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British Journal of Social Psychology (2013), 52, 345360

2011 The British Psychological Society
www.wileyonlinelibrary.com

Justifying discrimination against Muslim

immigrants: Out-group ideology and the five-step
social identity model
Maykel Verkuyten
ERCOMER, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
This study examines how Geert Wilders, leader of the far-right Party For Freedom
(PVV) in the Netherlands, justifies discriminatory measures for Muslim citizens. Wilders
contributions to four parliamentary debates and newspaper articles are analysed. The
analysis shows that Wilders consistently makes a distinction between Islam as a belief
system and Muslims as a group of people. Islam is defined as external to the West and as
a major threat to the virtuous nature of the in-group. Defending and preserving Western
liberal values against Islam is construed as a moral imperative. It is further shown how
the distinction between Islam and Muslims functions to ward off accusations of prejudice
and discrimination. It is concluded that social psychologists studying prejudice and
discrimination should pay more attention to the distinction between person categories
and ideological categories, and to political leadership.

The far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) was established in the Netherlands in early 2006.
It gained nine of the 150 parliamentary seats in the national elections of November that
year. In the most recent national election (9 June 2010), the PVV won no less than
24 seats, making it the third largest party of the 10 political parties in the Dutch
parliament. Geert Wilders is the undisputed leader of the PVV, which has no official
members other than himself. Wilders is known for his fiercely negative position on Islam.
In parliament, he has proposed several motions, in which the government is asked to
establish a complete stop to immigration from Islamic countries, a prohibition of the
building of new mosques, a closing of Islamic schools, a legal ban on the Koran, a special
tax for wearing a headscarf, the deportation of criminal Muslims when necessary after
denaturalization, and ethnic registration. These proposals are included in the election
programme of the PVV and commentators from across the political spectrum have argued
that they are discriminatory and go against the constitutional rights of equal treatment
and freedom of religion. In 2009, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal decided that Wilders
is to be prosecuted for inciting hatred and discriminating against Muslims. Despite the
controversy, Wilders has been quite successful in gathering public support. He tends
Correspondence should be addressed to Maykel Verkuyten, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Utrecht University,
Heidelberglaan 2, 3584 CS Utrecht, The Netherlands (e-mail: M.Verkuyten@uu.nl).
DOI:10.1111/j.2044-8309.2011.02081.x

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Maykel Verkuyten

to dominate the political debate and has become an important political factor in the
Netherlands. In October 2010, a minority government was installed with the support of
the PVV.
This article has two theoretical aims that relate to understanding the justification of
out-group discrimination. First, the article stems from an empirical investigation into the
five steps of the development of collective hate (Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008). The
analysis focuses on the ways in which Wilders represents us and them in order to
argue for discrimination against Muslim citizens. Second, the article investigates how
the distinction between out-group ideology and out-group psychology functions to ward
off accusations of prejudice and discrimination. In particular, I focus on the distinction
between Islam, as a belief system, and Muslims, as a group of people, which is consistently
used by this political leader to make his discriminatory policy proposals acceptable
and even necessary. These theoretical aims are pursued by the analysis of Wilders
contributions to parliamentary debates and national newspapers.

Justifying discrimination
The social psychological research on prejudice and discrimination is extensive and
typically examines individual differences in, for example, authoritarianism and social
dominance orientation, and group-level perceptions, cognitions, and motivations (see
Brown, 2010). The primary focus of this research is on inner dispositions and mental
processes: discrimination results from individual beliefs and the feelings on which people
act. One of the limitations of this social psychological work is that it tends to ignore the
justification of discrimination. To be sure, there is research on the legitimizing roles
of the endorsement of inter-group ideologies and perceptions of threat (e.g., Pereira,
Vala, & Costa-Lopes, 2010; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), but this research is not concerned
with the justification of discrimination as a rhetorically delicate accomplishment that
involves various category constructions. Furthermore, social psychological work tends
to ignore the critical role of political leaders in defining group distinctions and justifying
discriminatory measures (Allport, 1954; Reicher, 2007).
Reicher, Haslam, and Rath (2008) have proposed an integrative social identity model
of the development of collective hate. They argue that the belief systems that facilitate
out-group hatred are centred on the ways in which we define our own social identities
and those of others (Reicher et al., 2008, p. 1326). Their five-step model details
the identity-defining processes, through which negative acts against other groups are
considered acceptable and right. The five steps that are distinguished are labelled:
identification, exclusion, threat, virtue, and celebration. I will use these five steps
as an analytical framework for examining how Wilders defines and represents us and
them in justifying his discriminatory proposals.
First, the in-group needs to be construed as a distinct category with its specific
norms, beliefs, and practices. The in-group is psychologically primary (Yzerbyt, Castano,
Leyens, & Paladino, 2000), but this does not imply a preoccupation with the other.
The preoccupation may lie entirely within the group to which people belong and the
differences that exist within the in-group. Yet, the definition of the in-group forms the
first and necessary step for proposing unequal treatment of outsiders.
Second, category distinctions are made for all kinds of reasons and do not necessarily
imply discrimination. For example, essentialist notions about social groups are not
by definition oppressive but can also be used to argue for minority rights and the
recognition of cultural differences (e.g., Verkuyten, 2003; Wagner, Holtz, & Kashima,

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2009). However, the basis on which distinctions are made defines the nature of the
categories and who is and is not included in the moral community. National belonging,
defined in terms of ethnic ancestry, for example, tends to have more exclusionary
consequences than a definition in terms of civic commitment (Wakefield et al., 2011).
When placed outside the community, one is deprived of the positives accorded to ingroup members.
Third, exclusion from a social category does not in itself justify the imposition of
negative sanctions and discriminatory measures. This is more likely when out-groups
are seen as constituting a problem or threat to ones way of life. Research has shown
that perceived threat can function to legitimize discrimination against immigrants and
Muslim minorities (e.g., Perreira et al., 2010; Velasco Gonzalez, Verkuyten, Weesie, &
Poppe, 2008). When people feel threatened by these groups, they tend to find it more
acceptable to reject and exclude such group members. These threats can take different
forms but have in common the danger of what the other supposedly means for what
we believe in and the way in which we live our lives. This means that political leaders
can work up threatening versions of Islam to justify violent actions and exclusionary
measures (e.g., De Castella, McGarty, & Musgrove, 2009; Wood & Finlay, 2008).
Fourth, the justification of discrimination does not only relate to how others are
defined but importantly also to how we define ourselves. Reicher and colleagues (2008)
stress that the definition of in-group virtue is necessary to out-group exclusion. The more
virtuous we are considered to be, the more threatening the other becomes, and the
more acceptable it is to treat them differently. For example, majority members can
emphasize the self-defining meaning of in-group tolerance, which forms the basis for
criticizing minority groups for their intolerance and their lack of willingness to adapt
(Verkuyten, 2004).
Fifth, when they are construed as threatening our virtues, it becomes not only
justified to defend ourselves but also morally imperative. Discrimination becomes a
necessary self-defensive response when our virtuous nature is undermined. In this
context, in-group members who dare to discriminate have moral strength whereas those
who do not are morally suspect. In the political arena, far-right politicians can present
themselves as the courageous defenders of our virtuous national identity whereas
mainstream politicians, and particularly those on the left, are construed as traitors and
politically correct cowards (Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2011).

Categories and social psychology

Categorization is a central concept in inter-group relations and is typically understood
as the grouping of persons into social categories (Park & Judd, 2005). This grouping is
understood to underlie generic processes of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination.
This means that to reduce these negative consequences, it is necessary to minimize social
category distinctions, for example, by de-categorization (Brewer & Miller, 1984) or by
establishing meaningful contacts with out-group members (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).
However, not all societal entities are always represented in terms of person categories.
For example, nationhood can be imagined as places and institutions, and ethnicity can be
formulated in terms of language and cultural artefacts (Abell, Condor, & Stevenson, 2006;
Verkuyten, 2005). Condor (2006), for example, shows that ordinary Britons describe
Britishness in terms of a hybrid collection of people, objects, geographies, activities,
and institutions. Furthermore, our virtue and their danger do not have to stem from
personal characteristics or group psychology but rather from justifying beliefs or group

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ideology. For example, Herf (2006) argues that the Nazis anti-semitism was principally an
ideology of political danger rather than psychological inferiority. In similar vein, working
with a model of a simple agricultural society, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia focused on
total social equality that expressed itself in murderous violence against groups suspected
of undermining this ideology, such as professionals, intellectuals, and minorities (Staub,
1989). Less dramatic, political conservatives can claim that they have nothing against
minorities as people, but rather principled objections to minority policies (Sniderman
& Tetlock, 1986).
The focus on person categories is not only typical for social psychologists examining
perceptions and cognitions but is also found in discourse-oriented approaches. There is
quite a large body of research that has identified discursive repertoires and rhetorical
devices that are used to justify stereotypes and negative evaluations of minority group
members (see Augoustinos & Every, 2007, for a review). In the context of New Zealand,
Nairn and McCreanor (1991), for example, show that by conceding that there are good
Maori, any potential accusations of racism when criticising bad Maori can be fended
off. In addition to these repertoires and devices, societal entities can be defined in nonpersonal terms, which make it possible to avoid the use of stereotypic representations of
social groups. For example, by representing nationhood as a place, national stereotypes
can be avoided (Abell et al., 2006), and by making references to historical origins,
stereotypical accounts of a distinctive national character can be challenged (Condor,
2006). These studies focus on national identity but there are also different understandings
of the term religion. Religion can refer to institutions, systems of belief, ritual practices,
and a group of believers. These different understandings make it possible to represent
religions, for example, in ideological terms. In this paper, I examine how Wilders uses
Islam as a system of belief to argue for discrimination against Muslims as a group of people,
and how this distinction can function to mitigate against accusations of prejudice.

Method
Material
The material for the analysis consists of the official, verbatim transcripts of four
parliamentary debates that were downloaded from the official parliamentary website. No
amendments were made and punctuation is unaltered from the original text. I translated
the extracts into English and the translation was checked by a colleague.
The topics of the four parliamentary debates vary. On 6 September 2007, the
governments viewpoint on a report of the Governmental Scientific Counsel about
developments and diversity within Islamic communities (entitled Dynamics in Islamic
activism) was discussed. The debate on 1 April 2008 was about Fitna, the movie
Wilders produced with the aim of opening peoples eyes to the danger of the Islam.
A discussion on 18 November 2008 revolved around the resignation of the minister of
Housing and Integration amid increasing criticism on her performance. In the fourth
debate (26 March 2009), the approach of the Dutch government to immigration and the
economic crisis was discussed.
In these public meetings, members of parliament seek to defend their political
viewpoints. For each debate there is a scheduled order of speakers and colleagues can
interrupt and ask questions. Parliamentarians are thereby forced to justify their stances
directly to other politicians. Moreover, because of the media coverage of the debates,
the public forms a constant, albeit implicit, audience. This makes parliamentary debates
useful for examining the strategies that politicians use to defend their proposals.

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In addition to these parliamentary debates, I collected Wilders contributions to

national newspapers. In the last 6 to 7 years, Wilders has written several newspaper
articles, in which he explains his views and proposals that he presented and defended
in parliament.

Approach
The present analysis relied heavily on the work in rhetorical and critical discursive
psychology because this allows me to investigate the social and political consequences
of discursive patterning (Wetherell, 1998, p. 405). Like many discursive and rhetorical
studies on politics, my emphasis is on how categories are deployed and used in discourse
(e.g., Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2009; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Wood & Finlay, 2008).
The primary aim here is not a fine-grained analysis of the discursive devices deployed
in the constructions of categories, although some of these will be indicated. Rather,
I am interested in the broad patterns and themes within Wilders talk about (social)
categories.
Three stages were involved. In the first stage, the parliamentary debates were read
through and all contributions from Wilders were marked. In addition, his newspaper
contributions were closely read. In the second stage, the extracts were organized around
all instances in which Wilders makes category distinctions. Thus, the extracts were
examined according to the categories and category relations that he used. For these
extracts, I examined how recurring categories were defined and positioned vis-`a-vis
one another. Following this, in the third stage, I focused on how Wilders construes
Islam as outside of the moral order, and how this justifies discrimination. For reasons of
space I have only included a limited number of extracts, but there are many that make
similar points. The first section of the analysis that follows focuses on the five-step social
identity model and the second section examines how Wilders wards off accusations of
discrimination.

Analysis
Five steps in the justification of discrimination
Identification: Defining a distinctive in-group
Wilders frequently speaks about our country, our culture, our history, and our
identity. The particular use of these pronouns indicates that he is engaged in category
work. He is working up a distinction, in which the in-group is construed in contrast
to Islam. Depending on the rhetorical context, he defines the in-group as the Western
world, Europe, or The Netherlands. These three levels of us would share a JudeoChristian tradition and culture and a deep commitment to the liberal principles of
freedom, tolerance, and democracy. These characteristics form the cornerstone of who
we are, or as stated by Wilders, I want a new article 1 of the constitution in which
the leitcultur of the West is expressed. In the Netherlands there can be Jewish and
Christian schools, but no Islamic schools (HP/De Tijd, 12 December 2007).
This in-group representation is contrasted with a violent Islam. The first extract is
from the start of the parliamentary debate about the report Dynamics in Islamic activism
by the Scientific Council of Government Policy. Wilders is the first speaker scheduled
and in this debate, he proposes a legal ban of the Koran. He starts his contribution with
the following.

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Extract 1 (6 September 2007)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Madam Speaker. To start, my sincere thanks to you for organizing today, on my birthday,
a debate about Islam. I could not have wished for a more beautiful gift.
About 1,400 years ago, war was declared on us by an ideology of hate and violence
that emerged and was pronounced by a barbarian who called himself prophet Mohammed. I
am talking about Islam. Let me start with the fundamental book of the Islam: the Koran. The
obligation for all Muslims to fight against non-Muslims is the core theme of the Koran or,
what I called earlier, the Islamic Mein Kampf. What is meant with this fight is war, Jihad. The
Koran is predominantly a book of war in which people are called to slaughter non-Muslims, to
burn and to massacre. Jews are compared to monkeys and pigs. According to the Koran,
people who believe that Jesus Christ is the son of God must be fought (Sura 9, verse 30).
The West has problems with Islam, not with Judaism and Christianity.

In the first two lines, and by thanking Madam Speaker, Wilders presents himself as
someone who has strong feelings about Islam. In addition, he defines Islam as the topic
of the debate rather than the circumstance, processes, and changes in the activisms of
people who are influenced or inspired by Islam. This definition allows him to discuss
what he believes is the fundamental nature of Islam in lines 3 to 11, with which the West
has problems.
To identify Islam as a distinct category raises a question of the other and its
relationship to us. These category distinctions do not imply particular courses of action,
but they do provide a space for proposing exclusionary measures. This is particularly
likely when the other is construed as being incompatible with us.
Exclusion: Incompatibility
In extract 1, Wilders gives vivid and concrete examples of everyday life and, as in
many other extracts, he uses the Koran as the authority to work up a homogenous,
static, and culturally essentialist version of Islam (line 10, extract 1): an Islam that is
intrinsically different from our culture. Two further examples of Islam being intrinsically
different are the next extracts from a parliamentary debate. Wilders has argued that the
Netherlands has a traditional Judeo-Christian culture and that Islam is contradictory to
this and he concludes with:
Extract 2a
Islam is a religion, an ideology that does not belong to the Netherlands and certainly cannot
become part of our tradition.
Extract 2b
The norms and values of the Islamic culture do not belong in the Netherlands. They are
completely at odds with our Dutch culture.

Islamic belief is not only different from our culture but does not fit and is not
fit to become part of us: it is completely alien. Wilders consistently argues that
there is an inherent contradiction between Islam and Western culture making them
incompatible.
Orientalization is one familiar discursive strategy for defining Islam as aberrant and
incompatible (Lazar & Lazar, 2004; Said, 1978). In particular, the oriental motif of the
uncivilized other is deployed frequently by Wilders. In line 4 of extract 1, he calls the
Prophet Mohammed a barbarian and he uses these kinds of terms repeatedly to argue that

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Islamic culture is inferior to the Western. The next quotes from parliamentary debates
are examples.
Extract 3a (18 November 2008)
The Dutch culture is a thousand times better than Islam.
Extract 3b (26 March 2009)
I do not believe that cultures are equal. Our culture is much better than the backward
Islamic culture.
Extract 3c (1 April 2008)
It is not a clash of civilizations, but a collision between culture and barbarism and
backwardness.

In these quotes, a clear distinction between advanced and backward cultures is made.
It is not a clash of different civilizations because our culture is simply better and of a
higher level making it a confrontation between two incompatible ways of life. Wilders
frequent use of literal and metaphorical references to barbarism and Islam being an
archaic ideology from the desert further contributes to the uncivilized image of Islam.
The political corollary of this is the relegation of Islam beyond the boundaries of the
western-defined social and moral order. Islam is excluded from the benefits of belonging
to us, the rights and resources that stem from being part of the moral community that
has its roots in a Judeo-Christian tradition. However, this exclusion from society does
not in itself justify the imposition of the discriminatory measures that Wilders proposes.
A threatening out-group
What matters is not only how our culture and Islam differ, but also how Islam impacts
upon us. Islam is different and less civilized, and additionally a threat to our way of life.
This theme of threat is central in Wilders discourse. In the first extract (lines 38), he
defines the relationship as being at war since war has been declared on us (line 3).
And a bit later in the same debate, he further works up this relationship by saying
Extract 4 (6 September 2007)
Islam wants to dominate and aims to destroy our Western civilization. In 1945 in Europe
Nazism was defeated. In 1989 in Europe communism was defeated. Now we have to defeat
the Islamic ideology. Stop the Islamization. Defend our freedom.

The use of the metaphor of a war structures social reality in a particular way and implies a
confrontational view of group relations (Lakoff & Johnson, 1978). According to Wilders,
Islam has declared a historical war on us, making it the attacker and us the attacked.
Following this binary logic, aligning Islam with hate and violence implies that we
cannot be associated with that. The nature of their ideology is responsible for the fight
and being attacked gives us the right to defend ourselves. The war is about defending
who we are against an enemy that seeks to destroy our way of life. In addition to this
war metaphor, there are two other notable discursive devices that Wilders uses to
construe the image of a serious threat: the anthropomorphic reification of Islam and the
emphasis on the continuing process of Islamization.
First, Wilders works up an image of Islam as intrinsically intolerant and violent, and
seeking to destroy our way of life (see extract 1). In the parliamentary debate, he is
attacked several times on what he has to say about this true heart of the Islam. In his

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defence, he repeatedly cites violent verses from the Koran as evidence for his claims
(compare Wood & Finlay, 2008). He also states that if all violent and hateful passages
were removed from the Koran, a book as thin as the Donald Duck Weekly (i.e., a comic)
would remain (parliamentary debate 1 April 2008). Thus, according to Wilders, Islam
is intrinsically violent and aiming at world dominance (extract 1). He further works up
this representation by an anthropomorphic reification of Islam. The next extract is an
example (see also extract 4).
Extract 5 (6 September 2007)
Islam is a violent ideology, like communism and fascism. Islam wants to dominate, subject,
kill and fight a war. According to the PVV, the increasing Islamization has to be stopped.
Islam is the Trojan horse. If we do not stop the Islamization, then Eurabia and Nederabia are
just a matter of time. We are heading towards the end of European and Dutch society as we
know it now.

Wilders presents Islam as an impersonal entity that is capable of causing things in

the world. In this extract, and in many others, he attributes agentic qualities to Islam
by talking about what Islam wants, seeks, and does. Instead of people acting, the
nominalized entity of Islam is posited as intentional and having a thought-out plan. Islam
is a hidden enemy (Trojan horse) that wants to destroy us and is capable of doing so.
This anthropomorphic reification of a violent Islam gives it a dangerous character and
obscures the fact that different interpretations by a heterogeneous group of Muslims
constitute the Islamic belief.
Second, in extract 4 Wilders talks about the process of Islamization (see also extracts
5 and 6). He repeatedly uses the term Islamization to describe the process by which
the Netherlands and the western world more generally become increasingly Islamic.
The term Islamization is a powerful depiction of a threat because it implies an ongoing
empirical reality in which we gradually become more Islamic. The term describes a
process that relates the present with the future. It depicts a threatening future that
evolves from current, ongoing events that require an urgent response and drastic
measures. Islamization is a process and processes can be stopped, at least when we
are not too late.

Our virtues: Freedom, tolerance, and democracy

Wilders rhetoric is a celebration of the western world and the Netherlands in particular,
as a political, moral, and cultural community. The key values in this are freedom and
tolerance, with the former defining his political party: PVV. He stands for freedom
and tolerance, which emerge as the defining, fundamental virtues in his speeches and
writings. The next extract is an example.
Extract 6 (6 September 2007)
I fight for the freedom of the Netherlands. The Islamic ideology does not fit into that. The
Party for Freedom stands for all those peace and freedom-loving people who are against the
Islamization of the Netherlands and the West. People who choose democracy over Sharia.
People who want to stop the Islamization of our beautiful country.

Freedom is presented as central to our identity and contradictory to Islam (see extracts
4 and 6). If we are aligned with freedom, then Islam cannot be associated with it. Or
as Wilders argues, The more dominant Islam becomes in the Netherlands the further

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we will turn away from everything that has to do with freedom, tolerance and equality
(Nu.nl, 11 September 2008). The role of freedom as the cornerstone of our identity
is further established through its constant depiction as the main target of their attack.
In Wilders discourse, freedom is not so much a part of a Western liberal ideology but
rather stands for all that is good and just (compare Lazar & Lazar, 2004). In this way,
Islamic values and beliefs are made ideological and political, whereas ours are made to
appear non-ideological and non-political. The more we stand for the universal cause of
freedom, peace, and justice, the more evil their beliefs and actions are, and the more
legitimate it becomes to treat Islam differently.

The defence of our virtue

At the end of extract 6, Wilders not only defines his party as standing for peace, freedom,
and democracy but also as committed to defending these values against the Islamic threat.
And in extract 4, he calls for defending our freedom against the continuing Islamization
of the West.
As illustrated in previous extracts (1, 4, and 5), Wilders consistently talks about
Islam being an ideology rather than a religion. The use of the term ideology is
politically significant because, as Wilders himself argues, this means that his plea for
specific anti-Islam measures does not contradict the constitutional rights of freedom
of religion and education, and therefore is non-discriminatory. Islam becomes less of a
religion and instead a totalitarian ideology that seeks to destabilize and take over our
society (Nederabia) and Europe (Eurabia) (extracts 4 and 5). The next extract from a
newspaper article is a further example of this.
Extract 7
The core of the problem is the fascistic Islam, the sick ideology of Allah and Mohammed as
written in the Islamic Mein Kampf: the Koran (Volkskrant, 8 August 2007).

In extracts 4, 5, and 7, there is a lumping together of Islam with historically well-known

ideologies of oppression: fascism and communism. This is an important rhetorical ploy
to emphasize how bad Islam is (Finlay, 2007). Islam would be radical and extreme,
and seeking domination and power. Wilders depicts Islam as imperialistic (Muslimcolonizers, invaders) and violent, driven by a mission to take things over, and to
subject us (extracts 1, 4, and 5). This warrants action and makes counter-action not
only an urgent task but also a moral obligation, similar to the fights against Nazism and
communism. Fighting Islam becomes a matter of preserving our freedoms and liberties,
a struggle between good and evil and therefore a moral imperative for the native Dutch.
In this moral universe, those who fight against Islamization have moral strength and
those who do not are morally suspect. Wilders repeatedly accuses the latter of behaving
like a Chamberlain (a reference to the British Prime Minister who is famous for failing to
appreciate the full extent of Hitlers project), and in the next extract from a parliamentary
debate, Wilders accuses Minister Vogelaar of Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration
of betraying the Dutch culture.
Extract 8 (6 September 2007)
Minister Vogelaar quacked that in the future the Netherlands will have a Judeo-ChristianIslamic tradition and that she wants to help Islam to get rooted in Dutch society. To me, this
shows that she has become crazy, and that she betrays Dutch culture.

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Informed by Reicher et al.s (2008) approach, the previous analysis has examined
the different steps in how Wilders represents us and them (or rather it) in order
for us to exclude them. However, commentators consider many of his proposals
discriminatory and in parliamentary debates, he is regularly accused of making unjustified
generalizations about Muslims. His strong statements make Wilders vulnerable to moral
attacks, which raise the question of how he manages these accusations.

Rebutting the charge of prejudice

Out-group ideology and psychology
The representations of identity that Wilders uses are rooted in the notion that Islamic
ideology threatens our Judeo-Christian culture. The danger stems from Muslims ideology
rather than from Muslims as a group of people. This distinction between out-group
ideology and out-group psychology is very useful for dealing with accusations of
prejudice and discrimination. An example of this is found in the next extract, in which
Wilders responds to a member of parliament (Mister Pechtold) who states that Wilders
has been talking about a tsunami of Muslims coming to the Netherlands.
Extract 9 (1 April 2008)
I strongly object to this. I have never, completely never, talked about a tsunami of Muslims.
I have always spoken about a tsunami of Islamization . . . Mister Pechtold has to be honest.
Let him give one quote in which I talk about a tsunami of Muslims. I have never talked about
this. I have never talked about a tsunami of Muslims.

By using extreme case formulations like never, completely never (Pomerantz, 1986)
and by calling on his opponent to be honest, Wilders makes a clear distinction between
Islam and Muslims. He claims to be talking about an ideological system of belief and not
about a group of people. The next extract is a continuation of extract 1 in which he has
painted a very negative picture of Islam.
Extract 10 (6 September 2007)
This, of course, does not mean that all Muslims are extremists. I always make a distinction
between the belief and the people. Also the Party for Freedom has no problem with Muslims
who obey the law, but unfortunately that is not all that matters, because Islam, the Koran,
the Hadith are no good and intrinsically violent.

Here, Wilders explicitly distances himself from the possible accusation that his proposals
are discriminatory and racist by referring to the self-evident notion (of course) that not
all Muslims are similar. He makes an explicit distinction between Islam as a system of
belief and Muslims as people. He objects to the former and has no problems with the
latter. Wilders consistently makes this distinction and there are many examples where
he states that the religion is wicked but not its followers. The next extracts are other
examples. The former is taken from the parliamentary debates and the latter from the
statement that Wilders made at the beginning of his trial at the Amsterdam Court of
Appeal.
Extract 11 (1 April 2008)
Let me first say, I make a distinction between the ideology, the religion Islam, and the
people. I have nothing against Muslims. I have nothing against people. I have a problem
with the Islamic ideology.

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Extract 12
It is not my intention to spare this ideology of conquest and destruction, but it is also not
my aim to hurt peoples feelings. I have nothing against Muslims. I have a problem with
Islam and the Islamization of our country because Islam is contrary to freedom.

Both these extracts contain the typical disclaimer Ive have nothing against . . . to
deflect criticism and prevent a racist interpretation. With these statements, he places
himself and his party within the moral community of reasonable people who reject
generalizations and consider all individuals as equals. As he argues: Nobody, not a
single human being is less valuable than another (parliamentary debate 1 April 2008).
Prejudice and discrimination are typically directed at people as members of a particular
social category. Therefore, a focus on Islam as a system of belief rather than on Muslims
as a group of people is useful for warding off potential prejudicial accusations that would
undermine his political credibility. Criticizing a system of belief is an acceptable and even
expected course of political action, whereas discriminating or stigmatizing a group of
people is problematic.

Inequality
The assessment of discrimination is predicated on the notion of a shared categorization.
It is because people and groups are considered to belong to the same category that the
making of a distinction is considered inappropriate and unacceptable. For example, it
is considered discriminatory when male adults are allowed to drive a car and females
not, but it is acceptable that adults can drive and children not. Those judged to be equal
should be treated equally. As a corollary, those who are not equal do not have to be
treated in an equal way. Therefore, when they are not equal to us then our unequal
treatment of them becomes reasonable and acceptable rather than discriminatory.
However, the representation of a group of people as being not equal to us often has
racist connotations. It is more acceptable to argue that systems of belief differ, with
some being better than others. The next extract is from a parliamentary debate in which
Wilders is asked to explain his proposal to abolish the non-discrimination article 1 of the
constitution.
Extract 13 (1 April 2008)
Article 1 of the constitution forces the equal treatment of unequal cases. For the PVV, the
purpose of this abolition is not to discriminate but to make sure that unequal cases do not
have to be treated equally. . . . Our aim is not to discriminate. We sincerely believe that
with the abolition of Article 1, which makes it possible to establish Christian and Jewish
education, but not Islamic education, the integration of Muslim children is advanced.

Here, Wilders argues that the proposal of the PVV is not intended to discriminate but
rather to help Muslim children to integrate. His use of the word sincere underlines
the good intentions of his party in relation to the integration of Muslims. The statement
that the PVV does not want to discriminate is important because it endorses the moral
condemnation of discrimination and places the party within the moral community. The
rejection of discrimination as such implies the recognition of the value of equal treatment.
However, everyday Dutch proverbs such as equal monks, similar caps summarize the
point that cases that are similar should be treated in a similar way, but unequal cases
should not. As Wilders himself states,

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Extract 14 (Volkskrant, 13 March 2005)

Unequal cases do not have to be treated equally. Islam is an unequal case. That is why we
treat Islam differently. I do not want to concede to a culture that is alien to us. So, no Islamic
education. That is the principle.

Thus, by defining Islam as unequal to our culture, Wilders justifies his discriminatory
measures against Islamic schools, Mosques and other provisions and expressions of Islam.
A focus on Muslims as a group of people would make these measures more problematic.

Intolerance
The strict distinction between Islam and Muslims is a delicate one and sometimes difficult
to keep up. An ideology without people believing in it is a powerless threat and would
make Wilders criticism a kind of philosophical exercise. As stated by Pechthold in
response to what Wilders says in extract 9, Korans are not coming this way, but people.
Wilders cannot always avoid talking about Muslims rather than Islam as a system of belief.
The next quote is a continuation of the parliamentary debate presented in extract 6.
Extract 15 (6 September 2007)
[we have to stop] the ongoing Islamization, an ideology that in the end will destroy all of
our freedoms, because the people who adhere to this ideology are intolerant, because they
will accept nothing which is non-Islamic.

Here, Wilders argues that Islam threatens our freedoms because of the intolerance
of the people believing in it. Therefore, stopping the Islamization of the Netherlands
involves dealing with Muslim believers. One implication is that the measures that Wilders
proposes against such Islamization will affect the lives of individuals who adhere to
Islam and who already live in the Netherlands. There are a few cases in which Wilders
acknowledges that his proposals indeed will have discriminatory consequences for
Muslims. In each case he argues that this is unfortunate, but that it is inevitable that
we are intolerant because that is the only way to stop their intolerance that threatens
our way of life.
Extracts 16
We have to learn to be intolerant against those who are the intolerant, on the streets, in the
mosque, in court (NRC, 22 July 2006).
We are forced to be intolerant in order to defend our freedom (1 April 2008).
Unfortunately, you can answer intolerance only with intolerance (NRC, 24 May 2008).

In these quotes, the responsibility for our intolerant behaviour is blamed on them.
The intolerance comes not from us but from them. We have to learn to act in that
way, implying that it goes against our nature, whereas they are inherently intolerant.
Furthermore, we do not seek or like to be intolerant (Unfortunately) but we are forced
to it in order to defend our self-defining liberal values, making Muslims responsible
for the intolerance that we are forced to express in order to defend and preserve our
virtuousness.

Justifying discrimination

357

Discussion
This article had two theoretical aims related to the justification of out-group discrimination. First, the analysis provides an empirical investigation of the five steps of the
development of collective hate (Reicher et al., 2008). Second, I investigated how the
distinction between out-group ideology and out-group psychology functions to ward off
accusations of prejudice and discrimination.
The five-step model presents a theoretical account of how representations of us
and them legitimate inequality and make discriminatory measures understandable,
acceptable, and even morally necessary. Social psychological research on prejudice and
discrimination examines individual trait-like differences and group-level perceptions and
motivations, as well as the role of the endorsement of legitimizing ideologies. However,
this research neglects to examine the justification of discrimination as a rhetorically
delicate accomplishment that involves in-group as much as out-group representations.
In addition, this research tends to ignore the critical role of political leaders (see Allport,
1954; Reicher, 2007).
I have tried to show that the five-step model offers a useful framework for examining
processes of discrimination in a novel manner. Discrimination involves categorization,
and making distinctions is a social and political process with many possible outcomes
depending on the ways in which the categories are defined. In Wilders rhetoric, a strong
solution to the Islam question becomes a form of self-defence, which is acceptable and
legitimate. In a manner similar to political speeches of George Bush and Tony Blair (Lazar
& Lazar, 2004), Wilders uses the metaphor of war to present a confrontational view of
the relationship in which Islam is the hideous attacker responsible for the fight, whilst
our way of life is attacked giving us the right to defend ourselves. However, in trying
not to antagonize Muslim allies in their war on terror, Bush and Blair defined Islam as a
religion of peace, tolerance, and progress that is perverted by Muslim extremists (Lazar
& Lazar, 2004). In contrast, and similar to the British National Party (Wood & Finlay,
2008), Wilders works up a reified and intrinsically violent image of Islam. His political
project is not an international coalition against Muslim terrorism but rather the fight
against the Islamization of the Netherlands and the West more generally.
According to Wilders, our culture represents the good that is threatened by a barbaric
Islam. In this representation, discriminatory measures become not only acceptable but
morally necessary: a fight of good versus evil. In this fight, we sometimes are forced to act
in ways that go against our peace-loving and tolerant nature. Furthermore, in this moral
universe, leaders, such as Wilders, who dare to speak up and defend our virtues have
moral strength whereas those leaders who do not, are defined as traitors and cowards
(Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2011).
The systematic distinction that Wilders makes between out-group ideology (Islam)
and out-group psychology (Muslims) is an interesting type of rhetorical work that
mitigates against accusations of prejudice. A focus on Islam draws attention away
from human groups or social identities, which makes Wilders proposals to limit and
forbid Islamic schools, Mosques, the Koran, and other visible signs of this religion,
understandable. Criticizing a system of belief is more acceptable than stereotyping or
rejecting a group of people, and is part of what is expected of a politician. In addition,
defining a system of belief as being unequal to our norms and values is more acceptable
than labelling a group of people inferior. Notions of equality depend on categorization
and, as Wilders argues, because Islam is unequal to us, it is not discriminatory to treat
Islam in a different way. This use of the equality trope differs somewhat from what is

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Maykel Verkuyten

discussed in research on majority members talk on racial issues and inter-group relations
(Augoustinos, Tuffin, & Every, 2005; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Such research shows
that the notion of equality is interpreted in terms of equal opportunities rather than
equal outcomes and can be used to argue against affirmative action policies that would
discriminate against the majority group. The current analysis indicates that the notion
of equality is related to categorization. Some things are simply more equal than others
making differential treatment non-discriminatory.
This analysis indicates that social psychologists should not assume that politicians,
and people more generally, necessarily represent religious or national (Abell et al.,
2006; Condor, 2006) identities in terms of person categories with the associated
stereotypic characterizations. The focus in social psychology on person categories
is important but also limits our understanding of prejudice and discrimination. For
example, the social identity perspective is concerned with social comparisons, within
and between person category differences, prototypes, and levels of abstraction (Turner &
Reynolds, 2001). However, important constructs such as ethnicity, nation, and religion
are sometimes defined and represented in non-human ways that have political and
everyday implications. Systems of belief can be used as rhetorical substitutes for groups
of people. Compared to these groups, a system of belief is more uniform, more easy to
criticise, and more useful for justifying exclusion and discrimination.
The social psychological focus on human categories can also be limiting when
it comes to finding solutions to inter-group conflicts. Contact theory, for example,
is based on the proposition that people make erroneous generalizations about outgroup individuals who they do not know personally. Meaningful contact with out-group
members would reduce stereotypes and prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Dixon,
Durrheim, and Tredoux (2005) argue that participants own frameworks of meaning are
critical for understanding the effects of contact and they emphasize the importance of
peoples own constructions of contact situations. In this regard, the current analysis
suggests that it is also important to consider whether people represent categories in
social or ideological terms. This might mean that meaningful contact can improve
attitudes towards Muslims (Velasco Gonzalez et al., 2008), but that contact does not
necessarily reduce Islamophobia in which Islam is the enemy, rather than Muslims as
a group of people (Bleich, 2010; for a criticism of the concept of Islamophobia, see
Halliday, 1999). Individuals who have relatively positive attitudes towards Muslims might
be unwilling to attribute the same rights to Islam (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). This
could mean that Islamophobia does not necessarily implies anti-Muslim feelings, and
it might also be possible that people are negative about Muslim immigrants who are
changing our traditional ways of life without necessarily rejecting Islam as a system of
belief.
In conclusion, I have tried to show how Wilders persuades the public of the need for
discriminatory measures against Muslim citizens. The analysis offers empirical evidence
for the social identity model of the development of collective hate (Reicher et al., 2008).
Justification of discrimination is a rhetorically complex accomplishment that involves not
only how others are defined but also how we define ourselves. It is this combination
of category constructions that makes Wilders policy proposals more acceptable and
even morally necessary. There is an ideological battle taking place in society over the
place of Islam in the western world and the ability to create convincing definitions
requires rhetorical skill, especially when there are discriminatory consequences. The
distinction between person categories and other types of categories and the strategic
use of the latter as a substitute for the former seem particularly important for social

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359

psychologists to examine in future studies. In addition, it is critically important to

examine leadership processes in studying prejudice and discrimination (Reicher, 2007).
Allport (1954) devoted a chapter on demagogues in The nature of prejudice, but social
psychological research has mostly ignored the role of political leadership.

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