Kant On Marks and The Immediacy of Intuition

The PhilosophicalReview,Vol. 109, No.
2 (April 2000)
Kant on Marks and the Immediacy of Intuition

Houston Smit
The distinction between concept and intuition is of the utmost

importance for understanding Kant's critical philosophy. For, as
Kant himself claimed, all the distinctive claims of this philosophy
rest on, and develop out of, a detailed account of the way all our'
cognition of things requires both intuitions and concepts.2
Unfortunately,interpreting Kant's distinction between concepts
and intuitions remains a vexed matter.The locus classicusfor these
controversies is the Critique of Pure Reason's famous taxonomy of
representations (called the Stufenleiter, or "step-ladder"):
The genus is representationin general (representatio).Under it stands
representationwith consciousness (perceptio).A perception [Perception]
which relates solely to the subject, as the modification of its state, is
I am grateful, above all, to Tyler Burge for his extensive and incisive
criticisms of all of the many drafts this paper has undergone. This paper
has also benefited greatly from Robert M. Adams's and Charles Parsons's
insightful comments and expert advice. Torin Alter provided generous and
judicious comments on the penultimate draft. I am also grateful to the
following people for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts:
Rogers Albritton, Tim Bayne, Thomas Christiano, Suzanne Dovi, Bill Fitzpatrick, Sean Foran, Eckart Forster, Daniel Guevara, Thomas Hofweber,
Andrew Hsu, Michael Jacovides, David Kaplan, Keith Lehrer, Frank Menetrez, Marleen Rozemond, Daniel Sutherland, Joseph Tolliver, Carol
Voeller, and Eric Watkins. Finally, I am indebted to two anonymous referees
for the PhilosophicalReviewfor invaluable criticisms and suggestions.
"Our' in 'our cognition' is shorthand for 'human', a practice I will
follow throughout the present essay.
2See the Amphiboly chapter of the Critiqueof Pure Reason, especially A
269 / B 325f., where Kant presents his realization that concepts and intuitions are different in kind as key to his advancing beyond his predecessors.
In particular, he traces the shortcomings of the systems of Locke and Leibniz to their failure to appreciate the true nature of this distinction: the
former made the mistake of assimilating concepts to intuitions, the latter,
the reverse mistake; their conflations blinded them to the distinctive contribution each makes to our cognition of things. Passages from the first
critique will be cited in this, the usual, fashion: the first (1781) edition
pagination following 'A,' and the second (1787) edition pagination following 'B'. All other citations from Kant's works will be from the standard
German edition of his works, Kants GesammelteSchriften,edited by the Royal
Prussian Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter, 1900- ), with volume and page numbers separated by a colon.
235
HOUSTON SMIT
sensation (sensatio).Objective perception is cognition [Erkenntnis].

This [Diese,so objective perception3] is either intuition or concept.
The former relates to the object [beziehtsich auf den Gegenstand]im-
mediately and is singular, the latter, mediately, by means of a mark

[Merkmal]
which severalthings may have in common. (A 320 / B 37677)
Kant's
distinction
mediate
cepts,
between
of contrast:
two points
of debate
relation
Kant
among
other,
con-
points
of
to be a subject
is still much
there
of the immediacy
on
then,
of these
continue
In particular,
scholars.
turns,
and singular,
of both
import
to each
over the import
disagreement
are immediate
The
and general.
and their
contrast,
and intuitions
concepts
intuitions
criterion
that Kant
sets for intuition.4

I will argue
marks
that
notion
he develops
of the criterion
I begin
the
this debate
of Kant's
standing
criterion
to this
intuition
by means
in which
debate:
consists
the
(at least
of marks.
on logic
three
in the
recent
misunderstanding
assumption
in part)
In section
Kant uses 'object',
leads
reviewing
offered
a crucial
identify
by misunder-
hampered
Examining
the
account
of
to a new reading
he sets for intuition.
1 by briefly
in section
I then
ture.5
parties
in his writings
of immediacy
immediacy
has been
of a mark.
that
secondary
common
to all
of an
to its object
the interrelated
perception',
litera-
immediacy
in its not relating
2, I sketch
'objective
the
of
interpretations
senses
and 'cognition'
to his notion of a
in the Stufenleiter, bringing
out their connection
In section
Kant's
really possible
object of thought.
3, I elucidate
definition
tion
of a mark as a part of his essentially
of predication.
In section
4, I examine
Leibnizian
his pivotal,
concepyet almost
3'This' translates 'diese, and thus refers back to 'eine objectivePerzeption'

a point for which I am indebted to an anonymous referee for the Philosophical Review. As this referee also pointed out, Kant allows for cognitions-for example, practical ones, or the ones had in general logic-that
are not objective perceptions. In section 2, I explain how, in the sense in
which Kant employs 'cognition' in the Stufenleiter,these cognitions are not
objective perceptions.
4The term 'immediacy criterion' is due to Charles Parsons; see his
"Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic," originally printed in Philosophy,Science,
and Method, ed. S. Morganbesser, P. Suppes, and M. White (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1969) and reprinted, with a postscript, in his Mathematics
and Philosophy(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 110-49.
5My overview of these three readings is indebted to Parsons's incisive
discussion in his postscript to "Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic."
236
KANT ON ARKS AND)INTUITION
entirely overlooked, distinction between intuitive and discursive

marks. In section 5, I connect the foregoing to the debate over
Kant's distinction between intuitions and concepts, and offer a new
reading of the mediacy of concepts and the immediacy of intuition.
1. Three Readings of the Immediacy Criterion on Intuition
The authors who have recently proposed and defended different
readings of the immediacy criterion agree on the import of the
contrast between the singularity of intuitions and the generality of
concepts. What divides them is their understanding of the contrast
between the immediacy of intuitions and the mediacy of concepts.
Jaakko Hintikka ascribes to Kant the view that an intuition is
simply a singular representation, the counterpart of a singular term
in the latter's system of representations.6 On Hintikka's reading,
the generality and the mediacy of a concept amount to the same
thing, namely, a concept's relating to its object through marks,
where a mark is construed as a property at least potentially had by
more than one thing. Hintikka thus holds that the immediacy of
an intuition consists in its not relating to an object through marks
and that the immediacy criterion on intuition is merely a logical
corollary of the singularity criterion.
Charles Parsons agrees with Hintikka that, in being singular, an
intuition is the analogue of a singular term. But he contends that
the immediacy of an intuition consists, not merely in its not relating to its object through marks, but also in its being a cognition
in which the object is "directly present to the mind, as in perception." Parsons maintains, then, that the immediacy criterion is not
merely a logical corollary of the singularity criterion, but an independent constraint. What is more, Parsons holds that, on Kant's
view, this direct presence has a certain epistemic import: due to its
immediacy, intuition is "a source, ultimately the only source, of
6For Hintikka's most detailed defense of this reading, see "On Kant's
Notion of Intuition (Anschauung)," in Kant'sFirst Critique,ed. T. Penelhum
and J. J. MacIntosh, (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1969), 38-53. The assumption that the relation of intuitions to objects can be understood on
the model of the reference of singular terms has not gone unchallenged.
See Manley Thompson's classic article, "Singular Terms and Intuitions in
Kant's Epistemology," Review of Metaphysics26 (1972) and Kirk Wilson,
"Kant on Intuition," PhilosophicalQuarterly25 (1975).
237
HOUSTON SMIT
immediate knowledge of objects." Parsons goes on to remark that,

given his construal of the immediacy criterion, the fact that mathematics is based on intuition implies that it is "immediate knowledge and, even though synthetic a priori, does not require the
elaborate justificatory arguments which the Principles do
(A87=B120)."7
Robert Howell takes a middle course between Hintikka and Parsons. He agrees with Hintikka that A 320 / B 376 is to be read as
claiming that the immediacy of intuition consists simply in its not
relating to its object through marks.8 This he takes to be Kant's
strict definition of the immediacy of intuition. But he agrees with
Parsons in holding that the immediacy of intuition is not a mere
corollary of its singularity. Moreover, he suggests, Kant complements his strict definition of intuition's immediacy with a positive
conception of this immediacy, analogous to the contemporary notion of the direct reference had by demonstrative terms.9
All three commentators, then, hold that the immediacy of intuition consists at least in part in its not relating to objects, as
concepts do, through marks.10Call this the standard minimal reading
of the immediacy criterion. This reading is mistaken. Examining
Kant's notion of a mark, and his account of the way we cognize
things through marks, will show that concepts are not the only
objective perceptions that relate to objects through marks: our intuitions, being sensible, are also objective perceptions that relate
to objects through marks." What distinguishes sensible intuitions
7"Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic," 112; see also the postscript, 14446.

8"Intuition relates immediately to its object simply in that the relation
is not (as is that of concept and object) mediated by marks or characteristics" ("Intuition, Synthesis, and Individuation in the Critique of Pure
Reason," Noius7 (1973): 210f.).
9Howell, "Intuition, Synthesis, and Individuation in the Critique of Pure
Reason," 211-22. Others had already proposed that Kant's notion of intuition should be understood on the model of demonstratives; see, for
instance, Wilfrid Sellars, in Scienceand Metaphysics(London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1968), 3-8.
10In a recent article, Charles Parsons takes Kant's claim in this passage
and elsewhere that intuition relates to an object immediately to mean "at
least that it does not relate to an object by means of marks" ("The Transcendental Aesthetic," in The CambridgeCompanionto Kant, ed. Paul Guyer
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 64).
1'On Kant's conception of intuition, it is (at least logically) possible that
238
KANT ON MARKSAND INTUITION
from concepts is that they are objective perceptions that relate to

objects through singular, as against general, marks. It is neither a
part, nor a logical consequence, of Kant's notion of intuition that
an intuition does not relate to its object through marks. Seeing
how concepts are objective perceptions that relate to objects
through general marks will clarify both the mediacy of concepts
and the immediacy of intuition.
2. 'Object' and 'Cognition'
Before turning to Kant's notion of a mark and his account of how
all our objective perceptions relate to objects through marks, I will
discuss the relevant and highly interrelated senses of 'object', 'objective perception', and 'cognition'.'2
Near the outset of the Second Analogy of Experience, Kant
draws a distinction between two senses of 'Objekt':
Now one can, to be sure, call everything, and even every representation, insofar as one is conscious of it, an object [ Objekt], only what this
word is to mean in the case of appearances, not insofar as they are
(as representations)
objects [Objekte], but rather only insofar as they
designate an object [Objekt], requires a deeper investigation. Insofar
as they are, only as representations,
at the same time objects [Gegen-
there are intuitions that do not relate to objects by means of marks. Concepts, in contrast, relate to objects by means of marks as a matter of logical
necessity. Intuitions that do not relate to objects by means of marks would
an understandbe intuitions had by a being with intuitive understanding,
ing that does not cognize objects through concepts and thus does not
cognize things through marks (intuitive as well as discursive) at all. Kant's
notion of an intuitive understanding,
though notoriously difficult, is one
that plays a central role in his critical philosophy. Such an understanding
would be archetypal: it would create the things it cognizes, through its
cognition of them. It is thus akin to the kind of understanding
(at least of
created things) traditionally ascribed to God. I say a little more about
in section 3, as well as in note 48;
Kant's notion of intuitive understanding
one of the advantages of the account of marks developed in section 3 is
that it serves to clarify this notion.
12Any plausible reading of these notions needs to address complex and
still unresolved interpretive problems posed by a myriad of extremely difficult texts, and is thus apt to prove controversial. The one I offer is origand defense. In
inal, and consequently in need of extensive development
the present section, however, I will merely state the reading in outline,
citing a few crucial supporting passages. The outline should serve to orient
the reader for subsequent sections, which will provide, among other things,
the needed development
and defense of this reading.
239
HOUSTON SMIT
stdnde]of consciousness, they do not differ from their apprehension,

that is, from their being taken up into the synthesisof the imagination.
(B 234-35 / A 189-90)
The first sense of 'Objekt'is that of anything insofar as one is conscious of it, the notion of what is consciously represented. What
makes something an Objektin this sense is its making up the content of a conscious representing. In this passage Kant uses 'representation' in his customary sense to mean 'represented'. And in
claiming that "everything, even every representation," can, "insofar as one is conscious of it," be called an Objekt,he implies that
anything that is consciously represented, so including something
whose esse is not percipi, is as such an Objektin the first sense. The
proviso "insofar as one is conscious of it" in introducing his first
sense of 'object' must not be read in a sense that renders all objects
ideal-that is, as specifying that objects can exist only in being
consciously represented.
Kant's second sense of 'Objekt restricts the first, by specifying
further that an Objektbe something that a perception designates
and so something distinct from that representation. For example,
one can have a mental image of a tree in such a way that one is
conscious, not only of this image, but also thereby of that tree,
something distinct from that image. What we are conscious of, in
being conscious of the tree, is an Objekt,not only in the first, but
also in the second sense. An Objektin the second sense is what we
are conscious of through a representation.
Let's consider the Stufenleiterin light of this distinction between
Kant's two senses of 'Objekt'.On pain of its being redundant, 'objective' in 'objective [objektive]perception' must be a cognate of
'Objekt' in the second sense: since Kant defines 'perception' as
"representation with consciousness," all perceptions are as such
Objektein the first sense.13 This suggests that what makes a perception objective is its being a representation of which one is conscious
in such a way that one can thereby be conscious of an Objektin the
second sense. A sensation, in Kant's sense, is a representation (a
represented) that is an Objektin the first sense: this is why the Stuin the more restrictivesense when he uses its
13Kant also takes 'Objekt'
cognates in the phrases 'objectivevalidity', and 'objective reality'. For a
representationto have objective reality is for it to characterizethe reality
of a thing, that is, the quality of its activityas it exists outside of being
represented.
240
KANTON MARKSAD) INTUITION

fenleiter classifies sensations as a species of perception, representation with consciousness. What makes them subjective is not that
they are Objekteonly in the first sense and not in the second. What
makes them subjective is that they are representations of which we
are conscious in such a way that we cannot thereby also be conscious of them so that they designate an object. They are perceptions that can be related to the subject, but only as its representations: as Kant puts it, a sensation "relates solely to the subject, as
a modification of its state." The conceptof a sensation, in contrast,
is a representation that relates to other representations of the subject. It designates an object, and this is what makes it an objective
perception.'4
But at B 234-35 / A 189-90 Kant employs another term standardly translated with 'object'-' Gegenstand'.A Gegenstandin Kant's
sense is a thing insofar as it is consciously represented and so constitutes an Objekt.'5And a thing (Ding res) in the relevant sense is,
in turn, not just anything, but something real (etwas reales): something whose esse is not percipibut has its being, so that it can exist,
outside of being represented. Kant holds the Aristotelian view that
what makes something a thing is its being the subject of activity.
Numbers, figures, concepts-all on Kant's view are ideal, not (even
empirically) real.'6
Something that is not a Gegenstandcan be an Objektin the second
sense: for example, the geometric figure of which we are conscious
in doing geometry is, on Kant's view, not real, and so not a Gegenstand; however, it is an Objektthat one's geometric concepts and
intuitions designate. Moreover, Kant's remark that "appearances,
*14Note that the same material representational content-that common
to the sensation of pain and the concept of pain-can constitute different
representations, in Kant's sense of 'representation'. I will develop this point
further in section 4.
'5Keep in mind that B 234-35 / A 189-90 implies that a thing can be
an Objektin the first sense.
16I provide textual grounds for these readings of 'Dinge and 'Gegenstand'
in an unpublished manuscript, "What Can We Know about Things in
Themselves?" The connection between these two notions is evident in
Kant's claim that we can give content to our concepts of a Gegenstandonly
by relating them to contents given in our sensibility, where sensibility is
"the capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in
which we are affected by objects [Gegenstdnden]" (A 19 / B33); he makes
this claim, for example, at B147, in an important passage that I discuss in
note 20, below.
241
HOUSTONSMIT
insofar as they are, merely as representations, at the same time,
Gegenstdnde of consciousness, do not differ from their apprehension" implies that a Gegenstandcan be an Objektin merely the first
of the two senses Kant distinguishes. So considered appearances
are contained in consciousness "merely as representations" and
do not stand for an Objekt,so considered, appearances, like sensations, relate "only to the subject as a modification of its state."
What makes appearances so considered, nonetheless, Gegenstdnde
of consciousness is that in this consciousness we are conscious of
our own activity in uniting them.
Notice that in the StufenleiterKant contrasts concepts and intuitions in respect of the ways in which they relate to a Gegenstand,a
thing insofar as it constitutes an Objekt.Moreover, the Gegenstand
Kant has in mind is an Objektin the second sense, for it is the
Gegenstand to which an objective perception relates, and so the
Gegenstandit designates. In light of what we have seen about Kant's
use of these terms, I propose that a perception is objective, in the
sense of the Stufenleiter,if it is one in which the subject is conscious
of a content that she can predicate of a thing in cognizing it: it is
a representation that can make up the content of an act of cognizing a thing.'7 Unless I specify another sense, I will hereafter use
'object' to refer to a Gegenstandthat is an instance of an Objektin
the second sense.'8
We can clarify what makes a perception objective by looking at
Kant's conception of what it is to cognize (erkennen)a thing. In the
Logic he characterizes cognizing as a degree of the "objective content" of our cognition:
The third: kennen is to represent something in comparisonwith other
things in respect of identity as well as diversity.
The fourth: erkennen,kennenwith consciousness.
(Logic, Introduction?8; 9:64-65)
17Note that what makes any perception an objective one, is only the
possibilityof its constituting, perhaps only with other representations, a Gegenstand. In geometry, we employ the concept triangle to think, not about
a thing, but about the figure. This concept is, nonetheless, an objective
perception, because we can use it to think of a triangular thing.
18This sense seems close to the sense of 'object' that Strawson dubs
'weighty'; see The Bounds of Sense (New York: Routledge, 1989), 73. Strawson, however, does not distinguish Objektand Gegenstand,and so does not
specify that the sense he has in mind has the force of being ontologically
weighty.
242
KANT ON MARKSAD) INTUITION
Notice that being conscious merely of an object in general (as we

are when we represent a thing merely in the categories) does not
amount to cognizing a thing. To cognize a thing, one must be
conscious of a thing in respect of its determinate identity, so as to
distinguish it from (some) other things. Moreover, as Kant's contrasting a thing's identity with its diversity from other things suggests, to cognize a thing is to distinguish it from other things, not
merely negatively, in respect of what it is not, but also positively, in
respect of what it is. The objective content of our cognition thus
consists in content through which, in cognizing a thing, we are
conscious of that thing in respect of some aspect of its distinctive
intrinsic constitution. It follows, moreover, that Kant's notion of an
objective perception is broader than that of an objective content.
For the categories are objective perceptions, insofar as they constitute content that we can-and indeed must-predicate of objects
in any act of cognizing them (this is why the Stufenleiterincludes
them as instances of objective perceptions). However, as our concepts of an object in general, they do not themselves constitute
objective content.
The thing the identity of which one is conscious in cognizing it
is the object that one thereby cognizes. Consider an example of
an intuition, one species of objective perception. An experienced
birder and I both get a clear look at a bird. The birder identifies
it as a Hudsonian Godwit, and I, merely as a shorebird. Nonetheless, our intuitions are the same-we both see the various identifying properties of the Hudsonian Godwit (the curved bill, the
markings, and so forth). And, Kant would say, we both have the
same cognition (considered in respect of its objective content),
despite the difference in the manner in which we have it: I have a
mere intuition of the Hudsonian Godwit, whereas the content of
the birder's cognition is at the same time both an intuition and a
concept of the Hudsonian Godwit.19
19Consider Kant's contrast between the cognition had in looking at a
house by, on the one hand, a savage lacking the concept of a house, and,
on the other, by someone who has that concept (Logic, Introduction ?5; 9:
33). Kant says that both have "the same object before him" and thus "the
same cognition, in respect of its matter," but that in the savage this cognition is a mere intuition, whereas in the latter the cognition is "intuition
and concept at the same time."
Moreover, the consciousness of an objective content had in an objective
perception needn't be one of that content as an objective one. Indeed, on
243
HOUSTON SM[T
It may be surprising that Kant draws his distinction between concepts and intuitions as one between two species of objective perthat we can relate to things in cognizing
ceptions-perceptions
those things. After all, there are concepts (for instance, that of the
faculty of thought or the categorical form of judgment) that are
not concepts of a Gegenstand.But Kant often uses 'concept' in a
restrictive sense, on which a concept is a general representation
through which one can cognize, not just any subject matter, but a
thing. Indeed, more generally, throughout the first critique Kant
typically uses 'cognition' to refer to objective perception.20
Kant's account, the same holds of the consciousness had in cognitions that
are concepts, or even both "concepts and intuitions at the same time."
The cognition had in geometry is one in which one is conscious of an
objective content-the
content triangle, for instance, is one through which
one can be conscious of the identity of a body in an act of cognizing it.
But Kant is a conceptualist about geometric figures, and denies that figures
are things: not being possible existents, they cannot exist outside of being
represented
(see next note). Since in doing geometry one is concerned
merely with the figure, and not with triangular things, it follows that in
doing geometry one has cognition, despite not being conscious of objective
contents as objective contents.
20In the B edition Transcendental
Deduction we find a crucial case of
such usage, one concerning mathematical concepts:
Through the determination of pure intuition we can acquire a priori cognition
of objects [Gegenstdnden] (in mathematics), but only in regard to their form,
as appearances; whether there can be things which must be intuited in this
form, is still left undecided. Mathematical concepts are not, therefore, of themselves cognition, except on the supposition that there are things which allow
of being presented to us only in accordance with the form of that pure sensible
intuition. Now things in space and time are given only in so far as they are
perceptions (that is, representations accompanied by sensation)-therefore
only through empirical representation. Consequently, the pure concepts of understanding, even when they are applied to a priori intuitions, as in mathematics, yield cognition only in so far as these intuitions-and therefore indirectly by their means the pure concepts also-can be applied to empirical
intuitions. (B 147)
Kant uses 'cognition' in a sense in which mathematical concepts constitute
cognitions only in virtue of being contents that can be related to things in
are cognitions of objects. But
cognizing (and not mere thinking) them-so
it is only insofar as these a priori intuitions make up the form of empirical
intuitions (objective perceptions that relate to an object in an experience
of that object) that mathematical concepts constitute representations
of
things. This is why Kant makes it a condition of mathematical concepts
constituting cognitions that a priori intuitions are partially constitutive of
experience. Indeed, the second step of the B edition Deduction is, in part,
devoted to establishing that this condition holds-a
point I intend to develop elsewhere.
244
In the rest of the paper, I will follow Kant in using 'concept' and
'cognition' in this restrictive sense. A mark, in the sense with which
we will be concerned, is an identifying property through which we
can cognize a thing; Kant's notion of a mark, then, is that of a
property through which we can cognize, not just any subject matter, but things.2'
Before I turn to Kant's account of a mark, however, I need to
introduce a further distinction between two senses in which he
employs the term 'cognition'. What it is to cognize a thing in the
sense I have explicated thus far must be distinguished from an
epistemologically more restrictive sense on which the first critique
focuses. In particular, Kant holds that cognizing a thing requires
more than merely thinking of it (B xxvi n.). Merely thinking of a
thing requires only that one not contradict oneself in forming
Kant holds that the Objekteof pure intuition (geometric figures and numbers) are not things: they are ideal, and not real, because not capable of
existing outside of being represented. Mathematical concepts are predicable of Gegenstdnde,and so constitute cognitions, only in virtue of the fact
that the syntheses they signify are ones that proceed in accordance with
the axioms of intuition and the anticipations of perception. For, in according with these principles of pure understanding, mathematical concepts
constitute contents that are predicable, through the categories of quality
and quantity, of Gegenstdnde.Thus, Kant claims that mathematical concepts
do not, of themselves, constitute cognitions-that is to say, simply in virtue
of the use to which we put them in (pure) mathematics- "except insofar
as one presupposes that there are things that can be presented to us only
in accordance with the form of that pure intuition."
I am grateful to Tyler Burge for pointing out how I had been misreading
B 147. The present observations about Kant's conception of mathematical
concepts develop a point made originally by Thompson ("Singular Terms
and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology," 338-39) and discussed instructively
by Parsons in his postscript to "Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic" (147-48).
Friedman puts this point as follows: the objective reality of mathematics
depends on the possibility of applied mathematics, and this possibility is
established not in mathematics, but a priori in transcendental philosophy,
through the arguments for the mathematical principles of the pure understanding (note: not empirically, on the grounds adduced in applying
mathematics in experience). See Friedman's Kant and the Exact Sciences
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 102. The first two chapters
of this book contain a lucid and insightful discussion of Kant's theory of
concepts and intuitions, as well as an important new interpretation of the
nature and motivation of Kant's theory of mathematical construction.
21See, for instance, Kant's remark in the introduction to the first critique that necessity and universality are marks of a priori cognition (B 3);
here 'mark' is used in the broader sense, which will not be in question in
the definitions we will be examining.
245
HOUSTON SMIT
one's concept of that thing, and he refers to this, the possibility of

the concept of a thing, as "merely logical possibility" (ibid.). And
he maintains, further, that the nature of things might not permit
the existence of what one consistently thinks of in a concept of an
object, so that not every possible concept need have a "corresponding object in the sum-total of all possibilities" (ibid.). In other words, what one thinks of as a possible thing needn't be a possible thing. So, for instance, on Kant's view, although the thought
of a thing that is both round and square is possible, no such thing
is possible: we can see that the common nature shared by all the
phaenomena of our outer sense (the nature of matter) does not
permit the existence of such a thing. And although the concept of
God as the most real being is possible, Kant argues that we cannot
adjudicate the possibility of such a being itself (at least on theoretical grounds). In order to cognize a thing, as against merely
think of it, we must be able to establish the possibility of that thing
(ibid.). Let's call thoughts of things that satisfy this epistemic condition 'genuine cognitions'.
The overarching project of the first critique is to articulate the
nature of our understanding, our capacity to cognize objects, insofar as it constitutes a faculty of genuine cognition. Kant uncovers
the origin of our various a priori concepts of objects, and the roles
they play either in constituting our experience or in regulating our
pursuit of empirical cognition. And he does all this in the service
of explaining the grounds on which we may legitimately accord
real possibility to our concepts of objects and thereby determining
the bounds of our capacity to have insight into the natures of
things.22 So it should not be surprising that the first critique tends
to employ 'cognition' in the epistemically restrictive sense. The
Stufenleiter,however, uses 'cognition' and 'objective perception' in
the epistemically permissive sense, to refer to the content of a cognizing that need not constitute any more than a mere thinking of
a thing. For it counts ideas among objective perceptions, and thus
as cognitions (A 320 / B 377), and ideas are concepts, such as
22Tobe sure, the TranscendentalDeduction of the Categoriesprovides
an account of how we can grasp the nature of our facultyof mere thought,
by explaining the origin and the status of our grasp of the rules and principles that constitute this nature (see B 133-34 n.). But it does so in the
service of explaining how the categories have a valid a priori applicability
to objects in genuine cognition.
246
those of God, freedom, and immortality, the real possibility of

which we cannot adjudicate, and which thus do not constitute genuine cognitions. The Stufenleiter,we might say, offers a taxonomy
of mere representations as such (the highest genus it specifies is,
after all, "representation in general"), and thus abstracts from
whether representations meet the conditions required for them to
constitute genuine cognitions.
3. Kant's Notion of a Mark
Kant's notion of a mark, along with his notions of object, thing,
and cognition, makes up an integral part of his Leibnizian conception of predication.23 Examining Kant's notion of a mark, and
his claim that all our objective perceptions relate to objects
through marks, will help clarify this conception of predication. No
student of Kant's critical philosophy can afford to ignore this conception. For, as Allen Wood has pointed out, Kant retained this
conception of predication throughout his transcendental turn, and
develops his critical account of genuine cognition in terms of it.24
I will structure my discussion around the Logic's definition of a
mark, the only one of Kant's to be published in his lifetime:
A mark is that in a thing [Ding]which makes up part of its cognition,
23The texts on marks on which I will be relying in this and the following
sections are drawn mainly from Kant's Reflections on logic, private notes
that Kant kept for his lectures on logic (which he gave at least once a year
over the course of his long teaching career). He kept these notes in his
copy of the text he used, G. F. Meier's Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre.They
have been edited, compiled, and dated by Adickes, in volume 20 of the
Academy Edition of Kant's works. Questions could be raised about relying
too heavily on these notes: Kant did not, after all, intend them for publication, and since he kept them over the course of several decades, they
naturally evince some development in his thinking. Nonetheless, I take
them to be quite reliable: Kant's practice was to revise them constantly,
and it is a measure of the care he took in doing so that, when he entrusted
his student Gottlob Jasche with the task of preparing his lectures on logic
for publication, he gave Jasche his Reflections on logic to work from. The
Reflections that develop Kant's account of marks are a series that Adickes
compiles as R 2275 through R 2288. Adickes dates R 2275 through R 2279
to the 70s, and R 2280 through R 2288 to the 80s and 90s. The texts on
marks from Jdsche's Logic (to which I have referred, and will continue to
refer, simply as "the Logic") are largely paraphrases of these Reflections.
24See his Kant's Rational Theology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1978), 40-41. The present section is indebted to his helpful discussion of
the relevant passages from the first critique.
247
HOUSTON SMiT
or-what is the same-a partialrepresentationso far as it is considered

as ground of cognition [Erkenntnisgrund]
of the whole representation.
(Introduction?8; 9:58)
Here Kant uses 'cognition' and 'representation' in his customary
way, to refer to the content of a cognizing or representing. And
he uses 'thing' in his standard sense, in which a thing is to be
contrasted with a mere representation: as we will see, a thing, unlike a mere representation, is wholly determined in respect of every
possible predicate of things. Recall that to cognize a thing, in
Kant's sense, is to represent it positively in respect of its determinate identity, where one does so in consciousness.25 Such representing consists in being conscious of a thing as determined in
respect of possible predicates of things. So, as a first approximation, we can gloss the passage's first characterization of a mark as
follows. A mark is "that in a thing which makes up part of its cognition" (italics mine), because it is an identifying property of a
thing. It makes up only a part of a thing's cognition, because in
being conscious of a thing as having that property, one cognizes it
only partially, not wholly-that is, through some, but not all, of the
predicates that apply to that thing.
What is initially most puzzling about the Logic's definition is that
it treats a mark not only as an objective property ("that in a
thing"), but also as its representation ("part of its cognition" and
"partial representation"). Nor is this definition an anomaly. In
some texts Kant clearly counts properties as marks: in the first critique, he speaks of "a property [eine Beschaffenheit]which, as a
mark, can be met in some place [irgendwoan angetroffen]" (B 133
n.); and in his lectures on logic, he remarks that having a hand,

or having a perishable body, are marks of a human being. On the
other hand, Kant repeatedly counts representations as marks: he
holds that every mark "can be considered as a representation in
itself" (Logic Introduction ?8; 9:58; cf. R 2285; 16:299); and he
classes concepts as marks, writing, "All our concepts are marks and
all thought representation through them" (R 2287; 16:300). Indeed, Kant even speaks of the properties of body as constituting
our intuitions of a body: "All the properties which constitute the
intuition of a body [impenetrability, for example] belong merely
to appearance" (Prolegomena?13; 4:289).
25See, again, Logic, Introduction ?8; 9:64-65.
248
This puzzle reflects the way Kant operates, as do many other

early modern philosophers, within a broadly Aristotelian conception of cognition. On this conception, one cognizes a thing by
having its distinguishing properties in one's intellect. This conception turns on the idea that-to use Aquinas's terminology-a property can enjoy intentional, as well as natural, existence. This broadly Aristotelian conception of cognition is implicit in the Leibnizian
G. F. Meier's Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, a text Kant used for his
lecture courses on logic. Consider, in particular, the definition of
a mark that Meier offers in this work:
A mark, a character [Kennzeichnen]
of cognition and the thing [nota,
charactercognitionis et rei], is that in the cognition or the thing, which,
when it is cognized, is the ground on which we are conscious to ourselves of it. (?115; 16:296-97)
The definition suggests that a mark is a property that can exist,
not just in a thing, but also in our cognition of that thing. Indeed,
it suggests that the characteristic function of a mark requires that
it be a property that can exist intentionally, as well as naturally.
Kant, too, adapting Meier's notion of a mark, thinks of cognition
as formal assimilation, and of marks as the mediating element in
this assimilation. This explains why, in the passages cited above,
Kant uses 'property' in such a way that a property of a thing can
make up "part of its cognition": those that can, by existing intentionally in our representation and being related to a thing in a
cognition, are marks. As his remark that every mark "can be considered as a representation in itself" indicates, he takes potential
intentional being in some kind of representation as essential to a
mark: to consider a property as a mark is to consider it, not in
itself, but as the content of a possible representing.26
In order to bring out the Leibnizian conception of predication
implicit in it, I want next to examine the Logic's second characterization of a mark: "a partial representation so far as it is considered
as ground of cognition of the whole representation." Consider first
260n Kant'sview,what makes a propertya markis our being able to be
conscious of it as a propertyof a thing, and it is only by way of its existing
in our representation that we are able to be conscious of it as such a
property.Moreover,marksmay be represented,without therebybeing registered in consciousness,so as to serve as grounds of cognition, as R 2275
makes clear: "In consciousness there are marks.But where marksare represented, there is not alwaysconsciousness" (16:296).
249
HOUSTON SMIT
the technical Leibnizian terminology ("ground of cognition,"

"partial and whole representation") that this characterization employs. As his speaking of a mark as "that in a thing which makes
up its cognition" indicates, what is in question is cognition of an
object, and thus a ground on which one can cognize a thing, as
against a mererepresentation. In short, the ground of cognition in
question is a representation on which one can ground the identification of a thing in cognizing it (compare Meier's definition of
a mark). But a thing, as against its representation, must on Kant's
view be concrete, fully determined in respect of all possible predicates of things: in the "Ideal of Pure Reason" of the first critique,
he claims that every possible thing-as opposed to a concept-is
determined in respect of all possible predicates of things.27 This
suggests that the whole representation in question is one of a thing,
a suggestion confirmed by Kant's other characterizations of a mark.
In his Reflectionson Logic he writes that a mark is " [w] hat is considered as belonging as a part to the whole (possible) representation of a thing" (R 2280; 16: 298). And later in the Logic, he remarks that " [e]very mark may be considered from two sides: first,
as a representation in itself; second, as belonging as a partial concept to the whole representation of a thing, and thereby as a
ground of cognition of this thing itself' (Introduction, ?8; 9:58).28
The Logic's second characterization of mark, then, invokes a notion
of a whole representation that is a descendant of the Leibnizian
notion of a complete concept: the notion of a representation that
determines a thing in respect of all possible predicates of things.29
27To be sure, Kant adapts the Leibnizian conception of predication to
his critical philosophy by distinguishing between predicates of appearances, which apply to things as they appear to us in our experience, and
predicates of things in themselves. Our concept of a thing as it appears is
the concept of something fully determined in respect of all the possible
predicates of appearances, and our concept of a thing as it is in itself, a
concept of something fully determined in respect of all the possible predicates of things in themselves (see A 581-82 / B 610).
28Compare the parallel text in Kant's Reflectionson Logic "A mark is
considered, first, as a representation in itself, and second, as belonging as
a partial representation to another representation and thereby as a ground
of cognition of a thing" (R 2285; 16:299).
29Kant usually avoids calling such a representation a concept, since such
a representation is singular, and he holds that all concepts, by definition,
are general (cf. Logic 1, ?1.2; 9:91).
The notion of the whole representation of a thing in question is helpfully illustrated in the following passage from the introduction to the first
250
The notion of a partial representation this characterization employs is also one of the representation of a thing, a representation
that as such is a part of this whole representation, not of just any
representation that contains it. And this characterization reflects a
Leibnizian conception of predication on which to predicate a representation of an object is to regard it as belonging to a possible
whole representation of that thing.
We can now begin to see why Kant specifies that a mark is "a
partial representation so far as it is considered as ground of cognition [Erkenntnisgrund]of the whole representation." As we saw,
Kant holds that we can consider a mark "as a representation in
itself"-that is, apart from the relation it bears to a thing as a part
of its possible whole representation. But to consider it in this way
is to consider it, not as a mark-and so as a content that is predicable of an object-but rather as a mere representation (see section 2). Moreover, what makes a partial representation a mark is
not merely its being a partial representation, a representation that
makes up part of the whole representation of a thing. To consider
a partial representation as a mark is to consider it as "ground of
cognition of the whole representation," and we can, according to
Kant, at least conceive of a mode of cognition in which a partial
representation does not serve as the ground of that cognition. An
critique. Having claimed that all synthetic judgments demand, in addition
to the concepts of the logical subject ("A") and the logical predicate
("B"), some third element ("X") on which its justification rests, Kant
writes:
In the case of empirical judgments, judgments of experience, there is no difficulty whatsoever in meeting this demand. This X is the complete experience
of the object which I think through the concept A-a concept which makes
up only one part of this experience. For though I do not include in the concept
of a body in general the predicate "weight," the concept nonetheless designates the complete experience through one of its parts; and to this part, as
belonging to it, I can therefore add other parts of the same experience. (A 8;
see B 12)
The "complete experience of the object" is a representation
that determines an object in respect of all possible predicates of appearances and
thus as a phenomenon.
On Kant's account, such an objective content
would be infinite and thus one that we, having finite minds, cannot have.
Our concept of such a "complete experience" is, thus, a problematic concept, an idea: its object (like that of the cosmological idea of the world)
cannot be given to us. Nonetheless,
Kant holds that this idea is our idea
of a thing as it appears, of a thing that is determined
in respect of all
possible predicates of appearances.
251
HOUSTON SMIT
intuitive understanding, he maintains, would be one that grounds

its cognition of a thing on the whole representation of a thing, not
a partial representation, and thus a faculty that does not cognize
things through marks. Grounding one's cognition of things on partial representations of those things is a mode of cognition distinctive of a discursive understanding-a faculty of cognizing things in
representing them through concepts. Thus, to consider a partial
representation as a ground of cognition is to consider it, not insofar as it is predicable of an object in just any mode of cognition,
but specifically insofar as it is predicable of an object in the mode
of cognition distinctive of discursive understanding. This is why
Kant says that to consider a representation as a mark is to "consider
it as belonging as a partial conceptto the whole representation of
a thing and therebyas a ground of cognition of that thing itself"
(italics mine): what makes a partial representation a mark is its
being a representation on which a discursive understanding can
ground its cognition of that thing, by representing that partial representation through concepts as a part of a possible whole representation of a thing.
Fully appreciating Kant's conception of a mark would require
examining his account of the nature of discursive understanding.
And that is a task that I will have to defer for another occasion.
And I will thus also have to defer explaining why Kant infers from
our understanding's being discursive that "we cognize things only
through marks" (Logic, Introduction ?8; 9:58). But for present purposes, it will suffice to have a first approximation of his conclusion-namely, that we can be conscious of things in respect of their
determinate identities only in taking partial representations of
those things as the grounds of their cognition. It follows from this
conclusion that all the objective content of our cognition, content
through which we cognize things, must consist of marks-representations that we can legitimately regard in this way as a part of
a possible whole representation of a thing, and in such a way that
they function as grounds of that thing's cognition. In particular,
insofar as our intuitions are objective perceptions through which
we can cognize objects, they constitute objective content of our
cognition, and thus consist of marks. Indeed, it follows that all of
the categories, which as our
our objective perceptions-including
concepts of an object in general do not themselves constitute objective content-relate to things only through marks. The catego252
ries constitute objective perceptions, contents predicable of objects

in cognition, only insofar as they can be realized in possible marks
as the form of our cognition of any possible object in general. Finally, to understand the relation that our objective perceptions bear
to an object is to understand either how they themselves consist of
partial representations that we can legitimately regard as parts of a
possible whole representation, or how they are concepts whose employment is constitutive of so regarding partial representations.
In predicating an objective perception of an object-even where
that predicating constitutes a mere thought, not a genuine cognition-we represent that object as a possible thing. But, as we saw
(section 2), even where such a predicating satisfies the general
condition set by the law of noncontradiction, the object may not,
for all we know, be a possible thing: not just any such predicating
constitutes a genuine cognition. In order to constitute a genuine
cognition of a thing, our predicating an objective perception of an
object must meet the further, epistemic, condition specified above,
namely, that we can establish that the thing so represented is possible. Nonetheless, the Leibnizian conception of predication implicit in Kant's characterization of a mark provides a partial specification of what it is for one of our representations to relate to an
object as the ground of its genuine cognition. For it specifies the
logical conditions on doing so properly, ones set by the nature of
discursive understanding. Providing the rest of this specificationin the case of our a priori cognition, by articulating the relation
this cognition bears to possible experience-so
as to explain fully
the way these perceptions constitute grounds of our genuine cognitions of objects, is the task of Kant's transcendental philosophy.
A central tenet of this philosophy is that our thoughts meet the
conditions of constituting genuine cognitions only insofar as they
relate to possible experience, and thus that the scope of our genuine cognition is limited to possible objects of experience-a claim
that breaks sharply with the Leibnizian tradition. But Kant's task
of specifying this condition is framed by his Leibnizian conception
of predication, a conception on which the first critique builds.
Thus, although the Leibnizian conception of predication I have
sketched in this section is to be distinguished from Kant's account
of genuine cognition, it partially specifies the relation that any of
our objective perceptions bear to an object in a genuine cognition
of that object.
253
HOUSTON SMIT
4. Intuitive versus Discursive Marks

We have seen that Kant defines a mark as "that in a thing which
makes up part of its cognition." We have also seen that intuition
and concepts are two types of objective perceptions. It should come
as no surprise, then, that Kant distinguishes between two types of
marks, intuitive and discursive: an intuitive mark is a property as
it makes up a thing's (partial) cognition in intuition (that is, a
property as it is represented, and thus has intentional being, in
intuition), and a discursive mark, a property as it makes up a
thing's (partial) cognition in a concept (that is, a property as it is
represented, and thus has intentional being, in a concept).
Consider the following Reflection on logic, which to my knowledge is the only place in which Kant distinguishes explicitly between intuitive and discursive marks:
A mark is a partial representation (which), as such (is a ground of
cognition). It is either intuitive (a synthetic part): a part of intuition,
or discursive:a part of a concept, which is an analyticground of cognition.30(R 2286; 16:299-300)
An intuitive mark is "a part of intuition" because it is a partial
representation of a thing had in intuition. An example of an intuitive mark is the content rectanglein your perception of this page:
that is, this rectangular shape, which you relate to the page as its
property in intuiting it as a rectangular thing.3' Notice that what
makes this content singular (that is, predicable of only one thing
and thus intuitive) is not its characterizing a thing in respect of all
possible predicates of things (it is, after all, a partial representation), but rather its being a partial representation that is contained
in intuition ("a part of intuition"). A discursive mark, by contrast,
is "a part of a concept" because it is a partial representation of a
thing as it makes up-either a part or the whole of-a concept.32
30The parentheses indicate Kant's later emendations. Adickes dates this
Reflection to sometime between 1780 and 1789.
31So by "this rectangular shape," I mean the property of the page-not
the page itself, nor the shape merely as the object of pure intuition.
32The present reading accounts for Kant's holding that " [c] oncepts are
marks of general use" (R 2281; 16:298). I take his point to be that the
properties of objects insofar as these properties are represented in concepts, so as to constitute these concepts (wholly or partially) in respect of
their matter, are "of general use" in that they may be predicated of more
than one thing.
254
The concepts rectangleand body, thus, are examples of discursive

marks. For they are partial representations of things that, as concepts, are general: they subsume under themselves, and so can be
related in different possible judgments to, more than one rectangular body.
Kant's distinction between a discursive and an intuitive mark is,
thus, parallel to that between a universal property and a singular
instance of a universal property-what, in twentieth-century metaphysics, has variously been called an abstract particular or a trope.33
And, like more recent trope theorists, Kant privileges tropes in his
metaphysics. For, on his view, things-albeit merely as they appearconsist of appearances. And so regarded, appearances are tropes:
as the constituents of empirical intuitions, they are the singular
instances of the predicates through which we determine these
things in experiencing them. In doing transcendental philosophy,
we learn that these tropes can be regarded either empirically, insofar as they are real, or transcendentally, insofar as they are mere
representations (see section 2). Because tropes are real (if only
empirically), Kant develops his account of what makes a property
a trope in the course of developing his transcendental theory of
experience. But his account of universals is, in effect, a variant of
Notice that on this reading, the import of the phrases "a part of intuition" and "a part of a concept" is to distinguish between a partial representation (so a part of a whole representation of a thing) as that part is
had in intuition and as it is had in a concept. Its import is not to distinguish
between a representation that makes up part of an intuition and one that
makes up part of a concept. Against this second reading, notice that Kant
says "a part of intuition," not "a part of an intuition." Not noticing the
possibility of the first reading, Stuhlmann-Laeisz adopts the second reading, taking it to be definitive of a discursive mark that it is a representation
that makes up a part of a further concept, then goes on to show the difficulties that result (see Kants Logik (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1976), 73f.).
On the reading I propose, in contrast, a partial representation of a thing
can be considered in such a way that it constitutes a concept simply of
itself, and not only as a part of another (more determinate) concept.
33For a seminal discussion of this idea of an abstract particular, see G.
F. Stout, Proceedingsof the AristotelianSociety,supp. vol. 3 (1923), especially
114, where he introduces a notion of "character" quite similar to the notion of an intuitive mark that I am ascribing to Kant, as "abstract particulars
which are predicable of concrete particulars." See, too, Donald C. Williams, ThePrinciplesof EmpiricalRealism, (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1966), 74ff. especially 78, where Williams originates this use of the term
trope'.
255
HOUSTON SMIT
Aristotelian abstractionism: universals are nothing but contents of

certain acts of understanding. They are thus not real, even in the
empirical sense. And, because of its radically new conception of
metaphysics, and thus of what should head the metaphysical agenda, the first critique does not give the kind of prominence to the
distinction between intuitive and discursive marks that one might
expect. Nonetheless, Kant uses this distinction to pose and pursue
the distinctive questions of his new metaphysics.
Notice that on the reading I propose, Kant's distinction between
intuitive and discursive marks is one between two ways the same
partial representation of a thing (for example, the content rectangle) is predicable of a thing and thus constitutes a mark. This point
is implicit in Kant's hylomorphic analyses of intuitions and concepts. According to Kant the form of intuition34 and the form of
a concept are what, respectively, render the same partial representation either an intuitive or a discursive mark. So what makes the
content rectangle in your perception of this page an intuitive
mark-an objective content that is singular, predicable of only one
object-is its being contained in the forms of our sensible intuition, that is, in the unbounded individuals, space and time. But
the same partial representation can also take on the logical form
of a concept-that is, generality (Logic 1, ?2; 9:91)-and thereby
constitute a discursive mark, (the matter of) the concept rectangle.35
Let's take an initial look at Kant's account of the logical form of
34 am using 'form of intuition' in the sense of the Transcendental
Aesthetic, in which space as form of intuition is not distinguished from
space as formal intuition. It is only in the course of the B edition Deduction
that Kant comes to distinguish between these two, remarking that in the
Aesthetic he had for simplicity's sake treated the latter as merely sensible,
though it actually presupposes a synthesis and thus the activity of the understanding (B 160-61 n.). Henry Allison provides a helpful summary of
recent discussions of this important distinction in chapter 5 of Kant's TranscendentalIdealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), especially 9498; more recently, Longuenesse has suggested an interesting reading of
this distinction in chapter 8 of her important Kant and the CapacitytoJudge
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), especially 218 n. 12.
35In taking Kant's distinction between intuition and concept to turn on
his accounts of the form of intuition and the form of a concept, I am in
agreement with Kirk Dallas Wilson. See his interesting "Kant on Intuition,"
PhilosophicalQuarterly25 (1975). However, my accounts of these forms, and
especially of the way they ground Kant's distinction between intuition and
concept, differ sharply from Wilson's.
256
a concept.36 Kant maintains that this form is the product of our

cognitive activity:we makea representation general through certain
"logical acts" of comparison, reflection, and abstraction. For example, I produce the concept treeby (a) comparing a fir, a willow,
and a linden so as to notice the respects in which their trunks,
branches, leaves, and so forth, differ; (b) reflecting on just what
they do have in common, "the trunks, branches, and leaves themselves"; and (c) abstracting from other respects in which the objects differ (their size, shape, and so forth) (Logic 1, ??4-6; 9:9394). In the act of reflection, we consider a partial representation
as a property potentially common to more than one object, and
the very act of so considering the partial representation makes it
one common to more than one object. In short, reflection is an
act that makes a mark discursive, one predicable of more than one
object.37 This explains why Kant defines a concept as "a general
(representat. per notas communes) or a reflected representation
sentat. discursive)" (Logic 1, ?1; 9:91).
(repre-
Seeing that, on Kant's view, the generality of a concept is its

consisting of, and relating to an object by means of, one or more
discursive marks sheds light on his discussions of this generality.
Consider the Logic's initial characterization of the generality of a
concept:
Concept is to be contrastedwith intuition;for it is a general representation, or a representationof that which is common to a pluralityof
objects and so a representationinsofar as it can be contained in various ones [Verschiedenen].8(Logic 1, ?1.1; 9:91)
36Keep in mind that logical form, for Kant, is a property of thoughts.
It is not, as most since Frege have held, a property of propositions or
sentences (as is, for instance, their capacity to be true), or of their elements.
37The reflection that makes a mark discursive is a specific instance of
what Kant terms 'logical reflection' (B 318-19 / A 262). But what makes a
discursive mark a mark, a content predicable of a thing as one of its properties, is a different sort of reflection, which Kant terms 'transcendental';
for it is transcendental reflection that constitutes the relation of objective
perceptions to an object (B 319 / A 262). The form of a concept does not
suffice, of itself, to constitute an objective perception's relation to an object, any more than does the form of intuition. I discuss the difference
between these two sorts of reflection in "The Role of Reflection in Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly80 (1999). Beatrice
Longuenesse has developed a reading of Kant's account of reflection that
is, in many important respects, along the same lines. See chapters 5 and 6
of her Kant and the CapacitytoJudge.
38The passage leaves it open whether "the various ones" refers to ob257
HOUSTON SMIT
A parallel passage is to be found in the first critique, one that

invokes the notion of a common, that is, discursive, mark:
Now one must indeed think of every concept as a representation
which is contained in an infinite number of different possible representations (as their common mark). (B 40)
As B 40 confirms, what is referred to in the Logic passage as "a
representation of that which is common to a plurality of objects"
is a discursive mark, a partial representation that relates to objects
as a property common to them. And, recall, we relate a representation to an object as its identifying property in a cognition, by
regarding that representation "as belonging as a partial concept
to the whole representation of a thing, and thereby as a ground
of cognition of this thing itself." Moreover, what makes a representation one "of that which is common to a plurality of objects"
is our taking it as a representation that makes up part of the whole
representations of each of those different objects-as a representation contained in, and thus common to, all these different whole
representations.39 Kant thus concludes that a concept is a reprejects or to representations. But, given the readings of 'representation' and
'object' offered in section 2, nothing hangs on this choice: Kant's notion
of an object is one of a representation (though not a mere representation);
a possible object is a possible representation.
39Thus, though on Kant's view a concept can be contained in other,
more determinate concepts (for instance, the concept animal is contained,
as a part, in the concept human), what makes a concept an objective perception is its being contained in the whole representation of a thing, for
that is what makes it a ground of cognition of a thing. It is in light of this
point that Kant's contrast between the intension and extension of a concept should be understood:
Every concept, as a partial concept, is contained in the representationof a
thing; as ground of cognition, that is, as mark, these things are contained
under it. In the first respect, every concept has a content; in the other an
extension (Umfang). (Logic, 1 ?7; 9:95)
The first sentence presupposes Kant's view that all concepts (of objects)
are partial-that is, that no concept is a whole representation: a whole or
complete concept is an oxymoron, because such a concept would be a
singular representation, and generality is definitive of a concept. Moreover,
the first sentence implies that a concept's being partial consists in its being
contained in-making up a part of-the whole representation of a thing.
It is in respect of being so contained that a concept has an (objective)
content, because the (objective) content of a concept is what, in grasping
that concept, one regards as contained as a part in the whole representation of a thing. Moreover, Kant implies that every concept is a ground of
258
KANT ON ARKS AND INTUITION
sentation "insofar as it can be contained in various ones." In contrast, an intuition, as a representation predicable of only one object, is a representation insofar as it cannot be predicated of more
than one object.
Notice that Kant's characterizing a general representation as "a
representation insofar as it can be contained in more than one"
confirms the reading of R 2286 I have been developing. For this
characterization implies that if we abstract from the respective
forms of our concepts and intuitions and attend only to their matter, we can speak of the same partial representation (that is, an
objective content) as one that, in being contained in intuition,
constitutes an intuitive mark, and that, in being reflected, constitutes a discursive mark. Consider, too, R 2287, where, having stated
that "I[a]ll our concepts are marks and all thought representation
through them," Kant adds, "We speak here only of marks as concepts." Finally, the present reading accounts for Kant's describing
a representation as both a concept and an intuition (Logic, Introduction, ?5; 9:33): he has in mind a case in which we reflect on
an objective content that is contained in intuition, an intuitive
mark, so that it simultaneously also constitutes a discursive mark.
Indeed, to do so just is, on Kant's view, to subsume an intuition
under a concept: to recognize an intuitive mark as a singular instance of a discursive mark.
Most of Kant's commentators have entirely overlooked Kant's
distinction between intuitive and discursive marks. And, as a consequence, many give readings of his account of marks that, in effect, equate all marks with discursive ones.40 Moreover, among the
few who have noted the distinction, only one discusses it in any
detail, and none apply it to explicate Kant's contrast between intuitions and concepts.41 As we will now see, our understanding of
cognition, and that a concept's being a ground of cognition consists in its
containing things under itself in virtue of being contained in the whole
representation of those things.
40Robert Howell, for instance, holds that Kant identifies marks with general properties, in Kant's TranscendentalDeduction (Boston: Kluwer, 1992),
66. Allison presents Kant's account of the generation of concepts as a process whereby "impressions become transformed into marks" (Kant's TranscendentalIdealism,67). But what is distinctive about this process is precisely
that it produces discursive marks from intuitive ones.
41I know of three authors who note this distinction: Klaus Reich, The
Completenessof Kant's TableofJudgments,trans. Kneller and Losonsky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 37 (originally published in 1932);
259
HOUSTON SMIT
this contrast has been seriously impeded by this neglect of Kant's

distinction between intuitive and discursive marks.
5. The Mediacy of Concepts and the Immediacy of Intuition
Consider, once again, the way Kant contrasts concept and intuition
at A 320 / B 376: "[Intuition] relates to the object immediately
and is singular, [concept], mediately, by means of a mark which
can be common to several things." With the distinction between
discursive and intuitive marks in hand, we are in a position to see
that the standard minimal reading of the immediacy criterion is
based on a misinterpretation of this passage. Proponents of this
reading, in effect, take the phrase "by means of a mark which can
... as appositive to the mediacy of concepts.42 And they thereby
take the clause "which can be common to several things" as simply
unpacking a relevant aspect of Kant's notion of a mark.
However, on the reading I have proposed the clause "which can
." is restrictive: it specifies discursive, as opposed to intuitive,
marks.43'44Thus, the phrase "by means of a mark which can ...
Richard Aquila, RepresentationalMind (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1983), 37; and Rainer Stuhlmann-Laeisz, Kants Logik,73. StuhlmannLaeisz discusses the distinction in some detail, but offers a reading very
different from the one I develop. None of these three applies the distinction in interpreting Kant's contrast between concept and intuition.
42See, for example, Allison, Kant's TranscendentalIdealism, 66.
43Manley Thompson also interprets the clause "which can ..." as restrictive. In "Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology," he
reads this passage as asserting that intuitions
refer to an object immediately because they somehow mark characteristics peculiar to that object alone, while empirical concepts can refer to the same
object only mediately because they mark only characteristics that the object
may share with indefinitely many other objects. (316)
But in speaking of an intuition as referring to an object through "characteristics peculiar to that object alone," Thompson does not have intuitive
marks in mind. This becomes clear when he immediately goes on to remark: "But intuitions then appear to be simply concepts of a special sortindividual or singular rather than general concepts." Thompson thinks of
a mark through which an intuition refers to its object as "peculiar" to its
object not in being an individual proprietary to that object, but rather in
uniquely characterizing that object, so as to distinguish it qualitatively from
all other possible objects: only on this assumption would it make sense to
conclude that intuitions are singular concepts.
Now, as Thompson is well aware, this conclusion is antithetical to Kant's
most central critical tenets. It conflicts with his doctrine, propounded in
the Amphiboly, that, pace Locke and Leibniz, intuitions and concepts are
260
contrasts the generality of concepts with the singularity of intuition.

The import of the phrase is to specify what the generality, not the
mediacy, of a concept consists in. This reading is also suggested by
the parallel structure of Kant's contrast between intuitions and concepts. And it is confirmed by the Logic, which characterizes the
generalityof a concept as its being "a representation through common marks [per notas communes]"-that is, through discursive
marks-and refers to a concept as "a representation of what is
common to more than one thing" (1 ?1.1; 9:91). Although, as we
will see, it follows from an objective perception's being made up
of discursive marks that it relates to its object mediately, the mediacy of a concept's relation to an object does not itself consist in
its being a representation through discursive marks. In short, it is
not the mediacy but the generality of a concept that consists in its
being through discursive marks.
Indeed, having advanced the notion of an intuitive mark, Kant
cannot consistently maintain that the mediacy of a concept's relation to an object consists in its relating to objects by means of
marks. For, as we have seen, intuitive marks are, as marks, representations through which sensible intuitions-the objective perceptions whose matter they constitute-relate to an object. Thus, his
essentially different kinds of representations. Moreover, crediting us with
singular concepts would contradict Kant's above-cited claim that, our understanding being discursive, all of our concepts are general. On such
grounds, no doubt, Thompson regards A 320 / B 377 as a "trace" of a
preliminary view Kant held of intuition, that, by oversight, survived into
the first critique (315-16). But no such patchwork reading is necessary, if
we read the passage as implying that some intuitions (namely, ours) refer
to objects through intuitive marks.
In putting forward his reading, Thompson takes himself to be following
Hintikka (316). Hintikka, however, strongly objects to being read in this
vein, insisting that the immediacy of intuition consists precisely in not referring to its object through any marks. See "Kant's Theory of Mathematics
Revisited," in Essays in Kant's Critiqueof Pure Reason, ed. Mohanty and Shahan (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982), 214.
44Now one might object, in defense of the standard minimal reading,
that if the import of this clause were restrictive in this way, Kant would
surely have specified in A 320 / B 376 that intuitions relate to objects by
means of intuitive marks. But there is an important reason why he doesn't:
he wants his definition of intuition to be broad enough to include the
intuition had by an intuitive, as against a discursive or conceptual, understanding, an intuition that does not relate to an object by means of marks
(see note 11 and note 48).
261
HOUSTON SMIT
notion of an intuitive mark commits Kant to the possibility of intuitions that relate to objects by means of marks. The immediacy
of an intuition's relation to an object, then, cannot consist in its
not relating to an object by means of marks; and the mediacy of a
concept's relation to an object cannot consist in its relating to an
object by means of marks.
In what, then, do the mediacy of concepts and the immediacy
of intuitions consist? Consider the following passage from the
Metaphysical Deduction of the first critique:
Since no representationother than intuition goes immediatelyto an
object, a concept is never related immediatelyto an object, but rather
to some other representationof the same [object] (be it an intuition
or itself already a concept). Judgment is therefore the mediate cognition of an object, that is, the representationof a representationof
it. (A 68 / B 93) 45
What Kant explains in the passage is not the relation a concept

has to its objects that constitutes the generality of that concept.
This relation constitutes a concept's containing objects in its extension, in virtue of its being contained in other possible representations of those objects. It is thus a relation that concept has to
all of these objects. The relation to an object in question at A 68 /
B 93 is, rather, that which a concept has in being employed in a
judgment as a predicate. Since this relation is one a concept has
to a subset of the objects it contains in its extension, it must be
distinguished from that which the concept has to all of these objects.46
45Note the implication that a concept, in relating mediately to an object
by means of another representation of that object, relates immediately to
that further representation of the object. And Kant's subsequent discussion
makes it clear that a concept relates immediately to another concept in
being employed as a logical predicate in a categorical judgment: he says
that "in the judgment 'all bodies are divisible', the concept divisibleis related immediately to the concept body."And a concept relates immediately
to intuition (though perhaps not to a particular one) in being employed
as a logical subject in a categorical judgment: so Kant says that, in the
judgment just mentioned, the concept bodyis related immediately to "certain appearances that present themselves to us" (A 68 / B 98). Since appearances are the intuitive marks that make up the objective content of
an empirical intuition (B 34 / A 20), Kant is saying that a concept is employed in a judgment so as to relate immediately to an intuition, insofar
as it is related to the intuitive marks that make up the content of an intuition.
46Indeed, Kant holds that in a singular judgment, a concept is related
262
Nonetheless, the same conception of mediacy-as consisting in

mediation by some other representation of an object-is in play
when Kant, in passages such as the Stufenleiter,characterizes as mediate the relation to an object that constitutes the generality of a
concept. We saw that we generate this relation in reflection,
through thinking of a partial representation as general, as one that
is common to different possible whole representations of an object.
But, on Kant's account, this thought is equivalent to the thought
of that partial representation as the predicate of a possible judgment: so he maintains that our act of grasping a universal-which,
as we saw, makes a given objective content universal-can be reduced to the act of judging, the act of subsuming a particular under a universal. It follows that A 68 / B 93's characterization of the
mediacy of the relation that a concept has to an object in its use
also applies to the mediacy of the relation to an object that is
intrinsic to a concept: the mediacy of a concept's relation to an
object consists in its relating to an object by means of a further
representation of that object.
By implication, the immediacy of an intuition can be characterized-albeit negatively-as its not relating to an object by means of
some other representation of that object.47 But to say that the imimmediately to a particular intuition, in such a way as to come to have, in
this use, a relation to a single object. In his writings on logic, Kant admonishes Leibnizians who divide concepts into universal, particular, and singular, on the grounds that " [n] ot the concepts themselves, but their use,
can be divided in this way" (Logic, 1 ?1; 9: 91). Other remarks suggest that
what Kant has in mind by this singular use is the use of a concept as the
subject of a singular judgment: "Or I use the concept only for a single
thing, for example: This house is cleaned in such and such a way" (Wiener
Logik;24:909; cited by Parsons, "The Transcendental Aesthetic," 64). Manley Thompson ("Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology,")
and Charles Parsons (the postscript to his "Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic" and "The Transcendental Aesthetic," sect. 1) have both emphasized
the importance of this point.
47Longuenesse proposes, in passing, something close to this reading of
the immediacy of intuition: "Kant's characterization of intuition as immediate representation essentially means, I think, that intuition does not
require the mediation of another representation to relate to an object"
(Kant and the Capacityto Judge, 202 n. 15). However, the independence of
intuition from further representations needs qualification: some of our
intuitions require the mediation of some further representation to relate
to an object; it is only further representation of an objectthat does not
mediate an intuition's relation to an object. For Kant holds that an intuition is empirical if "it relates to the object through sensation" (A 20 / B
35). This does not render the intuition's relation to its object mediate,
263
HOUSTON SMIT
mediacy of intuition consists in its not relating to an object by

means of any otherrepresentation of that object is not to say that
an intuition does not relate to an object by means of any representation of that object. Indeed, it implies that an intuition relates
to an object by means of some representation of that object. And
since the immediacy of intuition consists in its not relating to an
object through any other representation of that object, the only
representation of an object through which an intuition can relate
to an object is itself. Kant's positive characterization of the immediacy of our intuition specifies how, in virtue of consisting of intuitive marks, our intuitions relate to their objects only through
themselves.
That our intuitions relate to objects through themselves should
not be surprising. For it is implicit in Kant's conception of marks,
and in his conception of the way in which all of our determinate
objective perceptions relate to objects through marks. Recall that
all of the objective content of our cognition consists of marks,
where a mark is "a partial representation so far as it is considered
as ground of cognition of the whole representation," and that we
thus predicate this objective content of objects in considering it as
consisting of marks (section 3). This is just to say that all of our
determinate objective perceptions relate to objects through the
marks that constitute their matter, as they constitute their matter,
and so through themselves. Our determinate concepts of objects
consist of discursive marks; they are objective perceptions that relate to objects by means of the discursive marks that constitute their
matter, as they constitute their matter. Our intuitions constitute
objective content and thus must, in an analogous vein, consist of
intuitive marks; intuitions are objective perceptions that relate to
objects by means of the intuitive marks that constitute their matter.
What distinguishes the relation to an object had by our intuitions
from that had by determinate concepts of objects is that our intuitions relate to their objects, and constitute grounds of cognition,
simply of themselves and thus only through themselves.
because these sensations are not, of themselves, representations of objects
(objective perceptions). It is only in conjunction with empirical intuition
that sensations may be attributed (beigelegt)to an object (and even so, only
relative to the subjective constitution of the particular cognizing subject)
(cf. B 70 n.). Recall the Stufenleiters characterization of sensation as perception that "itselfrelates solely to the subject, as a modification of its
state."
264
KANT ON ARKS AND INTUITION
Notice that on the reading I propose, the immediacy criterion

is not, as on Parsons's reading, independent of the singularity criterion. What makes an objective perception singular-its being
contained in the form of intuition-is also what renders its relation
to an object immediate. So, though distinct, these criteria are mutually entailing. Indeed, the parallel point holds for concepts. What
makes a concept general is also what renders its relation to an
object mediate: the form of generality that renders a partial representation general (a discursive mark) also makes it a representation that only relates to an object through a further representation of that object.48
Explaining Kant's positive conception of the immediacy of intuition-the way intuition relates to an object simply through itself-would require examining his account of synthesis. For synthesis is the act of mind that produces intuitions, in a fashion analogous to the way reflection produces concepts. Unfortunately, examining Kant's account of synthesis would take me beyond the
scope of the present paper. But I can close with a rough first approximation of what I believe the first critique's account of synthesis entails about Kant's positive conception of the immediacy of
empirical intuition. Synthesis makes an objective perception-a
representation with consciousness-an intuition in virtue of being
the act of the mind that constitutes the consciousness had in this
perception. In the case of a sensible intuition, this act of synthesis
is the act that orders appearances into the whole representation of
a single phenomenal world. But it is essential to an appearance
that it be a content that is a part of such a whole representation.
Thus, synthesis produces appearances in ordering them into the
whole representation of a single phenomenal world. Now the relation an appearance has to all the other possible appearances contained in that whole representation is what makes it a ground of
cognition of a thing as it appears. Moreover, insofar as appearances
have this relation to each other, and constitute such grounds of
cognition, they constitute empirical intuitions. Thus, what makes
48However, not just any kind of generality of an objective perception
entails its mediacy: the synthetic universal through which an intuitive understanding cognizes objects relates to these objects immediately, despite
being a general representation; it is only the generality of concepts, which
consists in the analytic unity of consciousness, that entails mediacy (see
CritiqueofJudgment, ?77; 6:407-10; cf. B133 n.).
265
HOUSTON SMIT
an objective perception an empirical intuition is also what constitutes the relation that empirical intuition has to its object. Moreover, according to Kant's transcendental idealism, this relation that
empirical intuitions have to an object is what constitutes that object-the thing as it appears to which an empirical intuition relates.
Thus, what makes an objective perception an empirical intuition
is the sole ground on which it relates to an object. But this is just
to say that an empirical intuition relates to an object simply
through itself, and so immediately. This sketch explains the sense
in which an appearance is an intuitive mark, a synthetic part (R
2286): it is as a part of the whole possible representation generated
in synthesis that an appearance relates to an object as a ground of
its cognition (see sections 3 and 4) .49
6. Conclusion
I have argued that we ought to reject the standard minimal reading
of Kant's immediacy criterion for intuition. On this reading, the
immediacy of intuition consists in its not relating to its object
through marks. Commentators have uniformly adopted this reading, because they have overlooked Kant's distinction between intuitive and discursive marks. Intuitive marks are singular instances
of properties, as they are represented in, and make up the content
of, our intuitions. Discursive marks, in contrast, are general properties as they are represented in, and make up the content of, our
concepts. Once one sees that Kant makes this distinction, it becomes clear that our intuitions, on his view, relate to objects
through marks-in particular, through the intuitive marks that
make up their contents. For it is a consequence of his view of
indiscursive understanding that any of its cognitions-including
tuition-of a thing must be through marks. The immediacy of our
intuition does not, then, consist in its not relating to its object
through marks. It consists, rather, in the fact that its relation to its
object is not mediated by any further cognition of that object.
Universityof Arizona
49In other work, I develop this sketch of Kant'spositive conception of
the immediacyof intuition, showing how it illumines his accounts of pure
sensible intuition and intellectual intuition. In doing so, I clarifyhow, in
relation to the whole of possible human experience, empirical and pure
sensible intuitions relate to objects as grounds of their genuine cognition.
266

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The PhilosophicalReview,Vol. 109, No.

Kant on Marks and the Immediacy of Intuition

The distinction between concept and intuition is of the utmost

sensation (sensatio).Objective perception is cognition [Erkenntnis].

mediately and is singular, the latter, mediately, by means of a mark

over the import

sets for intuition.4

Kant uses 'object',

he sets for intuition.

in its not relating

of a mark as a part of his essentially

3'This' translates 'diese, and thus refers back to 'eine objectivePerzeption'

KANT ON ARKS AND)INTUITION

entirely overlooked, distinction between intuitive and discursive

immediate knowledge of objects." Parsons goes on to remark that,

7"Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic," 112; see also the postscript, 14446.

KANT ON MARKSAND INTUITION

from concepts is that they are objective perceptions that relate to

stdnde]of consciousness, they do not differ from their apprehension,

KANTON MARKSAD) INTUITION

KANT ON MARKSAD) INTUITION

Notice that being conscious merely of an object in general (as we

KANT ON MARKSAND INTUITION

one's concept of that thing, and he refers to this, the possibility of

KANT ON MARKSAND INTUITION

those of God, freedom, and immortality, the real possibility of

or-what is the same-a partialrepresentationso far as it is considered

n.); and in his lectures on logic, he remarks that having a hand,

KANT ON MARKSAND INTUITION

This puzzle reflects the way Kant operates, as do many other

the technical Leibnizian terminology ("ground of cognition,"

KANT ON MARKSAND INTUITION

intuitive understanding, he maintains, would be one that grounds

KANT ON MARKSAND INTUITION

ries constitute objective perceptions, contents predicable of objects

4. Intuitive versus Discursive Marks

KANT ON MARKSAND INTUITION

The concepts rectangleand body, thus, are examples of discursive

Aristotelian abstractionism: universals are nothing but contents of

KANT ON MARKSAND INTUITION

a concept.36 Kant maintains that this form is the product of our

Seeing that, on Kant's view, the generality of a concept is its

A parallel passage is to be found in the first critique, one that

KANT ON ARKS AND INTUITION

this contrast has been seriously impeded by this neglect of Kant's

KANT ON MARKSAND INTUITION

contrasts the generality of concepts with the singularity of intuition.

What Kant explains in the passage is not the relation a concept

KANT ON MARKSAND INTUITION

Nonetheless, the same conception of mediacy-as consisting in

mediacy of intuition consists in its not relating to an object by

KANT ON ARKS AND INTUITION

Notice that on the reading I propose, the immediacy criterion

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