GER 210

Kevin Wong

In this paper, I shall delineate and schematise Kants position that the
good will is the only good without limitation, an argument found in the
first section of his seminal work, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of
Morals.
The opening pages of the Groundwork are dedicated almost exclusively
to developing this conclusion, which Kant proffers at the very outset,
writing, there is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the
world which can be regarded as good without qualification, except a
good will (393). This claim is central to Kants thought, and will
ultimately come to substantiate the remainder of his moral project as a
whole serving as the fundamental standard for moral behaviour and
engendering an attendant discussion of duty.
The argument begins by adducing characteristics that might commonly
(but erroneously) be seen as good-in-themselves. Broadly, there seem
to be two types of putatively good things that Kant enumerates and
critiques in more detail. I shall here denote these as felicitous and
facilitative qualities.
Felicitous qualities are those that are considered meritorious insofar as
they are desirable, typically because of the positive benefits that
derive thereof. As we shall see, this includes many of the things that
we conventionally think of as independently desirable, for example,
acute mental faculties, human talents, and material wealth. By turn,
facilitative qualities are those deemed good by virtue of their ability to
aid the work of the good will itself. These include temperaments that
are conducive to good behaviour, like self-restraint and sober
introspection. Kant believes though, that the characteristics subsumed
under both of these categories are insufficiently basic to serve as a
universal and unqualified standard of good. We shall see shortly why
this is the case.
The text commences with an analysis of felicitous characteristics,
identifying talents of the mind and qualities of temperament, and
pointing to the examples of intelligence, wit, judgment and courage,
resolution, perseverance, respectively. While it is quite natural to think
of these properties as essentially good, Kant asserts that unless
grounded in a good will, their entailments can actually become
extremely bad and harmful (393). This contention aligns neatly with
our intuition, as it is obvious that nefariously applied, instrumentally
useful skills could be responsible for great evil.
Likewise, and in the same category, gifts of fortune and even
happiness itself are not unconditionally good, for they can easily lead
to pride and often hereby even arrogance (393). The very idea of a
February 2015

Professor Joel Lande

GER 210

Kevin Wong

person who lacks a good will, but who nevertheless enjoys material
prosperity is a notion that Kant says, can never delight a rational and
impartial spectator (393).
All of the aforementioned qualities are good if and only if imbued with
a good will. The will itself is a necessary and sufficient good-maker,
and the felicitous qualities thus appear only to be containers, as it
were, for the good will. Let us proceed to derive some preliminary
premises:
(P1) Felicitous qualities can be bad and harmful if grounded in a
bad will;
(P2) A good will is required to make felicitous qualities good;
(P3) Anything that requires a good-maker is not unconditionally
good;
(C1) Therefore, felicitous qualities are not unconditionally good.
[P2, P3]
Kant next turns to facilitative qualities, which are conducive to this
good will itself and can facilitate its work (394). In this category, we
find dispositions like moderation in emotions and passions, selfcontrol, and calm deliberation (394), qualities which, seem to
constitute part of the intrinsic work of a person (394). While we may
be even more tempted to commend these qualities as unreservedly
good, Kant predictably argues that such faculties also presuppose a
good will, and [this fact] does not permit them to be regarded as
absolutely good (394). Like the felicitous qualities, a good will must
underpin the facilitative qualities in order for them to represent
genuine manifestations of the good itself.
Indeed, so distinct are these facilitative qualities from the
unconditional good that Kant claims they can potentially amplify the
bad if misapplied, for the coolness of a villain makes him not only
much more dangerous but also immediately more abominable than
he wouldve been without it (394). A few more premises can now
follow:
(P4) Unless grounded in a good will, facilitative qualities can be
extremely bad;
(P5) A good will is required in order for facilitative qualities to
acquire moral worth;
(C2) Therefore, facilitative qualities are not unconditionally good.
[P3, P5]

February 2015

Professor Joel Lande

GER 210

Kevin Wong

Moving beyond these two types, Kant finally considers the common
belief that the good will might derive its moral value from either its
produced consequences or instrumental value, but rejects both of
these propositions outright, claiming, a good will is good not because
of what it effects or accomplishes, nor because of its fitness to attain
some proposed end; it is good only through its willing, i.e., it is good in
itself 1 (394). This conclusion is quite significant, for it implies that
provided a good will, even acts that produce harmful or inefficacious
results would still be unconditionally virtuous. With this established, we
can now finish our schematisation of the argument, adding a number
of latent premises which Kant appears not to have spelled out
explicitly.
(P6) The good will is either good because of its consequences, or
good-in-itself;
(P7) It is not the case that consequences make the good will
good;
(C3) Therefore, the good will is good in itself. [P6, P7]
(P8) Facilitative qualities, felicitous qualities, and the good will
itself comprise the
set of all good things;
(P9) From the good things, there must be an unconditionally
good thing so as to
make good things good;
(P10) Of the good things, the good will alone does not require
anything else to be
good it is uniquely good in itself, and the sole goodmaker; [P2, P5, C3]
(C4) Therefore, the good will is the only unconditionally good
thing.
[P8, P9, P10]
Altogether, this argument ostensibly shows that the good will is the
highest good and the condition of all the rest (396). In Kants
hierarchy of goods, then, the will is the most basic element and
reflects the foundation upon which all other good things supervene.
Note that Kant does not claim that the will is the only good thing, for
he concedes that such a will may not indeed be the sole and complete
good (396). Presumably, one assumes, there exists a bevy of
conditionally good things that are made good when grounded in the
good will (such as the facilitative and felicitous goods that Kant himself
enumerates).
Critiques of this argument might be levelled on a number of grounds.
Perhaps the most obvious angle might be to deny the truth of (P7), and
1 Emphasis mine.
February 2015

Professor Joel Lande

GER 210

Kevin Wong

to assert that consequences are what count. This criticism is intuitively

compelling, for it seems absurd to claim that certain acts are
praiseworthy just by virtue of their intentions. We can see this
incongruity emerge more clearly in two types of scenarios.
The first is an instance where a good will produces decidedly evil
consequences. It is incoherent, surely, that reprehensible ends can be
justified merely by their altruistic motivations. Consider the case of a
person who intends to caution a child from falling into a pond, but in so
doing, inadvertently pushes and drowns the child. This act does not
seem to be morally redeemable merely by virtue of its benevolent
intention.
Another way we might cash out these absurd implications is by
considering two acts with identical intentions but asymmetric
consequences. Suppose that two people attempt to extract an infant
from a burning building. Person A does so safely and successfully,
heroically carrying the infant out of the building and saving its life.
Person B, however, suffers a great misfortune, failing to save the
infant, and unintentionally causing the floor to topple fatally trapping
dozens of other building residents in the process. It seems prima facie
senseless to consider these two acts as morally equivalent,
irrespective of the similarly good will behind both of them.
If this criticism were to hold, defeating (P7) would fundamentally
undermine Kants conclusion, for he could no longer claim that the
good will is the good-in-itself. Rather, the fundamental good would
become the virtue of produced consequences, engendering the need
for an independent value theory that could offer an account of exactly
which ends are desirable. While these flavours of consequentialist
ethics obviously have their own share of problems, the important fact
remains that Kants belief in the essential priority of the good will
seems deeply troubling on its face.
Note: All location indicators refer to marginal pagination derived from the Kniglich
Preuische Akademie der Wissenschaften edition of Kants works.

This essay represents my own work in accordance with

University regulations.

February 2015

Professor Joel Lande