Pakistan Institute of International Affairs

ENVIRONMENTAL TYPOLOGIES AND PAKISTAN'S SECURITY

Author(s): Syed Farooq Hasnat
Source: Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 40, No. 1 (First Quarter 1987), pp. 51-64
Published by: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs
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ENVIRONMENTAL

TYPOLOGIES

AND PAKISTAN S SECURITY

Syed Farooq Hasnat

Securityof a nation can be appropriatelyassessed by looking at

factorswhichbecome responsiblein alteringthe policymakingapparatus.
of its environmentmust be
In the case of Pakistanthe understanding
analysedif accurate resultsare to be achieved.
the
In this articlewe will be dealingwith the typesof environment
their
foreignpolicy
policymakersof Pakistanencounterwhile executing
the
from
be
A
must
made
clarification
because,apart
geographical
options.

setting,there are othervariableswhichcan accountfortheenvironment

as they have the requiredcapacityto influencethe foreignpolicymaking
process.1 However,we will confineourselvesto the criteriabased on the
frequencyand degree of foreigninteractions.The distanceof Pakistan
fromthe regionalas well as global actors, accordingto our scheme of
factor.
analysis,becomes less of an influencing
If a unit has to survive,it mustadapt itselfto its environmentor
alternativelyshould have enough capacityto changeits surroundingsas
according to its requirements.The question of adaptabilitytherefore
remainsthe keyto a nation'ssecurity.The mannerin whichit is achieved
and the methodsadopted could varyaccordingto the circumstances
of
different
countries.Nationsadaptto enhancetheirmilitary
capabilitiesso

thattheycan acquire a betterbargaining

leveragewiththe environmental
I. Harold
andMargaret
in theStudy
Factors
ofInternational
"Environmental
Sprout,
N. Rosenau,
Politics
andForeign
Politics,"
: AReader
ed.,James
Internatiopal
inResearch
Policy
andTheory
(NewYork:TheFreePress,1969).
5!

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forces. However, countries like Austria, because of their peculiar

are able to relymoreon theirdiplomaticmanoeuvring
rather
circumstances,
than gainingin military
strength. Countrieswithdifferent
requirements

can combine both the factors so that their weakness in military

capabilitycan be bridged by diplomacy. The basic condition remains
that environmentshould firstbe identifiedbased on objective security

interestsof a nation. Negligence in performingthe responsibilities

cannot solve even minor problems. The followingargumentsare
relevant to our propositions:

Vital interestscannot be defendedby detachmentand dissociation,

but nor should they be defendedby embracing the statusquo or

unattractiveregimes. What is required is an enhanced reputation

for decisivenessand credibilityin defenceof a country... and a
diplomacythat is persistent,selective and modulated.2
In order to obtainthe desiredsecurityobjectives,the policymakers
of Pakistanare expectedto understandwithclaritythe numberof actors
involvedin their environment.Moreover,the readingof signalsin their
properperspectivebecomenecessaryinthe avoidanceofsecuritythreats.3
Ifwe glanceat the past historywe observethatPakistan'sperception
of its potentialadversariesand friendshas been almostconsistent.Most
of the time,the foreignpolicyhas been constitutedby the bureaucratic
structures- unrepresentedin nature - and thereby have failed to

reflectthe genuinedesiresof the populationin theirforeignpolicypreferences. In our analysiswe will base our findingson the actionstaken
by the rulingelite but at the same instancewould pointout the misperceptions of the foreignpolicy makingapparatus. In other words the
environmental
considerationsof Pakistan'sforeignpolicywould be taken
as the global adjustmentsin termsof frequencyof interactionwith the
internationalactors.

2. Shahram
StatesandtheThirdWorld:Motives,
"TheUnited
Chubin,
Objectives,
Third
andInternational
World
Policies,"
ed.,Christoph
Bertram,
Conflict
Security
(London:
The Macmillan
Press,1982),p. 87.
3. GeraldSegal,TheGreatPowerTriangle
Press,1982),
(London:The Macmillan
p. 153.
52

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The above observationsare made, keepingin view the factthat th

ignoringof "congenial environment"is not confinedto Pakistanalone.
The tendencyexistsin otherdevelopingnationsas well. As notedabove,
the people at large do not participatein the formationof foreignpolicy.
In these countries,vested interestslike the bureaucraticstructureswith
as World Bankor International
theirlinkswithsuchorganizations
Monetary
as well as the feudaisalongwiththe
Fundis not uncommon.The military
play an equally importantrole in
newlyemergingclass of industrialists
the executionof a country'sforeignbehaviour- thus shiftinga nation
the genuinedesiresof the
towardsan environmentwhichdoes not fulfill
masses. In such circumstancesthe genuine securityrequirementsare

ignoredthus exposingthe countryto externaldangers. The state which

is unable to controlthe pressuregroups of its societyfrompermeating
on its foreignpolicyendeavourscan be regardedas the weakest.4 Here
it should be clarifiedthat we are discussingthose pressuregroupswhich
havetheirown institutionalized
interests,and do not representthe views
of the generalwill of the people.5

also occurswherea nationhas no control

ofenvironment
The shifting
over the circumstances.In thissituation,necessaryshiftsand adjustments
becomeinevitableinorderto movea countryawayfrompotentialdangers.
The externalenvironmentof Pakistanhas been in a state of fluxquite
frequently,thus desiringa degree of changein the policy orientations.
in the global set-up,caused bythe decline in the bipolar
The fluctuations
global systemin the mid 1960s,was the firstthreshold. The second came
in withthe loss of East Pakistanin 1971. The thirdturningpointwas the

emergenceof the Persian Gulf countries,i.e., their economic strength

from1973 onwards. In factthe changesin the global systemhas been a
continuous process. The following description of changes further
explainsour contentions:

RawMaterials
Investments
theNational
Interest:
D. Krasner,
4. Stephen
Defending
Princeton
NewJersey:
andU.S. Foreign
Press,1978),p. 56.
University
(Princeton,
Policy
debateby
afterthorough
thepoliciesareformulated
5. In democratic
societies,
ofthesociety.But therethe pressure
factions
various
groupsare notmonopolized
in democraticsocietieson occasions
by one group. In fact the government
the opposing
views.In non-democratic
withthe opposing
countries,
compromises
withan openmind.
are notaccepted
opinions
53

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There has been change in the natureof the major issues, e.g., the
cold war has turned into a detente and the North/Southconflict,
still continuing
which had started on the issue of anti-colonialism
about SouthernAfrica,has largelyshiftedto economicgrowth;there
has been changeinthe salienceofissue-areas- the gravityofinternational conflictshas moved fromsecurityto economics,resources,
and ecopolitics- and the majordangerspots whichhave gradually
shiftedfromEurope to the MiddleEast and Africa....6

The firstchangeinglobalset-upin the earlysixtiesgave-wayto more

inthe regionalmechanism,thus allowing the small and weak
flexibility
nationsto pursuetheir policies in a somewhat unrestrictedmanner.
However,there are somewriterswho stillbelievethatthe bigpowers, in

the formof"militaryor industrialpower", dominate the world politics

andthatthe role of the "ThirdWorld is negligible.*'7Our contentionis
thatthose militarily
weak nationswhichenjoythe supportof the masses
and are desirousto pursueindependentpolicies,can, in the prevailing
international
situationplaytheirrespectiverole. However,nationswhich
have startedto dependon the financialhelp of the big powersor relyon
the help ofthe big powers in their armamentrequirements,
loose their
relations.
of the international
independentcharacterin the affairs

The foreignpolicymakersof Pakistanadopteda subservientposition.

Pakistandid not take fulladvantageof the "new reality"of the situation
of detente and the rulingelite continuedto pursuethe statusquo. An
evidenceto this effectis givenwhen the outdatedalliancesystemin the

formofCENTO was carriedwell inthe late 1978. The loss ofEast Pakistan
towardsour securityshould have
in 1971 and the American-indifference
been a powerfulenoughcatalystto quit CENTO, butit never materialized. Moreover,the emergenceof the PersianGulfregionin 1973 should
also have been yet anotherreasonto leave the Americanbackedalliance
system. Such an action was necessaryfor a preferencefor more closer

m a Changing
Relations
World(Oxford:Oxford
6. JosephFrankel,
International
Press,1979),
p.200.
University
eds. HedleyBullandAdam
"A New International
7. Elie Kedourie,
Disorder,"
Clarendon
TheExpansion
International
Press,1984),p. 355.
Watson,
of
Society
(Oxford:
54

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relationswiththe PersianGulfcountriesin the fieldof commondefence

and security. We do recognizethat half-bakedeffortswere made to

establishclose contactswith the westernneighboursof Pakistan. Moreover such relationswere based on the principlesof limitedgains,in the
formof gettingforeignexchangeremittancefromthe Pakistanisworking
in that area and gettingsome grantsto purchasemilitaryequipment.
In otherwords,alternativesecurityunderstanding
as well as arrangementsshould have been made. In realityit was the Islamic Revolution
in Iran(1979) and itsconsequenceswhichsaw the collapseofthisoutdated
alliance. Otherwise,apparentlythe policy makerswere still not ready
to quit CENTO. On the otherhand, SEATO became ineffective
and
ultimatelycollapsed as the People's Republic of China and the United
States began to develop new understanding
of cooperation. The role of
Pakistanshould not have been that of a silent spectator. In fact, we
should have been more vigilantto the changingcircumstancesin our
regionalas well as global milieus. JamesN. Rosenau,narratesa policyof
adjustmentsas follows:"...The politicalorganismis alwaysexperiencing
both continuitiesand change,and thus it is always in motion,slipping
behind,movingahead, holdingfast,or otherwiseadjustingand changing
in responseto internaldevelopmentsand externalcircumstances."8
The propositionthatPakistanis a militarily
weak nationand,therefore,
cannotfreelyexerciseitsforeignpolicygoals,is disputedbysome analysts
of foreignpolicybahviour.There are a varietyof factorswhichcan compensate for being weak in militarystrength. For example, apart from
skilfuluse ofdiplomacy,whichwe havealreadymentioned,
thereare such
factorsas mobilizingof the masses (Iran is a good example); effective
ofa state.These elements,
leadershipand economicandsocialadvancement
"often enable small states to exercise influencetotallydisproportionate
to the rankand status accorded by the objective elementsof power."9
8. James
N. Rosenau,TheStudy
of Political
Printer,
Adaptation
(London:Frances
1981),p. I.
9. Agrippah
T. Mugomba,
"SmallDeveloping
StatesandtheExternal
Operational
TheYearBook
1979
underthe
Environment,"
, Vol.33,p. 212;Published
ofWorld
Affairs
oftheLondonInstitute
ofWorldAffairs.
auspices
55

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The degreeofimportance
given,eitheras a matterofoptionor imposed
fromthe external surroundings,is the core of the formulationof the
environmentaltypologiesof Pakistan'ssecurity. The physicalpresence
of a securitythreat,as well as the meansto avoid it, shouldbe takenin a
similarconceptual meaning. The considerationof neighbours,as being
the vitalfactorsby themselves,will be accepted withreservation.Howcannot
ever,at the sameinstancethe importanceofgeographical
continuity
be overlooked. We agree withJ.D.B. Millerwhen he writes,

to anystate,because of
been important
Neighbourshavetraditionally
the highincidenceof communication
with themthroughtrade and
travel;the possibilityof quarrelsover disputedborders;the problem
of what kindsof restrictionsare needed in order to ensure that
neighboursdo not gain too much advantage from one's own

situation;the effectsof havingsimilaror divergentethnicstock;and

so on. In a sense, neighbouringstates alwaysmatter,even though
they maynot matter mostro

Miller'sstatementcan be disputedin partswhenjudgedinthe context

of Pakistanisituation.For example,withIndia,Pakistandoes not maintain
situationdemands.
eithertradeor travelto a degreewhicha neighbouring
Similar is the case with present day Afghanistan.However, even the

absenceof sucha relationshippose securityconcernsas absenceof normal

conditionscreate tensions.

We can divide Pakistan'senvironmentinto three types. These

environmentaltypologiesare constructedkeepingin view the security
optionswhichthe policymakersof Pakistanshould keep in consideration
while executingthe options of our foreignpolicy. The typologiesareas
follows:
1. ImmediateAttentionType
2. NormalCircumstantial
Type
3. DistinctType.
CroomHelm,1981),p. 50.
10. J.D.B.Miller,
TheWorld
ofStates(London:
56

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The firstcategoryconsistsofthose actorswhichdirectlyor indirectly

affectthe vital concernsof Pakistan'ssecurity- either to maintainits
externalpostures,as according to its militaryand economic interests,
or to adopt internaldevelopmentalprogrammeswithout interference
frombig powers and multinational
corporations. The mere presenceof
the policyorientationofPakistan'ssecurity.
externalactorsdo notinfluence
But,once set in motionto pursuecertaingoals,the externalactorscreate
a situationwhich requires immediateattentionfrom our side. The

Immediate AttentionType environmentnot only includes situations

which pose securitythreat but would also incorporatefactorswhich,if
pursued,would notallow the emergenceofthe securitythreatto Pakistan.
We can dividethe firstcategoryintothe followingfivesub-divisions:
(ii) The United Statesas a supplier
(i) Russianoccupationof Afghanistan;
of armamentand economicaid; (iii) The historicalmistrustwith India;
withthe People's Republicof China;
(iv) Regularpatternof understanding
and (v) Sharingof securityconcernswith such Middle Eastern nations
as Saudi Arabia,Turkeyand Iran.

in December 1979and
(i) The Russianoccupation of Afghanistan
the continuouspresenceofthe RussiantroopsfocussedPakistan'sattention
towardsitswesternenvironment.Afghanistan
has beena sourceoftension
because of its Pakhtoonistan
policysince the independenceof Pakistanin
it
1947. However, never became a serious threatfor Pakistan'ssecurity
and thus remainedin the second categoryof the NormalCircumstantial
Type. In March1978,PresidentDaud visitedPakistanamongspeculations
that the futurewill witnesscloser ties between the two culturallyand
religiouslysimilarcountries. But Daud's assassinationin April of the
same year changedthe situationforthe worse as faras Pakistan'sdefence
interestswere concerned. Accordingto a descriptionof the Soviet invasion, the Russians "dramaticallytransformedPakistan's geostrategic
situation."All of a sudden Pakistanfaced the spector of Soviet troops
The
frontier.
virtuallyeverywherealong the thirteen-hundred-mile
II. W. Howard
"Pakistan's
fora Foreign
Search
after
theInvasion
Wriggins,
Policy
ofAfghanistan,"
Pacific
Affairs
1984),p. 285.
(Summer,
57

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presenceof large numberof Afghanrefugeeson the Pakistanisoil along

with the resistanceactivitiesof the Afghanfreedomfightersfurther
withAfghanistan.
aggravatedthe securityenvironment

The policymakersofPakistanhadalmosttotallyfocussedtheirattention
towardsAfghanistan
since December 1979,thusturningit into Immediate
AttentionType environment. The environmentturned into such a
categoryon which the Pakistaniauthoritieshad no control. However,

once it had settleddown to thatstage,the policymakerswere expected

to controlthe crisissituationin theirfavouror at leastcurtailthe security
threat. The Pakistanisocietyfaceda directsecuritychallengeand in order
to counterthatthreatthe massesshouldhavebeen mobilised.In crisisthe

activationofa largenumberofpeopleascertainsa powerfulforceto balance

the deficienciesin the defencestructures. Moreover,skilfuldiplomaty
was requiredto move Pakistanaway fromthe securitythreat that the
Russianswere posingin Afghanistan.

(ii) The UnitedStatesgave$3.2 billion,startingfrom1981and ending

in 1987, while as an aid with$4.02 billionis in the pipelineforthe future.
These figuresalso includecreditfor militarypurposes. The U.S. granted
such a generous help for the sole purpose of strengthening
Pakistan's
"It was a steptowardeasing
postureas againstthe Russiansin Afghanistan.
thisproblem,butitcouldnotsolveit."12 And,inthisfashiontheAmericans
became partof Pakistan'ssecurityenvironment
of the firstcategory.We
can argue that by draggingthe Americansin the ImmediateAttention
Type the governmentin fact created more securityhazards for their
countrythan achievingthe status of a counter balance which was the
apparentintention.A West Germanscholar,Dieter Braunwrites,
The Soviet Union does not lack leverages for propagandistically
accusingPakistanof beingan accompliceof the U.S. In this connection,it is constantlyassertedthat Pakistanceded to the U.S. military
rightson its territory,which are a threat to the Soviet Union...
andtheSoviet
Union
N.C.:DukePress
12. Henry
S. Bradsher,
Afghanistan
(Durham,
254.
Studies,
p.
Policy
1983),
58

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Numerous contacts between the two armed forces suggest that

consultationsare takingplace concerningcontingencyplanning.The
same holdstrue forPakistaniand Western suspicionswith regardto
Indo-Sovietmilitarycooperation... In this domain, the Zia/Junejo
governmentmustact with particularcare.13
The U.S. factorin the Afghanistan
crisisshould have been limitedto
humanitarianhelp for the refugeesand for the moral pressureson the
Sovietsto withdrawfromAfghanistan.
(iii) India's desire to be a mini-superpower in the South Asian
i-egionhas been obstructedby the refusalof Pakistanto become a subordinatestate. That also goes forother countriesof the region. To give
an example of the Indian thinkingabout their hegemonialtendencies,
Sarbjit Johal boasts:
As the dominantmilitarypower in SouthAsia,the Indiangovernment
has severalcapabilitiesto punish,coerce,or influencePakistan.These
capabilities have steadily increased since independence,and even
thoughthe Pakistanmilitaryhas revitalizedsince 1979,India'spresent
capabilitiesare muchgreater than Pakistan's. India's armed forces
numberI.I millionmen,a significant
total, globallyas well as regio14
nally.
The long historyof differences
with India on vital issues,along with
the realityof three major wars between the two countries,has created
hurdlesin any moveto normaliserelationswiththatcountry.The policy
makersof Pakistanin recentyears have tried to appease the new Indian
leadershipbut withoutanypositiveresponse. In factthe basicdifferences
betweenthe two nationsare such that drifting
Indiatowardsthe second
in
our
considerations
remains
a distantpossibility,at
category
security
least in the nearfuture.
13. DieterBraun,
"Pakistan's
Act- Factors
itsForeign
and
Balancing
Determining
- Archiv
translated
from
No. 15/1985
, Bonn,
Security
Policy,"
Europa
(10August,1985),
p. 3.
14. SarbjitJohal,
andIndo-Pakistan
Asian
South
Cooperation
Relations,"
"Regional
Eastern
andMiddle
Vlll:2(Winter,1984),
Studies
(Villanova),
p. 39.
59

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(iv) Pakistan'sties with the People's Republicof China has beeri

consistentsince their developmentfrom 1962. China proved to be a
reliable friendand its policytowards Pakistanhas been devoid of any
hegemonialdesigns. The Chinese factor in the first categoryof our
environmenttypology unlike the previouslydescribed environments
goes in Pakistan'sfavouras faras securityinterestsare concerned.Chinese
extendeda securityhelp in 1965war againstIndiaand thereafterbecame
confirmeda force whose affiliation
with Pakistanbegan to be regarded
as a securityasset.
(v) From 1971-1979,Pakistangave full attentionto Iran, Turkey
and Saudi Arabia along with other Middle Easterncountries. Such a
policywas a successbecausewhenthesenationswere madefirstpreference
environment
forPakistan'ssecurity,
we movedcloserto "congenialenvironmentaltype". In other words Pakistan moved nearer to its natural
externalsurroundings.
After1979,attentionwas divertedtowardsIndia,
to
mainly normalizerelations. Pakistanipolicy makers wasted nearly
nine years by creatingan environmentfor our securitywhichwas just
not there. In that effortthey ignored the genuine environmentlike
the Middle Easternsocieties.
Pakistan'sforeignpolicyoptionstowardsthe Gulfstatesin particular
and the MiddleEastin generalshouldhavebeen on the basisofideological,
economicand culturalcommitments.Generalthrustrestingon encouragementof contacton people to people level as relations relied solelyon
to governmentbasisare notstrongenoughforanypermanent
government
foundation.Growingcommunications,
betweenthe people of this region
on the one handand Pakistanon theother,are necessaryforbetterunderstandingand permanenceof contactsbetweenthe Muslimnationsofthe
area. A cohesive understandingwhich is indispensablefor better
relationshas not been givena fairtrialin the past.
Tables I and 2 are confinedto the ImmediateAttentionTypeenviron-

ment,explainingthe behaviourof the actorsof the firsttype.

60

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Table I is divided into conflictand cooperativeconductconstructed

on Pakistan'sactionsor statementstowardsexternalenvironment(from
December 1979 to November 1985),as well as statementsand actions

chanelledtowards Pakistan. The statementswere carefullychosen and

speculationsof the newspapersand radio on variousaspects of foreign
policywere omitted.

FromTable I we gatherthatinspiteofthe factthatduringthisperiod

the Russianinvasionin Afghanistan,
was attractingthe attentionof the
Pakistanipolicy makers,the conflictnumberof 228 in the Afghancase
is 12 interactions,lower than240 of the Indiancase. On the other hand
we note that the Indianconflictsin 1984-85nearlydoubled thanthose in
the previoustwo years (1982-83). This can be attributedto increasing
Indianhostility
to" divertitsdomesticproblems suchas the Sikh agitation
in IndianPunjab. Moreover,the Indianleaders were determinedto take
advantageof the politicalweak structuresin Pakistan.The Afghanrise in
conflictsin 1984-85is attributedto the increasingAfghanmujahideen's
the refugee
pressureto whichthe Kabul regimeretaliatedby bombarding
camps in Pakistan.

Table 2 indicatesthat Pakistanhad a fairlylow percentage,i.e. 5.8

during our research period with our otherwise trustfuland reliable
friendlikeTurkey.Iranaccountsfor 10.2 per cent in the cooperativefield
while Saudi Arabia had 9.3 per cent of cooperative interactionswith
Pakistan. As discussedearlier,the policy makersof Pakistanduringthe
period of our researchdid not emphasize,the promotionof the genuine
- the data confirms
our propositionsmade in the beginning
environment
of the article. Insteadthe energies and effortsof the Pakistanipolicy
makerswere exercised to normalizerelationswith India - which is
24.2 per cent of the total relationshipbetweenour samplecountries.We

should note here that mostof the cooperativegestureswere initiatedby

the Presidentof Pakistan.Fiftyper cent of the conflictinteractionwith
India indicatesthat they did not respondfavourablyto the President.
It is also worthwhilenotingthat India opposed Pakistanon all matters
which were of vital securityconcerns. For example, oppositionto the
63

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militaryaid fromthe United States,nuclearcapabilityeven for peaceful

purposes. Most importantof all, the Indianleadershipchose to occupy
partof the SiachenGlacier. That is the reasonwhywe see a surprisingly
highpercentageof 24.2 cooperativeinteractionswith India. Apartfrom
the Pakistanipresident'sgesturesof friendship,
there were cooperations
in variousfieldsas facilitatingthe railwaytraffic
as well as improvement
of telephone systems.

The relationwithChina in the periodof researchremainedconstant

with 14.9 per cent of the total cooperativeactionswhile not a singlecase
of conflictinteractionwas noted. The United States acquired a 19.1

per cent of cooperativeactions due to its policyof supportingPakistan

against the Russian invasion in Afghanistan.On the other hand,
Afghanistan's
fairlyhighcooperativeinteractionswith Pakistanaccounts
for the Afghanleaders' repeated statementsof havingdirecttalks with
Pakistan. Moreover,the regularmeetingsin Geneva lead the cooperative
to a higherlevel.
percentageof interactions
The NormalCircumstantial
Typeconsistsofthosecountrieswhich,inan

indirectmanner,imposetheirweightupon the ultimatesecurityoptions

of Pakistan.The developmentof economic relationswith Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan;*5 Economicsanctionsfromthe Western European
Community:establishingcommunicationlinkswiththe Muslim commwith the countriesof South Asia, are some of
unity,and understanding
the prominentexampleswhichcan be bracketedin this category.
The DistinctType includesthose globalactorswhichin normalcircumstancesdo notoccupya prominentpositioninthe securityorientedforeign
policyof Pakistan. Multinational
Corporationsas OPEC; developmentsin
Africa;tensionsituationin South East Asia; and the unfoldingof events
in Latin Americaare includedin the environmentof Pakistan'sforeign
policyoccupyingthe least importantposition.
- Japan
15. FordetailsofPakistan
see
relations
withat leastonecountry
economic
R.G.Sawhney,
New
Economic
Relations,"
Strategic
Analysis
"Pakistan-Japan:
Growing
(
Delhi)IX:6(September,
1985),pp.557-564.
64

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