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Vaiava Theology
JONATHAN B. EDELMANN | MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF RELIGION | DNAM | FRIDAY, NOV 21, 2014,
9:0011:00 AM
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
Conclusion............................................................................ 4
Bibliography.........................................................................4
Jonathan B. Edelmann
bells and whistles of Advaita, but leads them to pure and personalistic
bhakti of proper Gauya Vaiava theology. This leads to another
question:
things that Advaitins would say are the locus of agency and other
illusory qualities. For example, Chakravarthi Ramprasad (2011: 335)
notes that, the conscious subject of Advaita is strictly devoid of
agency, being witness (skin)
rdhara Svmins Bhvrthadpik (3.26.3)
andir tm puruo nirgua prakte para |
pratyag-dhm svaya-jyotir viva yena samanvitam ||
BhP 3.26.3 ||
KEYNOTE
Here rdhara is clearly reviewing a number of competing theories of
self. Just after this he talks about Prbhkara Mms. While not
developed here, he is interpreting the BhP as defending an Advaita
theory of self, one in which the self in its purest state is without
qualities.
Jva Gosvmin discusses this verse in his Kramasandarbha (3.26.3) and
Bhagavatsandarbha (section 23, Dasa p.219). In both cases he takes it
as saying something about the supreme self (paramtman). In neither
text does he pursue rdharas interpretation, not does he directly
contradict it, although he ultimately does develop a contradictory
theory of self, which I discuss further below.
rdhara Svmin, Subodhin (4.32)
Elsewhere rdhara Svmin more explicitly articulates an Advaitic
conception of the tman. When commenting on BhG 4.32, a verse that
says the vaidika yajas are , he writes:
eva bahu-vidh yaj vitat brahmao mukhe |
karma-jn viddhi tn sarvn eva jtv vimokyase ||
BhG 4.32||
Thus the yajas are of many types were enjoined in the
mouth of Brahman. You should know they are born of
karma. Having known all of them, you shall be free.
jna-yaja stotum uktn yajn upasaharati eva bahu-vidh
iti | brahmao vedasya mukhe vitat | vedena skd-vihit ity
artha | tathpi tn sarvn v-mana-kya-karma-janitn tmasvarpa-saspara-rahitn viddhi jnhi | tmana karmgocaratvt |
eva jtv jna-niha san sasrd vimukto bhaviyasi ||
rdhara Svmins ?? BhG 4.32||
Jonathan B. Edelmann
Jonathan B. Edelmann
Moreover, while it is the case that pure [self] has the power of agency,3
[1] nevertheless when he is conflated with Brahman the power of
agency is internalized because of the non-connection with [the items,
e.g. the mind-body complex] that link him with karma, and because of
the covering caused by the bliss of Brahman. That much we can agree
upon. Furthermore, [2] he4 who is possessed of the internal power (citakti) in the form of devotion for the Lord, or [3] he5 who obtains a
[spiritual] body as a companion [of the Lord] that is qualified by a
particular aspect of the internal power, they possess agency for the
service of that Lord, but it is not predominated by matter. In the first
case, he has superseded the [predominance of matter] by the internal
power; in the second case he is absolutely free from matter.
KEYNOTE
Given that the tmans inherent qualities only manifest when the
tman is connected with the body, Jva Gosvmin and other Gauya
Vaiava argue the tman accepts a spiritual body (siddha-deha) in the
liberated state. Although rdhara Svmin talks about spiritual bodies
in his commentary on Bhgavata Pura 1.6.29, it is not clear he
accepts them as a goal to be attained.
Stewart Elkman and Ravi Gupta also note the Advaitic strands in
rdhara Svmins interpretation of the Bhgavata Pura.
3 He has already argued that there is agency in the pure self, and here
he is listing three possible ways that this agency can exist.
4 This is the liberated devotee who still lives in the material world,
called a jvanmukta.
5 This is the liberated devotee, who is living in the eternal realm of
Vaikuha.
Jonathan B. Edelmann
I would first note that the Advaitin position of the status of the world is
contested. Anantananda Rambachan persuasively argues that
akaras view is that Brahman is the nimitta and updna kraa of
the world, and this contradicts the popular illusionism that is often
called Advaita by later commentators, the sort of illusionism reflected
in Siddhevara Bhacrayas reading of rdhara Svmin, but also I
would assume early commentators like Padmapda, Toaka and
Surevara. Rambachan argues, as I discuss more below, that akara
never says the world is false, only our cognition of it.
Others, however, have noted that rdhara Svmin differs from Advaita
in other ways; ways that Madhva and Vijayatrtha did not need to
critique him in their commentaries at certain places (Sharma (2000:
128, 459) and Okita (2014)).
rdhara Svmins Bhvthadpik (1.1.1)
KEYNOTE
I will begin by looking at the terms svarpa-lakaa and taasthalakaa, which appear have been first used by Surevara in his
Dakimrtivrttika and Padmapda in his Pacapdik. It does not
seem that not akara himself made this distinction. I think it helps
Padmapda make my and mithy into ontological categories,
something Rambachan and Comas argues akara himself never did.
In the his Pacapdik (5.4.9-11) Padmapda says that the
definition of Brahman must first be provided, and only then can other
things, like prama, yukti, sdhana and phala can be defined. There is
a definition of Brahman is in Brahmastra 1.1.2, janmdy asya
yata, from whom this world is born, etc.
Padmapda takes this as akaras definition of Brahman, from
whom the world has come (yata) to be the omniscient, omnipotent
cause of the world. He calls this definition the svarpalakaa, a
definition that expresses the inherent features of Brahman. The
svarpalakaa, according to Padmapda, is of two types:
1) upalakaa, indicative definition, which are worldly properties
existing separately (from the defiendum, that which is to be
defined, lakya). Padmapda writes that these attributive
adjuncts of the world stand outside of Brahman and yet denote
Brahman by indirect characterization and not by a description of
its nature (Rjasevsakta D Benkataramaih, 1948, p.261).
Jonathan B. Edelmann
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which is both the nimitta and updana causes of the world. Like other
Vedtins Jva Gosvmin would like to show that although the world
transforms, the Lord does not, and the analogy he uses is that of a
cintmai, or a touchstone and a magnet, both of which are said to
create movement and change from a distance without themselves
moving or changing. Jva Gosvmin unambiguously differs from
rdhara Svmin in that he affirms the reality of the world.
Paramtmasandarbha, section 58 (H 172-3)
tasmt paramtma-parima eva stra-siddhnta | [] tatra
cpariatasyaiva satocintay tay akty parima ity sau sanmtratvabhsamna-svarpa-vyha-rpa-dravykhya-akti-rpeaiva
pariamate na tu svarpeeti gamyate | yathaiva cintmai | atas
tan-mlatvn na paramtmopdnat-sampratipatti-bhaga |
Therefore, the conclusion of the scripture is that [the world] is a
transformation of the indwelling Lord. [] The transformation is of the
real, non-transforming, indwelling Lord by the paradoxical power. Thus
he transforms only by his power, which is referred to as a substance, in
the form of an extension of his inherent nature, which is manifesting
only from true begin (sat), but it should not be understood he
transforms by his inherent nature. This is just like a cintmai, a
touchstone. Thus, since the [world] has him as its foundation, one need
not disregard the view that the indwelling Lord is the material cause [of
the universe].
Jva Gosvmin also comments on the notion of adhysa or ropa
or superimposition, reflecting directly on the analogy of a mirage that
was discussed by rdhara Svmin in BD 1.1.1. He attempts to show,
however, that superimposition establishes the reality of the world.
Paramtmasandarbha, section 58 (H p.174, l.6)
anyatra siddhasya vastuna evnyatrropo yath uktau rajatasya etad
eva mithy-kha-pupder ropsambhavt prva-prva-vivarta-mtrasiddhndi-parampartve dntbhvc ca | kica prva khalu
vri-darand vry-kr mano-vttir jtpi tad-aprasaga-samaye
supt tihati tat-tulya-vastu-daranena tu jgrti tadvienusandhna vin tad-abhedena svatantratm ropayati,
tasmn na vri mithy, na v smaraa-may tad-kr vttir na v tattulya marcikdi vastu kintu tad-abhedenropa evyathrthatvn
mithy |
It is only an object that exists elsewhere that is superimposed on
something else, like silver on an oyster-shell. There is the impossibility
of superimposing a false (mithy) object like a sky-flower, and there is
Jonathan B. Edelmann
11
Conclusion
Let me now return to the topics of the theologian as parrot, and
the relationship of a rdhara Svmin (an Advaitin) and Jva Gosvmin.
Popular as it may be, the parrot conception of the theologian,
and/or the notion of an unchanging theology moving from teacher to
student over time finds problems at every step, at least in this context.
rdhara Svmin is an uncommon Advaitin, one who denies the reality
of the world at times (calling it mithy-sarga), against the views of
akara. Jva Gosvmin a critic, who we find returning to akara and
thus skipping over rdhara Svmin in the sense of re-defining mithy
a cognitive state, denying its ontological usage. Although both rdhara
Svmin and Jva Gosvmin have their own views about these topics,
both are conservationists, carrying them the teachings of the previous
teachers, all the while making them their own. They were men steeped
in tradition, but men of their own minds. Hindu theology today can
12
accept a similar relationship with the past, one of respect but critical
engagement.
Bibliography
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Jonathan B. Edelmann
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