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Reason dispels Myth. Science supplants Religion. Darwin refutes the Bible.
And so forth. These stories are subtractive in two senses. First, the move to
modernity is described as a skimming off of the dross of religious belief,
freeing up the underlying positum and essential kernel of human nature;
fanciful interpretations are dismissed, leaving pure, brute fact laying about
for all and sundry to see. Second, these stories are to Taylors eye far too
simple and reductive; they either unduly prioritize one factor as the major
motor of secularizatione.g., economics, science, etc.and/or drastically
distort religious belief, practice, and institutions in order to fit the bounds of
their interpretative frame.
Taylor is convinced that MST is propped up by a cluster of thoroughly modern
prejudices which he yokes under the phrase The Immanent Frame. The
gradual emergence and eventual victory of the immanent frame involves a
1
Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2007), 25.
2
Ibid., 22.
great many tectonic shifts in human thought, practice, and experience, such
as the disenchantment of the world, an ethic increasingly concentrated on
discipline, rules, and norms, the vision of nature as an impersonal order, and
the rise of an exclusive humanism,3 to name but a few; but the upshot of
these changes is the eclipse of any reference to a transcendent reality in
general, or God in particular. Human flourishing, moral life, and nature all
come to be understood in a self-sufficient, this-worldly, naturalistic,
immanent way.
Taylors alterative, the Reform Master Narrative (RMN), can be distilled into
three claims.4 (267-9) First, exclusive humanism and the modern moral
order, the anthropocentric shift that rejects a transcendent reality and
refuses to acknowledge a good beyond natural human flourishing, arose
mainly as a result of pressures within Latin Christendom, pressures toward
reform which collapses the long-standing complementary between the higher
spiritual vocations of the clergy and the more lax practices of the laity, a
social hierarchy anchored in a cosmic great chain of being.
Taylors second claim is that exclusive humanism could not have arisen on
any other basis. His conviction is that it was the new ethical options opened
up by exclusive humanism--not the cogency of its arguments or the
plausibility of its theories--that led (tempted?) larger segments of the
population to drift toward unbelief. A question Taylor poses well into his
narrative crystallizes his convictions about this issue: How could the
immense force of religion in human life [in pre-modern times] be countered,
except by using a modality of the most powerful ethical ideas, which this
religion itself had helped to entrench? (267)
The third claim is that the secular age bears a constitutive reference to belief
in God, albeit usually negative, as something that has been overcome. This
is the reason Taylor focuses so much on narrative and historicity in his
account of secularization. He detects a double historicity that determines
secularization and religious belief and that is quite lost on MST:
On the one hand, unbelief and exclusive humanism defined itself in
relation to earlier modes of belief, both orthodox theism and enchanted
understandings of the world; and this definition remains inseparable
from unbelief today. On the other hand, later-arising forms of unbelief,
as well as attempts to redefine and recover belief, define themselves in
relation to this first path-breaking humanism of freedom, discipline,
and order.5
Taylor thinks that our present predicament must be seen not as a black and
white tug of war between belief and unbelief, Science vs. Religion, Intelligent
3
Jose Casanova, A Secular Age: Dawn or Twilight? Varieties of Secularism in A Secular Age,
Yale University, April 3-5, 2008, 1.
Phenomenology
Ibid., 4-5.
Ibid., 13.
Ibid., 597.
Ibid., 5.
11
Ibid., 7.
12
Ibid., 7.
13
Ibid., 7.
10
Genealogy
Ibid., 573.
Ibid., 29.
is not an optional extra for history buffs that can be cleanly separated from
the mechanism of secularization. 16 We are studying not just factual changes
in the shape of Western societiessecularity 1 and 2but we are also the
heirs of and participants in a conflict of interpretations, and that is why
analysis and narrative must reflect one another. So long as we fail to do
justice to the variety of and connections between the narratives composing
our past and guiding our present, we will continue to misinterpret our own
position.
Taylor also describes the modern historical self-understanding as a stadial
consciousness, and he never tires of stressing just how remarkable and
unprecedented it is:
In virtually all pre-modern outlooks, the meaning of the repeated
cycles of time was found outside of time, or in higher time or eternity.
What is peculiar to the modern world is the rise of an outlook where
the single reality giving meaning to the repeatable cycles is a narrative
of human self-realization, variously understood as the story of
Progress, or Reason and Freedom, or Civilization or Decency or Human
Rights; or as the coming to maturity of a nation or culture. 17
What is peculiar, that is, is the level of confidence and certainty that the
pillars of the immanent frame are obvious, self-evident, natural, etc., the
sense that we have dispersed the childish clouds of myth-making and come
to take our stand on the sure ground of mature rationality. Once the
immanent frame is set in place, it comes to be seen as natural, as given, as
the way things are. Taylors stresses that
the narrative dimension is extremely important, because the force of
[the immanent frame] comes less from the supposed detail of the
argument (that science refutes religion, or that Christianity is
incompatible with human rights), an much more from the general form
of the narratives, to the effect that there was once a time when religion
could flourish, but that this time is past. 18
16
17
18
Ibid., 269.
Ibid., 716.
Ibid., 590.
Ibid., 171-2.
Ibid., 172.
Ibid., 25.
Ibid., 25.
Ibid., 63.
24
Taylor adverts to Gauchets work on the disenchantment of the world, noting how he too
gives a crucial important to this long drive to Reform, and adds that Im not sure if we
dont conceive it slightly differently, but does not explain his divergence in detail.
25
Ibid., 80.
23
pivots off the first. No longer assailed by invasive and unpredictable spiritual
forces, humans began to wield a new-found freedom to chart their own
course and determine their own destiny: we can rationalize the world, expel
the mystery from it (because it is all now concentrated in the will of God). A
great energy is released to re-order affairs in secular time. 26
Disenchantment makes Reform not only possible, but plausible; recall that
Taylor is trying to account for how modern modes of belief and practice
became available, acceptable, and sensible to society as a whole.
When Taylor discusses Reform, he is not merely referring to The
Reformation, but to the period roughly 1400-1650. Taylor clarifies his broad
understanding of Reform thus:
Briefly summed up, Reform demanded that everyone be a real, 100
percent Christian. Reform not only disenchants, but disciplines and reorders life and society. Along with civility, this makes for a notion of
moral order which gives a new sense to Christianity, and the demands
of the faith. This collapses the distance of faith from Christendom. It
induces an anthropocentric shift, and hence a break-out from the
monopoly of Christian faith.27
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
80.
774.
45.
47.
47.
10
recognition of a good beyond this life, beyond normal human flourishing and
the social order: the pull of communitas is potentially multi-valenced. It
can not only bring to the fore our community, but that of humankind. 31
While the late medieval balance of pre-axial and post-Axial spiritualities
repeated the rituals of reversal and the cyclical play of structure/antistructure, it was nevertheless shot through with a universalist, egalitarian
twist, a top-, or, depending on how one sees it, bottom-heavy tilt that would
enable it to tumble, first, into an inclusive humanism, in which the sources
of universal benevolence were located within human nature, with the latter
created by divine design and progressively carrying out the divine plan in
history, and later, into a full-blown exclusive humanism, in which the
universalism is retained but the God-reference and super-human goodthe
transcendent ontology and transformational morality--are jettisoned.
What happens as a result of Reform is the almost total triumph of structure.
Reform, Taylor says, was originally meant to make the spirit of communitas
which breaks out in moment of reversal or transgression, and which gives
legitimacy to the power of the weaka concrete social reality. Communitas
the vision of the church as the body of Christ on earthwas supposed to
replace the parochial and exclusive social identities of pre-Axial societies,
which were based on bloodlines, kinship, tribal affiliations, etc.with a
universal and inclusive one; Taylor calls this the Great Disembedding of
self, society, and cosmos. The goal was to maintain the carnality of the
relations, but expand their scope. But the project misfired. The order that
emerged from the spirit of reform was not a network of agape, but rather a
disciplined society in which categorial relations have primacy, and therefore
norms.32 That is, the new social identity that takes hold is based on abstract
categories drained of content and meaning; more and more layers are
padded on to the buffered self,33 to the point that the original motivations
for disenchantment, disengagement, and discipline are lost.
One of Taylors signature observations is his astonishment that the project of
Reform got off the ground at all. The creation of Webers protestant work
ethic, suffused with an inner-worldly asceticism, was to happen very
much through the active, reconstructive efforts of political authority. 34 The
goals were audacious: the eradication of violence and social anomie and the
universal inculcation of at least a modicum of the new civility, a project of
social engineering simply unprecedented in human history. Indeed, Taylor is
convinced that the modern lack of astonishment at this fact is perhaps the
greatest testament of its near total success. But the basic shift in the social
31
Ibid., 50.
Ibid., 158.
33
The buffered self is Taylors construct of the modern subject that is self-reflective, uses
instrumental reason to order about itself and the world, and is disengaged from society and
nature; this he opposes to the porous self of the enchanted world, which is subject to the
slings and arrows of magical forces, and cannot attain to full possession of itself.
34
Ibid., 119.
32
11
imaginary was the belief that, as Raeff notes, human nature was essentially
malleable, that it could be fashioned by will and external circumstances. 35
Lockes epistemology of the tabula rasa is the perfect image of the new
ethic; for Taylor, its primary significance derives from its attraction as an
ethical stance, not its plausibility as a theory of knowledge.
The other key belief that made Reform possible, or that convinced people it
was plausibleand that would set the stage for exclusive humanism--was
that we dont need to compromise, that we dont need complementarity,
that the erecting of order doesnt need to acknowledge limits in any
opposing principle of chaos.36 The exhilaration of the new freedom and zeal
for order, which was originally intended to bring the Kingdom down to earth,
would inadvertently power not just the decline of Hell, the watering down of
sin, the taming of violenceand its replacement by economic production as
the highest human activity--and so on, but eventually the exclusion of God.
The irony is that the same forces that drove the sanctification of ordinary
life would produce the view that ordinary life was all there is. Taylor yokes
these various developments under the phrase The Modern Moral Order
(MMO), which he sums up thus:
the order of mutual benefit holds (1) between individuals; the
benefits (2) crucially include life and the means of life, however
securing these relates to the practice of virtue; it is meant (3) to secure
freedom, and easily finds expressions in terms of rights. (4) these
rights, this freedom, this mutual benefit is to be secured to all
participants equally.37
But how was this MMO shorn of its constitutive reference to God? How did
the shift to exclusive humanism occur? Recall Taylors first claim: the MMO
was built on the back of Latin Christendom, which we see in its activist,
interventionist stance, both towards nature and to human society, and in its
appropriation of universalism from its Christian sources. 38 This latter is
crucial: the increasing and eventually all but universal recognition of inner
sources of benevolence, whether the powers of disengaged reason (neoStoicism), a pure, universal will (Kant), or a sense of universal sympathy
(Rousseau).39 Taylor urges that the paradox of these new views of human
nature, fruits of an inward turn, is that, on the one hand, this inward turn
is also evident in religious life; indeed, the whole turn was largely driven by
religious motives40; on the other, these immanent sources of human
goodness are the charter of modern unbelief. 41 So how did humanism
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
121.
125.
171.
246.
150-1.
258.
257.
12
become exclusive? How was the God reference of the MMO dispatched?
What triggers the anthropocentric shift?
Taylor summarizes the movement:
Because the very attempt to express what the Christian life means in
terms of a code of action in the saeculum opens the possibility of
devising a code whose main aim is to encompass the basic goods of
life in the saeculum: life, prosperity, peace, mutual benefit. In other
words, it makes possible the anthropocentric shift. Once this happens
then the break-out is ready to occur. It just needs the step to holding
that these secular goods are the point of the whole code. Pushed by
annoyance at the ascetic demands of ultra-conformity, many will be
willing to take this step.42
Taylors second claim, recall, is that this step must be seen not as a giant,
boot-strapping leap of mankind out of myth and superstition, a heroic casting
off of the yokes of belief, but as part of a stairway partly composed of
Christian materials. It is as though we climbed so high on the stairway that
we can no longer see what the lower steps were made of.
Taylor is at pains to convince us that this new order, the immanent frame,
must be seen as an invention, not a discovery; as a social imaginary, not just
a social theory, or naturalistic reality. If notin other words, if we ignore the
conditions of belief and our stadial consciousnessthen we are apt to take it
as natural, given, obvious, self-evident, and will fail to appreciate just how
much its erection was a hard slog. It seems obvious and undeniable that
the MMO is the way things are once the bogeymen of belief have been
banished. Taylor insists, however, that
the reverse is the case. Humans have lived for most of their history in
modes of complementarity, mixed with a greater or lesser degree of
hierarchy. What is rather surprising is that it was possible to win
through to modern individualism; not just on the level of theory, but
also transforming and penetrating the social imaginary. Now that this
imagination has become linked with societies of unprecedented power
in human history, it seems impossible to try to resist. 43
Ibid., 267.
Ibid., 169.
13
Taylors main points in expanding the sense of Reform and retelling the story
of secularization thus, are to show, first, that disenchantment, the disequilibrium of the hierarchical society/cosmos, the disembedding of society,
cosmos, and human good, and the project of Reformin short, the invention
of the Modern Moral Order--are induced by Latin Christendom through its
post-Axial sense of flourishing, the pull of communitas, and the ardor to
enact Gods plan in the world. And second, by casting the Modern Moral
Order as a social imaginary, he means to subvert the subtraction story of
secularization which holds that the truths we moderns hold to be self-evident
are not, in fact, a-historical facts covered for centuries by superstition and
metaphysics and simply discovered by natural science and clear-eyed,
unbiased reason, but are in part social constructions based onand
unimaginable apart from--prior, religious social imaginaries. Or, as Taylor
puts it, What happened here was not that one moral outlook bowed to brute
facts. Rather we might say that one moral outlook gave way to another. 44
Viewed in this broader context, first, religion isor can be--a catalyst for the
blossoming of reform and rationalization, not always an impediment, as MST
holds, and second, the latter holds moral stances that its naturalistic
ontology cannot ground.
Ibid., 563.
14
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
443.
443.
436.
436.
15
have broken out of the humanism of freedom and mutual benefit (e.g.,
Nietzsche and his followers)and lots else besides.49 The Nova picks up
speed in the 19th century and is still in full swing. The third stage, The SuperNovawhich Taylor also dubs The Age of Authenticity, is merely the spread
of the Nova to Western popular culture, which accelerates after the second
world war, and is powered by the ethic of authenticity or expressive
individualism, in which people are encouraged to find their own way,
discover their own fulfillment, do their own thing. 50 While there is not room
to sufficiently sketch Taylors portrait of the contemporary scene, his
intention in narrating these two latter stages in the process of secularization,
roughly from the middle of the 19 th century to the present, is to underwrite
his third central claim, namely, that the secular age bears a constitutive
reference to God. His conviction is that our age is deeply cross-pressured:
The salient feature of Western societies is not so much a decline of religious
faith and practice, though there has been lots of that, more in some societies
than in others, but rather a mutual fragilization of different religious
positiosn, as well as the outlooks of both belief and unbelief. 51 This is what
he means when he says that belief in God does not mean the same thing in
2000 as it did in 1500, and why he questions whether there could be
unbelief without any sense of some religious view which is being negated. 52
The MST tends to answer this question in the affirmative, but Taylor thinks
that such a response is predicated on a profound misunderstanding of its
own condition.
Another of Taylors other main misgivings with MSTas well as modern
theories of religion of, e.g., Nietzsche, Weber, and Gauchet-- is its
generalized view of religion. He believes this elides a tension fundamental to
our modern self-understanding. As noted above, MST tends to focus on
belief, and frames religion as mainly about belief in supernatural entities.
But Taylor wants to both broaden and specify the sense of religion, all while
avoiding a universally applicable definition: I want to focus not only on
beliefs and actions predicated on the existence of supernatural entities, but
also on the perspective of transformation of human beings which takes them
beyondwhatever is normally understood as human flourishing. 53 He
thinks that as far as secularization theory goes, we fudge the facts when we
talk about religion in general, rather than the specificity of belief as
Christian, since the ethical forms handed down to us by the latter have such
a hand in shaping the very modern posture that tries to analyze it! As he
puts it, In the Christian case, this means our participating in the love
(agape) of God for human beings, which is by definition a love which goes
49
50
51
52
53
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
299.
299.
595.
269.
430.
16
Taylor also links this to what he sees as Webers and Gauchets occasional
conflation of enchantment and religion 56; this is not consistent with their
recognition, elsewhere, that both Judaism and Christianity have themselves
at different times fostered various kinds of disenchantment. 57 Taylor seems
to think that this inconsistency may derive from the ethical reaction in the
face of the loss of meaning, the defiant attitude of digging in ones heels
and facing the void pervasive in modernity. He dubs Weber one of the most
influential proponents of the view that we must accept that this sense of
loss is inevitable; it is the price we pay for modernity and rationality, but we
must courageously accept the bargain. 58 The debunker believes this
because he is convinced that his position does not run ahead of reasons, that
it is yielding to his intellectual conscience. But Taylor holds that both open
and closed stances [on the immanent frame] involve a step beyond available
reasons into the realm of anticipatory confidence. 59 His point is that there is
belief involved here, aspiration to meet a high water mark, embody a set of
virtuescourage, intellectual honesty, living in touch with reality, etc.not a
mere recognition of and capitulation to the facts. Here, Taylor turns the
tables on the debunkers, who accuse all believers of intellectual dishonesty-the sacrifice of the intellect, in Webers words-- and charges that the
closed spin implies that ones thinking is clouded or cramped by a
54
Ibid., 430.
Ibid., 318.
56
Ibid., 553: Enchantment, [i.e., the world of spirits and meaningful causal forces, of wood
sprites and relics], is essential to some forms of religion; but other formshave been built
on its partial or total denial. We cannot just equate the two. He adds that Even Weber
seems to have fallen into this at times.
57
Ibid., 426.
58
Ibid., 307.
59
Ibid., 551.
55
17
Ibid., 551.
Ibid., 717-18: [Many modern] have seen the essence of religion in the answers it offers to
the question of meaning. I believe, as I argue above, that these theories are in an important
way off the track. They imply that the main point of religion is solving the human need for
meaning. In taking this stance, they absolutize the modern predicament. This is one of
the most important passages in the book.
62
Ibid., 531.
61
18
Taylors own spin on the return of the religious and re-enchantment of the
world is an argument for re-incarnation, which involves a more integral
approach to religion that re-instates the transformative perspective and
recovers a richer relationship to tradition and a renewal of the constitutive
power of language [language quote]
Taylors story is not meant to be a prediction, or even a prescription; it is
intended to hold up a more accurate mirror to our present, bring the regnant
narrativethe immanent frameto light, and show that the way we spin it
whether closed or openis dictated not by the frame itself, but by the
sundry sources of our secular selves. The gates of the immanent frame are
locked from the inside.
19