Interpretation and the visual arts

by
M O R R I S WEITZ
(Brandeis University)

I n his masterly historical monograph, Lorenzo Ghiberti,l Richard

Krautheimer devotes a whole chapter t o a critical analysis of the
competition reliefs of Ghiberti and Brunelleschi (1401). The Arte
dei Mercatanti di Calimala, the richest guild in Florence a t that
time, had set as the theme of the competition The Sacrifice of
Isaac; the prize was t o be the construction of the projected new
bronze door of the Baptistry. Of the seven reliefs submitted,
only two remain, those of Ghiberti (the victor) and of Brunelleschi. Both plaques are now in the Bargello, in Florence.
Brunelleschi, Krautheimer says, treats the theme with dramatic force. The artist divides the plaque into two horizontal registers. In the upper, larger tier, Abraham rushes toward Isaac.
The boy kneels on the altar, moving away from the threatening
knife. The angel forces it back from Isaacs throat; one feels the
resistance of the surprised patriarch. Below the angel are a ram
and a cliff. Abraham, Isaac, and the ram form what appears t o be
almost an isoceles triangle.
In the lower tier are two servants, utterly unconcerned with
the main event, and an ass. All the figures are in the round.
There is no depth within the relief. Each corner of the plaque
is painstakingly filled; and the whole plaque is filled in, in a
horror vacui.
The relief, Krautheimer speculates, must have impressed its
judges and spectators as strikingly new and exciting. Though
awkward in places, it teems with the experimenters love of
______

Richard Krautheimer, in collaboration with Trude Krautheimer-Hess, Lorenzo

Ghiberti, second printing, with corrections and new preface, 2 vols. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1970. All quotations are froin Vol. 1, C h . IV, pp.
44-49.

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problems and intricate solutions. The story is told in the most

violent language, the execution of which was designed t o shock
and arouse admiration in its dramatic force.
The plaque, then, is a series of experiments. Brunelleschi
explores the nature of movement-the interplay of limbs and
body and the relation between body and garment. This spirit of
inquiry is the very essence of his design. Certain features borrowed from antiquity also obtain, employed mostly because the
figures allantica, seated, kneeling, bent and doublebent, were
bold experiments in, and useful tools for, the study of movement.
Brunelleschis is a daring, aggressive piece; this does not
necessarily make a great piece of sculpture. Indeed, the entire
relief is full of strange inconsistencies, such as the conflict between the progressive naturalism in the narrative details and the
conservative conception of the design and composition.
Nothing could be more in contrast t o Brunelleschis relief
than Ghibertis. Not only technically, in its casting and finishing,
but especially in its design and narrative. Like Brunelleschi,
Ghiberti divides the quatrefoil into two parts, but diagonally, not
horizontally. The quatrefoil, unlike Brunelleschis, serves merely
as a frame. The figures are set off against rock or placed against
carefully balanced stretches of blank ground. The pause, as it
were, has been turned into a dynamic feature of creative design.
Ghibertis figures are not frozen. Their movements hint at
depth. Abraham in a beautifully swaying, almost protective curve,
bends over his son and the boys body follows the curve of his
fathers stance. The angel above, the cloak below, continue the
movement of the patriarch, closing the half circle and completing
the rhythm of the group.. . Every gesture is sure, yet delicate and
nervous.. . Every detail aims a t supporting this melodious, yet not
prettified beauty.. . The entire drapery is lively and articulate.. .
The narrative.. . merely hints at the events. It does not present
them with Brunelleschis brutal directness. Even the servants
participate, fulfilling a role not unlike the choir in a greek tragedy, in this great drama of the Sacrifice.
Thus, for Ghiberti but not for Brunelleschi, experimentation
is not the final aim. Ghiberti strives for credibility, not for

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realism;a credibility based on the perceptive handling of a face

and body.. .. Ghibertis relief, in its complete mastery of means
is of almost uncanny perfection. It is no wonder, Krautheimer
says, that he won the much coveted prize.
Krautheimer concludes his analysis of the reliefs (in ch. v) by
inquiring into the specific formative influences on Ghibertis
contribution. He argues, again with great force, that among these
influences are the Hercules Master of the Porta della Mandorla
and the Sienese painters of the Trecento, which painters he then
traces t o Northern, and in particular French, fourteenth-century,
art. Neither Florentine silversmiths nor painters, he claims, influenced Ghiberti, as they did Brunelleschi. Ghibertis relief,
consequently, must be seen against the background of the
International Style, with its particular emphasis upon the tactile
values of volume combined with lyrical values of elegant, linear
form. To understand this first major creation of Ghiberti, then,
is t o see it as the Florentine initiation of the whole European
International Style. In Ghibertis hands, this emphasis upon lyrical decoration combined with hard, tactile realism, becomes, as
it had in others, post-Gothic and, as such, part of the development
of the early Renaissance, along with the incipient Classicism,
with its concern for harmony and idealization, of which Ghibertis
Saint Mathew (1419-22) is a superb example.
I start with Krautheimer as my text for an explication of interpretation in the visual arts not because I think his analysis is
typical or paradigmatic of art history but because it provides a
rich mine for philosophical exploration. Although this text cannot
yield generalizations about the whole of art history, it can serve,
as any undisputed example can, as a constant reminder of what
must be included in such generalizations and, at the same time, t o
forestall or even t o refute extant generalizations or theories
about the kinds of discourse art history contains.
Well, now, what is Krautheimer doing in his historical-critical
discussion of the competition reliefs? Whatever else he does, he
describes certain elements of these works of art: their quatrefoil
shape; the narrative details; certain of the gestures; some of the

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ostensible facial and bodily features, etc; he compares: the use

of depth in Brunelleschi and Ghiberti; their different treatment
of the assigned theme, etc.; he evaluates: Brunelleschi is inconsistent; Ghiberti has an uncanny perfection, etc.; he explains:
Ghibertis and Brunelleschis use of the antique; the influence of
earlier artists, etc.; and he interprets: Brunelleschis relief is a
series of experimentations in movement-the interplay of limbs
and body and the relation between body and garment; Ghibertis
relief is a study in credibility-on the subtle interplay of glances
and gestures rather than on ferocious dramatization.
Of course these procedures interrelate and interpenetrate. But
they are not logically dependent upon each other. That is,
Krautheimers descriptions of the various donntes of the plaquesthough they serve as nodes of his interpretations and evaluations-are true (or false) quite independently of his other claims.
Consequently, it would be a mistake t o insist, as some philosophers of criticism do, that description, interpretation, and evaluation
always proceed together and cannot be separated.
As interesting and important as it would be t o dwell on these
differences among the various procedures of art history and
criticism, in this paper I wish only t o deal with the role of interpretation in the historical-critical approach t o visual art, employing Krautheimers text as my prime example.
One clear example of interpretation is Krautheimers reading
of Brunelleschis relief as essentially a series of experiments in
movement and of Ghibertis as a study in credibility of gesture
and expression. Here we have a straightforward instance of
interpretation as the attempt t o render coherent a set of elements
in which one element rather than another is taken t o be central
and hence the controlling factor in a work of art.
Is this kind of interpretation descriptive? Is it true (or false),
as is, for example, Both reliefs are cast in bronze? Or is it, as
C . L. Stevenson holds, quasi-imperative: i.e., See these reliefs
as studies in movement and in credibility.
It seems t o me, for reasons given in my Hamlet and the Philosophy of Literary Criticism (ch. xv), that this kind of interpretation is neither descriptive nor quasi-imperative but functions

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instead as explanation. Neither in Brunelleschis relief is movement central nor is credibility in Ghibertis. For even if movement
and credibility are donnies, centrality is not given as they are.
Nor do the claims about centrality disguise an imperative. Rather
these summative statements-this is what they are-function as
hypotheses about what make coherent and intelligible the various
elements of the two pieces before him. As hypotheses, they are
neither true nor false; instead they are more rather than less
adequate in so far as they do render coherent, without distortion
or omission, the ostensible, describable elements of the works.
Some interpretations are explanations. Are all explanations in
art history interpretations? Are, for example, Krautheimers hypotheses about the Hercules Master and the Trecento Sienese painters as formative influences upon Ghibertis relief interpretations
as well as explanations of the relief? Krautheimer certainly utilizes these explanations of Ghibertis sources in his reading of
the relief, but only to support his interpretation of it as a study
in credibility rather than movement. He explains this credibility
in part by referring t o the influence of the Hercules Master upon
Ghiberti: here explanation is giving causes and it contrasts with
interpretation as the giving of reasons in support of an hypothesis.
Of course, the reasons also can be causally explained, but such
explanation does not make interpretation causal. Because of this
radical difference between the role of causes in some historical
explanations of artistic phenomena and the role of reasons in some
critical interpretations of these same phenomena, I am inclined
t o distinguish interpretive explanations from other explanations
in the history and criticism of art.
What, now, about style? Krautheimer says that Ghibertis relief
is an early example of the International Style (a forecast),
though not as complete and superb an example as his Suint John
(1412-16). Krautheimer does not define that style; indeed, he
agrees with Panofsky that it is too imprecise t o yield a definition.
Nevertheless, he does state and employ certain criteria of that
style: its decorative linearism; its lyrical narration, executed in
calligraphic patterns; its soft ducts of drapery; its ornatenessall of which add up t o a post-Gothic style that prevailed in Europe

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a t the beginning of the fourteenth century. I t is a separate style

because, in its exploration of the tactile, visual, and psychological
facets of reality, it rebels against earlier literal realism and it comes
before Renaissance idealization.
There are many problems here: about the concept of style and
about this particular style concept. Are they descriptive, stipulative, normative or, as Gombrich claims, hypothetical blends of
norm and form? Are they ever definable, or are they inevitably
open? Are they governed by clear criteria? Having dealt with
these problems in my Genre and Style,2 I skip over them just
here and ask only whether the criteria-clear or not, definitive
or not-are interpretive and, if they are, what this adds t o the
role of interpretation in art history?
It seems t o me that Krautheimers individual criteria themselves operate under fairly clear and precise criteria of their own;
and that these individual criteria-decorative linearism, lyrical
narration, soft ducts of drapery, ornateness-are as precise
as calligraphic patterns. Consequently, if the latter can be said
to describe a feature in a work of art, I see no difficulty in classifying all of Krautheimers criteria as empirically ascertainable and
as descriptive in their critical function. These criteria of International Style seem no less descriptive than the criterion of
elongation, as this criterion is employed by some art historians
t o characterize Mannerism as an individual style. In other words,
Krautheimer introduces nothing like, say, Dvoiaks criterion of
spiritualityfor Mannerism,which is interpretive, in his elucidation of the International Style.
What makes Krautheimers criteria of the International Style
interpretive are not the individual criteria but the implicit claim
that they-as a set, whether definitive or not-are central or most
important in the artistic phenomena covered by the style term.
For surely Krautheimer does imply that his set of criteria illuminates an historical development in fourteenth-century art in a
Morris Weitz, Genre and Style, Contemporary Philosophic Thought (The
International Philosophy Year Conferences at Brockport), vol. 3, pp. 183-218.
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1970.

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way that no competing set of criteria does or would do. I t is this

implication of centrality that makes his criteria of the International
Style interpretive in the already discussed sense of an hypothesis
that attempts t o render coherent and intelligible a group of
elements, in this case, a number of art works of the fourteenth
century. Ghibertis relief is a forecast of the International Style,
then, is an art-historical utterance that is neither true nor false,
but is rather a claim about a putative member of a class of objects,
the criteria of which class are hypothesized as central by Krautheimer yet, as he himself admits, are open t o challenge or substitution and exchange of his criteria. My guess is that if we would
turn from Krautheimers criteria for the International Style t o
other historians criteria for the same style concept and t o their
collective disagreements, we would find, as I found for the style
concept of Mannerism, that it too is an irreducibly vague concept;
i.e., one whose competing sets of criteria are incomplete and incompletable, so that any extant, putative set functions interpretively rather than as a descriptive, real definition of the necessary and sufficient properties of the International Style. Thus,
while it is true that Ghibertis relief has a decorative linearism,
it is not true (or false) that decorative linearism is a necessary,
sufficient, or central criterion of the International Style. The
centrality of decorative linearism is simply not given in the sense
in which decorative linearism is; the centrality is projected on
the latter as a controlling feature that in effect helps render
coherent-explains-the
work.
Both claims about centrality and about style are interpretive.
Does interpretation play any other roles in art history? What
about Krautheimers talk of dramatic force, violent language,
dynamic design, beautifully swaying protective curve, sure,
delicate, nervous gestures, and melodious, yet not prettified
beauty?
Are these properties of Ghibertis relief? If they are, do their
corresponding terms name these properties? Here, of course, we
reach the notorious problem in aesthetics about the nature and
ontological status of expressive, phenomenological, or regional
properties of works of art. Rather than rehearse once again the

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various traditional theories, I shall deal only with a recent, powerful doctrine about these properties and their corresponding terms
or concepts, that of F. Sibley. In his essay, Aesthetic concept^,"^
Sibley introduces a whole group of concepts (including Krautheimers) that he claims are not governed by any conditions at all.
These concepts, t o be sure, depend upon certain conditions or
features but the presence of them, either singly, disjunctively,
or conjunctively, does not logically justify or warrant the application of these concepts. Even so, Sibley says, these concepts,
governed by no conditions of their use, have as their primary
function the description of certain objective features of art and
the world, hence, they can be legitimately classified as descriptive.
Sibley restricts this whole group of noncondition governed,
descriptive concepts t o the aesthetic, examples of which abound
in critical or historical discourse about works of art and in parallel
ordinary talk about everyday objects and persons. They include
adjectives, such as balanced, delicate, or tragic; as well as
expressions, such as telling contrast and sets up a tension.
Indeed, they comprise all the terms we use in talking about works
of art that are not indisputably descriptive, such as red or
rectangular, or clearly evaluative, such as great or mediocre.
Thus, for Sibley, Krautheimers list of attributions t o the reliefs
of Ghiberti and Brunelleschi-dramatic force, violent language,
etc.-are all descriptive, yet noncondition governed.
No particular aesthetic term, for Sibley, has any one condition
or set of conditions that determines its use. For example, no
amount of true talk about the pale pink color, thin shape, slim
line, etc., of a particular vase guarantees its delicacy, even though,
he says, the vase is delicate. Nevertheless, he adds, a necessary
condition for the correct employment of any aesthetic term is
the exercise of taste. Without taste but with normal eyesight,
we can apply nonaesthetic terms, such as red or rectangular,
even t o works of art. But with normal eyesight and no taste, we
Frank Sibley, Aesthetic Concepts, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 68 (1959),
pp. 421-450. Reprinted, J. Margolis, ed., Philosophy Looks at The Arts. New
York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1962.

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cannot apply aesthetic terms, such as delicate, balanced, or

tragic. The difference between the aesthetic and the nonaesthetic is marked by the exercise of taste as against its absence.
What, now, does Sibley mean by taste? It is an ability t o
notice or see or tell that things have certain q ~ a l i t i e s . However,
~
once we ask what is t o count as having taste-what its criteria
are-taste
becomes identical with the ability t o use certain
aesthetic terms. There is a circle here: aesthetic term is defined
in terms of taste and taste is defined in terms of aesthetic
term.
Let me put this difficulty aside, however, and return t o his
central thesis about aesthetic concepts as descriptive and noncondition governed. Whatever our view may be about taste and
its relation to the aesthetic, it is certainly true, as Sibley says,
that there is a large group of terms we use in talking about works
or art which seems to differ radically in its logical grammar from
purely descriptive terms, such as red and purely evaluative
terms, such as mediocre.
Is Sibley correct in putting these terms-what he calls aesthetic-into one logical bag? Are all of them employed t o describe
features of works of art? Are all of them governed by no conditions
whatever? If it is sheer dogmatism, as Sibley contends it is, to
hold that none of these terms denotes properties of works of art,
it is equally dogmatic t o insist that all of them do. Too much
blood has been spilled in the debate about expressive properties
t o allow for any wholesale transfusion.
If we turn from these attributed properties of works of art to
their corresponding locutions, as we must and as Sibley does, we
find that utterances containing aesthetic expressions, as Sibley
classifies them, are a logically mixed bag, not a homogeneous one
at all. Some of these, such as eerie or symmetrical, or Krautheimers dramatic force, beautifully swaying protective curve,
sure, delicate, nervous gestures, or violent language, veer
toward the descriptive in their use. Some, such as trite, garish,
or Krautheimers awkward, tend toward the evaluative. Some,
Ibid., Margolis, Philosophy Looks At The Arts, p. 65.
8-Theoria

3: 1-3

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for example, Krautheimers melodious, yet not prettified

beauty, which he uses t o characterize an overall expressive
quality, function as interpretive in a straightforwardly explanatory
sense. Brunelleschis relief is brutal in its realism; Ghibertis is
melodious, yet not prettified in its beauty [almost said by Krautheimer, and whose parallels are common enough in art history
and criticism; e.g., This Ckzannes Mt. Sainte-Victoire is monumental.) need not describe a quality, either simple, complex, or
regional. The utterance can also serve, as indeed I think it does in
Krautheimers text, as an interpretive hypothesis about what is
expressively central in the reliefs: what expressive quality best
explains the individual expressive qualities of the narrative and
compositional elements of the works. Finally, some of these terms
function as interpretive, albeit in an invitational or, to use
Stevensons phrase, quasi-imperative, way. Brunelleschis relief
is exciting but Ghibertis is profoundly moving, not said by
Krautheimer but certainly sayable by other art historians or, for
that matter, by anyone, and hardly a descriptive or explanatory
remark, is perhaps read best as an invitation to respond t o these
two works in certain ways. In any case, this remark should not be
coupled, which Sibley does, with Neither relief is completely
unified in its total design.
Sibley distinguishes between conditions and negative conditions; and between features that count for rather than against the
application of aesthetic terms. He does not then go on t o deny
that some features d o count for the application of aesthetic terms.
What he denies is that these features can ever function as logically
justifying or warranting conditions for the application of an
aesthetic term. And this is t o affirm that, although there are
criteria for the employment of an aesthetic term, these criteria
are never sufficient: the correct application of the criteria neither
entails the correct application of the term nor precludes the
intelligible withholding of the term.
Formulated in this manner, Sibleys aesthetic terms behave
logically like some clearly nonaesthetic terms, e.g., pain, at
least according t o Wittgenstein. For pain is also a term which
has criteria for its correct use, but no criterion or set of criteria

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the satisfying of which in any particular instance logically justifies

or warrants its application. Further, like X is delicate, X is in
pain can be true and known t o be true. And there are no entailment-conditions for the application of either delicate or pain.
Thus, in criteria, truth-value, and conditions, pain is exactly
like Sibleys delicate or any other aesthetic term. Consequently,
if Wittgenstein is right about upain, Sibley is wrong in identifying
the aesthetic with the noncondition governed.
But now we must ask, Are all aesthetic terms noncondition
governed? If they are logically homogeneous, with delicate as a
paradigm, Sibleys affirmative case remains intact. If they are
heterogenous, as I claim they are, some, e.g., eerie, symmetrical, or Krautheimers dramatic force, violent language, dynamic design, beautifully swaying protective curve, etc.- because they are employed in talk about art with the same sets of
criteria as they are in talk about everyday objects and personsmay be as condition governed as they are in ordinary life. But
most aesthetic terms-perhaps all-it must be conceded, are not
governed by sets of sufficient conditions. This observation, however, is no surprise since many, if not most, empirical terms have
no entailment-conditions. Rather than marking the distinction
between the aesthetic and the nonaesthetic, then, Sibley has merely showed that many terms are open in the sense that they have
no sufficient or sets of sufficient conditions or criteria. The logical
vagaries among these terms-for example, that tragic, delicate,
International Style, and credibility of gesture and expression,
though noncondition governed, nevertheless differ radically in
that some of these terms are perennially debatable, i.e., their
criteria are open to intelligible rejection; some are perennially
flexible, i.e., their extant sets of criteria must allow for new
criteria t o cover new cases with their new properties; and that
some are irreducibly vague, i.e., their sets of criteria are incomplete and incompletable-remain uncharted by Sibley and indeed
by all of us.
Philosophical elucidation of Krautheimers text-to sum up-yields
a t least one surprising result: that the three kinds of interpretation

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he engages in-about what is central in the reliefs; about the

stylistic features of a t least Ghibertis relief; and about the overall
expressive or regional qualities of the individual reliefs-are all
explanations in the sense that these interpretations function as
hypothese that attempt t o bring coherence and intelligibility t o
works of art. I have not claimed that explanation exhausts the
role of interpretation in the visual arts. All I affirm is that any
wholesale theory about that role must accommodate Krautheimers performance and, if I have described it correctly, the logical
results of that performance.

Received on July 5, 1971.