included a vast array of
organizations such as the PFLP, DFLP, PIJ, etc. The content of the statement is
revealing, demonstrating the firm and bold characteristics of the grassroots forces:
In the Name of God, the Forgiving and Compassionate
Our Brother, the President and Struggler Abu Ammar, God save him, The
President of the State of Palestine We express our confidence in your constant
position that adheres to the national constants [i.e., freedom, independence and
return]; however, we warn of falling into the trap of dealing with these tricky
25
scenarios The consensus of our people to continue with the Intifada until it
achieves its goals requires all of us to be prepared for a long battle which
requires reconsidering our internal condition and addressing it in a radical manner
to secure the components of steadfastness. Together until victory, until liberating
Jerusalem and achieving independence and return.
The State of Palestine
January 13, 2001
Arafat, while being elevated to a father-like status, is nevertheless warned not to
deviate from the constants. He is reminded of his militant past and of his days of armed
struggle as a symbol, being addressed as Abu Ammar the Struggler, to indicate the
sacredness of the goal, the achievement of which justifies the means taken and, equally
important, the organic linkage between himself (not the Tunisian-led PA) and the
Palestinian people. Thus, in spite of his symbolic status, Arafat is still constrained by
the blessed Intifada and, just as with the NIF members, the legitimacy of Arafat as the
leader of the Palestinian people is contingent upon a radical reconsidering of our
internal condition, seen as essential for the continuation of the Intifada.
Thus, instead of undercutting Hamass strategy, both the Tanzim and Hamas
complemented each others agendas and jointly posed a major challenge to the PA.
Indications of convergence between the two organizations were expressed, at first, in a
division of labor regarding their respective spheres of operation. Beginning in early
2001, it became clear that the Tanzim was concentrating on terrorist attacks against
Israeli soldiers and settlers within the territories, whereas Hamas was concentrating on
terrorist attacks (including suicide terrorism following the Israeli liquidation of one of
the organizations activists in November 2000) inside Israel.
This is not to say, though, that groups and factions within the Tanzim were not
calling for an escalation of the struggle, or that competition over Tanzim leadership
was absent. In fact, the harsher the Israeli crackdown became, the louder became the
voices within the Tanzim calling for it to engage in more lethal tactics. In that context,
Hamass growing popularity, given its success in inflicting damage on Israel, only
amplified these voices. Such was the case, for example, with Abd-al-Karim Awiss, a
grassroots leader of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Jennin, the armed wing of the
Tanzim. Escaping an Israeli liquidation attempt, Awiss called for the removal of the
taboo of limiting the Tanzims operations to within the territories. Despite a lack of
approval for his plan by Barghouti, Awiss nonetheless went ahead to initiate a terrorist
attack, although an abortive one, in the Golani intersection inside Israel, in late May
2001.
Tensions within the Tanzim revolving around the leadership of the organization in
the West Bank were also detrimental to Barghoutis ability to implement the Tanzims
strategy. His rival for the organizations leadership was Hussein a-Sheikh, who enjoyed
the support of several veteran Fatah members. Israel also acted to undermine
Barghoutis growing political power when during elections to the Fatah general
secretariat in summer 2000 it tried to influence the outcomes in favor of a-Sheikh. The
tension between Barghouti and a-Sheikh intensified, the more influential Barghouti
became. At times, a-Sheikh deliberately acted in opposition to Barghoutis directives,
with the consequence of heavier Israeli crackdowns, as was the case when the formers
supporters continued to fire on the settlement of Psagot, despite Barghoutis decision to
stop the shooting [19].
26
The fact of the matter was that Arafat indeed had little control over the spreading
clashes. In fact, the Palestinian leadership, according to Mansour [20], acted more as an
overseer than as the Intifadas general command, namely, the PA would sometimes
let things happen, sometimes be a spectator, and at other times arbitrate between rival
groups, in most cases to avoid taking initiatives (p. 11). To make things even more
complicated, attempts to dissociate himself from the increasing violence vis--vis the
US and EU seriously damaged Arafats status vis--vis the Tanzim and Hamas.
Structural Changes and Politics of Contention

Can changes in the structure of political conditions affect the strategy and tactics of
contention employed by the parties involved by projecting a sense of opportunity or a
sense of threat? Collective action does not develop in a vacuum; social movements act
for the fulfillment of political goals and, in turn, the political environment affects their
strategy. While students of CA shared this truism from the outset, political factors were
nonetheless viewed as limits rather than as engines for contention [21] (p. 201).
The view of political factors, developments, and processes as engines for
contention has been the cornerstone of the Political Process Model for the study of
Collective Action, with its promotion of the concepts of political opportunities and/or
threats. In contrast to earlier schools, the Political Process Model deals with changes in
political conditions that are above and beyond within-movement issues of shared
deprivation, organization and leadership. While acknowledging the importance of
internal factors to social movements, proponents of the Political Process Model argue
that events and occurrences external to movements are either ignored or seen, at best,
as indirectly affecting movement activists. For McAdam, The point is that any event
or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on
which the political establishment is structured occasions a shift in political
opportunities the political process is based on the idea that social processes
promote insurgency only indirectly through a restructuring of existing power relations
[22] (p. 41).
These changes, according to political scientist Sidney Tarrow, are consistent,
although not necessarily formal, permanent, or national dimensions of the political
struggle in a given political setting [23] (p. 83). Changes in political conditions can be
institutional (e.g., shifts in political alliances or the strength of social cleavages) or
cultural (e.g., legitimacy or public discourse) [12]. Depending on the specific political
location and status of a given political actor, changes in political conditions can be
perceived as either opportunities or as threats; hence an increase or a decrease in
mobilization for action is likely to ensue.
Finally, whether perceived opportunities and/or threats will increase or decrease
mobilization is contingent on the way both are combined to shape contention [24].
Specifically, instead of treating threats as merely the flip side of opportunities, we
should be mindful of (1) the various levels and types of political opportunities/threats
(i.e. movement, regional, national, and international levels or current and anticipated
threats), (2) asking: opportunity for what? that is, opportunity for or threat to the
accumulation of power within a movement or for shaking off an unjust authority, and
(3) that we should also think about political actors who make opportunities for
27
themselves. What follows is an attempt to demonstrate the relevance of these insights

as they operate in the case of the Tanzim.
As was already noted above, the aftermath of the 1987 Intifada complicated the
structure of the political environment for the Palestinians in the occupied territories.
While Israel played a major role in the process of Palestinian politicization of
discontent prior to the 1987-1992 cycle of contention, the assumption of power by the
Tunisian-based PLO as of 1994 led to a significant change in the sociopolitical setting
in the arena of contention.
Israel was still perceived as the ultimate source of Palestinian hardship; numerous
acts initiated by Israeli administrations and by non-institutional Israeli groups or
individuals have certainly contributed to this perception. The decision to place harsh
restrictions on work permits for Palestinians working in Israel, the continuation of
building new settlements and expanding existing ones, the massacre at the Cave of the
Patriarchs in Hebron on February 25, 1994, perpetrated by Baruch Goldstein, or
Netanyahus decision to open a Jewish holy site the Western Wall Tunnel on
September 24, 1996 and to expand the Jewish settlements around Jerusalem (e.g., the
construction on Har Homa) in March 1997, are only a few examples.
Sources of grievance and discontent were also found within the Palestinian polity.
The Palestinian Authority under the leadership of Arafat became the target of public
unrest and critique. The majority of the Palestinian population and political
organizations were willing to put up with the Palestinian Authoritys internal
corruption and mismanagement due to the high hopes of implementing the
achievements of the 1987 Intifada and the promise of Oslo.
Even with Hamas, and despite the clashes between the two camps, the balance of
power was clear. Following the heavy Israeli crackdown on Hamas and the
imprisonment of many of its key activists and leaders in 1992, the PLO was practically
the only well-resourced and well-organized political actor within the territories. Hamas
was still a central challenger to the PA and did its best to undermine Oslo through the
initiation of suicide terrorism against Israeli targets. Facing such an unfavorable
balance of power and being attentive to its popular base, however, Hamas was forced to
embrace a pragmatic approach according to which, for example, not recognizing the
PA did not mean fighting it. This pragmatic trend was rationalized through reviving
cultural themes from Islamic history and the Koran (e.g., sabr/patience and
hudna/truce) for framing the possibility of peace with Israel as a tactical, temporary
pause in the holy Jihad [25, 26].
What about the Tanzim? A second, no less important, impetus for the formation of
the Tanzim was the growing tension within the secular Nationalist camp. The roots of
this tension were found in the Tunisian PLO officials taking over of the Palestinian
Authority upon their return to Gaza. Despite their leading role in the 1987 Intifada,
many of the grassroots activists did not enjoy the fruits of its achievements and were
pushed aside by the Tunis-based leadership (the Tunisians). While carefully
refraining from criticizing Arafat personally, given his almost sacred symbolic status,
the Palestinian Authority became the target of spreading unrest, the result of
corruption, nepotism, and brutal oppression of critical voices.
As already noted, for the Tanzim the PA was not perceived as an outright
oppressor, and Arafat was unequivocally the indisputable leader of the Palestinian
people. Yet, the Tanzim under the leadership of Marwan Barghouti was systematically
accumulating power within the Nationalist camp. While carefully refraining from
28
questioning or criticizing Arafats domination, Barghouti nonetheless made a harsh

critique of the Tunisian-led PA and systematically acted to take over the Fatahs High
Committee and the Palestinian street. In fact, and as already noted, the Barghouti-led
Tanzim became so influential that Arafat made attempts to undermine Barghoutis
power.
A demonstration of Barghoutis political power and influence took place in March
1999. Following a harsh repression of public protests against the corruption inside the
PA by the latters security forces, Barghouti called for a general strike in the West
Bank, a call which was widely obeyed. The clashes that broke out and the subsequent
death of a twelve-year-old boy due to security forces opening fire pushed Barghouti to
initiate the strike without consulting Arafat, and to refuse to end it despite the heavy
pressure exerted by Arafat and PA officials [18]. This and other examples of
Barghoutis aspirations caused deep concerns among Fatah and the PAs high officials,
who influenced Arafat to decide to limit Barghoutis political power (see above). This
did not mean, however, that Arafat fully regained control over the situation. Arafat,
upon his return from Camp David in late July 2000, had little control over the situation,
and his popularity rating was exceptionally low.
In attempts to maintain his popularity, Arafat had little choice but to welcome and
support the Intifada, going so far as to release many of Hamass key political and
military activists. The above citation of the blunt warning to Arafat by the NIF can be
seen as indicative of who practically set the pace and the tone of what became the 2000
al-Aqsa Intifada. In that context, the sheer prospects of an agreed-upon Final Status
Agreement (FSA) at the Camp David Summit of July 2000 could be seen not only as a
potential threat to Hamas, but also to the Tanzim, which during the 1990s had created
for itself an opportunity to acquire a dominant position within the territories. While a
detailed study is warranted, it seems plausible to suggest that as generous as was
Baraks proposal to the Palestinians, and even if it was an opportunity for Arafat to
finally deliver on the promise of Oslo, Baraks (and President Clintons for that matter)
insistence on concluding an FSA might have triggered the 2000 Intifada. Indeed, an
FSA would have thwarted Barghoutis grand scheme to rekindle another popular
struggle, and he stated in March 2000 that, Anyone who thinks it is possible to reach a
final status agreement through negotiation would do better to stop fantasizing. In these
matters, we must engage in confrontations. We need tens of battles like the al-Aqsa
Tunnel [18] (p. 48).
Indeed, the Tanzim had been trying to mobilize the Palestinian population to action
throughout 2000 for the purpose of demonstrating its status and articulating what
Barghouti saw as the genuine voice of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories.
Such was the case with the al-Naqba commemoration day on May 15, 2000, when
massive demonstrations initiated by the Tanzim took place with stone throwing and
Molotov cocktails and shooting incidents throughout the territories. The confrontations
lasted for several days, and as a result eight Palestinians died and hundreds of
Palestinians and approximately thirty Israelis were injured.
A week after al-Naqba day, a significant development took place outside the arena
of contention. Israel decided to unilaterally withdraw from Southern Lebanon on May
22, 2000, after eighteen years of military presence, and this had a lasting effect on both
conflict parties. While no Israeli soldier was injured during the three days of
withdrawal, a series of unfortunate military incidents resulting from the fighting against
Hezbollah in Lebanon, widespread domestic critique in Israel over the ongoing
29
presence in what had been called the security zone, Hezbollahs continuing shooting
at Israeli forces, the large amounts of military equipment and supplies left behind and
the scenes of thousands of the Southern Lebanese Armys soldiers (Israels ally in the
region) desperately trying to enter Israel, made Israels retreat seem panicky, as though
it was yielding to the victorious Hezbollah.
On Israels part, fear of the withdrawal from Lebanon being perceived as a sign of
weakness convinced high-ranking Israeli military officials to prepare a much harsher
crackdown should Palestinians in the occupied territories attempt to further escalate the
situation. Indeed, as I will try to demonstrate below, the Israeli response to the
spreading unrest in late September 2000 was disproportionate, to say the least.
An additional factor that caused Israel to overreact was found in growing unrest
among Israeli-Palestinians. The deepening frustration and indignation among Israeli
Palestinians and signs of rising tensions were already felt during the first half of 2000,
when confrontations broke out in the city of Sakhnin during the commemoration of
Land Day. Yet, the most severe expression of the cumulative rage among Israeli
Palestinians occurred on October 1, 2000. Erupting in the Umm al-Fahm area, the
clashes and disturbances quickly spread throughout the Triangle and spilled into Israeli
cities, affecting Palestinian and Jewish communities such as Tiberias, Jaffa, and Upper
Nazareth. According to Susser and Rekhes [27], the violent clashes lasting for three
days came to a halt as a result of an aggressive police response, using tear gas, rubber
bullets and even live ammunition. On October 3, 2000, in the course of harsh protest
policing, thirteen Israeli Palestinians were killed, and hundreds of protestors and
dozens of police officers were injured.
On the Palestinian side, the lesson drawn from Israels withdrawal from Lebanon
was that given a sufficient level of pressure and casualties, Israel would withdraw from
the territories as well. Indeed, as argued by Harel and Isacharoff, Hezbollahs leader,
Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, became a hero in the eyes of many Palestinians. Cited by the
authors, a Tanzim activist from the Balata refugee camp argued that in retrospect,
Their [Hezbollahs] victory strengthened our faith in the effectiveness of armed
struggle and suicide attacks [18] (p. 65).
Indeed, for Barghouti, Sharons visit to the Temple Mount on September 28, 2000
was purely instrumental, as it held the potential of demonstrating to the Palestinian
public the cost of not acting what Goldstone and Tilly call current threat [24] (p.
185). In a revealing interview with the London-based Arabic daily al-Hayat, Barghouti
commented, [T]he night prior to Sharons visit, I participated in a panel on a local
television station, and I seized the opportunity to call on the public to go to the al-Aqsa
Mosque in the morning After Sharon left, I remained for two hours in the presence
of other people, we discussed the manner of response and how it was possible to react
in all the cities and not just in Jerusalem. We contacted all (the Palestinian) factions.
Yet, the Tanzims dominant mode of action was not from the outset terrorist
activity; it was surely far from engaging in suicide terrorism, the type that Hamas had
already been employing in 1993. A major factor in the Tanzims shift to terrorism has
something to do with developments outside the arena of contention: the effects of the
September 11 terror attacks on US and Israeli policy towards the Intifada. Evidently, if
Israel had practiced some measure of restraint in its attempts to suppress the Intifada
due to US and EU pressure prior to 9/11, the brutal airborne attacks brought about a
change in US policy towards the ongoing contention. For Sharon and Bush, the Intifada
had become another coordinate on the axis of evil. In a way, the White House
30
provided Sharon with a carte blanche to do what he thought best to eradicate terrorism.
Indeed, in the wake of 9/11, Israeli crackdowns turned into a battering policy. In a way,
the opportunity for Israel acted simultaneously as a threat to the Tanzim, pushing both
sides to the extreme in a violent interactive dance.
Contentious Politics: Interactive Contention and Repression

Recently, the study of CA has drawn attention to similarities between different forms
of contention. Instead of treating strike-waves, revolutions or terrorism as distinct subfields where each phenomenon has its own distinctive properties, the idea is to look for
commonalities that cut across the various forms of what has been labeled contentious
politics. Contentious politics, according to McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, begins
when people collectively make claims on other people, claims which if realized would
affect those others interests claims run from humble supplications to brutal attacks,
passing through petitions, chanted demands, and revolutionary manifestos [28] (p.
17). The social interaction in contentious politics involves contention: the making of
interest-entailing claims on others and at least one party to the interaction
(including third parties) is a government: an organization controlling the principal
concentrated means of coercion within a defined territory (Ibid.).
Collective claims making involves both the authorities, the targets of collective
action, and social movements, the agents of collective action. In the case of social
movements, I suggest that we name such claims making protest: collective claims
making in the name of social justice. In the case of the authorities, the collective claims
making is expressed in the demand for public order, hence the centrality of social
control and the resort to repressive measures when public order is disrupted. Claims
making by a social movement has nothing intrinsically violent or terrorist-like about it.
A tango can indeed turn into a lethal war dance, yet the possible shift to lethality should
not overshadow the basic commonalities between the various forms of interactive
claims making by social movements, or else we will attribute causality to what should
otherwise be seen as catalysts, e.g., ideological creeds and/or violent propensities.
In that case, protest is a general term, a continuum upon which various forms can
be located and along which shifts can, and do, take place. Social movement protests
can range from voting or non-voting, mounting barricades, hunger strikes, stone
throwing, rallying, promulgating revolutionary manifestos on up to terrorism.
Contentious politics can be contained (i.e., where all parties are previously established
as constituted actors employing well-established means of claims-making) or
transgressive (i.e., at least one party is a newly self-identified political actor, and at
least one party employs innovative actions).
The shift from contained to transgressive contention depends on three factors.
First, the historical specificity of contention: a collective actor may face limitations on
its action repertoire [7], a situation that could influence its action strategy and tactics.
Second, the given set of values and beliefs within which a movement operates dictates
what is legitimate or illegitimate, what is morally right or wrong. Third, and most
importantly, it is the relational action-counteraction dynamics between protestors and
authorities which not only determine the dominant contentious tactics (conventional,
disruptive or violent), but also bring about the emergence or reemergence of new forms
of contention: innovative contention [29].
31
I regard the third factor as central, since while the first two factors delimit the
baseline conditions for a relational dynamics of contention, it is the actual engagement
in and interaction of contention that can bring about a radicalization process like the
shift to terrorism, hence an alteration in the contours of the first two factors. We should
engage, as Tilly suggests [6], in an analysis of the changing ratio between the extent of
coordination between the parties to the conflict and the saliency of the infliction and the
reception of violent acts.
By now we know that during the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, Israelis and
Palestinian Authority officials were the two established constituted actors who
employed well-established means of claims making in the form of negotiations for
furthering the possibility of a resolution to the conflict (i.e., a Final Status Agreement).
I have also referred to the existence of other players in the arena of contention who
were not established as constituted players and who employed non-established means
of claims making. The Palestinian Islamic forces, namely Hamas and Islamic Jihad, on
the one hand, and Jewish settlers, on the other hand, systematically undermined the
peace process through the commission of terrorist acts.
As a result, the strengthening of right-wing political forces in Israel and the
simultaneous increase in the popularity of militant forces among the Palestinians
deepened the tensions between the parties and gradually destroyed the fragile
collaborative infrastructure (e.g., Defense Coordination Offices DCO) which had
been established following the Oslo Accords. This consisted of warnings from senior
members of the Palestinian negotiating team throughout 2000 that given the lack of
satisfactory progress in the negotiations the Palestinians would be forced to resort to
another round of violence [19]. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahus decisions to open
the Western Wall Tunnel and to expand Jewish settlement south to Jerusalem (Har
Homa) were unquestionably detrimental to the collaborative infrastructure. The
situation on the street was no less tense; for example, on various occasions
Palestinian security forces pointed their weapons at their Israeli counterparts during
joint patrols, and weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip was deliberately ignored.
In that context, it is possible to view the formation of the Tanzim as the result of
transgressive contention within the PA: as Arafats way to simultaneously cope with
the growing popularity of the Islamic forces and the rising discontent among
Palestinians, in general, and among protagonists of the 1987 Intifada, in particular. As
noted, finally, Arafat also intended the Tanzim to act as a non-established means of
claims making, thereby exerting pressure on Israel to make further concessions along
the way to a Final Status Agreement. Indeed, following the al-Naqba commemoration
day clashes in May 2000, initiated and directed by the Tanzim, and during the run-up to
the Camp David Summit, Arafat threatened to rekindle the Intifada within the
Palestinian territories.
Yet, the Tanzim was relatively autonomous in setting its own agenda. In spite of
its designated role as disruptor and the fact that other actors within the Palestinian
movement were committing terrorist acts, the Tanzim did not employ terrorism from
the outset [18]. The interactive violence between Israel and Tanzim activists was what
finally pushed the Tanzim down the slippery slope towards terrorism.
During the first days of confrontation, Tanzim activists limited their mode of
action to a combination of mobilizing the populace for a popular struggle by staging
massive demonstrations and open confrontations, mainly employing cold weapons
such a stones and Molotov Cocktails. This combination of conventional and disruptive
32
modes of action proved futile, given the considerable distance between demonstrators
and Israeli forces, the result of the Israeli forces location outside the PAs territories.
The fact of the matter was that this mode of action provoked a harsh Israeli crackdown,
as a result of which Tanzim activists and other paramilitary activists began to join the
crowd and fired on Israeli soldiers from among the demonstrators.
As it turned out already during the first few days of confrontation, the shootings
were not only as ineffective as stone throwing had been, but also detrimental, as they
provoked a harsher Israeli response. In the context of the deteriorating situation
between the parties during the run-up to September 29, the Israeli resolve to respond
harshly should Palestinians in the occupied territories attempt to further escalate the
situation in the context of the withdrawal from Lebanon, and the perceived threat to
Israel posed by the imminent possibility of a fifth column, that is massive waves of
violent clashes initiated by Israeli-Palestinians, Prime Minister Barak decided to
employ much harsher repressive measures. This consisted of harassment measures,
encirclement of Palestinian towns, bans on travel between the West Bank and Gaza,
bombings of buildings and land exposing (Hishuf) and the use of military equipment
such as helicopter gunships, tanks, cannons, etc. Figure A, below, based on BTselems
report, illustrates the high levels of casualties during the first year of contention.
140
18
120
10
100
110
102
80
9
60
8
51
62
12
45
40
20
20
18
15
26
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7
34
24
Israelis killed in
34
the OCT
8
12
Palestinians killed
in the OCT
P
SE
01
20
01
20
01
20
01
20
01
20
G
U
A
L
JU
N
JU
01
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M
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20
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R
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CT
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Figure 1. Palestinians and Israelis killed in the Occupied Territories (including East Jerusalem) during the
first year of the 2000 Intifada
Interestingly, at that point in time, and despite Israeli overreaction, Barghouti was
still trying to avoid a further escalation of the situation. Attuned to requests by Al-Bire
residents, Barghouti decided to stop the shooting from within their apartment buildings
towards the bordering settlement of Psagot. Unfortunately, Hussein a-Sheik,
Barghoutis rival for the Tanzim leadership, refused to obey the directive and continued
the shooting with his militia supporters. The consequent increase in Palestinian
casualties (according to JMCC seventy-five deaths during the first week alone 9/29
10/6) dissuaded many Palestinians from continuing to participate in the confrontations,
a fact that deeply frustrated the Tanzim forces for their lack of success in mobilizing
the masses. The growing frustration among Tanzim forces was translated into further
escalation of their mode of action. This time, Palestinian shooting activities
concentrated on the main roads leading to Jewish settlements, while other shooting
took place from within Palestinian houses, yet only to provoke an even harsher Israeli
response.
33
In retrospect, it seems that a major factor in the Tanzims willingness to abandon a

disruptive mode of action and to shift fully to a violent one was the terrible incident of
Muhammad al-Durahs death, already on September 30, 2000, during intensive
shooting between PA forces and an Israeli Defense Force outpost near the Netzarim
junction in the Gaza Strip. Although several months later an investigation by the IDF
concluded that al-Durrah was not hit by IDF bullets, the incident and the Israeli
declaration of a probable hit shortly after the incident triggered massive demonstrations
and violent clashes throughout the territories. The death of Muhammad al-Durrah
unleashed the rage accumulating for so long; the subsequent response was one of
unrestrained fury and vengeance, as later events such as the deadly confrontation at
Josephs Tomb and, later, the lynchings proved.
These developments were also central to the formation of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigades in Jennin in early November 2000. The Brigades, quickly becoming the
armed wing of the Tanzim, assumed the role of pacesetter in the struggle, presenting a
tougher and more militant strategy. Highly coordinated, leaders of the Brigades such as
Raad Karami from Tul-Karem, Awiss from Jenin, Ateff Abiyatt from Bethlehem, and
Marwan Zalum from Hebron, took the initiative in the armed struggle against Israel.
The shooting on Giloh became the Brigades primary mode of action. While far
from bringing about any serious damage or injuries on the Israeli side, it nevertheless
created an atmosphere of deepening fear and anxiety among Israelis. Thus, amidst the
barbaric lynching, the ongoing lack of success in ending the shooting on Giloh, the
attacks on Jewish settlements and military targets by Tanzim forces, the joining of
Hamas in the struggle employing terrorist attacks within the green-line, the heavy
international critique against excessive Israeli use of force (a critique which Israel was
willing to put up with, if these measures proved effective), and facing a harsh critique
by the Israeli public of its leadership, demanding to let the army win (i.e. to loosen
the restraints), pushed Israeli Prime Minister Barak to order the use of what was labeled
concentrated baffling/foiling, namely, liquidations.
Towards the end of 2000 and in early 2001, two lethal innovations were introduced
in a systematic fashion to the already ferocious dynamics of contention: the Israeli
liquidation policy and the Palestinian suicide bombings (Istishad). While early
incidents inside the arena of contention had occurred prior to the 2000 Intifada (e.g.,
the assassination of Izz-al-Din al-Qassam mastermind activist Yihye Ayyash on
January 5, 1996, and a Hamas suicide bombing near Beit-El in 1993), this time the two
parties resorted to these tactics in a much more frequent and systematic fashion.
The liquidation of Hussein Abiyatt, a member of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades,
(Hamass armed wing) on November 9, 2000 in an attempt to end the Palestinian
shootings from Bethlehem on the bordering Jerusalem neighborhood of Gilo was the
start of a series of dozens of liquidations. By the end of 2000, Israel had liquidated ten
more grassroots activists using a variety of techniques such as snipers or air strikes. In
the wake of September 11, 2001, liquidations turned into a full-fledged policy, given
tacit approval by the G.W. Bush-led White House [20].
By early 2002, the Tanzim reached the critical decision to further escalate the fight
against Israel using suicide terrorism, initiating a series of suicide bombings inside
Israel in which hundreds of Israelis died. According to Moghadam [16], in 2002 the
Tanzim initiated more suicide bombing attacks than all the other organizations
together, at times in joint collaboration with Hamas or Islamic Jihad.
34
This decision was made at a time when the chances of a significant truce between
the parties were greatest. Following the pressure put on Arafat by the Bush
Administration to regain control over the situation in the wake of 9/11, and the speech
made by the former in a serious attempt to de-escalate the situation, it seemed that the
carte blanche tacitly granted by Bush to Sharon permitted the desire for vengeance to
outweigh political prudence. Despite a significant decrease in the number of terrorist
acts during the four weeks following Arafats speech, a green light was granted by
Sharon to liquidate Raad Karmi, the leader of the Al-Aqsa Brigades in Tul-Karem, as
indeed occurred on January 14, 2002. Following the liquidation, Marwan Barghouti
made the critical executive decision to employ suicide terrorism. Using a prescheduled
press conference, Barghouti began by stating: Sharon opened the doors of hell to the
Israeli public.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have tried to demonstrate the usefulness of incorporating a Collective
Action perspective into the study of political terrorism. I suggested that we should
change our mode of thinking by substituting for the question, Why do they hate us?
the question, What have we done to provoke such deeds? In no way have I implied or
suggested that we should take the blame. It is not a matter of guilt, but rather of
responsibility.
I suggested further that such an epistemological shift may be useful for learning
more about the processes and developments that motivate a group to shift to political
terrorism. Asking, What have we done to provoke such deeds? would add a relational
mode of explanation to terrorism research, whereas asking, Why do they hate us?
could tempt us to settle for ideational and/or behavioral explanations for political
terrorism. While acknowledging the role played by destructive ideas and aggressive
propensities, I have tried to show how variable patterns of social interaction
developments and processes within, between, and outside the parties involved
constitute variations in the politics of contention.
In attempting that, I focused on the Tanzim. The analysis of the Tanzims shift to
terrorism was structured according to three theoretical tools or aspects in the study of
Collective Action, paralleling the three aforementioned relational processes
respectively. In focusing on social interaction within a movement, I analyzed the
internal dynamics, power relations, and division of labor between various actors within
the Palestinian movement. I tried to demonstrate, for example, how the Tanzim,
although originally founded by Arafat to counter the Islamist groups agenda, gradually
acquired relative autonomy and developed its own political agenda and strategy,
thereby complementing rather than undercutting Hamas. This consisted not only of
forming a coalition that practically adopted the Intifadas pace and tone, but also
presented a solid internal front that boldly challenged the Palestinian Authoritys
legitimacy. The convergence with Hamas influenced the Tanzims trajectory toward
terrorism, as both were competing for the same constituents, resources and recruits.
Hamass growing popularity, given its success in inflicting damage on Israel, made the
option of terrorism attractive in the eyes of many Tanzim activists, who went ahead to
found the al-Aqsa Brigades and escalated the struggle.
35
In analyzing processes and developments that unfolded outside the movement, I

have tried to demonstrate how a combination of political opportunities and threats
affected the development of the Tanzims political agenda and strategy and,
simultaneously, affected Israels policy towards the Tanzim, in particular, and the
Palestinian movement, in general. Within the Palestinian Authority, the Tanzim, under
the leadership of Marwan Barghouti, was systematically accumulating power within
the Nationalist camp, trying to create opportunities for itself by utilizing the ongoing
Israeli repressive policy and the widely spreading discontent and critique among the
Palestinian population against the PA. The possibility of concluding an FSA at Camp
David in July 2000 acted as a critical event for the Tanzim, in the sense that it
threatened to thwart Barghoutis painstaking efforts at maximizing his political power
within the PA. In that context, and vis--vis Israel, Sharons visit to the Temple Mount
was used by Barghouti as an opportunity to exploit the Palestinian rage resulting from
the provocative act and to initiate the al-Aqsa Intifada. On the Israeli side, the
perceived threat caused by the broadening clashes, especially in light of a possible
Israeli-Palestinian fifth column, was combined with the opportunity created by the 9/11
attacks. Tacitly granted a green light by the Bush Administration to escalate its
measures to fight terrorism, Israel employed a much heavier crackdown, pushing the
Tanzim to further radicalize its mode of action.
Finally, in analyzing the dynamics of contentious politics between the Tanzim and
Israeli forces, I demonstrated how the interactive action-counteraction between the two
parties influenced the Tanzims forces to employ political terrorism. I argued that in the
case of the Tanzim the form of contentious politics employed was a transgressive form
of contention. Indeed, the claims making by the Tanzim forces involved a mode of
action that was not considered a well-established means of claims making, i.e., in the
form of negotiations, as had been the case between Israeli and Palestinian
representatives from the outset. Still, the Tanzims shift to terrorism and then to suicide
terrorism was far from predestined. As I have shown, Tanzim forces employed, at first,
a restricted violence, a disruptive mode of action (e.g., demonstrations, stone throwing,
Molotov cocktails, etc.), before fully resorting to violent modes of contention that
involved shooting at Israeli soldiers and, later, at settlers. A lethal tango of interactive
violence is what propelled the Tanzim into political terrorism of the most extreme
form: suicide terrorism.
In that context, it is important to note that I make no claims about which of the
three processes is more or less critical in pushing a group down the slippery slope to
political terrorism. Rather, I would argue that it is the way the three processes
concatenate in a specific historical setting that shapes the trajectory of violent
contention; the shift toward political terrorism can begin in each of the processes, while
being augmented by the others. It may well be that processes within the actor will
influence processes between and outside the parties involved in the politics of
contention, yet other scenarios are just as likely to generate radicalization. In that sense,
the importance of providing a dynamic analysis of the group risk of political terrorism,
rather than check-listing specific variables or factors, is further supported.
36
Implications for Counter-terrorism

What implications for the study of counter-terrorism can be gleaned from the above
analysis? Is it possible to use the analysis of the Tanzims trajectory toward terrorism
for generalizable lessons? I would like to suggest three implications/lessons:
Perceptiveness: As demonstrated in the case of the Tanzim, the study of counterterrorism would benefit from viewing a terrorist organization as one actor in the overall
field of actors a social movement, and from furthering the analysis of the internal
dynamics within the movement. Actors within the movement affect each other and are
affected by each others strategy and modes of action. During episodes of contention,
seemingly unrelated actors with differing and at times conflicting ideologies and
worldviews can join hands to form ad-hoc coalitions, which can thwart the strategy of
the movement as a whole as dictated by the more dominant actor(s). Additionally, it is
crucial to bear in mind that no one actor within the movement is a unified whole.
Rather, the situation is precarious and incessantly in motion; each actor is prone to
factionalism and splitting, leading to the subsequent formation of additional actors and
groups, so that new alliances and new rivalries are to be expected.
In planning strategies of counter-terrorism, academic and non-academic specialists
must move beyond a mere recognition of such complexity, treating each as a possible
factor that can increase a groups proneness to terrorism [30]. An actor within a
movement can indeed go through a radicalization process through an alliance with a
more militant actor. Yet, this process is not unidirectional and predetermined; there
may well be a de-radicalization process, namely, if the more moderate actor exerts a
moderating influence on the more radical or militant actor. Such was the case with
Hamas, which went through a process of de-radicalization during the second half of the
1990s, leading it to temper its political agenda and strategy [31, 25].
Radicalization may come about because of internal issues of power relations
within the movement and the ways they are affected in the face of possible political
achievements or during the remnants of a protest cycle, if the last hurrah of activism
goes awry. Here I am referring to cases where the shift to political terrorism springs
from a perceived tempering of a dominant actor within a movement by other actors or
by members of the same actor (a.k.a. splinters/splits). Such was the case with the
Weathermen breaking away from the SDS or the Red Brigades emerging from the
ashes of the Italian Radical movement. Radicalization may also result from an
indiscriminate mode of countering terrorism, and the overall historical specificity of
shared grievances and discontent all of which, jointly and separately, has something
to do with a lack of discernment.
Discernment: Throughout the analysis of the Tanzim, I have paid close attention to
the specific historical constellation, factors, and processes, not only those out of which
the group was formed, but also those within which it has operated. Counter-terrorism
theorizing must have the capacity to provide a broad and deep analytical grasp of the
present in light of the past discernment a nuanced historical sense for keeping track
of and remaining attuned to the ambiguous legacies of politics, writ large [32]. A
counter-terrorism strategy in the sense of a war on terrorism is precisely a strategy
that lacks such a nuanced historical sense, a strategy that seeks to end terrorism instead
of seeking to resolve the underlying conflict that gave rise to terrorism in the first
place. Seeking to end terrorism through a just war perpetuates terrorism, as it selfrighteously overlooks the relational dimension of conflict by painting ourselves as
37
romantics at war [33]. The USs systematic overlooking of its historical role in the
creation of Al-Qaidas aims and motivations during the USSR-Afghanistan war and its
aftermath is a case in point.
A deep analytical grasp of the development of the Tanzim, as I have tried to
accomplish, would reject arguments such as that the Tanzim was just a tool in the
hands of Arafat, that it is inextricably linked to the Fatah, hence the name the FatahTanzim, or that by aligning with Hamas it embraced Hamass worldviews and
ideologies. Heeding the historical specificity of the group, we must come to realize that
the Tanzim has been a genuine expression of the Palestinian people within (and not
outside) the occupied territories; Tanzim members are those same grassroots activists
who practically initiated the 1987 Intifada, were responsible for its relative success,
handed the Intifada over to Arafat and, yet, were pushed aside by the Tunisians.
A differentiated historical sense in strategizing counter-terrorism would cast light
on the rationale behind the founding of the Tanzim, on the ongoing oppression of the
Palestinian people despite the Oslo Accords [34], on the deep tension between the
external and internal PLO, on the fact that the 2000 Intifada was also a challenge to
the Tunisian-led PA, on the crucial difference between types of leadership (i.e.,
symbolic or functional) and the effects of such differences on politics within the
challengers arena, and on the fact that many terrorist groups are politics-oriented and
have a certain degree of pragmatism and an instrumental approach to the use of force
and violence. This is true not only of the Tanzim, but also of Hamas. As one
incarcerated Hamas terrorist put it, armed attacks are an integral part of the
organizations struggle against the Zionist occupier our goal can only be achieved
through force, but force is the means, not the end. History shows that without force it
will be impossible to achieve independence [35] (p. 179). This is just as true of the
IRAs willingness to engage in cease-fire arrangements on the way to the Good Friday
Agreement in April 1998.
Pragmatism: Political processes affect contention above and beyond the
ideological imperatives and aggressive propensities of activists and leaders; they might
escalate contention by radicalizing the strategy and tactics employed by the parties
involved. Changes and developments in the political conditions on various levels
(local, national, or international) can be perceived by a group-at-risk for terrorism as
either opportunities or threats for a variety of purposes and goals. I specifically refrain
from using the concept of triggering events, because such a concept implies a direct
effect of events on the group-at-risk, whereas, in fact, events influence, if at all, the
group only indirectly, as they might occasion changes in the political conditions and,
consequently, alter the alignment of contention between the parties involved.
A counter-terrorism strategy must embrace pragmatism at any cost. A pragmatic
strategy of counter-terrorism warrants attentiveness to how changes in the political
conditions would be perceived by the group, as an opportunity or a threat, at what
level, and as an opportunity for or a threat to what? The counter-terrorism analyst
should look for possible shifts in the structure of the political conditions in order to
re/evaluate their effects on the group-at-risk, that is, to assess whether these changes
will be perceived as opportunities or as threats, hence an adaptation of policy vis--vis
the group-at-risk and the movement at large.
This is not merely an analytical distinction. Israel had already overreacted in the
context of the formation of Hamas during early 1988, misunderstanding Hamass
decision to join the Intifada as a threat to Israel, whereas in fact the formation of Hamas
38
had been the Muslim Brothers way to cope with the threat to their status within the
territories vis--vis the PLO. In a like manner, it may just as well be the case that Israel
overreacted in her response to the widely spreading demonstrations initiated by
Barghouti during Sharons visit to the Temple Mount, thereby failing to realize the
underlying motivation behind the Tanzims decision to increase contention: to further
its status within the Palestinian movement.
It goes without saying that the broadening contention backfired on Israel. Yet, to
my understanding and knowledge, in and of themselves changes in the structure of the
political conditions perceived by movement activists as either a threat or an
opportunity, while possibly bringing about a broadening of contention, did not cause a
shift to terrorism. Because political leaders misread the strategy and agenda of the
group-at-risk, they overreacted, thereby provoking the group to resort to terrorism.
Finally, the pragmatic counter-terrorism analyst should not forget the obvious:
political terrorists are politically-motivated and politics-oriented. Politics is a messy
business that involves compromises; many terrorist groups refrain from participating in
politics, at least formally, as the compromises involved run counter to their ideological
creed and their existential motivation. Yet, this does not mean that political processes
and developments go unnoticed and have no bearing on these groups strategy and
agenda, a fact that implies a certain degree of pragmatism on their part and necessitates
pragmatism on our part as well. We should avoid viewing terrorism, and suicide
terrorism for that matter, as intrinsically irrational or as a diabolical pathology [36, 37,
38, 39]. Just as in a specific political setting the three political processes can
concatenate to shift a group-at-risk from a nonviolent mode of action to a violent one,
political processes may generate the opposite result. A pragmatic counter-terrorism
specialist must seize any opportunity of that sort to pull a terrorist group back from the
edge of the abyss of violence. Otherwise, given such a misreading and/or lack of
discernment, political terrorism can transform itself into personal vendettas in which
destructive ideas and aggressive propensities dominate.
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40

IOS Press, 2006
Experiencing Terrorism in Spain: The Case

of ETA
Juan AVILES
Instituto Universitario de Investigacin sobre Seguridad Interior (IUISI) and
Universidad Nacional de Educacin a Distancia (UNED), Madrid, Spain
Abstract. ETA is a terrorist organization that has murdered more than 800 persons
since 1968. Its ideological origins are to be found both in the Basque nationalist
doctrine of the early XXth century and in the extreme left wing ideology of the
sixties. Its goal is the creation of an independent and socialist Basque State that
would include Spanish and French territories. Born in the last years of the Franco
dictatorship it thrived during the transition to democracy, winning the support of a
15% of the population in the Basque Autonomous Region. The Spanish counterterrorist strategy, that has nearly achieved the final defeat of ETA, offers valuable
experiences for other countries threatened by terrorism.
Keywords. Terrorism, Spain, Basque region, counter-terrorist strategy
Since the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, international
terrorism is rightly perceived as a major threat to world peace. Nor should the danger
posed by local terrorist organizations be forgotten. Even the Al-Qaeda led global
Jihadist network includes many local groups, from Kashmir to Algeria, which have
their own agenda, but still cooperate at an international level. It is also true that
religiously motivated terrorism is today the most lethal, but the threat from other,
differently motivated terrorist organizations, such as the social revolutionary,
nationalist and vigilante groups, should be kept in mind. The long Spanish experience
of fighting, for more than thirty years, a local nationalist terrorist group, namely ETA,
could therefore offer some useful lessons for the many countries that face terrorist
threats today.
Before describing this experience, two introductory remarks can be useful. The
first is a definition of the term terrorism as it is used in this essay. The second is a
brief introduction to the past and present of the Basque region, whose independence is
the declared goal of ETA.
Defining Terrorism
There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. In fact, some would argue that
the term is too ideological to be defined in a precise way. I do not agree with this
skeptical approach. I subscribe to the opinion that the term terrorism is useful to
describe a phenomenon that is not identical to other forms of political violence and
should therefore be analyzed separately. A universal definition would be welcome, as it
would represent a useful legal instrument in international cooperation against the
J. Aviles / Experiencing Terrorism in Spain: The Case of ETA
41
terrorist threat. And we as scholars need a definition as an analytical tool for the study
of the terrorist phenomenon.
A good starting point for defining terrorism is the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations in Resolution 54/109 of 9 December 1999. According to it, a terrorist
act is any act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any
other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict,
when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or
to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing
any act.
This definition has two important elements: A terrorist act is an act of violence a)
perpetrated against civilians or any other people who are not fighters in an armed
conflict, b) with the purpose of intimidating a population or forcing the will of a
government or international organization. But this is not enough to differentiate
terrorism from other forms of political violence.
Another commonly quoted definition is the one that is used by the US Department
of State in its annual reports on international terrorism. It is included in the US Code,
Title 22, Section 2656f, and according to it the term terrorism means, premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents.
We can assume that this definition includes, albeit in less precise ways, the two
elements found in UN Resolution 54/109. It also includes two new elements: terrorism
is a) premeditated and b) perpetrated by subnational groups or clandestine agents. The
last one is especially important, because it excludes from the definition of terrorism any
crimes perpetrated by the regular agents of a State. This is in fact the most common
usage of the term. Otherwise, we should conclude that the worst terrorists of the last
century were Hitler, Stalin and Pol Pot. Certainly, they terrorized more people than any
terrorist group, but there are good reasons to exclude their crimes from the scope of the
term terrorism. We should remember that the worst crimes committed by a State
through its regular agents are well defined in international law as war crimes, crimes
against humankind and genocide. If we included all these crimes under the term
terrorism, we would need another specific term for the acts we usually consider
terrorist.
By now, we have almost all the elements necessary for a definition precise enough
to differentiate terrorism from other forms of political violence. But there is a final
problem. Both the UN and the USA definitions point to the fact that violence against
combatants in a situation of armed conflict is not terrorism. Guerrilla warfare is thus
not in itself terrorism. But what about the deliberate killing of civilians in a situation of
armed conflict? If the killers are regular soldiers, their crimes are war crimes. But what
if the killers are irregular fighters are their acts war crimes, or rather terrorist acts?
In my opinion, the best solution to this puzzle is to restrict the concept of terrorism
to crimes perpetrated in a situation of peace and to consider crimes against
noncombatants committed by whichever party in a situation of armed conflict to be war
crimes. In fact, this is the common usage of the term, as killings in the context of war
are seldom considered terrorist acts. Of course, this poses the very difficult question of
how we can distinguish between a situation of peace and a situation of armed conflict
in our age of small wars, low intensity wars and armed insurgency.
42
Combining all the elements already considered, we arrive at a useful definition of

terrorism intended as an analytical instrument for scholarly research. It might be as
follows. Terrorism consists in premeditated violence, perpetrated by subnational groups
or clandestine agents of a State, against civilians or other noncombatants, in the
absence of a situation of armed conflict, with the purpose of intimidating a population,
or compelling a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from
doing any act.
In the case of Spain, it is obvious that there has not been a situation of armed
conflict for a long time. On the other hand, according to our definition there have been,
during the last forty years, four types of terrorism:
1. The terrorism of ETA, aimed at intimidating the Spanish population and
especially the Basque population opposed to secession from Spain, in order to
compel the Spanish government to grant independence to the Basque Country.
ETA has been responsible for 90% or more of the terrorist murders committed
during this period.
2. The social revolutionary terrorism of GRAPO, a Marxist-Leninist group
which for some years tried to ignite a social revolution.
3. Some acts of vigilante terrorism that during the first years of the democratic
transition tried to intimidate the left and put a brake on political change.
4. A campaign of vigilante terrorism perpetrated mainly in the south of France
by clandestine agents linked to some Spanish political authorities at the
Ministry of the Interior, with the purpose of intimidating the supporters of
ETA and possibly forcing the French government to suppress the freedom of
action that in the late seventies and early eighties ETA enjoyed on French
territory.
Explaining the Basque Conundrum

Like many other terrorist groups formed in the last century, ETA has a nationalist
ideology. This means that it considers itself the vanguard of a nation supposedly
oppressed by the Spaniards and the French that should fight for its independence. This
nation is the Basque nation. As the history of the Basques is almost unknown by most
readers outside of Spain, this hinders a better understanding of ETA. Therefore, a brief
introduction seems to be necessary.
Basque identity is based on the Basque language, a non-Indo-European language
spoken in some territories around the western end of the Pyrenees. Traditionally these
territories have been regarded as seven in number. Three of them are to the north of the
Pyrenees, and four are to the south. The three northern territories are rather smaller and
were part of the Kingdom of France since the Middle Ages. Three of the southern
territories, Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa and lava, in the Middle Ages joined the Kingdom of
Castile and then the Kingdom of Spain. The seventh territory, Navarre, was an
independent kingdom until the early sixteenth century, when it also joined Spain. As
was quite common in the old kingdoms of Europe, the four territories that joined the
Kingdom of Spain each had its own institutions and laws, called fueros, and they kept
them until the nineteenth century, in contrast to the other regions of Spain, which were
more integrated into the common institutional framework of the kingdom. The fueros
43
were abolished during the civil wars of the nineteenth century, as the victorious liberals
tried to create a new, modern centralized State, after the French model.
The Basque nationalist movement arose at the end of the nineteenth century as a
reaction to the loss of the fueros, the erosion of Basque traditions, the spread of the
Spanish language and the arrival of Castilian immigrants. As in other cases, it
represented a return to the old traditions that seemed to be threatened by the forces of
modernity. The nationalist movement was born in Vizcaya, extended to Guipuzcoa and
somehow to lava, but made little progress in Navarre, which had a strong sense of its
own identity, and in the northern French territories. Therefore when in 1978, after the
long dictatorship of General Franco, a new Spanish Constitution opened the possibility
of the creation of autonomous regions, Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa and lava formed the new
Basque Autonomous Region, called in Basque Euskadi, but Navarre opted to become
an autonomous region of its own. Since then the Basque nationalist parties have
obtained poor results in Navarre, but have won all the elections to the Basque
parliament and have headed all the autonomous Basque governments of the last 25
years. As the Basque Autonomous Region has very broad competencies, they have
easily engaged in an extensive process of building a separate Basque identity, via the
educational system and other instruments controlled by the Basque government.
Nevertheless, the non-nationalist parties, those that consider Euskadi to be part of
Spain, have strong roots in Euskadi and are well represented in the Basque autonomous
parliament.
In fact, Euskadi is not divided into two rival communities, as is the case in
Northern Ireland. The majority of the population feel themselves to be both Basque and
Spanish, and only about 30% consider themselves to be solely Basque. Less than 15%
vote for the political wing of ETA, far fewer than those who vote for either the
democratic Basque nationalist parties or the non-nationalist parties. ETA itself rejects
autonomy within Spain and demands the creation of a new independent Basque State
that would include all of the historic seven territories.
The Rise of ETA

ETA is a good example of the general fact that terrorist groups may thrive during a
process of transition from dictatorship to democracy. They can obtain broad popular
support as a result of indiscriminate repression in the last stages of dictatorship and
then use the new freedom brought by democracy to fight against democracy itself.
The first murders by ETA were perpetrated in the final years of Francos
dictatorship, but 95% of its victims were killed after Francos death, and ETA was
most deadly during the transition to democracy. It seems that ETA considered the
democratic transition as the best opportunity to impose its project of a socialist and
independent Basque Country by terrorist means and foresaw that the consolidation of
Spanish democracy and of Basque autonomy would put an end to that opportunity.
Founded in 1958, ETA combined two ideological trends. On one hand, it followed
the Basque nationalist doctrine of the early twentieth century, which was based on
Catholic fundamentalism, Basque racism, hatred towards Spain and anti-liberalism. On
the other hand, it adopted the revolutionary tendencies of the sixties. The founders of
ETA were no longer Catholic fundamentalists or racists, even if they inherited the old
messianic belief in the Basque Nation. Under the influence of the Chinese and Cuban
44
revolutions, and of the wars in Vietnam and Algeria, they came to believe that a
national liberation war was possible, that the Castroist guerrilla strategy could be
implemented in the Basque mountains.
100
92
90
76
80
66
70
60
52
50
46
43
37
40
30
30
19
20
10 2 1
0 0 1
0
1970
32 32
37
21 19
16 17
25
10
1975
26
23
14 12 15
5
1980
1985
1990
1995
15
13
6
5 3
2000
2004
Figure 1. Persons murdered by ETA, 1968-2004
A key element of ETAs first strategy, designed to ignite a popular insurrection,

was the action-repression-action dynamics. They hoped that the Spanish State would
respond to their attacks with a repressive violence that ETA itself would largely
manage to avoid and that would instead chiefly hurt the masses, provoking a popular
uprising.
In fact, this dynamics did not work as expected, in the sense that ETA did not
manage to avoid repression, but worked quite well in making the repression resented
by the population at large. The indiscriminate repression and the Franco regimes
hostility to any expression of Basque nationalism generated a wave of sympathy for
ETA. When Franco died in 1975, ETA had been almost completely dismantled, but had
won popular support that would enable it to recruit a large number of militants and to
launch a great terrorist offensive after 1978, when their imprisoned members were
released due to the 1977 amnesty. According to a 1980 survey, 47% of all Basques
agreed that the violence of the Spanish State was worse than the terrorist attacks, and
only 18% disagreed.
The structure designed by ETA during the democratic transition turned out to be
quite effective. It only kept underground its deadly commandos, whilst a large part of
its political wing and support groups operated openly.
Counter-Terrorist Mistakes
The Spanish experience provides two important lessons. Firstly, that the use of illegal
repressive means is counterproductive for a democratic State, and secondly that is
dangerous to allow the free operation of the apparently peaceful elements of a terrorist
network.
Successive Spanish governments made different mistakes in the struggle against
ETA. During the dictatorship and in the first years of the democratic transition, when
45
Spain lacked security forces prepared for the struggle against terrorism, a common
recourse was to indiscriminately arrest people linked to ETA, to be released thereafter.
The benefits of this policy in terms of collecting intelligence were less than the
negative reactions it produced in terms of the radicalization of the detained persons
themselves and their relatives and friends, especially in cases involving mistreatment.
Subsequently, the development of efficient information gathering services led to a
reduction in the number of detentions, which began to focus on the real terrorists.
A later and opposite mistake, which was not corrected until very recently, was to
consider that ETA was merely an armed organization. This misconception allowed
ETAs political wing, called Batasuna, and other ETA-linked groups to act openly and
without restrictions. It was hoped that if radical nationalism had legal action
opportunities, ETA would stop the terrorism. But the results were different: ETAs
fellow organizations contributed to increasing the intimidating effects of the terrorist
attacks, which inflicted a climate of fear on the Basque Country. A change began in
1998, when magistrate Baltasar Garzn stated for the first time that ETA was not just
an armed organization, but was rather a complex movement with different elements
acting in a coordinated way.
The most severe moral and political mistake, however, was committed when
sectors of the State administration promoted counter-terrorist terrorism in a dirty war.
Most of the counter-terrorist attacks took place in the French Basque territory that was
used by ETA as a base of operations. It seems that its main objective was to pressure
the French government to stop tolerating ETA activity on its territory. In fact, the
French government changed its policy in the mid eighties, and the dirty war, which
started in 1975, ended definitively in 1987.
ETAs Changing Strategy

ETA has used most of the strategies that a nationalist-separatist terrorist group can
possibly use against a democratic state: namely, the revolutionary war strategy, the
attrition strategy and the national front strategy.
During the period in which the revolutionary war strategy was implemented,
approximately from 1968 to 1978, ETA hoped that its terrorist actions would spark an
armed insurrection that would lead the Basque people towards independence from the
Spanish State. But this was no longer conceivable, not even by the most fanatic
ideologists, after the consolidation of democracy and the establishment of the Basque
autonomous region.
Therefore, ETA had to switch to another strategy. The new attrition strategy was
based on the assumption that prolonged terrorist pressure would succeed in forcing
Spain to yield to ETAs demands. A key element of the attrition strategy was
negotiation with the Spanish government. By offering negotiations, ETA achieved a
propaganda success, since it seemed disposed to dialogue. Should the government
agree to discussions, ETA would achieve a second propaganda success, since it would
prove that the Spanish State recognized the power of ETA. But negotiations came to
naught, since ETA was not likely to renounce to its main objective, namely
independence.
This strategy required some level of popular support, and ETA has been able to
obtain this. In elections to the Basque parliament, ETAs political wing, Batasuna,
46
typically receives almost 15% of the vote. And support has been greater among youth.
A 1990 survey revealed that 27% of Basque youth considered terrorism justified under
certain circumstances. The percentage rose to 46% among those who did not consider
themselves Spaniards but only Basques, and to 61% among those who regularly smoke
cannabis, which shows that both the nationalist and the anti-establishment components
of the youth sector are sympathetic to ETA. Nevertheless, in the last years there has
been a marked loss of support for ETAs terrorist actions. According to surveys, the
percentage of those who support or justify ETA has decreased from 12% in 1981 to
less than 1% in 2003.
In fact, ETA itself has suffered attrition, due firstly to the increasing efficacy of
security forces, who increasingly focus on the terrorist core, avoiding indiscriminate
repression, and secondly due to increasing counter-terrorism cooperation between
France and Spain since the mid-eighties.
The consolidation of Basque autonomy, ruled by democratic Basque nationalists,
has had an ambiguous effect on ETA. On one hand, the success of democratic
nationalism in reducing ETAs support is unquestionable, since it proved that it was
possible to preserve the differentiated Basque identity inside an increasingly
decentralized Spanish State. On the other hand, by defining Euskadi as a completely
different nation from Spain, despite their obvious and very ancient ties, democratic
nationalists tended to reinforce the ideology that nourishes ETA.
ETAs wearing-down and the ambiguity of democratic nationalism led to a new
strategy in the mid-nineties: the national front. This strategy implied that the Spanish
State should accept Basque Country self-determination. In order to achieve this, ETA
aimed at a union of all nationalist forces, including the democratic parties. Since it was
no longer a matter of forcing the State to negotiate, but rather of obtaining
independence by an agreement among the Basques themselves, the non-nationalist
Basques, who account for half the population of the Basque Autonomous Community,
became the main enemy.
Several non-nationalist Basque politicians were consequently murdered by ETA in
the mid-nineties. The kidnapping and assassination of one of them, a young Basque
town councilor, in 1997, provoked massive anti-terrorist demonstrations in the Basque
country, as well as in the whole of Spain. This worried the ruling democratic
nationalists, who feared an antinationalist backlash. As a result, democratic nationalists
considered that it was necessary to reach an agreement with ETA, which should forsake
terrorism and integrate itself into a nationalist union that would endeavor to reach
independence in the short-term. The new strategy materialized in a 1998 secret
agreement between the democratic nationalists and ETA, followed by an ETA truce.
But the agreement did not last very long, for reasons common in the dynamics of
terrorist groups. In a peaceful struggle for independence, political circumstances would
compel slow progress, and the effective leadership would belong to the democratic
parties, whilst ETA would gradually become irrelevant. Therefore, ETA broke the truce
and resumed its terrorist attacks in 2000.
Apparently, the attrition strategy was coming back. The loss of support,
international counter-terrorism cooperation and the efficacy of police measures have
greatly curtailed the operative capacity of ETA. It has also lost the support of various
organizations integrated in its terrorist network that have been outlawed after long
years in which they were allowed to operate freely. ETAs political wing, Batasuna,
was banned in 2002, after a new law on political parties stated that parties that
47
supported the activity of terrorist organizations were to be banned. And hegemony in

the nationalist camp has clearly passed from ETA to the democratic nationalist parties,
which after ruling the Basque autonomous region for more than twenty years are trying
to achieve a new step towards independence.
Conclusions
The Spanish experience reveals that once a terrorist movement has taken roots, the way
a democratic State can defeat it is through resolute and prolonged effort in which any
departure from democratic principles is counter-productive. Spain has defeated
terrorism without curtailing the political freedom of its citizens, including the right to
defend the nationalist thesis on the independence of the Basque country, and without
violating the human rights of suspected terrorists.
A key element in the Spanish counter-terrorism strategy of the last years has been
the realization that a developed terrorist network consists not only in the commandos
that actually commit violence, but also includes logistical, financial and propaganda
organizations that are no less part of the network than the commandos themselves.
After more than thirty years of Spanish counter-terrorism efforts, we are now entering
the last stage. As ETA is at its weakest point ever, the key question is how to force its
dissolution without paying a political price.
48

IOS Press, 2006
Combating Terrorism through International

Law
*
Barry A. FEINSTEIN
School of Law at Netanya College, Israel
Abstract. Apologists for terrorism frequently refer to root causes in an attempt to

explain away despicable atrocities perpetrated by terrorists. Portrayed typically as
understandable acts of desperation, these acts of terrorism in the name of addressing
alleged injustices are none other than appalling human rights violations. While
countless attempts have been made to pinpoint alleged root causes of terrorism, with
the supposition being that if its cause is eradicated then terrorism itself will disappear,
in reality the facts do not support the allegations. Yet, even if there did exist root
causes of terrorism, until those issues are adequately addressed and finally resolved in
an effective manner, a State which is the target of terrorist attacks is in the meantime
permitted to exercise its legitimate, inherent right to employ force in defense of its
citizens, and in order to forestall serious injury it is fully justified in engaging in
anticipatory measures of self-defense in an abetting State. Actions thus taken in selfdefense by the target State may be considered the legitimate direct response to the
unwillingness or inability of an abetting State to fulfill its international legal obligations
to halt terrorist attacks, or the imminent threat of terrorist attacks, which originate
within its borders, and are directed against the target State.
Keywords. Use of armed force, self-defense, armed attack, War on Terror, terrorism,
root causes of terrorism
1
Terrorism poses an ominous threat to humanity and to the peace and security of the
2
world. It knows no international border, nor does it distinguish between civilians and
3
combatants. Terrorists, by definition, are characterized by their lack of adherence to the
4
self-imposed restraints of moral standards. Instead, they place the cause above all in the
belief that the end justifies the means used to achieve it.
The inherent eclectic, unpredictable, and indiscriminate nature of terrorism has turned
what some excuse as acts of desperation by victims of oppression into one of the greatest
threats to the free world and modern civilization. Recent events, particularly and
unquestionably the horrifying suicide terrorist attacks on the United States on September
11, 2001, have finally brought the world to the realization that nothing can justify the
murder of innocent civilians, and political and social grievances of any particular group do
* The author is grateful to Naomi Kessler-Feinstein for her keen and indispensable perceptions as well as her
unceasing encouragement and support.
B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law

5
49
not entitle that group to violate the basic right to life of civilians. Regardless of its alleged
objectives or who perpetrates it, terrorism can never be legitimized.
Terrorists claim that they fight in the name of freedom and justice and that they
represent those suffering from subjugation and exploitation. However, it is the free
6
democratic societies that serve as prime and vulnerable targets for terrorism. Ironically, it
is the very moral strength of these societies openness, tolerance, and respect for human
rights that makes them so susceptible to harm by those driven by their antipathy to these
Western moral standards. As a result, the world today is often viewed as a dichotomy, with
7
civilization on one end and terrorism on the other.
Apologists for terrorism, and particularly for the acts committed by suicide terrorists,
frequently refer to root causes in an attempt to explain away despicable atrocities
perpetrated by terrorists. Portrayed typically as understandable, acts of terrorism in the
name of addressing alleged injustices8 are none other than appalling human rights
violations,9 and they are wrong, and they are evil; Those who practice terrorism murdering or victimizing innocent civilians - lose any right to have their cause understood
by decent people and lawful nations,10 explains New York Citys former Mayor Rudolph
W. Giuliani
It may seem natural at first glance though to try to identify root causes in an attempt
to correct them, since [r]oot causes have to be there .11 Consequently, countless
attempts have been made to pinpoint the alleged root causes of terrorism,12 with the
supposition being that if its cause is eradicated, then terrorism itself will disappear.13 Those
who advocate this approach typically assume that terrorisms root causes generally fall into
three basic sorts: poverty, oppression, and revolutionary nationalism.14
In the specific case of Palestinian terrorism, for instance, all three root causes are
said to come into play: Israeli control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is always
assumed to be the root cause of terrorism directed against both Israel and the United States.
Palestinian terror is assumed to be rooted in frustrated nationalism aggravated by relative
immiseration.15 Thus, terrorism is typically described as the legitimate response to
oppression, or, regarding some anti-American terrorism, the response to imagined
American complicity in Israels alleged crimes, i.e. maintaining [the U.S.s] alliance with
Israel.16
But in reality the facts do not support the allegations, as an examination and
comparison will demonstrate, for example, of the true and genuine motivation of Osama
bin Laden vis--vis his bogus and fake excuses for orchestrating the horrific and
catastrophic September 11, 2001 suicide terrorist hijackings and bombings in the United
States. In a February 1998 religious decree, or fatwa, Osama bin Laden called for among
17
other things the liberation of Muslim holy places in Israel as well as in Saudi Arabia, and
18
claimed he viewed the U.S. as assisting the Jews in their conquest of Palestine. Earlier, in
July 1996, bin Laden warned that the terrorists who bombed American soldiers in Saudi
Arabia will also attack the French and the British, and explicated in addition that a June
1996 bomb in Dhahran was the result of American behavior against Muslims, its support
19
of Jews in Palestine, and the massacre of Muslims in Palestine and Lebanon.
50
By means of these and similar pretexts attempting to tie his actions to the plight of the
Palestinians, bin Laden was trying to justify his cause and at the same time fuel antiAmerican sentiments. His actual vendetta, though, is ridding the Holy Cities of Medina
and Mecca, and all of Saudi Arabia, of the infidel, the crusading Americans, who he alleges
are satanically profaning his motherland. Bin Ladens rage and personal vendetta against
20
the United States is based on the United States military presence in Saudi Arabia.
Bin
Laden has declared that the Saudis have a legitimate right to attack the thousands of
United States military personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia: The presence of the American
crusader armed forces in the countries of the Islamic Gulf is the greatest danger and the
biggest harm that threatens the worlds largest oil reserves . . . . The infidels must be
21
thrown out of the Arabian Peninsula. The objective of al-Qaida (Arabic for the Military
Base) is in essence to unite all Muslims and to establish a government which follows the
rule of the Caliph, and the only way to do that, according to bin Laden, is to establish the
22
Caliphate by force. Simply put, al-Qaidas and bin Ladens goal is to liberate the land
23
Al-Qaida is thus intensely
of Islam from the infidels and establish the law of Allah.
24
anti-Western, and views the United States in particular as the prime enemy of Islam.
Through the invention of ostensible service to the Palestinian cause, bin Laden hence
unsuccessfully tried to adopt the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as his own crusade in the
form of a farfetched attachment to his fanatical obsession with any American presence in
25
general and U.S. military personnel and bases in particular in Saudi Arabia, and this
obsession of his would have existed irrespective of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Bin
Ladens attempts to link Palestinian aspirations to his cause were rejected outright by U.S.
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, in her former role as National Security Adviser, when
she explained that the war against terrorism was a war against evil people who would
26
hijack the Palestinian cause.
The suggestion that the Israeli-Palestinian issue is an
excuse for the terrorist suicide attacks on the U.S. is a tortured thought, explains U.S.
27
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld. It is not good thinking, he said.
Dr. Abd
Al-Hamid Al-Ansari, Dean of Sharia and Law at Qatar University in fact also found fault
with bin Ladens attempts to distort reality in this regard: In their hypocrisy, many of the
[Arab] intellectuals linked September 11 with the Palestinian problem something that
completely contradicts seven years of Al-Qaida literature. Al-Qaida never linked anything
28
to Palestine.
Suffice it to mention that bin Laden was implicated in the U.S. for his role in the first
terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, in which hundreds were killed
and injured, a terrorist bombing which had occurred in 1993, the same year that the
Palestinians and the Israelis signed the first stage of the Oslo Accords in an attempt to put a
29
The 1995 and 1996
final end to the countless decades of bloodshed between them.
bombings that killed and injured Americans and others in Saudi Arabia occurred while the
Israelis and Palestinians were in the midst of implementing the second stage of the Oslo
Accords designed to further enhance peace and long-hoped for cordial relations between
30
Bin Ladens malicious1996 and 1998 statements referred to
Israelis and Palestinians.
51
earlier were made while Palestinians and Israelis were continuing in their attempts to shore
up their peace accords through among other things engaging in numerous productive joint
enterprises. By 1998, the year when bin Laden and his associates were busy blowing up
U.S. embassies and killing and injuring thousands in Africa, Israelis and Palestinians could
show that cooperation between them was enormous and beneficial to the people on both
31
sides.
By the close of 1998, the Palestinian Authority and Israel had agreed to work
32
together to eventually employ 140,000 documented workers in Israel. The income earned
by Palestinian laborers in Israel was, at the time, significantly contributing to Palestinian
33
income. This earned income for Palestinians working in Israel amounted to between 3034
In monetary terms it
40% of the entire income of the Palestinian labor force in 1998.
35
translated to US$1 billion annually by the third quarter of 2000. All told, the economic
relations framework between Israel and the Palestinians by mid-September 2000 was
36
valued at some US $4 billion.
This same period when bin Laden was incessantly hurling vicious diatribes against
both Israel and the U.S. was, as a matter of fact, a time when examples of positive
Palestinian-Israeli cooperation abounded. Even though at times throughout some of these
years the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians moved more slowly than
many might have desired, cooperative activities between Israelis and Palestinians
37
nevertheless continued to flourish through the end of the twentieth century. For instance,
38
in addition to cooperative security efforts, both sides were often assisting each other with
road accidents, Palestinian and Israeli firefighters and rescue units were working together in
39
extinguishing fires, and specialized Israeli army units were, at the request of Palestinian
authorities, cooperating with Palestinian rescue teams and Palestinian Red Crescent units in
40
rescuing Palestinians trapped under fallen buildings in the Palestinian Authority.
Also,
41
Palestinian and Israeli police were cooperating in criminal investigations. Control of
42
agricultural disease was being jointly considered, and cooperative commercial relations
43
were flourishing. The prevalence of commercial interaction between the Palestinians and
44
the Israelis during this time period was demonstrated further by the tremendous flow of
business profits. In particular, Israeli citizens typically used to spend on average some ten
million New Israeli Shekels in shopping sprees on a normal Saturday in the Palestinian
cities of Nablus, Jenin, and Qalqilya, which was equivalent to more than US$100 million
45
annually on Saturdays alone. A total of 100,000 Israelis ordinarily used to shop on the
other side of the green line each week, translating to a yearly income for Palestinians of
half a billion dollars, from which 10,000 Palestinians directly were earning a living, while
the Palestinian Authority itself was purchasing annually US $1.8 billion of goods from
46
Israel. Palestinian and Israeli executives and business persons also were meeting during
47
this time to promote doing business in times of peace.
This was a time also when Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Egyptians, and others
48
were also working together and enjoying considerable professional and social contact.
52
For instance, in the health care field alone, a joint three-year investigation conducted by the
Brookdale Institute of the Joint Distribution Committee and al-Quds University of joint
Israeli-Palestinian health care projects for the period 1994-98, published in May 2000,
49
Approximately one-half of the Palestinian
found 148 examples of such cooperation.
participants and approximately one-third of the Israeli participants reported that the joint
50
activities positively influenced their attitudes toward coexistence.
Moreover, the report
indicated that after five years of activities, 99 percent of the Israelis and 88 percent of the
51
Palestinians suggested a desire to continue working together.
This positive and beneficial Palestinian-Israeli interaction was all occurring, to
reiterate, during bin Ladens busiest years of spewing forth anti-Israel and anti-U.S. diatribe
and hatred at the same time he was implementing those sentiments with terrorist bombings,
clearly belying his futile attempts to muddle reality and distortedly present the plight of the
Palestinian people, according to him, as a major source of his animosity towards the U.S.
and Israel.
Moreover, lest bin Ladens groping attempts to unnaturally attach the Palestinian issue
in a distorted manner as a rider unto his own personal vendetta against Western civilization
still be falling on attentive ears, it bears mention once more that up until autumn of 2000,
the Israelis and the Palestinians were slogging away at their negotiations and attempting in
a peaceful fashion to draw up a final settlement to their outstanding dispute. At that time
Yasser Arafat, then head of the Palestinian Authority, was offered a deal during peace
negotiations with the Israelis to finally end the conflict between the Palestinians and Israel,
a deal, according to Ambassador Dennis Ross, in charge of Middle East peace process
negotiations for the first President Bush and President Clinton, that would have given the
Palestinians a state with territory in over 97 percent of the West Bank, Gaza, and
52
Jerusalem, with the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem as its capital, and with the
53
unlimited right of return to it for Palestinian refugees. Before the onset of the recent
unrelenting violence against Israel, observes Ambassador Ross, not only was then-Israel
54
Prime Minister Ehud Barak prepared to give up most of the West Bank and Gaza, as well
as Arab East Jerusalem, but there was wide support across the political spectrum in Israel
for a solution like this, assuming of course that the Palestinians would give up violence and
55
their claim of a right of return to Israel. Arafats response to this generous offer was,
regrettably, to exchange war for negotiations, thereby denying the Palestinian people an
opportunity for peace, dignity, and prosperity while instigating and stimulating them to
56
become living bombs.
Thus, the truth of the Israeli-Palestinian matter, despite bin Ladens unsuccessful
attempts to distort reality, is that during the years and even days immediately prior to the
September 2000 outbreak of Palestinian violence, the two sides had been involved in
meaningful negotiations aimed at a peaceful settlement to their dispute in parallel to
ongoing worthwhile and constructive, as well as profitable, interaction between peoples on
both sides.57 In actuality, points out Alan Dershowitz, the Palestinians have been
victimized more by their own leaders than by any external country
53
Further dispelling the myth that terrorism against Israeli targets is the consequence of
Israels occupation of the West Bank and Gaza58 is the fact that terrorists in actuality had
already been targeting Israel and Israelis for decades before Israel acquired control over the
disputed territories in self-defense in June 1967. From 1920 through 1966, a total of 1,513
residents of Mandatory Palestine and, since 1948, of the State of Israel, were victims of
hostile enemy action, most in the form of terrorist attacks.59 In fact, before the State of
Israel was established in 1948, Arab terrorism was rife, particularly during the anti-Jewish
riots in 19201921, during the year 1929 when among other terrorist atrocities a pogrom
was carried out in Hebron against the Jews living there, as well as between the years 1936
and 1939.60 From May 1948 when Israel became a State, through June 1967, Arab terrorists
murdered some 1,000 Israelis, most of them civilians, and wounded numerous others. In
1952 alone, for example, terrorists carried out roughly 3,000 attacks across Israels borders,
many resulting in civilian casualties and the destruction of property.61 Another of the most
talked-about alleged reasons for terrorism is poverty.62 Yet, based on the data, the only
conclusion one can draw is that while many people in the world are poor, few of the poor
are terrorists, and relatively few terrorists are poor. In other words, while convictions about
economic injustice can fuel terrorism, poverty itself has no such effect. And it is not
economic hopelessness that fuels terror, but hope of a very specific and irrational variety,
hope that terror will significantly improve the situation.63
Thus, the facts do not fit the allegations. Even leaving aside multimillionaire Osama bin
Laden, the backgrounds of the September 11 killers indicates that they were without
exception scions of privilege: all were either affluent Saudis and Egyptians, citizens of the
wealthy Gulf statelets, or rich sons of Lebanon, trained in and familiar with the ways of the
West -- not exactly the victims of poverty in Muslim dictatorships.64 Historically,
terrorism in fact has been a virtual monopoly of the relatively privileged ever since the
Russian intellectuals invented modern terrorism in the 19th century .65 Always
educated, terrorists have come from the middle and upper classes, and were never poor.
The South American Tupamaros and Montoneros of the 1970s were all middle class,
starting as cafe Jacobins and graduating into urban terrorism, as were their followers among
the German Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Italian Red Brigades, France's Action Directe, the
Sandinista leadership in Nicaragua and, before it, Fidel Castro's Cuban revolutionaries.66
Thus terrorism, explains Alan Dershowitz, is not caused by frustration,
disenfranchisement or poverty. That is the big lie of terrorism. That may help explain how
terrorist leaders can recruit people to blow themselves up, but it doesn't explain why the
terrorist leaders who are wealthy, well-educated and calculating opt for the tactic of
terrorism. And the reason they opt for the tactic of terrorism is because it has a proven track
record of success .67 While the poor in Muslim states may be the popular base of
terrorist support, they have neither the money nor the votes the privileged do.
Ultimately, Islamic terrorism, just as its Marxist or secessionist version in the West and
Latin America was, is a matter of power -- who has it and how to get it -- not of poverty.68
Finally, anyone taking the time to examine the statistics, will be readily enlightened by
the fact that recently there has been a significant reduction in terrorist incidents perpetrated
54
against Israel and Israelis69 in comparison to the more than 22,400 terrorist attacks70 that
have been carried out against Israelis over the past five years , while there has been no
discernable improvement recently, however unfortunate, in the Palestinians misery and
poverty level, and which if anything may actually be getting worse.71 This further belies the
alleged relationship between root causes and terrorism.
Anger and hatred, though, even were they justified, are certainly no excuse for
committing acts of terror.72 Neither of course are poverty, misery, humiliation, or
oppression legitimate pretexts for perpetrating terrorist atrocities. No poverty or
misery or humiliation or oppression exemptions exist to the moral and legal
proscriptions against premeditated murdering of aged people and young children. In fact,
over at least the last two decades, resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and
Security Council have repeatedly condemned as criminal all acts, methods and practices of
terrorism wherever and by whomever committed.73 Not only did United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1269 of October 19, 1999, for instance, explicitly condemn all acts of
terrorism, irrespective of motive, wherever and by whomever committed,74 but it
furthermore unequivocally condemned all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as
criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and
manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed, in particular those which could
threaten international peace and security.75
Obviously though, there are certainly important reasons -- independent of their alleged
affect on of terrorism -- to address and indeed effectively deal with issues such as poverty,
oppression, humiliation, misery, and injustice of any kind throughout the world. In fact
some countries -- especially many in the Middle East -- that have the financial resources
that could help alleviate these maladies, actually use their resources to promote and finance
76
terrorism rather than to eradicate what they claim to be its main root causes.
In any respect, while the genuine hope of all is that the task of eliminating poverty,
oppression, humiliation, and misery throughout the world will be accomplished sooner
rather than later, to adequately deal with such crucial yet gargantuan global matters will in
reality most likely take years, decades, or even longer, however unfortunate. The question
then still remains, even if there did exist root causes of terrorism, until those issues are
adequately addressed and finally resolved in an effective manner, what is a State permitted
to do under international law in the meantime, if it and its citizens are attacked by armed
groups or individuals?
The ominous threat posed by terrorism to international peace, security, and global
77
stability has resulted in a mounting awareness of its danger and extent. When combined
78
with the obvious responsibility and duty of every State to protect its citizens, this
79
awareness has helped bring at least some of the free world to the simple realization that in
order to ensure the fundamental values of democracy, freedom, liberty, and security for
80
future generations, it is not only prudent but also necessary to declare war on terrorism.
81
The war on terror, however, is unlike any other war the world has experienced. Even
though the threat and actions of the terrorist enemy emanate from within a State, this is a
war against an enemy that does not operate within clearly defined borders. In fact, this is
55
not necessarily a war against a given sovereign State. There is no clearly identified
legitimate combatant that adheres to international customs, laws, and rules of war.
Moreover, rarely does one know when, where, or how terrorists will next strike, or who or
82
what their target will be at any given time. How then, can Western democracies that do
adhere to the rule of law engage in timely and effective defensive action against such an
83
amorphous and dreadful menace as terrorism? What protective actions may be justified
under international law?
Terrorists demonstrate brazen disregard for rules of international behavior and
accepted moral codes, while at the same time hiding behind these very rules and moral
codes to prevent the free world from protecting itself. Hence, one of the most serious
challenges facing the world today is the application of existing international rules to the
fight against terror. However, existing rules did not envisage situations like an enemy using
his or her body as a living bomb or a democratic state fighting against a network of terrorist
organizations and cells, intent on disrupting civilian life. Clearly, this new reality requires
interpretation and application of the existing rules in an innovative and dynamic fashion to
effectively confront this modern phenomenon.84 Those fighting this new type of war must
be given the legal tools with which to do it, so as to enable them to conduct the fight
against terrorism in a manner that will allow them to carry out their mission successfully.
Surely, the best and possibly only way to successfully combat such terrorism is to seek out
the terrorists wherever they are and destroy their infrastructure before they wreak more
devastating havoc.85 Certainly, in this modern technological age, international law cannot
require a State to sit back and wait while unfathomable terror threats crystallize and the
risks and dangers materialize86 portending inconceivable and unimaginable consequences.87
[T]he war on terror will not be won on the defensive, reasoned the President of the
United States. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the
worst threats before they emerge.88 Hence, it is necessary to engage in preemptive action
when necessary.89 As The National Security Strategy of the United States of September
2002 expounds, [t]he greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inactionand the more
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty
remains as to the time and place of the enemys attack.90
The use of armed force in or against a State harboring, sheltering, supporting, aiding or
abetting terrorists, in response to tragedy and devastation perpetrated in another State by
terrorists employing either conventional means or unconventional methods such as
suicide attacks and/or nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, raises far-reaching issues
that transcend any particular circumstance. One of the significant issues raised in this
context is the legality of the use of armed force by a State to counter terrorists directing
their attacks against its citizens from within the territory of another State.
States are obligated by Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter to refrain from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
91
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. Thus,
according to E. S. Fawcett, [a] state will be using such force in so far as it sends
these . . . bands across, or encourages or tolerates their crossing the frontier, or assists them
56

92
when they are already in the territory, of the other state. States are consequently
prohibited from sheltering and providing aid and support to terrorists, because such
assistance is exploited by the terrorists in furthering their threats and use of force against
the territorial integrity of the target State, and if a State sanctions terrorist activity
emanating from it against another State and/or its citizens, and/or fails to prevent such
terrorist activity, and/or tolerates such terrorist activity, and/or does not eliminate this
terrorist presence from its territory, it will be in violation of Article 2(4) of the United
Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council in its Resolution 748 of March 31,
1992, made this clear by explicitly linking a State's involvement with terrorism to its
obligations under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter when it re-affirmed that, in
accordance with the principle in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United
Nations, every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or
participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within
its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when such acts involve a threat
93
Already some thirty years before Resolution 748, Ian Brownlie
or use of force. . . .
correctly concludes that no State can claim that complicity in or toleration of the activities
of armed bands directed against another State is lawful, and this illegality, he explains, may
94
be expressed in terms of a violation of UN Charter Article 2(4). The use of such indirect
95
force, then, is clearly prohibited by this article.
Every State is furthermore bound by customary international law concerning non96
intervention and has the responsibility of insuring that its territory is not used as a base
97
from which to carry out acts that are injurious and hostile to other States: no State may
knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States,
98
held the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case. Traditionally, each
state was responsible for all activity within its borders, explains W. Michael Reisman,
and if military action emanated from its boundaries into the territory of another state, it
remained liable to that other state for the actual and constructive violations of the others
99
sovereignty. The concept of attributability to a State, then, applies if the State was
100
reluctant to impede these acts.
Beyond the responsibility of a State for all acts conducted within its territory which
violate the rights of another State as well as for any resulting violations of the other States
sovereignty, it moreover must actively prevent such acts and violations. [A] State is
bound to use due diligence to prevent the commission within its dominions of criminal acts
101
against another nation or its people, explains Judge John Moore in the S. S. Lotus Case.
Such acts the prevention of which by the State is required under international law include,
according to Hans Kelsen, hostile expeditions organized in [its] territory and directed
102
against the territorial integrity of [the] foreign state . . . . Not only is a State obligated
not to allow its territory to be used for such hostile expeditions, but, conclude Robert
103
Jennings and Arthur Watts, it must suppress and prevent them.
57
When a State fails, whether as a result of carelessness or devise, to exercise due

diligence to prevent the carrying out of injurious acts against other States, its failure is
104
Moreover, the
consequently considered an offense under customary international law.
failure to prevent such activities from taking place may result in the State being considered
as acting in complicity with the perpetrators of the activities illegal under customary
international law. Such state tolerance, which raises a presumption of governmental
complicity amounts to an international delinquency, reasoned Manuel R. Garcia105
Mora.
Rules of customary international law governing the obligation of a State to ensure that
terrorists do not use its territory as a base from which to direct attacks against another State
are reflected in multilateral conventions and in resolutions of international organizations.
Already some seventy years ago, included in various international conventions defining the
phrase aggression by a State was the [p]rovision of support to armed bands formed in its
territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the
request of the invaded State, to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power to
106
Likewise, on December 10, 1934,
deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.
the Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution that reiterated the same basic
tenants of customary international law, specifically that a State is responsible to ensure that
its territory is not used for terrorist acts against other States and that a State must
furthermore actively prevent its territory from being used for such terrorist acts. Article II
of the resolution stipulated that it is the duty of every State neither to encourage nor
tolerate on its territory any terrorist activity with a political purpose, [and] every State
must do all in its power to prevent and repress acts of this nature and must for this purpose
107
lend its assistance to Governments which request it. The Convention for the Prevention
and Punishment of Terrorism of 1937, also reaffirmed the principle of international law in
virtue of which it is the duty of every State to refrain from any act designed to encourage
terrorist activities directed against another State and to prevent the acts in which such
activities take
108
shape . . . .
In similar fashion, enumerated among the offenses in the Draft Code of Offences
against the Peace and Security of Mankind of 1954, are [t]he organization, or the
encouragement of the organization, by the authorities of a State, of armed bands within its
territory or any other territory for incursions into the territory of another State, or the
toleration of the organization of such bands in its own territory, or the toleration of the use
by such armed bands of its territory as a base of operations or as a point of departure for
incursions into the territory of another State, as well as direct participation in or support of
109
such incursions. Specifically relating to terrorism, the Draft Code of 1954 also includes
as an offense against the peace and security of mankind [t]he undertaking or
encouragement by the authorities of a State of terrorist activities in another State, or the
toleration by the authorities of a State of organized activities calculated to carry out
110
terrorist acts in another State.
58
In its Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of

States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty of December 21, 1965, the
United Nations General Assembly also condemns the toleration by a State of terrorist or
armed activity on its territory aimed against another State: [N]o State shall organize,
assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed
towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in
111
another State.
On October 24, 1970, the United Nations General Assembly, in its Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, forbade even the acquiescence
of a State in organized activities in its territory directed at committing acts of terrorism in
another State: Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the
organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into
112
the territory of another State.
Moreover, [e]very State has a duty to refrain from
organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in
another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the
113
commission of such acts, when the acts referred to . . . involve a threat or use of force.
A plethora of other resolutions of international organizations abounds that reflects the
rules of customary international law requiring a State to ensure that its territory is not used
by terrorists as a base from which to direct attacks against another State, such as United
114
United Nations
Nations General Assembly Resolution 40/61 of December 9, 1985,
115
United Nations Security
General Assembly Resolution 42/22 of November 18, 1987,
116
Council Resolution 748 of March 31, 1992,
United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 49/60 of December 9, 1994, which approved the Declaration on Measures to
117
Eliminate International Terrorism,
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1189 of
118
and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of September
August 13, 1998,
119
28, 2001.
Furthermore, the United Nations General Assemblys Definition of Aggression,
adopted on December 14, 1974, lists among the acts considered aggression [t]he sending
by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry
out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts [of
120
Certainly, the last
aggression] listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.
portion of this designation, or its substantial involvement therein, may comprise
involvement in the sending of armed bands by or on behalf of a State, as Julius Stone
rightly indicates, even though the delinquent State may not in point of fact be the one that is
121
launching the bands attacking the target State.
Consequently, in accordance with the law under the United Nations Charter, with
customary international law, with international conventions, as well as with numerous
resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, a
State is categorically responsible for all acts carried out within its territory which are
contrary to the rights of other States, and is liable for any resulting violations of the
59
sovereignty of another State. Furthermore, the delinquent State must actively prevent such
acts and violations. Hence, the failure by a State to prevent attacks by terrorists against the
122
target State constitutes a violation of the rights of the target State. Moreover, if a State
does nothing to stop terrorist actions aimed at the target State, its inaction in and of itself
constitutes complicity in the acts of terrorism: [G]overnmental inactivity in preventing
the organization of a military expedition amounts to complicity in the hostile attack and can
logically be regarded as actual governmental participation in the conflict, explains Garcia123
Even if a state has obviously used all the means at its disposal to prevent a
Mora.
hostile act of a person against a foreign nation but is physically unable to suppress it, it
124
The international obligations of a
certainly has not discharged its international duty.
State flow from its sovereign status, and its responsibilities as a State are unrelated to its
ability to control the carrying out of acts which emanate from its territory and which are
injurious to others beyond its borders. Accordingly, any claimed inability to control the
terrorists may not relieve a State of its international obligation to curb use of its soil by
125
terrorists to launch activities against other States.
Examined in this fashion, a States
failure to prevent assaults by terrorists against another State constitutes a violation of the
126
rights of the other State.
When a State is unwilling, or unable, to prevent terrorists from using its territory as a
base from which to attack another State, what recourse exists for the victim State? A nonmilitary solution, it is superfluous to say, is by far the preferable one. As Alan Dershowitz
correctly observes, military options are always a terrible, last resort. They are a
particularly terrible last resort when terrorists deliberately hide among the civilian
127
It cannot be stressed enough that the use of armed force can only be part of
population.
128
For instance, if an appeal is possible
the solution, and it can only be used as a last resort.
by a target or victim State to a State hosting terrorists an appeal that would be heeded and
effectively acted upon in an expeditious manner to remove a danger presented by armed
groups being formed on the territory of the host State for the purpose of a raid into the
target State the target or victim State is not permitted to enter the host State and use
129
armed force to deal with the terrorists.
In other words, if an effective and expeditious
alternative to the use of force is available, under international law that alternative should be
employed.
But the question of course naturally arises: What if there exists no alternative, no
expeditious and effective alternative to the use of force to protect the target State from acts
of terrorism? What then? Is the use of armed force ever permissible under international
law?
When a State is unwilling, or unable, to prevent terrorists from using its territory as a
base from which to attack another State, the State thereby attacked is indeed permitted to
exercise force to protect itself pursuant to its inherent right of self-defense. The operative
section of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter stipulates that [n]othing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
60
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security . . . .
Attacks against one State by terrorists emanating from the territory of another State
certainly constitute an armed attack and are deemed perpetrated not only by the terrorists
and their organizations themselves, but also by the State from which they are operating. As
far as the attacks perpetrated by the terrorists themselves, J. E. S. Fawcett explains that the
intrusion of armed bands may . . . constitute an armed attack for purposes of Article 51 of
130
Nothing contained in the United Nations Charter specifies that an armed
the Charter.
attack may only be perpetrated by a State, and Article 51 was drafted in a broad enough
131
manner to permit the use of force in self-defense to counter non-state actors.
Thus, [i]t
132
is accepted today that attacks of private terrorist groups may qualify as armed attacks,
concludes Carsten Stahn.
In regard to the State from which the terrorist attacks originated, it too definitely may
be considered to have committed an armed attack. [T]he undertaking or encouragement
by a state of terrorist activities in another state or the toleration by a state of organized
activities calculated to result in terrorist acts in another state, indicated Hans Kelsen,
133
Ian Brownlie as well, made
may be interpreted as constituting an armed attack . . . .
clear that it is conceivable that a coordinated and general campaign by powerful bands of
irregulars, with obvious or easily proven complicity of the government of a state from
134
which they operate, would constitute an armed attack.
The toleration or
encouragement by a State of the organization of hostile expeditions on its territory aimed
against another State is at the very least a constructive attack by the State in which these
preparations occur, and as a consequence, it becomes responsible for the illicit acts which
135
it has failed to prevent, summarized Ellery C. Stowell.
[F]or the attribution to a State of acts of . . . groups such as armed bands of irregulars
or rebels, according to the judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, it is sufficient to require that the group as a
136
As the International Criminal Tribunal
whole be under the overall control of the State.
held:
Under international law it is by no means necessary that the controlling authorities
should plan all the operations of the units dependent on them, choose their targets, or give
specific instructions concerning the conduct of military operations and any alleged
violations of international humanitarian law. The control required by international law may
be deemed to exist when a State (or, in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the
conflict) has a role in organising,, coordinating or planning the military actions of the
military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational
support to that group. Acts performed by the group or members thereof may be regarded as
acts of de facto State organs regardless of any specific instruction by the controlling State
137
concerning the commission of each of those acts.
Thus, the overall control test adopted by the International Criminal Tribunal
relieves the defending state from the (unrealistic) obligation to provide evidence about
61
specific instructions or directions of the host state relating to the terrorist act, triggering the
right to self-defence.138 Accordingly, what is required for criminal responsibility to arise
is some measure of control by a Party to the conflict over the perpetrators.139 Besides,
[a]ny suggestion that there are any acts of unlawful force between states that international
law forbids a state from defending against by proportionate force, by the means and to the
extent reasonably necessary to protect itself, degrades the concept of international law, and
diminishes the inducement for a responsible political leader to take its constraints seriously
into account in conflict situations in the actual planning and conduct of that state's
affairs.140
Moreover, deduced Carsten Stahn, there may be cases in which [an accumulation] of
several acts of support to a terrorist group causes much greater harm to the defending state
than the mere sending of it. To exclude these cases from the scope of application of Art. 51
141
would deprive states of their protection against indirect aggression.
Further, it should be pointed out that while Article 51 does not specifically indicate the
way in which an armed attack occurs,142 it could not be logically contended, for example,
that using airplanes loaded with fuel to crash into buildings on September 11th was
anything but an armed attack under Article 51; at the very least, their damage capability
was far greater than many military weapons purposely calculated to bring about vast loss of
life and enormous property devastation. Certainly the consequences of the suicide attacks
were tantamount to those of a military operation. Moreover, even where an attack takes
place against citizens of the target State who were at the time located abroad, Article 51
would still be applicable.143 Likewise, the scale of the attack, whether large or small, is
irrelevant to it being considered an armed attack:144 [T]he plain language of Article
51 . . . in no way limits itself to especially large, direct or important armed attacks,
explains John L. Hargrove.145 Therefore, [i]f armed attack means illegal armed attack it
means, on the other hand, any illegal armed attack, even a small border incident, writes
Josef L. Kunz.146 Certainly, then, [s]maller terrorist attacks which form part of a consistent
pattern of violent terrorist action may constitute an armed attack. . . .147
In decisive fashion, previously mentioned United Nations Security Council Resolution
1368, adopted on September 12, 2001, specifically recognized the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter in light of the
horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in New York,
Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania. The Security Council in this resolution also regarded
such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and
security, [and stressed] that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harboring the
148
The
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable.
Security Council also determined to combat by all means threats to international peace and
149
Some two weeks later, the United Nations
security caused by terrorist acts . . . .
Security Council, in Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001, reaffirmed the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations
in view of the terrorist attacks which took place in New York, Washington, D.C. and
Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001, . . . [that] like any act of international terrorism,
62
constitute a threat to international peace and security . . . . The resolution further

reaffirmed the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts as well as the
principle established . . . that every State has the duty to refrain from organizing,
instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in
organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts
150
. . . .
Consequently, while it is incontrovertible that the activities of terrorists against a target
State and its citizens would in and of themselves constitute an armed attack, within even
the most restrictive reading of United Nations Charter Article 51, the actions, or inactions,
of States that aid and abet terrorists may also constitute an armed attack within the
narrow meaning of the article. Thus, concludes J. E. S. Fawcett:
[W]here incursion of armed bands is a precursor to an armed attack, or itself
constitutes an attack, and the authorities in the territory, from which the armed bands came,
are either unable or unwilling to control and restrain them then armed intervention, having
as its sole object the removal or destruction of their bases, wouldit is believedbe
151
justifiable under Article 51.
Furthermore, as Albrecht Randelzhofer aptly pointed out, even if a State gives shelter
to terrorists after they have committed an act of terrorism within another State, the
152
Hence,
terrorist acts . . . [amounting] to an armed attack . . . are attributable to [it]. . . .
although a State may not have been used as a staging base for the terrorists, but rather, that
State gave sanctuary to terrorists who had perpetrated an attack, the defending state would
also be entitled to take military measures against [it]. . . . Why should a terrorist actor, who
simply changes jurisdiction, benefit from the shield of sovereignty of another host state
153
As
which fails to fulfil its duty to suppress terrorist activities emanating from its soil?
Albrecht Randelzhofer correctly concludes, even if a State were incapable of impeding
acts of terrorism committed by making use of its territory . . . the State victim of the acts is
not precluded from reacting by military means against the terrorists within the territory of
the other State. Otherwise, a so-called failed State would turn out to be a safe haven for
154
terrorists, certainly not what [Articles] 2(4) and 51 of the Charter are aiming at.
Under customary international law, the right of self-defense has furthermore always
been anticipatory and could be exercised against dangers and attacks that are imminent as
155
well as actual.
As Ellery C. Stowell explains, [a] state may . . . defend itself, by
preventive means if . . . necessary, against attack by another state, threat of attack, or
preparations or other conduct from which an intention to attack may reasonably be
156
Consequently, writes C. H. M. Waldock, the inherent right of selfapprehended.
157
defense may be exercised against an imminent threat of armed attack.
The language of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter itself in fact preserves the
inherent right of . . . self-defence: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to

158
63
maintain international peace and security . . . .

To adopt an unrealistic approach to
Article 51 of the Charter, an approach that does not comport with reality, would be
irreconcilable with the reasonable interests of States, since circumstances may arise prior
to an actual attack and call for self-defence immediately if it is to be of any avail at all,
159
Besides, [i]t is hardly likely that those who drafted Article
explains Derek W. Bowett.
51, elucidates D. W. Greig, would have been prepared to disregard the lessons of recent
history and to insist that a state should wait for the aggressors blow to fall before taking
positive measures for its own protection. There is no need to read Article 51 in such a way,
160
and it would be totally unrealistic to do so.
Thus, Article 51 did not restrict the
traditional right of a State to respond in self-defense in a manner that would exclude the
right to take action against an imminent danger that had not yet taken the form of an actual
161
armed attack.
Therefore, as Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts point out, if an appeal
by the target State to the host State to remove a danger, presented by armed groups being
formed on the territory of the host State for the purpose of a raid into the target State, were
fruitless or not possible, or if there is danger in delay, a case of necessity arises, which
162
permits the threatened State to enter the host State and eradicate the intending raiders.
The principle is simple, according to Carsten Stahn. The defending state is . . . under a
duty to resort initially to diplomatic means in requesting the government in whose territory
the terrorist acts have been planned or trained to take suppressive measures. If it becomes
evident that the host state is unable or unwilling to act, the injured may, as an ultima ratio
163
measure, take military action to stop the persisting threat.
The necessity, which would thus comprise a necessity for the purpose of selfdefense, has been characterized as instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
164
means, and no moment for deliberation.
Accordingly, if a State does not, or cannot control the inhabitants in the territory over
which it is sovereign, or police its borders, and if the target State is faced with an imminent
danger as a direct consequence of this unwillingness or incapacity, the target State is
justified in engaging in its own efforts to quell the threatened hostile actions from within
165
the abetting State
when peaceful attempts to eliminate the danger to the target State are
to no avail. In circumstances such as these, a case of necessity will consequently have
arisen leaving the target State no choice but to exercise its legitimate right of self-defense
by entering the abetting State to subdue the terrorists and destroy the terrorist bases and
166
apparatus poised against the target State. A strong probability of armed attack, that is,
an imminent threat of armed attack, is therefore sufficient to trigger a States right to self167
defense.
Thus, in addition to the legitimate exercise of self-defense directed against an
actual armed attack of terrorists, anticipatory action, aimed at preventing serious injury,
may also be taken against the abetting State. In any case, according to Peter Rowe, [i]t
may be that . . . the only realistic options available to a state to deal with [the] new breed
of apocalyptic terrorist are approaches that involve a state using military force to bring
168
terrorists to justice.
64
Furthermore, and even more far-reaching in specific reference to terrorism as such,

according to Rainer Grote, is that the right to intervention against terrorist groups does not
only apply in situations where the threat is imminent, but also in those cases where the
danger is more remote but nevertheless real. This wide interpretation of the time limits for
intervention corresponds to the specific nature of terrorism, which does not manifest itself
in sustained operations, but rather in intermittent acts of violence the times and places of
which are difficult, if not impossible to predict. In practice, this allows states to strike at
terrorist groups independent of any imminent threat in the narrow sense . . . where a
terrorist group has already demonstrated by past acts its capacity to wreak havoc upon
169
foreign nations.
Yet, there still remains the important issue as to how to determine whether or not a risk
of considerable consequences indeed exists, a risk such as will trigger the right to exercise
170
armed force in self-defense. Certainly the right of self-defense can always be abused, but
this is just to state the obvious. Self-defense can even be abused by an individual claiming
that a personal attack against him had occurred. All legal doctrines can be abused, but that
does not make them all suspect. The potential for abuse is reduced though if the events are
171
carefully scrutinized, evaluated, and analyzed in a reasonable and evenhanded manner.
It seems perfectly evident, according to Roberto Ago, that a State which considers itself
the victim of an armed attack or, in more general terms, of conduct entitling it to react in
self-defence against the author of that conduct, should not have to seek anybodys
permission beforehand to do so; to maintain the opposite would be to contradict the very
172
Thus, as Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts point
essence of the notion of self-defence.
out, [i]n practice it is for every state to judge for itself, in the first instance, whether a case
173
of necessity in self-defence has arisen.
Even in the specific context of NATO, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) determined
174
that it was necessary to adopt a robust anti-terrorist posture:
[D]efence against terrorism may include activities by NATOs military force () to
help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist attacks, or threat of attacks,
directed from abroad, against populations, territory, infrastructure and forces of any
175
member state, including by acting against these terrorists and those who harbour them.
When a State does not perform legal obligations incumbent upon it vis--vis another
State, it moreover cannot justifiably claim that its own rights, including sovereignty, should
be respected: The duty of every state itself to abstain, and to prevent its agents and, in
certain cases, nationals, from committing any violation of another states independence or
territorial or personal authority is correlative to the corresponding right possessed by other
176
expound Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts. In the words of Judge Max Huber,
states,
the consequent duty of the right of territorial sovereignty is the obligation to protect within
the territory the rights of other States, in particular their right to integrity and inviolability
177
in peace and in war.
States cannot set themselves above international law, but rather,
they are subject to it, and clearly the sovereignty of a State is limited. A State that will not,
or cannot, act in accordance with its obligations pursuant to international law cannot
65
reasonably anticipate that it will be able to retain the right of sovereign decision-making
178
identified as independence. Thus, a State may not simultaneously allege that it is unable
to perform its undoubted legal obligations, and that it has a right to be immune from
179
responsibility in respect of such defaults, elucidates Yehuda Z. Blum.
180
Territorial integrity is not an absolute.
It must give way to the threatened States
stronger right of self-defense, since it is considered an abuse of rights for a State to tolerate
181
As Derek W. Bowett astutely
activities within it that are detrimental to another State.
pointed out, a right of absolute inviolability is not conferred by [Article 2(4)] and the right
of territorial integrity remains, under the Charter, subject to the rights of other states to
exercise self-defence within the conditions prescribed by general international law and the
182
Accordingly, the unspoken premise of the 11 September attacks, writes
Charter.
Carsten Stahn, is that terrorist groups shall not receive an unwitting shield from the
territorial integrity of a state which is unable or unwilling to put an end to terrorist activity
giving rise to an armed attack. Stahn continued and explains that [t]he normative
corollary of this hypothesis is the emergence of a principle, which posits that the right to
territorial integrity must, in some instances, yield to the exercise of another states right to
183
protect itself and its citizens under the right to self-defence.
Thus, use of force, which ordinarily may be illegal is, under such circumstances, in
184
For it is the abuse of the rights of the territorial
accord with international law.
sovereign, in allowing his territory to harbour a danger to the security of a . . . state,
explains Bowett, that justifies
185
the . . . state in resorting to measures prima facie unlawful. A State, which does not
prevent the use of its territory for terrorist activities directed against and injurious to
another State, cannot justifiably complain if the target State uses force in order to quell the
186
danger that threatens it.
Actions taken by the target State, which are aimed at curbing
hostile activities of terrorist groups originating in and emanating from the abetting State,
therefore may be correctly described as actions not against the territorial integrity of the
187
abetting State, but rather as actions against terrorists operating in the abetting State.
In addition to the conditions established regarding the necessity for the purpose of
self-defense, the exercise of a States inherent right of self-defense must involve nothing
unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of self-defense must be
188
limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.
The action taken in self-defense
must be proportionate, both in scale and disposition, to the previous illegal act or imminent
189
Action engaged in self-defense must be restricted to
attack that required such measures.
the aim of thwarting or avoiding the injury, and must be reasonably proportionate to that
190
necessity in order to achieve this outcome. Yet, according to Roberto Ago, it would be a
mistake
to think that there must be proportionality between the conduct constituting the armed
attack and the opposing conduct. The action needed to halt and repulse the attack may well
have to assume dimensions disproportionate to those of the attack suffered. What matters in
66
this respect is the result to be achieved by the defensive action, and not the forms,
substance and strength of the action itself. [A] State which is the victim of an attack
cannot really be expected to adopt measures that in no way exceed the limits of what might
just suffice to prevent the attack from succeeding and bring it to an end. If, for example, a
State suffers a series of successive and different acts of armed attack from another State,
the requirement of proportionality will certainly not mean that the victim State is not free to
undertake a single armed action on a much larger scale in order to put an end to this
191
escalating succession of attacks.
Indeed, and especially considering the circumstances of constant terrorist attacks, it is
notoriously difficult to maintain an adequate defensive system which relies upon meeting
attacks incident by incident, explains Derek W. Bowett. Even more important, a series of
small-scale defensive measures will not have the same deterrent capacity as a large-scale
192
strike and may even be more costly to the defending state. As a consequence, if a State
is constantly threatened and harassed by terrorists, it may legitimately seek out and destroy
the center of organization of the attacks, even if the action taken in self-defense is of a
much greater scale than each individual harassment, or is greater than the entirety of the
infringements; the desired goal of the self-defense action is to avert future attacks or to
193
reduce their effectiveness and frequency. Hence, Oscar Schachter concludes, it does not
seem unreasonable, as a rule, to allow a state to retaliate beyond the immediate area of
attack, when that state has sufficient reason to expect a continuation of attacks . . . from the
194
same source. Consequently, self-defence . . . may carry the combat to the source of the
aggression, whether direct or indirect, opines Judge Stephen Schwebel in the Nicaragua
195
case.
Any action limited to warding off peril may lose its objective if conditions were to
allow the recurrence of that danger; [t]he argument is not without merit, writes Robert W.
Tucker, that given the circumstances attending the exercise of self-defense by nations, it is
only reasonable that the requirement of proportionality should be interpreted as permitting
the removal of the danger which initially justified the resort to measures of self196
There is, therefore, a strong case for measures taken to remove the source of
defense.
the threat . . . to the security of the state generally, Tucker explains, provided that these
measures do not result in disproportionate death and destruction. Given the persistently
avowed purposes of the [terrorists], and the activities undertaken in pursuit of those
197
purposes, [their] destruction is a legitimate end in itself. While self-defense is basically
designed to thwart an illegitimate armed attack, it does allow a State to engage beyond this
198
illegal attack in a legitimate war until victory and the aggressors total defeat.
Ultimately, the purpose of war, explains Lassa Oppenheim, is . . . the overpowering and
utter defeat of the opponent, and therefore, no moral or legal duty exists for a belligerent
to stop the war when his opponent is ready to concede the object for which war was
199
made.
In the end, it seems fair and reasonable to conclude that states exposed to constant
violence may have legitimate reasons to respond differently to acts of terrorism than states

200
67
which are not under permanent threat.

After all, maintains Hans Kelsen, severe
restriction of measures taken in self-defense may prove unreasonable in that it may defeat
201
the essential purpose for which measures of self-defense are permitted in the first place.
While September 11th and its aftermath have reinforced for everyone the reality of
terrorism as a tragic part of daily life, a realization of the clear and present danger to the
security of todays international environment,202 the war on international terror is
considered by far the most critical test confronting Western civilization.
Any legal analysis regarding the use of armed force against terrorists and States that
aid and abet them must take into consideration an abetting States official sanctioning of, or
acquiescence in, the freedom of action of terrorists operating from within the State, against
the target State. By not preventing terrorist attacks originating in, and emanating from, the
territory of an abetting State against the target State, the abetting State violates its
international legal obligation to curb the execution of such injurious acts against other
sovereign States. Even if an abetting State were incapable of preventing the terrorists from
using its territory to carry out attacks on the target State, or as sanctuary after the attacks, it
is not relieved of this international legal obligation. The failure of an abetting State to
prevent the training and organization of terrorists, or the providing of a safe haven or
shelter for them on its territory, and the perpetration of terrorist attacks against the target
State by terrorists using the abetting States territory to carry them out, raises a presumption
of complicity with the terrorists. Consequently, not only do such terrorist activities
constitute an armed attack against the target State, but the complicity of an abetting State
in these actions may also be considered an armed attack under Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter. Both trigger the target States legitimate, inherent right to employ force in
self-defense. Furthermore, in order to forestall serious injury to the target State and its
citizens, the target State is fully justified in engaging in anticipatory measures of selfdefense in an abetting State. Actions thus taken in self-defense by the target State may be
considered the legitimate direct response to the unwillingness or inability of the abetting
State to fulfill its international legal obligations to halt terrorist attacks, or the imminent
threat of terrorist attacks, which originate within its borders, and are directed against the
target State.
Consequently, any attempt to examine supposed root causes of terrorism is irrelevant
in a discussion on the manner in which a State is permitted under international law to
defend itself against acts perpetrated by armed groups or individuals. In fact, [b]ased on
history and logic, the root causes of terrorism are not what most people assume;
poverty, revolutionary nationalism and oppression. Instead, there is a brutal simplicity to
terrorism: Terrorism is often seen as an effective tactic. That leads to the conclusion that
de-legitimizing terrorism, crushing terrorist organizations and, in general, making certain
that terrorism invariably fails are the only ways to seriously address the root causes of
terrorism. By the same token, careless assumptions about root causes which serve as
justifications for terrorism, must themselves be seen as root causes of terrorism because
they make terrorism seem less outrageous which makes terrorism seem more rational,
more likely to succeed and, most significantly, more likely to be utilized again and
68

203
again.
Terrorism can never be rewarded, concludes Alan Dershowitz; rather, steps
204
taken to eradicate terrorism must always be rewarded.
Endnotes
1
See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians,
45-46 (Oct. 2002), available at www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrlpa/ISRAELPA1002.pdf (visited Oct. 18, 2003), also
available
at
http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:ZbN7R3TT0psJ:www.hrw.org/reports/2002/
isrlpa/
ISRAELPA1002.pdf+site:hrw.org+suicide+terrorism&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 (visited Oct. 18, 2003).
2
See, e.g., Intl Law Commission, Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (Draft), art.
2(4) and art. 2(6), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/offences.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003).
3
See, e.g., President William J. Clinton, Addressing the opening session of the 53rd United Nations General
Assembly, partially cited in Judy Aita, Clinton Opens UN General Assembly with Call to Combat Terrorism,
United States Information Agency, Sept. 21, 1998, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/ 98092102.htm
(visited Sept. 5, 2003).
4
See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address at the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 12, 2002), at
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/13434.htm (visited Sept. 5, 2003).
5
See, e.g., Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, Opening Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly Special
Session on Terrorism (Oct. 1, 2001), at http://www.un.org/terrorism/statements/giuliani.html (visited Sept. 5, 2003).
6
See, e.g., President William J. Clinton, Addressing the opening session of the 53rd United Nations General
Assembly, partially cited in Judy Aita, Clinton Opens UN General Assembly with Call to Combat Terrorism,
United States Information Agency, Sept. 21, 1998, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/ 98092102.htm
(visited Sept. 5, 2003).
7
See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to United Nations General Assembly,
USUN PRESS RELEASE # 162 (01) (Nov. 10, 2001), at http://www. un.int/usa/01_162.htm (visited Sept. 5,
2003); see also White House press secretary Scott McClellan, in Sarah el Deeb, Bin Laden Said to Warn of
Attacks in U.S. (Oct. 18, 2003), at http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story &cid=514&e=1&u=/
ap/20031018/ap_on_re_mi_ea/bin_laden_tpe_17 (visited Oct. 19, 2003); Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, Opening
Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Terrorism (Oct. 1, 2001), at
http://www.un.org/terrorism/statements/giuliani.html (visited Sept. 5, 2003).
8
Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, Opening Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on
Terrorism (Oct. 1, 2001), at http://www.un.org/terrorism/statements/giuliani.html (visited Sept. 5, 2003).
9
See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians,
45-46 (Oct. 2002), available at www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/ISRAELPA1002.pdf (visited Oct. 18, 2003),
also available at http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:ZbN7R3TT0psJ:www.hrw.org/reports/2002/ isrlpa/ISRAELPA1002.pdf+site:hrw.org+suicide+terrorism&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 (visited Oct. 18, 2003).
10
Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, Opening Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on
Terrorism (Oct. 1, 2001), at http://www.un.org/terrorism/statements/giuliani.html (visited Sept. 5, 2003).
11
Michael Radu , The Futile Search for Root Causes of Terrorism (May 6, 2002),
http://www.hnn.us/articles/712.html.
12
See, e.g., William Christison (Former CIA Director, Office of Regional and Political Analysis),
Globalization and The Root Causes of Terrorism (Apr. 10, 2002),
http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/zforum/02/nation_christison0410.htm.
13
See., e.g., Fredric Smoler, The Root Causes of Terrorism, Dispelling the Myths 1, 3,
www.defenddemocracy.org (visited Apr. 25, 2005).
14
See Fredric Smoler, The Root Causes of Terrorism, Dispelling the Myths 1, 3, www.defenddemocracy.org
(visited Apr. 25, 2005).
15
Fredric Smoler, The Root Causes of Terrorism, Dispelling the Myths 1, 3, www.defenddemocracy.org
69
16
17
Walter Pincus, Anti-U.S. Calls For Attacks are Seen as Serious, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1998, at A21
18
See Yoram Schweitzer, Osama bin Ladin: Wealth Plus Extremism Equals Terrorism (July 27, 1998), at
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/bin-ladin.htm.
19
Youssef M. Ibrahim, Saudi Exile Warns More Attacks Are Planned, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1996, at A6.
20
Report by CNNs U.S. State Department Correspondent Andrea Koppel (CNN television broadcast, Sept.
23, 2001) (recording on file with Author). This report was repeated a number of times over the course of the
morning of September 23, 2001: After all, Bin Ladens Holy War against the U.S. began over the U.S. military
presence in Saudi Arabia. Id.
21
Saudi Militant is Said to Urge Forced Ouster of U.S. Troops, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1996, at 2 (citing the
London-published newspaper, al-Quds al-Arabi); Saudi Dissident Reportedly Calls for War on U.S. Troops, Wash.
Post, Aug. 31, 1996, at A32 (citing the London-published newspaper, al-Quds al-Arabi), available at 1996 WL
10728997.
22
Al-Qaida (the Base), Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK - Services [Recruiting] Office) International Islamic
Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders, at http://www.intellnet.org/documents/200/060/269.html (visited
Sept. 30, 2001); see also Press Release, Anti-Defamation League, Osama bin Laden, at
http://www.adl.org/terrorism_america/bin_l.asp (Aug. 20, 1998); Anti-Defamation League, Osama bin Laden, at
http://www.adl.org/terrorism_america/bin_l.asp (visited Sept. 30, 2001).
23
Abu-Nasr,
Bin Ladens Past Words Revisited, at http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/
20010928/wl/bin_laden_s_words.html (Sept. 28, 2001).
24
Al-Qaida (the Base), Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK - Services [Recruiting] Office) International Islamic
Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders, at http://www.intellnet.org/documents/200/060/269.html (visited
Sept. 30, 2001).
25
See, e.g., U.S. Troops Reportedly Targeted, Wash. Post, May 11, 1997, at A26.
26
Randall Mikkelsen, U.S. Tells Arab TV War on Terror Not Against Islam, at
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20011015/pl/attack_rice_dc_3.html (Oct. 15, 2001); National Security Advisor
Briefs the Press, Press Briefing By National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice (Nov. 8, 2001), available at
http://navigation.helper.realnames.com/framer/1/262/default.asp?realname=white+house%2Ecom&url=http%3A
%2F%2Fwww%2Ewhitehouse%2Egov&frameid=1&providerid=262&uid=30116543.
27
Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with Al Jezeera (Oct. 16, 2001), at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t10172001_t1016sd.html; see also Zeev Schiff, All of a Sudden
Everything is Related to the Palestinian Problem, HaAretz, Oct. 22, 2001, at 1B (in Hebrew, on file with author);
Ann Leslie, The Hypocrisy of Islam, Daily Mail (London), Nov. 3, 2001, at 12-13.
28
Mitchell G. Bard, Myths & Facts Online, Current Controversies, Jewish Virtual Library (emphasis added),
available at http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/myths/mf24.html#58 (visited June 12, 2002) (citing Al-Raya (Qatar),
Jan. 6, 2002).
29
See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Isr.-P.L.O.
Team, 32 I.L.M. 1525.
30
See Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.P.L.O., 36 I.L.M. 551.
31
See Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good
Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U.
Intl L. Rev. 1, 122-27 (2000).
32
Amos Harel, Israel and the Authority Agreed to Increase the Number of Documented Palestinian Workers
to 140 Thousand, Haaretz, Nov. 19, 1998, at 5A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr.
Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable
Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Intl L. Rev. 1, 141-42 (2000). As of September
2000, the number of Palestinians who were coming daily to work in Israel had reached 120,000. Amos Harel, The
Chairman Prefers Business Before Independence, HaAretz, Sept. 13, 2000, at 2A (in Hebrew, on file with
author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors:
70
Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Intl L. Rev. 1,
143 (2000).
33
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Aff. & Ministry of Defense, Israeli-Palestinian Economic Relations August
1998, available at http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH07sc0 (visited Aug. 27, 2000); Dr. Barry A.
Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly
Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Intl L. Rev. 1, 85 (2000).
34
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Aff., Economic Relations Between Israel and the Palestinian Authority,
Update: May 25, 1998, at 1 (1999), at http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH01vn0; Dr. Barry A.
Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly
Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Intl L. Rev. 1, 143 (2000).
35
Amos Harel, The Chairman Prefers Business Before Independence, HaAretz, Sept. 13, 2000, at 2A (in
Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences
Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16
Am. U. Intl L. Rev. 1, 85 (2000).
36
Am. U. Intl L. Rev. 1, 87 (2000).
37
See, e.g., Lily Galili, We Are All One Epidemiological Family, HaAretz, Nov. 1, 1999, at 3B (in Hebrew,
on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good
Intl L. Rev. 1, 122 (2000).
38
See, e. g., Amos Harel et al., In the Security Services it is Assessed: Hamas is Planning a Number of
Parallel Attacks, HaAretz, Oct. 4, 1998, at 2A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr.
Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable
Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Intl L. Rev. 1, 122 (2000); see also Amos Harel,
Arafat: The Period Close at Hand is Especially Sensitive, I Will Work to Prevent Attacks, HaAretz, Jan. 24, 1999,
at 5A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Israel and the Palestine Authority, Memorandum of Security
Understandings, 17 December 1997, 27 J. Palestine Stud. 147-48 (1998).
39
Margot Dudkevitch, Palestinian Firemen Fight Blaze at Settlement, Jerusalem Post, Oct. 14, 1998, at 4;
Amos Harel, Firefighters From the Palestinian Authority Extinguished a Blaze That Threatened Elon Moreh,
HaAretz, May 24, 1999, at 7A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S.
Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict
Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Intl L. Rev. 1, 122 (2000).
40
Amira Hass, Two Construction Workers Were Killed and 7 Were Injured in a Roof Collapse in El Bireh,
HaAretz, July 9, 1999, at 6A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S.
Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict
Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Intl L. Rev. 1, 122 (2000).
41
See, e.g., Shimon Azulai, Israeli Palestinian Cooperation in the Investigation of Counterfeiting, Kol HaIr,
Sept. 17, 1999, at 25 (in Hebrew, on file with author); Anat Cygielman, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian
Authority Will Cooperate in the War Against Drug Traffickers, HaAretz, Feb. 18, 1999, at 9A (in Hebrew, on file
with author); Amira Hass, The Body of a Palestinian Woman Who Was Murdered by Stone Hits Was Found Near
the Settlement Elezar, HaAretz, Nov. 24, 1998, at 4A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein &
Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable
Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Intl L. Rev. 1, 122 (2000).
42
See, e.g., Hillal Adiri, in Gershon Baskin & Zakaria al Qaq eds., Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Trade:
Present Issues, Future possibilities 20 (1998); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi,
Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis
and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Intl L. Rev. 1, 122-23 (2000).
43
See, e.g., Samir Hazboun, Politics and Economics, Closure and Separation, 3 Palestine-Isr. J. Pol., Econ.
& Culture 86, 88 (1996); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make
71
Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am.
U. Intl L. Rev. 1, 123 (2000).
44
Amos Harel, The Israeli-Palestinian Common Market, HaAretz, Aug. 30, 1999, at 6A (in Hebrew, on file
with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good
Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Intl
L. Rev. 1, 124 (2000).
45
Amos Harel, The Israeli-Palestinian Common Market, HaAretz, Aug. 30, 1999, at 6A (in Hebrew, on file
L. Rev. 1, 124 (2000).
46
Am. U. Intl L. Rev. 1, 124 (2000).
47
See, e.g., HaAretz, June 21, 1999, at 10A (in Hebrew, on file with author) (in which a newpaper
advertisement publicized a conference to be held six days later for Israeli and Palestinian business persons and
executives on the subject of Doing Business in Peace); HaAretz, Sept. 25, 2000, at 11A (in Hebrew, on file
with author) (advertising a Conference on Legal Aspects of Doing Business in the Palestinian Authority
sponsored by the Israel Ministry of Regional Cooperation); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. DajaniDaoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between
Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Intl L. Rev. 1, 124 (2000).
48
Paul Scham, Arab-Israeli Research Cooperation, 1995-1999: An Analytical Study, Middle E. Rev. Intl
Aff., Sept. 2000, at 4, available at http://www.biu.ac.il.SOC/besa/meria/journal/2000/issue3/jv4n3a1.html. Israelis
also sought out local Palestinian dentists whose work would not force them to break into their personal savings
accounts. Amos Harel, The Israeli-Palestinian Common Market, HaAretz, Aug. 30, 1999, at 6A (in Hebrew, on
file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good
L. Rev. 1, 124 (2000).
49
Id. (citing Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in the Health Field, 1994-1998, JDC-Brookdale Inst., JDCIsrael & Al Quds Univ. (2000)).
50
Lily Galili, We Are All One Epidemiological Family, HaAretz, Nov. 1, 1999, at 3B (in Hebrew, on file
Intl L. Rev. 1, 37 (2000).
51
Lily Galili, We Are All One Epidemiological Family, HaAretz, Nov. 1, 1999, at 3B (in Hebrew, on file
Intl L. Rev. 1, 37-38 (2000).
52
Dennis B. Ross, Think Again: Yasir Arafat, Foreign Poly, July/Aug. 2002,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=179&page=0 (visited Mar. 6, 2005); Barry A. Feinstein,
Terror Forces Israel to Act in Self-Defense, Balt. Sun, July 9, 2004, at 13A.
53
See Dennis B. Ross, Think Again: Yasir Arafat, Foreign Poly, July/Aug. 2002,
Terror Forces Israel to Act in Self-Defense, Balt. Sun, July 9, 2004, at 13A. In a disclosure by the former-Foreign
Minister of Israel, Shlomo Ben-Ami, who was at the time in charge of Israels peace negotiations with the
Palestinians, he personally verified that in the summer and fall of 2000, Israel, during the peace negotiations with
the Palestinians, and in the framework of a final resolution to the conflict between them, had agreed to relinquish
its control over virtually 100 percent of the West Bank in favor of the Palestinians. See Ari Shavit, The Day the
Peace Died, Mosaf, HaAretz, Sept. 14, 2001, at 20, 22, 24 (HaAretz weekend magazine Supp.) (in Hebrew, on
file with author). As a matter of fact, the Palestinians and Israel had years before agreed to the establishment of an
elected Palestinian Authority, which pursuant to ensuing agreements with Israel had already by the autumn of
2000 expanded Palestinian control, authority, and jurisdiction over a significant amount of the territory in dispute
72
and more importantly, over 97 percent of the West Banks and Gazas Palestinian population. See Israel Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions:Palestinian Violence and Terrorism, The International
War against Terrorism (Updated - January 2002), at http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0i9o0#usa.
54
In the fall of 2000, Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and his wife Nava in fact even hosted Yasser Arafat as a
guest at their dining table in their home in Kochav Yair in Israel.
55
See Dennis B. Ross, Think Again: Yasir Arafat, Foreign Poly, July/Aug. 2002,
Terror Forces Israel to Act in Self-Defense, Balt. Sun, July 9, 2004, at 13A.
56
See Barry A. Feinstein, Terror Forces Israel to Act in Self-Defense, Balt. Sun, July 9, 2004, at 13A; Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Reasons Behind the Fence: Palestinian Terror Assault,
http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/document.asp?SubjectID=45212&MissionID=45187&LanguageID
=0&StatusID=0&DocumentID=-1 (visited Mar. 6, 2005)
57
Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors:
Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Intl L. Rev. 1, 3
et seq. (2000).
58
See, e.g., Opinion, Terrorism is a Result of Israels Denying a People its Rights, July 22, 2002,
http://www.acj.org/Daily%20News/July%20'02/July%2022.htm#4(visited Mar. 10, 2005).
59
See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Terror Deaths in Israel: 19201999 (1999),
http://mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0o7f0(visited Mar. 10, 2005).
60
See Israel Ministry of Foreign Aff., Which Came First - Terrorism or Occupation - Major Arab
Terrorist Attacks Against Israelis Prior to the 1967 Six-Day War (2002), http://www.israelmfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0ldc0 (visited Mar. 6, 2005).
61
See id.
62
63
64
65
66
67
Suzy Hansen, Why terrorism works, (Sept. 12, 2002), http://archive.salon.com/books/
int/2002/09/12/dershowitz/print.html.
68
69
See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism Since September
2000 (2005), http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/terrorism-%20obstacle%20to%20peace/palestinian%20terror%20since%
202000/Victims%20of%20Palestinian%20Violence%20and%20Terrorism%20sinc (visited May 12, 2005).
70
See Israel Defense Forces, Total of Attacks in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Home Front Since
September 2000 (2004), http://www1.idf.il/SIP_STORAGE/DOVER/files/9/21829.doc (visited Nov. 18, 2005).
71
See, e.g., Agence France-Presse (AFP), Endemic Palestinian poverty poses huge hurdle for Abbas (Jan.
11,
2005),
available
at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/274354bed4249b2085256f86006663bd (visited May 12,
2005); Greg Myre, Israeli and Palestinian Poverty Rising, Reports Say, The New York Times (Nov. 23, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/23/international/middleeast/23cndmideast.html?ex=1258952400&en=c70c21d51891419e&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt (visited May 12, 2005); Agence
France-Presse (AFP), Most Palestinians live in poverty, on two dollars a day (Sept. 7, 2004), available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/30e755578262856049256f09000eb4ea (visited May 12,
2005).
73
72
73
E.g., G.A. Res. 40/61, 108th plen. mtg. (1985) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/
documents/ga/res/40/a40r061.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003), Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, 84th plen. mtg., at art. 1 (1994), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/
49/a49r060.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003); Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 51/210, 88th plen. mtg., at art. 1 (1996), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ ga/res/51/a51r210.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003); S.C. Res. 1269, 4053d mtg. (1999),
available at http://www.un.org/ Docs/sc/committees/1373/Sres1269(1999).htm (visited Mar.24, 2003).
74
S.C. Res. 1269, 4053d mtg. (1999) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/
Docs/sc/committees/1373/Sres1269(1999).htm (visited Mar.24, 2003).
75
S.C. Res. 1269, 4053d mtg. (1999), available at http://www.un.org/ Docs/sc/committees/
1373/Sres1269(1999).htm (visited Mar.24, 2003).
76
See, e.g., Steven Stalinsky, Saudi Royal Family's Financial Support to the Palestinians 1998-2003: More
than 15 Billion Riyals ($4 Billion U.S.) Given to Mujahideen Fighters and Families of Martyrs, (July 3,
2003),
Special
Report
No.
17,
The
Middle
East
Media
Research
Institute,
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sr&ID=SR1703 (visited Nov. 25, 2005); Dore Gold, Saudi
Arabias Dubious Denials of Involvement in International Terrorism (Oct. 1, 2003), Jerusalem Viewpoints,
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp504.htm (visited Nov. 25, 2005).
77
See, e.g., Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism: Motivations and Causes, Terrorism Research Center (Jan. 1995), at
http://www.terrorism.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=5693&mode=
thread&order=0&thold=0 (visited Aug. 31, 2003).
78
See, e.g., NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Sec. Donald Rumsfeld: Part 2, (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 4,
2002), transcript at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-june02/rumsfeld_parttwo_2-4.html (visited Oct.
3, 2003).
79
Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism: Motivations and Causes, Terrorism Research Center (Jan. 1995), at
http://www.terrorism.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=5693&mode=
thread&order=0&thold=0 ( visited Aug. 31, 2003).
80
See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to United Nations General Assembly,
USUN PRESS RELEASE # 162 (01) (Nov. 10, 2001), at http://www. un.int/usa/01_162.htm (visited Sept. 5,
2003).
81
See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address of the President to the Nation (Sept. 7, 2003), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030907-1.html (visited Sept. 9, 2003).
82
See, e.g., The National Security Strategy of the United States (Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (visited Oct. 16, 2003); see also NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Sec. Donald
Rumsfeld: Part 2, (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 4, 2002), transcript at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
bb/military/jan-june02/rumsfeld_parttwo_2-4.html (visited Oct. 3, 2003).
83
See, e.g., Bruce Hoffman, Dealing with Asymmetric Threats, World Economic Forum, Annual Meeting
Jan.
24,
2003,
at
http://www.weforum.org/site/knowledgenavigator.nsf/Content/Dealing%20with%
20Asymmetric%20Threats_2003?open&country_id= (visited Oct. 13, 2003).
84
See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United
States Military Academy at West Point, NY. (June 1, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/06/20020601-3.html (visited Oct. 3, 2003).
85
See, e.g., id.; NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Sec. Donald Rumsfeld: Part 2, (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 4,
2002), transcript at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-june02/rumsfeld_parttwo_2-4.html (visited Oct.
3, 2003); see also President George W. Bush, Address of the President to the Nation (Sept. 7, 2003), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030907-1.html (visited Sept. 9, 2003).
86
See The National Security Strategy of the United States (Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (visited Oct. 16, 2003).
87
See, e.g., President George W. Bush, The President's State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), at
http://www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (visited Oct. 3, 2003).
74
88
President George W. Bush, Address of the President to the Nation (Sept. 7, 2003), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030907-1.html (visited Sept. 9, 2003); President George W.
Bush, Address by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy at West Point,
NY. (June 1, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2002/06/20020601-3.html (visited Oct. 3,
2003).
89
Id.; The National Security Strategy of the United States (Sept. 2002), available at
90
The National Security Strategy of the United States (Sept. 2002), available at
91
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, available at www.UN.org/aboutun/charter/ (visited March, 24, 2004).
92
J. E. S. Fawcett, Intervention in International Law, A Study of Some Recent Cases, 103 Recueil des Cours
343, 358-59 (1961-II) (emphasis added).
93
S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 3063rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/scres92.htm (visited Sept. 29, 2003).
94
Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 Intl & Comp. L. Q. 712, 734 (1958)
(emphasis added).
95
See Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in Bruno Simma (ed.), I The Charter of the United Nations: A
Commentary 112, 119-20 (2d ed. 2002)..
96
See, e.g., John C. Novogrod, Indirect Aggression, in I A Treatise on International Criminal Law: Crime
and Punishment 198, 214-15 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973).
97
See, e.g., id.
98
Corfu Channel Case (Gr. Brit. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. Reports 3, 22 (emphasis added); see Ann Van Wynen
Thomas & A. J. Thomas, Jr., Non-Intervention: The Law and Its Import in the Americas 134 (1956).
99
W. Michael Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision, 14 Va. J. Intl L. 1, 3
(1973) (emphasis added). For instance, as then-acting U.S. Secretary of State Kenneth Rush writes in 1974, it is
the established policy of the United States that a State is responsible for the international armed force originating
from its territory, whether that force be direct and overt or indirect and covert. Arthur W. Rovine, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 68 Am. J. Intl L. 720, 736 (1974) (citing Letter to
Eugene Rostow of the Yale Law School from Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Rush (May 29, 1974)) (emphasis
added).
100
Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in Bruno Simma (ed.), I The Charter of the United Nations: A
Commentary 788, 802 (2d ed. 2002).
101
S. S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Fr. v. Turk) (ser. A) No. 10, at 88 (Sept. 7, 1927) (Moore, J., dissenting), cited
in II World Court Reports, A Collection of the Judgments Orders and Opinions of the Permanent Court of
International Justice 1927-1932, at 65, 80 (Manley O. Hudson ed., 1935) (emphasis added). [W]hat a State claims
the right exclusively to control, such as its own territory, reasoned Charles C. Hyde, it must possess the power
and accept the obligation to endeavor so to control as to prevent occurrences therein from becoming by any
process the immediate cause of such injury to a foreign State as the latter, in consequence of the propriety of its
own conduct, should not be subjected to at the hands of a neighbor. Charles C. Hyde, I International Law, Chiefly
as Interpreted and Applied by the United States 723 (2d rev. ed. 1947) (emphasis added).
102
Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law 205-06 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed. rev. 1966).
103
I Oppenheims International Law 394 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996) (emphasis
added). States are under a duty to prevent and suppress such subversive activity against foreign Governments as
assumes the form of armed hostile expeditions or attempts to commit common crimes against life or property.
L. Oppenheim, I International Law: A Treatise 292-93 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) (emphasis added).
104
See John C. Novogrod, Indirect Aggression, in I A Treatise on International Criminal Law: Crime and
Punishment 198, 215 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973); Ann Van Wynen Thomas & A. J.
Thomas, Jr., Non-Intervention: The Law and Its Import in the Americas 217 (1956); J. E. S. Fawcett, Intervention
in International Law, A Study of Some Recent Cases, 103 Recueil des Cours 343, 356-57 (1961-II); L. Oppenheim,
I International Law: A Treatise 365 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955); I Oppenheims International Law 549-50
(Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996).
75
105
Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons Against Foreign
States 51 (1962). Certainly in those instances in which a State actually encourages and even promotes the
organization of [armed groups and] . . . provides them with financial assistance, training, and weapons these
groups may be considered de facto organs of the State. When such groups carry out the activities planned,
those activities are attributed to the State and constitute internationally wrongful acts of the State . . . . Roberto
Ago, Fourth report on State responsibility, A/CN.4/264 and Add.1, II Y.B. Intl L. Commn 1972, at 71, 120
(1974) (emphasis supplied). Whenever individuals or groups do in deed in fact act on behalf of a State, their
conduct is attributed to that State and is considered as an act of the State under international law. . . . Report of
the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-sixth session, A/9610/Rev.1, II(1) Y.B. Intl L.
Commn 1974, at 157, 277 (1975).
106
See, e.g., VI International Legislation, A Collection of the Texts of Multipartite International Instruments
of General Interest: 1932-1934, at 413, 418 (Manley O. Hudson, ed., 1937). Garcia-Mora, writing in 1962, also
concisely articulated [t]he general conviction . . . that support to, and toleration of, armed bands likely to make
incursions into foreign territory engage the international responsibility of the state amounting to an act of
aggression. Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons Against
Foreign States 114 (1962) (emphasis added). Quincy Wright, as well, believed that failure of a government to
prevent armed bands or insurgents from organizing within its territory to engage in hostilities across a frontier,
will make it responsible for aggression, if such hostilities actually occur. Quincy Wright, The Prevention of
Aggression, 50 Am. J. Intl L. 514, 527 (1956) (emphasis added).
107
League of Nations Doc. C. 543. 1934.VII, art II, 15 League of Nations O.J. (No. 12, Part II) 1759, 1760
(1934) (emphasis added).
108
Robert A. Friedlander, I Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control 253 (1979); VII
International Legislation, A Collection of the Texts of Multipartite International Instruments of General Interest:
1935-1937, at 862, 865 (Manley O. Hudson ed., 1941) (citing Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Terrorism, art. 1(1) (1937)) (emphasis added).
109 Intl Law Commission, Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (Draft), art. 2(4)
(emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/offences.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003). A 1996 draft
version of the Code does not contain this clause. See id.
110
Id. at art. 2(6) (emphasis added). This clause does not appear in the 1996 draft version of the Code. See id.
111
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of
their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U. N. GAOR 1st Comm., 20th Sess., 1408th plen. mtg., at
12 (1965) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ ga/res/20/ares20.htm (visited Sept. 30,
2003).
112
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U. N. GAOR 6th Comm., 25th
Sess., 1883rd plen. mtg., at 123 (1970) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/documents/
ga/res/25/ares25.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003).
113
Id. (emphasis added).
114
G.A. Res. 40/61, 108th plen. mtg. (1985) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/
documents/ga/res/40/a40r061.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003).
115
. G.A. Res. 42/22, 73rd plen. mtg. (1987) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/
documents/ga/res/42/a42r022.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003).
116
S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 3063rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/scres92.htm (visited Sept. 29, 2003).
117
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, 84th plen. mtg., at art. 1
(1994), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/ 49/a49r060.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003).
118
S.C. Res. 1189, 3915th mtg. (1998), available at http://www.un.org/ Docs/scres/1998/scres98.htm (visited
Sept. 30, 2003).
119
Id.
120
Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2319th plen. mtg., at art. 3(g) (1974)
(emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/29/ares29.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003).
121
Julius Stone, Conflict through Consensus: United Nations Approaches to Aggression 74 (1977).
76
122
See Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons Against
Foreign States 51 (1962).
123
Id. (emphasis added). After all, when a state is under a legal duty to act or under a legal duty not to act
and it breaches that duty with knowledge that the consequences of that breach of duty will interfere in the affairs
of another state by altering or maintaining the condition of things without its consent, the state which breached its
duty intends the consequences just as truly as it intended to do or to omit the thing done. And in intending the
consequences, it has thereby imposed its will upon another state. In such a case actual intent to alter or maintain
the condition of things or to compel action or inaction becomes unimportant; intervention occurs, so that
interference comes close to being synonymous with intervention. Ann Van Wynen Thomas & A. J. Thomas, Jr.,
Non-Intervention: The Law and Its Import in the Americas 73 (1956).
124
Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons Against Foreign
States 30 (1962) (emphasis added).
125
Cf. Barry Levenfeld, Israels Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defense and Reprisal Under
Modern International Law, 21 Colum. J. Transnatl L. 1, 12 (1982).
126
Cf. id. at 45-46.
127
Alan Dershowitz Speaks on His The Case for Israel, (Oct. 21, 2003) UCLA Ronald W. Burkle Center
for international Relations, available at http://www.isop.ucla.edu/bcir/article.asp?parentid=5071 (Oct. 29, 2003).
In the specific context of Israels defence against Palestinian terrorists, it is a point that is often missed in this
debate. The reason that Israel has killed more than 3,000 Palestinians in the past three years, most of whom, by the
way, who were combatants -- the number of civilians actually killed has been greater among the Israelis than
among the Palestinians -- is because the terrorists quite deliberately hide among civilians, putting Israel to the
choice of either letting them go and letting them continue their terrorism or risking the death of civilians. It's a
terrible choice. The Iraqi's did the same thing and it forced the United States too often to kill civilians.Alan
Dershowitz Speaks on His The Case for Israel, (Oct. 21, 2003) UCLA Ronald W. Burkle Center for
international Relations, available at http://www.isop.ucla.edu/bcir/article.asp?parentid=5071 (Oct. 29, 2003).
128
See, e.g., PBS Online NewsHour, Pres. Bush says Iraq must work with U.N., Calls War Lawt Resort
(Nov. 20, 2002), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/iraq_11-20-02.html; Joel D. Cusker, Charles H. Hash,
Mary E., Landry, and Dallas D. Owens, Disengaging from Consequence Management, 35 JFQ 42 available at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1035.pdf#search='last%20resort%20rumsfeld%20use%20of%20force',
(visited Apr. 30, 2005); remarks of French President Jacques Chirac appearing in Chirac and Schroeder on US
ultimatum, BBCNEWS World Edition (March 18, 2003) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2860715.stm; Paris
pact urges inspection boost, BBC News (Feb. 11, 2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2746459.stm.
[T]he military can only be part of the solution and it is always the last resort, explains U.S. Secretary of Defense
Donald H. Rumsfeld. David Rising, Rumsfeld calls for unity in fight against terrorism at security conference, The
Canadian Press, 2005, available at http://www.cp.org/premium/online/commercial/elxn_en/050212/
p021202A.html (visited Apr. 30, 2005).
129
See I Oppenheims International Law 421 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996); L.
Oppenheim, I International Law: A Treatise 298 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
130
343, 388 (1961-II) (emphasis added).
131
See Carsten Stahn,Nicaragua is dead, long live Nicaragua - The Right to Self-Defense under Art. 51
UN Charter and International Terrorism (sic), at 24, Conference Terrorism as a Challenge for National and
International Law, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (2003), available at
http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003).
132
Id. at 33.
133
Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law 62-63 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed. rev. 1966) (emphasis
added).
134
Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 279 (1963); Ian Brownlie, International
Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 Intl & Comp. L. Q. 712, 731 (1958) (emphasis added).
135
Ellery C. Stowell, International Law: A Restatement of Principles in Conformity with Actual Practice 8991 (1931).
77
136
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgement (1999), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
120, available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/index.htm (visited Oct. 16, 2003) (emphasis
added). This kind of State control over a military group and the fact that the State is held responsible for acts
performed by a group independently of any State instructions, or even contrary to instructions, to some extent
equates the group with State organs proper. Id. 121. Under the rules of State responsibility, as restated in
Article 10 of the Draft on State Responsibility as provisionally adopted by the International Law Commission, a
State . . . incurs responsibility even for acts committed by its officials outside their remit or contrary to its behest.
The rationale behind this provision is that a State must be held accountable for acts of its organs whether or not
these organs complied with instructions, if any, from the higher authorities. Id. 121.
137
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgement (1999), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
137, available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/index.htm (visited Oct. 16, 2003), available at
http://www.un.org (emphasis supplied). If, for example, a State knows that a private group is willing to commit
acts of military force against another State and [it] places its territory at the disposal of this group to train its
members and to offer them a safe haven after they have committed these acts and additionally provides them with
weapons and logistical support, it is hardly to be understood why this should be a lesser participation in the acts of
the group than the mere sending of it. It is not adequate to exclude generally certain types of supporting terrorism
from being qualified as substantial involvement and consequently armed attack. Albrecht Randelzhofer,
Article 51, in Bruno Simma (ed.), I The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 788, 801 (2d ed. 2002). In
other words, as Judge Sir Robert Jennings observes in his dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua case, to say that the
provision of arms, coupled with logistical or other support is not armed attack is going much too far. Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua
(Nicar.
v.
U.S.),
1986
I.C.J.
528,
543,
available
at
http://www.
icjcij.org/icjwww/Icases/iNus/inusframe.htm (visited Oct. 16, 2003) available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/Icases/iNus/inusframe.htm (visited Oct. 16, 2003). Furthermore, Judge Stephen Schwebel in his
dissent in the Nicaragua case rejects the construction of the United Nations Charter which would read Article 51
as if it were worded . . .if, and only if, an armed attack occurs . . . Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, Case
concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 259, 347,
available at http://www. icj-cij.org/icjwww/Icases/iNus/inusframe.htm (visited Oct. 16, 2003).
138
Carsten Stahn,Nicaragua is dead, long live Nicaragua - The Right to Self-Defense under Art. 51 UN
Charter and International Terrorism (sic), at 41, Conference Terrorism as a Challenge for National and
139
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgement (1999), International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, 96, available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/index.htm (visited Oct. 16, 2003).
140
John Lawrence Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-Defense,
81 Am. J. Intl L. 135, 139 (1987).
141
http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003) (emphasis supplied).
142
See Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to Amend Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter), 10 Hous. J. of Intl L. 25, 42 (1987).
143
See, e.g., Carsten Stahn,Nicaragua is dead, long live Nicaragua - The Right to Self-Defense under Art.
51 UN Charter and International Terrorism (sic), at 33, Conference Terrorism as a Challenge for National and
http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003); see also Antonio Cassese,
The International Communitys Legal Response to Terrorism, 38 Intl & Comp. L. Q., 589, 596 (1989); Yoram
Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense 197 (2d ed. 1994). [A]n armed attack can be perpetrated against a
States nationals abroad. The act would be tantamount to an armed attack against the State itself, if the nationals
are attacked deliberately because of the specific bound of nationality . . . . If so, the attack against those nationals
constitutes an armed attack . . . under Article 51. Yoram Dinstein, Comment, at 4, Conference Terrorism as a
Challenge for National and International Law, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and
78
International Law (2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct.

14, 2003).
144
See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense 192 (2d ed. 1994); Yoram Dinstein,
Comment, at 4, Conference Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law, Max Planck Institute
for Comparative Public Law and International Law (2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-onterrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003). [I]n reality, there is no cause to remove small-scale armed
attacks from the spectrum of armed attacks. Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense 192 (2d ed.
1994).
145
John Lawrence Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-Defense,
81 Am. J. Intl L. 135, 139 (1987). The Charter does not specify the means by which an armed attack must occur,
nor does it set a minimum level of attack which must be surpassed. Terrorist acts carried out by armed bands with
the support or encouragement of a foreign state is (sic), in a literal sense, an armed attack. Mark B. Baker,
Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10
Hous. J. of Intl L. 25, 42 (1987). But see id.
146
Josef L. Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
41 Am.J.Intl L. 872, 878 (1947).
147
Carsten Stahn,Nicaragua is dead, long live Nicaragua The Right to Self-Defense under Art. 51 UN
http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003); cf. Mark B. Baker,
Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10
Hous. J. of Intl L. 25, 43 (1987). But see Antonio Cassese, The International Communitys Legal Response to
Terrorism, 38 Intl & Comp. L. Q., 589, 596 (1989); Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in Bruno Simma (ed.), I
The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 788, 802 (2d ed. 2002); James P. Rowles, Military Responses
to Terrorism: Substantive and Procedural Constraints in International Law, 81 Proc. Am. Socy Intl L. 307, 314
(1987).
148
S.C. Res. 1368, 4370th mtg. (2001), available at http://www.un.org/ Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm (visited
Oct. 1, 2003) (emphasis added).
149
Id.
150
S.C. Res. 1373, 4385th mtg. (2001), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/ scres/2001/sc2001.htm (visited
Oct. 1, 2003) (emphasis added).
151
343, 363 (1961-II) (emphasis added); see also Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International
Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 Recueil des Cours 5, 173 (1957-II); Edward Miller,
Self-Defence, International Law and the Six-Day War, 20 Israel L.R. 49, 57-58 (1985); Barry Feinstein, SelfDefence and Israel in International Law: A Reappraisal, 11 Israel. L.R. 516, 539-40 (1976); Barry A. Feinstein,
The Legality of the Use of Armed Force by Israel in Lebanon - June 1982, 20 Israel L. Rev. 362 (1985), reprinted
in Terrorism 93, 117 (Conor Gearty ed., 1996) (a title in the series The International Library of Criminology,
Criminal Justice and Penology (Gerald Mars & David Nelken eds.)).
152
Commentary 788, 802 (2d ed. 2002) (emphasis added).
153
154
Commentary 788, 802 (2d ed. 2002).
155
See D. W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law 188-89 (1958).
156
Ellery C. Stowell, International Law: A Restatement of Principles in Conformity with Actual Practice
113-114 (1931) (emphasis added).
157
See C. H. M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81
Recueil des Cours 451, 500-01 (1952-II).

158
79
U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added), available at www.UN.org/aboutun/charter/ (visited March, 24,
2004).
159
D. W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law 191 (1958).

D. W. Greig, International Law 682 (1970).
162
I Oppenheims International Law 421 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996); see L.
Oppenheim, I International Law: A Treatise 298 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955). A State is definitely allowed
to employ measures of force in anticipatory self-defense if, as Rosalyn Higgins observes, it has been subjected,
over a period of time, to border raids by nationals of another state, which are openly supported by the government
of that state; to threats of a future, and possibly imminent, large-scale attack, and to the harassments of alleged
belligerent rights. Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the
United Nations 201(1963); see also Yehuda Blum, State Response to Acts of Terrorism, 19 Jahrbuch fur
Internationales Recht 223, 234 (1976). By analogy, the international law of neutrality may be of help to analyze
the obligations of a State that has failed to stop the perpetration of injurious acts emanating from its territory
against other States. See Hersch Lauterpacht, Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons Against Foreign States,
22 Am. J. Intl L. 105, 127 (1928); Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 Intl &
Comp. L. Q. 712, 723 (1958); Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private
Persons Against Foreign States 50 (1962). [I]t is well established in customary international law, writes John N.
Moore, that a belligerent Power may take action to end serious violations of neutral territory by an opposing
belligerent when the neutral Power is unable to prevent belligerent use of its territory and when the action is
necessary and proportional to lawful defensive objectives. John Norton Moore, Legal Dimensions of the Decision
to Intercede in Cambodia, in III The Vietnam War and International Law: The Widening Context 58, 71 (Richard
Falk ed., 1972) [hereinafter Falk, The Widening Context]; see also John C. Bender, Self-Defense and Cambodia: A
Critical Appraisal, in Falk, The Widening Context, supra, at 138, 146. As Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P.
Feliciano explain, [w]here a non-participant is unable or unwilling to prevent one belligerent from carrying on
hostile activities within neutral territory, or from utilizing such territory as a base of operations, the opposing
belligerent, seriously disadvantaged by neutral failure or weakness, becomes authorized to enter neutral territory
and there to take the necessary measures to counter and stop the hostile activities. Myres S. McDougal &
Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion
568 (1961); see, e.g., Note, International Law and Military Operations against Insurgents in Neutral Territory, 68
Colum. L.R. 1127, 1129 (1968).
163
http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003); see Roberto Ago, Addendum
to the eighth report on State responsibility, A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7, II(1) Y.B. Intl L. Commn 1980, at 13, 69
(1982).
164
This criterion appears in former U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Websters August 6, 1842 communiqu to
British official representative Lord Ashburton regarding the Caroline incident, as cited in John B. Moore, II A
Digest of International Law 412 (1906).
165
Cf. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations 220 (1977);
Julius Stone, Conflict through Consensus: United Nations Approaches to Aggression 79 (1977).
166
See I Oppenheims International Law 42 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996); L.
167
C. H. M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81
Recueil des Cours 451, 500 (1952-II); D. W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law 189 (1958).
168
Peter Rowe, Responses to Terror: The New War, 3 Melb. J Intl Law 321 (2002), available at
www.law.unimelb.edu.au/mjil/issues/archive/2002(2)/04Rowe.pdf (visited Oct. 17, 2003).
169
Rainer Grote, Between Crime Prevention and the Laws of War: Are the Traditional Categories of
International Law adequate for Assessing the Use of Force against International Terrorism?, at 31-32,
Conference Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law, Max Planck Institute for Comparative
160
161
80
Public Law and International Law (Jan. 2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-onterrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003).
170
See, e.g., id. at 32. Rainer Grote believes that it is incumbent upon the State that acts to demonstrate
significant verification of the terrorist threat and its immediacy. See id.
171
Cf. Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense 191 (2d ed. 1994).
172
Roberto Ago, Addendum to the eighth report on State responsibility, A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7, II(1) Y.B.
Intl L. Commn 1980, at 13, 70 (1982).
173
174
Bert Koenders, General Rapporteur, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, NATO and the Use of Force, Draft
General Report, (Oct. 25, 2004), http://www.atlcom.nl/verslag.Koenders.htm (visited May 7, 2005).
175
Bert Koenders, General Rapporteur, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, NATO and the Use of Force, Draft
General Report, (Oct. 25, 2004) (emphasis added), http://www.atlcom.nl/verslag.Koenders.htm (visited May 7,
2005). However, the September 2002 US National Security Strategy [The National Security Strategy of the
United States (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (visited Oct. 16, 2003)] foresees
pre-emptive use of military force only as a means of last resort. Naturally, any act of self-defence, including the
pre-emptive use of force, must comply with three criteria: necessity, proportionality and immediacy. Necessity
requires that defensive force only be employed when no other reasonable options exist to frustrate an attack. This
entails exhaustion of all viable diplomatic, political, economic, or other means available. The principle of
proportionality entails limiting defensive action to those needed to defeat the attack. According to Professor
Yoram Dinstein [Yoram Dinstein, War Agression, and Self Defense (Cambridge: 3rd ed. 2001)], imminence of the
attack is not assessed against the time remaining before it is launched, but instead with regard to the viability of
the defensive action at a particular point in time. In the context of a terrorist or WMD attack the last window of
opportunity may well lie before the attack occurs. Bert Koenders, General Rapporteur, NATO Parliamentary
Assembly, NATO and the Use of Force, Draft General Report, (Oct. 25, 2004),
http://www.atlcom.nl/verslag.Koenders.htm (visited May 7, 2005).
176
177
Judge Max Huber, Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.) (1928), II Reports of International Arbitral
Awards 829, 839 (1949).
178
See Ann Van Wynen Thomas & A. J. Thomas, Jr., Non-Intervention: The Law and Its Import in the
Americas 77 (1956). A State that breaches its international law obligations is likely to face intervention on the part
of the State against which it has committed the offense or on the part of other States that view this unlawful
behavior as an assault on the underlying principles needed for the proper functioning of international society. See
id. at 78.
179
Yehuda Blum, The Beirut Raid and the International Double Standard: A Reply to Professor Richard A.
Falk, 64 AM. J. Intl L. 73, 85 (1970).
180
See, e.g., Carsten Stahn,Nicaragua is dead, long live NicaraguaThe Right to Self-Defense under Art.
51 UN Charter and International Terrorism (sic), at 42, Conference Terrorism as a Challenge for National and
181
Foreign States 27 (1962); Rainer Grote, Between Crime Prevention and the Laws of War: Are the Traditional
Categories of International Law adequate for Assessing the Use of Force against International Terrorism?, at 31,
Conference Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law, Max Planck Institute for Comparative
Public Law and International Law (Jan. 2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-onterrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003).
182
183
81
184
Foreign States 27 (1962).
185
186
See Clyde Eagleton, International Government 82 (3rd ed. 1957).
187
See Roy Curtis, The Law of Hostile Military Expeditions as Applied by the United States, 8 Am. J. Intl L.
224, 236 (1914).
188
See, e.g., Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 261 (1963).
189
See Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United
Nations 201 (1963).
190
See C. H. M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81
Recueil des Cours 451, 464 (1952-II).
191
Roberto Ago, Addendum to the eighth report on State responsibility, A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7, II(1) Y.B.
Intl L. Commn 1980, at 13, 69-70 (1982) (emphasis added).
192
Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 Am. J. Intl L. 1, 9 (1972). When a
particular terrorist attack is merely one in a long series, it would only be reasonable to consider all the terrorist
attacks (or needle pricks) as one. The whole range and extent of terrorist activity perpetrated against the target
State ought to be taken into account when evaluating the States reactions to the acts of terrorism, since the target
State may be forced into circumstances of an even bigger risk by the extensive string of terrorist actions than by a
single conventional attack. See Yehuda Blum, State Response to Acts of Terrorism, 19 Jahrbuch fur Internationales
Recht 223, 235 (1976); see also Laurence M. Gross, Comment, The Legal Implications of Israels 1982 Invasion
into Lebanon, 13 Cal. W. Intl L.J. 458, 486-87 (1983).
193
See D. W. Greig, International Law 678 (1970).
194
Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1620, 1638 (1984).
Obviously, then, to use armed force against the State from which the terrorists are emanating if, say, the host
States forces link up with the terrorists and/or protect them or the State hosting the terrorists impedes the target
States defensive actions, may be acceptable. See Carsten Stahn,Nicaragua is dead, long live Nicaragua - The
Right to Self-Defense under Art. 51 UN Charter and International Terrorism (sic), at 48, Conference Terrorism
as a Challenge for National and International Law, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law (2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct.
14, 2003).
195
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 259, 371, available at http://www. icjcij.org/icjwww/Icases/iNus/inusframe.htm (visited Oct. 16, 2003).
196
See Robert W. Tucker, A Reply To Critics: Morality And The War, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1982, at A15
(emphasis added).
197
Robert W. Tucker, The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine 130 (1960).
198
See Josef L. Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, 41 Am.J.Intl L. 872, 876-77 (1947).
199
L. Oppenheim, II International Law: A Treatise 225 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952). After all,
according to A. V. Levontin, war is unlimited in object in the sense that every war may be regarded, potentially,
as undertaken with a view to the total subjugation or debellatio of the enemy. A. V. Levontin, The Myth of
International Security: A Juridical and Critical Analysis 63-64 (1957) (emphasis supplied).
200
201
Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law 83 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed. rev. 1966).
202
Even prior to September 11, 2001, the clear and present danger of international terrorism was obvious,
as President William J. Clinton announced to the United Nations General Assembly in 1998: [T]errorism . . . is a
clear and present danger to tolerant and open societies and innocent people everywhere. No one . . . [is] immune.
President William J. Clinton, Addressing the opening session of the 53rd United Nations General Assembly,
partially cited in Judy Aita, Clinton Opens UN General Assembly with Call to Combat Terrorism, United States
82
Information Agency, Sept. 21, 1998, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/ 98092102.htm (visited Sept. 5,

2003).
203
Fredric Smoler, The Root Causes of Terrorism, Dispelling the Myths 1, www.defenddemocracy.org
204
See Alan Dershowitz Speaks on His The Case for Israel, (Oct. 21, 2003) UCLA Ronald W. Burkle
Center for international Relations, available at http://www.isop.ucla.edu/bcir/article.asp?parentid=5071 (Oct. 29,
2003). As Tom Friedman aptly and perceptively observes, [i]f you reward Palestinian terrorism over there, it's
coming to a theater near you. Id.

IOS Press, 2006
83
Violence and Terrorism: The Sense and its

Names
Mokhtar BENABDALLAOUI
Department of Philosophy at Hassan II University, Casablanca
Abstract. Islam and terrorism / Violence and terrorism / Violence and the postnational State
Keywords. Islam, interpretation of Koran, violence, terrorism, globalization,
identity crisis
Islam and Terrorism

Many media in the West try to establish a direct link between the propagation of Islam
and the rise of terrorist acts throughout the World, without making a distinction
between Islam as a religion and the various interpretations given to its texts by people
who do not necessarily represent it. Generally, these media responses are based on
reactions that emanate from cultural, economic and political sources, and limit
themselves to interpreting them in a hypothetical religious context. Western researchers
raise the bar even higher; they point to a violent essence of Islam and go to the extreme
of claiming that the Koran openly encourages acts of terrorism, taking as a foundation
for their argument the use of the term Irhab, which appears in several verses of this
book.
This hasty and simplistic deduction is the consequence of a wrong translation of
the Arabic word Irhab with the notion of terrorism in its Western connotation. A
short etymological analysis of the word shows that the Koranic sense is completely
different. The root of the word Rahaba means in Arabic: to have extreme fear. It
occurs twelve times in the Koran, with diversified derivatives, and we can extract four
semiological contexts that generally express the word. None of them corresponds to the
contemporary sense of terrorism:
x First meaning: The extreme fear of God, which can reach extravagant
proportions in the life of a believer, and which incites him to do acts of divine
kindness. This fear generates pious behavior in a believer. In the Koranic
context, anger is in opposition to piety; it is for that reason that only after
having gotten rid of his anger was Moses able to receive the texts addressed
by God to believers. From the root Rahaba we derive the term Rhib,
which means a monk. A Rahib is a person motivated by piety, worship of
God, to be detached from the material world, and to devote himself to God
alone.
x Second meaning: Total psychological distress, facing a demonstration of
swiftness of supernatural proportions like that which magicians possessed and
84
M. Benabdallaoui / Violence and Terrorism: The Sense and Its Names
performed before Moses, Pharaoh and those who were present at that time
period.
x Third meaning: Show of force with a dissuasive aim.
x Fourth meaning: Divine Requirement, exhorting Moslems to fear God, in the
sense of respect and worship, and of an incentive to act according to its
injunctions.
This analysis enables us to refute any relationship between the contemporary
concept of terrorism and that of Irhab as used in the Koran. Even if the choice of this
term can be tolerated because of constraints of translation, since the meaning of the
words is dynamic and changes with time, it would be completely erroneous to derive
this meaning from the terms direction and to generalize it in a retroactive way.
Violence and Terrorism

Terrorism is one of the qualifications of violence; it can take very different forms,
which any man, or entity, can resort to in order to solve his problems in the way that
best serves his interests. The intensity and the use of violence change according to the
situation, time or political and social structures concerned. The terms which describe
each violent act are deliberately chosen by the actors, with justifiable goals: Djihad,
crusades, return to the promised land, defense, resistance, revolution, ethnic and
cleansing religious, release, pacification , etc., to respond to various situations.
Since Antiquity, hegemony and the quest for power have been instigators of violence;
the justifications were: the illusion of ethnic superiority in Antiquity, the detection of a
supreme truth during the Middle Ages, and the worship of the nation state in modern
times; violence has never been a goal in itself, but rather a means; a definitive target. In
each context, it changed its name and its legal or moral status.
Initially, with the Romans, war took the form of a civilizing mission directed at the
barbarians. In the Middle Ages, war was dissimulated behind faith, before raising the
Standard of legal and moral status. The contents of speech that legitimize violence are
variable; what is regarded as legitimate today will not be so tomorrow; this legitimacy
is also relative, it is often a direct consequence of the present balance of forces.
With the emergence of the nation state, the space and the means, the status and the
direction of violence changed. The State has become the abstract ogre and has
remained omnipresent, controlling all individuals and all goods. Thanks to the new
ideas of the Enlightenment, individuals have stopped being the monarchs subjects.
They are supposed to be free and independent, but the status of the monarch was
replaced by that of the State, which hides awkwardly in major complicities with the
interests of peoples, groups or communities. The constraint only changed its name!
During the first years of the Age of Enlightenment and at the time when political
doctrines spoke in praise of the freedom of Man and raised Man to the level of a
divinity, this freedom became corrosive with the nation State. In the majority of cases,
avant-garde intellectuals were the ones who promoted the capacity, in the name of
freedom, to spread terror and constraint. Isnt it true that it was Robespierre who in
1794 ordered the Convention to institute the worship of the State as a supreme being.
Wasnt it he who made terror a condition of morals! In fact, worship of the State and
violence are only two sides of the same coin. With the advent of modern times, the use
85
of violence became an exclusive monopoly of the State, which enjoys almost total
impunity. Therefore, public forms of violence made their appearance:
x Wars between nations seeking to defend or widen their interests (this form of
war replaced the religious one).
x Civil wars between social communities or categories seeking to seize power to
defend their own interests, as we saw after the French and Russian
revolutions, and after America gained its independence from England.
x The spontaneous insurrections, the occasional riots which express a strong
anger with regard to the State; they are sometimes unconscious reactions,
individuals or communities vis--vis the pressure exerted by the State; the
events of May 1968 are the perfect model.
These forms of violence developed in a way adapted to the model of the modern
State, or have been a direct consequence of its structures. The nation state has
geographically delimited borders, a population defined according to legal and
geographical standards, and the action of this new State is centered on the sacrosanct
principle of sovereignty. The declaration of a state of siege, emergency or of war
follows a completely new process.
In this new context, acts of violence are better rationalized and better regulated, the
right of war is codified; the rights of prisoners, casualties, civilians and people under
occupation administrations are recognized.
Violence and the Post-National State

Two great changes transformed the World towards the end of the last century: the rapid
and near complete disintegration of the East bloc and the unleashing of the process of
globalization. These two elements had a determining effect on the concept of violence
and the legitimacy of its use. The collapse and the dislocation of the face of the East
involved not only a total imbalance of forces, but also all the depleted morals on which
Third-World thinking was based. Movements of liberation were seen as based on
degraded idols being glorified, on the level of bands of mercenaries, or worse, terrorist
networks to track down. The insulation of these organizations, the lack of external
support and the drying up of available resources have strengthened the ties between
them.
Globalization has changed the face of the World; the nation state is being
profoundly and irrevocably transformed: trade, law, communication and culture are
more and more removed from their local bases; in most countries, modernity is moving
at a faster pace than mentality. This has led to a crisis of identity.
Globalization has weakened the role of the nation state, but this has not been
completely abolished. Large companies are not simply actors in the State, but real
partners, with equal roles. These companies are the source of the wealth of the State; on
the other hand, the State intervenes to open up new markets to them, to guarantee a
better economic environment and conditions that can enable them to be more
competitive. This situation transposes the existing ambivalence between the remainders
of a revised nationalism and the possibility of delocalization offered by globalization
in the contrary case!
In this new globalized scheme, the form of violence which we call terrorism is
no longer limited to a form with a place or with an aspect; it can take the form of a
86
hijacking, or a virus sprayed into a subway station or of computer viruses introduced

into a data-processing network. It can also be the work of a State, a group or an
individual. Because of the interference of the State with other actors, who are quite as
important, and which takes part in strategic decision-making, it has also become more
difficult to distinguish between military objectives and non-military ones. The sole
objective is to strike hardest where it is least expected.
Globalization is the process that made terrorism possible in the sense that the
lowering of the barriers to the transactions of men, goods and capital allowed the
emergence of supranational societies. The development of data processing and satellite
communications allowed the transmission of information almost in real time. Space, in
the physical sense, has lost its continuity, and interests have become so interwoven that
a strike in Nairobi could have anticipated results in London or Washington.
If globalization is the situation in which terrorism was born and developed, other
factors, bound directly or indirectly to globalization, have a determining impact on the
development of this phenomenon:
x The astronomical disparities between people in the Northern Hemisphere and
those in the Southern; never before have the gaps been so wide. The gigantic
differences relate not only to the level, or the quality of life, or to the level of
illiteracy, but also to the capacity to harm in the case of conflict. But let us not
forget that violence is a political tool that can be used to redress, alter or revise
the imbalance in progress. If we take the last century as an example, the
prevalent situation allowed belligerents, in the event of disputes, to have a
minimum of mutual capacity to harm. Vietnam was a traditional war, as
conducted by America, answered by a different form of war adapted,
moderated, and limited in space: the guerrilla war. The Afghans applied the
same technique and achieved their goals; by no means did they need to seek
more atrocious and expensive means. There are astronomical disproportions in
the capacities for war that we have recently seen in the Afghan war, in Iraq,
the zero-option victim. The surgical war, spoken of as clean, has not left any
choice to the weaker party; it can establish a minimum of balance only by the
implementation of new techniques.
x The incapacity of the United Nations to play a neutral and effective role and to
enforce its resolutions has spread a feeling of frustration: When conflicts, as in
Palestine, last for more than half a century, when generations are born and die
under occupation, and when refugees who live in precarious situations lose all
hope, it is very difficult to contain the spirit of revenge.
x Large contrasts in the Middle East. This is one of the richest areas in the
World in terms of natural resources, but most of its population is among the
poorest on the planet. The civilization of these nations is ancient.
Notwithstanding, it is permeated by modernity; the political regimes in place
are among the most criticized in the world because of their antiquated and
authoritarian governance, but remain on constant terms with the West.
Terrorism is not only the consequence of globalization, or of objective factors
related to this process; it reflects, especially in its Islamist version, the landscape of the
wreckage of the Cold War. It is manifestly known today that since 1976 the secret
services of Arab countries joined their coordination efforts with Western services in the
recruitment and orientation of Islamist activists, with the goal to counter and to weaken
87
Communism. The responsibility assumed by the assumption of these Islamist

organizations by these services enabled them:
x To gain very advanced military training and modern and sophisticated
weapons.
x To have a solid background to organize, involve, and project their operations.
x To have access to the local and international media, and to present themselves
as a movement of resistance acting with the aim to free their country from
Russian influence/occupation, that allows them to gain the sympathy and the
solidarity of the Moslem World.
x To allow them to cast a broad potential net of recruitment everywhere in the
World; almost all the terrorists who took part in terrorist acts are veterans of
Afghanistan.
Terrorism is not a sequence of globalization in its historical sense. Nor is it, either,
the product of progress or advanced technology, but a consequence of the unbalanced
widening of the world sphere. The world is changing more quickly than the judicial
institutions needed to articulate it and the principles and the laws intended to control it.
Terrorism cannot be treated in isolation or in a partial manner; all its forms are
reprehensible. State terrorism is as reprehensible as that of individuals and organized
groups; it is even more serious, because the State is supposed to be under the influence
of the law.
It is true that security measures can reduce terrorist acts in number and intensity.
However, the anticipated results can be effective only on a short-lived basis. Each time
the terrorists have proved that they lacked neither imagination nor audacity.
Technological progress is a weapon with a double edge. The West is powerful thanks
to its technology, but it remains vulnerable in facing these threats. In this sense, the
first duty of a liberal State is to not transform itself into a terrorist State.
Terrorism is a world-wide phenomenon; it must be treated as such; its defeat
should not be sought by pointing a finger at a religion or a culture, nor by invoking
cultural Darwinism. The best response is a common attachment to a just and more
interdependent World based on moderate, autonomous authorities that have the
appropriate means to enforce new values.
88

IOS Press, 2006
Fighting Terrorism by Tightening Laws: A

Tightrope Walk between Protecting
Security and Losing Liberty*
Berthold MEYER
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and Center for Conflict Research,
Philipps University Marburg, Germany
Abstract. This contribution examines the legislative responses to terrorism in

Germany after 9/11 in regard to the question of whether and to what extent
averting dangers to state security can be counterproductive when the price is the
imposition of major restrictions on the civil rights and liberties of those whose
freedom ought to be protected by the government. Tensions between striving for
freedom and trying to increase security arise in principle wherever democratic
states ruled by law try to guarantee both to their citizens. Anti-terror laws only
serve their purpose if they improve the states ability to defend itself against
terrorist attacks without excessively restricting the civil rights of citizens, because
the value that should be protected is the continuity of the liberal lifestyle of the
states sovereign, the people. It may not be possible to foresee all of the
consequences of the tightrope walk between increasing security and reducing
liberty that may result from any proposed legislation. But to prevent a quasi-state
of emergency from becoming a normal state of affairs, and to prevent civil rights
from being permanently restricted, it would be wise to provisionally limit the
duration of proposed new security laws to two years and to require that any
prolongation beyond that same period should depend upon an evaluation of its
usefulness.
Keywords. Civil rights, security, risk assessment, US patriot act
Human Striving for Security and the Problems of Risk Assessment

Democracies find it hard to protect both security and liberty when fighting terrorism by
tightening national laws. This contribution will show this in a case study on Germany.
But first, it is necessary to make some remarks on the human striving for security as a
principle. Striving for security is a universal human tendency [1]. In the sense of
seeking safety measures against hazardous natural environments, as well as against
unfriendly neighbors, security efforts have given important stimulation to the whole
process of civilization [2]. But only during the 20th century has security become a
symbol of a societal value, especially in the wealthy states of the North, which are
mostly democracies.
This contribution is an updated version of Berthold Meyer, Fighting Terrorism A Narrow Path
Between Saving Security and Losing Liberty, in: Alessandro Gobbicchi (ed.), Globalization, Armed
Conflicts and Security, CeMiSS, Roma 2004, pp. 227-238.
89
B. Meyer / Fighting Terrorism by Tightening Laws
In this connection, there is a special aspect of the German societal and political
situation which may derive from the German language, in which the word Sicherheit
means not merely security, but also safety, reliability, certainty, trustworthiness and
confidence. [1] (p.149). Each of these components of its meaning is connected to the
others. The loss of any one of these elements of meaning has the consequence that the
remaining sense of Sicherheit will be perceived as spurious and risky. It is, therefore,
obvious that transient phenomena of insecurity are rooted in diverse causes.
The simultaneity of a seemingly evident unambiguity and of vagueness of the
informative content gives the term security an enormous potential for emotional
appeals. [1] (p. 32). The term has thereby become the point of crystallization for
extremely different associations. [3] (pp. 13f). The perception of a relatively secure
situation deteriorating, or mere uncertainty about this, produces fear. Against these
feelings, promising security has the effect of a drug, but this effect wears off when new
uncertainties come into view. In the course of our constantly changing everyday lives,
as well as due to the numerous catastrophes constantly being reported in the media, we
are exposed to a steady stream of new uncertainties. This being the case, anyone who
promises increased security can count on an expanding audience. Promising greater
security is a good way for politicians to win votes.
Frei [3] has drawn attention to the difference between subjective and objective
uncertainty. He defined four different levels of security and insecurity: Subjective
uncertainty is caused by the fact that the future behavior of others can only be
predicted, but not precisely calculated. Objective uncertainty results from current, and
much more from future possibilities of action by other subjects. Dividing both
dimensions of uncertainty into high and low levels, Frei obtains the four types real
security, false security, insecurity and obsession. [3] (pp. 20ff)
Figure 1. Four Types of Perception of Security
subjective uncertainty
objective uncertainty
high
low
high
insecurity
false security
low
obsession
real security
Real security is present in the case in which the chance of a negative event is both
objectively and subjectively low, and the event seems very improbable. In contrast,
insecurity prevails in the case of a very uncertain subjective chance of realistic
expectation and an objectively very ambiguous situation.
In our context of fighting terrorism, the two asymmetric types of security
perception are the most interesting: Someone who only believes he is secure, but is
actually experiencing false security is either misjudging an objective danger or has
chosen the wrong measures for self-protection. In terms of insurance, such a person is
under-insured. Someone who, on the contrary, is obsessed by fear reacts excessively
either to minor or to improbable risks. He tends to invest in over-insurance, i.e., his
efforts to increase his security cost more than his potential losses if he were uninsured.
But individual persons, as well as whole societies and states, can get into trouble
with the question of what and how many security measures are sufficient to meet the
risks they actually face. Correct risk assessments claim to predict if, when, and with
90
what consequences a negative event might occur in the future. To reach such an
assessment it is necessary to examine past information on comparable events and their
prevailing conditions, bearing in mind whether it is possible to draw conclusions for
the future and what measures are best for the assumed danger. The probability of
winning or losing a coin toss is fifty-fifty. But societal, technological or international
risk assessments depend on a vast number of risk factors with different degrees of
potential damage.
This can be illustrated with an example from everyday life: When crowds
assemble, crimes can be committed, and accidents can happen. Some risks, such as
those involving pickpockets or hooligans, are realized relatively often; but it is also
possible that less common risks will be realized, e.g., a panic might break out after a
fire alarm. Therefore, at large sport events there are always large numbers of
policemen, firemen and ambulance attendants on duty who are prepared to go into
action if such an incident occurs. Still there was from the start some possibility that
during the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta a terrorist bomb would be detonated and
cause death and injury to visitors, or that members of Islamist terrorist groups would
plant bombs on three trains in Madrid on March 11th, 2004 or that on July, 7th, 2005
bombs would be detonated on three London subway trains and a bus, in both cases with
large numbers of victims. To reduce such risks as far as possible, some additional
thousands of policemen would be needed for strictly controlling all entrances to stadia,
amusement parks, discos or subway-stations, or it would be necessary to reduce the
number of mass events, as well as of subway-stations, which would impose restrictions
on the freedom of Western lifestyles and public mobility.
I will mention still another example: In the 1990s the U.S. began a very ambitious
anti-missile program with a budget of billions of dollars to secure the country against
air-raids by rogue-states. It was hardly possible to judge how effective this system
would be against an actual threat, because only a few tests were made before 2001. But
then 9/11 occurred, whereby 19 terrorists captured four civilian passenger aircraft
taking off from U.S. airports, overwhelmed the crews with carpet knives and steered
two of the planes into the Twin Towers of the New York World Trade Center and a
third into the Pentagon in Washington. They might have caused another disaster with
the fourth, which crashed (perhaps due to passenger resistance) before reaching a
target. The terror attack proved the need to reflect on the vulnerability of U.S. territory,
but it also showed that experts had focused their attention on attacks from far abroad
while ignoring potential dangers closer at hand. Only after terrorists had employed
methods they could just as easily have used years or decades earlier did politicians and
experts begin to reflect on how to prevent terror attacks made using the simple, but
very effective tactics of 9/11 for instance by reinforcing cockpit doors to prevent
hijackers from gaining access to them.
Terrorism: Attacks on Peoples Security and Liberty Needs

The U.S. government was not alone in reacting to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In the
following I will examine the legislative reactions of the German national government
and the Bundestag (federal parliament) to terrorism, asking in particular whether and to
what extent efforts to ward off dangers to state security can be counterproductive when
91
the price is a reduction of the civil rights and liberties of those whose freedom the
government is expected to protect.
Tensions between striving for freedom and for security arise in principle wherever
democratic states under the rule of law try to guarantee both values to their citizens.
However, there are important differences between the political cultures of the states: In
the U.S., the tradition of freedom has deep roots and is associated with the firm
conviction that individuals themselves are responsible for their personal security. That
is the reason why Amendment II to the U.S. Constitution is often interpreted as
protecting the rights of private persons to possess and bear firearms. This current of
American political culture does not take into consideration that the history of European
states and constitutions has shown the security-promoting effects of a state monopoly
on the use of force. Elias describes the development of this monopoly as a path from
continuous insecurity for the individual caused by violence during earlier phases of
civilization to a characteristic form of security. [2] (p. 325). But because the
monopoly on the use of force is not acceptable without control by the rule of law, it is
necessary for the constitutional state to combine the two principles [4]. Therefore, the
constitutional state has to solve the problem of how to balance liberty and security, as
every additional security measure necessarily narrows individual free space, and,
conversely, freedom itself entails risks and creates insecurities.
Terrorist attacks against democratic states upset the state monopoly of power.
Thereby they are meant to seriously disrupt the precarious balance of security and
freedom: All terrorist actions are intended to achieve great publicity effects. They are
not only meant to spread fear and anxiety, but also to gain the sympathy of a particular
segment of the public [5]. With this intention, revolutionary leftist terrorist groups like
the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Fraction) in West Germany or the Brigate
Rosso in Italy in the 1970s used violence against representatives of the states in which
they lived. They argued that these persons were responsible for economic exploitation
and political repression, but they acted selectively and tried to avoid harming innocent
bystanders. They wanted to undermine and eventually overthrow the political and
social order which until then had been secured by the state, including in the view of
the majority of the people reliability and therefore security, as well as the guarantee
of their civil rights. The terrorists expected the state to try to fulfill its responsibility for
maintaining public order by taking drastic measures after an attack, so that the political
class would unmask the state as illiberal and repressive, resulting in people losing
confidence in its ability to guarantee their civil rights. In the next phase, further
spectacular actions would demonstrate to the public that despite the growing
restrictions on their liberties and civil rights, no increase in security was being gained.
In this way, terrorists hoped to alienate citizens from the state, to gain sympathizers
among the citizenry and to find potential accomplices for their revolutionary aims.
As terrorist attacks are mostly characterized by an element of surprise that
intensifies the anxiety and the fear of follow-up actions, they directly influence the
security needs of the public. Important for this is not so much the actual dimensions of
the attack itself, but rather the sudden disruption of a situation previously perceived as
calm and safe and the uncertainty of the risk of further attacks in the near future.
Therefore, such a situation of political insecurity seems more dangerous than others
[1] (p. 19).
Whatever purpose terrorists intend with their acts, they force the directly or
indirectly concerned government to react quickly and actively. Were a government to
92
take a wait-and-see approach, it would risk that its own people, foreign states and, last
but not least, the terrorists themselves would interpret this as weakness. Therefore, a
government firstly has to try to prevent further attacks. Consequently, the immediate
reactions of states are to increase controls for gaining more information and early
warning to prevent the preparation of new terrorist actions. Such security measures are
aimed at enabling people to return as soon as possible to a normal everyday life free of
fear. But because absolute security cannot be attained, politicians worry about leaving
gaps in the defenses, because such gaps could have the side-effect of forcing them to
take responsibility for the harm inflicted by the next attack. Therefore, politicians tend
to maximize their security preparations at the price of more restrictions on citizens
liberties and civil rights than are necessary for effective prevention.
German Reactions to 9/11

The first reactions to the attacks on the U.S. by Germany and other countries were to
increase air traffic safety by increasing controls on passengers and baggage at airports
and introducing measures to protect airplanes against hijacking. This was
understandable, because airlines had to regain the confidence of their now extremely
insecure customers. Meanwhile, several independent tests of airport security measures
showed that it was nevertheless possible to smuggle knives and other weapons into the
cabins of airplanes in handbags or prepared shoe soles. Additionally, the ministers in
charge reacted very quickly by putting together legislative provisions so-called
security packets of laws against terrorism and trying to implement them by
administrative regulation, if possible, or by parliamentary legislation, if necessary.
On that occasion, the starting positions of the countries concerned were quite
different, as a sidelong glance at the U.S. shows. Because of its deep-rooted tradition of
personal freedom, there is no obligation in the U.S. to register ones residence with the
police or to carry a personal identity card. In reaction to 9/11, such a card is being
tested for the first time for a couple of years by the army and concerned parts of the
administration, and may subsequently become obligatory for all U.S. citizens. Even this
was criticized by civil-rights campaigners in 2001, as they see big brother lurking
behind such proposals. The particular facts recorded on a magnetic strip of the identity
card can be stored in a central data bank, making possible continuous surveillance of
the bearers permanent place of residence and temporary lodgings.
In Germany, in contrast, for generations there has been an obligation to register
ones residence and to carry identity papers (identity cards as well as passports), which
have been more or less safe against counterfeiting for more than a decade. The
Bundestag already started restricting constitutional rights in connection with the
emergency constitution in the 1960s. In the 1970s, the relevant laws were amended to
help fight terrorism and extremism. Even more recently, some civil rights were
restricted to better combat organized crime. The climate was ripe for the legitimation of
infringements on peoples right to privacy by undermining the Basic Law of the
inviolability of private dwellings to eavesdropping by the police and secret services
(Groer Lauschangriff),1 and three months before September 11th the powers of the
1
This law was overturned by the German Constitutional Court in March 2004. Its decision called intrusion
into peoples private sphere an infringement of Article 1 of the German Basic Law (constitution), which
93
Federal Intelligence Agency to monitor private telephone calls were also extended.
Therefore, it could have been expected that Germany unlike the U.S. would have no
deficiencies in its legal provisions for internal security. But far from it!
Together, the Federal Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily (SPD), and the
responsible ministries of most of the federal states reactivated the method of locating
suspects by means of computer data analysis involving many people
(Rasterfahndung), which was added to the code of criminal procedure in the period
of RAF terrorism. At the same time, the federal states prepared to enlarge their police
services. Exactly one month after 9/11, the Bundestag debated the so-called
Sicherheitspaket 1 (first security packet). On the one hand, this included reducing the
privileges of religious groups, which had been protected by the law of associations,
with the intention to withdraw legal protection from organizations conducting extremist
activities under the cover of religion. On the other hand, it contained an addition to the
criminal code (129 b) to make it possible to punish people for mere membership in a
foreign criminal organization, and at least an extension of the possibility to gather
information from telecommunication firms on telecommunication links. All these
measures were supported by a very broad majority of the Bundestag, with the
exception of a few members of the Green Party and the PDS (Left Socialists).
Immediately after this the Minister of the Interior presented a Sicherheitspaket II
(second security packet) to change many other laws and regulations2 with the aims of
x giving more competencies to all offices responsible for internal security,
x improving the exchange of data between the offices and services,
x preventing the entry of terrorists into Germany,
x improving the measures of personal identification on visa documents,
x improving the possibilities of control at the borders, and
x improving the ability to identify extremists residing in Germany.
Some other laws like those on passports and identity cards were to be changed,
especially to
x improve the security examination of persons in professions and positions with
relevance for domestic or external security,
x achieve a legal basis for the placement of biometric data on passports and
identity cards,
x stop the activities of extremist organizations of foreigners in Germany, and
x improve the possibility of using social data for Rasterfahndung.
Both lists show the priority attached by the Federal Ministry of the Interior to
providing more competencies to the security offices and services and to improving
their co-operation, especially to improving their ability to exchange information. The
main focus was placed on the control of foreigners who either wanted to travel to or
immigrate to Germany or who were already residing there. But many measures in
Sicherheitspaket II concern all persons living in Germany.
In this connection it was planned to put fingerprints, three pieces of biometric data
and a holograph on a chip on the passports and identity cards of all citizens in order to
protect these documents against falsification, counterfeiting or misuse by persons who
protects human dignity; but the Red-Green government and the CDU/CSU opposition agreed on June 15,
2005, to reintroduce this law in a version which seems to conform to the Basic Law.
2
Namely the Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz, the MAD-Gesetz, the BND-Gesetz, the
Bundesgrenzschutzgesetz, the Bundeskriminalamtsgesetz, the Auslndergesetz and some laws affecting
foreign citizens residing in Germany.
94
resemble the owner. The Bundestag agreed on December 14th, 2001 to this plan only in
principle and postponed the details of procedure until a later law. Meanwhile, under
pressure from the U.S. government regulation that starting in autumn 2006 European
tourists will only be allowed to enter the U.S. with passports containing chips with
biometric data, Interior Minister Schily presented such a passport, which will be
introduced gradually and will replace the current ones during the next few years.
The security legislation also allows the Bundesamt fr Verfassungsschutz (Interior
Secret Service) and the Federal Intelligence Agency to gather information from banks
and other financial institutions on accounts, account-holders, and other authorized
persons, as well as on transfers of money and financial investments. These services are
also empowered to collect data on the use of the telecommunication links of
telecommunication services. In addition, the Interior Secret Service is allowed to obtain
information from airlines and the mails. Finally, it was planned to prevent money
laundering and to investigate the financial transactions of potential terrorists by
collecting and storing all bank account data in Germany in a central register
(Kontoevidenzzentrale). This would have been a deep infringement on the banks
duty to maintain confidentiality, even if the transfer of money itself would not have
been registered in detail. Therefore, the Bundestag rejected this part of the legislation in
December 2001. But half a year later, a similar regulation was accepted by parliament,
as it was hidden in a complicated law on financial markets.3
The oppositional conservative Christian parties, the CDU and CSU, were
concerned about the public acknowledgement of their competence in questions of
domestic security. Concurrently to the governmental security packet, they filed an
application to amend the constitution to legalize domestic operations by the German
armed forces (Bundeswehr) for the protection of property. In 2001, they could not
mobilize sufficient support for this proposal in the Bundestag, but persisted in this aim.
And indeed, in May 2003 the new Federal Minister of Defense, Peter Struck (SPD),
expressed sympathy when he presented his first Defense Policy Guidelines with some
remarks on new ways of cooperation between the Bundeswehr and police in cases of
terrorist threats. Moreover, on June 18th, 2004, a majority of the Bundestag passed a
new air security law (Luftsicherheitsgesetz) which authorized the Bundeswehr to
shoot down any civilian airplane hijacked by terrorists and steered in the direction of a
skyscraper or a nuclear power plant. But the President of the Federal Republic, who has
to sign and to publish the law, objected that using this law would violate the human
rights of affected airplane passengers. Therefore, he asked the Federal Constitutional
Court to review the law. Nevertheless, up until the terrorist attacks on the London
subway, there were no real chances for any amendment to the constitution legalizing
domestic operations by the Bundeswehr, because an application would not have
received the necessary two-thirds majority in the Bundestag. But after this incident, the
conservative parties, the CDU and CSU, will try again.
3
The Viertes Finanzfrderungsgesetz of June 2002 creates a new 24c in the Kreditwesengesetz,
which legitimates a new control institution, the Bundesanstalt fr Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht to obtain
account information from all banks using an automated system which makes it impossible for banks to follow
this [6] (pp. 11f).
95
Does security Protect Liberty?

Anti-terror laws in a democratic state ruled by law only serve their purpose if they
improve the ability of the state to defend itself against terrorist attacks without
excessively restricting the civil rights of citizens. According to political theory, in an
act of sovereignty the people delegate the right to use force to the state, thereby
creating a state monopoly on the use of force and asserting a claim to protection by the
state. This protection, as intended by the people, is not restricted to sustaining their
lives and therefore does not depend on the continuity of just any kind of functioning
state, but rather on a democratic state under the rule of law. The value that is worth
being protected is the continuity of the free and liberal lifestyle of the states sovereign,
the people. In the case of protection against terrorist attacks, the question already
discussed earlier concerning internal security is, How to defend the republic without
violating the idea of liberty, without suspending civil rights: Liberality and efficiency
must be balanced in a way suitable to democracy. The defense of freedom is a preconditioned task: Success is predetermined by the means, which must be chosen very
scrupulously. [7] (p. 16)
Neither the German Minister of the Interior, nor the U.S. Attorney General, who is
responsible for the corresponding U.S. PATRIOTIC Act,4 nor their counterparts in
other countries have satisfied this need. Moreover, they have displayed behavior typical
of politicians in charge of domestic security, as described by Preuss already in 1989:
Whenever new problems arise, they first think of more severe punishment and
enlarged police powers. [8] (p. 488)5
The very broad majority that the first security packet received in parliament was
not given to the second. First, when the Federal Minister of the Interior tried to
introduce drastic measures like the planned changes in passports and identity cards by
administrative regulation, representatives of the Green party spoiled this in a coalition
talk at the end of October. Only then was this intention introduced through regular
legislative channels. After heated debates over the law on data protection, the details of
changing passports and identity cards were revised when the entire second security
packet passed the Bundestag on December 14th, 2001. Additionally, the intention of
authorizing the Federal Criminal Investigation Agency to start investigations without a
suspicion expressed by a public prosecutors office, as well as the plan to refuse
foreigners entry into Germany when there is a first moment of suspicion against them,
found no Green support in the governing coalition. Other rejections were revised by the
Greens after they got a promise that some of the measures would be effective for only
five years.
Minister Schilys draft of Security Packet II was criticized in the Bundestag by
some members of his own SPD faction, as well as by the Greens, the liberal FDP and
the leftist PDS, and outside parliament by lawyers, judges, and last but not least by the
data protection officers of the Federal Republic and of the Federal States. The main
reason for these criticisms was the fear of creating a man of glass with these laws
(i.e., that citizens would no longer have any secrets vis--vis the state). They see in this
tendency a violation of the basic law of the self-determination of citizens concerning
personal data (informationelle Selbstbestimmung), which was derived from Articles
4
The PATRIOT Act is an acronym for: Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism.
5
Translated by the author.
96
1 and 2 of the German Constitution by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1983. On the
other hand, the draft of Security Packet II received praise from the right wing of the
Bundestag, especially from the CDU/CSU faction. This came as no surprise: whenever
there is a choice between the values of security and freedom, conservatives of all
factions vote for security, while only a handful of Liberals (independently of the name
of their political party) are prepared to adopt a motto which was proposed by former
Federal Minister of the Interior Werner Maihofer (FDP): In dubio pro libertate! (In
doubt for liberty!). [9] (pp. 83ff). At that time, in the 1970s, his task had been to
formulate the first anti-terror law, including a new case, the formation of a terrorist
association, which meant that a group of persons would be subject to punishment not
for criminal actions, but simply for making plans to commit crimes in the future.
Maihofer had doubts about the preemptive character of this law. Therefore, he
vehemently argued against a security policy that produces stockpiles of paragraphs on
suspicion as being deeply in opposition to liberal principles. [9] (p. 88)6
Security Packet II, as it passed the Bundestag on December 14th, 2001, is meant to
be exactly such a stockpile of paragraphs to be ready for all eventualities. This
intention is not least of all connected to the attempts of conservative politicians and
lawyers to introduce the fiction of a basic law of security into the German discussion
on constitutional law. They argue that the Grundgesetz (German constitution) implies
such a basic law [10]. But if it were possible for the individual to take legal action
against the state in order to gain security in the same way as to gain rights of freedom,
the state would be obliged to take unlimited precautions against all kinds of insecurity.
What consequences this could have, can be shown quite clearly in the right of
protection against danger: in the police law danger is defined as a situation in which
one of the goods which are to be protected by the police (life, health, property, public
security, etc.) would suffer with sufficient probability without any intervention.
According to textbooks on police law, sufficient probability can only be presumed if
and when the fear that the danger will become a reality is caused by life experience.
[8] (p. 489)7
Working on the basis of sufficient probability and life experience is treading
on shaky ground, as the events of 9/11 show: Before this, there seemed to be no
grounds for the presumption that a civilian airplane would ever be steered into a
skyscraper with a terrorist intention. Since that day, life experience has had to
consider the risk of a repetition of such attacks, but this experience gives us no hints as
to either the probability or the possible targets. Therefore, it is completely impossible to
judge whether it is necessary for the police or military to continuously secure all
buildings above a certain height or whether it is sufficient to forbid flights over certain
parts of big cities and to control this to protect the supposed basic law of security for
everyone living or working in a skyscraper. If the existence of this basic right is
accepted, the door will be opened to enormous enlargements of security regulations and
systems.
In contrast, three examinations would have been necessary in autumn 2001 before
passing legislation in order to prevent regulations in security laws which are
superfluous, nonsensical or ineffective: first, an exact examination of already existing
security laws. This would have shown that it would have been more important to
remedy deficiencies in the execution of these laws than to try to close supposed gaps in
6
7

97
the laws themselves. Secondly, it would have been necessary to examine each single
measure of Security Packet II before it was introduced in the Bundestag as to whether it
was suitable to prevent attacks like those of 9/11 or to arrest terrorists living
inconspicuously in Germany as so-called sleepers before they hijacked the airplanes.
The third would have been to try to find an answer to the question of whether such
preventive laws are suitable to deter potential terrorists with the threatened punishment.
This is obviously not the case vis--vis persons who have decided to sacrifice their own
lives in a planned attack. In their view, assuring their own death as a martyr is
probably more important than the lives of their victims. And therefore, they cannot be
influenced by measures of deterrence.
It is possible that not all of the consequences of the tightrope walk between
protecting security and losing liberty, as implied in proposed legislation, can be
foreseen. But to prevent a quasi-state of emergency from becoming a normal one, and
to prevent civil rights from being permanently limited, the Bundestag would be wise to
limit the duration of the security laws provisionally to two years and to provide that any
prolongation beyond the same period depend upon an evaluation of its usefulness.
After the purpose of a law has ceased to exist, or after coming to realize that some
measures are ineffective, civil rights can then be restored. This would prevent civil
rights from being limited longer than is absolutely necessary.
References
[1]
Kaufmann, F.X. (1973). Sicherheit als soziologisches und sozialpolitisches Problem. Stuttgart:
Ferdinand Enke.
[2] Elias, N. (1977). ber den Prozess der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische
Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.
[3] Frei, D. (1977). Sicherheit. Grundfragen der Weltpolitik. Stuttgart/Berlin/Kln/Mainz: Kohlhammer.
[4] Senghaas, D. (1997). Frieden ein mehrfaches Komplexprogramm. In: Senghaas, D. (ed.). Frieden
machen. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 560-575.
[5] Hoffman, V. (1998). Inside Terrorism. London: Victor Gollancz.
[6] Meyer, B. (2005). Der Schutz des Individuums im Spannungsfeld von Sicherheit und Privatheit. In:
Knop, J.v., Zilkens, M. (eds.). Datenschutz im Spannungsfeld zwischen Sicherheit und Privatheit.
Bielefeld: Bertelsmann, 11-29.
[7] Leggewie, C., Meier, H. (1995). Republikschutz. Mastbe fr die Verteidigung der Demokratie.
Reinbek: Rowohlt.
[8] Preuss, UK. (1989). Vorsicht Sicherheit. Am Ende staatlicher Neutralisierung? Merkur, 6/1989, 487498.
[9] Maihofer, W. (1976). Innen- und Rechtspolitik: Im Zweifel fr die Freiheit. In: Genscher, H.D. (ed.):
Liberale in der Verantwortung. Mnchen/Wien: Hanser, 83-98.
[10] Isensee, J. (1984). Das Grundrecht auf Sicherheit. Zu den Schutzpflichten des freiheitlichen
Verfassungsstaates. Berlin - New York: Springer.
98

IOS Press, 2006
Peer Networks of Collaborating Intelligent

Software Agents: Modular Infrastructure for
Adaptive Distributed Intelligent Systems
Eitan HADAR
Department of Computer Science at Netanya College, Israel
Abstract. This paper suggests a framework for initiating the construction of an adaptive
global intelligent system for the detection of terrorist activities. The proposed systems
main features are based on already known recommendations and emerging
technologies. However, this research concentrates on the missing elements of
collaboration. The paper presents the technologies and principles on which this
framework will be based, while describing its relevant vision. The discussion is divided
into the following categories: distributed information and data gathering while
preserving privacy constraints; adaptive collaboration of software agents and domainspecific language; and secured network topology based on modular peer-to-peer and
web services.
Keywords. Artificial intelligence, terrorism, distributed information, software agents,
domain specific language, topology, peer-2-peer
Introduction
Todays scientific community is developing knowledge and technologies for meeting
security-related challenges, as well as distributed network aspects required for collaboration
among international peer-entities. However, the intelligence community and international
governments, even when tightly linked, are constrained in their work by several aspects.
The quantity and complexity of information that must be processed and handled by the
intelligence community is increasing exponentially over time. Thus, new adaptive means
are needed to successfully cope with changing data structures, as well as with flexible
analysis constraints. Any intelligent software that must support such constraints should be
highly modular, while preserving both its local implementations and its distributed network
capabilities.
Such effective collaborations across intelligence agencies must enable efficient
knowledge sharing, in order to detect, classify and identify terrorist threats [1]. However,
conventional collaboration technologies do not provide enough flexibility to achieve these
ambitious goals. These systems must adapt to rapid changes within a dynamic environment.
Due to the required size and dynamic behavior, current centralized systems are inadequate.
E. Hadar / Peer Networks of Collaborating Intelligent Software Agents
99
However, peer networks of adaptive systems can provide a feasible solution. According to
[1, 2, 3, 4], long-term systems should provide:
1. Scalable, robust and interoperable services.
2. Plug and play infrastructure.
3. Secured, cross-enterprise information sharing.
4. Role-based access control.
5. Autonomous, decentralized community in order to prevent the accumulation of
power and knowledge.
On-going technology development efforts are usually conducted within a specific
scope of knowledge, utilizing its own domain language. When linking miscellaneous
domains, one can only wonder what transformation activities are required in order to
integrate these different perspectives? Are there means to establish common adaptive
technological rules that can provide the basis for legislative collaboration? Can we define a
unified adaptive language that elegantly provides a mechanism for the combination of such
technologies, driven by a what-if analysis of the intelligence community? Can we construct
a published, unified repository structure that can assist in querying distributed systems?
This paper presents our vision, intended to define a framework for a peer network of
collaborating entities, while addressing these questions in a structured manner. The next
sections describe five main topics and our relevant perspectives, followed by a summary of
our proposed vision for the research framework.
Existing Technologies and Their Possible Contribution

In order to understand the steps required for establishing a collaboration network of
software agents, consider an exemplary case in which a terrorist threat is evaluated by an
analyst. The basic steps can be the extraction of personal and demographic information
about the potential terrorist from a variety of data repositories. This will be followed by
obtaining a psychological profile, if possible, and concluded by establishing assessment
criteria based on the analysts personal experience, thus, estimating the threat level.
The infrastructure required for such activities includes: (1) the ability to access
distributed information, (2) collaborative network topologies, (3) software agents that can
actually perform the complex search, (4) security and privacy constraints that are adapted to
each data repository and agent and (5) a unified language used in order to allow agents to
access each others services without revealing their inner structure, transparent to the
analysts language.
This section details each of these elements and their possible contribution to our
research vision. It concludes with the current status of related collaborative research.
Distributed Information and Data Structures
Relevant information needed by an analyst for an investigation includes intelligence
transcripts, government agency records, financial information, psychological observations
and so on [5]. Such information repositories are constantly changing, both in dimensions
100
and in contents. Moreover, they are distributed and controlled by different access
restrictions, as detailed below. Two basic models can be defined: Threat (what is a risk,
what are the logistics), and Combatant (mindset, cultural belief systems and objectives) [5].
The first represents an actual target, while the latter encapsulates beliefs and objectives in
the intellectual contribution of the terrorist mindset. These definitions naturally need to be
enlarged for a full descriptive language, encapsulated in such data structures.
In our vision, we suggest to define and construct the standardization of such
configurable information that will enable smart agents to adapt to changing needs. The
need to provide adaptive systems is a primary consideration in our ability to predict threats.
As an example, adaptation can be considered as a time element in the information
gathered: (i) the time of the information actually generated, i.e., the actual event, (ii) the
time when the information was published, (iii) the time when the query was generated and
the information was taken from the repository [5].
The connections among autonomous, decentralized community communication
systems are presented in Figure F-1 (from [3]), which offers an efficient information
dissemination infrastructure with a decentralized architecture. Our proposed system should
support the same concepts; however, with appropriate constraints applied due to legislation,
as well as to the accumulation of power and knowledge.
Figure 1 (from [3]). An efficient information dissemination infrastructure with a decentralized architecture.
101
Network Topologies
One of the recent technologies for providing dynamic linkages among peer elements is
service-oriented architecture. Such architecture types rely on the XML markup language
and web service technology such as: (i) SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol); (ii) UDDI
(Universal Description, Discovery and Integration); and (iii) WSDL (World Service
Description Language) [6, 7, 8], as presented in Figure F-2 (from [9]). These known
technologies are based on discovering the requested and provided information within realtime constraints. The discovery services are needed for revealing the actual service
provided by each node (agent). The interoperability of platforms is needed in order to
enable execution on any provider and with any available technology. The high availability
of the overall response of the system is maintained by making sure that a result will be
provided according to the actual participants in the specific investigation. In order to
maintain the constrained services, an entity should reveal its services only upon real-time
request due to legal limitations and internal restrictions.
Therefore, dynamic maintenance of the available services must be defined, and
adjustable structures must be applied accordingly. Consequently, there is a need for a
system that can provide an underlying adaptable mechanism based on a domain-specific
language [4] to be applied for this type of problem. Moreover, applying an adaptable
workflow of message-passing can enable a more secure dynamic infrastructure for
authentication and authorization [2].
Figure 2. The basic structure of webDG services, which resembles a common interaction flow (from [9]).
102
To date, net-centric technologies are negatively affected by cultural and policy issues
which impose barriers on information gathering. There is a need to combine these
capabilities and limitations into a single set of standardizations that can enable a dynamic
query within the boundaries of law [1].
Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks can solve these problems by their basic nature. P2P
networks and grids [10] are distributed computing models that enable decentralized
collaboration by integrating computers into networks in which each node can both use and
offer services [11]. P2P is a class of self-organizing systems or applications that takes
advantage of distributed resources (storage, processing, information and human presence)
available at the Internets edges. A grid is a geographically-distributed computation
platform comprising a set of heterogeneous machines that users can access through a single
interface. The potential benefits of P2P networks can be examined in the Internets three
fundamental assets: information, bandwidth and computing resources [7]. Finding useful
information in real-time is increasingly difficult. An example is the lack of a single search
engine or portal that can locate and catalogue the ever-increasing amount of information on
the Web in a timely fashion. Therefore, providing a search solution must rely on
collaborative P2P search engines which facilitate P2P communication, such as described in
[7] and [12]. This type pf query routing protocol promotes structured, lightweight and
efficient query message exchange. It is expressed in XML syntax: registration, request and
response, and can enable flexible queries using partial keywords, wildcards and ranges. The
concept of this proposed research exists in the query space, aimed to coordinate consumers
from the intelligence community and providers such as information sources and
governmental agencies.
Intelligent Software Agents
A typical example of gleaning data from a variety of databases is using an expert systems
mining approach, such as blackboard architecture. This type of architecture is based on
incremental knowledge acquisition that is designed to extract a maximum amount of
relevant information and filter out irrelevant information [8, 13]. As demonstrated by Rubin
et al. [13], a complex query can be derived through multi-layered tree structures. The query
initialization is generated by the analyst, and the remaining sub-segments of the tree can be
automatically selected using automated artificial intelligence (AI) agents. Therefore, a need
to define the possible segments and terminology is crucial for automated agents that create
and construct these complex trees. AI tools that support rapid configuration must take into
account dynamically changing multiple viewpoints and objectives. Such considerations can
be preserving privacy constraints [14] while evaluating the correctness of the query.
The AI goal is to accurately assess the meaning of multiple terabytes of confusing,
misleading and inconsistent information while using adaptive models based on intelligent
agents. There are several solutions for providing data mining activities that can conceal the
actual implementation, and for preventing the disclosure of information. However, they
occupy a certain space that is limited to the actual database being inspected. Knowledge
can be acquired after running automated methods and creating additional information
repositories.
103
Therefore, in order to maintain privacy, we argue that these systems must be governed
by adaptable external roles that can prohibit the automatic exploitation of the system. Such
constraints need to be constructed on at least three levels: public, protected and secured.
Each has increasing levels of security that can make possible the iterative, efficient retrieval
of data based on authorization and information transparency.
Security
The main concepts of security [14] encapsulate both the encryption of information,
authentication and authorization, as well as dynamic business linkage according to predefined schemes. Such systems can be considered as the one provided by IBM Matchbox
hardware and software technology [15]. This addresses the needs of users who must both
protect data and make it available in a distributed, insecure public setting.
One of the basic notions for establishing collaboration among peer elements is the
ability to control access, as suggested by [2]. This research presented an XML Role-Based
Access Control (X-RBAC) specification language that addresses multi-domain
environment policy-specification needs. It allows the specification of policies and
facilitates the specification of timing constraints on roles and access requirements. As
illustrated in Figure F-3 (from [2]), the systems agree to share information for a specified
amount of time in a tight manner in a controlled environment.
Figure 3 (from [2]. The Access Control (X-RBAC) specification language workflow.
104
Unlike these systems, our vision will need to define a dynamic workflow protocol that
can provide services on demand without compromising the handshake security protocol
among collaborators. Model-driven trust negotiation for web services [16] can use
predefined frameworks that assist in dynamic access control, whereby access is granted
based on trust established in negotiation between the service requestor and the service
provider. These systems can maintain, among other things, the policy lifecycle
management of a specific query.
Naturally, it should be defined in the terminology of the analysts. Our proposed
framework should maintain dynamic constraints on such lifecycle properties according to
ad hoc decisions made autonomously by the specific node which provides a service, and
not just by the service requestor, as usually conducted.
Domain-specific Languages
Research activities that combine natural language analysis based on exploring information
are presented in [4]. The success of such systems depends on understanding the automatic
system and on the nature of their users, in our case the analyst. They must use dialect,
terminology and cognitive patterns that resemble those of the target audience. The need for
domain-specific search follows from the unsolvability of randomization problems.
Therefore, our research must define a correct bidirectional language that can integrate
the scientific community, on one hand, and the intelligence community, on the other. This
language should encapsulate requests and constraints and act as the main mediator among
these different perspectives.
Existing Collaborative Research
Many collaborative research programs were started post-September 11, 2001. One of them
is the US Department of Defense Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA) program [17].
The TIA program aims to address the problem of connecting the dots improving US
authorities ability to analyze, understand, share and act on the information they have. TIA
is designed to create a system and network of integrated computer tools that the intelligence
community can use in order to help predict and eliminate potential terrorist threats. The
TIA programs major goals are: (1) to develop and test solutions that provide secure
collaborative problem solving, (2) structured discovery with sources and methods security,
(3) group understanding and context-aware visualization and, finally, (4) efficient decisionmaking with corporate memory. According to its May 20, 2004 Report, the main project
goal is to have a hardened and matured fragile TIA system technology with a
corresponding concept of operations.
The US governments executive and legislative branches have quickly heeded
recommendations from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States (the 9/11 Commission) to improve information-sharing capabilities among federal
agencies and among federal, state and local officials. Both the legislative and executive
branches have for the first time established firm deadlines for agency heads to submit plans
for architectures and procedures that will enhance data sharing. US President George W.
105
Bush signed an executive order establishing a timetable within which agency heads must
begin planning for such a network [18]. Two weeks later, Senators John McCain and
Joseph Lieberman introduced a 281-page omnibus antiterrorism bill [19] with 17 pages
dedicated to establishing a new information-sharing network and stipulating deadlines. This
bill was followed by recommendations for shared intelligence, specifically the need to
establish information sharing and intelligence reporting guidelines that maximize the
dissemination of information while protecting intelligence sources and methods.
Starting from this incentive, our research vision can be considered as a gap-filling one.
As noted, most of the research and recommendations concentrate on the technology to
solve direct links and is intended for internal use by the US government. Our vision
concentrates on the network language and on the interface definition of the systems
boundaries and architecture. Thus, our research results can enable technical teams to
employ their solutions according to global national perspectives and not just the US one.
The Proposed Vision and Research Framework

As detailed above, our research goals and architecture are divided into several aspects in
terms of internal and external views.
Basically, the internal architecture can be better understood when examining the
WebDG system as presented in Figure F-4 (from [9]), which describes governmental
providing web services. However, our vision of the system definition will describe the
interfaces of the system externally, including privacy polices and interactions. Thus, it will
maintain the maximal freedom of internal design for the miscellaneous scientific teams.
The proposed system model will be based on a peer network of autonomous entities
aligned in a grid format. The nations are modeled as similar hierarchies with internal
connections. Every nation has several operational entities, with parallel ones in neighboring
collaborating elements. The grid topology enables vertical (in-state) relations and
horizontal (out-of-state) links among similar entities. Using this grid, a documentation and
search mechanism will be possible for exploring international terror-related events. Each
nation will documenst its domestic terrorist activities, as well as additional information
depending on its legislation and limitations (governmental and political limitation), or its
domestic entity (such as military, intelligence agency, and so on).
In order to provide such collaboration and tools for future research, we will need to
investigate several aspects. These aspects can be divided into:
1. The information perspective:
x Define a standardization of a terror-related database structure that will enable
an adaptable structure for present and future terror-related events.
x Gather information into these systems with different levels of access based on
public, protected and private services. This repository is based on
investigating past occurrences of terrorist acts.
x Define configurable information schemes that can enable smart agents to
adapt to changing needs.
106
2.
The software agents collaboration and network topology perspective:

x Provide an assertion mechanism for legislation and privacy constraints and
perspectives for the prevention of power and knowledge accumulation.
x Utilize collaborative Peer-to-Peer network and search engines, while using
open services such as SOAP.
x Define an adaptive framework that can provide ad hoc collaboration and
dynamic services based on the reflection of actual conflicts and agreements
among their human initiators.
x Define the underlying mechanism and the domain-specific language notation
for applying an adaptable workflow of message passing among these software
agents, and among their human operators.
x Apply model-driven trust negotiation for web services to predefined
frameworks.
Figure 4 (from [9]). The WebDG architecture, as implemented for social government services. The WebDG
manager and privacy preserving processors compose and preserve privacy in e-government Web services
Conclusion
This paper presented our vision of research that is needed in order to enhance the
collaboration among the governmental and the intelligence communities with the aid of
technological means. In our perspective, the missing elements are to be found mainly in
two perspectives:
107
1.
The need to define a flexible information structure in order to achieve faster

collaboration and data collection, as well as management of access control.
2. The need to define a topology and domain-specific language based on peer-to-peer
networks which can provide a real-time negotiation framework as part of the
automatic collaboration among software agents.
In doing so, we can advance our global perspective on terrorist activities, thereby
increasing the probability to pre-identify and locate terrorist events (either global or local).
We believe that our vision will enable the technological community to better
understand and interlink with the intelligence one, providing a more accurate response to
terror-related threats.
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data mining from multi-party distributed resources. The 12th IEEE International Conference on Fuzzy
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108

IOS Press, 2006
The Impact of the Human Aspects in

Designing Collaborative Information
Technology Systems
Irit HADAR
Department of Management Information Systems,University of Haifa, Israel
Abstract. Human aspects have lately been found to have a significant effect on
software and information systems development projects. There are various
cognitive as well as social aspects that are important in the context of system
design and implementation that consequently need to be well understood prior to
the projects execution. In this paper, we describe in short the possible impacts of
human aspects. We illustrate several possible aspects relevant specifically to
designing collaborative information technology systems and suggest our vision for
managing this issue within the planned research frame.
Keywords: Human aspects, cognition, sociology, design, collaborative, IT
systems
Introduction
The issue of human aspects in the context of software development has recently been
addressed in the software engineering and information systems communities. This is
due to the high level of software project failures observed: 75% of software projects are
considered a failure when completed, and only 2% of software systems delivered to
customers fully meet their requirements. Research studies have recently discovered that
many of these failures are due to the impacts of various human aspects throughout the
development process [1]. As a result, lately a human-oriented perspective of systems
development has been studied and discussed. For example, this perspective includes
comparing the nature of software development to art [2] and acknowledges the unique
people-dependent nature of its processes [3].
To this end, human aspects in the context of software and information systems
development analyzes the perspective of those involved in the process: individuals,
teams, customers and organizations. [3], in their book, refer to both social topics and to
cognitive aspects. Social topics can be considered as teamwork, the customers
perspective, code of ethics and international perspective. Cognitive aspects are more
related to program comprehension and learning processes in software development.
When considering the unique nature of the designated collaborative information
technology system we need to attend to several more person-related aspects, for
example, cognitive processes in analysis and decision-making in counter-terrorism
activities, intelligence teamwork, legislative areas of different governments, invasion of
privacy, international collaboration, and cultural gaps. When designing this system it is
I. Hadar / The Impact of the Human Aspects in Designing Collaborative IT Systems
109
essential to understand the human aspects that may impact the process of building and
using the system, the challenges and risks derived from them, and possible solutions.
The human aspects impact may contribute either to the success or failure of this
project. Thoroughly studying certain aspects may make a significant contribution to the
systems design. These aspects can include understanding the cognitive processes of
analysts during decision-making. This may lead to a better understanding as to which
processes the system should support and how. Even more important, learning and
analyzing certain human aspects may prevent negative impacts on the systems
requirements, design, and usage. For example, if certain stakeholders of the system are
not committed to the principle of information sharing as defined, they may withhold
information during requirements analysis. This will lead to a low quality of the
designed system, as well as low usage of the system after its implementation.
In this paper, we deal with the richness and complexities of the human aspects that
need to be taken into consideration during information system design. Specifically, we
address these issues in relation to the collaborating information systems framework. In
the next section, we review several human aspects we find relevant to the discussed
system from cognitive and social points of view. In section three, we suggest our vision
for dealing with the challenges presented.
Human Aspects in Designing Collaborative Information Technology Systems

We will refer to the human aspects that may impact the project from several points of
view. First, we need to identify the stakeholders of this system, i.e., its development
contributors and its potential users. Second, in order to design the system to best
support intelligence processes, we need to deeply understand cognitive processes
during decision-making in this context. Third, for the same aim we need to investigate
the social and distributed cognitive aspect of teamwork in intelligence related activities.
Identifying the Human Factor
In order to understand the human aspects that may impact the systems comprehension,
an inspection of the human factor involved is needed. That is, we need to identify and
study each of the roles that will take part in the processes of requirements specification
and system design. The investigation will be of both potential users and other
stakeholders from the governmental and intelligence communities, as well as
technologists who influence the design of the supporting technologies. For instance, the
stakeholders can include experts from the following disciplines: intelligence analysis,
international law, homeland security, negotiations, conflict resolution, artificial
intelligence, networks, distributed and temporal databases, ontology, cognitive
psychology and organizational and international sociology.
Cognitive Aspects
As recalled, our goal is to establish a framework for a system that will simulate and
support counter-terrorism activities. In order to accomplish that, we wish to understand
the relevant cognitive processes that take place in this respect. [4] describes general
anti-terrorism activities structured in two phases. The artifacts of the first phase are: (1)
110
expectancies that prescribe what is to be observed next as the situation continues to

evolve, (2) relevant cues to which the decision-maker needs to pay attention, (3)
plausible goals, and (4) courses of action to apply in this type of situation. The main
task in the second phase is to carry out singular evaluation by imagining how the
course of action will evolve. The decision-maker may need to adjust the course of
action, or reject it and look for another option.
A support system for counter-terrorism activities will need to simulate these types
of products and present them to the users during decision-making processes.
Consequently, we will need to identify and understand the cognitive processes of
potential users of this system during counter-terrorism activities. The identification and
analysis of cognitive processes will enable us to specify in detail all the elements
needed for contributing to counter-terrorism decision-making and define the systems
requirements accordingly. For instance, in a process of identifying terror threats by
intelligence agents we will need to (1) define the needed information for this process,
(2) present the information in a structure that will contribute to a correct perception and
comprehension by the user, (3) prioritize activities in a structured and contributing
manner which may assist the cognitive process throughout the analysis workflow.
Moreover, in this context, identifying cognitive perspectives that do not contribute to
the goal at hand when practiced by the participants may have its own impact as well.
Such phenomena can be distracting, due to dealing with non-relevant information,
vague or dual-meaning presentation of information, cognitive processes and a decisionmaking process which generates conflicts with intuitive thinking, etc. In order to
achieve inter-connected levels of understanding, we can refer to a mathematical model
of learning in the context of Aristotelian Forms. Aristotle proposed that people begin
with a set of forms or models that are adapted through learning to more closely
resemble specific concepts [5]. Therefore, our vision of the system must encapsulate
the current actions performed by the specialists and evaluate their actions accordingly,
in order to provide an evolved mechanism.
Social Aspects
We find two types of social aspect relevant to our context. One is related to the
intelligence teamwork needed to analyze complex situations, and the other is the
conflicting social processes.
Intelligence teamwork is required when the cognitive demands are too complex,
dynamic and time-pressured to be dealt with by a single individual. To enable early
detection and successful processing of potential terrorist threats, teams must effectively
work together to quickly process and combine information from multiple sources [4].
One of biggest challenges for teamwork is information overload [6], namely the
volume of information relevant to a required analysis. In order to cope with this
challenge, the information is distributed across persons, objects, tools and
environments [4], leading to a situation called distributed cognition [7]. It is important
in our research to analyze distributed cognition, in addition to individual cognition, in
order to fully understand the intelligence analysis of complex situations. This will lead
us to explore the effects that social aspects have on an individuals cognitive processes,
how distributed cognition is constructed and how it operates. Moreover, we will need
to explore relevant issues derived from the concept of distributed cognition, such as
information access needed to the different participating parts.
111
Research studies have been presented in the literature with regard to team
cognition, decision-making and collaborative technology, as is practiced in the real
world [4]. Moreover, [8] implemented a team-oriented agent architecture which
realized a computational shared mental model which allows agents in a team, whether
they are software or human agents, to anticipate the potential information needs of
teammates and proactively assist them. Allocating and learning such existing
technologies may be the basis for the technological framework of our research.
The second type of social aspect consists in the social processes that may
contradict or give rise to conflicts with respect to the research vision. These processes
may be encountered due to personal or political interests. These conflicts of individuals
or groups within the general research vision may reduce the projects success. Such
issues can be domination over information in order to gain control, whether the motive
is of a political or ideological nature. Such actions can harm the basic nature of the
research, i.e., information sharing.
Trust relations among peoples and nations usually involve responsibilities, both for
success, but even more, for accountability for failures. Using our proposed system
framework, by implementing information sharing and mutual assistance in crisis
situations, the system can contribute to trust building measures and sharing
responsibilities.
The Vision
Our general approach will be to identify dependencies and triggers that initiate complex
sub-queries and automatic selections applied to collaborative information systems.
Eventually, these selections will enable us to establish the adaptable nature of that
query which fits the cognitive process of its human operator. In order to achieve this
goal, we will need to define a domain-specific language that can support cognitive
processes and communication among different participants. The language and its
definition need to support a common terminology which is accepted by the
stakeholders involved in this research and, eventually, the system. Accordingly, we will
study associations that emerge from analyzing such cases in two perspectives: (1) how
the intelligence analyst or analysis teams operate and conceive the dynamic vision of
investigation, and (2) how the technological and scientific community, with their
terminology, can adapt existing technology and mechanisms to our aim. In doing so,
we hope that we can support the ability to distribute tactical information rapidly to the
people who are in the best position to evaluate the relevant terror threats.
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
Hutchinss, E. (1995). Cognition in the wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Knuth, D,E. (1997). The art of computer programming (3rd Edition). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Brooks, P.F. (1975). The mythical man month: Essays on software engineering. Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley.
Yen, J., Fan, X., Sun, S., McNeese, M, and Hall, D. (2004). Supporting anti-terrorist analyst teams
using agents with shared RPD process." In Proceedings of CIHSPS2004 IEEE International
Conference on Computational Intelligence for Homeland Security and Personal Safety, Venice, Italy,
July 2004.
112
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
Krause, L.; Lehman, L.; Wheeler, A. (2003). A family of agent based models. International Conference
on Integration of Knowledge Intensive Multi-Agent Systems, 30 Sept.-4 Oct. 2003, 312 317.
Woods, D.D, Patterson, E.S., Roth, E.M. (1998). Aiding the intelligence analyst in situations of data
overload: A diagnosis of data overload". Ohio State University: Institute for Ergonomics/Cognitive
Systems Engineering Lab Report, ERGO-CSEL 98-TR-03.
Hazzan, O., Tomayko, J. (2004). Human aspects of software engineering. Charles River Media.
Yen, J., Yin, J., Ioerger, T.R., Miller, M., Xu, D., Volz, R.A. (2001). CAST: Collaborative agents for
simulating teamwork. In: Proceedings of the 7th IJCAI 2001, 1135-1142.

IOS Press, 2006
113
A Practitioners Thoughts about Terrorism

Mansour ABU RASHID
ACPD, Jordan
Abstract. How should terrorism be defined? / The concept of terrorism / Genesis

of terrorism / Individual terrorism / Group terrorism / International terrorism /
Islam and terrorism / Terrorism and self-defense / The response: What can be done
about it? / What contributions can be made by collective security mechanisms such
as the UN?
Keywords. Terrorism, Islam, self-defense, counter-terrorism, collective security
mechanisms
How Should Terrorism Be Defined?

x
Terrorism is predominantly, but not solely, a by-product of profound and

prolonged socio-economic, political and religious discontent. When such
aspirations and grievances of marginalized communities are not addressed,
either by their governments or the international community, they produce
deep-seated frustration and a profound sense of humiliation. The net result is
dangerous and intolerant ideologies of hate and violence. Nonetheless,
terrorism is actively supported only by a narrow segment of any population
suffering a sense of injustice and is committed by smaller groups of people
willing to sacrifice their own lives. Terrorist groups do not require large-scale
support to sustain their campaigns of violence. Violence is only a small part of
their activities, which include propaganda, recruiting, fund-raising,
procurement, training, surveillance and welfare for perpetrator- and supporter
families.
It is harder for political analysts, economists and ideologists to discuss
terrorism than ordinary issues. The criteria for this kind of discussion include
absolute objectivity and complete openness, accompanied by thorough
examination, accurate scientific research and analysis intended to reach
solutions to the phenomenon of terrorism, instead of simply reaffirming
misleading political representations that serve the purposes of a particular
country.
The Concept of Terrorism

x
There is more than one definition of terrorism; unfortunately, each differs

according to the political, military, economic and social circumstances of the
defining nation. Besides that, the interests of nations influence the acceptance
of new connotations and preclude a single, inclusive definition. However,
114
M. Abu Rashid / A Practitioners Thoughts About Terrorism
these difficulties and obstacles should not obstruct us from reviewing the
historical development of terrorism, explaining its dimensions and identifying
its indicators and connotations.
One of the best definitions of terrorism is found in the Encyclopaedia
Britannica, which defines terrorism as the systematic use of terror or
unpredictable violence against governments, publics, or individuals to attain a
political objective. Terrorism has been used by political organizations with
both rightist and leftist objectives, by nationalistic and ethnic groups, by
revolutionaries, and by the armies and secret police of governments
themselves.
In the 20th century, the world witnessed the most dreadful kinds of military
occupation and the worst forms of colonialism. It also witnessed the greatest
liberation and freedom movements. The meaning of occupation has also
changed: it no longer necessitates the occupation of a territory by military
means, but has become the intentional control over the worlds economic and
trade resources. In addition, in the middle of the 20th century the world was
divided into superpowers and disadvantaged and oppressed countries, based
on the possession of nuclear weapons and the utilization of knowledge and
information to divide the world into consumer and producer states. The world
also witnessed cultural and ideological occupation. Besides that, the world
was divided into Western and Eastern parts and a Third World segment that is
nameless but described as the developing world.
Genesis of Terrorism
x
Humans differ not only in their basic genetic dispositions, but also because of
the social, economic and political systems in which they live. Today, as has
been true throughout history, humans are faced with conflicts resulting from a
scarcity of resources, social injustice, and ideological or religious rivalries.
Individual Terrorism
x
When two persons differ on any matter, the normal behavior is that each will
try to convince the other of his/her point of view. It is also natural that in the
end they may agree or disagree. The sad thing is that one of them may feel
that he/she is more powerful and will try to impose his/her point of view on
the weaker side by force and intimidation. This attitude is considered as
bullying and aggression. This occurs between individuals. But when a person
disagrees with some other group on political, religious, or ethnic matters, and
instead of trying to understand or tolerate the differences, he/she resorts to an
act of aggression against one or more members of the group in an attempt to
impose his/her ideas on the other side or to express disagreement, this is called
terrorism. This aggression could include killing, and this crime may involve
one or more persons.
History has witnessed many acts such as the murder of Caliph Omar, more
than 1500 years ago, the killing of General Kleber during the French invasion
115
of Egypt about 200 years ago, and more recently the bombing of the Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City. All these incidents were acts of terrorism
that were conceived, planned and carried out by lone terrorists who were
expressing their different opinions or disagreements by aggression and
criminal acts that were deplorable and solved no problem. Individuals who
commit such acts are fanatics, mentally unstable or insane. They usually suffer
from psychiatric and socio-economic problems and find relief in the release of
the instinct of aggression.
This type of individual terrorism is very dangerous, because it is unpredictable
and impossible to prevent, regardless of any security measures. An example of
this type is the attempt on the life of US President Ronald Reagan by a
mentally-deranged loner, which was not prevented by an extensive security
system and numerous guards.
Group Terrorism
x
When a group of people have common beliefs or ideas, whether political,

social or religious, and instead of trying to promote its ideas through
legitimate and accepted ways, resorts to aggressive means to impose its ideas
or to try to change a lawful system by force, such a group, regardless of the
possible nobility, legitimacy or morality of its cause, is nothing more than a
terrorist group. These groups usually develop in countries ruled by dictators or
oppressive regimes that are corrupt and/or do not respect human rights. But
sometimes such groups may develop in countries that enjoy democratic
regimes, organized by individuals who believe in fanatic religious ideas or
social or economic theories that they want to impose by force. Such an
environment makes it easier to attract recruits among young, underprivileged
or unemployed men/women who are dissatisfied with their status in society.
In the past, killing a head of state might constitute success or the achievement
of the goal of such a group. Nowadays, this is practically impossible. Killing
the heads of states or prominent leaders of regimes has proved inadequate to
achieve the goals of terrorist groups. Therefore, terrorist groups resort to acts
that could create a state of instability and unrest or destroy a countrys
economy. Furthermore, it is logically obvious how wrong fanatic groups are
that claim to promote certain radical religious ideas by force or by killing
those who do not believe or accept their ideas, and their claims are also clearly
contrary to the texts and the spirit of all world religions, which reject
aggression, ask us to love our enemies and to never try to force our beliefs on
others.
International Terrorism
x
It is often mentioned that the roots of international terrorism originated in

Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion of that country. The United States, in
its attempt to force the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan, promoted
the idea of Jihad or holy war in support of Muslim Afghanistan against the
116
infidel Soviet invaders. Thousands of young men from many Muslim

countries rushed to Afghanistan to help its people in their fight for liberation.
The Americans supported this activity by establishing training centers in
Pakistan and supplying arms, equipment and logistics to volunteers, who were
called by the American media Mujahadeen. Their training was not confined to
military aspects and the use of weapons, but also involved brainwashing and
indoctrination in the ideas of reviving the radical themes and principles of
Islam and the glory of fighting and even dying to raise the banner of the faith,
and that this is the quickest way to Paradise. Those young men, who came
originally to fight the infidel Soviets, began to believe that the real cause of
the weakness, poverty, humiliation and backwardness of the Muslims is that
their countries are run by corrupt and oppressive regimes that do not rule
according to Islamic principles.
These Mujahadeen were organized under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden
in what was known as the notorious terrorist group Al-Qaeda. Bin Laden and
his supporters succeeded in the indoctrination of their ideas in the minds of a
great number of young volunteers. Their ideas were based on Jihad against the
enemies of Islam, mainly the United States and its stooges: the rulers of the
Islamic countries who do not rule according to Islam. Al-Qaeda took
advantage of the well-trained and indoctrinated young Mujahadeen who
returned to their own countries or were sent to other parts of the world and
established terrorists cells waiting for orders to carry out attacks. The sad
aspect is that a goodly number of those involved were highly-educated young
men who could have contributed positively to their countries and to
themselves, instead of destroying themselves and others.
The terrorist actions organized by Al-Qaeda have caused great material
destruction and the killing of innocent people, but have not and could not ever
solve any problem or achieve any rational goal. The most serious aspect of the
activity of this organization is its claim that it is acting to defend Islam and to
promote its principles. Nothing could be farther from the truth than this great
lie. But the most alarming consequence of this allegation is that it has created
unjustified general misunderstanding, animosity and hostility towards all
Muslims and Islam all over the world. It is not fair to hold more than a billion
innocent Muslims who have lived peacefully with others throughout history to
be responsible for the crimes of a few hundred or few thousand twisted minds
or extreme fanatics who claim to be Muslims but in reality have never
understood the true principles and spirit of Islam.
Islam and Terrorism

x
Terrorism is an abhorrent, vicious crime by all standards, as it usually involves

killing innocent people who have nothing to do with any dispute and may not
even know that such disputes exist. There is no conflict that cannot be solved
around a negotiation table. Some terrorist groups claim to be Muslims and that
their actions aim to defend Muslims or to achieve Muslim goals. This false
claim has created a general misunderstanding of Islam and a tendency to
hostility towards Muslims. Therefore, it is important to clear up this matter
117
and to try to explain the doctrines and principles of Islam, which invariably
reject aggression, violence or the killing of innocent people and the
destruction of their property and calls for peaceful co-existence with people of
different faiths or ethnic backgrounds.
Islam does not tolerate the irresponsible destructiveness that is terrorism. Such
irreligious acts run counter to Islamic practices, just as they run counter to the
practices of Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and indeed all other
faiths of mankind. Muslims have been emphatic in their condemnation of
terrorism, arguing that terrorist acts violate Islamic law. The Islamic scholar
Shaykh Zaki Badawi argues that the atrocities of September 11, 2001 are a
violation of Islamic law and ethics. Neither the people killed or injured, nor
the property destroyed qualified as legitimate targets in any system of law,
especially Islamic law. Sayyed Abdel-Majid Al-Khoei has described the
attacks as a criminal and barbaric act removed from every moral code and
from every religious and humanitarian principle.
In his farewell sermon, the Prophet Muhammad, addressing thousands of
pilgrims at the foot of the Mount of Mercy, said: God has made inviolable for
you each others blood and each others property until you meet your Lord.
He was reminding them of the Quantico decree that to destroy the life of one
individual amounts to destroying the entire human race (5:32). The Quran
emphasizes that those who disturb the peace of society and spread fear and
disorder deserve the severest punishment that can be imposed (5:33).
Islam prohibits any form of aggression, as well as destruction of life and
property, and hence it is impossible that it permits or accepts terrorist acts. At
the same time, it allows legitimate defense of life, property and national
interests against aggression. Nowadays, we are witnessing what we may call
the bandwagon of Islamic Terrorism. Many liberation movements, or
struggles for self-determination that were once accepted as legitimate are now,
after the attacks of September 11, considered terrorist simply because the
actors are Muslims. This is what we are now seeing in Chechnya, Kashmir
and other Islamic parts of the world where people are striving for
independence or self-determination.
Terrorism and Self-Defense

x
There has been a lot of disagreement concerning the definition of terrorism. A

terrorist act involves two main aspects: first, the use of force and aggression
against individuals, organizations or governmental establishments, second, the
aim to achieve political or ideological objectives with this force. It is
important to differentiate between terrorism and legitimate defense against
invasion or occupation. Similarly, struggles for self-determination or
liberation movements should not be classified as terrorist activities.
The contemporary definition of terrorism suffers from double standards and
changes in positions with changing situations. Most Western officials,
academics and media people differentiate between legitimate popular
liberation movements and terrorism, depending on whether they agree or
disagree with the objectives of these movements. For example, the struggle of
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the Afghans against the Soviet invasion was classified as a legitimate

liberation movement and enjoyed the full support of the Americans, but later it
was branded a terrorist movement. Similarly, the Irish Republican Army is
considered a terrorist organization in Britain, yet its leaders are often
welcomed in the USA. Contributions have been collected for it, and its
meetings in Boston have been attended by Senator Edward Kennedy, who was
never considered to be pro-terrorist.
Another example of double standards according to changing situations is the
case of the South African National Congress, which was considered an outlaw
terrorist organization till it achieved its objective and brought about the
downfall of the Apartheid regime.
The most effective and practical way to eliminate terrorism would be to
eliminate injustice in international relations, to uphold the rule of International
Law and respect the role of the United Nations in solving disputes, to devote
more efforts and resources to fighting poverty and disease around the World,
instead of supplying weapons to conflict parties. Democracy and respect for
human rights are noble ideals, but they should be considered along with
special social, religious and moral values in each particular situation.
We must differentiate between resistance and freedom fighting, on the one
hand, and terrorism, on the other hand. To clarify our point, the following are
some examples: in the history of the modern world, Nazi Germany saw the
French Resistance as a terrorist movement, whereas the Allies and French
regarded it as a liberation movement. Let us also remember the way the
French themselves looked at the Algerian liberation movement, which was
considered by the French as an armed terrorist movement, whereas the rest of
the world identified it as a popular liberation movement.
I must emphasize that terrorism is dynamic, and its means develop and change
constantly. It resorts to premeditated planning before the execution of any
operation. Terrorism is a means for spreading fear and horror and resorts to
murder, assassination, deprivation of individual freedoms and taking the lives
of civilians and other innocent persons.
There is terrorism based on compulsion, force and coercion; terrorism based
on spreading chaos, obstruction of justice and disobedience to conventional
laws; and there is terrorism oriented to principles, values, psychological
elements, demoralization, degradation, loss of confidence, frustration and
depression.
We have to differentiate between two kinds of terrorism. There is national
terrorism inside a nation, which aims to destroy the national government with
a hostile organization that is funded internally. Thus, terrorist actions will only
be committed within the boundaries of the nation itself. On the other hand,
there is external terrorism: training, arming and financing are carried out by a
different, hostile nation that executes terrorist actions through killing,
bombing, airplane hijacking, threatening public buildings and spaces,
assassinating government employees or their representatives, attacking and
destroying infrastructures and strategic resources such as oil refineries, electric
power stations, water supplies, and networks of bridges and tunnels.
119
The Response: What Can Be Done About It?

x
Understanding and responding to a series of challenges to good governance

(restoring the rule of law, ensuring justice, and fighting corruption), the
provision of basic amenities, e.g., clean water supplies, the eradication of
poverty, lack of education, unemployment, the lack of political representation
and economic opportunities throughout the world are the biggest challenges
facing the Western world today. As the gulf between North and South widens,
restoring the strategic balance will take many years of hard work. Until then,
terrorism will have to be dealt with simultaneously at both the strategic and
tactical levels.
Unlike the groups of the 1970s and 1980s, contemporary terrorist groups are
multi-dimensional. They challenge governments and societies violently and
through elections, financial systems and information services. Therefore, the
responses of states must go beyond mere law enforcement. Nonetheless, the
actions of intelligence services, police and law enforcement agencies, and the
military have proved to be effective in the short term. If it is to win in the long
term, the international community must develop a mix of responses, political,
economic, and ideological. Even as targeting terrorist financial infrastructures
can weaken terrorist capabilities, an ideological response is paramount for
defeating misguided beliefs. As long as governments especially Western
liberal democracies permit terrorist propaganda and tolerate hate speech,
recruiting and support for terrorist groups will continue, and may even
increase.
As contemporary groups operate across the ideological divide, cooperating
across geographical borders, fighting the contemporary wave of terrorism
requires a multi-branched, multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional response.
Although the traditional instruments police and intelligence services are
the most critical, they are inadequate to meet the extent and emerging
challenge of terrorism. In addition to other law enforcement services
customs, immigration, coast guard, port security, airport services, and surface
transportation security , new actors should include the emergency services,
the military army, navy, and air force , private security professionals, the
mass media, educational, and religious institutions. More must be done in the
areas of government security, joint training, joint and combined operations,
the transfer of resources and expertise, and most of all the sharing of
experience.
In addition, raising national capabilities is not just a matter of transferring
funding and know-how. Instead, it also requires permanently changing the
priorities of the international community to ensure that individual
governments uphold their responsibilities. This will require the creation of a
system of incentives and sanctions keyed to performance in such areas as
terrorism financing, policing borders, and ensuring that countries deny
terrorists a safe haven. Before 2001, this was done largely on a bilateral basis
or occasionally through joint efforts by a small group of nations on an ad
hoc basis. Countries that needed urgent attention because of terrorism
problems got it, but the overall level of concern was limited. Despite the
negotiation of a dozen international conventions relating to counter-terrorism,
120
monitoring compliance was done by the very few national governments with
strong counter-terrorism policies. No international system for enforcing the
conventions exists.
What Contributions Can Be Made by Collective Security Mechanisms Such as the

UN?
x
In the past the United Nations and other international organizations have had
relatively little to do with counter-terrorism issues. One reason was the
disagreement of most organizations as to a definition. The problem
symbolized by the saying that One mans terrorist is another mans freedom
fighter effectively kept serious movement on counter-terrorism issues from
ever occurring. There is no international agency devoted exclusively to
dealing with issues of counter-terrorism. This is rather astonishing, when one
considers that there are multilateral organizations that deal with chemical
weapons, nuclear matters of all kinds, international aviation, financial
corruption, missile technology exports, etc. It is worth adding that all these
various agencies have begun working on terrorism-related issues within their
mandated areas of activity. Still, there is a need for an institution to do the
fundamental work of ensuring that the norms of behavior regarding counterterrorism are raised globally.
The responses of the United Nations and international organizations have had
partial successes and failures. To change the strategic environment, to make it
harder for terrorist groups to operate, the United Nations has played a
significant role in developing twelve international conventions. In regional
conflicts, notably in Palestine and Kashmir, an internationally disputed area,
the United Nations has failed. In Bosnia and Afghanistan, two conflicts
worsened by international neglect, the United Nations failed again. The United
Nations, a white elephant that wants to be politically correct, lacks the
organization and the doctrines to effectively fulfill its responsibilities. To be
more relevant in the 21st century, the United Nations needs to be restructured,
with greater representation in the Security Council and more power given to
the Secretary General.
Without further delay, the United Nations should adopt a working definition
of terrorism the threat or the act of politically motivated violence that
deliberately targets non-combatants. Also, the United Nations should launch a
worldwide program to build a norm and an ethic against groups that target
non-combatants. As a prelude, the UN should concentrate its efforts,
exploiting its multi-lateral structure as a strength, and take a leadership role in
ending conflicts and ensuring that the resulting peace processes become longterm realities. In addition, the UN should concern itself not only with
international terrorism or acts of terrorism that involve citizens from more
than one country, but also with terrorism within individual states. As almost
all major terrorist groups have developed an external presence, the distinction
between domestic and international violence has become blurred. International
terrorism accounts for only 8-12% of all acts of political violence and largely
affects the Western world. Often governments failure to effectively manage
121
domestic violence spills over into the international arena. The UN has
designated as terrorist groups only Islamic extremist groups and supporting
entities, thereby angering the Muslim world. The UN must also designate as
terrorist the non-Islamist groups that deliberately target non-combatants to
achieve political change, thereby demonstrating a more even-handed approach
in its determination to free the world of terrorism. The UN must serve to bring
together those states that have offered assistance and training in capacitybuilding with those states that have requested assistance in their efforts to
combat terrorism.
Two closing points: first, an effort to institutionalize the war on terror should
avoid trying to achieve greater intelligence sharing. This oft-cited goal is best
handled through bilateral intelligence channels. When national leaders try to
force intelligence agencies to open their files more than the services wish to,
they typically fail. Trying to yoke this goal to any other ones involving
multilateral efforts will only sink the entire project. Second, the way forward
for the UN and other international organizations in strategic counter-terrorism
remains unclear. Large-scale initiatives will be required in such areas as
(gradual) democratization, economic liberalization, economic assistance and
educational reform and support. UN agencies such as UNDP and other
institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and IFC may play an important role
in reorienting policies to deal with these issues. A multilateral counterterrorism organization may provide an important forum for discussion and
strategy formulation. But the road is dimly lit, and it seems a fair wager that
only a bold, coordinated initiative by the U.S. or, perhaps, the EU can reorient
policy to address these issues on the broad basis that is required.
Ultimately, it is the member states that must combat terrorism under the aegis
of the United Nations, the latter providing the necessary encouragement for
them to fulfill their obligations, particularly in regard to measures stipulated
under Chapter VII resolutions.
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IOS Press, 2006
The Role of Business in the UK Policing

Counter-Terrorist Effort
Jeff FOUHY
Metropolitan Police Service, Scotland Yard, London, UK
Abstract. Organized terrorist groups such as the IRA require extensive networks
of financial support to sustain their activities. As the nature of the terrorist threat
becomes ever more serious, the recent development of legislation requiring
financial institutions to positively assist in the detection of terrorist financial
networks is likely to become more demanding and more sophisticated.
Keywords. Irish Republican Army, international terrorism, terrorist financial
networks, law enforcement agencies
The United Kingdom has been the target of terrorist attacks since the 1970s. The
primary cause has been the campaign fought by the so-called Irish Republican Army
and its Unionist counterparts, which together have been responsible for the deaths of
over 3800 people and the serious injury of many more. The UK has also periodically
been subjected to international terrorism, such as that experienced during the Iranian
Embassy Siege in 1980 or the bombing of an airplane at Lockerbie in 1988.
As the level and skills of the terrorist have increased, law enforcement agencies
have responded to the threat by using criminal law to counter terrorist crimes. The
Metropolitan Police Service, based at New Scotland Yard in London, has been the UK
leader in counter-terrorism throughout this period. It has developed a series of
measures to counter terrorist activity, depending upon the level and nature of the threat,
the assessment of which is reviewed continually.
Police culture in the UK has traditionally depended upon an informal contract
between the general public and the police to ensure public safety. There is an
expectation that citizens will report suspicious activity to the police and that the police
will undertake an investigation to determine the truth of the suspicion. Many successes
against the IRA in London were achieved as a result of the vigilance of citizens
reporting suspicious activities to the police.
It was recognized that terrorist campaigns directed against commercial targets
could not be countered by the police alone. It was necessary to engage the business
community to, in effect, police itself using its own security resources. The police have
assisted this process by training and briefing the business community on the nature of
terrorist threats and how businesses should respond. For instance during the early
1990s the IRA used very large Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
(VBIEDS) to cause maximum material loss to large commercial buildings in the
financial quarter of London. In response, businesses were encouraged to harden their
physical infrastructure, as well as train their staff in contingency planning and to design
systems to ensure resilience to the business should a terrorist attack occur. This strategy
was accompanied by a rapid increase in the use of closed circuit television cameras to
J. Fouhy / The Role of Business in the UK Policing Counter-Terrorist Effort
123
increase surveillance and provide vital evidence in the event of a terrorist attack.
Private security agencies have continued to expand to meet the needs of the business
community which the police, due to a lack of resources and competing demands, have
been unable to meet.
The Future: In recent times businesses have been subjected to intimidation and lowlevel attacks by single-issue campaign groups such as the so-called Animal Liberation
Front which have attempted to prevent animal / medical research and dissuade
companies and their employees from engaging in commercial research activities.
Although law enforcement agencies have been successful in detecting such activity, it
is possible that a more determined strain of single-issue group might use more violent
methods in an attempt to achieve their campaign aims.
It has long been recognized that organized terrorist groups such as the IRA require
extensive networks of financial support to sustain their activities. The recent
development of legislation requiring financial institutions to positively assist in the
detection of terrorist financial networks is likely to become more demanding and more
sophisticated as the nature of the terrorist threat becomes ever more serious e.g., the
potential use of weapons of mass destruction. As companies become more dependent
upon technology, the effects of terrorism on such technology may have more drastic
effects than have already been seen. Viral infection of the Internet is commonplace, as
is the hacking of Internet sites. The use of the Internet to cause loss of life through
terrorism may be a further step in the development of modern terrorism and a further
risk businesses will have to overcome through continued partnership with law
enforcement agencies.
124

IOS Press, 2006
An Analytical Model of Anti-Terror CrossBorder Cooperation

Alexander BLIGH
Department of Politics of Israel and the Middle East at the College of Judea and
Samaria, Israel
Abstract. The need / Computerized platforms / The original cross-border model /

Dimensions / Sources / Conclusions.
Keywords. Global terrorism, linked operational intelligence centers, artificial
intelligence
We categorically reject terrorism, whatever its motivations, forms or manifestations.

We are resolved to fight together, for as long as necessary, this scourge, which
challenges the values that unite us, most particularly freedom founded on the principles
of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. [1]
Looking at the world through the prism of combating terrorism, three apparently
unrelated processes have stood out since the beginning of the 21st century. The first is
the continuing dramatic increases in computing capabilities going beyond anything
previously dreamt of and, consequently, the increased use of sophisticated
communications systems with rapidly decreasing costs. Put differently, at the same
time that costs have decreased, the speed and quality of data transfer have increased.
Second is the wave of terror committed against major centers in the West and
elsewhere (New York, Madrid, London, Asia and the sub-continent of India, Sinai,
Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, etc.). Third is the closing of the ranks among a large number of
countries to fight against a new evil empire of groups committing terror based on a
radical interpretation of Islam.
Against this background, it is of major significance to read the words of Guenther
K. Weisse, a well-known German expert in the field of electronic intelligence:
The daily increasing threat posed by international terrorist groups to the United
States and its allies will require future common efforts within the intelligence
communities of all countries concerned with the global war against terrorism in order
to collect intelligence and distribute finished intelligence throughout in a timely
manner. [2]
Indeed, in spite of the ongoing attacks on existing governments and on human and
civic values and ways of life, no single, universally accepted definition of terror has yet
emerged. The connection between the lack of such a definition and interstate political
disputes is perhaps the primary explanation for the absence of a large-scale and
relatively open dialogue among all potential victim countries. Consequently, issues of
political orientation and the operation of the exchange of intelligence information and
the coordination of intelligence efforts should be separated. Combatants of terrorism do
not usually make policy decisions; their exclusive responsibility is to give
A. Bligh / An Analytical Model of Anti-Terror Cross-Border Cooperation
125
policymakers a political stage free of the need to make critical decisions under the
threat of terror. Hence, the definition of terror for operational purposes, as well as for
the purposes of this paper, should be based on the assumption that terrorists use force
so that victimized countries will be forced to take a policy line that they would not
otherwise take. In the words of a recent article:
Global terrorism is an act including, but not limited to, the use of force or
violence committed by any person or persons acting on behalf of, or in connection with
any organization causing serious harm to a person or serious damage to property or a
serious risk to the health or safety of the public, undertaken to influence a government
or civilian populace for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological
cause. [3]
Clearly, this definition does not in any way condone the acts of particular
organizations, nor does it give credibility to their political agenda. Adopting this
approach would bring into the scope of the current study criminal organizations, as
well as questionable bounty hunters of all persuasions, avoiding the issue of political
orientation. Perhaps an economic dimension should also be added, since some of the
organizations aspire to influence existing regimes by inflicting an economic
catastrophe on them. The most recent and notorious example of the latter is the terrorist
activities aimed at the Egyptian tourism industry in October 2004 and July 2005.
The Need
Recent terrorist activities in a score of liberal and liberalizing nation states have once
again highlighted the need to share intelligence and to create a comprehensive
framework to combat terrorism. This network should overcome the difficulties that
countries have in talking to each other on issues of terrorism, as well as the almost
impossible sharing of intelligence among agencies of the same country. The need is
obvious, but it is equally evident that the growing number of threatened countries
cannot, for many good reasons, develop a system acceptable to all. This study attempts
to map the needs and major hurdles and offer possible solutions based on the
integration of an analytical model with the most advanced technical hardware and
software presently available to national entities. The approach to be adopted is that of
integrating an existing computerized platform used by the US and NATO for somewhat
different purposes with an original analytical model, proposed here, that could be used
by all member countries of regional or supra-regional security organizations.
The war against terror necessitates clear, detailed and timely intelligence. All these
are basic elements of the NATO battlefield digitization process that was introduced in
the late 1990s. [4] However, in those far-away pre-9/11 days, the process was intended
for a somewhat old-fashioned theater of operations, such as the Balkans. Today, the
collection of data and its dissemination are not just tools to be used by armed forces.
The likely consumers today are security services, police forces, national banks, and last
but not least armed forces.
Fighting terror has, in recent years, become the first priority of all peace and
freedom loving countries. However, with the growing need for a concerted effort, it is
evident that there is much to be desired in terms of cooperation among these nations.
The lack of common terminology, no agreed upon standards or operating models and
different legal systems have made this war on terror a difficult undertaking. The
126
counter-terrorism effort in recent years has become a focal point for governments,
NGOs, international organizations, (the most notable of them being NATO), the
academic community and the media.
Clearly, the US and the EU are reluctant to enlist countries that do not conform to
widely accepted norms of political behavior into this war. Such countries at times label
as terrorists groups and individuals that would be considered legitimate political
participants in Western societies. Regardless of the fundamental differences in political
philosophy among many nations threatened by terror, they all need to cooperate in the
face of current terrorism and potential attacks. It is not inconceivable that Israel and
Egypt, for instance, two former enemies now at peace, would cooperate through this
model, very much in the way that there is now British-Russian cooperation against
terror. [5] Regrettably, this is neither the time nor the forum to discuss issues relating to
the legitimacy of various regimes. As long as they are willing and able to engage in
anti-terrorist efforts, they should be welcome. A time of war is no time to discriminate
between democracies and dictatorships. This was the case during WWII, and it should
be the case now. Admission of a country to the ad hoc coalition against terror cannot
and should not lead to the acceptance of non-democratic regimes in the EU. These
countries should enjoy some degree of tolerance for their practices only in the
framework of the war against terror. Moreover, incumbent regimes can only cooperate
with their respective numbers and not with any of the opposition organizations to them.
Computerized Platforms
Attempts to share intelligence by means of computerized models have been made in
recent years using three main platforms: LOCE (Linked Operational Intelligence
Centers Europe), COPLINK, and R-DEx. The first links the US and its NATO allies,
and the other two are used within the borders of the US.
Using a combination of these three and the lessons of their application may
provide a viable starting point for the model proposed here. Indeed, the difference
between an academic model and a usable one lies in the ability to convert the basic
features of the model into a working computerized system. In this context, one of the
tools that might be studied first is that of LOCE, a system that supports intelligence
operations by allowing all decision-makers to be online in near real time. This is just
one of a large variety of computer-related capabilities that allow connectivity and
interoperability with intelligence systems that support forces. [6]
LOCE is a system operated since the early 1990s by the US European Command
(USEUCOM) for imagery and information sharing between the US and its NATO
allies. It includes communication resources and information systems and provides
email connectivity and web access between a number of active (feeding data into the
system) and passive (customers) users. All participants of the LOCE system are from
NATO countries. Such a platform may serve as a paradigm to be used in a LOCE-like
model of intelligence gathering, sharing and disseminating. Obviously, considering that
this structure would be operated by NATO but be open to all concerned countries, it
would need to be operated and administered in total isolation from the original LOCE.
COPLINK [7] was developed by the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at the
University of Arizona in Tucson and is used by criminal justice agencies. The system is
marketed commercially and includes several modules, among them:
127
1.
A notification and collaboration tool that allows investigators to set an

automatic query on a specific database object. With the inclusion of any new
information, the individual user is notified. Investigators seeking the same
information are notified of each other unless they request not to be notified.
2. Another component displays the links and associations found by COPLINK in
a graphic display and can be adjusted to search up to eight levels for hidden
links. COPLINK Visualizer can also find links between specific database
objects. This feature is extremely significant if a detailed model of a terrorist
attack exists (see the model discussion below).
3. An additional add-on allows temporary consolidation of data from sources
that are not part of an individual COPLINK node. This feature permits
sophisticated analysis of data from multiple COPLINK nodes or other data
sources, such as motor vehicle records, drivers license records or even private
databases. The consolidation is temporary and lasts only for the duration of the
individual query.
Finally, the most recent addition to the computerized solutions to the issue of
collecting, disseminating and developing intelligence is R-DEx. This is a system used
by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) since February 2005 in order to
improve the sharing and use of data. [8] R-DEx aims to give state, local, and tribal law
enforcement a degree of access to federal investigative and intelligence information. RDEx gives detectives, investigators and analysts the ability to view linkages across
multiple cases and jurisdictions. These links include individuals, vehicles, weapons,
addresses, phone numbers or other types of links. The program also allows cases to be
plotted onto maps in order to identify geographic patterns or links.
The Original Cross-Border Model

Building on accumulated experience in the computerized approach to the issue of
intelligence collection and sharing, as well as the particular needs of the war against
terror, an integrated theoretical model has been developed by this author. The following
discussion will provide a common ground for the anti-terrorist effort by connecting two
ostensibly opposite poles of the struggle: the need to identify all elements of the terror
infrastructure and the imperative of working within the boundaries of current civil and
human rights laws. When implemented, the model would provide all involved countries
and their respective anti-terror agencies with a standardized model that would enable
them all to use identical terminology. In essence, the concept is not very different from
the ISO approach,1 only in this case it is not intended as a safeguard on a production
line, but rather as a means to create an accepted standard for the exchange of
intelligence and the assessment of the stages of a planned or executed terrorist act.
The methodology proposed is both preemptive and punitive. It aims to identify
terrorists and to stop their activities, and failing that, the model should provide a
framework for attempting to capture them. The proposed method aims to break down
each terrorist incident into its smallest elements, endeavoring through appropriate
1
TheISO (International Standards Organization) does not produce standards, but provides a means of
verifying that a proposed standard has met certain requirements for due process, consensus, and other criteria
by those developing the standard. The use of ISO has become widespread in the fields of production,
consulting, etc. In the current model a reverse engineering approach is used.
128
software to find associations and commonalities among certain actions and their stages.
Each piece of information is categorized, and a warrant is issued for the next stage.
The model is the result of the initial work with, and ongoing updating by, a team of
practitioners and academicians. The model follows the idea of a terrorist action from a
mere idea to its completion apprehension and prosecution of the perpetrators. Each
stage leaves a typical trail paper trail, stolen cars, money transfers and people found
where they do not belong, etc. All these would be followed and reported in order to
keep the model updated and to issue warnings when the accumulated data point toward
a tangible indication of terrorist activity.
The model assumes full cooperation by local/national law enforcement agencies
along with international agencies. It is also built on the assumption that all agencies
share the same information, at times the gist of the information, but not scenarios and
tactics. To allow a central distribution center to follow the model, it is to be established
by an international security organization.
This model endeavors to operate on three interwoven dimensions:
Dimension One:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Goal: Identify as many elements as possible of the terrorist infrastructure and

its operation: from the mere idea to the detonation of the bomb, the hijacking
or the suicide bombing.
Characterization of personnel: This comparative study will be carried out by
teams and sub-teams composed of academicians and terror experts.
Methodology: This part will be based upon the accumulated experience of
foiled terrorist attacks and the unfortunate cases that were studied post
mortem. The team will also collect data from existing literature and will
conduct field research consisting of interviews with apprehended and
convicted terrorists, and with anti-terror experts. This body of evidence will be
tabulated, compared and analyzed, including all early warning signs that were
ignored in the past. This will produce a master matrix of a flow chart of a
terrorist event.
End product: The main outcome of this part will be a generic model of a
terrorist attack, along with its early warning signals, i.e., we will try to break
the terrorist puzzle into the smallest components, so that once transmitted to
law enforcement agencies each would have the means to identify the degree of
threat and the level of preparations from each piece of information. Put
together, this step may be regarded as the creation of a manual on terrorism
intended to serve each combatant, from the commander-in-chief almost down
to the individual fighter.
Dimension Two:
Sources airport, bank and other surveillance camera images should be automatically
compared to images in existing databases of known and suspected terrorists. A
successful model is based on a thorough analysis of the records of border control posts,
private aircraft movements, reports relating to large transfers of money, interrogation
records of captured terrorists, etc.
1.
2.
3.
4.
129
Goal: Assigning responsibilities. The detailed model described in part 1 will

be followed by a list of law enforcement and other governmental agencies
responsible for each stage and each information-gathering effort and every
measure to prevent terrorist attacks.
Characterization of personnel: Anti-terror experts, our own and others,
representing existing agencies from NATO countries, and political science
personnel specializing in public administration, joined by legal experts who
will carefully examine the legality of each of the above-mentioned efforts.
Methodology: This part will be based upon the accumulated experience of
experts responsible for setting up intelligence units and other applicable
agencies. The team will also collect data from the existing literature and
conduct field research consisting of interviews with members of similar units
in governmental agencies in NATO member countries, present and future. All
organizations currently engaged in anti-terror activities, along with their
assigned and actual responsibilities, will be listed, and their current
contribution to the effort will be assessed in terms of their compatibility with
other agencies within NATO. Documents proposing the creation of new
agencies that never materialized will also be studied. This body of evidence
will be compared and integrated into the model presented in Dimension One.
End product: A model of a division of responsibilities reflecting the current
needs of anti-terrorist agencies based on the model, and a model of
information gathering, including targets, methods, sources and a permanent
and changing list of information priorities. One of the by-products of this stage
should be a categorized list of required pertinent information relating to
international terrorism. This may in turn lead to the compilation of a world
dictionary of relevant terms and expressions required for the counter-terrorism
effort. The model will map likely targets and integrate their data with that
coming from all security systems employed by regulated institutions like
banks. Applying this stage will contribute to the development of the means to
stop terrorist operations from taking place at any stage, with attention
obviously being given to the early stages.
Dimension Three:
1.
2.
3.
Goal: Providing the legal basis for the anti-terrorist effort.

Characterization of personnel: Joint teams of legal and anti-terror experts will
collect all pertinent pieces of legislation, laws and regulations from current
and future NATO members.
Methodology: The efforts described in Dimension One and Two need to
operate hand-in-hand with current legislation relating to civil and human
rights in NATO countries. These will be analyzed from the viewpoint of the
models previously presented. Additionally, agreements and discrepancies
among the relevant countries will be highlighted in terms of their contribution
to helping or hampering the joint effort to fight terrorism. The models detailed
will be followed by the legal basis for their implementation. This will provide
the legal basis for any action taken along the way, from the collection of data
to the actual apprehension of suspects and the seizure of material, using
current civil and human rights imperatives prevailing in NATO countries.
130
End product: A legal manual detailing for all anti-terrorist elements the legal
environment in which they operate. The manual will elaborate on the safe
steps that can be taken, broken down by individual countries, and the cases in
which legal advice is necessary.
All three dimensions will together produce an ANTI-TERRORIST TOOLBOX
consisting of: 1. a terror manual (to include: a generic model of the operation of a
terrorist network and a list of early-warning indicators); 2. an information-gathering
model (including: responsible bodies, a generic list of essential information, a glossary
of terminology); and finally: 3. a legal handbook including the breakdown of the legal
basis of operations by countries.
4.
Sources
The overall end product of this model would be the establishment of a NATO clearing
house of information that would enable law enforcement agencies, on a regular basis,
to classify the degree of risk and operate within the imperatives of all pertinent laws
while enjoying the best available information.
The model will also require a team of communications and computer experts as
advisors on all three dimensions, as well as computing all collected data and drawing
computerized conclusions.
Transforming the model into a working solution that could respond to the growing
need for coordinated efforts against terror would require setting up a central
intelligence operations room (CIOR). One of the main responsibilities of the CIOR
would be to detect any attempt to infiltrate the system; its staff would have access to all
systems through back doors in order to be able to shut down the system if any hostile
attempt were detected. The intelligence operations center would work in tandem with
the dynamic manual of the anti-terror model. That manual would enable the
distribution of data, along with its initial analysis and recommendations for action.
The CIOR would operate the system on a 24/7 basis. Staff would come from all
countries involved in the project. The CIOR would distribute each piece of information
to the member countries with its standing in relation to the model and indicating what
data should be collected by the members in order to develop the initial data into a
workable piece of intelligence. Concurrently, each member country would be allowed,
with no strings attached, to access the data, raw or processed, and attempt to fit it into
its own national intelligence picture.
Each country would have the right, or rather the obligation, to actively participate
in entering information into the system. Over time, it should be determined if a
minimal volume of contributed data should be required in order for a country to keep
full-member status. Each country would also have to undergo a periodical evaluation
process in order to assess the credibility of its information. In time, this criterion would
determine the success or failure of the system.
A decision that should eventually be made is whether the identity of a contributing
country should be made available to all other members, or whether there should be a
certain pre-defined relationship between a security classification and the identity of the
contributing country. In any case, subscribing to the system would entail full adherence
to a strict code of secrecy.
131
The model is to be operated on commercial workstations and notebook computers.

The software, based on a popular operating system, should run on each of these, along
with handheld computers. Consequently, the hardware and the software, including
common browsers, should be easy to operate and not require a long learning process.
These specifications are vital if the system is to be used in real time and during hot
pursuit. Still, it should be made clear that under no circumstances can the ground
operatives merge national intelligence networks with the network proposed here. The
task of entering information into the system should be assigned to a single unit
qualified for this responsibility.
Setting up such a system is far less complicated today than it would have been in
the past. Today it can and should build on the use of communication satellites,
broadband and cellular communications. All these combined can provide even the
smallest team on the ground with real time, or near real time, intelligence, even if its
source is thousands of miles away. Obviously, as already noted, the one and only
prerequisite is an acceptable level of skill in reading, writing and conversing in English.
Applying a cross-border model involves a number of hurdles; overcoming them is
the key to the smooth application of the model. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these is
the issue of a common language. Even before discussing common terminology and
associations, the basic issue of a lingua franca should be raised. A model such as the
one proposed here should be used mainly by countries committed directly or indirectly
to the Western concept of combating terrorism. Consequently, the obvious conclusion
is that all countries involved should cooperate in putting together a basic course in
anti-terror English. Participation by representatives of a given country in this basic
course will constitute a prerequisite for participation in the program based on the
model.
A second set of future obstacles in implementing the model has to do with the
various, at times conflicting, laws of privacy and banking in the participating countries.
Additionally, each national security service has its own classification system, which at
times would render some pieces of information unsuitable for use in a multi-national
security system. At times, even the same piece of information, when passed through
several agencies within the same country, would receive a different security
classification.
One possible approach to resolving this issue is by an agreement that each country
would contribute data in accord with its own national laws and security classifications,
while it would be allowed to obtain any information available from the cross-national
pool. All information stored in the system would be accessible to all and could be
transformed into operational orders by all without the need to obtain further consent
from any of the other participants. This depends on the understanding that all countries
would contribute accurate information and not use the model as still another
sophisticated tool of subversion and intelligence warfare against any other country
within or outside of the system. In time, it would become evident if some countries
enjoyed benefits disproportional to their contributions, and that could necessitate some
modifications of the system.
Another concern has to do with the net assessment of the information contributed
to and drawn from the general pool. Each country has its own way of evaluating data
that may differ from that of other participating countries. Thus, no single assessment
would be imposed upon any member country. Each country would integrate the pieces
into its own intelligence jigsaw in any way it saw fit.
132
Essentially, the success or failure of any model depends to a large degree on the
extent of cooperation among the parties. There is no question that the existence of
hundreds of agencies worldwide that do not talk to each other makes some of the
intelligence gathered useless. Still, there is no point in complaining about national
governments, since the US itself took a full two years after 9/11 to consolidate all the
watch lists of suspects of all governmental agencies into a single authoritative list to
be used by all cleared personnel. [9]
Intelligence sharing is perhaps the one issue that stands out as a possible major
stumbling block for the approach proposed here. Only now, in the post 9/11 era, is the
United States beginning to develop ways of communication among its 15 existing
intelligence agencies, so that they will start sharing their information on a regular basis.
[10]
Another significant issue is that of human rights. The model should be consistent
with the strictest norms of human and civil rights. Concurrent with the technological
revolution, many countries have adopted stricter privacy laws, recognizing the right to
privacy as a constitutional right. Even Israel, which has not been able to create a
comprehensive constitution, has recognized this right as constitutional in a basic law
(to be integrated into the constitution in the future) and adopted a privacy law. The
conflict between the right of the citizen to security, on one hand, and the need to give
up some civil liberties, on the other, goes back centuries. One of the notable writers on
this conflict is the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes in the late 16th -early 17th
century. However, since no single universally accepted solution has ever been found,
the model need not aspire to develop one. It should simply make a decision on a caseby-case basis. An elaborate anti-terrorist model might, given the right circumstances,
be used against any citizen of any country. Moreover, the European Union, a major
member of NATO, has in recent years led the global trend toward stricter checks and
balances on the use of force and guarding individual rights. However, it should be
made clear to all participants that non-citizens found illegally on the sovereign territory
of any of the countries are not eligible to invoke all constitutional rights enjoyed by full
citizens and legal aliens.
The problem of dealing with the issue of the constitutionality of collecting data and
sharing it with allies touches upon another sensitive area: should the system be limited
to data collected outside the country and on foreigners only? It is understandable that
no country wants to exchange information on its own citizens; however, as the July
2005 incidents in London teach us, there is no way of escaping this issue. The system
will integrate law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies, putting issues of
domestic and international terror on the same footing. Thus, the attempt to make the
system as tight as possible requires the inclusion of all pertinent agencies and their own
intelligence. Clearly, intelligence acquired from a bank surveillance camera in country
A may provide the missing piece of the terrorism puzzle for country B.
The model proposed here is indeed a major undertaking in itself. Nevertheless, it
cannot provide perfect security and can only supplement other methods and approaches
used by a variety of anti-terrorist organizations. Moreover, it is evident that overdependence on computer capabilities may lead to over-exposure to hackers and cyberterrorists. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that the system be protected on the
webmaster level, as well as on the individual-user level. It is imperative that system
security not be compromised, since it contains the anti-terror secrets of many different
nations, and not just those of a single organization or nation.
133
Conclusion
The war against terror cannot be won by a single means. Victory will be the outcome of
a concerted effort that overcomes political divisions and emphasizes a common
denominator: no government should be forced to make decisions under the threat of
terror. This model is perhaps another tool to enable all concerned countries to share
intelligence, some of its operational conclusions and the ongoing study of lessons for
the future. Simply put, this is perhaps the first attempt ever to conceptualize the war
against terror along standardized lines through the introduction of a dynamic model of
assessment and action. Integration works is the lesson of the US since 9/11; it should
be studied and developed by the international community as well.
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27, 2005; http://www.fbi.gov./pressrel/ pressrel05/niss062705.htm.
[9] Database will unite agencies terrorist lists, USA Today, September 17, 2003, News, 5A.
[10] Thompson, L.D. (2003). Intelligence Collection and Information Sharing within the United States.
Testimony before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, December 8,
2003, http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/ thompson/20031208.htm.
134

IOS Press, 2006
Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and

Conceptual Inadequacies
Olga A. VORKUNOVA & David HOVHANNESIAN
Center for Development and Peace Studies FORUM and Russian Academy of Peace,
Russia
Abstract. Introduction / What is terrorism? / Towards a definition of terrorism /

On the problem of co-operation and collaboration in the South Caucasus region in
the struggle against international terrorism / Conclusions.
Keywords. Caucasus, Chechnya, fundamentalism, Russia, Terrorism
Introduction
The early years of the twenty-first century were violently shaken by the 11 September
2001 terrorist attacks on the USA. Societies around the world must now learn to cope
with the challenge of terrorism. The end of the Cold War, the globalization process, the
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the subsequent transition from command-driven
to capitalist economies in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) have transformed the structures of international politics. These changes
have coincided with an acceleration of the movement towards regional integration and
with the internal collapse of many countries. Almost everywhere in the world they have
revealed a crisis of national sovereignty and called into question the very mechanisms
of international regulation. The break-up of the former Soviet Union awakened hopes
of a new international order, which were linked with plans to reform United Nations
organizations and establish new institutional mechanisms.
The enormous challenges of worldwide violence and criminality as driving forces
of disruption have been a major factor in the resurgence of political chaos, civil wars
and humanitarian disasters in the former Yugoslavia and many ex-republics of the
former Soviet Union. The classical geopolitical representations of international
relations strategic competition between the Soviet Union and the USA the EastWest or even North-South divides are now obsolescent. The Cold War has been
replaced by a network war between the rich West, symbolized by the gold billion,
and those who regard themselves as being excluded from the benefits of international
development. The start of the network war has clearly increased the willingness of
governments to face international terrorism with different forms of co-ordination in an
effort to stop the spread of international anarchy. Despite this more cooperative
environment, however, the number of terrorist acts around the world has not decreased.
Terrorist activity has heightened the awareness that simply ending Cold War hostility is
not the same as building a secure post-Cold War peace.
O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies 135
Terrorist acts at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first
centuries have produced ever greater numbers of victims, unprecedented catastrophes
and enormous human suffering worldwide. In response to the new terrorist attacks, the
international community has demonstrated its will to suppress violence through
enforcement mechanisms such as the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and
the support of democracy in turbulent zones. But these efforts have largely failed to
counteract terror and steer the complex systems of organized networks from outside.
They have facilitated the production and utilization of knowledge on how terrorism
affects the current functioning of international relations in a context that has changed
enormously since the end of the bipolar world. However, the notion of terrorism as a
manifestation of violence has its limitations and has a high potential for mythification.
The resurgence of the demons of terror and the spread of hatred and violence in
Europe and the USA against immigrants from the Muslim/Arab world and in Russia
against immigrants from the Caucasus underline the need to reexamine modern
terrorism and to trace its social and political roots. The prevention of terrorism has
become an urgent issue and has made it essential to precisely define this phenomenon.
International agreement on a definition of modern terrorism as a threat to security and
democracy would be of considerable value to policy-makers. It would help in
formulating policy recommendations for counter-terror measures.
What Is Terrorism?
Terrorism is ultimately about destabilization and disruption causing chaotic,
disorganized conditions. It is conceived to include systems of disorder at all levels of
human activity from the family to the international organization in which the
pursuit of goals through the exercise of deterrence and intimidation has transnational
repercussions and affects the many unstable political systems that have been caught up
in the proliferating networks of an increasingly interdependent world. Reviews of the
literature generally conclude that the term terrorism is used in a wide variety of ways
and has many different meanings. There is, however, a baseline agreement that terror
refers to something horrifying, and its dictionary entry defines it as a term for intense,
overpowering fear. It can be seen as a threat to, or an act of violence against, civilians.
Even if one does not accept the pessimistic views of some analysts that virtually all
the unstable regions of the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and the
Caucasus are rapidly drifting toward chaos, the destabilizing effects of post-Cold War
international trends increasing economic competition and the resulting national
dislocations, a fundamental shift in the relations linking states, markets and societies,
declining state authority and legitimacy, rising pressures for political participation, the
dramatic increase in societal complexity which results from the growing functional
differentiation of institutional orders, spreading terrorism and the like will continue to
heighten the danger of violence in many countries and regions. The spread and
escalation of terrorism and its self-regulation of complex systems in turbulent
environments makes it problematic for major countries outside these regions to expect
that they will be able to avoid facing the issue of terrorism.
Ever since the French Bourgeois revolution, the term terrorism has been widely,
if not exclusively, associated with political violence. Although the literature devoted to
terrorism as a phenomenon often equates the term with violence within individual
136 O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies
states, it is clearly part of a broader attempt to find new ways of characterizing global
trends in international relations. The essence of terrorism is its focus on mechanisms of
deterrence that do not depend on recourse to the authority and sanctions of the state,
with its monopoly of legitimate coercive power.
Those who committed terrorist violence in the nineteenth century avoided using
the term and quite often claimed that they were fighting for justice and freedom. In the
1970s, terrorist organizations stressed the political content of their actions rather than
the terrorist content [1] (p. 138). When studying terrorism it is impossible to ignore the
psychological and emotional factors that play a major role in this context. A common
justification for terrorism is, for example, the argument that it can promote social
justice and the general welfare. What distinguishes conventional terrorism from the
modern sort of terrorist attacks is the mass character of terrorist acts. The difference
between these two types resides in the way their respective victims are conceptualized
whether they are conceived of as naturally inhuman targets, as civilians, or as their
ideological and political opponents, be it a state, an empire or a commonwealth.
Political terrorism legitimates the practice of violence. It constitutes an ideology that
naturalizes and thereby aims to neutralize specific patterns of modernity.
According to Richard Falk, in American and Israeli political discourse terrorism
has been associated with anti-state forms of violence that are regarded as so criminally
reprehensible that any method of enforcement and retaliation is viewed as acceptable
and beyond criticism. [2] (p. 18). The danger of terrorism lies in its domestic
consequences: from violence committed against a foreign ruler, it has become violence
committed against ones own people. Terrorists resort to the use of violence when their
goals cannot be realized by other means.
The concept of terrorism refers to a complex set of tools and actors. Its variety
cannot be reduced to specific types or ways of committing terrorist attacks. In a world
undergoing many national transitions from one economic and political system to
another, for example, change, tensions and political turmoil can have positive as well
as negative results. The complexity of the problem also results from the ambiguity of
different persons perceptions of legitimacy, the variety of their estimations of social,
economic, political factors and ways of development in human society. Persons who
choose the strategy of terror start with rather original representations of the necessity of
change in existing society and, not recognizing any other methods, try to achieve their
aims by sowing violence and death. The main problem for policymakers is the lack of a
set of interpretive categories in terms of which reports of emerging terrorist attacks can
be assessed and judged. There is a psychological tendency to either interpret terror in
familiar terms, or to filter out its unfamiliar or unconventional aspects. Terrorism is
ultimately concerned with threats or acts of violence, but it can also be seen as a
reaction to oppression and injustice. In cases where the majority of the population lives
in constant threat of regimes guilty of torture, execution, disappearances and brutal
prison treatment of suspected dissidents, terrorist attacks tend to be a response to state
violence.
Throughout the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century,
we have witnessed a process of mythification of warfare which has justified an
unprecedented unleashing of state violence and its civil-society counterpart,
indiscriminate killing. Acts of terrorism of both state and civil origin draw inspiration
from an ideology in which such deeds acquire a quasi-mythical dimension. Another
dimension is the purely technological factor of the new military and communication
resources that greatly enhance both the human capacity for destruction and its resultant
terrorist effects.
Analysis of the problem of terrorism cannot be restricted to legal frameworks. It
demands taking into account psychological, social, political and other factors in order
to understand the incentives, motives, organizational/technical skills or financial
support of terrorists. Terrorism is a form of political violence exacerbated by structural
deficiencies such as a lack of democracy and an unjust distribution of national wealth,
and it is legitimized by religious convictions. It is governed by an instrumental logic.
Terror is increasingly becoming one of the chief means of struggle for political ends,
whether it is intended to disrupt and undermine the political system of a certain country
or to create a worldwide empire. However, its chief characteristic is the destruction of
the established legal order and the sowing of chaos with the aim of establishing a new
order. If we start from a given definition of terrorism as a phenomenon essentially
connected with criminality, instead of with various forms of opposition, liberation
movements and revolts, then the fight against this phenomenon should be based in the
field of international criminal law.
The spread of terrorism as an international threat is linked to the process of
globalization. Indeed, globalization has given terrorism its international character. As
we have seen, the network character of international interdependence in a world
marked by increasingly extended and rapidly changing patterns of interaction makes it
susceptible to the traditional network structures of terrorist organizations. This
complicates the development of countermeasures that meet the requirements of welltimed action. Modern terrorism is international in scope; it differs in terms of the
resources that terrorists can mobilize, the terror training camps, the weapons suppliers
and the perpetrators of terrorist acts. Modern terrorists practice a division of labor
across many organizations and at many levels within their heterarchic mode of
coordination. They are organized in the form of cells, the modern units that become a
matter of cultural-ideological identity for their incorporated members. The main
difference between modern terrorism and other conventional forms is its truly mass
character, hi-tech forms and operational methods.
The problem of modern terrorism is connected with challenges to world cities
and with major urban change that is hierarchical in nature. The city is arguably the
prime target for terrorist attacks. Larger cities are commercial centers where corporate
headquarters and leading banks are located. They are key nodes in a global network.
Globalization takes place in cities, and cities embody and symbolize globalization.
Contemporary urban dynamics are the spatial expression of globalization [3] (p.9). The
city civilization, with major cities becoming the command and control centers of the
global economy [4], is also becoming the target of acts of terrorism. Information about
terrorist operations is increasingly becoming worldwide in scope as the mass media
widely report on it. Exerting psychological influence is becoming the central goal of
terrorist attacks. Every exercise in terrorization is multiplied by the mass media.
Gradually terrorism and criminality are becoming professional and highly-paid
activities, and simultaneously effective means of exerting pressure to gain power.
Terrorism takes several forms: state terrorism, religious and national intolerance,
political terrorism. Terrorists express themselves through violent attacks against the
armed forces and police, and against anyone whom they regard as betraying their
ideals. Militarism is becoming their chief raison dtre. They view themselves as
guerrilla fighters openly challenging federal power (as in Chechnya, Ingushetia,
Daghestan) or the State (as in Sri Lanka). They are becoming the men and women of
the hour in the mass media, especially in television reportage. The more militant the
group is, the more effective the terrorists seem to be in performing their vital function
of advancing their goals. The conception of extreme violence justifies a certain form
of nihilism, the exaltation of sacrifice by perpetrators who see themselves as the chosen
ones who are insensitive to and even scornful of the victims [5] (p. 475). Johan
Galtung describes this particular feature as the Chosenness-Glory-Trauma syndrome
(CGT). He writes: At the level of the individual this would be a person with a mandate
from God, with glory waiting in the future, deeply marked and marred by trauma, real
or imagined, inflicted by Others. There is a certain inner logic in this: he who has
Gods markings on his forehead is predestined to something Great. But he will also
evoke enormous Envy in evil others, wanting to get him [6] (p. 23).
Thus, a high degree of militancy is the keynote of the organization of terrorist
movements, although the underground character of the movement, the cell type of
organization and the ban on their activities make such movements immensely attractive
to youth. Idealistic youth are challenging many of the established norms of modern
society. Extreme violence is a form of revolt against the principal assets of the
capitalist system and its ability to stimulate desires and needs for material consumption.
Violence then becomes an instrument of communion with the higher principle
invoked in justifying it, a higher principle that effectively transcends the vulgar world.
Terrorists see themselves as the chosen ones and are insensitive to and even scornful
of the victims [5] (p. 475).
When citizens become increasingly dependent on them, terrorists become a more
open political force with clear-cut political targets. Socially and institutionally, they
look forward to establishing themselves as representatives of a cultural identity. Not
socio-political needs alone are the forces that increasingly integrate terrorist groups into
the social life of populations. It should be understood that a mythopolitics based on
international terrorism as a phenomenon, rather than a certain form of international
organization, is a social radicalism/revolt that is calling into question many of the
ideological foundations of postmodern society. The archetype of total violence is the
violence unleashed by radical religious groups such as, for example, radical Islam [5]
(p. 475). These radical religious groups differ from violent secular groups on several
counts: their violence is termed a sacramental act or divine duty and an end, while
that of secular groups is a means. Extreme state violence has provoked its counterpart,
oppositional violence. Thus, we see a mythification of the war against international
terrorism, which is viewed as the major threat to the modern state. After the wars in the
former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, it is difficult to distinguish state warfare
from terrorism by claiming that the latter disregards the rules and conventions of
warfare, targets civilians and is always indiscriminate and arbitrary. For these
characteristics can also be found in many different forms of contemporary state
violence.
The modern Western mass media, oriented to the passions of the individual person,
to everything out of the ordinary, to events that rarely occur in mundane daily life, to
violence, to sensationalism, provide a favorable environment for the spread of
terrorism, for constantly drawing attention to it. The flood of violence is being
absorbed into the consciousnesses of millions of people, creating enduring stereotypes.
As a result, the stereotype of terrorism is becoming a commonplace phenomenon for
civilian populations. Thus the mass media are guided by the aim to win as much
support as possible from most of the population and to justify the emphasis on violence
and methods of reporting news with a basic stress on conflicts, wars, disasters and
destruction.
This journalism of war in the press, on TV and radio is itself creating a demand
for violence, insinuating itself into the public consciousness and gratifying its hunger
for sensationalism. Terrorism is being transformed into a marketable commodity. As
Isabelle Sommier argues, the exercise of violence feeds on an ideology lending such
acts a quasi-mystical dimension [5] (p. 475).
The social background of modern terrorism is anomie, which is the deactivation of
a societys laws and basic moral norms. Thus, while the legal order continues to exist,
it acquires a mythical character. Formally everything continues to operate in
accordance with the established laws: the police continue to perform their duties, the
judicial system functions as before, the government still carries on its tasks; yet the
population is no longer orientated to official law and order, but instead to game rules
which deviate greatly from those of formal legality. Describing the conditions of
modern (post-modern society), Johan Galtung argues that, political violence, today
referred to as terrorism, may be a problem of structures/cultures partly of the past.
Today the problem may be that there is no structure/culture at all and that violence,
hurting and harming, is erupting everywhere as a consequence of social
disorganization [7] (p. 17). The actions of power-holders, bureaucrats or
administrations are invested with a ritual character, and their behavior is subordinated
to the developed state of affairs. The social disorganization of a society is expressed in
a breakdown of functional interactions between people [8] (p. 19). Terrorism and
criminality are symptoms of social disorganization, a breakdown of social relations
resulting from the discrepancy between common cultural expectations and the socially
legitimate ways and means to achieve them [9] (p. 134). Opportunities for the
satisfaction of essential needs are limited in a world characterized by perversity,
criminality and anomie resulting from the humiliation of one pole of the social
structure by the perversity, criminality and anomie rooted in the luxury and
wastefulness of its other pole [10] (p. 403).
As centuries-old practice shows, illegal means of achieving ends often seem the
most effective. An economy based on the principles of free competition, that is on the
efforts of individuals to profit by exploiting the mistakes of others, gives rise to a need
for massive disasters, destruction and, as a consequence, acts of extreme violence. In
the social reality of a modern, heterogeneous society, favorable conditions arise for the
suspension of laws and moral norms, for criminal behavior, for terrorism as a method
of effecting change, instability and conflicts. Thus, the increasing segmentation of
society, the decline of basic social communication, the growing complexity of society,
the poverty of general customs, traditions and beliefs, generate disrespect for the
existing norms of morals and laws, and legal nihilism becomes a norm and a major
regulator of behavior. Anomie is a breeding ground for terrorism. A person
experiencing anomie is spiritually sterile, cares only for himself and has no sense of
obligations. He exists on a thin dividing line between disbelief in the future and the
oblivion of the past [11] (p. 84, 85). The parallel archetype is the suitable environment
for the development of criminality.
Therefore, if it is a question of ways to contain and prevent terrorism, it would be
naive to think that the simple isolation of perpetrators, including terrorists, or their
physical destruction, could eradicate this phenomenon. Modern society reproduces

criminals and terrorists on a growing scale and in an infinite sequence.
Perpetrators always have an ultimate goal and an addressee for their actions. The
ultimate goal of political terrorism is to influence either a governments domestic
policy (to secure the release of imprisoned activists, to prevent a law from being
passed, to promote secession) or its foreign policy, in the interest of a sponsoring
state. Moreover, the victims of terrorism are subdivided into targets: innocent victims
and those to whom the mass destruction of people is addressed. Democracy creates an
extremely favorable environment for terrorism to flourish, because in the majority of
states it represents another form of political domination, with dominant elites supported
by financial and industrial magnates or, drawing on Max Webers terminology,
plebiscitary dictatorship.
The attacks of 7 July 2005 in London provoked a wave of Islamophobia as an
aspect of xenophobia in Great Britain, with increased dislike and distrust of immigrants
from Muslim countries. In combination with the fear of terrorist attacks committed by
radical Islamists, this dehumanizes Islam. The term fundamentalism has
conventionally been reserved for describing anti-modern, neotraditionalist religious
phenomena and movements interpreted as a reaction to socio-economic and cultural
modernization [12] (p. 27).
Like terrorism, fundamentalism is a term usually reserved for Other ...
Fundamentalism polarizes, dehumanizes, verminizes Other and bolsters Self.
Fundamentalism provides ideal legitimation for employment of even extreme violence,
say, against defenseless civilians by bombing from above (state terrorism) or from
below (terrorism), thereby numbing both terrorists to the suffering of Other [6] (p.
25).
The rise of Islamophobia in the USA and Europe is a manifestation of the fear of
potential terrorist attacks by Islamic fundamentalists and extremists. Modernity, with
its growing mobility, has spread this problem more widely than ever before. A similar
process is unfolding in Russia. A new type of specter now haunts Russian politics:
Caucasophobia. A latent resentment or feeling, an attitude that underlies pervasive
hostility and distrust of Chechens and other strangers from the South and North
Caucasus can prepare the ground for pogroms. But in itself, this hostile approach,
based on the fear of potential terrorist attacks by Chechen insurgents, does not fall
within the purview of the law and legal prevention. The police now regularly require all
persons of Caucasian appearance to present their identity documents.
Towards a Definition of Terrorism

The first normative definition of terrorism was adopted in international law by the
League of Nations in 1937. It concluded that it consisted of all criminal acts directed
against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of
particular persons or a group of persons or the general public [5] (p. 473).
Russian political theory uses the term terrorism to refer to political violence.
Russian legal experts on terrorism are of the opinion that only the state, with its formal
institutions, possesses a monopoly of legitimate coercive power, including violent
actions. The most detailed review of attempts to define terrorism in Russia was
undertaken by V. Emeljanov in his book Terrorism and Crimes with Patterns of
Terrorism. Rightly pointing to the significant difficulties in the construction of a

universal definition of terrorism, he lists four distinctive characteristics of terrorism:
the creation of a real danger menacing a non-specified number of victims; the public
character of its commission; the deliberate inducement of states of fear, depression and
stress not for the sake of producing fear, but rather for other purposes; and lastly, it is
performed in such a way that socially harmful violence is directed against a certain
person or property, but produces a psychological effect intended to influence another
targets behavior in its interest. Terrorism consists in publicly committed, socially
harmful actions or threats meant to terrorize the civilian population or social groups. It
is intended to influence, directly or indirectly, the targets decisions/policies or to
prevent a decision from being adopted. However, there are several inconsistencies in
this definition [13]. Morozov, a Russian legal scholar stresses that according to
Emeljanovs definition the preparation for war in Chechnya was not an act of terrorism,
and he points as well to the contrary thesis that this activity has a public character,
although it could also occur behind closed doors [14] (p. 42).
When terrorism has a domestic character and refers to the practice of violence
directed against the civilian population or the state authority within a certain country, it
is subject to the criminal laws of the state. Thus, the Russian Criminal Code contains
Article 205, Terrorism, which specifies that terrorist acts include: detonating
explosions, committing arson or other actions resulting in a danger of serious physical
harm to other people, causing significant property damage or aiming at other socially
dangerous consequences, if these actions are performed with an intent to infringe on
public safety, intimidate the population or exert influence on decision-making, and also
the threat to commit the specified actions for the same purposes, which will be
punished by imprisonment for a term of from five to ten years. A list of circumstances
follows qualifying the commission of the given crime, among which aggravating
factors (especially severe consequences) can increase the punishment by imprisonment
for between ten and twenty additional years [14] (p. 42).
In the Federal Law of the Russian Federation On the Fight Against Terrorism,
adopted on June 25, 1998, the list of types of terrorist acts is more extensive than in the
Criminal Code: Causing explosions, committing arson, or the use of or threat to use
nuclear explosive devices, radioactive, chemical, biological explosives, toxic, noxious,
aggressive or poisonous substances; the destruction, damaging, or seizure of vehicles or
other facilities; the attempt on the life of a statesman or public figure or representative
of national, ethnic, religious or other population groups; the seizure of hostages and
kidnapping; the creation of a danger of harm to the life, health or property of an
nonspecific range of people by creating the conditions for accidents and man-made
disasters or the real threat of the creation of such a danger; the dissemination of threats
in any form and by any means; other actions creating a danger of loss of life,
significant damage to property, or other socially dangerous consequences. [14] (p. 6465).
The concept of terrorism in a legal expert community is considered as a certain
class of crimes committed at any time in a given place (in a country, region or city).
We shall address the definition of the Russian scholar I.A. Kirillov, who argues that
terrorism is a class of crimes of terrorist character committed within a specific period.
The characteristic of terrorism is violence against persons or groups of people intended
for the intimidation of the population or of a group of persons in order to induce or
maintain a social-psychological atmosphere of fear with a view toward influencing the
state, organizations, or a group of persons to accept or reject any given decision. A

terrorist organization (community) is an organization serving the purposes of terrorism
or recognizing the opportunity for its use in carrying out crimes of a terrorist character
[15] (p. 11-12).
Usually the term is used to refer to criminality. Terrorism is applied as a qualitative
category for the designation of a criminal condition in a society as a whole or its parts,
together with an evaluation of public morals and a sense of justice, a condition of civil
security. The growth of criminality, the growth of terrorism characterize first of all a
condition of a society, the attitude of a society as a whole to offenses committed within
it, whether it is indifferent to or intolerant of them.
International terrorism is a complex phenomenon of a political-legal character. The
broad applicability of the term, its reference to basic problems of political violence
(including efficiency and legitimacy), and its lack of a rational explanation for why
civilian victims, not directly involved in conflicts, are attacked, have made it useful to a
growing number of participants in the expert debate. International terrorism, although
receiving increasing attention, remains a by no means transparent phenomenon; it has
not been explained, and there is no adequate joint action against and control of it. At
the same time, many people around the world are shocked and frightened by terrorism,
since it can strike anyone at any time or place. Governments in turn are not in a
position to work out effective means of fighting this threat and reaching agreement on
its nature. There is an extensive literature devoted to terrorism, but the innumerable
scholarly studies have not led to international agreement on the definition of this
concept.
Despite the recent currency of the concept of international terrorism, an
operational definition of the term has not been easy to specify. Analysts disagree on a
definition, since there are different understandings of national security in many states,
and there are various forms of international terrorism (state carried out by its
institutions or sponsored by them, non-governmental, transnational, individual).
The process of developing a universal concept of terrorism is also complicated by
subjective factors: the unwillingness of some states to adopt a fixed formula suited to
constructing a barrier against terrorist activity, and they are related to terrorists in ways
concealed from the world and their own people. Russian author E. Ljahov, in his book
Terrorism and the Interstate Approach, argues that international terrorism represents a
complex phenomenon of a political-legal character and as a crime possesses various
attributes and organizational structures (terrorist organizations and terrorist
ideologies and doctrines). In this connection, E. Ljahov emphasizes that the traditional
manner of assessment in studies of international law is a form of description of a crime
that contributes little to the theory and practice of fighting this crime. An identification
of its patterns is needed. In the literature, terror, terrorism and acts of terrorism are
understood as intimidation using violent methods against the political opponent, that is
the concrete physical person (persons) exercising state, political or other public duties.
As to the concept of international terrorism, state terrorism, we shall note that there is
still no public treatment [16] (p. 15).
The Russian legal scholar A. Trajnin considered terrorism to be a form of indirect
aggression. This definition affected the Soviet draft of the concept of aggression
proposed by the USSR to the League of Nations in 1933 [17] (p. 118-129). Professor I.
Karpets, a legal expert and criminologist in the USSR, former Director of the Institute
under the Office of the Public Prosecutor of the USSR and the Management of the
Criminal Investigation Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR,

offered the following definition: International or interstate terrorism, with international
patterns (that is involving two or more states), is an organized activity intended for the
formation of particular organizations and groups for the commission of murder and
attempted murder, causing physical injury, the employment of violence and the
kidnapping of persons as hostages for the purpose of extorting ransom, violent
deprivation of human freedom, interfaced to violations of the person, the perpetration
of torture, extortion, etc. Terrorism can be accompanied by the destruction and looting
of buildings, premises and other facilities. The purpose of terrorism causing harm to
democratic and progressive social transformations, the property of organizations,
establishments, private persons, the intimidation of people, committing violence
against them and physical destruction in the name of the ideologies of fascism, racism,
anarchism, chauvinism or in military-bureaucratic senses, and also receiving material
or other benefits from criminal elements or the organizations supporting them, groups
and persons [18] (p. 64-98).
In his work Terrorism and Interstate Attitudes, E. Ljahov concludes that
international terrorism is not only regarded as an international crime by the criminal
law of the states, but also threatens international opinion and international law ... The
act of terrorism of a person (even if it is not organized by the state) against one or
several components of the system of values protected by international law is directed
against interstate opinion. The list of proposed definitions can be expanded. However,
as the same E. Ljahov rightly specifies, in each case they do not provide an
opportunity for full and precise representation of it, as about the criminal action of an
individual, mentioning interstate attitudes.
The conflation in the law and the criminal code of interstate and international
terrorism is characteristic of the criminal legislation of many countries. Sanctions
against international terrorism should be stipulated in national law. At the same time, it
is necessary to pay attention to the stipulation of the Russian Federation, which notes
that international terrorism occurs when terrorist activity is committed on the territory
of more than one state or detrimental to the interests of more than one state. This
stipulation is superficial, since international terrorism can also be committed within the
territory of a single state. In fact, Arabian, Pakistani and other mercenaries of the
Chechen insurgents commit acts of terrorism in Russia a single state. Especially a
formal interpretation of this law can give terrorists a certain degree of impunity, can
make their acts seem less dangerous to society. This definition in the Law of the
Russian Federation On the Fight Against Terrorism requires a criminal law addition.
Despite the widespread use of word combinations, and even though international
terrorism is already considered among the main threats to international security and
stability, the conventional treatment of this concept is still unclear. Some authors use
definitions of international terrorism as violence having as its objective to cause
political changes which will destabilize international attitudes and which the
international community considers incompatible with desirable norms of behavior.
These actions are directed at destabilizing the international political system of
communications and are contrary to international norms of morals and rights [19] (p.
51). On the other hand, modern history shows that in the global opposition of two
super-states, both parties used the activities of terrorist organizations against their
opponents. And after the break-up of the Soviet Union, these organizations have
become independent and started to develop their own trajectory, threatening to
international security and stability. Therefore, with the use of terrorist groups in a
world policy for the achievement of the purposes of the construction of new world
empires, international terrorism will expand, encroaching on all new spaces.
There are also structural causes that give rise to terrorism, and under special
circumstances attacks could be removed from the competence of territorial national
courts. The danger of international complications resulted in the international norm
calling for something broader in scope than judicial investigation, which adds only an
insignificant element of value in such complex and important political crises. Most
fruitful, in our opinion, is the notion of international criminal law developed by
Kudryavtsev in his book International Criminal Law. He concludes that international
criminal law is a set of norms created through the coordination of states. There is also a
point of view according to which international criminal law represents an independent
branch of law which enters into neither international public law nor domestic law.
Norms of international criminal law, as a rule, are realized through norms of
interstate criminal law and process. Therefore, measures of punishment (sanction) are
defined in the criminal laws of states after incorporating them into domestic legislation.
International criminal law can be defined as the branch of law including the principles
and norms, the protection of international law and order created for the purpose of
preventing criminal encroachments by the subjects of international law through the
establishment of the criminal liability of guilty physical persons and the responsibility
of the state for the commission of international crimes and crimes of an international
character.
On the whole, the subjects of international crimes are states, their organs,
transnational corporations, and also physical, private persons or officials, particularly
the perpetrators of these crimes. Thus there is a description of nine international crimes,
one of which is terrorism (in addition, crimes against the world and the security of
mankind, war crimes, genocide, ecocide, apartheid, slavery).
It is necessary to emphasize that Islamist terrorist organizations deviate from the
rigid structures of organizations characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s. Today they are,
as a rule, decentralized organizations with functional specialization. Those who
dominate them possess their own banks, enterprises and landed property. Modern
technologies allow leaders to control the hierarchical structures of terrorist
organizations and their networks from a distance. Thus the administrative pyramid
becomes flatter, separate groups entering into it can operate more independently, can
exist separately and, in some cases, only general ideas unite them. Such terrorist
formations differ more in comparison with earlier groups due to their flexibility,
survival skills and ability to adapt to changing conditions.
Terrorist formations are born and function outside a field of legal regulation and
are able to penetrate all parts of society. They can develop and function in any
neutral, friendly or hostile environment and create a trans-territorial infrastructure as
a basis, depending on modern communication technologies, legal and illegal methods
of mobilization and the use of human resources. They are firmly linked by a
comprehensive ideology that portrays terror as just, eliminates the problem of
justifying the sacrifice of human victims, promotes a disciplined internal organization
and increases the conspiratorial level.
A number of terrorist organizations have acquired new military capacities in the
field of network war. Organizational structures as pacesetters have started to build
networks possessing increased resistance to external influences and greater flexibility,
shifting from a strategy of hand-to-hand combat to terrorist tactics of an indiscriminate

mass character. Thus the elements of network structures have become both independent
groups and separate individuals. Elements of network structures can be united for the
pursuit of specific goals and temporarily interrupt their activity after their operation,
thus not endangering the existence of the overall network.
In recent times, the poorly interconnected structures of a network with all its
elements are being joined by a common ideology, religion, nationalist or ethnic
aspirations. This system has enjoyed the greatest adoption by the terrorist and
militarized structures of Islamists. The action strategy of these organizations is based
on principles formulated over time by one of the leaders of the Egyptian Jihad Islami,
who defined them as follows: it is necessary to create small groups, which are the most
suitable in the struggle against the enemy; as one of the most effective instruments it is
necessary to use the readiness of the Mujahadeen for self-sacrifice; each region and
the country demands the development of an adequate strategy of conducting jihad [20].
The groups making up modern terrorist movements are independent. Each group,
party, structure, in turn, is also an atomie-destructuration process. The members of the
cell, consisting of from three to five persons, know only the head. The last member
communicates only with his immediate superior. Very often regrouping, a party is a
complex, versatile association including political and economic (financial)
components and a unit of direct action, in other words, a direct executor of acts of
terrorism. The structure of the latter is changeable [21] (p. 12). The possession by a
terrorist grouping of own financial assets reduces its dependence on external sponsors.
In particular, it reduces its dependence on certain states of the Persian Gulf, especially
on Saudi Arabia, so that terrorist acts become even more unpredictable. Organizations
of the Al-Qaeda type have a weak organizational hierarchy. Their spider-web form
includes self-organizing interpersonal networks, negotiated inter-organizational
coordination and decentralized, context-mediated inter-systemic steering. These
organizations are operationally autonomous from one another and structurally
decoupled due to their mutual interdependence. The lack of a precisely defined,
uniform center creates greater complexities for power structures trying to prevent or
counteract the attacks of Islamic radical groups. Al-Qaeda is, most likely, the
patrimonial name of any extreme Islamist group that advocates anti-American or antiWestern attitudes.
Political terrorism in Russia is based on a mixture of religious, ethnic, separatist
and nationalist motives. Political terrorism is caused by both internal and external
factors. In a modern Russia experiencing a systemic crisis, a process of property
stratification, ideological delimitation, and the registration of new political movements
or parties, various sorts of political unions and organizations are arising, professing
various political views and fighting for authority. Consequently, the population is
becoming polarized. The power of any politically stable state, to be sure, consists in the
ability to resolutely and automatically resist even hints of a threat of terrorism,
irrespective of their source. Even the threat of acts of terrorism should not escape
punishment by a state that is stable and legitimate. Therefore, in Russia there are a
number of internal problems in the transition period, including the struggle for the
repartition of property and for political authority, attempts to change the state and to
give legal status to separate regions, inter-ethnic clashes and conflicts, ideological
differences and the increase of criminality in society, the rise and spread of organized
crime and corruption, and a growing mistrust of authority and law. According to the
latest polls (August, 2005) by Yuri Levadas Center, respondents have named as
among the most corrupt professions: militia (police) (38 %), Members of the State
Duma and ministers (19 %), businessmen (14 %), actual criminals (14 %) and lawyers
(7 %) (according to the TV program 25 Hours, broadcast on August 11, 2005).
Islamic terrorism in Southern Russia is inspired by traditional archaic forms of
social behavior in the North Caucasus, a specific system of social institutions:
naezdnichestvo (foray system), ZekIye (special mechanisms of high military
preparedness, used especially by the Adygei people), abrechestvo (specific terrorist
form of liberation movement in the North Caucasus as a result of the military defeat of
the mountain peoples), blood revenge [22] (p. 328-329). An acquaintance with the
historical roots of traditional social mobilization is indispensable to understanding the
mental frameworks within which terrorist motivations emerge. Terrorist attacks in
Southern Russia are seen by Chechens as acts of revenge for the historical humiliation
of the Chechens during the Caucasus Wars (1818-1864) and the forced deportation of
Chechens (1944 1957). As Valerij Tishkov, a Russian specialist in history and
anthropology, explains, the Chechen crisis is reinforcing a rich pseudo-scientific
mythology about the history and modern aspects of the people. The myth of the
freedom-loving and noble character of the Chechens, who celebrated their 200-year
long resistance to Russian colonialism, is joined with another myth of the Chechens as
the most ancient people in the Caucasus [23] (p. 186-187). This Chosen People
syndrome, that the Chechens were chosen to play the role of leader for all of the
Caucasus, is part of the Chechens archetype.
The main political goal beyond the tactical use of terrorism was to bring justice to
Chechnya and to separate the Republic of Ichkeria from the Russian Federation. The
Chechen war has provoked Russia to engage in terror, severing all the bonds of moral
restraint. The political exertion in the terrorization of Chechnya has reproduced the
breviary of religious radicalism. Since the military campaign of 1994-1996, the
situation in the so-called Republic of Ichkeria has been affected by the growing
influence of radical Islamists, more often called Wahhabis. In 1996, Z. Yandarbiyev,
the former nationalist leader, promulgated a decree that invalidated Federal Laws in
Chechnya and proclaimed a system of law in accord with the traditions of the Prophet.
A system of Sharia courts was created. Later, in 1999, A. Maskhadov, a former
president of Chechnya, introduced the Sharia Board [22] (p. 326-329, 336).
During the counter-terrorist operation in early autumn 1999, the process of
Islamicizing the underground movements considerably intensified, while the secular
opposition rapidly collapsed. This process ended with the acceptance in 2002 of quasiWahhabi amendments to the so-called Constitution of Ichkeria, which was
proclaimed the supreme source of Islamist authority, led by an amir (leader), and also
authorized foreign fighters to lead Chechen paramilitary groups. By the spring of 2002,
only S. Basaev, one of 11 field commanders members of the Shura (consultative
council of warriors) was Chechen, while all the others were of Arab origin.
Strengthening the positions of radical Islamists in command of Chechen guerrillas
has promoted the transfer to the Chechen Republic of the organizational and political
forms of radical Islamic movements that have already had solid developmental
experience. It is a question, firstly, of the decentralization of extremist groupings that
began to be constructed on the principle of Ummah (community of believers in a
divine plan). These consist of small cells scattered in different areas of the republic.
Each cell has a leader, who is free in taking organizational and political decisions.
Under conditions of effective action by federal forces and the Chechen militia against
underground groups in the Chechen Republic, they, as in other parts of the Muslim
world, became as much as possible independent and decentralized.
Analysis of messages received during successful operations against criminal
groups and the liquidations of so-called amirs has confirmed that the majority of
paramilitary organizations are small groups operating within the limits of a few
settlements, seldom crossing the boundaries of an area. The skeletons of gangs consist
of criminals, for whom it is difficult to count on indulgence by the law. Incorporated
mutual relations play a significant role in the preservation of underground movements,
often dominated by a person who is authoritative in the traditional social structure.
Besides this, each group includes foreign mercenaries who supervise the activities of
the insurgents, Chechens, carry on communications with the leaders and give them
weapons, money and training. Thus, each similarly constructed group is independently
able to make tactical decisions.
Under similar conditions, the role of Chechen nationals in the top leadership of the
underground movement has steadily decreased, as the key channels for the supply of
weapons and financial assets are controlled by the representatives of foreign Islamic
organizations. In the course of time, such persons have included the Jordanian Emir
Hattab, then the Arab Abu Valid, etc., who have become the most influential figures in
the illegal armed formations of the Chechen Republic. Their authority is actually
greater than that of the Chechen field commanders.
Fundamentalist Islam in the North Caucasus has emerged from and operates in
specific contexts. The terrorists are called Wahhabis (Wahhabites), but in Chechnya
Wahhabism (austere form of Islam that insists on a literal interpretation of the Koran)
was a specific form of Islamic ideological modernization and a transformation of youth
protest against traditional forms of social organization. For Caucasian youth
Wahhabism means self-reliance within the framework of new forms of social
solidarity. Wahhabi communities could provide safety under conditions of unleashing
criminality and anarchy. Radical Islam here corresponds to the ideology of the Arabian
ultra-radical Islamist groups, but in a way adapted to the mentality of the Chechen or of
any other North Caucasian ethnos. In this connection, it is possible to prove that in the
Northern Caucasus Russia was confronted by a specific form of modern terrorism
which is based on the ideology of Radical Islam, including the religious, ethnic and
criminal elements of terrorism and supported by similar international structures. It is,
therefore, possible to conclude that this movement is a branch of international
terrorism.
This ideology has a dual nature. On the one hand, it is a particular distorted
understanding of patriotism or of religious dogmas, the tactical employment of
terrorism for noble political purposes (from their point of view) using criminal
methods. On the other hand, these ideologies become an instrument of recruitment,
tools for the justification of mercenary ideas, in the opinion of the perpetrators and their
financial sponsors (which was clearly shown in South Russia, when S. Basayev and
Hattab used violence against civilians in the name of Islamic fundamentalism), though
it is well known that no major world religion endorses terror.
But in both cases, terrorists use ideology to justify their own personal orientation.
People who commit violence against civilians in the form of terrorist acts could be
ordinary men or women. They are not necessarily persons with pathological or
hysterical character traits. But they kill in the name of Islam in a world fighting a war
without innocent victims, and they find internal subconscious justifications to

legitimize violence.
Ideologists are followed by experts who provide training for terrorist operations in
various areas or by persons who have received special instruction in terrorist training
camps. For material reasons, this group is employed for the sake of a cost-benefit
approach. Russia has played a role in creating the Afghan syndrome human life has
depreciated in value, many people have become accustomed to killing, and when
returning to civilian life have experienced psychological stress. All this is rather typical
of the destiny of Chechen terrorists and citizens of other countries: mercenaries or
volunteers. Naturally, it is a question not only of the perpetrators of crimes, but also of
all those who are involved in the organization, financing and partnership in crime.
Russia has repeatedly declared that it highly values giving new impulses to
international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism, and it regularly proposes
constructive initiatives, including the implementation of achieved and mature
arrangements. Emphasizing the importance of complete consensus on the responsibility
of all citizens in fighting terrorists, Russia supports further steps to discourage
countries from granting refuge to terrorists.
During the latest period, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has done useful
work in the crafting of interstate cooperation in the struggle against terrorism. In this
area, it is necessary to establish working contacts with corresponding regional
structures in a number of positive aspects of the development of cooperation by the
Russian Federation with Western states. Consultations by the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs with the EU took place for the first time in February 1996 on the problematic
aspects of counteracting terrorism. The Russian delegation suggested developing a
concrete program of cooperation between Russia and the EU in the field. Negotiations
with a security management service of NATO took place in June 1996 in Moscow
concerning possible joint actions on these problems.
Special attention is deserved for the development of cooperation by Russia in the
struggle against terrorism at a bilateral level, in particular, with the USA and Great
Britain. Russia has signed intergovernmental memoranda of mutual understanding and
cooperation in the field of civil aviation, in which forms of bilateral operative
interaction are provided in the crisis situations caused by terrorist operations against
civilian airlines. Also, fruitful dialogues concerning the struggle against terrorism were
developed with Turkey, Italy, France, Germany, Portugal and other countries. Russia
insists that tactical policy strategies be developed that reconcile future and current
objectives by indicating what amounts and kinds of measures are acceptable at a given
moment in light of the need to prevent terrorist actions. A recent Russian priority has
been to prevent terrorist acts using nuclear weapons. The challenge is to cut across the
boundaries that divide governments, their agencies and organizations with different
functional mandates in order to focus their respective energies on the common goals of
anti-terrorist strategy. The bureaucratic hierarchies of governments and international
bodies are not well suited to dealing with spider-web organizational structures. But a
full range of policy tools, including economic, diplomatic and military ones, should be
considered at certain decision-making levels, and a unified apparatus should be
constructed with which potential terrorist acts can be anticipated and combated.
There is a need for all partnerships to declare terrorism subject to severe penalty,
especially the financial sponsors of terrorism and organized crime, the suppliers of
weapons to organized criminals, including traitors in the armed forces. There can be no
exceptions. There is a need for the extradition (handing over) of mercenaries from
foreign states, aside from those that have special agreements with Russia on legal
assistance, or in cases where acts of terrorism are committed on the territory of other
states.
The problem of encouraging political will and effective responses to the terrorist
threat stems from the difficulty in reaching a consensus on the definition of terrorism
and discovering the root causes of terrorism, determining what conditions are more
favorable for the spread of terrorism and why certain underground organizations and
groups are driven by such a strategy and, as a counter-strategy, deciding how to deter
the use of the strategy of terror. We can identify some generic factors that appear to be
conducive to suppressing the growth of organized crime and extreme violence. First of
all, there are the natural factors of the socio-cultural context: a homogeneous structure
of the population, that is lower heterogeneity, restrictions on the inflow of immigrants
over long periods and the specificity of socio-cultural factors, including traditional
mutual relations in the civilian population interactive human togetherness, guided by
mutual rights and obligations [7] (p.4), emphasis on feelings of shame and advantage,
binding norms, value orientations assuming tolerance in a society, sympathy,
compassion and a strong consciousness of solidarity within the family, local society,
high educational levels, traditional diligence.
Obtaining support from members of the traditional family must be based on its
protection against abuse, providing benefits and supporting family welfare. These
features and qualities are more typical of rural, small cities that can preserve their
community spirit. The preservation and cultivation of traditional communal, collectivist
moral values and customs, the creation of an approximation of community by building
enterprises in which a consciousness of belonging to the company as to the family is
cultivated, are major factors in the prevention of terrorism. The construction of a
society on communitarian principles is a positive counter-structure, as terrorist
organizations are also constructed using the principle of micro-groups in which each
member adheres to an accepted code of conduct, and its infringement is considered a
more serious crime than the infringement of official laws. Commitment to a radical
terrorist group means that the activists own death and sacrifice is always seen as a
possible outcome, serving as an example to others [5] (p. 479).
On the Problem of Co-Operation and Collaboration in the South Caucasus Region

in the Struggle against International Terrorism
By reason of its geographical proximity to the countries of both the Middle and Far
East, and to Russias North Caucasus republics, where advocates and agents of various
Islamic extremist organizations have been working very actively since the 1980s, the
South Caucasus region has, to a significant degree, been drawn into a system of
multilateral relations, the establishment of which has, of course, been hastened by the
war on terrorism which is already being waged worldwide. While giving priority to
developing principles for the participation of the regions countries in this new
confrontation, it is, at the same time, necessary to note that whereas the war on terror
and participation in the many forces and resources of the international anti-terrorist
coalition are important and highly significant, this is still just one of quite a large
number of elements that make up the concept of regional security. It is evident that
for the peoples inhabiting the South Caucasus region, a great many other aspects of
security including such aspects as economic security, environmental security,
genetic security, the breakdown of the traditional system of values, the traditional
way of life, and many others are very pressing. However, in the light of the
development of well-known tendencies that are determining the principal trends in
world politics, it is probable that the most pressing current issues are those connected
with combining the world communitys efforts in the war against international
terrorism. This task is very important, especially for the South Caucasus region, which
has been used as a conduit for combatants and weapons and where there is the
additional risk of the spread of various types of fundamentalist ideologies that are
hostile to traditional forms of Islam. It has become customary for all publications
dedicated to the problems of international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism to
begin by pointing to the terror attacks of 11 September 2001. It is quite clear that
changes in the way American society relates to the realia of the modern world are
linked to 11 September, as a result of which Americans have started a very serious
process of re-evaluating their system of values and, in particular, of bidding farewell to
the last remnants of their isolationist approach to determining relations between
America and the rest of the world. On the other hand, the actions of the shahids1 have
raised a number of questions in American intellectual circles relating to the universality
of the values being advocated by them. In this way, both of the dominant principles
have been called into question which have, up till now, taken turns to determine
American societys approaches to the United States rest of the world system of
relations. Of course, an event that provoked such processes could not but be reflected
in both the internal situation of the United States and its foreign policy. Some
American researchers (for example, Ann Applebaum in an article dedicated to what US
President George Bush refers to as the New World Order) have pointed out that the
USAs war on international terrorism, like the Cold War before it, has given the
American administration those practical and ideological reference points that it lost
when the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain were dismantled. The new challenge posed
by a concept as difficult to define as world or international terrorism has been
personified by the Bush administration in the shape of an imagined Al-Qaeda
organization (the real Al-Qaeda differs in its real characteristics from the myth that has
been created around the name of Al-Qaeda) and its number one terrorist,
identified as Osama bin Laden (the real person named Osama bin Laden, of course,
differs from the constructed myth), thus producing a goal and at the same time a target
for its policies. In our opinion, the reason why the US adopted precisely this approach
in a situation that demanded a quick response and a demonstration of the new
administrations readiness to respond to any type of challenge apart from specific
reasons connected with the time, place and participants in the operation was a
fundamental difference between the system, structure and function of the State and the
system, the structure and functions of the so-called all-embracing systems, which
include the system defined as Islamic fundamentalism, Wahhabism, Muslim
extremism, etc. This systems all-embracing, universal character can be inferred
from the list of names given to the system by its ideologues at various stages of its
development from the Muslim Brotherhood and Green Internationale2 to the
1
The Arabic word for witnesses, the term is used in Islam to refer to martyrs tr.
This term appears to be restricted to the Russian media and is used to refer to a loose international
collective of Islamic terrorist movements tr.
2
World Islamic Congress and World Islamic Front. All these organizations adopt as
their goal the restoration of pure Islam, of which the ummah (Muslim
community or ideal state worldwide) of the Prophet Mohammed is the ideal, and the
modern concept of civil society which is based on the system of liberalism and
democracy that was constructed in the process of developing Western civilization as
their the antithesis. The principal characteristics of the all-embracing systems their
universality; their reliance on mystical, religious principles of community and their
rejection of national [principles]; and the branched and borderless nature of their
structure, which has no center and, therefore, has very flexible leadership and is well
protected against external threats are fundamentally different from the system and
structure of the State. The functions of these two systems are also directly opposed: the
State is called upon first and foremost to protect its borders, territory, society and
citizens, while the all-embracing system has as its goal the infiltration and
undermining of borders and of those principles upon which borders rest. One should
note that following the end of the Cold War, the first President George Bush
proclaimed several basic principles of the new world order the affirmation of
democratic values; the primacy of human rights (human rights has been one of the
main principles of American foreign policy since Jimmy Carters time); the
transparency and permeability of borders to goods and capital; the standardization of
tariffs and taxes as well as other measures also aimed at strengthening the USAs role
as the single center [of the world] and affirming the universal democratic values upon
which this role was intended to rest. This orienting of US foreign and domestic policy
would inevitably have weakened those State institutions that were by their very logic
opposed to transparency and permeability, i.e., which contradicted the stated
principles of the new American policy. However, immediately after September 11
President George W. Bush assigned his top experts the task of reviewing domestic
policy with a view to strengthening US national security, which automatically led to
the imposition of major restrictions on democratic institutions and human rights. In the
area of foreign policy, the US president intensified bi-lateral i.e., intergovernmental
links, entirely forgetting about international organizations (the fact that, in those first
days [following September 11] the US president apparently forgot about the existence
of such figures in international politics as, for example, Kofi Annan and Javier Solana,
did not escape analysts). At the same time, it is patently evident that illegitimate
international systems can only be effectively combated by legitimate systems of the
same quality and niveau, committed to protecting the norms of international law3 and
the rules of social intercourse in the world community. A system that has the same
characteristics and attributes, [but] which relies on the laws and support of the states
and organizations that established it, can vie with an underground all-embracing
system. It would appear that reinterpreting the tasks and functions of international and
regional organizations is going to be one of the determining principles of modern
politics. To some extent this is already happening in relation to NATO; next, [it will
also take place in relation to] other international structures. In light of the above, the
need for all the countries of the South Caucasus region to collaborate in the antiterrorist struggle which should naturally lead to a serious re-evaluation of values in
the region becomes apparent. Co-operation and collaboration should not be limited to
bi-lateral relations with the leaders of the anti-terrorist coalition. They are necessary in
3
There appears to have been a misprint or misspelling at this point in the original text; prava (law) makes
rather better sense than nrava (disposition). tr.
the region, first and foremost because there is a very serious threat to its stability and
security.
Conclusions
Terrorism, as a form of violence (political, structural, cultural, etc.), arises in response
to injustice at both the local and global levels. A foundation for the transformation of
structural violence is found not only in the imperative in the fight against injustice in
the world. It is also present in the possibility to address the deep culture potential,
including community values. When we try to understand terrorism as a rational
phenomenon and engage in discussing how it is justified and condemned, we can
consider alternatives to terrorism and think about how injustice can be corrected.
In conclusion, the notion of terrorism suffers from the same inadequacies as the
widely accepted understanding of criminality. These include: an inability to understand
the nature of effective anti-terror systems and a clear underestimation of the role of
myth in politics. In order to account for the real problems facing democracies and the
ways open to them for emerging from cultural and structural crises, account must be
taken of the social institutions and norms in which they are embedded. These point to
the possible paths towards action that would genuinely bring about the transformation
and elimination of terrorism and insurgency.
Anti-terrorist policy has to be designed and applied more deliberately and
consistently. It is one thing to employ anti-terrorist or preventive actions on a case-tocase basis (post factum); it is quite another to be prepared on an ongoing basis to
anticipate and respond to potential terrorist attacks. To gain the maximum benefit from
scarce resources, all the actors engaged in anti-terrorist policy have to be better
focused, supported, and coordinated, and the lessons of the past must be incorporated
into present and future policy. Anti-terrorist policy must be replaced by more
systematic and regularized strategies, and the institutional resources for implementing
them have to be strengthened. To implement a more deliberate, informed and coherent
approach, several main issues and related tasks regarding policy and operations have to
be addressed, whatever the particular circumstances facing specific interventions.
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154

IOS Press, 2006
The War Against State Terrorism:

Reframing the Debate on Global Terrorism
Lubna NADVI
School of Politics at the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal.
Abstract. The War on Terrorism (WOT) that has been unleashed by the United
States government and its alliance partners over the last few years has ironically
resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties globally. This has occurred through
state sponsored military strikes in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, where noncombatant civilians usually became victims of such military action. Such acts have
incited the emergence of many more non-state militant groupings that are intent on
pursuing violence as a means of responding to the War on Terror. Inevitably,
civilians have become caught between state and non-state actors who are both
advancing militant violence in order to achieve political objectives. This chapter
attempts to unpack the complex dynamics of the WOT, by arguing that it is critical
for civil society to become more pro-actively engaged in challenging both
governments and non-state militants as regards their involvement in this war, as
well as to reframe the paradigm within which terrorism is understood and
ultimately perpetrated. In essence, civil society needs to demand accountability
from governments whose policies are arguably the root cause of much of the
contemporary terrorism that we see unfolding before us.
Keywords. Terrorism, civil society, War on Terror, state terrorism
The recent terrorist attacks in London have once again forced the issue of global
terrorism firmly back onto the core political agenda of nations. While the so-called
war on terrorism has, since September 11, 2001, been waged by the United States
government and its allies on a variety of militant organizations, ironically resulting in
more civilian deaths than military fatalities, the July 2005 incident has prompted in its
wake a far more sinister version of the detention-without-trial policy, a drastic shoot-tokill policy, regardless of whether the intended target may actually be guilty of
terrorism, which is currently being enforced by the British government as a way of
responding to terrorist attacks on its soil. This has already led to the shooting death of a
Brazilian man who was not a terrorist. The ensuing paranoia in the aftermath of these
attacks may indeed result in increasing numbers of civilian deaths at the hands of
authorities, simply because of the color of their skin or the way they dress.
In responding to the outrageous nature of these acts, one is forced to reflect on
whether the war against terrorism that has been unleashed by a range of governments
against militant insurgents is actually curtailing terrorist activity, or whether
government actions simply inflame further violent militancy, such as that of the attacks
on the London underground. Many analysts, anti-war activists and intellectuals have
argued vociferously and consistently that it is indeed the case that the foreign policy
agendas of nations such as the United States and Britain have resulted in the emergence
of networks of militant dissidents who are deeply resentful of the injustices that such
L. Nadvi / The War Against State Terrorism: Reframing the Debate on Global Terrorism
155
policies have wreaked on the communities from which they come and, as such, have
sought to express this rage through acts of resistance.
What has remained controversial is the manner in which this resistance has
manifested itself. Very often it has been in the form of indiscriminate violence targeted
at civilians. In addition, the call to violence has often been located within a religious
framework, which has been an unfortunate abuse of the Islamic faith and has called
into question the very foundation on which the global Muslim community bases itself,
i.e., peaceful co-existence with its fellow humanity. Furthermore, the subsequent
actions of governments in response to these insurgent acts has been to further curb
civil liberties and introduce anti-terror legislation which has had and continues to have
disastrous consequences.
The effects of the resistance campaign and the commensurate war against
terrorism have resulted in the heaviest price being paid by civilians, who have
inevitably become caught between ongoing state-sponsored violence and non-state
militancy carried out by armed insurgents. These civilian victims have become part of
what is ironically referred to by both state and non-state perpetrators of violent
activities as collateral damage.
The debates on how to manage what has become an increasingly chaotic global
security situation, with both armed militants and governments intent on pursuing their
respective agendas, has been fraught with controversy and a fair measure of political
posturing from all sides. It is unfortunate that rational and reasoned engagement,
particularly on the part of governments, has been sorely lacking. A clear example of
this is the unilateral and illegal invasion of a sovereign nation, Iraq, by the United
States and its coalition partners. The consequences of this action have been disastrous,
and the policy has neither managed to curb any violence and terrorism, nor has it really
liberated Iraqis from dictatorship, given that they are currently forced to live under a
military occupation.
The strategy of the militants who are opposing unilateral government actions has
been similarly problematic, given that they have not managed to successfully evict
occupation armies from territories where they have been operating. In fact, the violent
nature of their engagement against civilians has often detracted from the legitimate and
necessary resistance against imperialist occupation, conflating a liberation struggle
with a terrorist modus operandi. While an armed struggle that directs its militancy
against state oppression has often been seen as acceptable and indeed necessary, it has,
however, in a contemporary context, found an uncomfortable home in terrorism, which
arguably can not be sustainable, given that it is often met with further repression from
governments, which use the full force of their state apparatus to clamp down on such
militancy. The question of whether it is justifiable to direct violence against civilians in
order to achieve political objectives has always remained a deeply divisive issue, and
the killing of innocent people, whether it is on a train in Madrid or in the London
underground, or the streets of Baghdad and Kabul, should surely be unacceptable,
regardless of who perpetrates these murders.
Given the almost intractable nature of the phenomenon of modern terrorism, it
becomes necessary that we tackle this crisis at the point at which it arguably originates
and is given momentum. This is effectively at the level of state-sponsored terrorism,
which has been seen as the root cause of reactionary militancy by non-state actors, and
has given rise to a global network that can at any given point unleash violence against a
civilian population. Governments are, given these circumstances, virtually unable to
156
protect their citizens, nor do they seem to understand their own complicity in the
creation of such terrorist networks.
The onus, then, to find sustainable ways of addressing this issue, would ostensibly
fall on global civil society to create a space for constructive engagement where the
public can demand accountability from both governments and non-state militants who
are essentially responsible for the chaos that is being unleashed on civilian populations.
The question remains of where one should begin this critical process? In the
aftermath of the declaration of war by the United States and its coalition partners on
Iraq, the global anti-war movement embarked on unprecedented mass action to protest
against this illegal war. Clearly, the determination by civil society to express its
discontent at governments and their unilateral actions was overwhelming.
Unfortunately, that did not stop the war from actually being waged, nor the huge loss of
civilian life. What an analysis of this set of circumstances essentially demands is that
civil society needs to re-assess the way in which it has sought to engage and the
outcomes that it has managed to effect.
While lobbying and advocacy are a useful part of the overall process of addressing
what has now become institutionalized terrorism, it becomes necessary for civil society
to begin to engage differently. There must be a deeper understanding of the relationship
between government policy, which forces people into extreme and repressive
situations, and the corporate infrastructure that supports these policies. The idea that
governments are exempt from being held accountable by the people who elect them
needs to be seriously contested by virtue of sustained forms of pressure by civil society
networks. In the same way, the relationship between the financing of state-sponsored
terrorism by corporate entities has to be challenged, not simply by encouraging
consumer boycotts of certain brand names, but by educating people about the ways in
which their support of these financial networks is creating poverty and exploitation and
leads to inevitable violence whose political trajectory often ends up manifesting itself
as resistance in the guise of terrorism.
In the final analysis, the task of addressing terrorism must arguably be assumed by
citizens, given that they often pay the greatest price when terrorism is unleashed. The
reality is that governments no longer have the capacity to fight this so-called war on
terrorism. They, together with corporations, have become proverbial creators of the
Frankenstein monster that has now come back to haunt them. The best that they are
able to come up with is clamping down on civil liberties, which creates further paranoia
and deeper resentment, and inevitably ends up killing more people.
In order that the civil society project to tackle terrorism becomes sustainable and
practically viable, a call for a global peoples summit on terrorism needs to be effected.
This must be a task undertaken by civic networks and driven by grassroots movements.
To assume that one is safe from terrorism would be naive at best, given that it has often
reared its ugly head where least expected. As citizens, we cannot afford to remain
complacent about the phenomenon of terrorism, whether it is perpetrated by states or
non-state actors. Nor must it be understood as simply a problem to be tackled by
Muslims. The reality is that it has become a crisis that demands a holistic solution.
We cannot romanticize it, nor can we ignore it, as it has become an entrenched
phenomenon in our times.
The call for peoples action must be one that is well thought through and
essentially sustainable. While engagements with governments are clearly going to be
157
inevitable as part of this process, it is arguably essential that such a project remain
firmly within the grasp of peoples movements. The time to act is now.
The most controversial aspect of the detention-without-trial policy has been the
Guantanamo military base in Cuba, which has continued to operate despite worldwide
condemnation. In addition, other similar actions by state authorities in various countries
that have been profiling individuals has been a cause for concern. Various intellectuals
such as Tariq Ali and activists such as Arundhati Roy have expressed these sentiments
very articulately in a range of anti-war essays and writings. There has to be a reframing
of the debate around who should take charge of the situation. Where governments are
failing, citizens have to essentially assume responsibility for their own security.
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IOS Press, 2006
Understanding Suicide Terrorism:

Countering Human Bombs and Their
Senders1
Anne SPECKHARD
Georgetown University Medical School and Vesalius College at the Free University of
Brussels, Belgium
Abstract. The nature of suicide terror / The organizational component / The

psycho-social component / The individual component / Choosing to become a
suicide bomber: Trauma & ideology / The role of personal traumatization /
Secondary traumatization and hidden traumas / Self-sacrifice: The interaction
among social awareness, desire for change and a lack of legitimate outlets /
Factors that facilitate the decision to become a suicide bomber / The role of
religion / Cult of martyrdom and popular support for suicide terrorism /
Dissociation / Acts of defense and the expressive quality of suicide terrorism /
Gender differences: Women and suicide terror / Europe and suicide terrorism /
Motivational sets for human bombs / Nationalistic, community defense,
expressive, trauma and revenge based motivations / Alienation, marginalization,
loss of identity, desire for meaningfulness and adventure, secondary traumatization
and desire for redemption / Better understanding the threat and addressing root
causes / Supporting key research and making use of our existing knowledge /
Providing alternative views and outlets / A balanced approach.
Keywords. Motivation, suicide terrorism, free speech, human rights, trauma,
ideology
Suicidal terrorism is one of the fastest growing and least understood threats to peace in
modern-day democracies. Currently there is only an extremely small empirical research
literature that policymakers can draw on to understand suicide terrorism, its genesis and
prevention. Yet, there has been an exponential growth in suicide terrorism in recent
years. Peacekeeping and coalition forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan are finding
suicide terrorism to be a major factor in undermining rebuilding efforts and in bringing
peace to the region. Israel and Russia have been plagued by an increase in suicide
terrorism, which has been a major security threat to both countries and their regions in
recent years. Although yet untouched by suicide terrorism, Western Europe was the
staging ground for many of the 9/11 bombers, and the United Kingdom has generated
three suicide bombers (two acting in Israel, the third carrying a bomb in his shoe on an
international flight).
Reference for this work: Speckhard, Anne. Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs
and Their Senders in Topics in Terrorism: Toward a Transatlantic Consensus on the Nature of the Threat"
(Volume I) Eds. Jason S. Purcell & Joshua D. Weintraub Atlantic Council Publication 2005.
A. Speckhard / Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders
159
The Nature of Suicide Terror

Modern day suicide terrorism began in Lebanon in 1983, but it has not remained
limited to the Middle East. Suicide terrorism as a tactic has migrated around the world:
it is used in Sri Lanka by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (or ltte, which perfected
the suicide belt), the Kurdistan Workers Party (pkk) in Turkey, Hamas, Palestinian
Islamic Jihad (pij), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (pflp), Al-Asqa
Martyrs Brigade in Israel, Al-Qaeda around the world, numerous groups in Iraq, and
the Chechen rebels in Russia. The organizational goals of these groups are not
necessarily linked to one another, yet across the entire spectrum, the use of human
bombs has proven to be a powerful tactic in the hands of terrorists, who are thus able to
force concessions from occupying forces even to the point of expelling them to
wreak havoc on peace processes, gain international recognition in the media for both
the sponsoring group and its cause, disrupt daily lives and create widespread dread and
horror. Recognition of the effectiveness of this tactic in achieving terror organizations
short-term goals seems to be lending momentum to, and indeed fostering, an
exponential increase in the use of suicide attacks. Yet, despite this recent increase,
suicide terror remains the least utilized if most lethal means of terrorism.
Human bombs are in essence smart bombs that go unerringly to their target with
the ability to detect surveillance and alter their course to maximize damage. Unlike
other forms of terrorism, these require no escape plans for the perpetrators. Suicide
terror, when successful, also leaves little trace of the perpetrator. He or she is no longer
alive to be tracked down, incarcerated and interrogated. Only the organizers can be
caught though even this is difficult once the suicide mission is accomplished.
Suicide terrorism is a complex, individual, psycho-social and organizational
phenomenon.
To research it properly, one must consider all its aspects, asking: what motivates
the individual to move into a self-sacrificial mode (to be willing to die in order to kill
others); how do societies come to embrace this tactic, and what role(s) do
organizational goals, methods, planning, recruitment, training/indoctrination and
execution play vis--vis suicide terrorism? When we consider both the individual and
organizational motivations, we cannot forget that both are embedded within a psychosocial context, and that neither individual nor organizational inputs are likely to take
off in any strong and consistent form without real daily-life psycho-social issues
causing the message and possibility of this option to reverberate on both sides of the
equation.
The Organizational Component
According to Ariel Merari, to date no suicide bomber has acted entirely on his or her
own that is, assembling a bomb, picking a target and detonating without the aid and
support of an organization. However, recent interviews by Nichole Argo update
Meraris claim providing data on at least one bomber who acted independently of
organizational backing. In any event, it is a myth to believe that a lengthy and in-depth
period of training and indoctrination is necessary. Some suicide terrorists receive all
their training and carry out their attacks in less than two weeks time. And not all
suicide terrorists are recruited by the organizations that send them; many individuals
recruit themselves, approaching an organization and volunteering to be human bombs.
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From the point of view of the organization, it is clear that suicide bombing has a
powerful effect. It is a combination of an extremely lethal tactic in terms of numbers
wounded and killed and devastating psychological effects. It has the potential to
create widespread changes in mentality, awareness and lifestyle. For example, suicide
terrorism has shown itself able to derail sensitive negotiations (such as the Oslo
Accords), strongly impact the political process (Madrid train bombings), disrupt
military, humanitarian and rebuilding efforts (Afghanistan and Iraq) and draw world
attention and concern to political issues (Chechnya). Moreover, it is appealing partially
because it is cheap, requiring only minimal equipment and the loss of the bombers
themselves. Whether it is effective in achieving any real political gains outside of the
community in which it originates i.e., whether it creates any real power base for those
who employ suicide terrorism is yet to be seen.
Thus while it is still open to debate whether this tactic manifests itself in real status
quo gains, we do know that its perpetrators and their communities often feel
empowered by it. The expressive nature of the act expressing ones desperation and
making another feel ones pain as well as its shared meaning as an act of defense in
behalf of the community, brings both the organization and individual perpetrating it
recognition and status within that community. This, despite all else, is a real gain to
both parties.
The Psycho-Social Component
While organizations that make use of human bombs often consciously and purposefully
promulgate ideologies supporting this tactic, it is crucial to note that to be successful
their message must provoke the right response within both the individuals and the
society that ultimately embraces these ideologies. Without a leadership promoting the
utility and even morality of suicide terrorism as a tactic, widespread acceptance and use
of it might never occur. Yet, we must also acknowledge that this is not entirely a topdown phenomenon. Social indoctrination of perpetrators with ideologies that support
suicide terrorism need not always occur in an intentional mission pursued on behalf of
an organization or religion, but can simply be a social phenomenon which results from
community and individual responses to the circumstances in which they find
themselves. Consider, for instance, that in the Palestinian experience the idea of
embracing martyrdom (shudada the death of innocents) had to gain prominence
from repeated unfortunate experiences before Palestinian culture reached the point
where it could embrace and nurture the concept of self-martydom (istichhadin).
Similarly, suicide terrorism had no place in Chechen history, but during the last
two wars Chechen individuals and Chechen society as a whole increasingly found
themselves devastated by meaningless traumas. In response to this, many sought out,
embraced and constructed, individually and as groups, ideologies that empowered,
derived meaning from and expressed their pain while fighting back against enemies
much more powerful than themselves. Indeed, the entire phenomenon of suicide
terrorism in Chechnya, as in all the places it has migrated to since its modern-day
appearance in Beirut, began as a psycho-social phenomena in reaction to traumatic
stress, a besieged mentality, social marginalization, alienation, or other perceived or
real suffering and in this response, some segment of society has embraced and
promoted the ideologies that breathed life into it as tactic for fighting back.
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Organizations and ideologies find prominence in communities when they meet the
psycho-social needs of individuals and groups within those communities. As Maslow
showed with his hierarchy of individual needs, individuals first strive to meet their
basic needs, and then continue on up to trying to achieve a sense of self-actualization
which includes a sense of dignity and meaning in life. When under duress,
communities and individuals are drawn to groups and ideologies that resonant with
their own needs and that are empowering and capable to defend their community, and
give them a sense of dignity and expression for their pain and a way to meet their
desire to strike back.
The Individual Component
On the individual level, motivations are multi-faceted and multi-leveled. They can
include political/nationalistic, religious, ideological, economic, community,
sociological, psychological, personal and familial motivations. Other factors that can
potentially operate within the matrix of a suicide terrorists motivations are:
The individuals psycho-social history, including his or her indoctrination or
embracing over time of whatever religious and ideological justifications are given; the
individuals personal and familial life experiences, including issues of personal and
secondary traumatization (e.g., history of incarceration, torture, trauma, etc.); cultural
identification with the concept of revenge and the need for it; community affiliations;
identifications with the sponsoring group; notions of sacrifice for the group; and the use
of psychological defenses, including the dissociative defense, which appears possibly
necessary to carry out the act. These are examined more fully here.
Choosing to Become a Suicide Bomber: Trauma & Ideology

The Role of Personal Traumatization
It is clear that the ideologies promoted by the organizations supporting suicide
terrorism often resonate with the experiences and psycho-social needs of many young
people within their societies. Witness Hamass claim to have thousands of selfrecruited individual bombers (most of whom it allegedly has to turn away) or the fact
that Chechen suicide terrorists also appear to be self-recruited.
In both Palestine and Chechnya, experiences of deep personal traumatization and
bereavement create in some a vulnerability that leads them to seek out the ideological
message of those promoting violent and Jihadist methods. This message helps
traumatized individuals to find a framework for dealing with their shattered world
assumptions and to address their emotional suffering, survivor guilt and sense of a
foreshortened future.
But the psychological first aid offered by these organizations is short-lived for
the individual, as it quickly progresses from the traumatized individual needing an
answer to psychic pain to becoming a radicalized bomber willing to give his or her life
for the cause. While objectively the psychological first aid is short-lived, in that the
bomber gives up his life in exchange for what he gains by taking on the role of martyr,
in his view he may see it as an exchange of an earthly life for greater eternal rewards,
so that even after death he will live on as a hero in the memories of his community and
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so that he will achieve peace and strength in their estimation of him as a defender of the
community. Thus, the rationality of the choice must be considered from the actors
perspective, taking into account his valuing of acting on behalf of his community,
being recalled forever as heroic, and potentially gaining eternal life and the spiritual
rewards that he expects to be bestowed upon him as a martyr.
While the severity of the human rights abuses occurring in the Palestinian
territories is difficult to compare with that of the abuses in Chechnya, which are far
worse, Palestinian bombers also are motivated by a sense of personal traumatization.
Many claim that they have personally felt their lives threatened by the Israeli
Defense Forces; many were incarcerated and began their involvement with terror
groups with deep impressions and friendships made while in Israeli prisons; and a large
number identify with, or are grappling with a stress overload from the daily
humiliations and trials that face Palestinians at checkpoints, at work, in unemployment
and in the difficulties and limitations of daily life.
Traumatic stress or stress overload is, however, insufficient in itself to cause an
individual to consider suicide terrorism. Clearly, the majority of Palestinian and
Chechen society has been deeply traumatized, and yet most individuals in both
societies are remarkably resilient, carrying on with daily life in the face of enduring
emotional pain. Indeed, it appears rather that traumatic experience that is lifethreatening, emotionally overwhelming experiences that are inescapable and cause
deep psychic pain and for which there is little redress can form the psychological basis
within the individual as well as the society to be receptive to and to even produce
ideologies and groups that promote the tactic of suicide terrorism. The one must be
present, in a sense to marry the other, as together they form a union that empowers,
provides a method of redress, expresses pain in a manner that causes the enemy other
to feel it as well, and creates meaning and honor in an individual who has been deeply
dehumanized and shamed. But neither traumatic stress nor an ideology promoting
suicide terrorism is likely to be able to support this tactic on its own; the one resonates
within the other. Of course, this raises the issue of the Al-Qaeda suicide terrorism that
has sprung out of societies in which there is little apparent traumatization. This issue is
addressed later.
Thus, the ideas contained within Jihadist ideologies and martyrdom that resonate
with individual trauma are clear: the individual has been deeply hurt and desires social
redress, but the circumstances deny this to him. The ideology and organization provide
the individual with a means of empowering him to strike back, to defend his
community, to express his pain and be sure that the generalized enemy other will feel
his pain as well, to find meaning in his suffering, to end his own suffering in an
honorable way exiting the community while becoming a hero in it, and to ultimately
enact justice (from his point of view) in a situation in which he rightly or wrongly
perceives no other pathway to seek justice. And all of this occurs in a manner that is
justified by the group, the wider community that supports the group and often by
aspects of the communitys religion as well. Each of these aspects will be discussed in
greater detail in the following sections.
Secondary Traumatization & Hidden Traumas
Identification with the traumas of others and secondary traumatization occurring by
witnessing, over the Internet or on television, vivid images of injustices committed
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against others with whom one identifies as fictive kin (e.g., the brotherhood of
Muslims) may also resonate with individual feelings of disaffection. Trauma
psychologists have known for years that witnessing or learning of the deaths or traumas
of others can in themselves engender powerful feelings of traumatization.
Indeed terrorism researcher Nichole Argo reports the following statement by a
Palestinian militant leader, The difference between the first Intifada and the second is
television. Before, I knew when we were attacked here, or in a nearby camp, but the
reality of the attacks everywhere else was not so clear. Now, I cannot get away from
Israeli attacks TV brings them into my living room. When they are not in my camp,
they are in Rafah, Gaza City, Ramallah, Jenin. And you cant turn the TV off. How
could you live with yourself? At the same time, you cant ignore the problem what
are you doing to protect your people? We live in an internal struggle. Whether you
choose to fight or not, every day is this internal struggle. PFLP leader, Khan Yunis,
June 2004.
Furthermore, it is likely that the security services and societies trying to fight
terrorism underestimate the negative psychological effects and even traumatization
that can occur in young people who are profiled as terrorists simply by race or creed,
who are arrested or incarcerated, or who undergo interrogation and breaking methods
that many argue are neither illegal nor torture, yet are often referred to as torture-lite.
Self-Sacrifice: The Interaction Among Social Awareness, Desire for Change and a
Lack of Legitimate Outlets
Group dynamics, including that of self-sacrifice for the community, are likewise
powerful individual motivators. In general, suicide bombers have been found to be
socio-economically better off, and at least as well educated (though often better
educated) than their peers. As a result, they are likely to be more socially-aware and
potentially more sensitive to the plights of their communities. Persons whose education
would otherwise prompt them to contribute to their society as leaders frequently find
themselves disaffected in their community and blocked from pursuing legitimate ways
to fight injustice a scenario which makes them potentially more vulnerable to being
attracted to using the tactic of suicide terrorism. In essence, feelings of being qualified
to serve as a leader and yet unable to find legitimate ways to bring about change,
coupled with sensitivity to the shared pain of ones community, may powerfully
contribute to seeking other available outlets for expression.
Likewise, when a cult of martyrdom has sprung up strongly in a society, these
vulnerable yet talented individuals may feel that it is a burden not to act: that to fail to
take on the martyr role when no other means of effecting change seems available is
in itself a failure. This phenomenon is more strongly in evidence the closer that
traumatization hits ones family, community or home, especially if the culture in
question has embedded within itself a duty to avenge the loss of loved ones.
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Factors that Facilitate the Decision to Become a Suicide Bomber

The Role of Religion
Religion is not a cause of suicide terrorism, but it can be a powerful mobilizer on
behalf of this terror tactic. Jihadist Islamic ideologies promote the idea of self-sacrifice
to benefit the larger community in exchange for other-worldly rewards including
forgiveness of sins, salvation and instant entry into paradise. For a troubled, bereaved
and guilt-ridden individual, the vision of these rewards can constitute strong
motivation. The promise that in paradise one will be reunited with those who have gone
on before especially other martyrs is a particularly powerful draw to those caught
up in traumatic bereavement. Moreover, the promise that a martyr will be able to
intercede on behalf of seventy relatives securing, for them, as well, entry into
paradise helps to assuage guilt and grief over leaving loved ones behind.
Survivor guilt and a sense of a foreshortened future also make martyrdom an
attractive option; one is freed of guilt by giving up a life that was not going to be long
anyway. Because suicide is forbidden, but martyrdom is not, suicide terrorism presents
a seemingly honorable way to escape from psychic pain it an honored choice. And
having a choice in regard to ones own death has proven alluring to many, especially
the fugitive who believes that he or she is facing imminent capture, torture, death or
imprisonment.
Cult of Martyrdom & Popular Support for Suicide Terrorism
In the Palestinian territories, there currently exists a cult of martyrdom. From a very
young age children are socialized into a group consciousness that honors martyrs,
including human bombers who have given up their lives in the fight against what is
perceived by Palestinians to be the unjust occupation of their lands. Young children are
told stories of martyrs. Many young people wear necklaces venerating particular
martyrs, posters decorate the walls of towns, and rock and music videos extol the
virtues of suicide bombers. Each act of suicide terrorism is also commemorated by a
last testament and video, which are prepared ahead of time by the martyr, who can
later achieve great popularity when the video is shown on television. Despite the very
deep and real grief of the family and friends left behind, the funerals of martyrs are
generally the occasion for much fanfare by the community and the sponsoring
organization. Often, the effect of this is confusing to outsiders, as it can disrupt, delay
and even circumvent the familys ability to focus on its grief over the loss of a family
member, and it may even support family members in proclaiming to outsiders their joy
over the loss of the loved one. This cult of martyrdom, which has a strong
underpinning in longstanding cultural roots (the honoring of martyrs), appears to have
developed principally over the last decade, as the first act of suicide terrorism occurred
in Israel only twelve years ago.
In Chechnya, suicide terrorism first appeared in the year 2000, and widespread
popular support for suicide terrorism does not yet exist, although the first pop song
venerating a female bomber has now made its appearance and is very popular with
Chechen youth. Moreover, at least two Chechen suicide attacks have included preprepared videos, one of which was aired over Al-Jazeera during the Dubrovka siege. It
is possible that over time, with continued societal traumatization, these and other
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means will be able to popularize support for suicide terrorism among the general public
in Chechnya a development that should be watched carefully and curbed, if possible.
Dissociation
Dissociative defenses are commonly found in the survivors of psychological traumas
(those with acute and posttraumatic stress disorder), and also in individuals who grow
up under frequently traumatic circumstances, such as those that characterize the lives of
many suicide bombers. Dissociation that is the disruption of the normally integrated
functions of consciousness, memory, identity or perception of the environment, as well
as the ability to enter and make use of a dissociative trance state is frequently
observed in trauma survivors. Traumatized individuals, especially those who have
suffered multiple and repeated traumas particularly in childhood, have often learned to
utilize this defense to detach themselves from overwhelming horrifying, terrifying and
life-threatening circumstances. This dissociative function that is the ability to enter
into a trance state and separate oneself from fear, dread, and grief seems to be both a
facilitator and a commonly spoken-about characteristic of those who commit acts of
suicide terrorism. Almost universally, the putative bombers describe their
psychological state (with their bombs strapped on) as one of floating or bliss, or
they report having felt nothing, etc. Such descriptions are consistent with dissociative
trance states and feature prominently and repeatedly in accounts given by failed suicide
terrorists to journalists and researchers.
Such accounts are common in Israel, where at the peak of the second Intifada one
Palestinian suicide bomber a day was stopped before detonating his bomb and was
subsequently incarcerated. This has created a pool of detainees whom researchers can
ask about their experiences with bombs actually strapped to their bodies. Arin, for
example, a twenty-four-year-old woman interviewed in an Israeli prison by the author,
was arrested after she had worn her explosive belt for six hours but decided against
detonating it. She recalls her mental state while wearing the belt, I was not conscious.
When I meet bad things, I, Arin, move away. I collect the bad things and work out of
myself. She looks back, I felt very nervous. I felt my mind stopped. For six hours I
cannot think. Just at the last moment, I looked at the people. I looked at the babies. I
saw babies. I thought, if he dies, what should I tell God? What should I tell Him? If he
wants to cut off my life and take my soul, okay, but I dont have the right.
Clearly, we can see in Arins description a dissociative mode that was only in the
last moments disrupted. Arins motivation for violence began first with the constant
humiliations at checkpoints, threatening encounters with security officials on the road
and in her community and finally culminated in a desire to be a bomber when her
boyfriend was killed two months previous to her action. Arin is still so distressed by his
death that she cannot discuss it, but she states that when he was killed, My mind was
stopped. My life was stopped. My thought was everything is black. She describes
going to ask for a bomb: I wasnt asked. I asked to get the belt.
Here we see a person who reached her own point of traumatic stress overload and,
as a result of too much psychic pain, chose to end her life by becoming a human bomb.
It is important to note though that her decision was not simple suicide, but rather
sacrificial giving of herself in behalf of her community. I gave my life just to say, no!
After listing many threats and humiliations that she and her community had endured,
culminating in her boyfriends killing, Arin states, I thought that my home will come
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in danger, that they (Israelis) can come and fight us. I have nothing to do as a girl. I
havent any weapon. I have to save my world. I have to play my role. I thought this was
the only way to play my role, to carry out my responsibility to my nation, my family
She describes her mental state in the four days she waited between requesting the
mission and receiving the belt, I was not talking to anyone, just in my imagination,
looking at my aunts, saying goodbye to everything. I was not in a normal frame of
mind. I felt disconnected from them and they felt it. They asked, What is going on
with you? and I said I was sick. I wrote a letter to them asking forgive me, and Im
really sorry this is my life and I want to end it in my own way. Fortunately, Arins
dissociative mode was somehow disrupted by seeing babies, and she shifted suddenly
back into her normal moral consciousness, which prevented her from going ahead with
the mission.
In the case of Chechen bombers, we find similar observations made by the
bombers hostages and family members those who observed the bombers just prior
to, or while wearing, suicide bombs. For example, a Chechen respondent recalls how
her cousin became withdrawn and depressed following the killing of her brother by
Russians, but just before going on her suicide mission this girl became euphoric, falsely
announcing her need to travel to Moscow in order to prepare for marriage. A cousin
recalls, I believed her, because she really was very much excited in those days, and a
gleam appeared in her eyes. Indeed, just as with normal suicides who have committed
themselves to die, her depression likely lifted as she began contemplating release from
psychic pain, and she unconsciously activated the dissociative defense necessary to
carry out her wish.
Given that it is so commonly reported and observed in human bombers, it appears
that the dissociative defense is unconsciously activated by suicide terrorists to enable
them to overcome the overwhelmingly negative emotions likely to be engendered by
contemplating blowing oneself up, as well as murdering others while doing so. In all
likelihood this defense engenders a release of endorphins given that it is commonly
observed and recalled as either a highly emotionally distanced, drugged, or euphoric
state. Interestingly, this dissociative state has also been observed by researchers
studying conventional suicide. It seems that a fair number of suicidal persons videoand audiotape their last moments, enabling researchers to observe them as they prepare
to take their own lives. Many are reported to enter a highly dissociative trance state
before pulling the trigger, hanging themselves or otherwise taking their own lives.
Presently in many arenas where suicide terrorism is being used there is no need for
groups to use any period of indoctrination, as individuals come in droves volunteering
as human bombs. However, it is also clear that those sponsoring groups that use (or in
the past used) indoctrination periods do so by inculcating hypnotic trance and/or
dissociative modes. This is done by manipulating religious symbols, rituala, practices
and/or ideologies, which can induce trance even in the course of their normal or
intended usage. The rich tradition of religious ritual contained in nearly all mainstream
religions is capable of inducing trance, and often does so as a means of coping with and
even transcending the suffering endured in this life. Organizations which use these
same trance-inducing methods to induce a state that enables an individual person to
strap on explosives and detonate himself among civilians make a travesty of the
religion from which this ability was derived.
By making use of religious ideology and practices to induce and strengthen
dissociative and trance states, and by failing to address in any other way than
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encouraging death among the traumatized populations which they draw upon, many
sponsoring groups take advantage of, and reinforce, the dissociative tendencies of
traumatized youth who wish to become human bombs. Such groups lower the barriers
to becoming a suicide terrorist and greatly reduce the chances of the bomber backing
out due to fear.
That dissociation is likely a necessary or at least highly likely aspect of the suicide
terrorists ability to move forward toward his own death was also born out in an
unusual study. In a Brussels University study of normal students from varied
international backgrounds, researchers were able to induce this same defense
mechanism simply by asking subjects to take part in a thought experiment in which the
students briefly took on the role of bombers who had been stopped just before
detonating.
Nearly all of the subjects described their fantasized memory of having the bomb
strapped to their bodies in a highly dissociative manner. It is telling that even
individuals with no intent to carry out such an act seemed to find it necessary to use a
dissociative defense mechanism in order to confront imagining their own deaths
through the strapping to their bodies (and eventual detonation) of lethal explosives.
When Zacharia Zubeidi, the leader of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Jenin, spoke
to the author about the mental states of those he sends out as bombers, he explained
that even he frequently experienced this type of dissociative state. Recalling a stand-off
in which he was surrounded by Israeli soldiers, and sure that he could not bear to return
to the torments of torture and imprisonment which he calls a piece of hell, he decided
it was better to die shooting as many soldiers as he could. Describing his mental state at
the time he was facing his decision to martyr himself, he recalls, I took a look out
the window. I decided I wanted to die. But when I got my weapon ready and jumped on
them, I decided not to die. It was, for a moment, a feeling like death is mercy. I felt
the feeling of being a martyr when I jumped on them, but it changed just when I
opened the door. In the blink of an eye, my feelings changed from asking to be
martyred to cursing.
Zubeidi explains that his experiences of psychological torture and imprisonment
were so unbearable that he preferred death to arrest. Prison, even if only a cage with
no torture it takes away all your achievements. In one moment, it all disappears. You
always keep remembering the outside, the outside you start to hallucinate. In
freedom, he still suffers traumatic flashbacks. He explains, I get the whole tape
rewound, the whole prison, flashbacks of the prison.
Like many trauma survivors, Zubeidi often involuntarily moves into a dissociative
mode. Yet, he argues that he is still flexible in his response to stress and that this is the
difference between himself and those he sends out as martyrs. They are completely
different from us (fighters). They have only one decision. We have many options. The
thought of running away is always available. We can go out and shoot. In contrast, he
describes the martyrs as locked into an inflexible dissociative mode caused by
traumatic stress and the one decision that comes from it, Of course they get flashbacks
all the time, and for them death is a mercy. While a normal person moves between a
fight or flight response to stress and only into dissocative defenses when the threat
becomes overwhelmingly horrific, terrifying and life-threatening, the individuals he
equips to become suicide terrorists are, according to his observations, caught inflexibly
over long periods of time in this dissociative mode. Explaining his own mode in
comparison to theirs, he explains, For the martyr all the cells in his mind are dead
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except for one. According to Zubeidi, these individuals are in too much pain to find
another way to cope and become totally fixated on carrying out what they view as acts
of community defense, expressions of pain and enacting justice in response to all that
he has seen. Explaining their inflexibility, he states, When I feel this way I stay there
one or two hours, but that one, after all that he has observed, there is only that one thing
(i.e., to end their lives in behalf of the community).
Acts of Defense and the Expressive Quality of Suicide Terrorism
When one considers that human bombs may be individuals who have reached their
individual breaking point due to traumatic stress who have become so filled with
grief, trauma and guilt over surviving when others have not, and so convinced of the
futility and shortness of life, and so dissociative that they feel already dead, death can
be understood as the leader of the Al-Asqa Martyrs Brigade described his own
dissociative response as mercy for them. When religion expressly forbids suicide,
and the dissociative individual is able to separate himself enough from his psychic pain
to avoid suicide, which is often the case with this defense moving to this act of
human bombing is not seen by the individual as suicidal, but rather as sacrificial.
Despite this self-perception, there are parallels in choosing to become a human bomb to
choosing conventional suicide. The traumatized and dissociative individual who
becomes a bomber has lost his ability to see other options for acting and is severely
constricted in his responses, as his dissociative defense increasingly causes him to
simply stay numb and distanced from the many options he might otherwise see as
available. This is similar to the cognitive restriction frequently observed in
conventional suicides, who see taking their own lives as their only viable option for
dealing with their psychic pain. Likewise, when society has embraced an ideology that
permits and even promotes human bombs, then death in this manner can become a door
through which one walks to escape psychic pain, as well as all the closed-off options
that traumatic dissociation now contains, and a heroic way to act in defense of ones
community. Human bombs generally believe that they are defending their communities
by acting in this manner, they generally cite serious grievances as their motivations for
acting, and they value highly the fact that they are acting. It is in a sense a great move
out of traumatic depression into action, which is highly significant for the person who
makes it. In doing so, they are taking their last bit of psychic energy to act and by doing
so expressing their own pain and that of their community and making their enemy
other experience and feel their pain. Especially when the enemy has been able to
conduct a war at a distance from helicopters, using smart bombs and guided missiles,
losing few soldiers taking a bomb into the heart of the enemys territory can greatly
even the odds and fulfill a desire to make the other feel ones pain. Unfortunately, this
solution for the individual ends in his own death, but generally he knows that this
embracing of his own death will be seen as a sacrifice by his community, and he will
be honored for it.
Gender Differences: Women & Suicide Terror

Gender differences can certainly be observed between men and women suicide
bombers, and these are important to understand. That being said, however, we have
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found that gender is rarely the central factor in the individual or organizational
motivation for choosing to become or send a bomber.
Certainly, Palestinian terror organizations began to open this option to women, as
it became more and more difficult to send male bombers across increasingly secure
checkpoints. Women could more easily hide explosives by feigning pregnancy, and
respect for the cultural mores of modesty at first prevented vigorous searches of
women, and their use created a spectacular element of surprise (though with the
increase in female bombers this has changed).
There is some evidence that some sending organizations view women as
expendable and that they find it expedient to exploit the particular vulnerabilities of
women in certain societies. There have been suggestions that the pkk used women as
bombers more often than in other capacities because the terror cells need to relocate
fairly frequently, and women were observed to be slower at hiking and less useful for
carrying equipment over long distances. Additionally, in rare cases there is evidence
that both men and women have been exploited by senders who use blackmail or
outright coercion threatening to expose a sexual secret or drug habit, etc., which, if
exposed, would cause the would-be bomber to be killed or severely socially ostracized,
or explicitly threatening women with death. Blackmail is generally a more powerful
tactic when used against women in conservative societies, because women are often
constrained to live with more numerous and more rigid moral strictures than are men.
In her interviews with family members of female Palestinian bombers, Barbara
Victor concluded that strict and narrow role assignments in a tightly controlled society
made the choice of martyrdom seem more attractive to those women who were unable
or unwilling to fulfill their prescribed social roles (due to infertility, discovery of an
illicit sexual relationship or pregnancy, etc.). Certainly, this was true of Tamil Tiger
female suicide bombers who were raped at checkpoints by their enemies and thus
rendered unable to return to the normal roles of becoming wives and mothers. The
result of this practice was to leave the affected women the choice of becoming
prostitutes, militants or bombers, although these cases were not representative of the
majority of Tamil female bombers. We also found the problem of inability to fulfill
normal roles because of cancer, infertility, etc. in the cases of a few female Chechen
bombers, though this set of issues was always far less important in the main motivating
effect than deep personal traumatization.
Recent interviews with would be Palestinian women bombers in Israeli prison
also dispelled this myth each bomber denying the validity of Victors theories. One
respondent frankly laughed when asked about Victors theories, saying they were
implausible, For this you want to explode yourself? For infertility? This is stupidity.
For having had illicit sexual relations? You will die for this? No I can speak to God and
He will forgive me. She went on to say that people always search for such
explanations, especially for female bombers, because females dont have to give their
lives this way. Yet she explains, Every girl can decide for herself If you want to die
and you know you want to die this is what is going on with blowing ourselves up.
Although this discussion has focused on self-recruited suicide bombers, rumors
abound of instances of coercion, especially in regard to the so-called Chechen Black
Widows. Zarema Mujukhoeva, the only Chechen bomber to abandon her suicide
mission, and someone who, unlike all the others, agreed to do so in the first place for
money, claimed after arrest that the Black Widows are forced to carry out their
missions by a phantom figure she called Black Fatima. According to Mujukhoeva,
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Black Fatima follows the bombers to make sure they detonate and triggers the
detonation by remote control if they do not. If this story has any truth to it, one wonders
how Mujukhoeva could have lived to tell her story, given that she put her fullycharged, bomb-filled backpack down on the streets of Moscow while trying to abandon
her mission. Why would Black Fatima not have detonated Mujukhoevas bomb by
remote control?
It seems more likely this is merely a rumor that originated with Mujukhoeva
(wanting to deny all responsibility for her criminal actions and later admitting to many
lies), which was then amplified by a Russian press unable to grasp the reality of the
motivations leading Chechen women to suicide terrorism women who are not
coerced, but are in fact willing volunteers.
What is certainly a serious difference between men and women bombers is that
men who want to fight back against a powerful enemy or who are trying to take flight
from the same have many more options than their female counterparts in conservative
societies. Militant organizations in conservative societies are often not willing to arm
women to fight in battles or even to martyr themselves in a shoot-out in which they
will ultimately be killed, nor can women act as easily in the many other fighting or
evasive roles that are open to men. Likewise, when equally traumatized there is some
evidence that females are often more dissociative in response to their traumatic
experience than males, who often act out their traumatic stress in behavioral disorders
and hyperactivity. Hence the human bomb option of fighting back can be a result of the
less flexible options of women in conservative societies, not in terms of life in general,
but in response to traumatic stress they may much more easily get caught in a
dissociative mode that can make them vulnerable to opting to act as human bombs.
Zacharia Zubeidi, leader of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Jenin, reports, Girls
come begging for such operations (human bombings) much more than boys. Twice as
many girls ask. When asked why he thought this was so, he answers, The emotions
of girls are stronger than those of boys. Their feelings are much deeper than boys. God
made girls more sensitive. Then reflecting a bit more, he adds, We decided, no girls.
No one took them since the Intifada began, so this pool increased. A guy can let a little
of whats inside out by going out on an operation to shoot, to shoot and come back. A
girl has few choices. She cannot go and shoot. Every girl has just one way a
(bombing) operation. Indeed, we met a young Palestinian woman who told us she had
asked for a mission but was repeatedly rejected. Yet her desire grew, as did her
traumatic stress and frustration each time another of her friends self-martyred or was
killed by Israelis, and she felt powerless to do anything.
Certainly, a woman who chooses to become a bomber briefly attains a sense of
power in life and taking on the traditionally male role of warrior is a great equalizer.
But both of these feelings are quite short-lived, given the short career path that
characterizes this role. Hence, these are likely only secondary motivations following
traumatic stress. Likewise, in some societies a woman can attain rock star status only
after death; a status that is very difficult for a woman to attain in life in most traditional
societies.
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Europe and Suicide Terrorism

Though it has thus far been relatively free of suicide terrorism, Europe is no stranger to
this phenomenon. Germany and Spain served as staging grounds for 9/11, with
Mohammed Attas cell originating in Germany and many relevant financial
transactions made in Spain. Likewise, three suicide bombers have originated in the
United Kingdom, two of whom carried out their attacks in Israel, while a third would
have blown up an entire planeload of passengers had he not been stopped. Furthermore,
at least two groups have been caught using what could be characterized as weapons of
mass destruction that is, planning to carry out ricin attacks in London and Paris.
Important to note is that, in Paris, the so-called Chechen cell was made up of North
Africans who so strongly identified with the traumas of their Chechen brothers that
they risked their own lives plotting to poison the staff at the Russian embassy. This is
chilling evidence of the possibility that growing numbers of disaffected and socially
alienated Muslims living in Europe will identify with the traumas of their fictive kin
living outside of the continent and therefore act as terrorists within Europe on behalf of
these others. The Madrid bombings might be seen as supporting this theory.
One of the current concerns in Europe is the widespread radicalization of Muslim
youth living there. A growing number of European cities have high concentrations of
Muslim youth, many of whom are poorly integrated into local society. Brussels, for
example, is 20 percent Moroccan. Given the impressive cyber-infrastructure in Europe
and in the United States, it is not hard to imagine that al-Qaeda which is no longer a
coherent organization but more of a movement could radicalize large numbers of
disaffected and socially alienated young Muslims and then mobilize them to support
suicide terrorism by disseminating its ideas over the Internet to target groups living on
either side of the Atlantic. This would constitute the first step in a nascent movement to
mobilize individuals who might be willing to carry bombs outside of the already active
zones of conflict. If this threat were to be realized on a large scale, it would likely
create deep changes in the way that Europeans and Americans currently go about and
enjoy their lives.
To understand the phenomenon of European-based suicide terrorism, we know
with certainty that these individuals at least claim to be motivated on behalf of traumas
suffered by their fictive kin their Muslim brothers. But is this enough to motivate a
Muslim living in Europe to become a human bomb? Our view is no, that there is an
entirely different mechanism operating in this arena than in those in which daily
humiliations and traumatic stress are part of everyday life, that there are basically two
separate motivational sets for suicide terrorism that operate in differing arenas and
according to different psychological and psycho-social circumstances.
Motivational Sets for Human Bombs
Nationalistic, Community Defense, Expressive, Trauma and Revenge based
Motivations
As stated above, there appear to be two primary groups of motivations or motivational
sets for suicide terrorism the first of which emanates from societies which see
themselves rightly or wrongly as under occupation or engaged in warfare. In many
ways these individuals, societies, and sponsoring organizations often have the
mentality of insurgents. Their primary motivations are often nationalistic, and their
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personal motivations are trauma and revenge driven. They often rely on dissociation as
a defense. These bombers generally see themselves as acting in defense of their
communities, acting in an expressive manner and wishing to cause pain to their enemy
other in order to make them feel our pain. They have frequently but not always
adopted a religious ideology which allows them to act as cosmic warriors dispensing
with the normal limitations on carrying out violence, seeing it as an all or nothing
battle, and demonizing their enemies. In this group we find that men and womens
motivations and the psychological processes leading them to become human bombers
are nearly identical. Leadership and organizations play a role in promoting this option
as a viable and morally approved choice. Societies and individuals enduring too much
traumatic stress and in too much psychic pain respond positively to this message,
contribute to it and act accordingly.
Alienation, Marginalization, Loss of Identity, Desire for Meaningfulness and
Adventure, Secondary Traumatization and Desire for Redemption
The second group of motivations or motivational sets is entirely different from the first
and emanates from cultures in which immigration, migration and a clash of cultures are
a primary issue. We see these bombers making up the group of radicalized Muslims in
Europe who have acted as human bombs Mohammed Atta and his 9/11 cell
originating in Hamburg, Germany and finding much of their support in Europe; the
9/11 bombers who came from Saudi Arabia; the two nightclub bombers originating in
the UK who acted in Israel; Richard Reid also from the UK who was the would-be
shoe bomber was a Muslim convert and nearly took down a passenger plane heading
for the U.S.; the Casa Blanca bombers in Morocco; the Moroccan train station bombers
in Madrid; and lastly the Muslim Europeans and Arabs who have gone to Iraq as
bombers. In this group, to date, we find few women.
This second group have motivations that appear to us to be made up of a lethal
cocktail of a sense of societal alienation and marginalization for those temporarily or
for generations transplanted from their original cultures; a loss of positive selfconcept/identity, (both of which are met by group dynamics, loyalty and a sense of
belonging to the group); a desire for adventure; and life meaningfulness; a resonance to
secondary traumatization occurring in the first group (i.e., identifying with traumas and
injustices done for instance to Muslims in Chechnya and Palestinian territories) and
indirect traumatization by viewing images of these populations hardships on television
and the Internet; and lastly a desire for personal redemption from moral dissipation.
These last two items are perhaps the most important, as marginalization,
alienation, a search for adventure and a positive identity are all strong motivators, but
when combined with strong identification with the traumas of others (which is easily
accomplished these days by the use of videotapes, graphic Internet footage, television
coverage, etc.), along with the frequent history of having been corrupted by the host
society, the individual often feels a very strong need to redeem himself. In
psychological terms, the Muslim immigrant who has let himself go wild in the West
drinking, using drugs, chasing women and decides finally that he has had enough
dissipation enough often goes through a process in which he returns to Islam and
embraces a very conservative and militant form of religion. In this move he begins to
feel real sympathy for the sufferings of others, but at the same time cannot come to
terms with his own bad boy self. Instead, in re-embracing Islam and choosing a
militant fundamentalist form of it, he subsequently splits off and disowns the bad boy
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parts of himself and projects this bad boy self onto Western society, concluding that
the West must now be punished or destroyed.
In joining a close-knit group of militants, this person replaces his negative selfimage with a positive, adventurous and heroic self-image that is reinforced by
belonging to the group. Loyalty, belonging and group dynamics begin to fill the need
for belonging and positive self-image, even at the final cost of losing the good self on
behalf of the groups ultimate goal. Hence a sudden transformation can occur in what
seemed to be a normal, somewhat integrated Muslim man who can suddenly
transform into a virulent human bomb giving rise to the cries of horror about how
Muslims living and being educated in Europe and the U.S. could suddenly turn against
the West and commit crimes such as the 9/11 attacks.
This second motivational set is far less likely to be active in women for a number
of reasons. First of all, women in conservative cultures are used to playing secondary
roles in society the immigrant secondary role is similar to the one they played at
home. They do not suffer a huge drop in status when immigrating as men do. Women
are often far more adaptable as immigrants than men. Likewise, they are often carefully
supervised by their families in their home and new cultures and are not allowed to go
about freely without careful safeguards or to integrate into the host culture as readily.
When living as immigrants, their families often impose many safeguards on their
behavior so a sense of internal dissipation is less likely in women they arent
allowed, as their brothers, to run wild in the West. Likewise, those who travel from
Arab and European countries to Iraq as bombers are more likely to be men, because
Muslim women are far less likely to be allowed to travel freely, although the Chechen
case deviates from this rule. Chechen women traveled long distances, although always
with caretakers to commit their acts of suicide terrorism.
Better Understanding the Threat & Addressing Root Causes

Supporting Key Research and Making Use of Our Existing Knowledge
Those who wish to fight suicide terrorism and combat popular support for it need to
understand the phenomenon as it exists today in the many settings in which it is
occurring. The first step toward doing so is to support solid research aimed at learning
as much as possible about organizational and individual motivations and the
communities that support them as well as the modes of interaction or intersection
among them. In achieving such understanding, it becomes possible to begin to design
interventions based on solid empirical evidence which might then help to curb this very
lethal and exponentially growing global threat.
Likewise, it is important to put into use what we already know. Suicide terrorism is
not the result of poverty or illiteracy alone. Simply reading the statements of terror
groups makes clear that many are attempting to address failed political processes and
that a number of these are legitimately concerned with social injustices some of
which are easier than others to begin to address. Survey data collected by researcher
Khalil Shiqaqi show that popular support for suicide terrorism among Palestinians can
be seen to increase or decrease depending upon how threatened the society feels or how
confident it is in the political process at any given time.
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Providing Alternative Views and Outlets

It is also clear that suicide terrorists make use of willingly manipulated mass media. It
might be wise to investigate the possibility of voluntary self-censorship on the part of
the most sensational reporting organizations. Israel already does this successfully,
whereas Russias President Vladimir Putin has threatened to achieve similar ends by
state decree a move that could well prompt the Chechen terrorists to attack more
often inside of Moscow or other major cities, where complete state control of the media
would be nearly impossible.
But more fundamentally, the terrorist ideologies that so successfully address
feelings of social alienation, victimization and trauma and that manipulate the
dissociative states occurring among many Muslim youth as a result of traumatization
must also find competition from societies that are willing and able to address, in
constructive ways, these same issues of trauma, alienation and the need for social
justice. Organized or informal groups, both within and outside affected societies, must
begin to offer roles and hope to young people, so that they will not turn to suicide
terrorism for want of alternative ways to change their lives and communities.
Religious leaders must begin to stand up to the manipulation of Islam by Jihadist
militants, and those who do speak out ought to be supported (if quietly) by the West,
However, not many are likely to want this role, so long as the West continues to be
seen by large numbers of their supporters as tainted by the abuses at Abu Ghraib,
seemingly extralegal detentions or practices considered as torture-lite in places such
as Guantanamo Bay, and continued reports of soldiers failing to act honorably in Iraq
and elsewhere. By extension, it can be argued that preserving cherished Western
freedoms will require finding means to deal with the conflict zones that inflame
Jihadist mentalities in ways that uphold democratic ideals. This no easy task, but it is
necessary to prevent the spread of suicide terror as a tactic. Already, the ideas and
culture of suicide terrorism have made significant inroads among many groups and can
be seen to have migrated successfully from conflict area to conflict area. This is
unlikely to stop if the West does not begin to address the root causes of suicide
terrorism including the ideologies as well as the individuals psychosocial
motivations.
A Balanced Approach
This is not to say that intelligence operations aimed at infiltrating terror groups or
military operations aimed at decapitating their leadership cannot make a difference.
Israel has shown dramatic short-term success in this regard, although it could be argued
that this success is bought at the cost of motivating future terrorists. As U.S. Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld lamented in 2004, it is not enough simply to kill terrorists, if
these are able to replace their ranks faster than they can be killed. Especially within
conflict zones, individual psychology and traumatic experiences play a major role in
the individuals decision to become a bomber. Other key factors include the failure of
the political process to address individual grievances and sponsoring organizations
willingness to exploit such failure. Community support for suicide terrorism increases
when threats to its well-being are perceived as high, and political processes are viewed
as failing to meet those threats.
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The prevention and gradual reduction of the threat posed by suicide terrorism thus
requires that we address root causes. Repressive governments must be encouraged and
pressured to reform, so as to open the way for economic growth and increased
opportunities for the frustrated, disillusioned and often well-educated youth who
constitute the most explosive sector of the societies from which suicide terrorism
comes. All sectors of society both at home and abroad must be given a voice, and
all ethnic, gender and religious groups must be attended to with respect, so these do not
find solace in the ideologies and activities of radical groups. Human rights abuses,
whether at home or abroad, must be neither tolerated nor seem to be tolerated, even in
the name of fighting terrorism. To do so abandons democratic values and exchanges
freedom for security, and this, in the end, brings neither.
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IOS Press, 2006
The World After 9/11: New Actors, New

Game
Samuel PELEG
Israel
Abstract. The concluding chapter picks up the themes of the book, namely the
rational and calculated character of terrorism and the open society it operates in,
and it introduces to this setting the relevance of religiously motivated terrorism.
This article focuses on the revitalized identity group as the new actor on the
terrorist scene in the aftermath of 9-11. Ignorance of the motivation and sacrifice
of this new and powerful actor will impede the sacred task of counterterrorism.
These, in turn, prosper on grievances and deprivation, which are, in the final
analysis, the real breeders of political violence.
Keywords. Al-Quaeda, September 11, international conflict, revitalized identity
groups, globalism, populism
Intrinsic changes in the character of social and political conflicts are happening all over
the world. These developments are not being adequately explained, because research is
still trapped within the neat and parsimonious paradigm of political realism, in which
states or governments are the major actors of global politics, and thus, the main
perpetrators of conflict and violence [1, 2]. The recent rise to prominence of the Islamic
militant organization al-Qaeda on the global agenda undermines the conventional
wisdom of the realist approach. But who are those people, and how are they organized?
What are their motivations and stimulations? These questions must be asked in light of
the September 11th trauma and the terrorist events that have plagued the world since
then. A new emphasis should be sought. Instead of the customary symptom treatment
of anti-terrorist methods and military counter-measures, the focus should be put on the
motivation and inspiration of the perpetrators, which is the foundation for a root
treatment of terrorism. The spotlight should be cast on who initiates political conflicts,
who ignites the flames, and when and how are they are ignited. In short, who are the
agents of socio-political change and what makes them tick.
The Game: International Conflict

This chapter portrays a certain operative mode of socio-political conflicts, in which the
participants are not merely governments and some vague elements that violate social
codes, but specific organized, non-governmental actors, in particular revitalized
identity groups. These groups are tenacious and ambitious, because they represent real
grievances, real constituencies and unresolved problems incorrectly treated or ignored
by the establishment. Characterized by their defiance of political norms and the rules of
S. Peleg / The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game
177
the game, such groups dramatically influence the course and intensity of conflict. In
order to establish themselves as worthy opponents to the mechanisms of government
and social control, revitalized identity groups must invest in mobilization, solidarity
and group cohesion processes.
A reexamination of the dynamics of conflict undermines the general concept which
determines that political conflicts are fought between formal groups and within normal
political confines. The idea presented here will show that these explanations fail to take
into account the identity groups that dispute the states authority in their search for the
fulfillment of their aspirations.1 The conflicting interests between identity groups and
the state, or the international hierarchy of states, cause and incite protracted conflicts,
which are most difficult to resolve. Owing to their complex nature, these conflicts have
a tendency to deteriorate into violence and, in extreme circumstances, even to
terrorism. An identity group perspective can elucidate the phenomenal emergence of
Bin Laden and al-Qaeda on the international stage and their soaring popularity in many
parts of the globe.
The Actor: The Revitalized Movement

A revival or revitalized movement is an extremist group motivated by the force of a
desire to rebuild the whole complex of social and political relations around it, holding
onto a holistic point of view of a better future, in contrast to the oppressive present
situation. It is a modern phenomenon, despite the reverence for old symbolism and
ancient rhetoric. They continue to wait for signs and wonders that will foreshadow the
doom of modernity. At the same time, it is an active, aggressive political group, with a
clear plan of action as to how to expedite its agenda. Accordingly, Charles Tilly
sketches the image of the revitalized identity group as a challenger and as a pro-activist
group. He claims that rapid change is improbable, except by the formation of a new
identity group, which comes into being in a drastic process of revitalization [3] (p.
507).
In addition to its being a pro-activist group coveting change, Tilly identifies the
revitalized identity group as a non-organizational communal entity, (pp. 508-510).
Tillys analysis describes them as small communal groups of local extent, whose
organizational structure is primary lacking any departmentalization. In most cases, this
is a traditional group with outmoded principles and aspirations. The number of its
supporters is quite limited; thus, the means for growth of such a group are limited.
Nevertheless, those members who have aligned themselves with the group are as a rule
loyal. The source of its ruling authority is either traditional or charismatic, not legal or
rational, and no laws constrain its leadership. On the other hand, says Tilly, an
organizational group is modern, large and more efficient in the advancement of society
as a whole. Its organization is intelligent and departmental, and its ability to mobilize
resources is well developed and much more efficient. Boulding [4] (pp. 107-108) uses
other words to describe the same distinction between the types of groups. He proposes
a dichotomy between volitional and non-volitional to differentiate between communal
1
The analytical dilemma in this work focuses on the question of what is the most appropriate angle to
review and understand socio-political conflicts. As an axiom, most existing theories of socio-political
conflicts ignore a whole category of players, their distresses, their wishes and their capabilities. The
revitalized identity group is worthy of theoretical attention.
178
and organizational groups. The differentiating criteria are the freedom of choice open
to the individual to join or choose his identity group. According to this explanation,
communality means a choice-less ascription, because ties of heredity and clannish
cohesion bind the members to their group.
I agree that a revitalized identity group is indeed of a communal character, but only
in the characteristics that concern the loyalty of its members and their stubborn
irrational adherence to the aims and fantasies of a charismatic leadership. However,
scope-wise, revitalized identity movements can match or even eclipse any associative
group while simultaneously boasting of a commitment, ardor and devotion of adherents
unparalleled by any other mobilization endeavor. Thus, modern movements of
revitalized identity groups have the power to sweep with them enormous populations,
crossing national boundaries, positioning themselves as central powers all over the
world. By combining structural features of associative groups with the soul of
communal groups, such movements establish themselves as a formidable power to
reckon with.
What are the reasons for the renewed growth of communal identity groups, and
what has ignited the revitalization phenomenon? Largely, it was a reaction against the
worlds increased interdependence and the tendency towards global affiliation and
integration on various economic collateral and political frontiers. These tendencies of
rapprochement in the international system constitute a warning signal to national,
religious and ethnic entities, which became anxious lest they might be swallowed up by
this new global village. Thus, paradoxically, global developments characterized by
the emergence of a world culture and the crystallization of new regional arrangements
and contacts gave birth to its antithesis: the revitalized identity groups and their quest
for segregation and separation. In a spiral process of mutual fertilization, the two
opposing orientations feed on each other: globalism has inspired localism and localism
has spurred globalism. The system has bred sub-systems, which in turn aim at the
annihilation of that system.
Furthermore, modernization and industrialization have caused a sharp competition
over raw materials and resources, thus finally causing their overuse and increasing
scarcity. The economic shortage in a shrinking world creates a discriminating
advantage for those who have, causing distress and frustration in those who have not.
Distress is an accelerator for the development of revitalized identity groups, no matter
whether the distress is economic, political, educational or cultural. The aim of the
revitalized identity group is significant political change: a structural change in the
source of authority and in patterns of behavior. Therefore, the clear target of their
activity is the state: the governmental structure, its authority and its existing sociopolitical patterns of action. The revolt of the revitalized identity groups is directed
against the authority of the political establishment in an effort to undermine its ruling
capacity. The final aim is a political upheaval by toppling the regime or by causing a
fundamental change in its policy. In any case, the initiators and challengers are the
identity groups.
The inevitable tension between existing power structures, either of the
international system or the state, and the identity group prevails because of the utterly
opposing interests of the two sides: organization, order and hierarchy in contrast to
separation, seclusion and uniqueness. These differences come to the fore in particular
when attempts to impose loyalty to the system cause the development of deprivation
179
and injustice towards the sub-system, thus threatening its basic values and needs. This
is the preliminary condition to the formation of a protracted conflict.
The main motivation to embark on a total system conversion is fear. The fears of
all minorities are a shared and common experience describing an existing or impending
unbearable situation that must be entirely and rapidly replaced or eliminated. The
distress that identity groups experience is the fear of liquidation [5], which means that
the small entity might be absorbed by the dominant authority. More distinctly, such
foreboding can be classified as concern about potential shifts in group boundaries. The
blurring of affiliation can occur either by assimilation loss of distinctive identity
through merger with a larger entity, or by differentiation the drifting apart of smaller
subgroups. The two types of fear provoke different action strategies. Fear of
assimilation is countered by a greater emphasis on recalling the ancient glories of
the culture that binds group members, resuscitating all that distinguishes them from
others, destroying all that links them to others [6] (p. 9). Fear of differentiation, on the
other hand, is met with attempts to reconstruct history by emphasizing myths of
common origins, and especially a single ancestor (p. 9).
Another important property of revitalized groups is the urge to build a whole new
cultural system, specifying new sets of relationships between man and society and
between man and government. In an identity group approach, relationships are given
saliency as a vital variable in the sequence of socio-political behavior. Problem-solving
and conflict resolution may be observed in the group members conscious and
deliberate efforts to construct a more satisfying system as a solution to the emerging
grievances and tensions of a deplorable status quo. Lastly, the grievances and despair
that spur the members of revitalized groups to radical activism emerge from the pursuit
of human needs not met by the prevailing structure. As Wallace noted long ago, the
rationale for any human association is finding and elaborating culturally recognized
techniques for satisfying needs [7] (p. 268).
Al-Qaeda is a revitalized fundamentalist movement that is religiously motivated to
meet its unfulfilled human needs in a better and imminent future. The return to basic
tenets as a source of eternal bliss is a firmly established principle. Fundamentalism has
been a formidable sustaining force, and it has given rise to a multitude of popular
movements. Al-Qaeda epitomizes active fundamentalism, which envisages the advent
as the culmination of a preparatory stage in which the members themselves must
assiduously achieve purity and salvation from a degenerate present in the spirit of a
glorified past.
The anticipation of the imminence of redemption galvanizes Al-Qaeda into action.
The confidence in an ultimate triumph and the conviction of an indubitable rescue
stimulate intense endeavors to promote these goals. Activists are encouraged to be
steadfast and risk everything, because the goal is ultimate salvation, and no
compromises are admissible. It is a relentless movement that acts on its beliefs and
successfully mobilizes devoted followers for its deeds. Al-Qaeda thrives on the
charisma and self-assurance of its leaders, who manage to implant in their adherents
enthusiasm and faith in the future the two indispensable features of the devout
identity group.
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The Nature of the Fundamentalist Identity Group

The revitalized fundamentalist movement accumulates strength as more and more
adherents choose it as their primary identity group. Such a decision means that those
who believe in the movements message have committed themselves to a total change
of society as a goal and to the ideology of the organization as the blueprint or formula
for action. Prior to joining the group, activists experience or are aware of grievances
and hardships in their larger human association the nation, the state or the
community. These grievances, and the urge to remedy them, push new recruits into the
unified and cohesive identity group, in which others desire the same goals. This mutual
sense of deprivation and ultimate concern reinforces the activists extremist state-ofmind. It cultivates their readiness to deviate from prevailing social norms and their
predisposition to violate the political rules of the game by adhering to a stubborn
ideology and an unyielding goal of total change. This section explores the unique
character of the revitalized identity group by underscoring the contribution of extremist
propensities and the significance of ideology to the spirit of the activists.
A revitalization movement must discredit the prevailing system in the most
fundamental manner. Its leaders should discount and denounce every aspect of the
current regime, focusing chiefly on the issues pertaining to the groups predicament. To
gain the support and loyalty of their followers, the challengers leaders endeavor to fan
a spirit of extremism in their disciples. Extremism might be seen as the tendency to go
to the poles of an ideological axis, or it can be the attempt to attain a goal beyond the
limits of legal-normative procedures [8]. Such an understanding of the idea implies
both a concept and behavior. For a group of determined activists who aspire to allembracing change, extremism is an invaluable disposition that makes a fanatic
ideology and the resulting excessive deeds easier to assimilate.
Extremism and radicalism are often used synonymously, but in fact they are
different. Radicalism refers to a profound questioning of the system. Political radicals
are those who call for the reinterpretation of the central concepts and principles of the
system and those who call into doubt the established practices of the status quo.
Naturally, radicals become a nuisance to incumbents or conservatives, who wish to
minimize any activity that might challenge their power position. Thus, authorities often
portray radicals as threatening the very foundations of society. This depiction
contributes to the popular notion that radicals and extremists are indistinguishable.
This obfuscation is detrimental not only to accurate analyses, but also to policymaking. Radicals who invoke fundamental truths and thereby undermine orthodoxy
are an asset in any society. They rejuvenate and sustain the values upon which human
communities are founded. Extremism is the real danger to a political system,
particularly a democratic one. Although similar to radicals in their craving for ultimate
change, extremists adopt militant, aggressive tactics to bring this about. Thus,
extremists not only contest ideas and concepts, they also repudiate behavioral norms
and order. As a result, instead of constructing a more just or equal society, they wreak
havoc and drive the people to revolt. Abcarian concisely sums up the distinction
between radicals and extremists:
A radical may or may not be an extremist, depending upon the political style, not
the ideas, he adopts. Radicalism refers to insistence on basic policy changes.
Extremism, on the other hand, implies rejection or destruction of accepted mechanisms
and processes through which such policies are made. [9] (p. 18)
181
Though radicals can certainly threaten political stability with their demands, the
threat of anarchy and chaos arises more from the conduct of extremists. The members
of Al-Qaeda are extremists. They adopt both goals and means that defy existing norms
and jeopardize the stability of the international system.
Extremism, then, is a state of mind that pits activists against the socio-political
order and facilitates their resort to unconventional means to achieve their objectives.
But, while regarded as meritorious by the revitalized identity group, extremism spells
social irresponsibility toward society as a whole. Extremist perceptions and ambitions
compare what is with what should be, but they do not accurately perceive their impact
on society; they only conjecture as to the end effects. Hence, their scenario of change is
absolute and unmitigated, regardless of how society adapts to it. Indifference to the fate
of others who happen to disagree with their drastic solutions is what Mannheim calls a
utopian mentality:
Certain oppressed groups are intellectually so strongly interested in the
destruction and transformation of a given condition of society that they unwittingly see
only those elements in the situation which tend to negate it. Their thinking is incapable
of correctly diagnosing an existing condition of society. They are not at all concerned
with what really exists; rather in their thinking they already seek to change the situation
that exists. Their thought is never a diagnosis of the situation; it can be used only as a
direction for action. [10] (p. 36)
What distinguishes extremist groups is their cognitive style, the manner in which
they think, plan and see the world. The deterministic, irresponsible cognitive style
unites extremists of all political hues, whether from the left or from the right. Lipset
and Raab reiterate the interchangeability among extremists, although they initially
analyze right-wing groups in America [8]. In their elaborate study, the authors discern
five major traits of the extremist cognitive style, or state of mind: monism, or antipluralism, simplism, moralism, populism and the assumption of conspiracy:2 Monism
is a unified, organic, and conformist position that does not tolerate other opinions and
abhors any kind of dissent. Simplism is an uncomplicated and plain interpretation of
the socio-political environment, using banal and unsophisticated rhetoric to appeal to
the lowest common denominator. Moralism is the tendency to relate human history to
the ongoing struggle between good and evil and to judge reality through normative,
value-laden lenses. Populism is the presumption of representing and fighting for the
common man and the underdog against exploiters. Finally, the assumption of
conspiracy means a sense of isolation and deprivation despite being just and the
desperate feeling of being malevolently plotted against.
Extremists claim that they have sole possession of the truth, or at least, that they
are closer to it than most other people [14]. On this basis, new recruits are persuaded to
join the group, and alternative views are flatly rejected. In fact, any sort of opposition,
disagreement, compromise, or negotiation which is part and parcel of politics is
foreign to the revitalized identity group. In other words, extremism rejects the essence
of politics. Hence, extremism is essentially anti-politics. Instead, the identity group
2
This classification resembles similar attempts by Mead [11] and Abcarian [9], but Lipset and Raabs [8]is
more descriptive and useful, in my opinion. Notice, however, that one of Abcarians extremist tendencies is
revitalization, which is described as: the demand for social reconstruction through a spirit of insurgency,
through acts of disruption and detachment from practices or institutions deemed corruptive of ones
normative commitments. Another body of literature that discusses extremist and doctrinarian characteristics
is the personality traits and the political psychological field [12, 13].
182
demands unity and self-sacrifice from its adherents. The group is the safe haven which
bundles together the frustrations and anxieties of individuals who dread the status quo
or an impending change in it. The group is a great cauldron in which discrete
grievances and complaints are transmuted into a concerted and powerful effort. The
impact of the revitalized identity group is appraised by its capacity to generate
collective action from the disparate potencies and strengths of its recruits. Charismatic
leaders who can channel the extremist lan of their followers by inculcating in them a
guiding ideology and a fervent faith are the components of an effective revitalization
movement.
In his provocative seminal analysis of mass movements, Eric Hoffer attributes the
vigor of extremist groups to their skill in united action and capacity for self-sacrifice.
The author proclaims that to know the processes by which such a capacity is
engendered is to grasp the inner logic of most of the characteristic attitudes and
practices of an active mass movement [15] (p. 57). His book is a brilliant attempt to
link together grievances, the extremist state of mind, ideology and collective action.
Thus, Hoffer points out that [t]he technique of an active mass movement consists
basically in the inculcation and cultivation of proclivities and responses indigenous to
the frustrated mind. (p. 59)
Readiness to sacrifice oneself for the cause is fostered by the complete absorption
of the individual into the collective body of the group. To be associated with something
bigger, more honorable and just confers on the extremist a source of strength and faith.
Hoffer contends, in this regard, that faith here is primarily a process of identification of
the single personality with the collective being of the group (p. 62). Detached from
their disaffected and egoistical selves, true believers find it easier to immolate
themselves on the altar of sacred intentions. The entire horrifying and appalling ritual
of suicide bombing is based upon this premise.
Religion as a Fountainhead for Revitalization

The purpose of this section is to elucidate why religious motivation and inspiration
characterize todays militant and active revitalized movements, rather than ethnic or
national-separatist groups, which are just as committed. Their intention is to
demonstrate that in the intrinsic nature of religion lies a propensity to extremism and
disruption, together with the craving for leadership and unity, the yearning for
redemption and harmony, conjointly with a penchant for contention and violence. It is
this Janus-faced character of religion the joiner and the divider that makes it a fertile
ground for the burgeoning of revitalization movements.
The phenomena of religion and revitalization are in many respects entwined. They
both imply a transformation of the human condition from dissatisfaction to fulfillment,
or at least an attempt to bring about such a transformation. Wallace suggests that the
historical origin of most religious movements has actually been in revitalization
movements torn or split off from their parent religion after failing to invigorate it from
within. Thus, religion is a very appropriate backdrop for introducing revitalized identity
groups. In Wallaces own illustrative formulation, all religions are relics of old
revitalization movements, surviving in reutilized forms in stabilized cultures, and that
religious phenomena per se originated in the revitalization process i.e., in visions
of a new way of life by individuals under extreme stress. [7] (p. 268)
183
The entire transformation a person undergoes from an inactive observer of politics

to an ardent participant is more cogently appreciated in a religious explanatory
framework. Isaacs asserts that religion provides the means by which the religious
person ... satisfies some otherwise unappeasable needs [16] (p. 143), but once these
needs are threatened, the whole chain of extremism, ideology, and action is activated.
The threat at issue here arises in modernity and the challenge it represents to the
familiar truths of religion. Instead of grappling with a radically new and unpredictable
present, many prefer to retreat to the sheltering and comforting haven of faith.
Furthermore, this self-reassurance is performed with great intensity: creeds are
passionately reasserted and reinterpreted in letter and in spirit. This is how religious
fundamentalism a return to the bedrock of faith [17] is nurtured.
The crisis that modernity has caused for religion is signified by secularism or
heresy, but more frighteningly, by pluralism. Plurality of thought undermines the
monistic authority of orthodoxy and challenges the validity of its mores. Under these
dire circumstances, there are three options for the guardians of faith: reaffirmation of
tradition in defiance of change; secularization of religion in admitting change; or
carefully and prudently adjusting tradition to meet the challenges of the times. Berger
vehemently supports the third option, which he calls the inductive possibility, as the
best way to combat the heretical imperative of modernity. This alternative is described
as inductive, because the justifications and explanations for being religious are
aggregated and argued from experience, by reexamining basic questions. This trial
and error procedure reconciles the abiding the precepts of faith with the inconstant
social environment. It takes prudent and discerning spiritual leaders to forego some of
their basic convictions for the advantage of their people. In the same vein, Pipes
introduces the term medieval synthesis to denote the policy compromise Muslim
leaders formulated between the religious Sharia law and changing human realities.
This blend has come to be known as traditionalist Islam, as opposed to strict and
implacable fundamentalism. The synthesis worked well as an immensely stable and
attractive combination of ideal goals and pragmatic actions which held in several
continents and over many centuries. [18] (p. 57).
Unfortunately, it is the first alternative the reaffirmation of tradition, or the
deductive possibility in Bergers terms, that revitalized identity groups adopt. Changes
of a lesser magnitude may yield compromises and incremental acclimation, but the
acute and excruciating peril of modernity does not permit such a propitiatory response
from the defenders of faith. Hence, the deductive option means that believers reassert
the authority of a religious tradition in the face of modern secularity. The tradition thus
having been restored to the status of datum, of something given a priori, it is then
possible to deduce religious affirmations from it at least more or less as was the norm
in premodern times. [19] (p. 61)
This means that religious revitalization movements arise with a vengeance: the
historical interval in which tradition was not established, but was taken for granted,
must be suppressed.
The most appropriate and efficient milieu in which to categorically eschew the
pluralist threat is the identity group. A complete set of alternative values must be
cultivated in an insulated and protected ambience. Believers must be detached from a
confusing reality and from contending versions of the truth. The leaders of the identity
group must try to interpose a fact-proof screen between their followers and the actual
world [15] (p. 60). They do that by imbuing their adherents with strong in-group
184
feelings and by reinforcing a spirit of cohesion and solidarity. Religion becomes the
bond that secures the attachment of the followers to a framework that rearranges and
realigns their thoughts, attitudes, and beliefs. The confirmation of faith is achieved by
emphasizing the righteousness of fellow-members. Appropriately, Coleman describes
the religious identity group as a mutual admiration society [20] (p. 53).
In sum, the religious identity group is a zone of retreat for individuals in need of
solace, a sanctuary for those who are threatened by uncertainty and who desire
reassurance in an era of tumult. Isaacs convincingly portrays this mood when he writes
that, Life cannot be lived on earth by man standing on his own two feet alone.
Confused enough, fearful enough, threatened enough, every man, even the most
Enlightened, will find his way back to his knees and to his God. [16] (p. 166)
But as much as religion unifies its own members, in the modern world it divides
society as a whole. Thus, it has a dual nature: a focus of integration and loyalty and a
source of societal cleavages and implacable opposition. The encouragement of in-group
feelings coincidently fosters distinctions and cleavages among groups. This
separateness is augmented, because traditionally meaningful symbols develop within
historically designated communities of believers. Hence, shared values are localized in
particular affiliation groups, which render the religious experience and commitment of
each group unique and exclusive.
This fragile pluralism is marred by perpetual suspicion and tensions. The tone of
self-assurance of religious identity groups establishes a we versus them mentality
and the conviction that the ideology of ones group is the only route to redemption. The
leaders of the religious identity group implant in their disciples what I call the chosen
people complex. Such a vision inherently excludes any alternative scenarios of
salvation. The feeling of superiority is profoundly entrenched. The more firmly these
notions are held, the greater the animosity toward different religious views. Here is
where the extremist state of mind converges upon the character of the revitalized
religious identity group: the arbitrariness of thought, the intolerance of compromise and
dissidence, and the denigration of alternative identity groups further monism, simplism,
moralism, populism and the feeling that everybody else is conspiring against you.
Extremism sets a challengers sequence in motion by tapping the radical ideology
that already exists as the groups mobilizing power.3 An ideology requires controversy
or conflict to strengthen and sharpen its message vis--vis alternative solutions. Once
the intrinsic antagonism among identity groups is exposed and the parties concentrate
on their incompatibilities, conflict is inescapable. In order to spur believers to action
the third component of the challengers sequence a detailed strategy must be present,
and an acute sense of there being no other choice must prevail. In other words, an
operational trigger arises when activists are convinced that they must do something lest
the situation deteriorate. Writing about the sanctuary movements in the U.S., Yarnold
suggests an example of such a trigger:
[I]dentity groups call for fundamental change in the positive law, when the
positive law does not coincide with natural law precepts, and members of identity
groups are willing to engage in unconventional tactics to achieve their goals, even if
this means that they must violate positive law. [22] (p. 3)
3
A challengers sequence is a process of transformation from silent or latent opposition to active, and
sometimes radical, protest and struggle against the power wielders and agents of social control. The sequence
is composed of psychological, sociological and rational components, which together combine to create a
powerful mechanism of mobilization and collective behavior [21].
185
The incongruity between the law of God (natural law) and the law of the land
(positive law) also prompts Al-Qaeda militants to action. The movement regards the
secular law as temporary and expedient until it collides with their faith; then it must be
transgressed. But must collective action in the name of faith be violent? Not
necessarily, but frequently it is. The spirit and rhetoric of religion is fierce. It
emphatically differentiates believers from infidels, the chosen from the rejected, and
the saved from the damned. Hence the need, the duty, indeed the divine command to
slay the Amalekites, to stone the sinner, to put heretics to the torch, nonbelievers to the
sword. From these passions, from the wounds of these severances, great streams of
blood have flowed. [16] (p. 153)
Action, and specifically violent action, operates as a unifying agent. The stress, the
sense of a common kismet, and the confidence that you are right help overcome moral
inhibitions against violence, and as Hoffer recognizes, these are admirable
qualifications for resolute and ruthless action in any field [15] (p. 113).
Mark Juergensmeyer has undertaken a more profound inquiry into the logic of
religious violence [23, 24]. He defines religion as a constant tension between order and
disorder, or a conflict between more profound and more superficial realities. Many
religions are bursting with violent images and myths that provide their followers with a
sense of chaos. But the violence of disorder must be confronted with violence, because
the perpetrators of anarchy will not voluntarily capitulate. Some religions are more
prone to violence than others. These are usually the traditions that uphold the image of
an eternal cosmic struggle [23] (p. 61) between good and evil. These traditions incite
their believers to act, because the present is the decisive moment in the great cosmic
war, in order to tip the scales one way or another, so that a small intervention of
dedicated persons could make all the difference.
Violence is likely to intensify when religious identity groups are prone to identify
mundane socio-political conflicts with the eternal cosmic struggle. The publications of
Al-Qaeda are fraught with inferences and idioms pertaining to Armageddon. The
adversaries the United States, its allies, Israel and other representatives of modernity,
secularism and the West are the heretics and the symptoms of chaos. The American
government frustrates order and justice with its imprudent and prejudiced policies,
whereas the true believers of Al-Qaeda sacrifice themselves to precipitate redemption.
Since their violence is necessary in light of the larger cosmic battle, they will be
exonerated for the results of their deeds.
Establishing that religious identity groups display extremist tendencies, follow
radical ideologies and are prone to violence is not sufficient to understand why some
members of such groups resort to terrorist activities while others do not. Strategically,
the frustrated and concerned activists find no channel in which to redeem their
grievances or put their fears to rest. They do not have the military capacity to wage a
full-scale war, or the economic capabilities to pressure other groups or the
unsympathetic world order. The indigenous features that associate religion with
violence are augmented by desperation and ultimate defiance of the intolerable status
quo in the turn to terrorism. The phenomenon of political terrorism, as presented in the
next section, is, indeed, one of the most explosive challenges to the governability of a
state or a world order in the modern era.
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Political Terrorism
Terrorism has become a frequent, if not an accepted, form of political behavior on the
level of both national and international politics. As such, terrorism is just another form
of political conduct: exerting influence and competing for power or resources. Hence,
paraphrasing Clausewitz, the great 18th century historian of war, and replacing war
with terrorism, we can say that in the modern world, in light of the growing
improbability of conventional war, terrorism has become politics by other means.
Nevertheless, beyond the political and strategic dimensions, the vexing question still
remains of what propels young zealots to hijack civilian airliners and crash them into
skyscrapers or blow themselves up in restaurants and buses.
Political terror is just one facet of the wider spectrum of political violence. Hence,
to better comprehend the sources of terrorism, we must put it within the broader
context of violence. The idea of violence has been approached from various directions.
The famous anthropologist Margaret Mead saw violence as a violation of the norms of
society [11] (p. 270), while sociologist Alan Greeson [25] perceived violence as a
criterion and instrument of social change. Furthermore, he maintained, violence is the
opposite of apathy, as it demonstrates that the organism [the nation, the minority group,
society] is alive and demanding. Thus, violence cannot simply subside, but needs to be
faced and taken heed of. For H.L. Nieburg, political violence is a continuation of
bargaining begun by other means ... the threat of force becomes action ... [and] a direct
test of relative power by actual mutual attack and defense [26] (p. 12).
In these disparate accounts, political violence is elucidated as both harmful and
constructive: the destroyer of order and the rejuvenator of a stagnant status quo. Like
terrorism, violence is either detested or supported, but it can never be ignored. There is
no single concept of violence in the political context. It depends on who defines it and
on the circumstances of the definition. As long as there are grievances and discontent in
human societies, there will be political violence: the capacity for violence might be
inherent in men. However, the likelihood of an actual outburst of collective violence
hinges upon how badly systems violate the socially derived expectations of certain
groups in the populace. The appeal of political violence increases in direct relation with
the ideological pluralism and fragmentation of identity that are so characteristic of
modern nation states. The nation state itself is a rarity: there are very few countries
today that shelter only one single nation within their borders. Economic
interdependence, mass-communication systems and increased mobility across borders
in the industrialized countries, coupled with a colonial legacy of imposed arbitrary
boundaries which cut across tribal and primordial identities in the Third World, have
created a multitude of societies in a permanent state of flux.
Prominent mainstream political scientists like Dahl, Lipset and Almond regard
variation and plurality as stabilizing and promoting tranquility, primarily in liberaldemocracies. Cleavages in society, they argue, whether political, ethnic, religious or
socio-economic contribute to integration and to the free market of ideas that nurtures
democracy. It keeps opposition viable and reminds incumbents that alternative views
exist and are ready to replace them. Furthermore, because individuals simultaneously
belong to several different identity groups (political party, church, labor union,
Salvation Army, bridge club, etc.) with concurrent loyalties they are prevented from
being detached from society by affiliating with an alienated identity group which
opposes the system. But these cross-cutting cleavages might turn out to be
187
reinforcing cleavages if the cleavages are not accommodated and mitigated from
time to time by a sensitive government. In societies where ethnic, cultural or religious
affiliations coalesce with socio-economic status, and deprivation is identified with race
or faith, cleavages hamper, rather than fortify, the delicate texture of the community. A
fragmented society is one where political violence is more likely to erupt. In a similar
fashion, a fragmented world in which the same ethnic or religious affiliations
persistently occupy the lower echelons of the global socioeconomic order might spur
frustration and anger and ultimately violence on a global scale.
Paul Wilkinson [27] presents an escalation ladder of political violence and
classifies types of violence in terms of general aims and purposes: His scheme starts
with inter-communal conflict between rival ethno-religious groups, then remonstrative
violence as protest against policy-makers, then praetorian violence a more severe
violence used to coerce changes in leadership and policies, next repression, violence
from above to quell protest from below. The clash between the two opposing forces
fans a more vehement type of violence resistance, with an all-out alternative to the
political establishment. One step further on the ladder of violence brings us to
terrorism, which feeds on the frustrations and animosities between the protagonists.
This is the harshest stage of violence short of all-out war.
While there are numerous debates about a precise and yet all-encompassing
definition of political terrorism, there is substantial agreement that:
1. There is a clear distinction between terrorism employed by national
governments (terrorism from above) and terrorism waged by identifiable
groups against the government (terrorism from below) [28].
2. The increase in political terrorism in recent years is directly related to
changing political and technological conditions in the world.
3. Political terrorism is essentially arbitrary and unpredictable with regard to
whom, when and where it strikes [29].
4. It is a ruthless and destructive form of violence which violates the most
deeply-rooted moral and legal codes of society. (Of course, if one does not
agree with the moral-legal code of the land, one would have fewer moral
inhibitions about terrorism, but this important point will be dealt with later.)
5. Terrorism elicits different reactions than do other forms of political influence:
it sparks a sense of vulnerability, weakness and fear which is far out of
proportion to the act or the long-term power of the perpetrators [30].
6. Political terrorism is not mindless violence. It is a pre-meditated, goal-oriented
activity that purports to achieve concrete political objectives.
7. Terrorists distinguish between two types of targets: the ultimate victim,
usually a political or an influential figure whose behavior needs to be changed;
and the immediate victim, who is innocent and unconnected to the original
goal. The latter is attacked in order to convince the former to alter their
decisions. The intermediate victim is used when the ultimate target is heavily
guarded and the chances of reaching him or her directly are slim.
These common symptomatic features of political terrorism alleviate the task of
formulating a viable and broad definition: political terrorism is an act of violence
against an intermediate (innocent) victim, intended to elicit fear and submission in an
ultimate victim, thereby fostering political change. Such a definition embraces all the
premises of terrorism: violence, two types of victim, fear, and psychological impact,
influence and change the goal of radicalism. This definition elucidates some
188
interesting insights regarding the special trademarks of terrorism, which distinguish it

from other modes of violence. Since terrorism is not directly aimed at the ultimate
target, but at a wider group the intermediate victim it is inherently indiscriminate
and impersonal. The perpetrators do not know their designated prey, and they are
evidently indifferent as to whether innocent bystanders live or die. Terrorists hope that
the act of violence will convey their message of dissatisfaction and grievance, through
the media and the reactions of the public, to intransigent policy-makers [31]. The
Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin called this strategy propaganda by the deed, adding
that to voice discontent one bomb speaks louder than a thousand words. Thus, terrorism
is underpinned by a profound concern with the status quo or an impending change
(which is the classic distinction between left-wing and right-wing terrorism); by cruelty
and lack of moral inhibitions; by psychological impact on public opinion (the mere
physical damage terrorism inflicts is inconsiderable), and by the crucial role the media
assumes as the potential source of information about the terrorists plight.
These are unique characteristics of terrorism. Unlike the soldier, the guerrilla
fighter or the revolutionary, the terrorist is always in the paradoxical position of
undertaking actions with no particular immediate aims. In a conventional war, guerrilla
campaign or revolution activists fight their direct opponents: the enemy armed forces,
the authorities, the Old Regime. Terrorists callously attack people who have done them
no wrong. In warfare, the destruction of people and property is a goal in itself;
terrorism uses this destruction as a means to a higher goal. Accordingly, if the ultimate
target the government, the party or the multinational corporation does not change
its political behavior, the terrorists efforts will fail regardless of the fate of the
hostages taken or property captured. The irony of political terrorism is that its actual
success depends not on the performance of the perpetrators, but on the reaction of its
target, again unlike the case in conventional war or guerrilla insurgency.
Political terrorism is not a single act or a spontaneous one, as the meticulous
planning of the September 11th attackers has shown. It is an organized, pre-meditated
action aimed at very tangible ends. Terrorists do not seek remedies for personal
grievances or injuries. They are not lone actors, but tend to work in groups. They
identify with and act in the names of organizations. They adopt the groups plan or
ideology and recognize its rules and hierarchy. From the group they gain
encouragement, devotion and a spirit of camaraderie that enhance their determination,
although some of the initial stimulation to join the group in the first place might be
personal: e.g., self-redemption, emancipation, excitement, frustration, etc.
Weinberg and Davis [32] distinguish between terrorists strategies and their tactics,
referring to goals versus purposes. The authors stress a significant factor: exposing the
government as a terrorist in certain political systems. Then the goals of terrorism from
above are twofold: repression of dissidents while maintaining stability and
mobilization of the masses to implement the ideologies and priorities of the
government. Note the circularity between the purposes of terrorism from below to
agitate and provoke decision-makers to repression and the goal of terrorism from
above repression to save a regime. The proximity between the two types of terrorism
creates a chicken and egg problem, which can be stated as a question of what comes
first: the insurgency of aggrieved segments of the population that trigger, as a result,
the harsh counter-measures of the authorities? Perhaps it is an inflexible government,
impervious to calls for reform and blind to the suffering of its people, which compels
desperate people to extremism? The dilemma, in short, is as follows: does the
189
governments draconian policies provoke terrorism, or does terrorism necessitate a

governments strong hand? To be sure, there are justifications as well as
recriminations from each side. This perceived symmetry accounts for Bin Ladens
explanations that Al-Qaeda acts merely in response to U.S. world terrorism against
the have-nots.
Terrorism is a specific form of political violence. It is an extreme form of violating
norms, causing physical harm and using illegitimate force. People decide to undertake
terrorist activities when their protest is ignored and when their challenge to the status
quo is suppressed. In order to bring about radical political change, dissidents must
mobilize the masses behind them. Once the guardians of the status quo suppress the
challengers endeavors, no other channel for their frustration remains open. At this
point, the most defiant dissidents go underground and burn all their bridges to society:
they become terrorists.
This overview of political terrorism was advanced to underline one of the major
shortcomings in contemporary theories of political conflict: most theories disregard the
role revitalized identity groups play in making conflicts more complex. The idea of
identity groups struggling for basic needs and defying the socio-political order to
obtain their goals turns the spotlight (and responsibility) from social control to
collective action [33] as the focal perspective to comprehend the essence of conflict.
One of the identity groups initial bases of strength is also a source of weakness.
Identity is nurtured by close ties, the sharing of faith and, consequently, by some
pattern of proximity (geographical, physical, historical, etc.). But this quality can also
be a predicament that might hamper the effectiveness of identity groups and shrink
their growth potential by rendering them sectarian. By being isolated mentally and
spiritually, identity groups are limited in their ability to command mass support for
their struggle. Such comprehensive support could under certain conditions cause drastic
and even total changes in the social and political system. However, the exclusive nature
of identity groups prevents them from gaining broad-based support in their struggle,
which might terminate conflict by demonstrating massive support for the groups
claims. Instead, the restrictedness of the identity group steers conflict away from swift
resolution and towards an unstable process of gradual escalation, protracted conflict
and terrorism. This explains why Al-Qaeda finds it difficult to gain the support of other
underprivileged groups in the world that are not Muslim or Arab. Had it gained such
support, its protest would have gained much more momentum, and perhaps the resort to
vicious terrorism would not have been necessary. In sum, to better understand
phenomena of protracted conflict and terror, it is necessary to shift the analysis from
the state level to that of the group level. The focus should be turned to the identity
group, the primary social group to which people belong by primordial and ancient ties.
In contrast to the state, which consists of a number of separate collective entities that
enforce loyalty by legal sanctions and law enforcement, the identity group thrives on
collective values and understandings. The states social supervision and legal system
may goad identity groups to accelerate their impulse to throw off the yoke of law and
order, instead of guiding them towards discipline and integration. Such a scenario is
imminent when the moral code of the state contradicts and endangers the groups own.
190
Conclusion
In an effort to figure out the much condemned but little understood Al-Qaeda
movement, I have concentrated on elucidating the growing function of identity groups
in social struggles and their unfulfilled needs as a source of aggression. Such an
understanding rests on shifting our attention from the associative organization the
state or society as a whole to that of the communal organization, the religious, ethnic
or national group. Conventionally, a communal organization is classified as only of
local and limited power, in contrast to the associative organization, possessor of all
resources, as well as of sovereignty and power. However, I disagree with the
conventional wisdom, which is rapidly becoming obsolete and irrelevant: identity
groups are capable of bundling resources and capabilities together and launching an
impressive attack on the political business-as-usual. By adopting a position of
returning to the study of community power, this investigation suggests that community
groups, while adhering to emotional and non-utilitarian criteria of affiliation and,
despite being limited in scope, are nevertheless capable of augmenting their power and
bolstering their motivation and resolve. Thus, carried on the wings of renewal and
rejuvenation, these groups develop a new and comprehensive way of understanding
reality [7].
At the turn of the 21st century, communal revival is flourishing all over the world,
marked by bloody ethnic riots, as for example in the Southern and Eastern Republics of
the former USSR; intertribal massacres in Africa, the latest of which were in Burundi
and Rwanda; the bitter and drawn-out confrontations on the Indian sub-continent from
Kashmir to Sri-Lanka; and of course the violent and unrelenting struggle among the
fragments of former Yugoslavia, where Serbs, Croats and Muslims tore at each others
throats. We live in a stormy and dramatic era of developments in the world arena,
characterized by the reduction in the scope of interstate conflicts, while at the same
time there is a sharp rise in internal distresses. At the center of these conflicts are
extremist identity groups. They are classified as extremists because their aims and
means deviate markedly from normative standards determined by the state.
A direct outgrowth of such fragmentary processes in the world is the phenomenon
of international terrorism on an unprecedented level of scope and intensity. The
revitalized Islamic movement Al-Qaeda is spearheading an assault on the contemporary
global order. This is a movement charged with religious ardor which has escalated into
terror under great duress. In its struggle, the movement is defying the code of
international behavior dictated, they claim, by Western interests and principles. In AlQaeda, as in other revitalized identity groups, there lurks the potential for the
destruction of the delicate fabric of mutual existence. All four criteria mentioned earlier
for the intensification of their struggle coexist: Its members experience a sincere and
profound fear of a degeneration of the national Islamic identity. They vehemently
oppose expanding Western, and mainly American, cultural and economic influence
worldwide. These misgivings drive the movement to dominate and institutionalize their
grip on its domains of influence. For this purpose, it has mounted a massive campaign
aimed at controlling resources as well as organizational operations, causing the
immediate counter-mobilization by the US and its Western allies banding together in
an attempt at curbing Al-Qaedas growing challenge.
In summation, the nature of modern global conflict is undergoing a tremendous
shake up: the crystallization of the identity group and its defiance against authorities
191
and conventional political norms and regulations are at the center of it. These changes
are expressed in the type of the conflict and its participants (from formal confrontation
between states to worldwide subversive activity, set in motion by actors from within
the state); in the intensity and frequency (from organized and planned conflict
according to accepted rules to unpredictable and unrestrained terrorism) and in its
duration (from the clear boundaries of beginning and termination, to a protracted
conflict with no end in sight.) Four possible sources might prod and sustain the
inspiration and commitment required for such defiance: religion, culture, ethnicity, and
nationalism. All four are influential in intensifying and aggravating protracted
conflicts. They are also active in the creation of hostilities and the division of societies.
The worlds current attention is concentrated on the religious factor, which gained
momentum in the last two decades of the previous century and continued into the new
one. But terrorism is far too elusive and sustainable to rely on a single source of
strength. Like a parasite, it will always find a new host to nurture it. Thus, not religions,
cultures, ethnicities or nationalities should be the target of counter-terrorism, but
grievances, afflictions and injustices, which are the real incubators and breeders of the
curse of terrorism.
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193

IOS Press, 2006
Subject Index
Afghan War
17,86
Afghani syndrome
148
Afghanistan
xii,9,10,37,87,115,116,
120,135,138,154,158,160
Air security law
94
Al-Qaeda xii,18,40,116,145,150,159,
162,171,176,177,179,181,185,189,190
America x,7,9,18,85,86,150,151,181
American policy
91,151
Anarchism
143
Anomie
139,152
Anti-terrorist coalition
149,151
Appeasement policy
15
Arabian
50,143,147
Arabs
vii,12,50,52,53,86,135,146,
147,172,173,189
Armed attack
37,48,5967
Armed force viii,x,17,48,50,55,58,59,
64,67,94,125,137,148,188
Artificial intelligence
xi,98,102,109,
124,126
Authoritarian state
8,9
Basque region
40
Biometric data
93,94
Bosnia
16,120
Bosnia Conflict
1416,19
Brigate Rosso
91
Bundestag
90,9297
Capitalist economies
134
Caucasus
ix,134,135,140,146,147,
149151,153
Caucasusphobia
140
Central Asia
135,153
Chaos
ix,xi,118,134,135,137,156,
181,185
Chauvinism
143
Chechnya
134,137,141,146,147
Chemical weapons
15,55
CIS (Commonwealth of Independent
States)
134
Civil rights
x,38,88,91,92,95,97,132
Civil society
xi,10,12,151,154,156
Civil wars
9,43,85,134
Clash of civilizations
12
Cognition
17,108,110,111
Cognitive factors
14
Cold War
86,134,135,150,151
Collaborative
31,99,102,104,106,
108,109,111,112
Contentious politics
20,21,30,35,39
Counter-terrorism
vix,xii,8,12,21,
3639,46,47,108110,113,119122,
126,129,191,192
Counter-terrorist strategy
40
Criminality
134,137,139,142,145,
147,152
Crisis
83,85,111,134,145,146,148,
155,156,183
Croatia
16
Dehumanization
16
Delinquency
57
Democracy
vi,ixxii,1,14,15,18,39,
40,43,45,54,95,118,124,135,137,140,
151,186
Deprivation 1,6,26,118,143,176,178,
180,181,187
Deterrence
97
Dialogue
vii,8,9,12,45,124,148,152
Disintegration
85,134,152
Distributed information
98,99
Domain specific language
98
Double standards
117,118
Double-bind communication
15
Eastern Europe
134
EU (European Union)
10,16,26,29,
121,126,132,148
Eurocentrism
11
Europe
9,1113,133,135,140,158,
171173
Extremism
69,92,150,180184,188,
191
Fascism
11,143
Fear
ix,xii,5,8,14,29,33,45,83,84,89,
91,92,95,96,117,118,135,140,141,
165,167,179,185,187,190
Financial networks
122,123,156
194
France
Free speech
Frustration
10,42,46,53,148
158
911,29,32,53,86,113,
118,170,178,182,187189
Fundamentalism
5,8,12,13,43,134,
140,147,150,179,183,191
Germany vi,12,88,9295,97,118,148,
171,172
Global War
8,74,124
Globalism
176,178
Globalization 8,9,13,19,72,83,8588,
134,137
Great Britain
140,148
Gulf War
14,15,19
Harmonization
15
Hegemony
8,9,11,12,47,84
Human dignity
14,18
Human rights
vi,9,11,12,14,1618,
4749,94,115,118,127,129,132,151,
158,162,175
Humanitarian disasters
134
Identification suggestions
15
Identity
3,4,6,42,43,46,83,130,137,
138,158,165,172,186,189,190
Ideology
1,4,7,23,40,42,46,136,139,
144,145,147,158,161,162,166,168,
172,180,182184,188,191
Immunization
15
Insurgency
26,39,41,152,188
International conflict
176
International law
vii,ix,x,17,41,48,
5462,64,65,67,109,118,140,
142144,151
Intifada vii,20,21,2329,3135,37,39,
163,165,170
IRA (Irish Republican Army)
3,118,
122
Iran
10,16
Iraq
9,11,15,16,76,135,138,158,
172174
Islam
viii,11,83,113,116,117,138,
147,172,174,191
Islamophobia
140
Israel 911,21,24,25,2733,35,37,38,
49,5154,126,158,164,174,185
IT systems
108
Italy
12,91
Jihad
v,11,27,69,115,116,145,159
Justice
vi,6,7,9,15,30,49,63,118,119,
136,142,146,162,168,174,185
Koran
27,83
Law enforcement
xii,119,122,123,
127130,132,189
Liberal state
vvii,xi,7,9,12,87
Liberalism
39,43,151
Liberation
44,49,114,116
Liberation movement 10,85,117,118,
137,146
Liberties vi,vii,ix,x,18,88,91,92,132,
155,156
Localism
178
Mediation
17
Middle East
5,38,39,52,54,135
Military intervention
17,135
Military logic
14,16
Monism
181,184
Moralism
181,184
Motivational logic
15,16
Motivation
vii,viii,xii,1,4,11,3739,
49,54,124,146,158,159,161,164,165,
168174,176,179,182,190
Movements of liberation
85
NATO
vi,9,12,64,125,126,129,130,
132,133,148,151
New World Order
9,10,15,16,19,
150,151
Nuclear weapons
10,15,114,148
Open society
v,vi,ix,1,176
Oppression
10,27,37,48,49,54,67,
136,155
Pakistan
116
Palestine 9,10,24,39,49,50,53,86,120,
159,161
Palestinian v,viii,11,21,2329,3135,
3739,4952,54,159,160,162165,
169,170,172,173
Participation
1,3,46,39,57,59,131,
135,149
Peace enforcement
17
Peace logic
14,16
Peacemaking
17
Peer-2-peer
98
Pentagon
17,90
Persian Gulf
15,135,145
Political opportunities
20,26,35
Populism
176,181,184
195
Portugal
148
Post-fundamentalism
13
Propaganda 1419,45,47,113,119,188
Racism
11,43,143
RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion)
91,93
Rasterfahndung
93
Redemption
158,172
Regional conflicts
120
Regional co-operation
8,13
Regional integration
134
Repression 20,28,30,39,43,44,46,91,
155,187,188
Resistance
vii,8,10,11,14,84,87,90,
118,144,146,155,156,187
Risk assessment
8890
Root causes of terrorism
48,67
Russia
134,135,140,143,145149
Saudi Arabia
49,50,145,172
Second World War
15
Security
vi,ixxi,4,9,31,48,54,57,
6063,6567,8897,99,103,104,107,
109,111,119,131,132,135,142144,
149152,175
Self-defence
6166,113
September 11 x,14,17,18,20,29,33,40,
4850,53,61,67,92,104,117,
151,154,176,188
Serbia
16
Simplism
181,184
Slovenia
16
Sociology
108,109
Software agents
98,99,102,106,107
Soviet Union
115,134,143,153
Spain
9,12,40,42,43,4547,171
Sri Lanka
State terrorism
138,152
vii,xi,5,8,10,11,87,
137,140,142,143,154
Subjectivity
12
Sudan
10
Suicide terrorism viii,25,27,29,3335,
38,39,158166,168,170,171,
173175
Syria
10
Tanzim
viii,2038
Topology
98,105107
Trauma
138,158,160163,165,167,
168,171,172,174,176
Turkey
148,159
Two-sided messages
15
UN (United Nations)
9,10,15,41,
5456,5862,67,86,113,118,120,
121,134
Uni-polar system
10
US patriot act
88
USA
x,9,10,12,17,18,23,26,29,37,
41,104,105,118,125,126,132135,
140,148,150,151,190
Victim
9
Violence
vii,viii,2,79,11,12,15,18,
20,21,26,31,35,3742,44,47,52,64,
66,8386,91,113,114,117,120,121,
125,134138,149,152156,165,172,
176,177,182,185,191,192
War on Terror
15,48,69,154
World Trade Center
17,50,90
Yugoslavia
16,60,77,134,138,190
Zero-Sum orientation
14
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197

IOS Press, 2006
Author Index
Abu Rashid, M.
Alimi, E.Y.
Aviles, J.
Benabdallaoui, M.
Bligh, A.
Feinstein, B.A.
Fouhy, J.
Hadar, E.
Hadar, I.
113
20
40
83
124
48
122
98
108
Hanafi, H.
Hovhannesian, D.
Kempf, W.
Meyer, B.
Nadvi, L.
Peleg, S.
Speckhard, A.
Vorkunova, O.A.
8
134
14
88
154
v, 1, 176
158
134
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FIGHTING TERRORISM IN THE LIBERAL STATE

NATO Security through Science Series

Chemistry and Biology

Springer Science and Business Media

Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics Vol. 9

Fighting Terrorism in the

Amsterdam Berlin Oxford Tokyo Washington, DC

2006 IOS Press.

Distributor in the USA and Canada

Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State

because a consideration of the cognitive processes of decision-makers, the associations

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may expedite motion toward this future. A passionate certitude of a cataclysmic

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arose in the fifties and the sixties: decolonization, liberation movements,

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