1st ASEAN Conference on Humanities and Social Sciences

28-30 May 2015, Vientiane, Lao PDR.

22 May 2014 and Coup d'Etat in Thailand

Wanwichit Boonprong*

Abstract
Coup dtat has turned into an ultimate means to address matters in Thai politics through overthrowing civil
administration by military junta for the past two decades. The 1991 and 2006 coups were instigated by the governments
unlawful behaviours, corruption, and negligence to protect the monarchy, which led to a righteous cause for such coups.
However, the coup on 22 May 2014 differed from those in the past as the circumstance of political demonstration would have
brought lawlessness into Thai politics. This paper intends to examine the root cause of the coups in the past three decades.
The result has reveal two associating factors: 1) influence of the Royal Thai Army in Thai politics, and 2) growth and
potential of the middle class, both of which have always been the provisions of coup dtat that military juntas often exploit to
restore order in Thai politics.
Keywords: Coup d'tat, Royal Thai Army, Middle Class

Introduction
In regard to theories of Thailands recent civil-military relations, particularly the concept of military intervention in
politics through coup d'tat of military juntas, who deemed the countrys political situations critical and thus implemented
measures to break down insoluble problems, as in the case of Egypt which is comparable to Thailands situation in some
aspects. Varol (2013) has proposed a new conception on coup d'tat in Egypt in 2013 that intervention in politics is
democratic coup, which contested general context of political sciences that views coups d'tat degrade democracy. Varol
has established seven attributes that constitute democratic coups: (1) the coup is staged against an authoritarian or totalitarian
regime; (2) the military responds to persistent popular opposition against that regime; (3) the authoritarian or totalitarian
regime refuses to step down in response to the popular uprising; (4) the coup is staged by a military that is highly respected
*

Lecturer, Faculty of Political Science, College of Government, Rangsit University; Email: wanwichit.b@rsu.ac.th

1st ASEAN Conference on Humanities and Social Sciences

28-30 May 2015, Vientiane, Lao PDR.
within the nation, ordinarily because of mandatory conscription; (5) the military stages the coup to overthrow the authoritarian
or totalitarian regime; (6) the military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time; and (7) the coup ends with
the transfer of power to democratically elected leaders (2012: 300), though eventually the situation in Egypt turned into a
violent bloodshed, as the overthrown civil government had a great number of supporters, and the former Egyptian leader also
came from election by the people.
Although differing from his own conception, he also published an academic paper titled The Military as the
Guardian of Constitutional Democracy, disclosing that democratic coup dtat must be staged through legal channels, or
democracy has become a rightful tool to resolve issues of nation that went into crisis or riot (2012: 30).
Whereas Intawong (2008: 30) has summed up the concept of military intervention into two aspects; first, such
intervention originates from faults in social structure, failure of civil administration and political institutions, and second,
reinforcement of military organisations; the armed forces are considered sounder, more independent, and more advanced than
any other organisation, so any interventions would intend to drag the society out of underdevelopment.
In case studies of civil government overthrow through coup dtat in African countries, Sierra Leone (1968), Ghana
(1978), Sudan (1985), and Niger (1999), which were glazed with deceptions and positive attitudes toward the coups, in
perspectives of the military juntas, it was often believed that civil government lacks capabilities and efficiency to solve
economic issues, poverty, social disharmony, corruption, and lead the country to democratic transition, consequently saving
the country from chronic issues, and also re-establishing central governing authority of the state (Miller, 2011: 45-49), similar
to the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) that intends to reorganise politics, economy, and the society to order.
While Chambers (2011: 226-229) analysed that Thai military juntas possess political ideals or construct their own
political ideals in accordance with the main institutions of the country, particularly the institution of power into the monarch
since 1957, which the armed forces have a duty to protect with loyalty, in addition to being the spiritual centre of the nation,
bringing harmony into the people, in times of challenges from other ideals, such as communism which can spoil the stability
of the nation and its primary institutions.
So, the aforementioned concepts and theories were all relative to circumstances of Thai politics. This paper intends
to examine the root cause of the coup on 22 May 2014. The result reveals 1) the influence of the Royal Thai Army in Thai
politics, and 2) the growth and potentials of the middle class, which accelerate the overthrowing process of the military junta
under the lead of General Prayut Chan-o-cha, the then Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army. The details can be
explicated as follows:

Royal Thai Armys influence in Thai politics

Looking back in the history of Thai politics, it could be observed that the Royal Thai Army has become a major
player in political intervention through coup dtat, which had both achieved success for many times and failed to overthrow
the government, rendering them rebels, for 11 times (Petchlertanan, 2550: 17). To transform political power or oversee that
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the country is in harmony is an important duty of the army, especially of figures who hold supreme authority, or the
commander in chief. If an agreement to intervene in politics from the commander-in-chief has not been reached, it would be
difficult to reconstruct politics. Moreover, the roles of the armed forces in politics, apart from defending the nation, also
include instilling national consciousness, focusing on protecting the monarchy. After the 1947 coup, the Army had reinstated
the power of the monarch in creating symbols of harmony and unity within the country. Annual activities of the royal court
and armed forces have made the people acknowledge such close relationship between the two institutions.
The armed forces are a part of organisations that protect the country and also developed mutual relationship between
the forces and civilians to the point of close relation in national development. It cannot be denied that, on several occasions,
the people, particularly the mass media, tend to give importance to comments of leaders in the armed forces in circumstances
that the country is on the verge of troubles, or perspectives on political issues in a manner of care for the nation, which
sometimes become seeds of fears to civilian government against such leaders who deviate from the government, led to
displacements of key positions in the army. In some cases, the armed forces have to retreated and been pressured by the
government until compelled to intervene, despite the withdrawal of the armed forces roles to an extent. (Boonprong, 2014: 56).
The events have in turn become causes of political conflicts and increased the number of frustrated individuals
against the armys role of political intervention, resulting in expansion of United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship
(UDD) supporters. It is generally known that opposing beliefs between the government and the protesters lead to severe
conflicts, pushing the armed forces to implement measures to reclaim public areas against the protesters, who occupied
economic zones in the heart of Bangkok, resulting in bloodshed, injury, and death. (Thabchumpon and Mccargo, 2011: 993994). However, the inclination of democracy in this era of borderless communications that has been fired up brought about the
development of national consciousness among the people, greatly diminishing the power and influence of bureaucratic groups
accordingly.
Still, the political roles of the armed forces have come to light once again following the six-month protest of
People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), who rallied a vast number of people to express frustration and challenged
the administration of Yingluck Shinawatra, the prime minister who tried to push the amnesty bill that would have benefitted
certain figures in governments party, resulting in violence and loss of many of those who opposed the government.
To prevent impending turmoil, the then Commander in Chief of Royal Thai Army enacted martial laws in order to
install military forces to restore order, and used the opportunity to establish a middle platform between the two opposing
parties of the government and leaders of protesters to negotiate for resolution to political conflicts, so as to avoid
confrontations between the two parties (Wadhwaney,2014), which would spoil the image of the nation. Still, the opposing
parties only proposed schemes which were not satisfactory to one another and never reached settlement, so the commander in
chief had to stage a coup on 22 May 2014 to address political issues which were orientated towards a dead-end, difficult to
attain a compromise without punishing or counteracting such groups that hold opposing political standpoints against the coup,

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and tried to instigate an impression of power seizing to bring about the process of harmony among the people in the country
(Alagappa,2014: 1-2).
Nevertheless, the influence of the army in Thai politics has been moulded into experiences for the military juntas
who have witnessed the coups of the last two decades that coup dtat might be the neatest solution for Thai political culture.
When considering the career advancement of military leaders of the National Council for Peace and Order, it should be
observable that they were all associated with key units of the Royal Thai Army in the last three coups in Thailand, as detailed
in the table below;
Table 1 Career Advancement of Military Leaders of National Council for Peace and Order
Ranks and Posts in the Royal Thai Army as of 23 February 1991 Coup dtats
Prawit Wongsuwan
Anupong
Prayut Chan-o-cha
Udomdej Sitabutr
Paochinda
Commanding
Chief of Staff of
Commanding General of Commander of Cadet
Officer of the 12th
the 21st Infantry 2nd Infantry Division, 21st
Regimen, Armed
Infantry Regiment Regiment (Queen's Infantry Regiment (Queen's Forces Academies
(Queens Guard)
Guard) (Colonel)
Guard) (Lieutenant
Preparatory School
(Colonel)
Colonel)
(Lieutenant Colonel)
Ranks and Posts in the Royal Thai Army as of 19 September 2006 Coup dtats
Prawit Wongsuwan Anupong Paochinda
Prayut Chan-o-cha
Udomdej Sitabutr
Former Commander1st Army Area
The 1st Army Area
Dupety Commanding
in-Chief
Commander
Commander (Major
General of the 1st
(Lieutenant General)
General)
Division (Kings
Guard)
(Colonel)
Ranks and Posts in the Royal Thai Army as of 22 May 2014 Coup dtats
Prawit Wongsuwan Anupong Paochinda
Prayut Chan-o-cha
Udomdej Sitabutr
Former Commander- Former Commander- Commander-in-Chief
Deputy Commanderin-Chief
in-Chief
in-Chief

Paibul Khumchaya
Commanding General
of 2nd Infantry
Division, 11th Infantry
Regiment (Lieutenant
Colonel)
Paibul Khumchaya
Commander of the 1st
Infantry Regiment
(Kings Guard)
(Colonel)

Paibul Khumchaya
Assistant
Commander-in-Chief
(General)

From Table 1, it can be seen that five military leaders were on career paths of certain importance and it has been
highly expected of military officers in the Royal Thai Army for the last two decades that the five leaders engage in
determination to intervene in politics of the armed forces, both directly or indirectly, from the time when they were lower in

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ranks until risen to high ranks. It is possible that the last two coups on the five leaders watch have certain influence to their
paradigm to establish a stand and attitude towards Thai political system. After the coup of 22 May 2014, the five leaders have
also held political positions, reflecting the influence of the armed forces in Thai politics; General Udomdej Sitabutr has
succeeded General Prayut Chan-o-cha, who retired as commander-in-chief, holding just the positions of prime minister and
head of military junta. The coup was intended to keep peace in the manner of guided semi-democracy in order to bring
country into order as in the era of General Prem Tinsulanonda, president of the Privy Council and a former prime minister.
The commander believed that the guided semi-democracy regime would be more effective than participatory democracy
(International Crisis Group, 2014:24-25)
Furthermore, the military officers who were close and involved in networks of the five leaders were all granted
rewards to hold positions on the State Enterprise Committee, as detailed in Table 2 below;
Table 2 List of Military Officers on State Enterprise Committee
Name and Rank in the Military
General Paiboon Koomchaya / Deputy Supreme Commander
General Yodyuth Boonyatikarn / Public Servant
Genera Chatchalerm Chalermsukh / Chief of Staff
General Patamapong Prathompat / Army Senior Expert
General Sirichai Distakul / Permanent Secretary for Defence
General Wilas Aroonsri / Former Army Senior Expert
General Walit Rojanapakdee / Deputy Chief of Joint Staff
Lieutenant General Supakorn Sa-Nguanchartsornkrai /
Deputy Chief of Staff
Lieutenant General Kampanat Ruddit / 1st Army Area
Commander
Lieutenant General Theppong Tippayachan / 1st Army Corps
Commander
Major General Chalongrat Nakartit / Army Expert
Major General Wara Boonyasit / 1st Army Area Deputy
Commander

State Enterprise Affiliation

PTT Public Company Limited
Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRTA)
Port of Thailand
Expressway Authority of Thailand
CAT Telecom Public Company Limited
Thailand Tobacco
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand
Government Pharmaceutical Organization
Airports of Thailand PLC
Provincial Waterworks Authority
The Government Lottery Office
Bangkok Mass Transit Authority (BMTA)

Table 2 shows that many military officers have assumed positions on a committee or executives in state enterprises
to oversee such organisations to adhere to policies of the government and National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO).
Besides, the rejection against the officers who assumed the positions was lesser than that of politicians, who often questioned

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by civil society sector if the assumption is intended for exploitation since politicians in state enterprises hold great benefits,
due to the belief that the armed forces have less conflict of interest issues than politicians.

Growth and Potential of the Middle Class

Political participation of the middle class has started for at least two decades, as evidenced by the mobile phone
mob which relayed political movements until the military government stepped down in May 1992 (Boonprong, 2000: 45).
Even the gathering of people who began to protest against Thaksins administration in 2005 on basis of corrupted
agenda and the governments attitude against the monarch led to the protest to overthrow the government (Phongpaichit and
Baker, 2009: 250-257).
During the past years, a political conscious has made its way into a group of people who call themselves the middle
class. The original middle class are the people who resides in Bangkok and surrounding provinces, and those who migrate to
Bangkok for education and work and become a group of people who hold strong political, economic, and social power and a
key political foundation when administrative policies benefit them. Moreover, the relative conservatism has some influence
on their own belief. If the opposition tries to challenge their belief, they would be ready to counter strongly if they believe that
what the government exploits on their campaigns affect their way of life and see that they are losing advantages. These middle
class also deeply feel that people in provincial areas can be easily manipulated by corrupted politicians and propaganda since
they work as labour and have low income, thus not using as much professional skills as they are, as evidenced by the results
of elections over past decade, where the majority of provincial people voted for Thaksins party because they loved his
campaigns and benefits that his government provided for them (Ngyenu, Poling and Rustici, 2014: 4).
The development of political conscious of the middle class in Thailands capital has caused confusion to liberalist
political scientists like Lipset, who stated that the more middle class people are, the more democratic or the proposal of
Alexis de Tocqueville that views the middle class as sentinels for tyranny of the majority. This conflict against the behaviour
against the democracy of modern middle-class has led to the call for military intervention to overthrow the corrupted
government, as well as the movements in the past that oriented towards the military actions against protesters who occupied
the heart of the city.
The belief of Thai middle-class who would rather pay taxes in exchange for quality public service, safety, and social
stability, instead of using corrupted taxes to help poor provincial people through propaganda, which leads to bringing middleclass conception about revoking voting rights of provincial citizens or inferior votes derived from vote-buying, so the demand
for transparent political system goes against the need for equality among provincial inhabitants, becoming a chronic conflict
in Thai society for long period of time (Saxer, 2014: 164-167).
The second middle-class group, who hold a different political conscious from the first and was less true middleclass than the middle class in the city, was a democratic political conscious towards equality and social justice. This group
build themselves as labour, agriculturalists, or low income group due to limitations of income and education, and many are
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still under average. This group calls themselves the Red Shirts but was disrespected by people in the city as grass roots
and viewed as a tool for politicians who tend to buy votes. This Red Shirt group mainly resides in northern and northeastern
regions who love and gets benefits from populist policies of Thaksins and Yinglucks governments.
The uprising of city middle-class when Pheu Thai Party tried to push the amnesty bill, which they saw as an
intention to help Thaksin Shinawatra, former prime minister who was corrupted, as well as the gathering of the people and
politicians from Democrat Party who had the majority of support in Bangkok to overthrow Pheu Thai government, hoping to
cleanse Thai politics from bad politicians or those suspicious in loyalty since the gathering of the yellow shirt in 2005. These
yellow shirt people turned to wear national flag patterned shirt under Suthep Thaugsuban, a leader from Democrat Party, in
the name of People's Democratic Reform Committee, intended to preserve national interests and purge Thai political systems
from dirty corrupted politicians. Said intention pleased the leaders and the city middle class. The gathering began in the late of
September 2014; hundreds of thousands participated and the majority of which were city middle class, corporate employees
and entrepreneurs, who rejected Yingluck Shinawatras administration. The gathering lasted several months and throughout
which the leaders of protestors often orientated towards the protesters movement, even when the government withdrew the
amnesty bill to reduce the tension among people in the society and dissolved the government for a new election, but the
discontent had already progressed toward obstruction of elections in many areas by the protestors. Ultimately, there were a
group of bad persons taking advantage of the circumstance and caused violence until there were many injuries and casualties
among the protestors (Marshall, 2014: 190-204).
Eventually, a military junta under the lead of General Prayut Chan-o-cha, then Commander in Chief of the Royal
Thai Army, who had always taken a neutral stand, came up to prevent violent circumstances that could progress into a civil
war and a dead-end to Thai politics. Martial law was enacted on 20 May 2014 to hold back irreconcilable political attitudes,
and then a coup was staged on 22 May 2014, introducing a concept of returning the happiness to the people to the country
under the administration of the military junta (Marshall, 2014: 183-184), so as to advance the nation in manners as customary
as possible.
The 22 May 2014 coup might not be the last coup dtat in Thailand, as long as the armed forces hold strong
influence on Thai politics. It is expected that the forces will hold onto the influence on Thai politics for a very long time, and
the take on of the role to be the middle party in conflict resolution or the establishment of transformation framework on Thai
politics that the commanders want will certainly drag Thai politics into a vicious cycle. Furthermore, the middle class want
the armed forces to intervene and handle political circumstances susceptible to conflict and violence, leaving no room for
conventional courses of problem solving in democratic fashion. The middle-class also have to change the attitude toward
provincial people. Economic growth and decentralisation will bring about a new breed of middle-class as by-product of such
advancement, and partially impart this new group with political conscious of equality and acknowledge the democratic
approaches that deem peaceful political power transformation practicable. If Thailand ever progresses to that point, the stance
or role of the armed forces in Thai politics might shift to the point where a coup is disregarded in solving political issues.

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