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regard himself and cognize laws for the use of his powers and
consequently for all his actions; first, insofar as he belongs to the
world of sense, under laws of nature (heteronomy); second, as
belonging to the intelligible world, under laws which, being
independent of nature, are not empirical but grounded merely in
reason. (4:452)
4. The Intelligible World and Autonomy
As a rational being, and thus as a being belonging to the
intelligible world, the human being can never think of the
causality of his own will otherwise than under the idea of
freedom; for, independence from the determining causes of the
world of sense (which reason must always ascribe to itself) is
freedom. With the idea of freedom the concept of autonomy is
now inseparably combined, and with the concept of autonomy
the universal principle of morality, which in the idea is the
ground of all actions of rational beings, just as the law of nature
is the ground of appearances. (4:452-3)
5. The Law of the Intelligible World as an Imperative for the
Sensible World
But because the world of understanding contains the ground of
the world of sense and so too of its laws, and is therefore
immediately lawgiving with respect to my will (which belongs
wholly to the world of understanding) and must according also be
thought as such, it follows that I shall cognize myself as
intelligence, though on the other side as a being belonging to the
world of sense, as nevertheless subject to the law of the world of
understanding, that is, of reason, which contains in the idea of
freedom the law of the world of understanding, and thus cognize
myself as subject to the autonomy of the will; consequently the
laws of the world of understanding must be regarded as
imperatives for me, and actions in conformity with these as
duties. (4:453-4)
The moral ought is then his own necessary will as a member
of an intelligible world, and is thought by him as ought only
insofar as he regards himself at the same time as a member of
the world of sense. (4:455)
Questions to consider:
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1) Why does Kant claim that freedom and morality are reciprocal
concepts?
2) Does Kants argument in Groundwork III rely on a theoretical
proof that we actually possess free will? If not, why not? If so,
does this violate Kants strictures on knowledge in the
Critique of Pure Reason and Prolegomena?
3) Does the reciprocity of morality and freedom entail that
immoral actions are not free? If so, can we still be held
accountable for our immoral actions?
4) Does Kant provide an adequate explanation for why the
sensible self must regard herself as subject to the intelligible
selfs law?