The Impact of Mandatory versus Voluntary Auditor Switch on Stock Liquidity

in the Korean Market

Ferdinand A Gul
Monash University, Sunway Campus, Malaysia
Woo-Jong Lee
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Abstract

Using Korean-listed firms subject to the auditor designation rule, this paper shows that, 1)
on average, stock liquidity is negatively related to auditor switches, and that 2) the negative
liquidity effect of the auditor switch is concentrated in firms that switch from high-quality
auditors to low-quality auditors. Meanwhile, firms with designated auditors exhibit even
higher stock liquidity when they have higher audit risk, consistent with enhanced audit
quality as a result of auditor designation.
Data Availability: The data are available from the sources identified in the paper.
JEL Classification Code: G14, M48
Keywords: Auditor switch; stock liquidity; auditor designation

_________________
* We gratefully acknowledge comments from Sunhwa Choi, Simon Fung, Lee-Seok Hwang, Yongtae Kim, Jay
Junghun Lee, Se-Yong Lee, Jeffrey Pittman, Bahlgeun Roh, B. Charlie Sohn, Wilson Tong, and Cheong H. Yi.
We also thank participants at Monash University, Kuala Lumpur seminar workshop for their helpful comments.
We thank Cheong H. Yi for generously providing auditor designation data. We acknowledge financial support
for this research from The Hong Kong Polytechnic University. All errors are our own.
** Correspondence: Woo-Jong Lee, School of Accounting and Finance, The Hong Kong Polytechnic
University, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong; Tel: +852 2766 4539; Fax: +852 2330 9845; Email:
afwjlee@inet.polyu.edu.hk.

The Impact of Mandatory versus Voluntary Auditor Switch on Stock Liquidity

in the Korean Market

1. Introduction
This paper investigates the association between auditor switches and stock liquidity.
Auditors play an important role in determining the quality of financial reporting and are
responsible for its effect in the stock market (Pitman, 2004). Chief Justice Burger in a
unanimous decision of the U.S. Supreme Court had this to say about the responsibility of
auditors to the public (Wild et al. 2001, p. 129):
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporations financial status,
the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment
relationship with the client. The independent public accountant performing his special
function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporations creditors and stock holders, as
well as the investing public..Public faith in the reliability of a corporations
financial statements depend upon the public perception of the outside auditor as an
independent professionif investors were to view the auditor as an advocate for the
corporate client, the value of the audit function might itself be lost.
Such a role of auditors in independently verifying financial statements could be more
important in emerging markets where the quality of financial reporting is generally poorer
(Francis and Wang, 2008). In addition, there is a growing demand for an investigation of the
audit quality in emerging market countries because investors are increasingly looking to these
markets to diversify their investment portfolios (Levich, 2001). At a general level, however,
the literature on emerging markets has relatively neglected the role of auditors in those
markets. We aim to fill this gap by examining how stock liquidity is related to firms decision
to switch their incumbent auditors.

In this paper, we focus on Korean-listed companies for the several reasons. First, the
Korean audit market enables us to compare the effects of voluntary auditor switches and
mandatory auditor switches on liquidity. The Korean regulatory authority, the Securities and
Futures Commission (SFC), mandates firms that have a propensity to manage earnings to
replace their incumbent auditors with designated auditors (a.k.a., auditor designation rule).
This in turn enables researchers to examine differential impacts of two types of auditor
switches. Second, the Korean stock market is characterized by high market liquidity.
According to Lesmond et al. (2004) and Lesmond (2005), while U.S. firms listed in NYSE
and AMEX have approximately 23.5 percent zero returns over an annual trading period,
Korean-listed firms exhibit about 13 percent zero returns, indicating that the Korean stock
market is more liquid than the U.S. market. 1 Third, there is a high frequency of auditor
changes in the Korean audit market. In our sample spanning from 1995 to 2006, about 20
percent of our sample switch auditors, which is relatively high compared with U.S. firms.2
Collectively, both high liquidity and frequent auditor switches provides us with a better
setting to investigate the relation between auditor switches and stock liquidity.
1
This high liquidity of Korean stocks, at least in part, can be attributed to the significant presence of foreign investors in the
Korean stock market. Unlike other emerging markets, the Korean capital market is widely open to foreign investors that
demand high quality financial reporting and provide sufficient liquidity, especially in developing markets (Doidge et al.,
2009). For instance, in 2006, foreign investors held 35.16 percent of the total shares in the Korean Stock Exchange, while
domestic institutional investors held only 20.08 percent. The average foreign ownership of the 20 largest listed companies
(based on market capitalization) was 52 percent as of 2006.
2
Highly frequent auditor switches may be attributable to the discrepancy between high demand and low supply for high
quality audit services. First, the market share of the Big 4 auditors in Korea is very low compared with that in the U.S.
According to Choi and Wong (2007), the market share of the Big 4 auditors in Korea is 66.36 percent, while that in the U.S.
is 95.79 percent. Second, as Fan and Wong (2005) indicate, where legal institutions are less developed, firms with serious
agency problems tend to employ the Big 4 auditors to alleviate them. Further, the Korean capital market is largely open to
foreign investors that demand high quality financial reporting (Doidge et al., 2009). Such high demand for high-quality audit
services, accompanied by the low supply of the Big 4 audit services, creates a unique opportunity for these Big 4 auditors to
rebalance their audit client portfolios with ease.

In this paper, we first analyze the differences in stock liquidity across firms that switch
from high-quality to low-quality auditors (and vice versa) and firms that do not switch
auditors. In doing so, we employ three stock return-based constructs of stock liquidity: the
information cost as measured by Lesmond et al. (1999), the proportion of zero returns, and
the effective spread as measured by Roll (1984). We expect these stock return-based
constructs to reflect credibility of financial reporting. Using factor analysis, we identify a
liquidity factor, which captures the information contained in our three individual liquidity
variables. We then compare the liquidity of switching firms and non-switching firms. 3
Second, we examine whether or not the effect of auditor switches on liquidity is also
pronounced in firms that are required to change auditors under the auditor designation rule.
While auditor switches generally reflect the tendency of managers for opinion-shopping, Kim
and Yi (2009) document that mandatory auditor switches by auditor designation improves
accounting quality. We thus posit that investors reaction to mandatory auditor switches will
be different from that to voluntary auditor switches.
The premise of this paper is that auditor quality is positively associated with credibility
of corporate reporting, and hence stock liquidity. This premise is consistent with the notion
that high-quality auditors produce reliable information about firms that may efficiently

Another set of conventional liquidity measures may include Amihuds (2002) price impact measure and the bid-ask spread.
Because the use of these measures drastically reduces the sample size, we report the results of these tests only as
supplementary evidence under the additional tests section at the end of the paper. Meanwhile, there is no reason to believe
that the use of such high-frequency measures bring about different results. Specifically, Goyenko et al. (2009) have shown
that low-frequency measures (i.e., stock return-based measures) capture high-frequency measures (i.e., transaction-based
measures) well.

resolve contracting problems (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986;
Francis et al., 1999; Pittman and Fortin, 2004). For example, high-quality auditors can
enhance the credibility of financial statements by improving the precision of the earnings
reports of firms (DeAngelo, 1981; Balvers et al., 1988, Kanagaretnam et al., 2010), thereby
lowering the firms cost of capital (Fortin and Pittman, 2007). Both theory and empirical
evidence are consistent with this link (Easley and OHara, 2004; Francis et al., 2005; Leuz
and Verrecchia, 2007). Furthermore, the literature also documents that earnings quality is
positively associated with stock liquidity. Lang, Lins, and Maffett (2011) document greater
liquidity for firms with less evidence of earnings management. Therefore, the quality of
auditors in assuring the quality of financial reporting is to be reflected in stock liquidity.
However, both theory and empirical evidence on the economic effects of an auditor
switch are somewhat incomplete and difficult to interpret. Theories suggest that the direction
of the capital market reaction to auditor change cannot be clearly anticipated. First, given that
auditor choice is an optimal firm decision, only auditor changes that enhance firm value
should be initiated, suggesting that the market should react positively to such changes. If a
change in auditor is fully anticipated by market participants, the market price of the firms
stock will then reflect its value. Therefore, the market price should be, at worst, zero in an
efficient market (Johnson and Lys, 1990). Second, if managers change auditors solely to
maximize their own utility rather than to maximize shareholder wealth, market reactions to

auditor changes will be negative. Furthermore, if a firm changes its incumbent auditor to
signal its future prospects, only a change from a high-quality auditor to a low-quality auditor
will reveal negative private information on firm prospects, leading to a short-term negative
impact on the value of a firm in a market with weak informational efficiency. The upshot of
these different arguments is that it is difficult to predict the market reaction to an auditor
switch.
Furthermore, the findings of empirical studies based on U.S. data remain inconclusive.
Earlier empirical evidence shows a negative or insignificant market reaction to auditor
change (Fried and Schiff, 1981; Nichols and Smith, 1983; John and Lys, 1990). By focusing
on a shorter event-window, later studies succeeded in finding a negative market reaction (e.g.,
Whisenant et al., 2003; Beneish et al., 2005; Knechel et al., 2007). On the other hand, other
studies document a positive or non-negative market reaction (Sankaraguruswamy and
Whisenant, 2004; Whisenant, 2006).4 In sum, evidence on the economic consequences of an
auditor switch remains insufficient.5
Our empirical tests use two sets of data to address the implications of an auditor switch.
First, using a large sample of Korean-listed firms that exhibit a high frequency of auditor
4

As for Korean evidences, since Korean firms started to disclose auditor switch news after 2002, it was practically
impossible to examine stock market responses around auditor switch news in Korea before 2002. Using 201 Korean firms in
2002 and 2003, Sohn and Kim (2004) find that stock market negatively responds to auditor switch.
5
It is also argued that the economic consequences of an auditor switch vary with the type of the switch. For instance,
regulators expect switches from a low-quality auditor (i.e., a non-Big 4 auditor) to a high-quality auditor (i.e., a Big 4
auditor) to enhance the credibility of the firms financial statements, improve corporate transparency, and hence benefit
investors (e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission, 1988). This therefore implies that the economic consequences of a
change in auditor are asymmetric to the type of auditor change (e.g., Eichenseher et al., 1989). Extant evidence fairly
consistently supports that investors interpret switches negatively when the analysis more narrowly isolates those involving
downgrades (i.e., from Big N to non-Big N).

switches, we analyze the effects of auditor switches on stock liquidity. Second, by

categorizing our sample into firms subject to mandatory auditor change (i.e., where the
auditor is designated by the SFC) and those that change their auditor on a voluntary basis (i.e.,
where the auditor switch is initiated by the client firm), we examine whether or not auditor
switches that are mandatory also have an effect on stock liquidity. The SFC has assigned
statutory auditors to firms suspected of accounting fraud under a prescribed set of conditions
since 1990. Given that this type of regulatory designation forces firms that would not
otherwise switch auditors, we expect an auditor switch initiated by the rule to have a nonnegative effect on stock liquidity. More details on the institutional uniqueness of the auditor
designation rule in Korea are presented in Section 2.
In this work, we run cross-sectional firm-level regressions using these two datasets and
find lower stock liquidity for firms that switch auditors than those that do not. Further
analyses reveal that this effect is concentrated on BN firms (i.e., firms that switch from Big 4
to non-Big 4 auditors).6 In one of our specifications that use zero return frequency as a proxy
for stock liquidity, the percentage of days without trades is higher in BN firms by 1 percent,
which represents about a 3 percent deterioration in liquidity relative to firms that do not
switch auditors. Even when we aggregated all three liquidity proxies into a single liquidity
factor for parsimony, the tenor of the results does not change.
6

We used NB, BN, BB, and NN to designate firms that switch from non-Big 4 to Big 4 auditors, firms that switch from Big
4 to non-Big 4 auditors, firms that switch from one Big 4 to another Big 4 auditor, and firms that switch from one non-Big 4
to another non-Big 4 auditor, respectively. Likewise, our industry specialty tests also used similar terms, such as NS, SN, SS
and SS, where N (S) denotes a non-specialist (specialist) auditor.

We also relax the assumption that a firms decision on switching auditors is exogenous.
In reality, the auditor choice decision is likely to be endogenous. We use both Heckman
(1979)s 2 stage regression approach and propensity score matching to address the concern,
thereby ensuring that our findings are not due to the endogeneity of the auditor switching
decision, but are more likely to represent a causal relationship.
While the liquidity effects for firms switching auditors are statistically and
economically significant, these effects are generally smaller for firms whose auditor switches
are mandated by the regulatory body than firms voluntarily switching auditors. This suggests
that investors are more concerned about voluntary auditor switches than mandatory auditor
switches. Interestingly, we find that firms with designated auditors do not exhibit lower
liquidity, consistent with the market perception that auditor designation results in enhanced
audit quality. When a new auditor is assigned to a firm suspected of earnings manipulation
under certain conditions, such as being subject to high default risk, investors expect the
auditor designation to improve the credibility of the firms financial statements, which is
consistent with the view that designated auditors improve audit quality (Kim and Yi, 2009).
This study makes several important contributions to the literature. First, while prior
studies have examined different dimensions of liquidity in different markets (Bacidorea et al.,
2005; Frino et al., 2008; Kryzanowski et al., 2010), in this study we focus on Korea, a rapidly
developing economy. In this way we extend the vast literature on liquidity issues, in general,

and the links between financial reporting and liquidity, in particular. Second, prior studies
regarding the link between the economic consequences of an auditor switch and stock returns
are inconclusive and mixed. In this paper, we instead focus on stock liquidity around the time
of the auditor switch as an alternative proxy for the capital market effect. As the only
exception, Boone and Raman (2001) find that liquidity decreases for firms whose auditors
resigned, but not for firms whose auditor is dismissed. While they focus on auditors
resignation to adjust client portfolios, we discuss clients incentives to switch auditors and
extend their findings. Third, the concern of Korean regulators in auditor switches is that
auditor changes are motivated by management opportunism. Hence, the findings should be of
interest to regulators and policy makers in Korea as well as in any other countries considering
the adoption of similar regulation. Fourth, our study makes a novel contribution in that it
examines the effect of a mandatory auditor switch on liquidity. This is particularly interesting
because the economic consequences of the auditor switch depend on who actually initiates
the decision to switch auditors. Finally, our paper adds to the general body of knowledge
concerning the role played by high quality audits in reducing information asymmetry in the
market (Autore et al., 2009; Pittman and Fortin, 2004).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses
and reviews the literature. Section 3 specifies the research design we use for hypothesis
testing and Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 summarizes and concludes this

paper. In the Appendix, we provide additional details on the construction of the three
liquidity proxies.

2. Literature review and hypothesis development

2.1. Auditor switch and stock liquidity
Rational managers may maximize their own utility at the expense of the shareholders
rather than boosting the shareholders wealth by enhancing firm value. However, it would be
still fair to assume that the objective of the auditor change decision is the maximization of
firm value. Empirical evidence in this line of research is largely inconclusive. Most
importantly, while some of the prior literature shows that opportunistic managers switch
auditors to obtain more favorable audit opinions (Lennox, 2000), other empirical evidence on
opinion shopping is not supportive of this finding because post-switch opinions are no more
favorable than pre-switch opinions (e.g., Krishnan and Stephens, 1995). Numerous papers
that use stock returns to proxy for the capital market effect document that investors react
negatively to auditor changes and that stock price drops vary cross-sectionally with auditor or
firm characteristics (Smith, 1988; Wells and Loudder, 1997; Shu, 2000; Whisenant et al.,
2003; Beneish et al., 2005; Knechel et al., 2007). While the prior studies noted above report a
negative response to auditor switch announcements, some studies document a positive or
non-negative market reaction (Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant, 2004; Whisenant, 2006),
thereby raising questions over the opportunistic auditor switch assumption.

While tests based on stock returns conducted in prior studies are aimed at reflecting
perceived changes in firm value surrounding the auditor switch, our tests attempt to
determine whether or not the auditor switch implies the willingness of investors to face risks
stemming from changes in the credibility of the firms financial statements. An important
distinction between stock return and liquidity tests is that the former reflects changes in the
expectations of the market as a whole, while the latter reflects changes in the expectations of
individual investors. Although news of an auditor switch may be neutral in that it does not
change the expectations of the market as a whole, it may greatly alter the expectations of
individual investors. In an extreme case, we can envisage a shift in portfolio positions, which
is captured by a change in liquidity without any price reaction. If so, a return-based test may
be less sensitive to news of an auditor switch than a liquidity-based test. In a similar vein, we
expect stock liquidity to be more sensitive to auditor switch news than stock returns to the
extent that we assume informed and uninformed traders react differently to such news.
Informed traders are likely to be indifferent to information about the credibility of financial
statements because of their greater access to private information about the firm, while
uninformed traders may indeed be affected by such an announcement. Stock liquidity then
better captures the heterogeneity in the expectations of informed and uninformed traders than
do stock returns. Hence, to better examine the market perception of auditor changes, we

10

employ stock liquidity instead of stock returns and test the following hypothesis in alternative
form:

H1A: The stock liquidity of firms that switch auditors is significantly different from that of
firms that do not switch auditors, other things being equal.

The premise underlying this hypothesis is that an auditor switch conveys new
information to capital market participants about the firms future prospects. We expect that
switching from a high-quality auditor to a low-quality auditor (from a low-quality auditor to a
high-quality auditor) makes corporate reporting less (more) credible, increases (decreases)
information asymmetry, and hence decreases (increases) stock liquidity.

2.2. Effect of auditor designation

In Korea, the regulatory authority designates external auditors for firms deemed to have
strong incentives and/or great potential for fraudulent accounting and orders these firms to
replace their incumbent auditors, appoint new auditors, and retain them for a certain period.
This regulatory regime is known as auditor designation or mandatory auditor assignment.
(Kim and Yi, 2009; Jeong et al., 2005).

11

The auditor designation rule in Korea is unique and different from mandatory auditor
rotation in three ways. By designating auditors for problematic firms, the auditor designation
rule aims to alleviate alleged problems arising from long-term relationships between auditors
and clients while mandatory auditor rotation typically requires auditor changes for all firms
after a certain period of an initial engagement. Furthermore, the auditor designation rule
mandates retention of newly designated auditors for a certain period to protect designated
auditors from early dismissal, and thereby mitigating a major threat to auditor independence.
Finally, by requiring the regulatory authority to choose incoming auditors, the auditor
designation rule enhances auditor independence, and thereby improving audit quality. To our
knowledge, no country other than Korea has ever introduced or considered an auditor
designation policy. We take advantage of this unique institutional feature to examine whether
differences in stock liquidity are less pronounced in firms with designated auditors.
Empirical evidence suggests that the appointment of a designated auditor may result in
higher audit quality. Jeong et al. (2005) find that designated auditors charge significantly
higher audit fees than others. More recently, Kim and Yi (2009) find that the auditor
designation rule is effective in deterring managers from engaging in income-increasing
earnings management. They also find that firms subject to mandatory auditor changes
effected through the auditor designation regime report significantly lower discretionary

12

accruals than firms that make voluntary auditor changes, suggesting that the appointment of a
designated auditor enhances audit quality.
To the extent that the auditor designation rule is effective in improving auditor
independence and thus audit quality, designated auditors are likely to be less lenient towards
managerial opportunism than are non-designated auditors. As a consequence, firms with
designated auditors should exhibit higher stock liquidity, or at least they should not exhibit
lower stock liquidity. We expect the liquidity effects of mandatory auditor changes (i.e.,
auditor designation) to be less pronounced than those of voluntary auditor changes and thus
test the following hypothesis.

H2: The stock liquidity effects of auditor switches are less pronounced when firms are
mandated to switch auditors.

3. Research design and sample composition

3.1. Research design
To test our hypotheses, we specify the following regression model linking stock
liquidity with auditor switch and other control variables.

Liquidityit = 0 + 1 SWITCHit + 2 SIZEit + 3 LEVit + 4 ATURNit + 5 ROAit

+ 6 SGROWit + 7 QUICKit + 8 RETVARit + Year + Industry + it,
where for firm i and year t:

13

(1)

Dependent Variables
Liquidity
stock liquidity proxies; LOT, ZERO, ROLL, and FACTOR
LOT =
The natural logarithm of a yearly estimate of the transaction costs implied
by the trading behavior of investors developed by Lesmond et al. (1999).
The estimation period spans month -5 through month +7 so that the firms
annual reports are publicly available for a few months, which should enable
markets to impound the auditor switch effect.
ZERO =
The proportion of zero daily returns out of the maximum potential number
of trading days in a given year. The measurement period spans month -5
through month +7 relative to the firms fiscal year-end.
ROLL =
Rolls (1984) effective spread based on the bid-ask bounce-induced negative
serial correlation in returns. The measurement period spans month -5
through month +7 relative to the firms fiscal year-end.
FACTOR = a liquidity factor based on factor analysis using LOT, ZERO, and ROLL
Independent Variables
Switch =
an indicator variable which is one if a firm switches its auditor and zero
otherwise
BN =
an indicator variable which is one if a firm switches from a Big 4 auditor to
a non-Big 4 auditor and zero otherwise
NB =
an indicator variable which is one if a firm switches from a non-Big 4
auditor to a Big 4 auditor and zero otherwise
BB =
an indicator variable which is one if a firm switches from one Big 4 auditor
to another Big 4 auditor and zero otherwise
NN =
an indicator variable which is one if a firm switches from one non-Big 4
auditor to another non-Big 4 auditor and zero otherwise
Control Variables
SIZE =
the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets
LEV =
financial leverage measure by the ratio of total debt to total assets
ATURN = asset turnover measured as sales deflated by assets
ROA =
net income deflated by total assets
SGROW = sales growth measured as the difference in sales deflated by lagged sales
QUICK =
current assets deflated by current liabilities
RETVAR = return variability measured as the standard deviation of daily returns
To conduct the empirical tests, we create a binary indicator variable, Switch, that takes
the value of one for firms that switch auditors. This variable should capture the average
liquidity effect around the time of the auditor switch as the key variable of interest. We
introduce four separate indicator variables for firm-year observations from firms that switch

14

auditors. We distinguish BN, NB, BB, and NN switchers, respectively, depending on the types
of the former and successor auditors.
For dependent variables, we use four proxies LOT, ZERO, ROLL, and FACTOR for
stock liquidity.7 We construct the first three proxies using daily individual stock returns and
aggregate market returns. Assuming that daily returns are normally distributed, we estimate
all three measures for each firm and year over the period from month -5 through month +7
relative to the firms fiscal year-end.8 The first dependent variable, LOT, is a yearly estimate
of the total round trip transaction costs implied by the trading behavior of investors developed
by Lesmond et al. (1999). The second dependent variable, ZERO, is the proportion of zero
daily returns out of the maximum potential number of trading days in a given year. Lesmond
et al. (1999) argue that zero-return days occur when the transaction costs of trading outweigh
the value of new information not yet contained in prices and it is better not to trade. The zeroreturn metric commonly serves as a proxy for illiquidity (e.g., Bekaert et al., 2007). The third
measure is ROLL, which is designed to capture the bid-ask bounce-induced negative serial
autocorrelation in returns to estimate the effective spread. If the serial autocovariance is
positive, we force it to be negative and use the Roll estimate as if a negative serial
autocovariance were being estimated (Harris, 1989). Harris (1990) explains that positive

In Table A1, we also report the results based on the price impact measure and the bid-ask spread. We avoid using these two
measures in the main analyses because of limited data availability.
8
Korean listed firms have not been required to disclose auditor switch news before 2002. Without the exact date of auditors
being replaced, we are unable to examine short-term market responses around auditor switch dates. Admitting potential
confounding effects can exist in our long-horizon test, we also use two different estimation periods for our liquidity proxies
(month -6 to month +6, and month -4 to month +8). Our results hold robust to the changes in estimation periods.

15

autocovariance can result from closing prices that cluster at the ask, violating Rolls
assumption of trade independence. Due to the strengths and weaknesses of each liquidity
measure and proxy, we employ all three measures to construct FACTOR using factor analysis
and use it as a separate dependent variable in the analyses.9 Note that higher values of all of
our liquidity proxies indicate lower stock liquidity by definition. In common with prior
studies, we control for firm size, leverage, asset turnover, return-on-assets ratio, sales growth,
the quick ratio, and return variability in the regressions (Chordia et al., 2000; Leuz and
Verrecchia, 2000).

3.2. Sample composition

The initial sample for our study consists of all firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange
(KSE) and the Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (KOSDAQ). We retrieve
financial data from the KIS-Value database developed by the Korea Information Service
(KIS), the top credit rating agency affiliated with Moodys. This database has been used in
several recent studies on accounting and finance (Kim and Yi, 2009). We obtain monthly
stock returns data from the 2006 Korea Securities Research Institute database (KSRI 2006).
The sample period spans from 1995 to 2006.10

Factor analysis is initially run on three measures of stock liquidity and the factor obtained is used to test the hypotheses.
Factor analysis is a data reduction technique that simplifies complex and diverse relationships that exist among a set of
variables by generating new variables, the factors of which extract the main sources of variation among the original variables
(Dillon and Goldstein, 1984). Specifically, we combine three liquidity proxies (i.e., trading costs based on Lesmond et al.
(1999), zero returns, and effective spreads based on Roll, 1984) by factor analysis with one oblique rotation. The liquidity
factor is the factor score from the first (and only) factor with an eigenvalue greater than one.
10
We start from 1995 because this is the first year for which stock return data are available in the KSRI database.

16

We begin the sample collection procedure with all observations for which we have the
necessary data to compute the variables used in the firm-year regressions described above.
We exclude financial companies from our sample because the financial reporting
environment for financial institutions differs from that for companies in other industries. The
final sample includes 9,241 firm-year observations after we delete observations with missing
financial data. For our auditor designation sample, we obtain a list of 583 firm-year
observations for 291 distinct firms whose auditors were designated in the 19952002 period
from the Korea Financial Supervisory Service. 11 For the analysis testing our second
hypothesis, the data consist of 5,093 firm-year observations including 583 auditor-designated
observations.

4. Empirical results
4.1. Sample description
Table 1 summarizes our variable definitions and Table 2 describes the summary
statistics. Panel A of Table 2 provides a breakdown of the number of observations and shows
the composition of the samples used for our analyses. The full sample consists of 7,445 nonswitching firm-year observations and 1,796 switching firm-year observations. The second
dataset, the auditor designation sample, spans the period from 1995 to 2002 and consists of
583 firm-year observations in which mandatory auditor switches take place. The number of
11

We thank Professor Cheong H. Yi for providing the list of firms subject to auditor designation during the 1995-2002
period. We dont extend the sample period because SFC practically stopped designating auditors for listed companies. Since
2003, only a small number of firms subject to delisting have been mandated to change auditors.

17

observations in our non-designated sample during the same period is 4,510, yielding 5,093
firm-year observations in total.12
Panel B of Table 2 shows that the mean of SWITCH is 19.4% for the final sample,
indicating that about one-fifth of our firm-year observations are switchers, a higher
proportion than those observed in U.S. samples. Among these switching firms, about half
(8.5%) change from one Big 4 auditor to another Big 4 auditor, suggesting that caution is
required when drawing inferences based solely on SWITCH as a proxy for audit quality. The
means of LOT and ZERO are -4.835 and 0.089, respectively. The 8.9% of trading days with
zero returns equates to 23 days in each year without price changes. The ROLL measure is
2.3% on average, which is a fairly low effective spread cost. As previously discussed, the
Korean stock market has better liquidity than other emerging markets, a feature we expect to
provide us with reasonable test power in the following analyses. We winsorize all the
variables other than those with natural lower and upper bounds at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
The correlations reported in Panel C of Table 2 show that all three liquidity variables are
positively associated with the auditor switch indicator (SWITCH), and similarly, return
variability (RETVAR) is positively correlated with the switch indicator. The three liquidity
proxies are also significantly and positively related with one another, suggesting the effective
internal validity of these measures. Firm size (SIZE), financial leverage (LEV), asset turnover

12
The availability of audit fee data used to construct fee-based industry specialization variables restricts our final dataset to
4,850 observations since audit fee data is publicly available since 2001.

18

(ATURN), the return-on-assets ratio (ROA), sales growth (SGROW), the quick ratio (QUICK),
and return variability (RETVAR) are significantly related to liquidity measures, thereby
confirming that we need to control for these variables in examining the incremental liquidity
effect of an auditor switch.

4.2. Auditor switch and stock liquidity

4.2.1. Multivariate analyses
We now test the association between auditor switches and stock liquidity for the full
sample. We estimate Eq. (1) using our full sample of 9,241 firm-year observations covering
1,677 unique firms. In Table 3, we report the regression coefficients and their t-values
computed using standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level for our pooled OLS
regressions to control for serial correlation problems.
The results reported in Panel A of Table 3 show that the coefficient for SWITCH is
significantly positive in all cases in which a stock liquidity measure is used as the dependent
variable. These findings are consistent with the view that auditor switches have negative
economic consequences and suggest that auditor switching firms are less liquid than their
non-switching counterparts.
We then run regressions using separate indicators of the auditor switch types BN, NB,
BB, and NN in Panel B of Table 3. We find that the negative stock liquidity effect of an
auditor switch is pronounced only in BN firms. In our specification, the percentage of days

19

without trades increases by 1% for BN firms, which represents a deterioration in liquidity of

about 3% (= 0.009/0.274) relative to the liquidity of firms that do not switch auditors. The
coefficients of both LOT and ROLL are also significantly positive (t = 3.94 and 2.18,
respectively). When we aggregate all three liquidity proxies into a single liquidity factor for
parsimony, we also find a significantly lower liquidity only for BN firms (coefficient = 0.196,
t = 3.69).
Turning to the control variables, we observe several significant relations. Using the
liquidity factor as a dependent variable, we find that consistent with the prior market
microstructure literature (e.g., Chordia et al., 2000; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), larger firms
and firms with higher profitability, higher sales growth, a higher quick ratio, and higher
return variability exhibit higher stock liquidity.

4.2.1. Accounting for endogenous auditor switching decisions

The reverse causality problem may not be a big concern in Table 3 because it is unlikely
that firms facing the prospect of lower stock liquidity will tend to replace high-quality
auditors with low-quality auditors. Rather, as Fan and Wong (2005) argue, firms with a
higher level of information risk will hire high-quality auditors to mitigate investors concerns
about information risk. In this regard, the potential reverse causality issue, if any, is unlikely
to explain our results because it works against finding significant results in our analyses.

20

On the other hand, because auditor switching decisions are unlikely to be exogenous,
this may raise some concerns over our previous findings on the liquidity effect of an auditor
switch. To address the concern, we use matched sample techniques that have been developed
in the literature (e.g., Clatworthy et al., 2009). Specifically, we estimate the probit model of
the probability of switching auditor using a set of firm characteristics as explanatory variables,
as described below:

SWITCHit = 0 + 1 Xit-1 + Year + Industry + it,

(2)

where SWITCH is an indicator of whether firm i switches auditor in year t, X is the vector of
firm characteristics including KSE (an indicator of whether a firm is listed on the Korean
Stock Exchange), Size (the natural logarithm of total assets), ROA (the return-on-assets ratio),
LOSS (an indicator of a firm reporting negative net income), the interaction of ROA and
LOSS, and NSWITCH (the frequency of auditor switches during the sample period).13 We
take the predicted value from Equation (2) to construct the propensity score of auditor
switches for each firm i in year t. Next, using this propensity score, we match auditorswitching firm-years with non-switching firm-years that have the closest propensity score to
the matched switching firm for the same year.14 The resultant sample thus consists solely of
firms that have a similar probability of switching observations. By doing so, we control for
13

At the first stage, all the explanatory variables other than SIZE are statistically significant at the 5% significance level. The
model also has reasonable fit as its log likelihood is -3,676.49. The coefficients are estimated as: SWITCH=-1.30-0.51*KSE0.01*SIZE+1.44*ROA-2.37*ROA*LOSS+0.11*LOSS+0.47*NSWITCH.
14
The mean value of the differences in propensity scores between the two samples is 0.003, with a standard deviation of
0.013, indicating our propensity matching exercise is reasonably successful.

21

firm characteristics that could possibly drive auditor switch decisions. In such a sample, the
coefficient on our SWITCH indicator variable can be reliably interpreted as a causal effect of
the auditor switch on stock liquidity.15
Before analyzing the matched sample, we first use observations for firms that switch
auditors only once during our sample periods shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4. This
sample consists of 2,819 observations for 542 firms. We choose one-time switchers only
because we expect they exhibit a clearer difference in stock liquidity after changing auditors
than firms that switch auditors repetitively. By doing so, we can compare stock liquidity of
pre-switching periods with that of post-periods for such firms. In column (1), the coefficient
of SWITCH is positive but insignificant. But in column (2), the coefficient of BN remains
significantly positive, suggesting that firms experience lower liquidity after they switch high
quality auditors to low quality auditors. 16 This reconfirms our previous results that stock
liquidity is related to the quality of auditors.

15

Propensity score matching has several advantages over instrumental variable (IV) methods as a solution of the
endogeneity problem (Core, 2010). First, it does not require the identification of reliable IVs which is very challenging in
many empirical settings. For example, Clatworthy et al. (2009) and Francis, Lennox, and Wang (2010) find that the
inferences from Heckmans two-stage estimation are sensitive to the choice of IVs. Furthermore, Larcker and Rusticus
(2010) show that if IVs are not appropriate, ordinary least squares estimates can be better than two-stage or three-stage least
squares (2SLS or 3SLS) estimates. Second, it is robust to misspecification of the functional form because it is not subject to
parametric assumptions of IV methods (Armstrong et al., 2010). However, propensity score matching does not address
endogeneity directly as do IV methods. We thus discuss the robustness of our results using Heckmans two-stage estimation
in footnote 20.
16
Examining changes in liquidity around the event of auditor switches is known as an effective way in controlling for
potential biases from omitted variables. However, the event date cannot be identified in our setting. Even though auditor
switches can occur at any time during the fiscal year, in Korea, firms switching auditors have not been required to announce
the news at the event before 2002. As a result, it is practically impossible to figure out when the auditor switch news is
released to the public. Therefore, it may not be appropriate to investigate the impact of auditor switches on the change in
liquidity variables over time. It is noted that matching samples can be an alternative in such a case (Mayhew and Mihov,
2004).

22

In columns (3) and (4), we match all 1,796 switching year observations to the same
number of non-switching year observations, yielding 3,592 firm-year observations in total.
The matched non-switching observations should have the closest propensity score in the same
year of the switching observations. Specifically, a switching firm-year observation is matched
with a non-switching firm-year observation having the most similar likelihood of switching
an auditor in the same year, which means the benchmark group in columns (3) and (4)
consists of non-switching observations in the same year of switching observations. For
completeness, in columns (5) and (6), we choose the switching year observations of 542 onetime switchers that are used in columns (1) and (2) and match them to the same number of
observations for firms that have never changed auditors, yielding a total of 1,084
observations. The matching also requires the closest propensity score in the same year.
The results in columns (3) to (6) corroborate our previous findings that auditor switches
have negative implications for stock liquidity. The findings suggest that, even after we
control for firm characteristics that might affect auditor switch decisions, the negative
liquidity effect of auditor switch holds robust. Especially, the within-firm approach in
columns (1) and (2) confirms that the results in Table 3 are not due to the potential bias of
auditor switching decisions, but are instead likely to reflect a causal relationship.17

17

Despite several advantages of the propensity matching technique, its major limitation is that matching is based only on
observable variables and therefore it cannot control for selectivity based on unobservables. We thus conduct Heckmans
(1979) 2SLS test for robustness check and find similar results. With the inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio estimated from
the first stage probit model in the second stage OLS, the coefficient of SWITCH is positive but becomes insignificant (coeff.
= 0.102, t = 0.98), while the coefficient of BN remains significantly positive (coeff. = 0.238, t = 2.10). However, we are also
cautious in interpreting this result because of the difficulty of identifying an exogenous instrument variable in the first stage.

23

4.3. The liquidity effects of a mandatory auditor switch: evidence from an auditor designation
sample
4.3.1. The effect of a mandatory auditor switch on stock liquidity
In this section, we compare the liquidity effects of mandatory auditor changes (i.e.,
auditor designation) with those of voluntary auditor changes to investigate further whether
the effect of mandatory auditor change differs systematically from that of voluntary auditor
change. In so doing, we construct a subsample in which auditors are switched on either a
mandatory or a voluntary basis from 1995 to 2002. We use 5,093 firm-year observations
consisting of 583 firm-year observations for designated auditor switches and 4,510 firm-year
observations for non-designated auditor switches.
Table 5 reports the subsample results for the liquidity effects of auditor designation. For
simplicity, we report only the results based on the liquidity factor (FACTOR), although the
results obtained using the three different individual measures are qualitatively similar to those
reported for the composite factor. Column (1) shows the result of Eq. (1) using the subsample
and reports a positive coefficient of SWITCH. We include the auditor designation dummy
(DSG) and define an interaction term, DSG*SWITCH, that captures any incremental liquidity
effect for firms subject to the auditor designation rule. As shown in column (3), the

Note that it is essential to identify exogenous independent variables from the first stage choice model that can be validly
excluded from the second stage regression to successfully implement the Heckman (1979) procedure (Francis et al., 2010).
We thus consider NSWITCH as an exogenous variable to capture firms tendency to frequently switch auditors. We also
expect NSWITCH not to be related to the error terms in Equation (1) as it is counted over the sample period and there is no
reason to expect it has an impact on stock liquidity in a particular year.

24

coefficient of DSG*SWITCH is significantly negative, which indicates that the negative

liquidity effect of auditor switching is less pronounced if the switch is driven by the auditor
designation rule. As the rule aims to improve auditor independence and thus audit quality,
switching to an incoming designated auditor is perceived to have positive economic
consequences in the capital market. The F-test result confirms that the negative impact of an
auditor switch is no longer observed when the switch is mandatory. As the auditor is
designated when a firm is suspected of fraudulent accounting, this finding is consistent with
the view that designated auditors improve audit quality (Kim and Yi, 2009).
Columns (3) and (4) show that the negative liquidity effects of auditor-switching firms
are concentrated in firms that switch from a Big 4 auditor to a non-Big 4 auditor and that such
effects are less pronounced when the switch is initiated by the rule. The positive liquidity
effects of auditor designation, which we report in Columns (2) and (4), are mostly driven by
firms switching from a non-Big 4 auditor to a Big 4 auditor.

4.3.2. The effect of audit risk on the relation between a mandated auditor switch and stock
liquidity
If the non-negative liquidity impact of a mandated auditor switch is attributed to the
fact that investors are well aware of the regulatory intervention objective of improving audit
quality, this impact is likely to be greater when the firm is subject to higher audit risk. We

25

thus further examine whether the liquidity effects of designated auditor switches vary with
the level of audit risk. As shown in Panel A of Table 6, Article 10 of the Financial
Supervisory Service (FSC) Regulation under the Act on External Audit stipulates that listed
firms will be subject to an auditor designation requirement if they meet one of the 10
specified conditions. Following Kim and Yi (2009), we consider that the first four conditions
describe instances of lower client risk, while the last six describe circumstances of higher
client risk. Among the 583 auditor designation sample observations, 184 (399) belong to the
low-risk (high-risk) group.18 Panel B shows that the liquidity effect is pronounced only in
NB firms subject to higher risk. Difference tests between the two risk groups show that
liquidity effects can be observed in firms switching to Big 4 auditors, regardless of the type
of auditor formerly engaged.
The results imply that the positive liquidity effect of a mandatory auditor switch is
related to the potential impact of auditor designation on the audit risk of client firms. The
finding that there is a positive liquidity effect of auditor switches in firms with higher audit
risk suggests that investors expect designated auditors to play a more significant role in such
firms. Accordingly, the results reported in Table 6 corroborate our previous findings about
the implications of mandatory auditor switches.

4.4. Additional tests

18

We follow Kim and Yi (2009) in classifying risk. Of the ten criteria for auditor designation, four are regarded as indicating
low client risk and the other six are regarded as indicating high client risk. See Table 6 for details.

26

4.4.1. An alternative proxy for audit quality: industry specialization

Prior studies have employed auditor brand name or auditor size (i.e., Big 4) as a proxy
for audit quality. However, audit firm brand name is only one possible indication of audit
quality (e.g., Knechel et al., 2007). To mitigate the concern over using an empirical proxy for
audit quality, recent studies have hypothesized that auditor industry specialization also
contributes to audit quality. Knechel et al. (2007) find that firms switching between Big 4
auditors experience significant positive abnormal returns when the successor auditor is an
industry specialist and experience significant negative abnormal returns when the successor
auditor is not a specialist. Balsam et al. (2003) report that client firms of specialist auditors
have lower discretionary accruals and higher earnings response coefficients than client firms
of non-specialists. On the whole, the industry specialist indicator is perceived as an effective
proxy for audit quality. We thus corroborate our analyses by focusing on industry
specialization. Given that the market perceives audit quality differences based on industry
specialization (Knechel et al., 2007), this test will confirm that differences in the credibility
of financial statements are relevant to stock liquidity.
We identify auditor expertise by considering each auditors industry market share in a
specific year. To identify industry specialists, we manually collect audit fee information
disclosed by Korean listed firms. We code an indicator variable (Specialist) equal to one if
the firm is audited by an industry specialist that reports the greatest market share in terms of

27

the audit fee in each two digit industry. We also categorize switchers as SN, NS, SS, or NN
based on the industry specialization of their successor auditors. In so doing, we examine
whether a switch from an industry specialist auditor to a non-specialist auditor has a
significant impact on stock liquidity. If the auditor switch has a discernible effect on stock
liquidity, we expect the firm switching from a specialist (a non-specialist) auditor to a nonspecialist (specialist) auditor to exhibit a lower (higher) level of stock liquidity than a firm
that does not switch its auditor. This test is carried out using 4,850 firm-year observations
during the 20012005 period, a timeframe for which audit fee data are publicly available.
Table 7 confirms that the negative liquidity effect of an auditor switch remains constant
in the subset of data for the limited sample period from 2001 to 2005. Similar to the previous
result showing a concentrated liquidity effect among BN firms, the liquidity effect of auditor
switches is most pronounced among SN firms (i.e., firms switching from an industry
specialist auditor to a non-specialist auditor). NN firms also exhibit lower stock liquidity,
suggesting that market participants penalize firms that switch to non-specialist auditors
regardless of the type of auditor formerly engaged. Given that the market perceives audit
quality differences based on industry specialization (Knechel et al., 2007), these results
suggest that employing industry specialists to improve the credibility of financial statements

28

is relevant to stock liquidity. In this regard, our findings can be regarded as robust regardless
of the measure of audit quality employed.19

4.4.2 Other measures of stock liquidity

Following prior studies, we also use the price impact measure of Amihud (2002) and the
bid-ask spread as additional measures of liquidity. However, trading volume and transaction
data, both of which are essential to construct these two measures, are available only for KSE
(Korean Stock Exchange) firms and not for KOSDAQ (Korean Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation) firms. For example, the bid-ask spread can be calculated for only 5,089 firm-year
observations from the KSE, which represents about 55% of our total sample. To avoid such a
substantial loss of data, we have reported our main results without relying on these two
measures. However, when we repeat our main analyses based on these two measures for
completeness, the tenor of our main results does not change. These results, which are
reported in Table A1, give us more confidence in our conclusions.

5. Concluding remarks
19

We also use alternative measures of industry specialization such as auditors industry share based on auditees sales or
assets (Balsam et al., 2003; Knechel et al., 2007). Although we find directionally consistent results, the coefficient on SN is
not statistically significant (t=0.45 when we use asset-based industry leadership and t=0.21 when we use sales-based industry
leadership). Rather, the coefficient of NN becomes positive and marginally significant. (t=1.86 when we use asset-based
industry leadership and t=1.88 when we use sales-based industry leadership). It is possible that an auditor can increase the
number of clients (thus the summation of sales or assets of the clients) by proposing a discounted price (Ettredge and
Greenberg, 1990; Pearson and Trompeter, 1994). Alternatively, another auditor can charge higher audit fees and at the same
time increase the market share in an industry. The latter case is possible only when the auditor provides higher-quality audit
service enough to justify the higher price than the other auditors charge. In contrast, it is hard to say that the auditors in the
former case are the industry expertise auditor. Thus, with caution, we argue that the industry specialist measure based on
audit fee is a better proxy for the auditor industry specialist. Consistent with this argument, Craswell et al. (1995) document
the existence of significant industry specialist auditor fee premium.

29

In this paper, we examine the effect of auditor switches on stock liquidity. We find that
other things being equal, firms that switch auditors are more likely to exhibit lower stock
liquidity than firms that do not switch auditors, thereby supporting the agency risk
explanation of auditor switches. We also find that the negative liquidity effect is driven by
firms switching from a high-quality auditor to a low-quality auditor.
We further examine whether auditor switches mandated by a regulatory body under the
auditor designation rule in Korea are also associated with stock liquidity. Consistent with the
notion that auditor designation improves audit quality, we find a non-negative association
between stock liquidity and a designated auditor switch. Furthermore, we document an even
positive association between them when firms with newly designated auditors have higher
audit risk. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that the auditor designation rule
in Korea enhances audit quality and thus the credibility of financial reporting.
Our study is subject to several limitations. First, as many previous studies point out,
auditor switches often coincide with other substantial changes in the firm. It is possible that
our results reflect the joint effects of these changes and hence cannot be attributed solely to
the auditor switch. Second, if the stock market is efficient enough to anticipate the
announcement of the auditor switch, this is likely to reduce the power of our tests. Finally,
the results are based solely on data on Korean firms and therefore cannot be easily
generalized to other countries.

30

Despite these limitations, the study makes meaningful contributions to the literature. In
particular, we provide evidence regarding the economic consequences of an auditor switch in
terms of the significant capital market costs incurred around the time of the announcement. In
contrast, the results of prior studies based on stock returns have been inconclusive and mixed.
Given that regulators interest in auditor switches is due to the concern that auditor changes
are motivated by management opportunism, our findings are likely to be of interest to
regulators and policymakers. Our study is also novel in that it examines the liquidity effect of
mandatory auditor switches required by regulation. It implies that investors are concerned not
only with changes in audit quality, but also with who initiates the change. Overall, our paper
contributes to the ongoing debate on the economic costs and benefits of voluntary versus
mandatory auditor changes and the literature on stock liquidity.

31

Appendix
Table A1.
Regression results based on other liquidity proxies
This table reports the regression results for the relation between auditor switch and
stock liquidity using PRCIMPT and SPREAD. Panel A (B) regresses the stock
liquidity measures on the auditor switch indicator (each auditor switch type).
FACTOR5 represents the scores for single factors extracted from all five liquidity
variables (LOT, ZERO, ROLL, PRCIMPT, and SPREAD) employing factor analysis.
We include industry- and year-fixed effects based on the two-digit SIC code, but we
do not report the coefficients. The table reports the OLS coefficient estimates and tstatistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. See Table 1 for
variable definitions.
(Panel A) Results based on auditor switch indicator
(1)
(2)
Dependent var. =
PRCIMPT
SPREAD
Parameter
Intercept
SWITCH
SIZE
LEV
ATURN
ROA
SGROW
QUICK
RETVAR
Year
Industry
Adj.R2
#Obs.

Coef.
12.186
0.117
-0.527
-0.141
-0.179
1.271
-0.199
-0.049
-44.528
Yes
Yes
0.334
4,852

t-stat.
9.95
2.21
-12.55
-0.46
-1.73
2.81
-2.13
-1.22
-11.38

Coef.
-3.064
0.012
-0.101
0.139
-0.049
-0.473
-0.013
0.011
3.106
Yes
Yes
0.167
5,089

Coef.
-12.39
0.70
-11.98
2.07
-2.07
-4.72
-0.51
0.95
2.61

(Panel B) Results based on auditor switch type

(1)
(2)
Dependent var. =
PRCIMPT
SPREAD
Parameter
Intercept
BN
NB
BB
NN
SIZE
LEV
ATURN
ROA
SGROW
QUICK
RETVAR
Year
Industry
Adj.R2
#Obs.

Coef.
12.309
0.230
0.062
0.199
-0.224
-0.531
-0.152
-0.179
1.286
-0.199
-0.051
-44.492
Yes
Yes
0.335
4,852

t-stat.
10.08
2.14
0.60
2.71
-1.51
-12.66
-0.49
-1.72
2.85
-2.13
-1.28
-11.34

32

Coef.
-3.064
0.082
-0.013
0.005
-0.030
-0.101
0.136
-0.050
-0.469
-0.013
0.011
3.112
Yes
Yes
0.167
5,089

t-stat.
-12.28
2.23
-0.39
0.20
-0.73
-11.84
2.03
-2.09
-4.67
-0.50
0.93
2.61

(3)
FACTOR5
Coef.
6.190
0.051
-0.238
0.025
-0.008
-0.399
-0.040
0.015
-8.767
Yes
Yes
0.296
4,147

t-stat.
10.93
1.36
-12.10
0.17
-0.16
-1.96
-0.74
0.62
-3.67

(3)
FACTOR5
Coef.
6.197
0.182
0.010
0.035
-0.021
-0.238
0.021
-0.010
-0.378
-0.040
0.014
-8.773
Yes
Yes
0.296
4,147

t-stat.
10.92
2.42
0.13
0.65
-0.21
-12.08
0.14
-0.19
-1.87
-0.75
0.56
-3.67

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36

Table 1
Variable definitions
Variable

Description

Dependent variables
LOT
The natural logarithm of a yearly estimate of the transaction costs
implied by the trading behavior of investors developed by
Lesmond et al. (1999). The estimation period spans month -5
through month +7 so that the firms annual reports are publicly
available for a few months, which should enable markets to
impound the auditor switch effect.
ZERO
The proportion of zero daily returns out of the maximum potential
number of trading days in a given year. The measurement period
spans month -5 through month +7 relative to the firms fiscal yearend.
ROLL
Rolls (1984) effective spread based on the bid-ask bounceinduced negative serial correlation in returns. The measurement
period spans month -5 through month +7 relative to the firms
fiscal year-end.
PRCIMPT
Amihuds (2002) illiquidity measure which captures the price
impact of trades. We measure illiquidity as the median daily price
impact over the year and compute the price impact as the daily
absolute price change in percentage terms divided by trading
volume (measured in million KRW). To avoid the
misclassification of days with no or low trading activity, we omit
zero-return days from yearly median calculations. We take the
natural logarithm of the value for expositional purposes. The
measurement period runs from month -5 to month +7 relative to
the firms fiscal year-end.
SPREAD
The bid-ask spread. We obtain the closing bid and ask prices for
each day from the intraday transaction data of the Korean Stock
Exchange and compute the daily quoted spread as the difference
between the two prices divided by the midpoint. We then compute
the median daily spread over the year. The measurement period
runs from month -5 to month +7 relative to the firms fiscal yearend.
Auditor switch variables
SWITCH
1 if a firm changes its auditor in the period; 0 otherwise
BN
1 if a firm changes from a Big 4 auditor to a non-Big 4 auditor; 0
otherwise
NB
1 if a firm changes from a non-Big 4 auditor to a Big 4 auditor; 0
otherwise
BB
1 if a firm changes from one Big 4 auditor to another Big 4
auditor; 0 otherwise
NN
1 if a firm changes from one non-Big 4 to another non-Big 4
auditor; 0 otherwise
Industry specialization variables
SN
1 if a firm changes its auditor from an industry specialist to a nonspecialist; 0 otherwise
NS
1 if a firm changes its auditor from a non-specialist to a specialist;
0 otherwise
SS
1 if a firm changes its auditor from one specialist to another
specialist; 0 otherwise
NN
1 if a firm changes its auditor from one non-specialist to another

37

non-specialist; 0 otherwise
Other variables
SIZE
LEV
ATURN
ROA
SGROW
QUICK
RETVAR
DSG
FO

The natural logarithm of total assets

The leverage ratio, calculated as the sum of short-term and longterm debt divided by total assets
The asset turnover ratio, calculated as sales divided by total assets
The return-on-assets ratio, calculated as net income divided by
total assets
Sales growth, calculated as the change in sales divided by sales in
the previous year
The current ratio, calculated as current assets divided by current
liabilities
Return variability, calculated as the standard deviation of daily
returns in the year. The measurement period spans from month -5
to month +7 relative to the firms fiscal year-end.
1 if a firms auditor is designated by regulation; 0 otherwise
Percentage of foreign ownership

38

Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Panel A presents the number of observations for each auditor switch type. Panel B
presents the summary statistics for the full sample. Panel C reports the Pearson
correlation matrix for the key variables. The full sample comprises a maximum of
9,421 firm-year observations between 1995 and 2006 with non-missing financial data.
See Table 1 for variable definitions.
(Panel A) Number of observations by auditor switch type
Type

Full sample
(1995 to 2006)

Non-switch
Switch
BN
NB
BB
NN
Total

7,445
1,796
353
347
786
310
9,241

Auditor designation
sample
(1995 to 2002)
Others
Designated
286
3,839
297
671
75
124
57
149
117
262
48
136
583
4,510

(Panel B) Full sample (N = 9,241, 1995 to 2006)

Variable
SWITCH
BN
NB
BB
NN
LOT
ZERO
ROLL
SIZE
LEV
ATURN
ROA
SGROW
QUICK
RETVAR

Mean Std Dev

0.194
0.396
0.038
0.192
0.038
0.190
0.085
0.279
0.034
0.180
-4.836
0.551
0.089
0.053
0.023
0.014
25.648
1.458
0.405
0.240
0.951
0.514
-0.015
0.168
0.089
0.297
1.950
1.914
0.039
0.014

Min.
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-6.123
0.016
0.000
23.035
0.003
0.140
-0.993
-0.655
0.235
0.015

39

Q1
Median
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-5.199
-4.852
0.052
0.076
0.013
0.020
24.593
25.410
0.230
0.396
0.620
0.855
-0.013
0.019
-0.049
0.065
0.930
1.361
0.028
0.038

Q3
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-4.516
0.111
0.030
26.423
0.556
1.162
0.055
0.189
2.116
0.049

Max.
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
-3.175
0.310
0.113
30.057
1.300
3.249
0.216
1.476
12.022
0.074

(Panel C) Pearson correlation matrix

SWITCH
LOT
ZERO
ROLL
SIZE
LEV

LOT
0.062
0.00

ZERO
0.024
0.02
0.754
0.00

ROLL
0.070
0.00
0.126
0.00
0.183
0.00

SIZE
-0.007
0.52
-0.194
0.00
-0.020
0.05
-0.203
0.00

LEV
ATURN
0.047
-0.011
0.00
0.31
0.145
-0.008
0.00
0.42
0.076
0.022
0.00
0.04
0.151
-0.075
0.00
0.00
0.137
-0.063
0.00
0.00
0.064
0.00

ATURN
ROA
SGROW
QUICK

40

ROA
SGROW
-0.011
0.005
0.28
0.61
-0.146
-0.040
0.00
0.00
0.022
0.016
0.03
0.12
-0.227
-0.039
0.00
0.00
0.208
0.063
0.00
0.00
-0.388
-0.023
0.00
0.03
0.105
0.150
0.00
0.00
0.227
0.00

QUICK
RETVAR
-0.020
0.079
0.06
0.00
-0.064
0.114
0.00
0.00
-0.080
-0.372
0.00
0.00
0.000
0.650
0.99
0.00
-0.270
-0.294
0.00
0.00
-0.513
0.171
0.00
0.00
-0.154
-0.078
0.00
0.00
0.070
-0.302
0.00
0.00
-0.054
-0.055
0.00
0.00
0.029
0.01

Table 3
Regression results for the relation between auditor switch and stock liquidity
This table reports the regression results for the relation between auditor switch and
stock liquidity. Panel A (B) regresses the stock liquidity measures on the auditor switch
indicator (each auditor switch type). FACTOR summarizes our liquidity proxies and
represents the scores of a single factor extracted from liquidity variables (1) through (3)
employing factor analysis. We include industry- and year-fixed effects based on the
two-digit SIC code, but we do not report the coefficients. The table reports the OLS
coefficient estimates and t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by
firm. See Table 1 for variable definitions.
(Panel A) Results based on auditor switch indicator
Dependent var. =

(1)
LOT

(2)
ZERO

Parameter
Intercept
SWITCH
SIZE
LEV
ATURN
ROA
SGROW
QUICK
RETVAR
Year
Industry
Adj.R2
#Obs.

Coef. t-stat.
-1.765 -9.43
0.041
2.83
-0.127 -19.08
0.133
2.46
-0.003 -0.21
-0.618 -9.69
-0.061 -3.18
-0.015 -3.31
-3.661 -5.37
Yes
Yes
0.161
9,241

Coef. t-stat.
0.275 15.44
0.003
2.23
-0.007 -10.56
-0.011 -1.95
0.003
1.63
-0.030 -5.15
-0.002 -1.01
-0.001 -2.63
-1.037 -16.11
Yes
Yes
0.305
9,241

(3)
ROLL

(4)
FACTOR

Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.

0.056 17.53 4.792 13.62
0.001
2.35 0.067
2.61
-0.002 -15.71 -0.186 -14.93
0.007
8.64 0.004
0.04
-0.001 -4.69 0.026
0.83
-0.009 -5.68 -0.880 -7.57
-0.001 -2.42 -0.075 -2.13
0.000
1.26 -0.026 -3.10
0.188 13.23 -14.551 -11.64
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.334
0.242
9,241
9,241

(Panel B) Results based on auditor switch type

Dependent var. =

(1)
LOT

(2)
ZERO

Parameter
Intercept
BN
NB
BB
NN
SIZE
LEV
ATURN
ROA
SGROW
QUICK
RETVAR
Year
Industry
adj.R2
#Obs.

Coef. t-stat.
-1.780 -9.48
0.115
3.94
0.011
0.40
0.026
1.31
0.024
0.73
-0.126 -18.95
0.132
2.44
-0.003 -0.19
-0.617 -9.68
-0.060 -3.16
-0.015 -3.31
-3.654 -5.37
Yes
Yes
0.218
9,241

Coef. t-stat.
0.274 15.40
0.009
3.15
0.002
0.74
0.002
1.15
0.000 -0.14
-0.007 -10.52
-0.011 -1.98
0.003
1.65
-0.030 -5.15
-0.002 -0.99
-0.001 -2.63
-1.035 -16.10
Yes
Yes
0.305
9,241

41

(3)
ROLL

(4)
FACTOR

Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.

0.056 17.38 4.771 13.54
0.001
2.18 0.196
3.69
0.000
0.72 0.027
0.58
0.001
1.19 0.046
1.27
0.001
1.25 0.017
0.28
-0.002 -15.55 -0.185 -14.85
0.007
8.62 0.001
0.01
-0.001 -4.69 0.026
0.85
-0.009 -5.66 -0.880 -7.57
-0.001 -2.41 -0.074 -2.12
0.000
1.27 -0.026 -3.10
0.188 13.20 -14.528 -11.63
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.334
0.242
9,241
9,241

Table 4
Regression results after controlling for the likelihood of switching auditors
This table controls for the likelihood of switching auditors in the regression results for the relation between auditor switch and stock liquidity. In
columns (1) and (2), we use firm-year observations for firms that switch auditors only once during our sample period. In columns (3) to (6), we
first construct the propensity score as a predicted probability of auditor switch. Next, using this propensity score, we match auditor-switching
observations with non-switching observations in the same year in columns (3) and (4). In columns (5) and (6), we match switching year
observations for firms that switch auditors only once during the sample period with the same year observations for firms that have never changed
auditors. We use FACTOR and the scores for single factors extracted from the three liquidity variables - LOT, ZERO, and ROLL - as dependent
variables. We include industry- and year-fixed effects based on the two-digit SIC code, but we do not report the coefficients. The table reports
the OLS coefficient estimates and t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. See Table 1 for variable definitions.
Dep. Var =
FACTOR

Pre-Post analysis:
One-time switchers only
(1)

Parameter
Intercept
SWITCH
BN
NB
BB
NN
SIZE
LEV
ATURN
ROA
SGROW
QUICK
RETVAR
Year
Industry
Adj.R2
#Obs.

Coef.
4.284
0.039

-0.169
0.135
0.002
-0.829
-0.080
-0.039
-14.253
Yes
Yes
0.258
2,819

Switching and non-switching pairs

matched by the propensity score

(2)
t-stat.
7.48
0.97

-7.81
0.72
0.04
-3.97
-1.64
-3.05
-7.71

Coef.
4.200
0.275
-0.070
-0.027
0.009
-0.166
0.130
0.006
-0.839
-0.079
-0.037
-14.155
Yes
Yes
0.260
2,819

(3)
t-stat.
7.34

Coef.
4.794
0.082

2.95
-0.88
-0.48
0.10
-7.68 -0.188
0.69
0.000
0.12 -0.006
-4.06 -0.662
-1.63 -0.096
-2.97
0.001
-7.71 -14.933
Yes
Yes
0.223
3,592

42

(4)
t-stat.
8.32
2.29

-9.47
0.00
-0.12
-3.67
-1.30
0.09
-6.67

Coef.
4.757

t-stat.
8.18

0.220
0.028
0.071
0.017
-0.187
-0.008
-0.005
-0.664
-0.093
0.002
-14.870
Yes
Yes
0.225
3,592

3.68
0.54
1.55
0.25
-9.31
-0.05
-0.11
-3.69
-1.27
0.11
-6.65

Switching and non-switching pairs

using one-time switchers and neverswitching firms
(matched by the propensity score)
(5)
(6)
Coef.
t-stat.
Coef.
t-stat.
5.395
6.24
5.209
6.05
0.121
1.81
0.370
3.35
-0.005
-0.06
0.059
0.71
0.096
0.90
-0.212
-7.08 -0.205
-6.90
0.201
0.90
0.194
0.87
0.002
0.03
0.007
0.12
-0.686
-2.53 -0.701
-2.59
-0.157
-1.89 -0.156
-1.91
-0.024
-1.58 -0.021
-1.39
-20.308
-6.35 -20.067
-6.27
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.251
0.258
1,084
1,084

Table 5
The effect of auditor designation on the relation between auditor switch and stock
liquidity
This table reports the regression results for the auditor designation effect on the relation
between auditor switch and stock liquidity. The sample comprises 5,093 firm-year
observations between 1995 and 2002. The auditor designation rule is applied in 671 of
these observations. DSG is an indicator that equals 1 if a firm is audited by a designated
auditor and 0 otherwise. We use FACTOR and the scores for single factors extracted
from the three liquidity variables - LOT, ZERO, and ROLL - as the dependent variables.
We include industry- and year-fixed effects based on the two-digit SIC code, but we do
not report the coefficients. The table reports the OLS coefficient estimates and tstatistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. See Table 1 for
variable definitions.
Depvar.=FACTOR
Parameter
Intercept
SWITCH
BN
NB
BB
NN
DSG
DSG*SWITCH
DSG*BN
DSG*NB
DSG*BB
DSG*NN
SIZE
LEV
ATURN
ROA
SGROW
QUICK
RETVAR
Year
Industry
adj.R2
#Obs.
F-test
SWITCH
+DSG*SWITCH
BN+DSG*BN
NB+DSG*NB

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Coef. t-stat.
2.524 4.59
0.085 2.65

Coef. t-stat.
2.512 4.58

Coef. t-stat.
2.453 4.49
0.092 2.28

Coef. t-stat.
2.439 4.46

0.141
0.107
0.058
0.057

2.19
1.82
1.23
0.72
0.288 4.31
-0.170 -2.50

-0.091
-0.232
0.068
-0.987
-0.130
-0.003
-13.668
Yes
Yes
0.307
5,093

-4.99 -0.090
-1.69 -0.235
1.65
0.067
-6.07 -0.987
-2.86 -0.129
-0.21 -0.003
-8.14 -13.653
Yes
Yes
0.306
5,093

-4.98 -0.087
-1.70 -0.317
1.64
0.072
-6.07 -0.981
-2.83 -0.127
-0.22 -0.006
-8.13 -13.658
Yes
Yes
0.312
5,093

-4.79
-2.32
1.76
-6.04
-2.84
-0.46
-8.21

0.169
0.141
0.045
0.068
0.349

2.05
1.97
0.85
0.84
4.75

-0.327
-0.355
-0.203
-0.292
-0.086
-0.335
0.072
-0.970
-0.126
-0.007
-13.695
Yes
Yes
0.312
5,093

-2.38
-2.56
-1.70
-1.54
-4.75
-2.44
1.76
-6.00
-2.81
-0.48
-8.23

-0.077 (p=0.15)
-0.157 (p=0.29)
-0.214 (p=0.16)

43

Table 6
The effect of client risk on the relation between auditor switch and stock liquidity:
evidence from an auditor designation sample
This table reports the regression results for the audit risk effect on the relation between
auditor switch and stock liquidity. Panel A explains the risk criteria specified in the
regulation according to which the sample is classified into low- and high-risk groups.
Panel B reports the regression results for the audit risk effect on the relation between
auditor switch type and stock liquidity. The sample comprises 583 firm-year
observations to which the auditor designation rule is applied. We use FACTOR and the
scores for single factors extracted from the three liquidity variables - LOT, ZERO, and
ROLL - as the dependent variables. We include industry- and year-fixed effects based
on the two-digit SIC code, but we do not report the coefficients. The table reports the
OLS coefficient estimates and t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are
clustered by firm. We present the p-values for tests of differences in coefficient
magnitudes across the groups. The p-value is obtained from the t-statistics of separate
interaction terms for group identity in a pooled model. See Table 1 for variable
definitions.
(Panel A) Audit risk criteria
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Rationale for auditor designation

Delay in auditor selection
Industry restructuring
Insufficient separation of ownership and management
Voluntary designation
Questionable auditor change
Excess loans to related parties
Excessive reliance on debt
Accounting enforcement action
Trading on administrative post
Violation of the Security Trading Act

Client risk
Low

High

(Panel B) Results based on client risk

Dependent var. = FACTOR
Parameter
Intercept
BN
NB
BB
NN
SIZE
LEV
ATURN
ROA
SGROW
QUICK
RETVAR
Year
Industry
adj.R2
#Obs.

(1)
Low risk

(2)
High risk

Coef.
t-stat.
0.427
0.08
-0.060
-0.37
0.176
0.76
0.258
1.21
0.095
0.43
0.022
0.13
-0.596
-0.70
-0.034
-0.15
0.772
1.03
-0.072
-0.23
-0.045
-0.69
-17.185
-1.14
Yes
Yes
0.161
184

44

Coef.
t-stat.
7.121
3.61
-0.132
-0.94
-0.403
-2.64
-0.232
-1.75
-0.287
-1.18
-0.208
-3.51
-0.263
-0.94
-0.061
-0.61
0.038
0.10
-0.339
-2.14
0.106
2.98
-26.485
-2.90
Yes
Yes
0.225
399

Difference
(1)-(2)
Diff.
p-value
-6.695
0.06
0.072
0.80
0.578
0.06
0.490
0.04
0.382
0.22
0.230
0.05
-0.333
0.61
0.027
0.91
0.734
0.50
0.267
0.52
-0.152
0.09
9.300
0.57

Table 7
The effect of auditor specialty on the relation between auditor switch and stock
liquidity
This table reports the regression results for the auditor specialty effect on the relation
between auditor switch type and stock liquidity. The sample comprises 4,850 firm-year
observations between 2001 and 2005, for which period audit fee data are publicly
available. We regard an audit firm as an industry specialist when its audit fee revenue is
the highest within an industry based on the two-digit SIC code. We use FACTOR and
the scores for single factors extracted from the three liquidity variables - LOT, ZERO,
and ROLL - as the dependent variables. We include industry- and year-fixed effects
based on the two-digit SIC code, but we do not report the coefficients. The table reports
the OLS coefficient estimates and t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are
clustered by firm. See Table 1 for variable definitions.
Dependent var. = FACTOR
Parameter
Intercept
SWITCH
SN (Specialist to Non-specialist)
NS (Non-specialist to Specialist)
SS (Specialist to Specialist)
NN (Non-specialist to Non-specialist)
SIZE
LEV
ATURN
ROA
SGROW
QUICK
RETVAR
Year
Industry
adj.R2
#Obs.

(1)
Coef.
t-stat.
6.662
18.07
0.113
3.07

-0.248
0.230
0.001
-0.713
-0.081
-0.031
-15.206
Yes
Yes
0.191
4,850

45

-18.68
1.96
0.03
-4.83
-1.86
-3.37
-11.25

(2)
Coef.
t-stat.
6.669
18.05
0.280
0.048
-0.139
0.103
-0.248
0.228
0.000
-0.712
-0.081
-0.031
-15.250
Yes
Yes
0.191
4,850

2.81
0.59
-0.74
2.49
-18.66
1.95
0.01
-4.84
-1.87
-3.39
-11.27