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Critique and Conservation in Gauya

Vaiava Theology
JONATHAN B. EDELMANN | MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF RELIGION | DNAM | FRIDAY, NOV 21, 2014,
9:0011:00 AM
TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

1. The Theologian as Parrot..................................................1


2. rdhara Svmin in the Caitanyacaritmta.......................2
3. Jva Gosvmin and rdhara Svmin: some similarities,
differences, and unknowns....................................................3
3.1 The Inherent Feature of the tman: Bhgavata Pura 3.26.3. 3
rdhara Svmins Bhvrthadpik (3.26.3).............................................3
rdhara Svmin, Subodhin (4.32)............................................................4
Jva Gosvmin on the inherent features of the self (tma-svabhva)........4
3.2 The Reality or Non-Reality of the World..................................4
rdhara Svmins Bhvthadpik (1.1.1)................................................4
Jva Gosvmin on the nature of the material world...................................4

Conclusion............................................................................ 4
Bibliography.........................................................................4

1. The Theologian as Parrot


For some time I have been involved in arguing, along with a number
of others, that there are scholars and scholarly texts in larger Hindu
traditions that are justifiably called theological, and by this I mean a
philosophical and philological reflection on the meaning of revealed
scripture.
This is not to say that theology is perfect term, only that it is more
appropriate in many cases that philosophy or some other term.
In this paper I want to confront a particular prva-paka, one that I
wont spend our time here tracing, but one that will at least seem
familiar. The prva-paka is that the theologian, the tradition-specific
interpreter of previous teachers and their comments on root stras, is
but a parrot who repeats in new words the exact same thing that the

Jonathan B. Edelmann

predecessors thought. The view is expressed by Hindus as diverse as


Jayanta Bhaa and Bhaktivedanta Swami.1
A theologians walks into a locked, ossified, and yet immaculate
system of thought, and one is only a real theologian if one
unquestioningly and consistently re-articulates that system like a
parrot repeats the words he was taught.
I admit that this prva-paka is one of the ways in which Hinduism
was introduced to me, ways that were shaped by Bhaktivedanta
Swami, who repeatedly said that the role of a teacher is to parrot the
previous teachers.
I have noted that that the acceptance of these theses would
undermine the brilliance and fecundity of Indian intellectuals, reducing
them to mere parrots rather than independently thoughtful, creative,
and constructive authors.
But this parrot (ukcrya) view of the theologian is particularly
vexing for the Gauya Vaiava for two reasons:
1. the state of the art understanding of the tradition is so limited
that parroting is impossible,
2. the relationship of the early Gauya Vaiava theologians with
their previous teachers is clearly not one of a parrot parroting a
parrot.
I wish to focus on the second point, looking at the relationship between
rdhara Svmin (mid-14th century) and Jva Gosvmin (16th century).

2. rdhara Svmin in the Caitanyacaritmta


When one talks about the Gauya Vaiava tradition or the
Gauya Vaiava sapradya there are a number of problems that
arise. With whom does it start? What are its sources? Who are the
major carriers of that tradition from its beginning to now?
For the purposes of this paper I want to focus on the role of
rdhara Svmin (mid-14th century), who wrote the oldest surviving
Bhgavata Pura commentary called the Bhvrthadpik. The
Bhgavata Pura aside, rdhara Svmin is in some sense the oldest
and most important source of theology for the Gauya Vaiava
1 Bhaktivedanta Swami said, What Ka says, I repeat, like parrot.
That's all. I have no knowledge. (740219 - Lecture BG 07.04
Bombay)
Jonathan B. Edelmann

tradition. There is an even older commentary on the Bhgavata Pura


by Madhva (13th century), but this is rarely used by Jva Gosvmin.
As noted by many, like Ravi Gupta, rdhara Svmin is quoted
judiciously by the Gauya Vaiava theologians; used when
supportive, politely overlooked when not. rdhara Svmin is never
explicitly contradicted (as far as I know) even when hes implicitly
contradicted.
This issue of how and in what ways Hindu thinkers disagree with
their authorities is one that has been given great attention by
Indologists. Rosalind OHanlon recently noted a student must have
carefully disagreed with an authority because the student-teacher
relationship was often a father-son relationship; they shared the same
space and decorum was important. While this is an important insight, it
is inapplicable in our case here because Jva Gosvmin and rdhara
Svmin were separated by hundreds of years.
rdhara Svmin is famously located in the tradition by Ka
dsa in the CC. Ka dsa has Caitany saying, one who does not
honor Svm is to counted as inwardly a prostitute (Dimock and
Stewart, p.877, di.7.98; see Gupta p.67).
A number of questions follow from this:
Why would the otherwise respectful and humble Caitanya take
such a hard stand on what appears to be marginal issue, the use
of rdhara Svmin who was not unambigiously a Vaiava?
o Such concerns were not raised about Madhvas
commentary. In fact, the early Gauya Vaiava mostly
ignored it.
Why would Caitanya defend rdhara Svmin so passionately
when it appears that rdhara Svmin is an Advaitin, at least at
times? Perhaps Caitanya was himself an Advaitin, and his
passionate defense of rdhara reflects that, or perhaps
Kadsa over-dramatized for reasons all his own.
Given that Gauya Vaiava do contradict rdhara Svmin, can
we say Caitanyas disciples (e.g. Jva Gosvmin) honored
rdhara? What would it mean to honor in this context?
The contradictions between rdhara and the orthodox Gauya
Vaiava theologians is widely recognized, and often explained by the
Gauya Vaiava tradition by saying that rdhara was trying to lure
the interest2 of the Advaitins by creating a theology that has all the
2 see Sheridan, p.50; Tattvasandarbha 27; The Advaitic statements of
rdhara, Baladeva argues, are like the meat on the end of a hook,
Jonathan B. Edelmann

bells and whistles of Advaita, but leads them to pure and personalistic
bhakti of proper Gauya Vaiava theology. This leads to another
question:

Why should we believe that rdhara Svmin was a fisher of


Advaitins and not just a regular Advaitin?
o As far as I know rdhara Svmin never identifies himself
as a fisher of Advaitins, not that it would be prudent to
do so if he was.

3. Jva Gosvmin and rdhara Svmin: some


similarities, differences, and unknowns
I hope to demonstrate here that Jva Gosvmin does in fact differ
from rdhara on a number of key theological issues, but that the
extent to which this is true requires a lot of further clarification. Yet he
doesnt always differ as an Advaitin, as he is often accused. Whatever
the case I have never seen a place where Jva Gosvmin explicitly
denies Sridhara in the manner that is often used in the dialectical
reasoning of commentaries, e.g. iti cen, na.

3.1 The Inherent Feature of the tman: Bhgavata Pura


3.26.3
There is a tremendous amout of debate in Indian philosophy and
theology about the inherent features of the self (tma-svarpa). Edwin
Gerow and David Lawrence (Odd Eyed One), for instance have noted
the tendency in Advaita to deny agency as a feature of the self,
something that Buddhist thinkers like Ngrjuna and Dharmakrti take
to an extreme. It culminated in the grammarian Ngeas treatment of
the passive intransitive as paradigmatic in language. Other traditions,
such as Abhinavaguptas and Vidycakravatins Kashmiri aivism, as
well as Jva Gosvmins and Vivantha Cakravartins Gauya Vaiava
bring agency and other features directly into the innate qualities of the
self.
There is some evidence, given below, that rdhara takes a
traditional Advaitin view that self, tman, is devoid of qualities such as
agency. This is a view that Gauya Vaiava must deny since they
want to argue that bhakti for Bhagavn Ka is expressive of the selfs
desire, that it is liberative, and that it exists even in the liberated state
when the self has discarded the material body and mind, the very
meant to lure fish (Elkman 1986: 119 120). See also S C Chakravarti,
Philosophical Foundations, p.22; and SK De, 1961, p.18.
Jonathan B. Edelmann

things that Advaitins would say are the locus of agency and other
illusory qualities. For example, Chakravarthi Ramprasad (2011: 335)
notes that, the conscious subject of Advaita is strictly devoid of
agency, being witness (skin)
rdhara Svmins Bhvrthadpik (3.26.3)
andir tm puruo nirgua prakte para |
pratyag-dhm svaya-jyotir viva yena samanvitam ||
BhP 3.26.3 ||
KEYNOTE
Here rdhara is clearly reviewing a number of competing theories of
self. Just after this he talks about Prbhkara Mms. While not
developed here, he is interpreting the BhP as defending an Advaita
theory of self, one in which the self in its purest state is without
qualities.
Jva Gosvmin discusses this verse in his Kramasandarbha (3.26.3) and
Bhagavatsandarbha (section 23, Dasa p.219). In both cases he takes it
as saying something about the supreme self (paramtman). In neither
text does he pursue rdharas interpretation, not does he directly
contradict it, although he ultimately does develop a contradictory
theory of self, which I discuss further below.
rdhara Svmin, Subodhin (4.32)
Elsewhere rdhara Svmin more explicitly articulates an Advaitic
conception of the tman. When commenting on BhG 4.32, a verse that
says the vaidika yajas are , he writes:
eva bahu-vidh yaj vitat brahmao mukhe |
karma-jn viddhi tn sarvn eva jtv vimokyase ||
BhG 4.32||
Thus the yajas are of many types were enjoined in the
mouth of Brahman. You should know they are born of
karma. Having known all of them, you shall be free.
jna-yaja stotum uktn yajn upasaharati eva bahu-vidh
iti | brahmao vedasya mukhe vitat | vedena skd-vihit ity
artha | tathpi tn sarvn v-mana-kya-karma-janitn tmasvarpa-saspara-rahitn viddhi jnhi | tmana karmgocaratvt |
eva jtv jna-niha san sasrd vimukto bhaviyasi ||
rdhara Svmins ?? BhG 4.32||

Jonathan B. Edelmann

In this verse he concludes [] They were enjoined in the mouth of


Brahman, or of the Veda. The meaning of this verse is that [the
yajas] are enjoined directly by the Veda. You should know, you
should understand, that although all of them [the yajas] are
produced from the karma of words, mind, and body, in a manner
devoid of contact with the inherent nature of the tman since the
tman is not within the realm of karma. Having known, being fixed in
jna, you will be freed from the cycle of birth and death.
At the same time, rdhara Svmin does talk about the spiritual
body (siddha-deha) in a number of places, and I am not sure how a self
devoid of qualities can be or was reconciled with the idea that the self
can live in a spiritual body for eternity with Viu.
Jva Gosvmin on the inherent features of the self (tmasvabhva)
For Gauya Vaiavas, however, agency and other features of
the self are quality potentials, powers or energies of the self that
manifest in and through contact with a body and mind. For example,
Jva Gosvmin quotes and comments a verse, which appears to be
based on the Padmapura, of Jmt Muni (c. 1370-1443 AD) who is
also known as Varavara Muni, a follower of Rmnuja (c. 10171137
AD) in his Paramtmasandarbha (section 19, [Haridsa 1984: 80]):
tath jttva-karttva-bhokttva-nija-dharmaka |
Furthermore, the intrinsic or innate characteristics of the self are
apprehension, agency and qualitative experience.
KEYNOTE
Here Jva Gosvmin explicitly contradicts rdhara Svmin by affirming
that the self has specific qualities. Jva Gosvmin says in the
Paramtmasandarbha that these qualities manifest when in contact
with a spiritual or material body.
uddhasyaiva karttva-aktau ca yasypi brahmai layas tasya
brahmnandenvarat karma-sayogsayogc ca karttva-akter
antar-bhva evety abhyupagantavya, yasya ca bhagavad-bhaktirpa-cic-chaktyviat cic-chaki-vtti-viea-prada-deha-prptir v,
tasya tat-sev-karttve tu na prakti-prdhnyam | prvatra tm
upamardya cic-chakte prdhnyt | aparatra kaivalyc ca |
(Paramtmasandarbha, Sarvasavdin, section 37, [Haridsa 1984:
110])

Jonathan B. Edelmann

Moreover, while it is the case that pure [self] has the power of agency,3
[1] nevertheless when he is conflated with Brahman the power of
agency is internalized because of the non-connection with [the items,
e.g. the mind-body complex] that link him with karma, and because of
the covering caused by the bliss of Brahman. That much we can agree
upon. Furthermore, [2] he4 who is possessed of the internal power (citakti) in the form of devotion for the Lord, or [3] he5 who obtains a
[spiritual] body as a companion [of the Lord] that is qualified by a
particular aspect of the internal power, they possess agency for the
service of that Lord, but it is not predominated by matter. In the first
case, he has superseded the [predominance of matter] by the internal
power; in the second case he is absolutely free from matter.
KEYNOTE
Given that the tmans inherent qualities only manifest when the
tman is connected with the body, Jva Gosvmin and other Gauya
Vaiava argue the tman accepts a spiritual body (siddha-deha) in the
liberated state. Although rdhara Svmin talks about spiritual bodies
in his commentary on Bhgavata Pura 1.6.29, it is not clear he
accepts them as a goal to be attained.

3.2 The Reality or Non-Reality of the World


Although there is very little written on rdhara, most see him as
denying the reality of the world:

Siddhevara Bhacraya (1950: 28) says of rdharas


interpretation of BhP 2.9.33: So rdharas interpretation of the
text boils down to this: -As one experiences hallucination of the
second moon though there is no second moon, so the world is
cognised (through illusion) though it is not actually existent.

Daniel Sheridan (56) paraphrases a passage from rdharas


commentary on BhP 1.1.1 as: the three-fold evolution is not real
in reality but false (mithy).

Stewart Elkman and Ravi Gupta also note the Advaitic strands in
rdhara Svmins interpretation of the Bhgavata Pura.

3 He has already argued that there is agency in the pure self, and here
he is listing three possible ways that this agency can exist.
4 This is the liberated devotee who still lives in the material world,
called a jvanmukta.
5 This is the liberated devotee, who is living in the eternal realm of
Vaikuha.
Jonathan B. Edelmann

I would first note that the Advaitin position of the status of the world is
contested. Anantananda Rambachan persuasively argues that
akaras view is that Brahman is the nimitta and updna kraa of
the world, and this contradicts the popular illusionism that is often
called Advaita by later commentators, the sort of illusionism reflected
in Siddhevara Bhacrayas reading of rdhara Svmin, but also I
would assume early commentators like Padmapda, Toaka and
Surevara. Rambachan argues, as I discuss more below, that akara
never says the world is false, only our cognition of it.
Others, however, have noted that rdhara Svmin differs from Advaita
in other ways; ways that Madhva and Vijayatrtha did not need to
critique him in their commentaries at certain places (Sharma (2000:
128, 459) and Okita (2014)).
rdhara Svmins Bhvthadpik (1.1.1)
KEYNOTE
I will begin by looking at the terms svarpa-lakaa and taasthalakaa, which appear have been first used by Surevara in his
Dakimrtivrttika and Padmapda in his Pacapdik. It does not
seem that not akara himself made this distinction. I think it helps
Padmapda make my and mithy into ontological categories,
something Rambachan and Comas argues akara himself never did.
In the his Pacapdik (5.4.9-11) Padmapda says that the
definition of Brahman must first be provided, and only then can other
things, like prama, yukti, sdhana and phala can be defined. There is
a definition of Brahman is in Brahmastra 1.1.2, janmdy asya
yata, from whom this world is born, etc.
Padmapda takes this as akaras definition of Brahman, from
whom the world has come (yata) to be the omniscient, omnipotent
cause of the world. He calls this definition the svarpalakaa, a
definition that expresses the inherent features of Brahman. The
svarpalakaa, according to Padmapda, is of two types:
1) upalakaa, indicative definition, which are worldly properties
existing separately (from the defiendum, that which is to be
defined, lakya). Padmapda writes that these attributive
adjuncts of the world stand outside of Brahman and yet denote
Brahman by indirect characterization and not by a description of
its nature (Rjasevsakta D Benkataramaih, 1948, p.261).

Jonathan B. Edelmann

In his Dakimrtivrttika or Mnasollsa, Surevara


seems to define taasthalakaa in a manner similar to
Padmapdas upalakaa: Calling God and self cause
and effect is to speak of them in the accidental
(taastha) definition, like defining the moon to be on the
branch of a tree (Potter, p.555).

2) vieaalakaa, descriptive definitions (Rjasevsakta D


Benkataramaih, 1948, p.261).
Padmapda takes the stra from whom this world is born, etc., as
an upalakaa, a definition of Brahman that characterizes the
attributes of Brahman that stand out side Brahman. It is not a
description of Brahman itself. Both Surevara and Padmapda agree
that definitions like the well known passage from the Taittirya
Upaniad (2.1.2), satya jnam ananta brahma, the ultimate
reality is unlimited true awareness or statements like Brahman is
saccidnanda are descriptions of Brahman itself.
Does Jva Gosvmin sustain these distinctions? He does not
explicitly reject them, but his theology does not distinguish between
the Lord and things outside the Lord. Jva Gosvmin writes in his
commentary on Bhgavata Pura 2.9.32: the Lord says, that which
is this universe, even that is I only. This means that the universe has
the nature of me since it is not different from me (Okita p.65).
Furthermore, Jva Gosvmin use the term svarpa in a very
different way, as the Lords most internal, intimate, and essential
nature (svarpa-akti, also called cit-akti, antaraga-akti, uddhasattva, hldin-akti, and yoga-my). And the term taastha refers not
to an indicative definition of Brahman, but the souls (jva) who are
manifested from the indwelling Lord (paramtman).
Furthermore, like akara, Jva Gosvmin argues that Bhagavn,
a personal, real, qualified God in the form of r Ka is both the
updna- and nimitta-kraa. The world is a real transformation
(parinma) of Bhagavn, and Jva Gosvmin says parinma does not
necessitate vivarta. Jva Gosvmin is committed to a vision of the world
that sees it as non-different from Bhagavn.
More puzzling, however is rdhara Svmin use of the term
mithy-sarga. Srinivasa Rao and Anant Rambachan have argued
convincingly that akara never uses term mithy in a compound with
a word for the created world (e.g. sarga, jagat, prapaca, prakti, etc.).
Rather, the term mithy is applied to our jna, or our cognition or
understanding of objects and the world in general.
Jonathan B. Edelmann

In other words, mithy in akaras theology is an epistemological


or cognitive descriptor, not an ontological descriptor. Rambachan
(Advaita Worldview, p.76) writes:

akara does not describe the world as an illusion, and it is


often not remembered that he argued against the subjective
idealists who reduce the world to a mere idea of the perceiving
individual and who deny the world any existence outside of the
mind.
rdhara Svmins Advaita sounds more like Toakcrya, who
writes in is ruti-sra-samuddharaa (vs. 116):
gagana-pramukha pthiv-cara viayondriya-buddhimana sahitam |
janimaj-jagad etad abhtam iti rutaya pravadanty
upamna-atai || 116
The ruti says, through hundreds of illustrations, that this
world that has originated comprising everything from
space to earth and including sense-objects, sense-organs,
intellect and mind is unreal (abhta) (Comas, p.78).

Against Toaka and rdhara Svmin, I am reminded of the fact


that Vivantha, an 18th century Gauya Vaiava, also defines
mithy as a cognitive state, one in which a person wrongly
connects two things that are in fact not connected
o Perhaps, then, in this sense the Gauya Vaiava disagree
with rdhara Svmin, who is often called an Advaitin, only
to find themselves closer to akara.

As seen in the translated text, rdhara Svmins views are ambiguous,


partly because he provides different interpretations, some more
illusionist than others. Whatever the case, Jva Gosvmin is at odds
with rdhara Svmin in this regard.
Jva Gosvmin on the nature of the material world 6
Jva Gosvmin accepts that the world is a transformation
(parinma) of the Lords paradoxical (acintya) power (akti), one which
is the same as and different from him at the same time. More
specifically, the world is a transformation of the Lords my-akti,
6 I want to thank Satyanryaa Bb for pointing me to these
passages, and providing a rough translation of them.
Jonathan B. Edelmann

10

which is both the nimitta and updana causes of the world. Like other
Vedtins Jva Gosvmin would like to show that although the world
transforms, the Lord does not, and the analogy he uses is that of a
cintmai, or a touchstone and a magnet, both of which are said to
create movement and change from a distance without themselves
moving or changing. Jva Gosvmin unambiguously differs from
rdhara Svmin in that he affirms the reality of the world.
Paramtmasandarbha, section 58 (H 172-3)
tasmt paramtma-parima eva stra-siddhnta | [] tatra
cpariatasyaiva satocintay tay akty parima ity sau sanmtratvabhsamna-svarpa-vyha-rpa-dravykhya-akti-rpeaiva
pariamate na tu svarpeeti gamyate | yathaiva cintmai | atas
tan-mlatvn na paramtmopdnat-sampratipatti-bhaga |
Therefore, the conclusion of the scripture is that [the world] is a
transformation of the indwelling Lord. [] The transformation is of the
real, non-transforming, indwelling Lord by the paradoxical power. Thus
he transforms only by his power, which is referred to as a substance, in
the form of an extension of his inherent nature, which is manifesting
only from true begin (sat), but it should not be understood he
transforms by his inherent nature. This is just like a cintmai, a
touchstone. Thus, since the [world] has him as its foundation, one need
not disregard the view that the indwelling Lord is the material cause [of
the universe].
Jva Gosvmin also comments on the notion of adhysa or ropa
or superimposition, reflecting directly on the analogy of a mirage that
was discussed by rdhara Svmin in BD 1.1.1. He attempts to show,
however, that superimposition establishes the reality of the world.
Paramtmasandarbha, section 58 (H p.174, l.6)
anyatra siddhasya vastuna evnyatrropo yath uktau rajatasya etad
eva mithy-kha-pupder ropsambhavt prva-prva-vivarta-mtrasiddhndi-parampartve dntbhvc ca | kica prva khalu
vri-darand vry-kr mano-vttir jtpi tad-aprasaga-samaye
supt tihati tat-tulya-vastu-daranena tu jgrti tadvienusandhna vin tad-abhedena svatantratm ropayati,
tasmn na vri mithy, na v smaraa-may tad-kr vttir na v tattulya marcikdi vastu kintu tad-abhedenropa evyathrthatvn
mithy |
It is only an object that exists elsewhere that is superimposed on
something else, like silver on an oyster-shell. There is the impossibility
of superimposing a false (mithy) object like a sky-flower, and there is
Jonathan B. Edelmann

11

no example of a beginning-less succession of vivarta7 one before the


other. Furthermore, only on account of seeing water in the past, a form
of water is produced as a mental impression; upon being disconnected
from it, it is dormant. By seeing an object that is similar to it [water], it
is awakened and without properly discerning its characteristics, one
willfully (svatantrat) superimposes because of the similarity (abheda)
with it. Therefore, water is not false, nor is the mental form of it that
has the nature of a memory, nor is the object or the mirage that is
similar to it. Rather, there is superimposition because of the similarity
(abheda) with it; there is falsity because of the unreality (ayath) of the
object.
There are other points of difference: rdhara Svmin says there are
332 chapters in the Bhgavata Pura, Jva Gosvmin says there are
335. rdhara Svmin at times accepts karma that is dispassionately
offered to the Lord as a form of Bhakti, Jva Gosvmin does not.
rdhara Svmin suggests that Ka is an avatra of Viu, Jva
Gosvmin does not.

Conclusion
Let me now return to the topics of the theologian as parrot, and
the relationship of a rdhara Svmin (an Advaitin) and Jva Gosvmin.
Popular as it may be, the parrot conception of the theologian,
and/or the notion of an unchanging theology moving from teacher to
student over time finds problems at every step, at least in this context.
rdhara Svmin is an uncommon Advaitin, one who denies the reality
of the world at times (calling it mithy-sarga), against the views of
akara. Jva Gosvmin a critic, who we find returning to akara and
thus skipping over rdhara Svmin in the sense of re-defining mithy
a cognitive state, denying its ontological usage. Although both rdhara
Svmin and Jva Gosvmin have their own views about these topics,
both are conservationists, carrying them the teachings of the previous
teachers, all the while making them their own. They were men steeped
in tradition, but men of their own minds. Hindu theology today can

7 akaras doctrine of vivarta says that the underlying cause is real,


but the objects or effects that are made out of the cause are not real.
The doctrine is based on Chndogya Upaniad (6.1.4). Comas has
argued: The teaching that Brahman is the material cause and that the
world is its actual transformation (parima) leads on to the teaching
that there is only an apparent transformation (vivarta), once it is
clearly understood that the effect of the material cause is not an entity
in its own right. (Early method, p.192).
Jonathan B. Edelmann

12

accept a similar relationship with the past, one of respect but critical
engagement.

Bibliography
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Daniel Sheridan. rdhara 1.1.1


Siddhevara Bhacrya. A Critique of the Bhgavata-Pura.
Dimock and Stewart, CC
K
The Phenomenal Separateness of Self, Chakravathi Ram-Prasad
HD, PS
Rambachan, Advaita Worldview
Halbfass, Philology and Confrontation

Jonathan B. Edelmann

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