G. R. Nos.

102009-10,July 6, 1994
People vs. Rolando De Gracia

FACTS:
The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d'
etat staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by the
Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAMSFP)

against

the

Government.

At

that

time,

various

government

establishments and military camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded

by the rightist group with their "tora-tora" planes. At around midnight of
November 30, 1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines
occupied Villamor Air Base, while the Scout Rangers took over the
Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and
Channel 4, the government television station. Also, some elements of the
Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills
Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila.
That on or about the 5th day of DECEMBER, 1989, in QUEZON
CITY, METRO MANILA, PHILIPPINES, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
and without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in their possession,
custody and control, the following to wit:
Five

(5)

bundles

of

C-4

or

dynamites

Six (6) cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 each

One hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV bombs
without first securing the necessary license and/or permit to
possess the same from the proper authorities, and armed with
said dynamites, ammunition and explosives and pursuant to
their conspiracy heretofore agreed upon by them and

prompted by common designs, come to an agreement and

decision to commit the crime of rebellion, by then and there
participating therein and publicly taking arms against the duly
constituted authorities, for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, disrupting and
jeopardizing its activities and removing from its allegiance the
territory of the Philippines or parts thereof.
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11756, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson,
Lamberto Bicus, Rodolfo Tor and several John Does were charged with
attempted homicide allegedly committed on December 1, 1989 in Quezon
City upon the person of Crispin Sagario who was shot and hit on the right
thigh.
Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of
rebellion, but was acquitted of attempted homicide.
As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching
team composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt.
Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry
Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office.
They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five
bundles

of

C-4

dynamites,

M-shells

of

different

calibers,

and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col.
Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar
Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw appellant De
Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously
peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only person then present
inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also
found. As a result of the raid, the team arrested appellant, as well as
Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar
building. They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of
the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No
search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to

them, at that time there was so much disorder considering that the
nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and
there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office,
aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed. The group
was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr.
Gutierrez and that appellant is supposedly a "boy" therein.
Appellant Rolando de Gracia gave another version of the incident. First, he
claims that on November 30, 1989, he was in Antipolo to help in the
birthday party of Col. Matillano. He denies that he was at the Eurocar
Sales Office on December 1, 1989. Second, he contends that when the
raiding team arrived at the Eurocar Sales Office on December 5, 1989, he
was inside his house, a small nipa hut which is adjacent to the building.
According to him, he was tasked to guard the office of Col. Matillano which
is located at the right side of the building. He denies, however, that he
was inside the room of Col. Matillano when the raiding team barged in and
that he had explosives in his possession. He testified that when the
military raided the office, he was ordered to get out of his house and
made to lie on the ground face down, together with "Obet" and "Dong"
who were janitors of the building. He avers that he does not know
anything about the explosives and insists that when they were asked to
stand up, the explosives were already there.
Appellant stated that he visited Col. Matillano in 1987 at the stockade of
the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP), and that
he knew Matillano was detained because of the latter's involvement in the
1987coup d' etat. In July, 1989, appellant again went to see Matillano
because he had no job. Col. Matillano then told him that he could stay in
the PC-INP stockade and do the marketing for them. From that time until
his arrest at the Eurocar office, appellant worked for Matillano.
De Gracia believes that the prosecution witnesses were moved to testify
against him because "bata raw ako ni Col. Matillano eh may atraso daw sa

kanila si Col. Matillano kaya sabi nila ito na lang bata niya ang ipitin
natin."
ISSUES:
I.

The first issue to be resolved is whether or not intent to possess

is an essential element of the offense punishable under
Presidential Decree No. 1866 and, if so, whether appellant De
Gracia did intend to illegally possess firearms and ammunition.

II.

Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case.

RULING:
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession
which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive
possession

or

the

subjection

of

the

thing

to

one's

control

and

management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be

effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law
penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be
its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the
proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever.
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to
convict a person for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an
intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes
significance since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum
prohibitum punished by a special law, in which case good faith and
absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit
the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent
to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the
crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person
may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend

to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime
itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal
intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the
prohibited act is done freely and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent
and intent to possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is
sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must
still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on
the part of the accused.

11

Such intent to possess is, however, without

regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may
have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the
intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found
guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no
authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess
the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without
criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or
control of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute
prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential
Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive
possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no
offense committed.
Coming now to the case before the court, there is no doubt in its mind
that appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty of having intentionally possessed
several firearms, explosives and ammunition without the requisite license
or authority therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically
testified that he was the first one to enter the Eurocar Sales Office when
the military operatives raided the same, and he saw De Gracia standing in
the room and holding the several explosives marked in evidence as

Exhibits D to D-4. At first, appellant denied any knowledge about the

explosives. Then, he alternatively contended that his act of guarding the
explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano does not constitute illegal
possession thereof because there was no intent on his part to possess the
same, since he was merely employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano.
His pretension of impersonal or indifferent material possession does not
and cannot inspire credence.
Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a case
to case basis, taking into consideration the prior and coetaneous acts of
the accused and the surrounding circumstances. What exists in the realm
of thought is often disclosed in the range of action. It is not controverted
that appellant De Gracia is a former soldier, having served with the
Philippine Constabulary prior to his separation from the service for going
on

absence

without

leave

(AWOL). We do not hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude that he is

familiar with and knowledgeable about the dynamites, "molotov" bombs,
and various kinds of ammunition which were confiscated by the military
from his possession. As a former soldier, it would be absurd for him not to
know anything about the dangerous uses and power of these weapons.
A fortiori, he cannot feign ignorance on the import of having in his
possession

such

large

quantity

of

explosives

and

ammunition.

Furthermore, the place where the explosives were found is not a military
camp or office, nor one where such items can ordinarily but lawfully be
stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal or armory. Even an ordinarily prudent
man would be put on guard and be suspicious if he finds articles of this
nature in a place intended to carry out the business of selling cars and
which has nothing to do at all, directly or indirectly, with the trade of
firearms and ammunition.
On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, it is apparent, the SC hold, that
appellant De Gracia actually intended to possess the articles confiscated
from his person.

G.R. No. 125754, December 22, 1999

People vs. Bolasa

FACTS:
An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert
Carizon in the early evening of 11 September 1995 that a man and a
woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house in Sta. Brigida
St., Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. PO3 Salonga and PO3 Carizon
together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas immediately proceeded to the house
of the suspects and parked their car some three hundred (300) meters

away. They walked towards their quarry's lair accompanied this time by
their unnamed informer. When they reached the house they "peeped
(inside) through a small window and x x x saw one man and a woman
repacking suspected marijuana."[1] They entered the house and introduced
themselves as police officers to the occupants and thereupon confiscated
the tea bags and some drug paraphernalia. They arrested the two (2) who
turned out to be the accused Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan and Roberto
delos Reyes. Subsequent examination of the tea bags by NBI Forensic
Chemist Rubie Calalo confirmed the suspicion that the tea bags contained
marijuana.

ISSUE:
Whether vor not the arrest of Zenaida Bolasa and the search
preceeded by it was illegal.

RULING:
The Supreme Court sustained the appeal. This case clearly illustrates
how constitutional guarantees against illegal arrests and seizures can be
violated by overzealous police officers in the arrest of suspected drug
offenders. Thus, after a meticulous evaluation of the evidence at hand,
this Court finds itself with no other recourse but to strike down the process
adopted

by

the

prosecution

and

acquit

accused-appellants

for

insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt.

Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution provides The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined

personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its
citizens

as

constitutional

well

as

into

provision

their

sheathes

houses,
the

papers

private

and

effects. The

individual

with

an

impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and seizures. It

protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful
arrests and other forms of restraint, and prevents him from being
irreversibly "cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of
the most unhappy in some measure agreeable.
For sure, this constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition
against all searches and seizures as it obviously operates only against
searches and seizures that are "unreasonable. Thus, arrests and seizures
in the following instances are not deemed unreasonable and are thus
allowed even in the absence of a warrant 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in plain view. The elements are: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where
they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain
view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when
its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[6]
An arrest is lawful even in the absence of a warrant: (a) when the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about
to commit an offense in his presence; (b) when an offense has in fact been
committed and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and, (c) when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
[7]

A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous

weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of

the offense.[8]
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not
fall under any of the above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest
is illegal. First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at
the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just committed, were
committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did
they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants
committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have
escaped from a penal establishment.
Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First,
there was no valid intrusion. As already discussed, accused-appellants
were illegally arrested. Second, the evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on
found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently discovered. The police
officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and

ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the room. In like

manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving
vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop and
frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for
the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should
have conducted first a surveillance considering that the identities and
address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. After
conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable
cause for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search
warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being
illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every
evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against
accused-appellants;[9] hence,

their

acquittal

must

follow

in

faithful

obeisance to the fundamental law.

Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales and National Telecommunications

Commission,
G.R. No. 168338,
February 15, 2008
FACTS:
As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci
compact

disc

audiotapes

involving

wiretapped mobile

phone

conversation

between

then-President

Gloria

Arroyo

and

Comelec

Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales

warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those
broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the AntiWiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said
tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody.
Finally, he stated that he had ordered the National Bureau of Investigation
to go after media organizations found to have caused the spread, the
playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.
Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio
stations and TV network owners/operators that the conditions of the
authorization and permits issued to them by government like the
Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that
they shall not use their stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false
information or willful misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the
continuous airing or broadcast of the Hello Garci taped conversations by
radio and TV stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law
and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of
Authority. It warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information
and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to
the said media establishments.
Subsequently,

dialogue

was

held

between

the

NTC

and

the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) which resulted in the

issuance of a Joint Press Statement which stated, among others, that the
supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled
responsibly.
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents
Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1.

Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping

Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the

press?
2.

Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary

and the NTC constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has
transgressed the Constitution?
RULING:
[The Court voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales,
Azcuna, Reyes and Tinga in the majority, as against JJ. Corona, ChicoNazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Velasco in the minority) in
granting the petition insofar as respondent Secretary Gonzalezs press
statement was concerned. Likewise, it voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ.
Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago,

Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio,

Austria-

Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Velasco in the majority, as

against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Tinga
in the minority) in granting the same insofar as NTCs press statement
was concerned.]
1.

NO, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping

Law will NOT justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and
of the press.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the
press based

on

content is

given

the government having the burden of

the strictest

scrutiny, with

overcoming

the

presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This

rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.

Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not
abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and
present danger test. [T]he great evil which government wants to prevent
is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping
law. The records of the case at bar however are confused and confusing,
and respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present
danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary
obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the
integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary
showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a complete
version and the other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of the
respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is
ambivalent, especially considering the tapes different versions. The
identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other
related

and

relevant

proofs

are

some

of

the

invisibles

of

this

case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even
arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
We

rule

that not

every

violation

of

law

will

justify

straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.

Our laws are of different kindsand doubtless, some of them provide norms
of conduct which[,] even if violated[,] have only an adverse effect on a
persons private comfort but does not endanger national security. There
are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without
more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free press. In
fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be
weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the
press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and
public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded
by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting
freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated
measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine

compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not
be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations
of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their
own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation
cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a
preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of
the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present
danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free
speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the
anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.
2.

YES,

the mere

press

statements of

respondents

DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of content-based prior

restraint that has transgressed the Constitution.
[I]t is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents
were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is
sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in
the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales
made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its
statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act done, such as a
speech

uttered,

for

and

on

behalf

of

the

government

in

an

official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of

an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or
official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official
order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on
prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck
down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the
right to free speech and press.

NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. vs.

HON. CEASAR G. DY
G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411
April 2, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC),
an AM radio broadcast station, and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio
broadcast station, in Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds
commenced relocation of its broadcasting station, management office,
and transmitters on propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.
On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and
Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC)
affirmed and certified that the commercial structure to be constructed
conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the location is
classified as a commercial area. The radio station was able to fully
operate

smoothly

thereafter.

In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayors

permit, City Zoning Administratior-Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to
issue zoning clearance on the grounds that petitioners were not able to
submit conversion papers showing that the agricultural land was
converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the

issuance of mayors permit but the court denied the action. In the
meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region II office
issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property
from

agricultural

to

commercial.

In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of

mayors permit, attaching the DAR Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer,
acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied the same, claiming that
it was void on the grounds that they did not have record of the DAR Order.
The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and
Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of Cauayan City, closed the
radio station. Due to the prvosion of Omnibus Election Code which
prohibits the closure of radio station during the pendency of election
period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate
before Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again by respondent Mayor
Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio station had no permit.
Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004
after

elections.

Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayors
permit

but

both

courts

denied

the

petition.

A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue

licenses and permits, and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of
the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued,
pursuant to law or ordinance. In case of Cauayan City, the authority to
require a mayors permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004,
enacted in 1993. However, nothing in the ordinance requires an
application for a mayors permit to submit either an approved land
conversion papers from DAR, showing that its property was converted
from prime agricultural land or an approved resolution from the
Sangguniang
reclassification

Bayan
of

or

Sangguniang

property

from

Panglungsod

agricultural

to

authorizing
commercial

the
land.

In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the

property

as

commercial.

Petitioners

are

also

armed

with

several

certifications stating that the property is indeed a commercial area. Also,

petitioners paid real property taxes based on the classification of property
as

commercial

without

objections

raised

by

therespondents.

Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local

government of Cauayan of the commercial character of the property
constitutes estoppels against respondents from denying the fact before
the courts. The lower courts had ruled that the government of Cauayan
City is not bound by estoppels, but petitioners classified that this concept
is understood to only refer to acts and mistakes of its official especially to
those

which

are

irregular.

ISSUE:
Whether the lower court is correct in contending that the government of
Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels on the grounds that the state is
immune against suits.

RULING:

No. While it is true that the state cannot be put in estoppels by mistake or
error

of

its

officials

or

agents,

there

is

an

exception.

Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked
except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where
they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to
protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should

be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly
require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble
part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . .,
the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public
authorities

as

well

as

against

private

individuals

Thus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or

negligence on the part of the government official whose acts are being
disowned other than the bare assertion on the part of the State, the
Supreme Court have declined to apply State immunity from estoppel.
Herein, there is absolutely no evidence other than the bare assertions of
the respondents that the Cauayan City government had previously erred
when it certified that the property had been zoned for commercial use.
The absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to
2001 certifications were incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that
respondents are estopped from asserting that the previous recognition of
the

property

as

commercial

was

wrong.

Respondents were further estopped from disclaiming the previous

consistent recognition by the Cauayan City government that the property
was commercially zoned unless they had evidence, which they had none,
that the local officials who issued such certifications acted irregularly in
doing so. It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to
even require petitioners to secure approved land conversion papers from
the DAR showing that the property was converted from prime agricultural
land

to

commercial

land.

Respondents closure of petitioners radio stations is clearly tainted with ill

motvies. Petitioners have been aggressive in exposing the widespread
election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent
Dy and his political dynasty. Such statement manifests and confirms that
respondents denial of the renewal applications on the ground that
property is commercial and merely a pretext, and their real agenda is to
remove petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latters voice. This

is

blatant

violation

of

constitutional

right

to

press

freedom.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the

Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24,
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

KMU vs. ERMITA

GR NO. 17855
October 5, 2010

FACTS:
In 2005, Executive Order No. 420 was passed. This law sought to
harmonize and streamline the countrys id system. Kilusang Mayo Uno,
Bayan Muna, and other concerned groups sought to enjoin the DirectorGeneral from implementing the EO because they allege that the said EO is
unconstitutional for it infringes upon the right to privacy of the people and
that the same is a usurpation of legislative power by the president.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said EO is unconstitutional.
HELD:
No. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to adopt
a unified multi-purpose ID system. Thus, all government entities that
issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are required to
adopt a uniform data collection and format for their IDs.
Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data
collection and format. The President may by executive or administrative
order direct the government entities under the Executive department to
adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Sec 17, Article 7 of the
1987 Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all
executive departments, bureaus and offices.

The same Section also

mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can
direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under
existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to
achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to
the public.
The Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing and
does not need any implementing legislation.

Of course, the Presidents

power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and

does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional
commissions.

Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the

COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voters ID

cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID
system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that
is compulsory for all branches of government.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance

G.R. No. 115455
August 25, 1994
FACTS:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange
of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA
7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance
its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There
are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various
grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the
Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2
distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that
S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the
Constitution
RULING:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the
Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the
revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not
only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the
enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill

would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments
but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply
means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory
that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can
be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor
does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by
the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not
pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because
the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was
because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of
printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the
certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on
separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is
supported by the weight of legislative practice.

Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of Cebu

GR NO. 95770
December 29, 1995

FACTS:

Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition

were filed and consolidated raising the same issue whether school
children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovahs
Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for
refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag
ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine
national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic
pledge.
All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from
their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute
the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as
required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by

Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag
Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955 of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
Petitioners are Jehovahs Witnesses believing that by doing these is
religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They
contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades
protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents
relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where
the Court upheld the explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a
system of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid of
religious significance and it doesnt involve any religious ceremony. The
children of Jehovahs Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in
the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover,
exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize
the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great
majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution
does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with
reasonable

and

non-discriminatory

laws,

rules

and

regulations

promulgated by competent authority.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of
religion?

RULING:
YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the
school was not justified.

Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the

amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of
man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a
two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones
belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the
realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. The only
limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present
danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right
to prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory
flag ceremony, they do not engage in external acts or behavior that
would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of
country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand
at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of
those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do
not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 153888
July 9, 2003

FACTS:
Petitioner
voluntary

is

services

a
to

non-governmental
the

Filipino

organization

people,

that

especially

to

extends
Muslim

Communities. Petitioner began to issue, for a fee, halal certifications to

qualified products and food manufacturers on account of the actual need
to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers'
request. Subsequently, Executive Order (EO) 46 was issued creating the
Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office of
Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. In this petition for
prohibition, petitioner alleged, among others, that the subject EO violates
the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of

religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of the fundamental
law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred status. Without doubt,
classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the
standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving
the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46
encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein
petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for
Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal
certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own
interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate

and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify
the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court found
no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim

organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a

product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos
can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to
issue halal certificates.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Eexecutive Order 46 violates the constitutional
provision on the separation of Church and State.

RULING:
No. In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom
of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of the
fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred status.
Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function
because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic
beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as
halal, Executive Order 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what
food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself
the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced
Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on
halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate

and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify
the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court found
no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a
product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos

can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to

issue halal certificates.

Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the

security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of
religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.
In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must
minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow
them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. In
the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to
deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right
to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of
Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the
exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion
of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing
laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring
that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption,
properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on
the religious freedom of Muslims.