Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
A.The Regalian Doctrine i. Paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution:
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production,
joint venture orproduction-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within. Private ownership is presumed to belong to the State. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or
disposable, and subsequently alienated by the State, it remains part of the public domain. Occupation or possession thereof by a person
in the concept of owner, no matter how long cannot ripen in ownership
Anyone who applies for confirmation of imperfect title
has burden of proof to overcome the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of
public domain (Regalian doctrine)
Regalian doctrine - All lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. All lands not otherwise
clearly appearing to be privately-owned are presumed to belong to the State.
On 24 March 1998, respondent requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali fence and restore the concrete fence. On 20 May
1998, Mayor Domalanta informed respondent that the construction of the building of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but that
he was willing to discuss with respondent to resolve the problem concerning Lot 736.
On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of Illegal Constructions, Injunction and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan. On 24 August 1998, the trial court ordered the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction.
On 4 January 2000, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Lingayen-Dagupan]:
1.
2.
Ordering the defendants to cause to be restored the concrete wall with iron railings, to cause to be
removed the sawali fence, both at the expense of the defendants, jointly and severally, and
3.
Condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally, to the plaintiff the amount of P25,000.00 as
litigation expenses, attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00 and the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with the modification that the awards of litigation expenses, attorneys fees, and
costs should be deleted. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration of the Municipality of Binmaley and
the Rural Bank of Anda.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley are valid.
The Ruling of the Court
This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands and waters of the public domain. [17] Thus,
under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
state.
Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government lands without prior grant from the government.
[18]
Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley exceeded its authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104
and 105. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void and consequently, the contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley
and the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 October 2001 and the Resolution dated 23 August 2002
of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
2. DENR VS YAP
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD
No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all
unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such classification modified by the 1973
Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of
these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been
expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the
Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of
years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the
Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot
be assumed. They call for proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President
Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of
each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
NOTES:
1. Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the
President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time,
the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending
upon the preponderance of the evidence. Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of Public Land Act, gave
the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusiveprerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest. Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification
of lands of the public domain.
2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the
other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the
Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each
case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case
is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question
of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitutionclassifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest
or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense
growths of trees and underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestryis particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may
have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops
by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land as a classification of lands of the
public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a
classification for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its
physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it
has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and
other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their
occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or
protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from
certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill now pending in the House of Representatives
Munoz, which was unfortunately not acted upon by the proper authorities. This court however cannot sustain this argument. As well
settled in jurisprudence, it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show a positive act of the government
such as presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigations,
legislative act or a statue or certification from the government that the land applied for is alienable and disposable which the
respondent failed to secure. The court cannot approve the application for registration due to failure to prove that the land is alienable
and disposable.
1. TIPTON VS ANDUEZA
On the 30th day of October, 1899, Vicente Aguirre y Flores, as administrator of the San Lazaro Hospital, leased to the defendant in
this case a tract of land belonging to the hospital. It was stipulated in the contract that the lease should run for a period of ten years
from the 1st day of January, 1899. Aguirre, the administrator, was duly authorized to execute such contracts, but his power was
general in terms and contained no provision specially authorizing him to make leases with respect to the hospital property for a period
of ten years or any other specific term.
The plaintiff, as the present administrator of the hospital property, claims that the contract made by his predecessor, Aguirre, was null
and void for want of power on his part to make such contract, basing his contention upon the provisions of article 1548 of the Civil
Code. That article reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The husband with respect to the property of his wife, the father and guardian with regard to that of his children or minor, and the
administrator of property without a special power giving him such authority, can not execute a lease for a period exceeding six
years."cralaw virtua1aw library
This provision plainly shows that Aguirre could not, as administrator, have validly executed a lease of the land in question for a period
of ten years in the absence of special authority to that effect. This, in our opinion, vitiated the contract. This defect, however, did not
affect the contract in its entirety, but only in so far as it exceeded the six-year limit fixed by law as the maximum period for which an
administrator can execute a lease without special power. The contract in question was perfectly valid in so far as it did not exceed that
limit, having been executed by the administrator, Aguirre, within the scope of the legal authority he had under his general power to
lease. That general power carried with it, under the article above quoted, the authority to lease the property for a period not exceeding
six years. There was no excess of authority and consequently no cause for nullification arising therefrom, as to the first six years of the
lease. As to the last four, the contract was, however, void, the administrator having acted beyond the scope of his powers.
The trial court construed article 1548 of the Civil Code as applying only to administrators of estates of deceased persons. This
construction is manifestly erroneous. The provisions of that article are general and apply as well to administrators of property of living
as of deceased persons.
It is contended, on the other hand, by the defendant, that article 1548 is not applicable to public lands such as the property in question,
nor to public officials as was Vicente Aguirre, the administrator of the San Lazaro Hospital.
As to the first contention, it is not stated in defendants brief in what sense the words "public lands" are used. It seems, however, that
the defendant refers to lands of the public domain. He testified at the trial that the lands of the San Lazaro Hospital belonged to the
Government of the United States. If such were the case his interpretation of these words would be erroneous. That property belongs to
the public domain which is destined to public use or which belongs exclusively to the State without being devoted to common use or
which is destined to some public service or to the development of the national resources and of mines until transferred to private
persons. (Art. 339 of the Civil Code.) The land in question does not pertain to any of these classes. The best proof of it is that the
defendant himself had been using it for his own personal and exclusive benefit. So that, assuming without deciding that the land in
question belonged to the Government of the United States, it would be nevertheless private property under the provisions of articles
340 and 345 of the Civil Code, and as such, unless provided for by special legislation, is subject to the provisions of those articles. The
defendant has not called our attention to any special law providing a method different from that contained in the Civil Code for the
leasing of the lands belonging to the San Lazaro Hospital, and we do not know of the existence of any such law.
As to public officials, the only reason given by defendant in support of his contention that article 1548 does not apply to them is that it
would be impossible for the Government to make a lease for a period, exceeding six years, because it has no legal capacity and must
necessarily transact all its business through the medium of officials. This contention can not be sustained. It is a manifest error to say
that the Government has no legal capacity or that if has no power to grant special authority to one of its officials for the leasing of
Government property for a period exceeding six years, if deemed advisable. This is so apparent that it certainly requires no argument.
It is claimed, however, that Government officials do not act by virtue of any special power but under the law creating their respective
offices, and that for this reason they are no affected by the provisions of article 1548, which refer to administrators whose acts may be
governed by the limitations of a power of attorney. We think that this is a mere question of words. Power, according to text writers,
means the authority granted by one person to another to do in his behalf the same thing which he would do himself in the premises.
This is the sense in which the word power is used in that article and it refers to the private individual who administers property
belonging to another as well as to the public official who administers patrimonial property or the private property belonging to the
State. Such property, whether owned by the State or by a private citizen, is covered by the provisions of the Civil Code. In either case
the administrator, in so far as he has the management of the property of another, is a mere agent whose acts must be governed by the
limitations of the power which his principal may have conferred upon him. In neither case can he exceed these limitations, but must
discharge his trust in accordance with his instructions. A public official is not, as such, exempt from the operation of this rule. He can
not assume that he has the power to lease to others the patrimonial property belonging to the State for such time as he may see fit, say,
for eighty or ninety years. He can not do so unless expressly authorized. Whether the administrator derives his powers from a
legislative enactment, as in the case of a public official, or from the terms of a public instrument where private parties only are
concerned, is immaterial. It is a mere question of form which does not affect the provision of the code above cited. What the law
requires in order that the administrator may lease the property for a period exceeding six years is special power giving him such
authority. The grant must be contained in a public document. (Art. 1280 of the Civil Code.) A public document may be either a public
instrument or a legislative enactment, for legislative acts are also public documents under our code.
Furthermore it is very doubtful whether Aguirre was in fact a public official as the administrator of the San Lazaro estate. This
question, however, was not raised in the court below, no evidence bearing on the subject having been introduced. We have merely
assumed that he was such for the sake of argument.
It is further contended by the defendant that the complaint does not state a cause of action. This is not true. A mere perusal of the
complaint will show the contrary. We hold that the facts therein set forth constitute a sufficient cause of action.
It is also contended that there is no allegation with respect to the interest of the plaintiff in this action. Without passing upon the
correctness of this allegation which refers to the legal capacity of the plaintiff, it may be said that as no question was raised as to this
point in the court below it can not be urged on appeal.
The court below expressly found that the Government had collected rent for four years and held that it had thereby ratified the
contract. This question was not discussed in the court below and, legally speaking, the court should not and could not have made any
such finding. We hold that this was error on the part of the trial court.
The judgment of the court below is hereby modified so as to declare that the lease in question was valid only for six years from the 1st
day of January, 1899, to the 31st of December, 1904, and void as to the last four years of the contract term that is to say, the effects
of its nullity should date from the 1st day of January, 1905. The defendant shall return the land in the form and manner provided for in
the lease together with the proceeds derived from its possession since the last-mentioned date. The plaintiff will return to the defendant
the rent received during the same period, provided the rent has in fact been paid to him, with legal interest thereon at the rate of 6 per
cent per annum. No costs will be allowed to either party in either instance. After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered
in accordance herewith and let the case be remanded to the court below for action in conformity herewith. So ordered.
2. TDC vs Manila
WALA KO MAHANAP