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ENBANC
ABBOTT
LABORATORIES,
CECILLE
A.
PHILIPPINES,
TERRIBLE, EDWIN D. FEIST,
MARIA OLIVIA T. YABUTC.
MISA,
TERES ITA
BERNARDO, AND ALLAN G.
ALMAZAR,
Petitioners,
-versusPEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ,
Respondent.
Present:
SERENO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
REYES,
PERLAS-BERNABE, and
LEONEN,JJ.
..~
Promulgated:
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------~
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision 2
dated December 10,2009 and Resolution 3 dated June 9, 2010 ofthe Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101045 which pronounced that the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it ruled that respondent Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz (Alcaraz)
was illegally dismissed from her employment.
Ro//o(G.R.No.192571),pp.l4-58.
Id. at I 040-1054. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias Dicdican, with Associate Justices Remedios A.
Salazar-Fernando and Romeo F. Barza, concuiTing.
Id. at I 139-1140.
Decision
The Facts
On June 27, 2004, petitioner Abbott Laboratories, Philippines
(Abbott) caused the publication in a major broadsheet newspaper of its need
for a Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager (Regulatory Affairs
Manager) who would: (a) be responsible for drug safety surveillance
operations, staffing, and budget; (b) lead the development and
implementation of standard operating procedures/policies for drug safety
surveillance and vigilance; and (c) act as the primary interface with internal
and external customers regarding safety operations and queries.4 Alcaraz
who was then a Regulatory Affairs and Information Manager at Aventis
Pasteur Philippines, Incorporated (another pharmaceutical company like
Abbott) showed interest and submitted her application on October 4,
2004.5
On December 7, 2004, Abbott formally offered Alcaraz the abovementioned position which was an item under the companys Hospira
Affiliate Local Surveillance Unit (ALSU) department.6 In Abbotts offer
sheet,7 it was stated that Alcaraz was to be employed on a probationary
basis.8 Later that day, she accepted the said offer and received an electronic
mail (e-mail) from Abbotts Recruitment Officer, petitioner Teresita C.
Bernardo (Bernardo), confirming the same. Attached to Bernardos e-mail
were Abbotts organizational chart and a job description of Alcarazs work.9
On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment contract which
stated, inter alia, that she was to be placed on probation for a period of six
(6) months beginning February 15, 2005 to August 14, 2005. The said
contract was also signed by Abbotts General Manager, petitioner Edwin
Feist (Feist):10
PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT
Dear Pearl,
After having successfully passed the pre-employment requirements, you
are hereby appointed as follows:
4
5
6
8
9
10
Id. at 74.
Id. at 75-76.
Id. at 51-52. Based on Abbotts organizational structure, the Regulatory Affairs Manager was under
the umbrella of Hospira ALSU, a sub-department in Abbotts Hospital Care Division. ALSU serves as
a transition body of Hospira, Inc., a corporation based in the United States of America, while it is in
the process of organization in the Philippines. Abbott intended to cede the qualified employees under
ALSU to Hospira once the latter obtained its own legal personality to engage in business in the
Philippines.
Id. at 165-168. Abbott sent Alcaraz an initial offer sheet on December 1, 2004. The compensation
contained therein was re-negotiated and thus, the increased offer as per the offer sheet dated December
7, 2004.
Id. at 167-168.
Id. at 127, 169-172.
Id. at 174.
Decision
3
Position Title
Department
: Probationary
: February 15, 2005 to August 14, 2005
: P110,000.00/ month
It is understood that you agree to abide by all existing policies, rules and
regulations of the company, as well as those, which may be hereinafter
promulgated.
Unless renewed, probationary appointment expires on the date indicated
subject to earlier termination by the Company for any justifiable reason.
If you agree to the terms and conditions of your employment, please
signify your conformity below and return a copy to HRD.
Welcome to Abbott!
Very truly yours,
Sgd.
EDWIN D. FEIST
General Manager
CONFORME:
Sgd.
PEARLIE ANN FERRER-ALCARAZ
Decision
Hospira ALSU are required to use two identification cards: one, to identify
them as Abbotts employees and another, to identify them as Hospira
employees.11
On March 3, 2005, petitioner Maria Olivia T. Yabut-Misa (Misa),
Abbotts Human Resources (HR) Director, sent Alcaraz an e-mail which
contained an explanation of the procedure for evaluating the performance of
probationary employees and further indicated that Abbott had only one
evaluation system for all of its employees. Alcaraz was also given copies of
Abbotts Code of Conduct and Probationary Performance Standards and
Evaluation (PPSE) and Performance Excellence Orientation Modules
(Performance Modules) which she had to apply in line with her task of
evaluating the Hospira ALSU staff.12
Abbotts PPSE procedure mandates that the job performance of a
probationary employee should be formally reviewed and discussed with the
employee at least twice: first on the third month and second on the fifth
month from the date of employment. The necessary Performance
Improvement Plan should also be made during the third-month review in
case of a gap between the employees performance and the standards set.
These performance standards should be discussed in detail with the
employee within the first two (2) weeks on the job. It was equally required
that a signed copy of the PPSE form must be submitted to Abbotts Human
Resources Department (HRD) and shall serve as documentation of the
employees performance during his/her probationary period. This shall form
the basis for recommending the confirmation or termination of the
probationary employment.13
During the course of her employment, Alcaraz noticed that some of
the staff had disciplinary problems. Thus, she would reprimand them for
their unprofessional behavior such as non-observance of the dress code,
moonlighting, and disrespect of Abbott officers. However, Alcarazs method
of management was considered by Walsh to be too strict.14 Alcaraz
approached Misa to discuss these concerns and was told to lie low and let
Walsh handle the matter. Misa even assured her that Abbotts HRD would
support her in all her management decisions.15
On April 12, 2005, Alcaraz received an e-mail from Misa requesting
immediate action on the staffs performance evaluation as their probationary
periods were about to end. This Alcaraz eventually submitted.16
11
12
13
14
15
16
Id. at 127-128.
Id. at 1042-1043.
Id.
Id. at 1044.
Id.
Id.
Decision
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Id. at 1044-1045.
Id. at 1045.
Id.
Id. at 1046.
Id. at 1047.
Id. at 19-21, 78, and 80-81.
Id. at 1047.
Id. at 255. See Labor Arbiter (LA) Decision dated March 30, 2006.
Formerly, Article 281 of the Labor Code; renumbered pursuant to Republic Act No. 10151.
Decision
contended that while her employment contract stated that she was to be
engaged on a probationary status, the same did not indicate the standards on
which her regularization would be based.26 She further averred that the
individual petitioners maliciously connived to illegally dismiss her when: (a)
they threatened her with termination; (b) she was ordered not to enter
company premises even if she was still an employee thereof; and (c) they
publicly announced that she already resigned in order to humiliate her.27
On the contrary, petitioners maintained that Alcaraz was validly
terminated from her probationary employment given her failure to satisfy the
prescribed standards for her regularization which were made known to her at
the time of her engagement.28
The LA Ruling
In a Decision dated March 30, 2006,29 the LA dismissed Alcarazs
complaint for lack of merit.
The LA rejected Alcarazs argument that she was not informed of the
reasonable standards to qualify as a regular employee considering her
admissions that she was briefed by Almazar on her work during her preemployment orientation meeting30 and that she received copies of Abbotts
Code of Conduct and Performance Modules which were used for evaluating
all types of Abbott employees.31 As Alcaraz was unable to meet the
standards set by Abbott as per her performance evaluation, the LA ruled that
the termination of her probationary employment was justified.32 Lastly, the
LA found that there was no evidence to conclude that Abbotts officers and
employees acted in bad faith in terminating Alcarazs employment.33
Displeased with the LAs ruling, Alcaraz filed an appeal with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The NLRC Ruling
On September 15, 2006, the NLRC rendered a Decision,34 annulling
and setting aside the LAs ruling, the dispositive portion of which reads:
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
Decision
PhP 1,650,000.00
110,000.00
PhP 1,760,000.00
35
The NLRC reversed the findings of the LA and ruled that there was
no evidence showing that Alcaraz had been apprised of her probationary
status and the requirements which she should have complied with in order to
be a regular employee.36 It held that Alcarazs receipt of her job description
and Abbotts Code of Conduct and Performance Modules was not equivalent
to her being actually informed of the performance standards upon which she
should have been evaluated on.37 It further observed that Abbott did not
comply with its own standard operating procedure in evaluating
probationary employees.38 The NLRC was also not convinced that Alcaraz
was terminated for a valid cause given that petitioners allegation of
Alcarazs poor performance remained unsubstantiated.39
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
NLRC in a Resolution dated July 31, 2007.40
35
36
37
38
39
40
Id. at 377-378.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 370-373.
Id. at 413-416. Penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go, with Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C.
Nograles and Commissioner Perlita B. Velasco, concurring.
Decision
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
Id. at 417-450.
Id. at 1403.
Id.
Id. at 1040-1054.
Id at 1052.
Id.
Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1139-1140.
Id. at 1218.
Decision
writ of execution before the LA. On June 7, 2010, petitioners received the
LAs order granting Alcarazs motion for execution which they in turn
appealed to the NLRC through a Memorandum of Appeal dated June 16,
2010 (June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal ) on the ground that the
implementation of the LAs order would render its motion for
reconsideration moot and academic.50
Meanwhile, petitioners motion for reconsideration of the CAs May
18, 2010 Resolution in the Second CA Petition was denied via a Resolution
dated October 4, 2010.51 This attained finality on January 10, 2011 for
petitioners failure to timely appeal the same.52 Hence, as it stands, only the
issues in the First CA petition are left to be resolved.
Incidentally, in her Comment dated November 15, 2010, Alcaraz also
alleges that petitioners were guilty of forum shopping when they filed the
Second CA Petition pending the resolution of their motion for
reconsideration of the CAs December 10, 2009 Decision i.e., the decision in
the First CA Petition.53 She also contends that petitioners have not complied
with the certification requirement under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court when they failed to disclose in the instant petition the filing of the
June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal filed before the NLRC.54
The Issues Before the Court
The following issues have been raised for the Courts resolution: (a)
whether or not petitioners are guilty of forum shopping and have violated the
certification requirement under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court; (b)
whether or not Alcaraz was sufficiently informed of the reasonable standards
to qualify her as a regular employee; (c) whether or not Alcaraz was validly
terminated from her employment; and (d) whether or not the individual
petitioners herein are liable.
The Courts Ruling
A.
Forum
Shopping
and
Violation of Section 5, Rule 7
of the Rules of Court.
50
51
52
53
54
Id.
Id. at 1219.
Rollo (G.R. No. 193976), p. 30.
Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), pp.1223-1228.
Id. at 1224.
Decision
10
under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. In Sps. Ong v. CA,55 the Court
explained that:
x x x The distinction between the prohibition against forum
shopping and the certification requirement should by now be too
elementary to be misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the
certification against forum shopping is separate from and independent of
the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in
the treatment between failure to comply with the certification requirement
and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms
of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The
former constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice [to
the filing] of the complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and after
hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and for
direct contempt. x x x. 56
55
56
57
58
Decision
11
by not disclosing the fact that it filed the June 16, 2010 Memorandum of
Appeal before the NLRC in the instant petition.
In this regard, Section 5(b), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that
a plaintiff who files a case should provide a complete statement of the
present status of any pending case if the latter involves the same issues as
the one that was filed. If there is no such similar pending case, Section 5(a)
of the same rule provides that the plaintiff is obliged to declare under oath
that to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending.
Records show that the issues raised in the instant petition and those in
the June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal filed with the NLRC likewise
cover different subject matters and causes of action. In this case, the validity
of Alcarazs dismissal is at issue whereas in the said Memorandum of
Appeal, the propriety of the issuance of a writ of execution was in question.
Thus, given the dissimilar issues, petitioners did not have to disclose in the
present petition the filing of their June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal
with the NLRC. In any event, considering that the issue on the propriety of
the issuance of a writ of execution had been resolved in the Second CA
Petition which in fact had already attained finality the matter of
disclosing the June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal is now moot and
academic.
Having settled the foregoing procedural matter, the Court now
proceeds to resolve the substantive issues.
B.
Probationary
employment;
grounds for termination.
59
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading
has been filed.
xxxx
Robinsons Galleria/Robinsons Supermarket Corporation v. Ranchez, G.R. No. 177937, January 19,
2011, 640 SCRA 135, 142.
Decision
12
60
61
62
Id.
Id. at 145.
495 Phil. 706, 716-717 (2005).
Decision
13
Decision
14
63
64
Decision
15
Probationary
employment;
termination procedure.
65
Refers to the procedure stated in Article 291(b) of the Labor Code, as renumbered pursuant to
Republic Act No. 10151, viz.:
Article 291. Miscellaneous Provisions.
xxxx
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be
protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice
to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the
worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a
statement of the cause for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in
accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set
by the Department of Labor and Employment.
xxxx
This procedure is also found in Section 2(d), Rule I, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code which state:
xxxx
(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process
shall be substantially observed:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 [now,
Article 296] of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the
assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.
66
Decision
16
this written notice sufficiently meets the criteria set forth above, thereby
legitimizing the cause and manner of Alcarazs dismissal as a probationary
employee under the parameters set by the Labor Code.67
D.
Employers
company
procedure.
violation
policy
of
and
67
68
69
Id. at 1047.
170 S.W.3d 354 (Ky. 2005).
Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), p. 1052.
Decision
17
PPSE form should be submitted to Abbotts HRD as the same would serve
as basis for recommending the confirmation or termination of the
probationary employment.70
In this case, it is apparent that Abbott failed to follow the above-stated
procedure in evaluating Alcaraz. For one, there lies a hiatus of evidence that
a signed copy of Alcarazs PPSE form was submitted to the HRD. It was not
even shown that a PPSE form was completed to formally assess her
performance. Neither was the performance evaluation discussed with her
during the third and fifth months of her employment. Nor did Abbott come
up with the necessary Performance Improvement Plan to properly gauge
Alcarazs performance with the set company standards.
While it is Abbotts management prerogative to promulgate its own
company rules and even subsequently amend them, this right equally
demands that when it does create its own policies and thereafter notify its
employee of the same, it accords upon itself the obligation to faithfully
implement them. Indeed, a contrary interpretation would entail a
disharmonious relationship in the work place for the laborer should never be
mired by the uncertainty of flimsy rules in which the latters labor rights and
duties would, to some extent, depend.
In this light, while there lies due cause to terminate Alcarazs
probationary employment for her failure to meet the standards required for
her regularization, and while it must be further pointed out that Abbott had
satisfied its statutory duty to serve a written notice of termination, the fact
that it violated its own company procedure renders the termination of
Alcarazs employment procedurally infirm, warranting the payment of
nominal damages. A further exposition is apropos.
Case law has settled that an employer who terminates an employee for
a valid cause but does so through invalid procedure is liable to pay the latter
nominal damages.
In Agabon v. NLRC (Agabon),71 the Court pronounced that where the
dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not
nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the
employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory
rights.72 Thus, in Agabon, the employer was ordered to pay the employee
nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00.73
70
71
72
73
Id. at 1043.
G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 573.
Id. at 616.
Id. at 620.
Decision
18
Proceeding from the same ratio, the Court modified Agabon in the
case of Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot (Jaka)74 where it created
a distinction between procedurally defective dismissals due to a just cause,
on one hand, and those due to an authorized cause, on the other.
It was explained that if the dismissal is based on a just cause under
Article 282 of the Labor Code (now Article 296) but the employer failed to
comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him
should be tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by
an act imputable to the employee; if the dismissal is based on an authorized
cause under Article 283 (now Article 297) but the employer failed to comply
with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the
dismissal process was initiated by the employers exercise of his
management prerogative.75 Hence, in Jaka, where the employee was
dismissed for an authorized cause of retrenchment76 as contradistinguished
from the employee in Agabon who was dismissed for a just cause of neglect
of duty77 the Court ordered the employer to pay the employee nominal
damages at the higher amount of P50,000.00.
Evidently, the sanctions imposed in both Agabon and Jaka proceed
from the necessity to deter employers from future violations of the statutory
due process rights of employees.78 In similar regard, the Court deems it
proper to apply the same principle to the case at bar for the reason that an
employers contractual breach of its own company procedure albeit not
statutory in source has the parallel effect of violating the laborers rights.
Suffice it to state, the contract is the law between the parties and thus,
breaches of the same impel recompense to vindicate a right that has been
violated. Consequently, while the Court is wont to uphold the dismissal of
Alcaraz because a valid cause exists, the payment of nominal damages on
account of Abbotts contractual breach is warranted in accordance with
Article 2221 of the Civil Code.79
74
75
76
77
78
79
Decision
E.
Liability
petitioners
officers.
19
of
as
individual
corporate
A judicious perusal of the records show that other than her unfounded
assertions on the matter, there is no evidence to support the fact that the
individual petitioners herein, in their capacity as Abbotts officers and
employees, acted in bad faith or were motivated by ill will in terminating
Alcarazs services. The fact that Alcaraz was made to resign and not allowed
to enter the workplace does not necessarily indicate bad faith on Abbotts
part since a sufficient ground existed for the latter to actually proceed with
her termination. On the alleged loss of her personal belongings, records are
bereft of any showing that the same could be attributed to Abbott or any of
its officers. It is a well-settled rule that bad faith cannot be presumed and he
who alleges bad faith has the onus of proving it. All told, since Alcaraz
failed to prove any malicious act on the part of Abbott or any of its officers,
the Court finds the award of moral or exemplary damages unwarranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
December 10, 2009 and Resolution dated June 9, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101045 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 30, 2006 of the Labor
Arbiter is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines be ORDERED to pay respondent Pearlie
80
81
Carag v. NLRC, 548 Phil. 581, 605 (2007), citing McLeod v. NLRC, 541 Phil. 214, 242 (2007).
Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), pp. 262, 1046.
20
Decision
ESTELA
~E~-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
~~~~
~LLO
Associate Justice
~S.VILL
Q~~
Associate Justice
~
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Decision
21
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.