Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
FEDERICO
JARANTILLA,
JR.
vs.
ANTONIETA
JARANTILLA,
BUENAVENTURA REMOTIGUE, SUBSTITUTED BY CYNTHIA REMOTIGUE,
DOROTEO JARANTILLA and TOMAS JARANTILLA (2010)
Under Article 1767 of the Civil Code, there are two essential elements in a
contract of partnership: (a) an agreement to contribute money, property or
industry to a common fund; and (b) intent to divide the profits among the
contracting parties. The first element is undoubtedly present in the case at
bar, for, admittedly, all the parties in this case have agreed to, and did,
contribute money and property to a common fund. Hence, the issue narrows
down to their intent in acting as they did. And in the present case, there was
no intent to form a partnership.
Facts:
1. In 1948, the eight (8) Jarantilla heirs extrajudicially partitioned the real
properties of their deceased parents, Andres and Felisa. (Some
produce went to fund the studies of Rafael and Antonieta Jarantilla).
2. In the same year, the spouses Rosita Jarantilla and Vivencio
Deocampo entered into a Joint Business Relationship agreement with
the spouses Conchita Jarantilla and Buenaventura Remotigue.
3. This business relationship became successful and spawned other
businesses, including acquiring buildings and other real properties
subject of this case.
4. In 1973, the partners agreed to dissolve their "joint business
relationship/arrangement."
5. Before this, on 1957, the spouses Remotigue executed a document
wherein they acknowledged that while registered only in
Buenaventura Remotigue's name, they were not the only owners of
the capital of the businesses Manila Athletic Supply (712 Raon Street,
Manila), Remotigue Trading (Calle Real, Iloilo City) and Remotigue
Trading (Cotabato City).
6. In this same "Acknowledgement of Participating Capital," they
stated the participating capital of their co-owners as of the year 1952,
with Antonieta Jarantilla's stated as eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00)
and Federico Jarantilla, Jr.'s as five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
7. In 1987, Antonieta (aunt of the petitioner) filed a case against
Buenaventura Remotigue, Cynthia Remotigue, Federico Jarantilla, Jr.
(grandchild of the Andres and who later joined his aunt as petitioner),
Doroteo Jarantilla and Tomas Jarantilla (brothers of Federico, Jr.), for
the accounting of the assets and income of the co-ownership, for its
partition and the delivery of her share corresponding to eight
percent (8%), and for damages.
8. Antonieta claimed that the initial contribution of property and money
came from the heirs' inheritance. She also claimed co-ownership of
certain properties (QC, Rizal and Cotabato), since the only way the
defendants could have purchased these properties were through the
partnership as they had no other source of income.
9. DEFENSE: No partnership. In 1946, Antonieta was still in school and
the proceeds of a certain land was used to pay for her schooling. If
she helped Conchita in the business, she was paid a salary. The 8%
WON Federico is part owner of the subject properties in QC, Rizal and
Cotabato? NO. Only those mentioned in the said 1957 document.
Held/Ratio: CA decision affirmed.
1. There is a co-ownership when an undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons. It is a partnership when two or more persons bind
themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common
fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves.
2. Art. 1797. The losses and profits shall be distributed in
conformity with the agreement. If only the share of each partner
in the profits has been agreed upon, the share of each in the losses
shall be in the same proportion.
In the absence of stipulation, the share of each partner in the
profits and losses shall be in proportion to what he may have
contributed, but the industrial partner shall not be liable for the
losses. As for the profits, the industrial partner shall receive such
share as may be just and equitable under the circumstances. If
besides his services he has contributed capital, he shall also receive a
share in the profits in proportion to his capital. (Emphases supplied.)
3. Federico is not a partner. He is a co-owner but only to those properties
enumerated in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. Since
there was a clear agreement that the capital the partners contributed
went to the three businesses, then there is no reason to deviate from
such agreement and go beyond the stipulations in the document.
4. Petitioner has not presented evidence, other than unsubstantiated
testimonies, to prove that the respondents did not have the means to
fund their other businesses and real properties without the
and (c) whatever is left of the assets becomes available for the payment of
the partners' shares.
Facts:
02
G.R. No. 144214
PANGANIBAN, J.:
cvflores
Short Version:
Facts: Managers of the partnership closed the business. When one partner
asked for the return of his capital, the managers refused to pay. The
managers based their refusal due to business losses and that they have
delivered furniture and equipment to the partner as settlement for his capital.
The partner filed a case against the managers.
Held: It is the partnership not the managers that must refund the equity of the
retiring partners. The exact amount of refund for the capital contribution
cannot determined until (a) all the partnership assets have been liquidated in
other words, sold and converted to cash (b) all the creditors have been paid;
The delivery of the store furniture and equipment to Ramirez was for the
purpose of storage and not for the settlement of their capital contribution.
(3) SC made no pronouncement as to costs. Although, as a rule, costs are
adjudged against the losing party, courts have discretion, "for special
reasons," to decree otherwise. When a lower court is reversed, the higher
court normally does not award costs, because the losing party relied on
the lower court's judgment which is presumed to have been issued in
good faith, even if found later on to be erroneous.
(1) whether petitioners are liable to respondents for the latter's share in the
partnership;
(2) whether the CA's computation of P253,114 as respondents' share is
correct; and
(3) whether the CA was likewise correct in not assessing costs.
SC granted the petition but without prejudice to proper proceedings for the
accounting, the liquidation and the distribution of the remaining partnership
assets, if any.
Ruling:
03
(1) Villareal and Jose are not liable. It is the partnership not the managers
that must refund the equity of the retiring partners. The partnership has
a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of each of the
partners. Except as managers of the partnership, petitioners did not
personally hold its equity or assets. The dissolution took place when
Ramirez informed petitioners of the intention to discontinue because of
dissatisfaction with, and loss of trust in, the management of the
partnership affairs.
(2) The exact amount of refund for the capital contribution cannot
determined until
a. all the partnership assets have been liquidated in other words,
sold and converted to cash
b. all the creditors have been paid
c. whatever is left of the assets becomes available for the payment
of the partners' shares
The CA computation was erroneous.
ELIGIO ESTANISLAO, JR. vs. CA, REMEDIOS ESTANISLAO, EMILIO and LEOCADIO
SANTIAGO
GANCAYCO, J.: G.R. No. L-49982 April 27, 1988
cvflores
Short Version:
Facts: Estanislao siblings were the owners of certain lots in QC leased to Shell.
The siblings wanted to open a gas station so they negotiated with Shell. In a
joint affidavit, the siblings, as co-owners, asked Shell for advance rentals up to
P15k. However said joint affidavit was cancelled in a subsequent document
where the siblings waived in favour of their brother, Eligio the rentals due to
them from Shell. Eligio then assigned the rentals to Shell which was supposed
to be applied by Shell as Eligios additional security. At first, Eligio submitted
financial statements to his other siblings but therafter failed to render
subsequent accounting. The other siblings then filed a suit. Eligio contended
that there was no partnership.
Held: There was a partnership. Eligio was named sole dealer only because of
Shells policy of appointing only 1 dealer. Eligio submitted periodic
accounting of the business. He gave a written authority to his sister, to
examine and audit the books of their "common business. His sister also
assisted in the running of the business.
Facts:
The parties to this case are brothers and sisters. They are co-owners of
certain lots at the corner of Annapolis and Aurora Blvd., Quezon City.
The lots were leased to Shell Company of the Philippines Limited (Shell).
There is no doubt that the parties hereto formed a partnership when they
bound themselves to contribute money to a common fund with the intention
of dividing the profits among themselves.
The sole dealership by Eligio and the issuance of all government permits and
licenses in his name was in compliance with the aforestated policy of Shell
and the understanding of the parties of having only one dealer of the Shell
products.
04. LITONJUA vs LITONJUA
AURELIO K. LITONJUA, JR., Petitioner, vs. EDUARDO K. LITONJUA, SR.,
ROBERT T. YANG, ANGLO PHILS. MARITIME, INC., CINEPLEX, INC., DDM
GARMENTS, INC., EDDIE K. LITONJUA SHIPPING AGENCY, INC., EDDIE
K. LITONJUA SHIPPING CO., INC., LITONJUA SECURITIES, INC.
(formerly E. K. Litonjua Sec), LUNETA THEATER, INC., E & L REALTY,
(formerly E & L INTL SHIPPING CORP.), FNP CO., INC., HOME
ENTERPRISES, INC., BEAUMONT DEV. REALTY CO., INC., GLOED LAND
CORP., EQUITY TRADING CO., INC., 3D CORP., L DEV. CORP, LCM
THEATRICAL ENTERPRISES, INC., LITONJUA SHIPPING CO. INC.,
MACOIL INC., ODEON REALTY CORP., SARATOGA REALTY, INC., ACT
THEATER INC. (formerly General Theatrical & Film Exchange, INC.),
AVENUE REALTY, INC., AVENUE THEATER, INC. and LVF PHILIPPINES,
INC., (Formerly VF PHILIPPINES), Respondents.
December 13, 2005
GARCIA, J.
Petition for Review of a Decision of the CA
FACTS: Aurelio and Eduardo are brothers. Yang and the other corporations just
got involved because they are allegedly holdings and/or members of the
partnership.
In 1973, Aurelio alleged that Eduardo entered into a contract of partnership
with him. Aurelio showed as evidence a letter sent to him by Eduardo (Annex
A) that the latter is allowing Aurelio to manage their family business (if
Eduardos away) and in exchange thereof he will be giving Aurelio P1 million
or 10% equity, whichever is higher. A memorandum was subsequently made
for the said partnership agreement. The memorandum this time stated that in
exchange of Aurelio, who just got married, retaining his share in the family
business (movie theatres, shipping and land development) and some other
immovable properties, he will be given P1 Million or 10% equity in all these
businesses and those to be subsequently acquired by them whichever is
greater.
In 1992 however, the relationship between the brothers went sour. And so
Aurelio demanded an accounting and the liquidation of his share in the
partnership. Eduardo did not heed and so Aurelio sued Eduardo to render an
accounting and annotate on the titles of these real properties a notice of lis
pendens . Aurelio alleges that Eduardo and the other partners are transferring
various real properties of the corporations belonging to the joint
venture/partnership to other parties in fraud of Aurelio.
Eduardo filed an answer with affirmative defenses. He denies ever having
gone into a partnership with Aurelio and argues that there is no cause of
action since one cannot be derived from the actionable document. (Referring
to Annex A, in that it does not show the existence of a partnership.) He argues
that the contents are void under the terms of Article 1767 in relation to Article
1773 of the Civil Code further alleges that whatever undertaking Eduardo
agreed to do under Annex A are unenforceable under the provisions of the
Statute of Frauds.
In an Omnibus Order, the trial court denied the affirmative defenses and later
denied the MR as well. Yang filed an MTD which was dismissed. Yang filed an
answer reserving his right to file for reconsideration on the dismissal of his
MTD. Eduardo filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the omnibus
order on the contention that grave abuse of discretion and injudicious haste
attended the issuance of the trial courts aforementioned Omnibus Orders.
Yang also filed a petition for certiorari on the dismissal of his MTD. The CA
consolidated both petitions and reversed the trial court, dismissing the
complaint of Aurelio.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a partnership. (NO)
RATIO: A partnership exists when two or more persons agree to place their
money, effects, labor, and skill in lawful commerce or business, with the
understanding that there shall be a proportionate sharing of the profits and
losses between them. A contract of partnership is defined by the Civil Code as
one where two or more persons bound themselves to contribute money,
property, or industry to a common fund with the intention of dividing the
profits among themselves. A joint venture, on the other hand, is hardly
distinguishable from, and may be likened to, a partnership since their
elements are similar, i.e., community of interests in the business and sharing
of profits and losses. Being a form of partnership, a joint venture is generally
governed by the law on partnership.
Given the foregoing perspective, what the CA said about the probative value
and legal effect of Annex A commends itself for concurrence:
Considering that the allegations in the complaint showed that Aurelio
contributed immovable properties to the alleged partnership, the
Memorandum (Annex A) which purports to establish the said
partnership/joint venture is NOT a public instrument and there was NO
inventory of the immovable property duly signed by the parties. As such, said
Memorandum is null and void for purposes of establishing the existence of a
valid contract of partnership. Indeed, because of the failure to comply with
the essential formalities of a valid contract, the purported partnership/joint
venture is legally inexistent and it produces no effect whatsoever.
Necessarily, a void or legally inexistent contract cannot be the source of any
contractual or legal right. Accordingly, the allegations in the complaint,
including the actionable document attached thereto, clearly demonstrates
that Aurelio has NO valid contractual or legal right which could be violated by
Eduardo or Yang. As a consequence, Aurelios complaint does NOT state a
valid cause of action because NOT all the essential elements of a cause of
action are present.
The documentary evidence presented by Aurelio, i.e. the letter from Eduardo
and the Memorandum, did not prove partnership.
The 1973 letter from Eduardo on its face, contains typewritten entries,
personal in tone, but is unsigned and undated. As an unsigned document,
there can be no quibbling that said letter does not meet the public
instrumentation requirements exacted under Article 1771 (how partnership is
constituted) of the Civil Code. Moreover, being unsigned and doubtless
referring to a partnership involving more than P3,000.00 in money or
property, said letter cannot be presented for notarization, let alone registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as called for under the
Article 1772 (capitalization of a partnership) of the Code. And inasmuch as the
inventory requirement under the succeeding Article 1773 goes into the matter
of validity when immovable property is contributed to the partnership, the
next logical point of inquiry turns on the nature of Aurelios contribution, if
any, to the supposed partnership.
It is at once apparent that what Eduardo imposed upon himself under the
above passage, if he indeed wrote Annex A, is a promise which is not to be
performed within one year from contract execution on June 22, 1973.
Accordingly, the agreement covered by the Statute of Frauds and ergo
unenforceable for non-compliance therewith. By force of the statute of frauds,
an agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the
making thereof shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some
note or memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party
charged. Corollarily, no action can be proved unless the requirement exacted
by the statute of frauds is complied with.
The Memorandum is also not a proof of the partnership for the same is not a
public instrument and again, no inventory was made of the immovable
property and no inventory was attached to the Memorandum. Article 1773 of
the Civil Code requires that if immovable property is contributed to the
partnership an inventory shall be had and attached to the contract.
Per the Courts own count, Aurelio used in his complaint the mixed words
joint venture/partnership nineteen (19) times and the term partner four
(4) times. He made reference to the law of joint venture/partnership [being
applicable] to the business relationship between [him], Eduardo and Bobby
[Yang] and to his rights in all specific properties of their joint
venture/partnership. Given this consideration, Aurelios right of action
against Eduardo and Yang doubtless pivots on the existence of the
partnership between the three of them, as purportedly evidenced by the
undated and unsigned Annex A. A void Annex A, as an actionable document of
partnership, would strip petitioner of a cause of action under the premises. A
complaint for delivery and accounting of partnership property based on such
void or legally non-existent actionable document is dismissible for failure to
state of action. So, in gist, said the Court of Appeals. The Court agrees.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED; Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
-Mike
05
(3)
The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership,
whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or
interest in any property from which the returns are derived
From the above it appears that the fact that those who agree to form a coownership share or do not share any profits made by the use of the property
held in common does not convert their venture into a partnership. Or the
sharing of the gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership whether
or not the persons sharing therein have a joint or common right or interest in
the property. This only means that, aside from the circumstance of profit, the
presence of other elements constituting partnership is necessary, such as the
clear intent to form a partnership, the existence of a juridical personality
different from that of the individual partners, and the freedom to transfer or
assign any interest in the property by one with the consent of the others.
An isolated transaction whereby two or more persons contribute funds to buy
certain real estate for profit in the absence of other circumstances showing a
contrary intention cannot be considered a partnership.
[The SC relied heavily on Evangelista v. Collector (G.R. No. 9996, Oct.
15,1957,102 Phil. 140), by comparing it with the instant case. In Evangelista,
Petitioners contributed to a common fund to buy real properties rented or
leased to various tenants for several years, with the intention to earn profits.
The SC found them to have formed a partnership liable for corporate income
tax because: (1) said common fund was not something they found already in
existence; (2) they invested the same, not merely in one transaction, but in a
series of transactions; (3) The lots were not devoted to residential purposes or
to other personal uses of petitioners but were leased separately to several
persons; (4) the properties have been under the management of one person,
with full power to lease, to collect rents, to issue receipts, to bring suits, to
sign letters and contracts, and to indorse and deposit notes and checks, and
thus, the affairs relative to said properties have been handled as if the same
belonged to a corporation or business enterprise operated for profit; (5) there
was a series of transactions where petitioners purchased twenty-four (24) lots
showing that the purpose was not limited to the conservation or preservation
of the common fund or even the properties acquired by them, the character of
habituality peculiar to business transactions engaged in for the purpose of
gain was present.]
SC Petition granted, CTA Decision reversed and set aside, relieved Petitioner
of corporate income tax liability.
06
July 14, 1995: SEC granted the application of Pacfor for a license to
transact business in the Philippines under the name of Pacfor or
Pacfor Phils. Pacfor designated Mendiola as its resident agent in the
Philippines, authorized to accept summons and processes in all legal
proceedings, and all notices affecting the corporation.
July 2000: Mendiola wrote Kevin Daley, VP for Asia of Pacfor, seeking
confirmation of his 50% equity of Pacfor Phils. Private respondent
Pacfor, through William Gleason, its President, replied that petitioner
is not a part-owner of Pacfor Phils. because the latter is merely Pacfor
USAs representative office and not an entity separate and distinct
from Pacfor USA.
Its simply a theoretical company with the purpose of
dividing the income 50-50.
Mendiola presumably knew of this arrangement from the
start, having been the one to propose to Pacfor the setting up
of a representative office and not a branch office to save on
taxes.
FACTS:
- This was originally an action brought in the CFI Rizal, QC Branch, to recover
possession of registered land situated in barrio Tatalon, Quezon City.
- The complaint by plaintiffs JM Tuason, represented by Gregorio Araneta, Inc.
was amended three times with respect to the description of the land sought to
be recovered throughout the trial.
- Defendant set up prescriptive acquisition through open, continuous,
exclusive, public and notorious possession by him and his predecessor in
interest from time in-memorial.
Petitioner argues that Gregorio Araneta, Inc., cannot act as managing partner
for plaintiff on the theory that it is illegal for two corporations to enter into a
partnership. This is without merit, for the true rule is that: though a
corporation has no power to enter into a partnership, it may nevertheless
enter into a joint venture with another where the nature of that venture is in
line with the business authorized by its charter. (Wyoming-Indiana Oil Gas
Co. v. Weston).
2) Amendment is not even necessary for the purpose of rendering judgment
on an issue proved but not alleged according to (then) Sec. 4 Rule 17 ROC:
Sec. 4.Amendment to conform to evidence. When issues not raised
by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised
in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise
these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial
on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings,
the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall be so
freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court
that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in
maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court may
grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such
evidence.
Here, that practice is followed, since the complaint is signed by the law firm of
Araneta and Araneta and commences with the statement comes now
plaintiff, through its undersigned counsel.
It is true that the complaint also states that the plaintiff is represented herein
by its Managing Partner, Gregorio Araneta, Inc., another corporation, but
there is nothing against one corporation being represented by another person,
natural or juridical, in a suit in court.
Phase II: all that Primelink had done was to grade the
area
Primelink refused to heed the Lazatins letterdemands for compliance with the JVA, so the Lazatins
sent a final letter formally rescinding the JVA.
o Based on the Sales-Income-Cost projection, the Lazatins stood
to receive the amount of Php70,218,296.00 as their net share
in the joint venture project. But after almost 4 years and
despite the undertaking in the JVA that they would shall
initially get 20% of the agreed net revenue during the first 2
years (on the basis of the 60%-40% sharing) and their full
40% share thereafter, Primelink had yet to deliver these
shares to them.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Lazatins.
o Found that based on the evidence...
Issues:
1. WON the Lazatins are entitled to the possession of the parcels of land
covered by the JVA and the improvements thereon introduced by
Primelink and Lopez as their contribution to the JVA
2. WON Primelink and Lopez entitled to reimbursement for the value of
the improvements on the parcels of land.
Held: Petition DENIED. CA Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.
Ratio:
(NOTE: In the interest of brevity, the many Civil Cases cited in the case are
not quoted in full.)
1. The Lazatins are entitled to the possession of the parcels of land covered
by the JVA and the improvements thereon introduced by Primelink and
Lopez as their contribution to the JVA.
a. Although the Lazatins did not specifically pray in their complaint
that possession of the improvements on the parcels of land which
they contributed to the JVA be transferred to them (they prayed
that upon the rescission of the JVA, they be placed in possession
of the parcels of land subject of the agreement, and for other
reliefs and such other remedies as are just and equitable in the
premises), the RTC was not precluded from awarding them
possession of the improvements.
i. Sec. 2(c), Rule 7, Rules of Court: A pleading shall specify
the relief sought but it may add as general prayer for
such further or other relief as may be deemed just and
equitable.
1. Eugenio v. Velez: Even without the prayer for a
specific remedy, proper relief may be granted by
the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and
the evidence introduced so warrant
2. Arroyo, Jr. v. Taduran: The prayer in the complaint
for other reliefs equitable and just in the premises
justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise
specifically prayed for.
b. The parcels of land, as well as the improvements made thereon,
were contributed by the parties to the joint venture under the JVA,
and thus formed part of the assets of the joint venture. The
Lazatins were entitled to the possession not only of the parcels of
land, but also of the improvements thereon, as a consequence of
the RTCs finding that Primelink and Lopez breached their
agreement and defrauded the Lazatins of their share of the net
income under the JVA.
2. Primelink and the Lazatins entered into a joint venture as evidenced by
their JVA which, under the Aurbach ruling, is a form of partnership, and as
such is to be governed by the laws on partnership.
a.
b.
c.
iii.
iv.
09
Heirs of Tan EngKeev.CA and Benguet Lumber Company, represented
by its President Tan Eng Lay De Leon, Jr., J. 3 October 2000
SV: Tan EngKees Heirs allege that the deceased and his brother, Tan EngLay
entered into a partnership to sell lumber and hardware supplies. They filed
suit to cause the accounting, liquidation and winding up of such alleged
partnership. The RTC ruled that Kee and Lay entered into a joint venture which
was akin to a partnership. The CA reversed such ruling. The SC agreed with
the CA and declared that there was no partnership in this case.
FACTS:
The common-law spouse and children of TAN ENG KEE (the plaintiffs) filed suit
against the decedent's brother TAN ENG LAY for accounting, liquidation and
winding up of the alleged partnership formed after World War II between Tan
EngKee and Tan Eng Lay.
After the second World War,Tan Eng Keeand Tan Eng Lay allegedly entered
into a partnership engaged in the business of selling lumber and hardware
and construction supplies named "BenguetLumber" which they jointly
managed until Tan Eng Kee's death.
Petitioners claim that in 1981, Tan Eng Lay and his children caused the
conversion of the partnership "Benguet Lumber" into a corporation called
"Benguet Lumber Company." The incorporation was purportedly a ruse to
deprive Tan Eng Kee and his heirs of their rightful participation in the profits of
the business.
They filed an amended complaint impleading Benguet Lumber Company.
RTC granted the petition for accounting and determined that Tan Eng Kee and
Tan Eng Lay had entered into a joint venture, which it said was akin to a
partnership.
The CA reversed such decision,hence the present petition (Rule 45 appeal.
ISSUE:
WON there a partnership between Tan Eng Kee and Tan Eng Lay. NO, there
was none.
REASONING:
1) The CA correctly noted that the trial court over extended the issue because
it went so far as to justify the existence of a joint adventure when all the
plaintiffs alleged was the existence of a partnership.
10
JOSEFINA P. REALUBIT vs. PROSENCIO D. JASO and EDEN G. JASO
(2011)
"The transfer by a partner of his partnership interest does not make the
assignee of such interest a partner of the firm, nor entitle the assignee to
RTC: ifo Sps Jaso. Sps. Jaso has been subrogated to the rights of Biondo.
There is partnership. Sps. Realubit to submit complete accounting and
inventory of the assets and liabilities of the joint venture from its inception
to the present, to allow plaintiffs access to the books and accounting
records of the joint venture, to deliver to plaintiffs their share in the
profits, if any, plus P20k for moral damages.
CA: ifo of Sps Jaso. RTC decision set aside. There was no partnership.
The business continued its operation in Sanville Subd.; Eden cannot be
considered as a partner in the business, pursuant to Article 1813 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines; while entitled to Biondo's share in the
profits of the business, Eden cannot, however, interfere with the
management of the partnership, require information or account of its
transactions and inspect its books; the partnership should first be
dissolved before Eden can seek an accounting of its transactions
and demand Biondo's share in the business; and no moral damages to be
awarded. MR denied.
Issue:
11
VICENTE SY, TRINIDAD PAULINO, 6BS TRUCKING CORP., AND SBT TRUCKING
CORP., PETITIONERS
V.
COURT OF APPEALS AND JAIME SAHOT.
GR No. 142293 February 27, 2003
Quisumbing, J.
SV: Sahot has been serving the trucking company as a truck helper and later
as a truck driver. At 59, he got sick and was not able to report back to work
despite the demand of the trucking corporation to return. Because of this, the
trucking corp dismissed him. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before
the LA. LA ruled that he was an industrial partner before 1994 and there was
no illegal dismissal, this was however reversed by the NLRC and such reversal
was affirmed by the CA
SC: SAhot is not an industrial partner, there was no written agreement; he did
not contribute to the common fund; no proof that he was receiving shares in
the profits; and no proof that he was participating in the management,
administration and adoption of policies of the business. There was no valid
dismissal although the labor code allows dismissal on the ground of disease
since the trucking corp did not comply with the requirements. Sahot was
illegally dismissed and entitled to separation pay.
1.
2.
3.
law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give
maximum aid and protection of labor. This rule should be applied in the case
at bar, especially since the evidence presented by the private respondent
company is not convincing.