Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Reference:
SKU/MTESHCAWP/14
Reporting date:
30th July 2014
Report by:
Human Factors section, GTC Southampton
Contents
1.
2.
3.
4.
Introduction
1.1
1.2
1.3
Background
2.1
Increased criticality
2.2
Technical focus
2.3
Where to start?
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
Summary of Guides
3.1
Guide: Human Centred approach - best practice for ship designers and builders
3.2
10
4.2
11
4.3
12
4.4
12
4.5
14
4.6
14
4.7
14
4.8
14
4.9
15
5.
6.
10
15
16
5.1
16
5.2
19
5.3
Past work
19
5.4
20
20
7.
8.
ii
Footer
21
21
1.
Introduction
1.1
The Human Centred approach: A Best Practice Guide for Ship Designers and Builders.
The Human Centred approach: A Best Practice Guide for Equipment Manufacturers.
These are companion guides to The Human Element: Best Practice for Ship Operators [1]
published in 2007 and available from the LR Webstore.
The intent of this document is to promote discussion on human element best practice, and the
development and use of the Guides. This document hopes to encourage collaboration in a
human-centred approach to addressing human element issues.
1.2
1.3
Background
This section describes some relevant background, from the LR programme on the human element,
the general state of guidance and regulation on the human element, and the specific
background from the Guide for Ship Operators.
1.3.1 Lloyds Register programme on the human element
Lloyds Register has had a long-standing programme of work to address the human element.
The programme has spanned from Rules development through to longer-term research. The
guides fit into this programme.
Rules development: An analysis of LR Rules found a large number of implicit human element
requirements. These are unlikely to be knowingly complied with most of the time given the
general level of human element competence in the industry. LR has since introduced mandatory
human element training for all surveyors, and is engaged in a programme to improve the
treatment of human element issues in the Rules.
The guides draw on recent Rule developments e.g. the use of the System Operational Concept
document. The approach taken in the guides is compatible with developments such as the Rules
for Novel Technology.
Guidance: LR has developed a number of guides relating to the human element, including a
general introduction to the human element [2] and to HCD [3] and the companion to the guides
discussed here, The Human Element: Best Practice for Ship Operators [1] published in 2007.
Standards development: It was recognised that assessment criteria needed to be demonstrably
based on accepted best practice, leading to a sustained contribution to the development of
3 of 32
relevant International Standards. Where possible, this has been within the context of marine
standards. However, it has also been necessary to contribute to general ergonomics standards to
take advantage of industrial activity from other sectors. Rejected alternatives were:
Work exclusively within marine standards and miss the leverage to be obtained from
other sectors that are considerably ahead of marine.
It is to be hoped that in the future, shipping either makes greater use of general ergonomics
standards, or supports tailored versions.
The guides are firmly based on International Standards that have had considerable industrial
input from a number of sectors, and have proved their worth in use.
Awareness: The LR Foundation (LRF) (formerly the LR Educational Trust), working with the
Nautical Institute, has supported the Alert! Bulletin as a means of awareness raising and
education. The series of the Bulletin have addressed the following topics:
1. A holistic overview of the human element.
2. The top issues or concerns (discussed further at Section 4.7).
3. Competence requirements for key stakeholders (discussed further at Section 4.1).
The guides draw on the material published in Alert! and the articles available from the Alert!
database (www.he-alert.org).
Consultancy: LR Consulting has assisted clients in addressing human element concerns,
particularly competence management, and exemplar designs.
Research: LR has conducted a programme of in-house activity and collaborative research to
address human element issues from a Class perspective, including European research projects.
LRF has sponsored longer-term research at SIRC Cardiff.
The LR programme is discussed further in Section 5.
1.3.2 The state of human element regulation, guidance and support
The overarching human element document is the IMO vision for the human element [4], given in
the Frontispiece below. It recognizes the need for all stakeholders to address human element
issues effectively.
The IMO Secretary General has recently called for a 50% reduction in the lives lost annually at sea
by 2015 [5]. Achieving this goal will require a wide range of human element issues to be
addressed. Operational changes and modifications can, of course, be implemented more quickly
than major design modifications, but longer-term solutions may well turn out to be changes to
design.
There is a long history of guidance on ergonomics and the human element from a wide range of
stakeholders including Class Societies, P&I Clubs, professional societies, Flag States and IMO. The
first maritime Human Factors conference was in 1977 [6]. The result of all this work is that there
are good ergonomic criteria for most topics of importance.
The problem is one of usage. It could be considered that much of the design community needs
to move from a compliance culture to taking a human-centred approach.
The hope for the guides is that by concentrating on activity within design and manufacturing
organizations, they can simplify and promote usage and uptake of good practice. Given this
4
Footer
background, the aim of the Guides is to offer some scale of benefit to the user (e.g. yard) and to
provide assistance with making simple improvements from a basic starting position.
1.3.3 The state of human-centred practice
Some manufacturers of integrated control systems apply systematic HCD. However, in general,
the maritime sector has little professionally-conducted HCD less than comparable sectors.
However, ease of operation and ease of use are frequently considered to be important and
valuable in marketing by equipment manufacturers, by ship design services and by yards. A
recent development is that Ballast Water Treatment suppliers cite ease of operation and
maintenance in response to IMO Guidelines [7]. The e-navigation community is discussing options
for addressing usability in future regulation and practice.
The current approaches to claims of ease of use, operation, maintenance seem to include the
following:
All of the above claims could have considerable merit. They are unsupported however, but could
be substantiated. The use of operating experience could be made more effective by adopting a
more managed human-centred approach. Claims of ease of operation could be supported by
usability test results in a standardised open format. Features-based claims could be substantiated
by supported test results and/or claims of a human-centred approach. In software intensive
systems it has long been recognised (Landauer [8]) that creeping featuritis detracts from
operability rather than enhances it.
1.3.4 The Guide for Ship Operators
The Best Practice Guide for Ship Operators [1] provides a reference of best practice to support an
examination of the extent to which human element issues are considered in eleven areas of
management practice. It also describes best practice for human resources and human-centred
design.
5 of 32
Figure 1 Activities in the Human element best practice guide for ship operators
Figure 1 above shows the eleven areas of management practice in addressing human element
issues in ship operation.
Each area is set out at four levels, which allows ship operators to take a continuous improvement
approach to revising the orientation and scope of their management practices with respect to the
human element. The levels are:
Reactive;
Proactive;
Managed;
Optimised.
Associated with the Guide was a Human Element Gap Analysis (HEGA) review service, conducted
by appropriately authorised auditors. A gap analysis assessment conducted over a few days gives
a picture of organizational capability.
Use of the new guides could give similar picture of organizational capability to build usable ships
and systems.
6
Footer
2.
2.1
Increased criticality
Human element issues need attention across the maritime industry, as they are becoming critical for the
following reasons:
The norms of past experience amongst the seafaring population are not immediately transferable
to computer-based control systems and other new technologies;
2.2
Competition in shipping services has reduced manning levels so that back up may not be available
in critical situations;
Ships are becoming more integrated into transport chains, thus the consequences of failure are
greater;
The majority of crews are employed from supplier countries which have different cultures and
languages and differing attitudes towards lifestyle, training and education;
Technical focus
Marine management tends to have a technical focus;
2.3
Shipyards and equipment manufacturers are concerned with optimising their production methods
separately and do not always develop integrated, operator-focused systems;
Competence requirements are not keeping pace with changes in regulation and technology;
International regulation lags behind the operational needs of modern ship systems; and
There are a variety of ship types (container, passenger, gas etc.) that are getting larger, such that
the consequences of a single failure are more significant.
Where to start?
The key to improvement is in the close involvement of all stakeholders. Lack of attention to the
human/system interface, in terms of the design, layout and integration of systems, and training in their use,
is the root cause of many accidents today.
The guides presented in this note aim to help shipyards, equipment manufacturers and Class to address
human element issues by taking a human-centred approach.
It is easy to see when a system is hard to use when it is in operation. There are well-established measures
that can be used that go beyond common-sense.
By this time, it is too late to make changes. So what is it about an organization that builds usable systems
that is different to one that builds unusable equipment? We know the answer to this - it is Human Centred
Design (HCD). HCD is well-understood and captured in International Standards.
The Principles of Human-Centred Design [9] are as follows:
Iteration
A useful starting point for an organization wishing to deliver usable systems would be to conduct an
informal simple self-assessment against these principles, perhaps by a series of workshops.
It is simple, but not necessarily easy for an organization to do HCD. Indeed, some organizations are actively
hostile to the idea of addressing seafarer needs, and their first encounter with usability can be emotionally
laden; this encounter might be a video of someone failing to use their equipment, criticism on a web site,
some simple usability testing, or an incident report.
As discussed at Section 1.3, there are organizations that use ease of operation/use as a marketing claim.
Where such claims are supportable, it will be because the organization uses HCD at some level of maturity,
and a fuller assessment would enable the organization to a) substantiate the claim and b) make further
improvements.
The introduction of goal-based standards and regulations is likely to increase the need to substantiate such
claims e.g. the IMO Guideline [7] requiring ease of operation and maintenance.
Goal-based regulation does not specify how to achieve compliance. It sets goals that allow alternative ways
to comply. For example: People shall be prevented from falling over the edge of a cliff, is an example of
goal-based regulation. In prescriptive regulation, the guidance would read: You shall install a one-metre
high rail at the edge of the cliff. [10]
2.4
2600
2400
2200
2000
Lives lost
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Year
Figure 2: Lives lost as a result of total losses (LR/Fairplay & IMO world casualty statistics)
The introduction of improved technical standards, including more demanding survey regimes and stronger
regulation enforced through a rigorous Port State Control system, has had a strong positive influence on
safety. However there is a limit to how much additional improvement is possible if attention is only focused
on the structural, mechanical, electrical and electronic components. Further improvements will require a
focus on the way that a ship is used; in other words, considering the overall ship system. This cannot ignore
the people operating it, often known as the human element.
2.5
Today, all insurers are aware that the biggest obstacle to a lasting improvement in casualty rates is human
error; statistics collated by International Union of Marine Insurance show that human failure is a leading
cause of lost lives, vessels and the valuable cargoes they carry.
Moreover, IUMIs Deidre Littlefield said last year that it was fully committed to improving maritime safety by
improving the understanding of the role people play in safe operations.
Despite this, most regulation continues to focus on assets and their control systems.
Another accident? Add another micro-switch or control system, adding to the complexity of the operation
and probably increasing unknown risks. [10]
The people, systems and machines have changed, and will continue to change. Changes to date include:
More complicated systems, with greater use of automation and remote technology;
Although human error is frequently mentioned in incident reports, it is increasingly recognised in other
sectors that such errors are the result of latent errors in design offices.
The MLC places a number of prescriptive requirements on ship and equipment design. Compliance to clear
and bounded prescriptive requirements may not require a human-centred approach. However, the MLC
also contains requirements relating to risk assessment and safe working and these would benefit from a
human-centred approach.
The regulatory environment reflects the zero risk tolerance of society. Considerable efforts have been made
to reduce the risk from the design of ship structures, the design of ship machinery, and human error is the
major risk remaining to be addressed.
It is necessary to minimise the risk of incidents associated with human error - perhaps particularly with
regard to environmental stewardship. Human variability and adaptability pose challenges to both
prescriptive and goal-based regulation.
2.6
it is hard to find a champion for the operability of environmental control or monitoring systems. The
problems for Oily Water Separators were well-documented eight years ago [11] and are still continuing. A
HCD approach is needed to address these operability issues, and it is to be hoped that offering assurance
that such an approach has been adopted is to be valued.
In closing, I would like to remind everyone here about who takes the most risk in shipping. It is the
seafarer.
We all have an obligation to make sure we never gamble with the lives of our seafarers. If we take
commercial or regulatory risks that endanger seafarers lives, we are letting ourselves, our industry and our
society down. [10]
2.7
Competent people
Usable systems
General Considerations.
The usable systems half of the balanced approach focuses on Human Factors considerations and brings
the following benefits:
Getting the design right is a one-time activity , while training and competence requirements are a
continuing commitment;
An ergonomic design provides support when it is most needed, e.g. when fatigued or under stress;
The state of the art is such that cheap, simple design changes can have a significant reduction in
human error potential.
Usability is particularly important when introducing new technology and functions e.g. for environmental
control or e-navigation. It provides support to the seafarer performing an unfamiliar task, particularly in
situations where operational use precedes training delivery. The LRF report on the introduction of AIS [13]
illustrates this.
It is recognised that the shipyard or manufacturer does not benefit directly from usable equipment, in the
way that a ship operator does. One of the hopes for the Guides is to help to reward efforts made, and to
provide incentives to those who are in the early stages of addressing usability.
3.
Summary of Guides
3.1
Guide: Human Centred approach - best practice for ship designers and builders
The guide Human Element - Best Practice for Ship Designers and Builders is intended to help yards to
improve ship and equipment design from the seafarer point of view. It enables them to plan and
implement an achievable improvement programme. Using HCD can identify low-cost changes to design
that can bring significant improvements.
The contractual environment in the past has not favoured consideration of human element issues. The
potential gains from business model innovation are leading to changes in the contractual environment, and
it is likely that a good understanding of the context of use will be important to these business changes,
such as changes to the structure of the supply chain, and the integration process.
The technical environment is changing rapidly. Installed systems are becoming more complex. Operation
and diagnostics will continue to become more demanding. Improved usability is becoming a more
important aspect of system design. Poor user interface design can mean that the increased power and
flexibility of modern systems is not exploited. The combination of increased automation and remote
operation/support/management has impacts that extend beyond the user interface into job and
organizational design. The Job To Be Done [14] onboard and ashore needs to be clear if operation that is
safe, protects the environment and is operationally effective is to be assured, with an immediate impact on
the design of ships and onboard equipment, and the associated design process.
The problems of advanced automation, supervisory control, mode errors etc. are well-known, as are the
means of addressing the human element issues involved. For the equipment manufacturer, the Guide
1
Although there is only one opportunity to design in usability, once it is addressed the benefits last through the life of the ship or system. However, if
this opportunity is not fully grasped it is still possible to incrementally improve usability through modification and when systems are replaced.
offers a proven way of providing assurance that these issues have been addressed. For the yard that wants
to build a usable ship, it is important to be able to select equipment that is usable, and some means of
providing assurance are necessary. The Guides will help with this process.
The rapid pace of technical change is likely to lead to more frequent updates, refits and possibly shorter
ship life. The context of use will be continually evolving. A HCD approach will help to track this and to use
it to inform design.
The combined pace of change means that at-sea experience becomes out of date even more quickly and
that new strategies for seafarer input are required. The Guides support such approaches.
The regulatory environment is moving to a goal-based approach, as discussed by Richard Sadler in Section
5.1. Perhaps the first area to be affected is access. In the longer term, the need to show that a design
meets operability-related goals will require evidence that a human-centred approach has been followed.
The operational environment is changing, and an understanding of changes to user needs is necessary if
ship design is to be cost-effective. More operation in harsh environments will require ergonomicallydesigned living and working arrangements, and changing business priorities and metrics will need to be
reflected in the design.
Using the Guide will help yards to:
Produce designs with supportable claims for improved flexibility and error-resistance, and so
improved safety and environmental protection.
Produce designs that are in tune with real-world operating requirements and constraints, and
underpinning a demonstrable focus on the customer, offering better effectiveness.
Achieve compliance with the letter and the spirit of the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC).
3.2
The need for product support beyond a guarantee period, with a more extended lifecycle, and less
organizational partitioning between stages.
4.
4.1
Understanding the human element in shipping operations and its impact on risk is critical. We all know the
proper training and experience are the keys to producing reliable mariners, of course. But this also applies
to the underwriters, loss-control professionals and surveyors who assume and manage the risks associated
with international trade.
Clearly, the ability to assess if a ship is well-operated requires a different skillset to assessing if it is well
designed and maintained.
The qualifications of surveyors and regulators are often discussed. But, if the influence of the human
element on safe operations is going to be fully understood, it will require our entire industry to acquire a
new skillset. [10]
Achieving high levels of HCD requires additional competences for a range of marine professionals. Series 3
of the Alert! Bulletin has defined the responsibilities and drafted the competences needed to address the
human element for a range of disciplines, including naval architects and project managers (Issue 24).
10
capability to carry out business processes related to HCD, but may also help companies and individuals to
improve their competence informally.
4.2
Yard des ign environment S hip Des ign and B uild Guide
Devise
new build
business concept
Business case
Devise
design
response
C ustomer
requirements
Develop
initial
design
Operational
c onc ept
S hip
design
S ystem
requirements
HC D
documents
Customer requirements includes a statement on the Concept of Operations (from a business point of
view), including crewing and support requirements and constraints, design drivers.
The initial design response includes a statement on the operational concept (from a design point of
view), demonstrating how the operational design works.
The cascading requirements to specific design teams and suppliers include requirements derived from
the operational concept and Human Factors (HF) good practice design requirements.
A Concept of Operations report provides information with regard to describes the ships intended service in
terms of purpose and function. It includes information on crewing, operational situations, temperatures,
motions, arrangements under reasonably foreseeable, normal and abnormal conditions, and other
information pertinent to the design of the ship.
The human-centred approach bridges design and operation. The divide between design and operation is
much deeper in shipping than in other sectors. The Operational Concept is intended to form the bridge
between the owner/operators needs and the design of the ship and its systems.
11
A System Operational Concept report demonstrates that the systems architecture, configuration and
criticality meet the requirements defined by the concept of operations and the designers assumptions or
intent in regard to the operation of a system comprising multiple items of equipment and sub-systems. It
details the intended configuration for different operations and modes of operation and conveys intent
regarding the criticality of system features and/or equipment.
A System Design Description report details the systems capability and functionality under all normal and
reasonably foreseeable abnormal operating and fault conditions, defined operating and emergency
conditions.
There are established standards for HCD documents that can be used as a resource to develop documents
that are useful without being burdensome.
4.3
4.4
Owners involving their crews or representative users in the preparation of the specification;
12
Business driver
Reference model
of best practice
Review need to
improve
Improve
management
practices
Business need
L ev el 3
Managed
L ev el 2
P roac tiv e
L ev el 1
Getting S tarted
Human E lement
Not Cons idered
Initiate is s ue gathering
R ais e awarenes s
13
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
14
ISO 9241-210 [9]. This standard sets out HCD from a project managers point of view.
ISO 9241-220 [16]. This standard is under development and will provide the main process-based
model of HCD. It is a progression from ISO TR 18529 [17]. As such, it is the main input to the
Guides.
ISO TS 18152 [18]. This is a process model for HCD on large systems, and has also been used as
input to the Guides.
For communities that are familiar with software-intensive systems, the process standards and the Guides
can be summarised as CMM for usability. The standard for writing and using process models is ISO
2
15504 [19].
4.9
4.10
Fatigue;
Ineffective communication;
Complacency.
Topics examined in the Alert! Bulletin (on the basis of industry consultation) included:
Fatigue;
Some of these are more obviously technical issues than others, but all have design implications. Some
design implications are specific e.g. to prevent slips, trips, falls, some have a number of varied specific
implications e.g. design to reduce fatigue, and some require a look at the ship as a whole as a place to live
and work.
It is worth examining incident reports for the type of ship or trade being considered to spot possible design
improvements. For example, collisions are the major type of casualty in European waters, but foundering is
most prominent elsewhere.
In terms of finding places to start, perhaps the most straightforward issues for ship design are slips, trips,
falls, automation and control systems, and information management e.g. manuals. Design to reduce
fatigue includes some straightforward measures such as avoiding intermittent noise (e.g. doors that might
bang or pumps that start intermittently) near accommodation. Seafarer input is the best way to finding
This series of standards is currently being revised and renumbered as ISO/IEC 33000 series.
15
cost-effective improvements in all of these topics, of course. For automation design, alarms, mode errors,
and mitigating single person error might be issues to start with, but again, user input is the deciding factor.
5.
5.1
Do our current maritime regulations adequately control the financial and insurance risks of operation?
Prescriptive regulation was in place when the Deepwater Horizon Rig met its demise in the Gulf of Mexico.
If it had been operating in the North Sea, it would have been subject to risk-based regulation. So, as
insurers, you may want to ask yourself if there is a difference.
Risk-based regulation in the North Sea puts the responsibility on the operator to identify the risks, mitigate
them, get an independent party to ensure that the solution is appropriate, and then present the safety case
to the authorities.
As our assets get bigger, as we enter more hostile environments to search for new stores of energy, as we
use more advanced materials and systems, the technology challenges increase. The pace of development
increases in line with the speed of implementation. In our modern world, we simply do not have the luxury
of time-based testing and the incremental change regimes upon which prescriptive regulation depends.
Goal-based regulation does not specify how to achieve compliance. It sets goals that allow alternative ways
to comply. For example: People shall be prevented from falling over the edge of a cliff, is an example of
goal-based regulation. In prescriptive regulation, the guidance would read: You shall install a one-metre
high rail at the edge of the cliff.
There are acknowledged shortcomings of prescriptive regulation. The parties applying such regulations are
only required to carry out the mandated actions to discharge their legal responsibilities. If these actions do
not prevent an accident, it is the regulations and regulators who are seen to be deficient, not the parties
applying them, who, by the way, the law holds clearly responsible.
There has always been a contradiction, if not inherent conflict, in prescriptive regulation.
Prescriptive regulation tends to be a distillation of past experience and, as such, while still having a value as
a corporate or state memory, it can become less and less relevant over time. At worst, it creates
unnecessary dangers in industries that are technically innovative. It is the innovators that are best placed to
ensure the safety of their designs, not the regulator. Clearly, prescriptive regulations cannot cope with a
wide diversity of design solutions.
Also, prescriptive regulation encodes the best engineering practices at the time they were written and
rapidly become deficient when best practice changes, for example, with evolving technology. In fact, it is
likely that prescriptive regulation eventually prevents industry from adopting new best practices.
There are clear benefits from adopting a goal-based approach, which gives greater freedom to develop
technical solutions and accommodate different standards.
The trend toward a risk-based approach does, however, raise questions about how insurers will assess risk
if the methods by which goals are achieved vary according to designer and operator. I will leave that
question unanswered for those in the room far more qualified than I to consider. But it is fair to say that
the people who most understand the risks of a specific asset are those who designed it, and will operate it.
16
Assessing asset risk involves a number of factors, including: design, the operating environment, duty factor,
the operators experience and ability, the appetite for risk embedded in the operators management system
and maintenance regime.
This is why I am often concerned about the tendency of insurers and financiers to tightly focus on asset
value and type when they assess whether to accept any risk. I will return to this later when I look at the role
of human element.
So, if risk-based regulation is seen as superior in countries such as the UK and Norway, why arent the US
authorities wholeheartedly accepting it?
Perhaps the biggest hurdle is found in the courtroom. In a litigious society where any incident is likely to
end up in court, operational actions have to be rigorously defended.
Prescriptive regulation says you must do A, B and C before you can operate. Once you prove you have
done A, B and C -- regardless if it is known to be appropriate -- you are free to operate, and can hide
behind adherence to the regulation in your defence should something go wrong.
Risk-based regulation is more subjective. Engineers and operators assess the co-components of risk -people, plant and process -- agree on the severity of the individual risks, and put design or operating
processes in place to minimise it. This flexibility is much more difficult to defend in court, especially after an
event when an unexpected sequence of events caused a failure.
Secondly, transitioning from a prescriptive to a risk-based regulatory regime requires a different approach
from designers and regulators. To some degree, it requires retraining. You are asking people to take a
wider view of the risks to ensure that the people, plant and process issues have been properly considered. It
is a different skill set than simply having to check compliance with a prescription. The transition takes time
and, during any transition, there is risk.
So, as insurers, when the ships and other assets you cover move from prescriptive to risk-based regulatory
regimes, you may ask yourself if those entrusted with risk mitigation in the new system fully understand the
new challenge.
I strongly believe that goal-based regulations provide the best risk mitigation in a technical environment
that is evolving quickly. It is a shame when the priorities of the legal environment override our mandate to
make assets safer and more sustainable.
So we have covered the risks of getting a shipping strategy wrong, we have covered the risks of the wrong
regulatory regime, so what else? Simple. We must now address risks posed by the workforce: the human
element. Because, as I said earlier, if the social side of progress is ignored, we greatly limit our potential.
It is widely accepted that the cause of most accidents is human error, yet the focus of most regulation is
squarely on the asset.
If you look at the original Lloyds Register of Ships from 1760, there are two columns that no longer
appear: One is the detail of the fitted guns and cannons, and the other is the name of the Captain.
The Captain was recorded when ships were assessed for risk in the days of Edward Lloyds original coffee
shop because the right Captain with the right experience went a long way to mitigating the risks of a long
voyage. How have we lost sight of that?
Today, all insurers are aware that the biggest obstacle to a lasting improvement in casualty rates is human
error; statistics collated by International Union of Marine Insurance show that human failure is a leading
cause of lost lives, vessels and the valuable cargoes they carry.
Moreover, IUMIs Deidre Littlefield said last year that it was fully committed to improving maritime safety by
improving the understanding of the role people play in safe operations.
Despite this, most regulation continues to focus on assets and their control systems.
17
Another accident? Add another micro-switch or control system, adding to the complexity of the operation
and probably increasing unknown risks.
Understanding the human element in shipping operations and its impact on risk is critical. We all know the
proper training and experience are the keys to producing reliable mariners, of course. But this also applies
to the underwriters, loss-control professionals and surveyors who assume and manage the risks associated
with international trade.
Clearly, the ability to assess if a ship is well-operated requires a different skillset to assessing if it is well
designed and maintained.
The qualifications of surveyors and regulators are often discussed. But, if the influence of the human
element on safe operations is going to be fully understood, it will require our entire industry to acquire a
new skillset.
Crew selection and training, maintenance in terminals and on board ships -- as well as basic operations
such as loading and discharge -- can be positively or negatively affected by economic conditions. All marine
professionals must be aware of how this potentially impacts the risks on their businesses.
Today's modern ship is a highly complex piece of machinery, largely controlled by computer programmes
and systems, from the bridge to the engine room. Making the time for thorough training in these new
technologies is vital for all parties, onshore and off.
Language is another big issue when crews from different countries come together with little or no common
language skills. Marine insurers and the P&I clubs are largely agreed that, in an ideal world, shipping should
take its lead from the aviation industry, where English is the undisputed common language. But, in
practice, the lack of a common language remains a risk.
I am convinced that we are not paying enough attention to the human element. Standardising the training
and qualifications of seafarer-trading establishments, ensuring a higher level of competency for operating
procedures, maintenance and the management of shipboard staff will go a long way to minimising these
risks.
As I said at the beginning, properly assessing risk can be as simple as knowing enough to know how big a
gamble you are taking. At its core, it can be as simple as knowing the odds.
There was an article in the New Scientist recently that focussed on risk intelligence, essentially described
as the ability to accurately estimate probability, or having the right amount of certainty to make educated
guesses. Its a simple definition, even if the task is complex.
At its essence, assessing risk is about learning how to act on the basis of limited information and how to
cope with an uncertain world; its about knowing your limitations and odds of success and failure.
Expert gamblers have a chance to make money, because they know the odds; careless gamblers simply lose
it. There are subtle differences. They both gamble in a manner that appears to be compulsive. But expert
gamblers know how much to bet, and they evaluate each opportunity.
Shipping is no place for careless gamblers. The risks are too high; the playing environment changes every
day, while political and social demands shift with the tides.
In closing, I would like to remind everyone here about who takes the most risk in shipping. It is the
seafarer.
We all have an obligation to make sure we never gamble with the lives of our seafarers. If we take
commercial or regulatory risks that endanger seafarers lives, we are letting ourselves, our industry and our
society down.
18
As members of the London marine cluster, we should all have one simple rule that I tell my staff should
govern the risks we take: if your son or daughter worked on or near the asset youre assessing, or insuring
in your case, what would be your tolerance for the associated risk?
Would you risk their livelihoods on the spin of a wheel?
Figure 10 - Extract from Richard Sadlers 2012 Donaldson Lecture
5.2
5.3
Past work
Much of the work has, not surprisingly, focused on people and software. Because of the rapid rate of
technological change here, this area lends itself to approaches other than prescriptive design requirements,
including the process approach adopted in the Equipment Design Guide. A regulatory trigger for some of
the work in this area was SOLAS/V Regulation 15, where a translation between seafarer common-sense
language and requirements for design and operation was required.
One of the features has been the development of standards, tools, methods that are practical and usable in
marine practice, largely in anticipation of uptake in the sector. This provided a base for the generation of
human element services, such as notations, rules, and consultancy.
The examination of the Rules for implicit human element requirements found a large number of such
requirements. Recent work has included developing explicit human element requirements for inclusion in
the Rules.
Chronologically, human element at LR can be considered as follows:
19
LR human element has participated in a number of UK and European collaborative projects, including
ADVANCES, ATOMOS, CHSME, CONTESSE, INSTEP, INTUITIVE, INUSE, PRICES. LR has also initiated
collaboration on specific topics e.g. HCPIG (on process improvement) and extensive reviews of drafts of ISO
18529 & 18152. Research with other organizations has included MTO-Sea with Kalmar Maritime Academy,
and advisory membership of the Lighthouse group at Chalmers University.
5.4
6.
20
7.
8.
References
[1]
The Human Element. Best Practice for Ship Operators. Continuous Improvement of the Human
Element. Lloyds Register 2007
[2]
[3]
Human-centred development. Putting the principles into practice Lloyds Register, Issue 1, April
2008.
[4]
IMO Resolution A.947(23): HUMAN ELEMENT VISION, PRINCIPLES AND GOALS FOR THE
ORGANIZATION Adopted on 27 November 2003
[5]
Lives lost at sea halved and piracy eradicated should be targets, says Sekimizu
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/03-new-year-targets.aspx
[6]
First International Conference on Human Factors in the Design and Operation of Ships Edited by D.
Anderson, H. Istance, J. Spencer, Gothenburg, Sweden, February 1977.
[7]
IMO Resolution MEPC.149(55) Guidelines for Ballast Water Exchange Design and Construction
Standards (G11) MePC55/23 Annex 1 23 October 2006
[8]
Landauer, T.K. The trouble with computers: Usefulness, usability and productivity. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1995.
[9]
[10]
Sadler, R., Shipping Risk - Knowing the Odds, annual Donaldson Lecture to the Lloyds Market
Association, in London, October 25, 2012 http://www.lr.org/news_and_events/pressreleases/244019-shipping-risk-knowing-the-odds.aspx
[11]
Van Hemmen, H. A proposal for a joint industry effort at improving bilge oily water separator
design and operation, Joint SMPE, SNAME, IMarEST meeting March 16 2005.
[12]
21
[13]
Bailey, N., Ellis, N., Sampson, H,, Training and Technology Onboard Ship: How seafarers learned to
use the shipboard Automatic Identification System (AIS) (2008)
http://www.sirc.cf.ac.uk/uploads/publications/Training%20&%20Technology%20AIS.pdf
22
[14]
Clay Christensens Milkshake Marketing Harvard Business School Working Knowledge 14 Feb
2011 http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6496.html
[15]
Ltzhft. M., and Nyce, J., 2008, Integration work on the ships bridge, Journal of Maritime
Research, 2008, (5), 2.
[16]
ISO/WD 9241-220 Ergonomics of human-computer interaction -- Part 220: Processes for enabling,
executing and assessing human-centred design within organizations
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
Squire, N.D. The Human Element in Shipping presentation to The Hong Kong Shipowners
Association Ltd in association with The Nautical Institute, on 21 October 2004.
Jonathan Earthy
Principal Human Factors Coordinator
Lloyds Register EMEA, Global Technology Centre, Mountbatten House, 1 Grosvenor Square, Southampton SO15
2JU, United Kingdom
T 44 (0)2380 249590
M 44 (0)782 538 6784
E Jonathan.Earthy@lr.org
W www.he-alert.org www.lr.org
This document can be obtained from www.webstore.lr.org (Marine/Technical Guides)
www.lr.org
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