KU Leuven

Engineering Science Faculty

Chemical Engineering Department

T2 Laboratories, INC. Incident

Abdelrahman Abdelkader
Petra Janska
Serkan Yildiz
Stijn Beeckmans
Thomas Bollen

May 31st, 2015

Abstract
Florida USA, December 2007. The T2 laboratories INC., a local producer of a chemical used as gasoline
antiknock additive, exploded. According to investigations, the explosion was caused by a problem with
the cooling water. This report tracks the incident roots, trying to practise and apply current
regulations and legislations.
First, identification of the chemical substances involved in the process are handled. A CLP hazard
identification is presented associated with the REACH regulations.
Through a systematic qualitative HAZOP study, possible risk scenarios and causes are identified.
Possible counter actions, that could have been taken to avoid such scenarios, are also stated.
Because the company was dealing with a dangerous reactive solvent, a research study needs to be
carried out to look for alternative solvents. Experiments are to be executed, to study the compatibility
of the alternative solvents with the process. Introduced in this report are the regulations and
procedures required to search for such a solvent.
The Seveso directives purpose is to be a reference for dangerous processes and substances. In this
report, these regulations are introduced and applied on the T2 laboratories situation.
For processes carried out under pressure and involving exothermic chemical reactions, explosion
hazards become more likely to occur. ATEX regulations are applied to have sufficient understanding in
these processes and take the required measurements for safe operation.

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Table of Contents
Abstract...................................................................................................................................... 2
List of figures.............................................................................................................................. 3
List of tables............................................................................................................................... 3
Introduction................................................................................................................................ 4
Description CLP hazards and REACH obligations........................................................................5
CLP hazards related to involved substances........................................................................... 5
Sodium................................................................................................................................. 5
Methylcyclopentadiene........................................................................................................ 5
Diethylene glycol dimethyl ether (diglyme).........................................................................5
Hydrogen............................................................................................................................. 5
Mineral oil............................................................................................................................ 6
REACH obligations related to involved substances.................................................................6
Risk assessment analysis........................................................................................................... 7
Handling the Reactive Solvents and Risk Assessment.............................................................10
SEVESO Directive..................................................................................................................... 11
ATEX......................................................................................................................................... 13
Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 14
Bibliography............................................................................................................................. 15

List of figures
Figure 1: T2 reactor classified into zones according to ATEX....................................................14

List of tables
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:

HAZOP study................................................................................................................. 7
Main Seveso directive categories................................................................................ 11
Other Seveso directive categories.............................................................................. 12
Chemical substances amounts in the site...................................................................12
Results from the summation rule................................................................................ 12
Chemical species involved classified according to ATEX.............................................13

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Introduction
Chemical industry becomes more and more crucial to modern society. Yet this industry requires the
use and processing of dangerous substances. They may become harmful to humans, animals and the
surrounding environment if they are not properly handled and processed. Also, these incidents can
cause huge economic loss.
For safe handling and processing of these substances a lot of research and studies needs to be carried
out. Regulations are required to have an intrinsically safe process and to reduce the impact of
incidents in case they occur.
CLP and REACH are examples of such regulations. Databanks are composed to collect information
about chemical substances those were studied earlier and regulations were established for safe
handling and processing.
Process design needs to be intrinsically safe and counter hazard measurements needs to be considered.
Therefore risk scenarios need to be assessed, based on the knowledge of process nature and design, to
eliminate it or at least take sufficient counter measurements. These eliminations can be done by using
other substances or other techniques. If it seems that an intrinsically dangerous process design is nonreplaceable, additional process control strategies and layers of defence should be applied to assure
safety.
Seveso directive is a reference for handling dangerous substances in a safe way. Its always important,
as well as obligatory, to consult it while performing the safety study regarding a chemical plant. ATEX
regulations are another example for these references. They are specialized in dealing with explosive
environments. ATEX regulations classify processes into zones according to their explosion
probabilities.

Page | 4

Description CLP hazards and REACH obligations

In chemical engineering, it is important to know the hazards of the substances. This section describes
the CLP hazards and REACH obligations related to the substances involved in the incident. The CLP
hazards are discussed by using GHS.

The information can be retrieved from the website of the

European Chemicals Agency ECHA per compound [1]. The incident happened in the batch reactor
which was producing the first intermediate, sodium methylcyclopentadiene. The substances to be
discussed are respectively sodium, methylcyclopentadiene, diethylene glycol dimethyl ether (diglyme),
hydrogen and mineral oil. The end product Sodium methylcyclopentadiene and the first intermediate
sodium methylcyclopentadiene will not be discussed because they are not included in the CLP
databank.

CLP hazards related to involved substances

This subsection describes a short overview of the CLP hazards of the substances involved in the
incident.

Sodium
o
o

Signal word: Danger

Hazard statements:
- H260, category 1: In contact with water releases flammable gases which may ignite
spontaneously (Physical hazard)
- H314, category 1B: Causes severe skin burns and eye damage (Health hazard)
Additional labelling requirement:
- EUH014: Reacts violently with water

Methylcyclopentadiene
o
o

Signal word: Danger

Hazard statements:
- H226, category 3: Flammable liquid and vapour (Physical hazard)
- H304, category 1: May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways (Health hazard)
- H315, category 2: Causes skin irritation (Health hazard)
- H319, category 2: Causes serious eye irritation (Health hazard)
- H332, category 4: Harmful if inhaled (Health hazard)
- H340, category 1B: May cause genetic defects <state route of exposure if it is conclusively
-

proven that no other routes of exposure cause the hazard> (Germ cell mutagenicity)
H350, category 1A: May cause cancer <state route of exposure if it is conclusively proven that

no other routes of exposure cause the hazard> (Carcinogenicity)

H400, category 1: Very toxic to aquatic life (Environmental hazard)
H410, category 1: Very toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects (Environmental hazard)

Diethylene glycol dimethyl ether (diglyme)

o
o

Signal word: Danger

Hazard statements:
- H226, category 3: Flammable liquid and vapour (Physical hazard)
- H360, category 1B: May damage fertility or the unborn child <state specific effect if known >
<state route of exposure if it is conclusively proven that no other routes of exposure cause the
hazard>. Specific effect: embryotoxicity, damage of testes (Reproductive toxicity)
Page | 5

Additional labelling requirement:

- EUH019: May form explosive peroxides

Hydrogen
o
o

Signal word: Danger

Hazard statements:
- H220, category 1: Extremely flammable gas (Physical hazard)
- H280: Contains gas under pressure; may explode if heated (Physical hazard)

Mineral oil
If viscosity 20.5 mm/s at 40C:
o
o

Signal word: Danger

Hazard statements:
- H304, category 1: May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways (Health hazard)

REACH obligations related to involved substances

Every compound involved in the incident can be seen as substances used by end users because sodium,
methylcyclopentadiene, diglyme, hydrogen and mineral oil are not placed in the market by T2
laboratories. The REACH obligations are equal for every substance and will be discussed in general.
Hydrogen is a pre-registered substance, unlike the other compounds.
Following the REACH regulation, the user has to fulfil the end users obligations. This is a very wide
range of obligations.
o

Apply suitable risk management measures (RMMs) and operational conditions (OC) proposed in
(extended) safety data sheet (ext-SDS) or other information received from your supplier to control

o
o
o

the risks identified.

Contact your supplier with any information of nonconformity with the given RMMs or OC.
Check compliance with exposure scenarios (ESs) attached to SDS received from your supplier.
Note that according to Article 37 (2) you have a right to inform the supplier about your use of the

substance, in case it is not identified in SDS.

Decide on which actions to take if you use the substance or mixture outside the exposure scenario
communicated by your supplier. In this respect, you may decide to make your own Chemical Safety

Report (CSR) and to report to ECHA according to Article 38.

If the substance on its own, in a mixture or in an article requires an authorisation before use, it
should be stated in the SDS or in other communication from your supplier. If an authorisation has
been granted ensure that it covers your use(s), check if you comply with the authorisation
conditions and report to ECHA the use of the substance under the authorisation of an actor up the

supply chain.
Communicate to your suppliers any new or additional information on the hazards of substances
when new information becomes available to you

This are the most important end users obligations, which cover a wide range of obligations.
The user also has to comply with the restriction listed in Annex XVII to the REACH regulation. If you
are a manufacturer of a substance, you are obliged to follow with any restriction on the manufacture,
placing on the market and use of substances as set out in Annex XVII. This Annex covers the
restrictions adopted since 1976 in the framework of the Limitations Directive (Directive 76/769/EEC).
Page | 6

The supplier of the substances must always include information about the substance supplied is being
subjected to restriction in the SDS. Without a SDS, the supplier has to give the information on
restriction separately. If the restriction is a prohibition on use, you have to stop using the compound by
the date specified in Annex XVII. If the restriction takes another form, compare the conditions of the
restrictions, as set out in SDS or other information you receive from your supplier, with your
conditions of use, your RMMs, and the mixtures or articles the user produces. The company is obliged
to check the updated version of Annex XVII to see if substance has been put into the Annex which may
causes some limitations for manufacture, placing on market, etc.
Lastly, the company has to report all his uses subject to authorisation. This means that the user
needs to notify ECHA of the use of a substance under the authorisation of an actor up the supply
chain. The expiration date is three months after the first delivery of the substance after authorisation
was granted.

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Risk assessment analysis

Hazard and risk assessment are extremely important especially in reactive system. Typically it should
predict the possible deviations from the normal operation parameters and suggest required actions.
Many systematics studies can be used, HAZOP study is one of the efficient risk assessment studies.
Table 1 offers a HAZOP study carried out on the batch reactor using the following set of key words,
A. NO
C. LESS
on the following set of parameters,

B. MORE
D. REVERSE

Reactant 1: methylcyclopentadiene
Reactant 2: Sodium particles
Temperature

Pressure
Reaction
Mixing

Heating oil
Cooling water

According to CSB report no evidence that T2 ever performed the HAZOP was found [2].
Table 1: HAZOP study

HAZOP Worksheet
Process unit: Sodium methylcyclopentadiene - Batch reactor
Key
Possible
Possible
No. wor
Deviation
Required actions
Causes
consequences
d
Blockage of
No
No reaction
A.1
Pipe cleaning
filling pipe
methylcyclop
take place,
entadiene in
Heat stress on
A.2
Pump failure
Pump fixing
the reactor
heating coil

No Sodium in
the reactor

A.3

Problem with
heating fluid
NO

A.4

A.5

No heating
for reactants

A.6

A.7

A.8

Operator error

No cooling
for reactor

Heating
control system
failure (CV,
TIC)
Problem with
cooling water
Cooling
control system
failure (CV,
TIC)
Cooling water
pipe blockage

Desired
reaction don't
take place,
Other possible
reactions,
Undesired
products
Sodium
particles don't
melt, Desired
reaction don't
take place.
Possible erosion
to reactor
body/agitator
Reaction
overheating,
Reactor over
pressure, Run
away reaction,
Explosion
hazard

Standard method for

adding Sodium

Heating fluid (TI)

Check reactor
TIC/Heating system
CV
Secondary cooling
system
Check reactor
TIC/Cooling system CV
Pipe cleaning,
installing a net
(depending on water
source)
Page | 8

MORE

HAZOP Worksheet
Process unit: Sodium methylcyclopentadiene - Batch reactor
Key
Possible
Possible
No. wor
Deviation
Required actions
Causes
consequences
d
Pump indicator, Stand
Cooling water
A.9
by pump,
pump failure
Reactor quenching [3]
A.1
Agitator drive
Poor mixing of
Drive indicator
0
failure
reactants,
No mixing for
Lower reaction
Agitator
the reactants
A.1
Blades check
rate, Lower
blades
1
(while cleaning)
conversion
damage
A.1
No reaction
No conversion,
A.1
A.1
2
take place
No product
More reactants,
More
More heat
methylcyclop
B.1
LI failure
generation,
Check reactor LI
entadiene in
More H2 gas,
the reactor
Higher pressure
More reactants,
More heat
More Sodium
Standard method for
B.2
Operator error
generation,
in the reactor
adding Sodium
More H2 gas,
Higher pressure
Higher
temperature,
Heating
Higher reaction
Check reactor
More heating control system
B.3
rate, High
TIC/Heating system
for reactants
failure (CV,
pressure,
CV
TIC)
Possible run
away reaction
Lower
Cooling
temperature,
More cooling
control system
Check reactor
B.4
Lower reaction
for reactor
failure (CV,
TIC/Cooling system CV
rate, Lower
TIC)
conversion
More
methylcyclope
B.5
Check reactor LI
ntadiene in
Higher
the reactor
temperature,
More Sodium
Standard method for
More
Higher reaction
B.6
in
the
reactor
adding Sodium
temperature
rate, High
in the reactor
pressure,
Check less cooling
B.7
Less cooling
Possible run
scenario
away reaction
Check reactor
B.8
More heating
TIC/Heating system
CV
B.9
More
B.1, B.2, B.3,
Explosion
B.1, B.2, B.3, C.4-5.
pressure in
C.4-5
hazard
Good designed PSV
the reactor
Reactor quenching1,
PIC [3]

1 Reactor quench can be by addition of cold water or dumping the reactor content in a tank
underneath dedicated for this. This can be controlled with an on/off valve controlled by
reactor pressure.
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HAZOP Worksheet
Process unit: Sodium methylcyclopentadiene - Batch reactor
Key
Possible
Possible
No. wor
Deviation
Required actions
Causes
consequences
d
Pressure
Check reactor
B.1
control system
PIC/Pressure system
3
failure (CV,
CV
PIC)
More heat
generation,
B.1
More reaction
B.3, B.5-8
More pressure,
B.3, B.5-8
4
conversion
Possible run
away reaction
Less
methylcyclop
Less reactants,
C.1
LI failure
Check reactor LI
entadiene in
Less production
the reactor
Less Sodium
in the reactor

Operator error

C.3

Less heating
for reactants

Heating
control system
failure (CV,
TIC)

C.4

LESS

C.2

Less cooling
for reactor

Cooling
control system
failure (CV,
TIC)
Mineral scale
formation

C.5

Less reactants,
Lower
conversion
Lower
temperature,
Lower reaction
rate, Lower
conversion
Higher
temperature,
Higher reaction
rate, Higher
pressure,
Possible run
away reaction

Standard method for

adding Sodium
Check reactor
TIC/Heating system
CV
Check reactor
TIC/Cooling system CV
Cooling water pipe
cleaning, Addition of
anti-scale formation

C.1, C.2, C.3,

B.4

Lower
temperature,
Lower reaction
rate, Lower
conversion

C.1, C.2, C.3, B.4

C.7

Less pressure
in the reactor

Pressure
control system
failure (CV,
PIC)

No right
conditions for
reaction

Check reactor
PIC/Pressure system
CV

C.8

Less reaction
conversion

B.4, C.2, C.3,

C.6

D.1

D.2
D.3
D.4

REVERSE

C.6

Less
temperature
in the reactor

Reverse
agitator
direction
Reverse flow
of cooling
water

Reverse
electrical
connection
Check valve
reversely
installed
A.6-8
Vaporized
water
pressure build

Less product,
Different
compositions
Less mixing
efficiency,
Lower reaction
rate, Lower
conversion
Higher
temperature,
Higher reaction
rate, Higher
pressure,
Possible run
away reaction

B.4, C.2, C.3, C.6

Visual check of
agitator direction
Reverse check valve
installation
A.6-8
Vaporized water vent
cleaning
Page | 10

HAZOP Worksheet
Process unit: Sodium methylcyclopentadiene - Batch reactor
Key
Possible
Possible
No. wor
Deviation
Required actions
Causes
consequences
d
up
D.5

A.9

A.9

Page | 11

Handling the Reactive Solvents and Risk Assessment

Diethylene glycol dimethyl ether (diglyme) solvent used to produce methylcyclopetadiene manganese
tricarbonyl (MCMT) is found by CSB to be the cause led to the explosion in T2 laboratories. The main
cause for that was explained with the lack of cooling and resulting in a temperature rise within the
reactor [2].
Working with reactive hazards requires serious information and precautions beforehand. To prevent
such an unfortunate incident the following actions must be done;
-

Inventory (identification) of the hazards (consult SDS)

Obtain conditions of use and/ or storage
Determine exposure routes
Suggest and implement preventive measures
Perform risk analysis

Process hazard analysis (PHA) in the development phase helps to establish limits and operating
strategies to prevent runway reactions. Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) is a type of PHA which
would have identified the need to test for thermodynamic and kinetic nature of the reaction and also
the limits for pressure and cooling. CSB found out T2 laboratories never performed the HAZOP.
Another risk present was the fact that the operating temperature for producing MCMT in the reactor
and the decomposition temperature of diglyme were dangerously close, approximately 176 and
198.90C respectively [4]. The risk of the runaway exothermic reaction which led to a rapid rise in
temperature and pressure should have been taken more seriously.
If the solvent were not to be replaced, risk assessment has to be done thoroughly. All the aspects and
possibilities must be identified and taken into account, also the counter measures to both prevent and
stop if an unexpected reaction takes place. Because of the stated disadvantages of diglyme, searching
for another solvent is plausible. The solvent should give the same results as diglyme regarding the
production, but with less and beforehand known hazards. Therefore, a complete risk assessment can
be done in the following steps [5]
-

Identify chemicals to be used and circumstances of use

Consult sources of information
Evaluate type of physical, flammable, explosive, or reactive hazard(s) posed by the chemicals
Evaluate the hazards posed by chemical changes over the course of the experiment
Evaluate type of physical hazard(s) posed by the equipment required
Select appropriate procedures to minimize risk
Prepare for contingencies

Page | 12

SEVESO Directive
The Seveso directive is an EU legislation that is named after the catastrophic accident in the Italian
town of Seveso. It defines itself as: This Directive lays down rules for the prevention of major
accidents which involve dangerous substances, and the limitation of their consequences for human
health and the environment, with a view to ensuring a high level of protection throughout the Union in
a consistent and effective manner [6].
In Table 2 , the lower and upper tier requirements of chemical substances [7] involved in the process
are given. The Annexs Hazard categories are in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 [8]. In
this table only the main Seveso category, defined by CLP databank of ECHA [9], can be found.
Table 2: Main Seveso directive categories

Dangerous
Substances

Sodium

Methylcyclopentad
iene

Diglyme

Hazard categories

O2) Substances and mixtures which

in contact with water emit flammable
gases, Category 1
P5b) FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS
Flammable liquids Category 2 or 3
where particular processing
conditions, such as high pressure or
high temperature, may create majoraccident hazards
P5b) FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS
Flammable liquids Category 2 or 3
where particular processing
conditions, such as high pressure or
high temperature, may create majoraccident hazards

Hydrogen

15.) Hydrogen

Lowertier
requirem
ents
(tonnes)

Uppertier
requirem
ents
(tonnes)

100

500

50

200

50

200

50

However, since the individual amount of dangerous substances available at the site is less than the
lower-tier requirement, the following summation rule has to be applied:

Qi 1, i=different substances
i

With:

qi = available quantity of dangerous substance i at the site

Qi = quantity of dangerous substance i for lower-tier requirement
This rule must be used to assess the health, physical and environmental hazards. This means it must
be applied three times. Therefore, not only the main Seveso category is needed, all the related
categories need to be known. These are to be found in Table 3 Note that for the Seveso directive,
mixtures must be treated in the same way as pure substances. So the fact that all substances are
Page | 13

mixed in reactor is not important. Also, the mineral oil is not taken into the Seviso-directe. The oil is
hazardous for aquatic environment, but is in category Chronic 3 and Annex I only treats Chronic 1&2.

Page | 14

Table 3: Other Seveso directive categories

Dangerous
Substances

Sodium,
Methylcyclopentadi
ene, Diglyme
Sodium
Methylcyclopentadi
ene

Hazard categories

H3 STOT SPECIFIC TARGET ORGAN

TOXICITY SINGLE EXPOSURE STOT
SE Category 1

Lowertier
requirem
ents
(tonnes)

Uppertier
requirem
ents
(tonnes)

50

200

10

50

100

200

P2 FLAMMABLE GASES Flammable

gases, Category 1 or 2
E1 Hazardous to the Aquatic
Environment in Category Acute 1 or
Chronic 1

Article 2 [6] describes the scope of the Seveso directive. The T2 laboratory is not part of the summation
of establishments to who the directive does not apply. This means it must apply to establishments as
defined in Article 3. Establishments are either lower-tier establishments or upper-tier establishments,
depending on the available amount of dangerous substance at the site. The exact data of available
amount of substances at the site is difficult to be found, therefore there is made an estimation:
The batch reactor has a volume of 2,450 gallon (9.27m). According to the article, the reaction is filled
for two-third. One-third is kept free for gas. In addition, the article presents a possible distribution of
feed necessary for one batch.
But not only is the amount of substances in the batch required. The total amount present at the site is
required, so also the amount stored. Assuming the substances are present in fivefold of what is needed
for one batch, the amount present in the site are found in Table 4.
Table 4: Chemical substances amounts at the site

Substance
sodium
MCDP dimer
Diglyme
total

Amount (tonnes)
2.97
12.26
12.08
27.30

Hydrogen is not taken up in the table, because it is present at such small values that it is negligible.
Also Annex I quotes this: Dangerous substances present at an establishment only in quantities equal
to or less than 2 % of the relevant qualifying quantity shall be ignored. The results of applying the
summation rules are to found in Table 5. Notice that for fivefold, none of the hazards is equal or bigger
than one. Starting from a storage of sevenfold, the Physical hazard reach the Seveso-directive lower
limit.
A final conclusion concerning the Seveso directive is to be found in the general conclusion at the end of
the report.
Table 5: Results from the summation rule

Type of Hazard

Summation result

Summation result

2 Specific target organ toxicity

Page | 15

fivefold
Health
Physical
Environmental

0.55
0.78
0.12

sevenfold
0.7644
1.10
0.17

Important note: The end product is not taken into account because for this component, there was no
data available in the CLP databank. However, in case the amount of end product could be included, the
lower limit would be reached more readily.

ATEX
The ATEX directive consists of two EU directives describing what equipment and work environment is
allowed in an environment with an explosive atmosphere [10]. Hazardous areas are classified into
zones based on an assessment of the frequency of the occurrence and duration of an explosive gas
atmosphere, as follows:

Zone 0: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is present continuously or for long periods
Zone 1: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is likely to occur in normal operation
Zone 2: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is not likely to occur in normal operation
and, if it occurs, will only exist for a short time [11].

In the process described in 'T2 incident paper' following reaction occurs:

Methylcyclopentadiene

SodiumSodium methylcyclo-pentadiene
Hydrogen

Chemical species involved in process could be characterise from ATEX point of view as is described in
Table 6.
Table 6: Chemical species involved classified according to ATEX

Chemical species
Methylcyclopentadiene
(reactant)
Sodium (reactant)

Classification
Flammable / explosive vapours, ATEX guidelines are applicable
It is not in a powder form neither gas/vapour, not considered for
ATEX

Hydrogen (by-product)

Explosive gas, ATEX guidelines are applicable

Diglyme (solvent)

Flammable / explosive vapours, ATEX guidelines are applicable

Mineral oil

It is not in a powder form neither gas/vapour, not considered for

ATEX

Identified zones are depicted in Figure 1. Red color covers ZONE 0 in which is a reactor and hydrogen
vent pipe because there is permanent or very often occurrence of explosive mixture. Yellow color
denotes ZONE 2 in which is a safety vent pipe with rupture disk, explosive mixture is not likely to
occur there under normal operation conditions.

Page | 16

Figure 1: T2 reactor classified into zones according to ATEX

Conclusion
The CLP hazards give an idea of the behaviour and hazards of the involved substances at the T2
laboratories. These hazards include a broad spectrum of consequences. Health, Physical and
Environmental hazards are present. Subsequently, the REACH obligations concerning these
substances are discussed. Next, a Risk assessment analysis is executed using the HAZOP study.
Thereafter, the solvent issue is discussed. The used solvent was not ideal due to the low decomposition
temperature of diglyme and the exothermic reaction this causes. There is presented which steps to
take when searching for a new suitable solvent.
For the Seveso-directive, there is concluded that substances are taken up in the Seveso-directive. The
establishment is subjected to the Seveso-directive in case a sevenfold or more of necessary substances
for one batch is stored. To finish, the ATEX directives are argued. The ATEX guidelines are applicable
to the establishment. The different zones are identified on the sketch of the reactor.

Page | 17

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1. ECHA, 2015. Retrieved from ECHA Europe: http://www.echa.europa.eu/
2. T2 Laboratories, INC. Run away reaction. CSB, 2009.
3. HSE, 2010. http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/sragtech/techmeasquench.htm. Retrieved from
Health and safety excutive, UK.
4. The intergration of process safety into chemical industry, Kinetic modeling of the T2
incident. Willey, Ronald J. 2010.
5. Prudent Practices in the Laboratory: Handling and Management of Chemical Hazards, 2011.
Washington (DC): National Research Council (US) Committee on Prudent Practices in
the Laboratory.
6. Article 1,2&3. SEVESO III, 2012.
7. Annex I. SEVESOIII, 2012.
8. European Commission Regulations, 2008.
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/documents/classification/index_en.htm
#h2-1.
9. ECHA, CLP databank, 2015. http://echa.europa.eu/information-on-chemicals/cl-inventorydatabase?p_p_id=clinventory_WAR. Retrieved from ECHA.
10. ATEX directive, EC, 2014.
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/mechanical/atex/index_en.htm. Retrieved from
European Commission:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/mechanical/atex/index_en.htm
11. Course material, 2015. Boogaerts, G.

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