ELECTION LAWS CASES

Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 122250 & 122258. July 21, 1997]
EDGARDO C. NOLASCO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, and
EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, respondents.
FLORENTINO P. BLANCO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
First, we rewind the facts. The election for mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan was held on
May 8, 1995. The principal protagonists were petitioner Florentino P. Blanco and private
respondent Eduardo A. Alarilla. Blanco received 29,753 votes, while Alarilla got 23,038
votes.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] Edgardo Nolasco was elected Vice-Mayor with 37,240 votes.
On May 9, 1995, Alarilla filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Blanco. He
alleged:
xxxxxxxxx
4. Based on intelligence reports that respondent was maintaining his own `private army'
at his aforesaid resident, P/Insp. Ronaldo O. Lee of the Philippine National Police
assigned with the Intelligence Command at Camp Crame, applied for and was granted
search warrant no. 95-147 by Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila on 5 May
1995. A copy of the said search warrant is attached as Annex "A" hereof.
5. In compliance with said search warrant no. 95-147, an elite composite team of the
PNP Intelligence Command, Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), and Bulacan
Provincial Command, backed up by the Philippine National Police Special Action Force,
accompanied by mediamen who witnessed and recorded the search by video and still
cameras, raided the house of respondent Florentino Blanco at his stated address at
Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
6. Enclosed as Annex "A-1" is a video tape taken of the proceedings during the raid.
7. The composite team was able to enter the said premises of respondent Florentino
Blanco where they conducted a search of the subject firearms and ammunition.
8. The search resulted in the arrest of six (6) men who were found carrying various high
powered firearms without any license or authority to use or possess such long arms.
These persons composing respondent's `private army,' and the unlicensed firearms are
as follows:
A. Virgilio Luna y Valderama 1. PYTHOM (sic) Cal. 347 SN 26946 with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.
2. INGRAM M10 Cal. 45 MP with Suppressor SN: 45457 with two (2) Mags and 54
Rounds of Ammo.
B. Raymundo Bahala y Pon 1. HKMP5 Sn. C334644 with two (2) Mags and 47 Rounds of Ammo.
C.Roberto Santos y Sacris 1. Smith and Wesson 357 Magnum Sn: 522218 with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.

D. Melchor Cabanero y Oreil 1. Armscor 12 Gauge with three (3) Rounds of Ammo.
E. Edgardo Orteza y Asuncion 1. Paltik Cal. 38 Rev with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.
F. Francisco Libari y Calimag 1. Paltik Cal. 38 SN: 36869
Copies of the inventory receipts are hereto attached as Annexes "B" to "B-5" hereof.
9. During the search, members of the composite team saw through a large clear glass
window, respondent's Galil assault rifle on a sofa inside a closed room of the subject
premises.
10. Not allowed entry thereto by respondent and his wife, the members of the
composite police-military team applied for the issuance of a second search warrant
(Annex "B-6") so that they could enter the said room to seize the said firearm.
11. While waiting for the issuance of the second search warrant, respondent's wife and
respondent's brother, Mariano Blanco, claiming to be the campaign manager of
respondent in the Nationalist People's Coalition Party, asked permission to enter the
locked room so they could withdraw money in a vault inside the locked room to pay
their watchers, and the teachers of Meycauayan in the 8 May 1995 elections.
12. For reasons not known to petitioner, Mrs. Florentino Blanco and Mariano Blanco,
were allowed to withdraw ten (10) large plastic bags from the vault.
13. When the said PNP composite team examined the ten (10) black plastic bags, they
found out that each bag contained ten (10) shoe boxes. Each shoe box when examined
contained 200 pay envelopes, and each pay envelope when opened contained the
amount of P1,000.00. When questioned, respondent's brother Mariano Blanco and
respondent's wife, admitted to the raiding team that the total amount of money in the
ten (10) plastic bags is P10,000,000.00.
14. The labels found in the envelope shows that the money were intended as
respondent's bribe money to the teachers of Meycauayan. Attached as Annex "C" is the
cover of one of the shoe boxes containing the inscription that it is intended to the
teachers of Brgy. Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
15. On election day 8 May 1995, respondent perpetrated the most massive vote-buying
activity ever in the history of Meycauayan politics. Attached as Annex "D" is the
envelope where this P10,000,000.00 was placed in 100 peso denominations totalling
one thousand pesos per envelope with the inscription `VOTE!!! TINOY.'
This massive vote-buying activity was engineered by the respondent through his
organization called `MTB' or `MOVEMENT FOR TINOY BLANCO VOLUNTEERS.' The
chairman of this movement is respondent's brother, Mariano P. Blanco, who admitted to
the police during the raid that these money were for the teachers and watchers of
Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Attached as Annex "E" hereof is an MTB ID issued to one Armando Bulan of Precinct
77-A, Brgy. Jasmin, Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan. You will note that the ID is
perforated in the middle. The purpose is for the voter to tear the office copy and return it
to respondent's headquarters to receive the balance of the P500.00 of the bribe money
after voting for respondent during the elections. The voter will initially be given a downpayment of P500.00.
16. This massive vote-buying was also perpetrated by respondent thru the familiar use

ELECTION LAWS CASES

Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
of flying voters. Attached as Annex "F" hereof is a copy of the Police Blotter dated 8
May 1995 showing that six (6) flying voters were caught in different precincts of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, who admitted after being caught and arrested that they were
paid P200.00 to P300.00 by respondent and his followers, to vote for other voters in the
voter's list.
17. Not satisfied, and with his overflowing supply of money, respondent used another
scheme as follows. Respondent's paid voter will identify his target from the list of voter
and will impersonate said voter in the list and falsify his signature.
Attached as Annex "G" hereof is the Minutes of Voting and Counting of Votes in
Precinct No. 26, Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. Annex "G-1" is the statement of
one Ma. Luisa de los Reyes Cruz stating that when she went to her precinct to vote, her
name was already voted upon by another person. This entry was noted by Leticia T.
Villanco, Poll Chairman; Estelita Artajo, - Poll Clerk; and Nelson John Nito - Poll
Member.
18. Earlier before the election, respondent used his tremendous money to get in the
good graces of the local Comelec Registrar, who was replaced by this Office upon the
petition of the people of Meycauayan. Attached as Annex "H" hereof is an article in the
3 May 1995 issue of Abante entitled `1 M Suhol sa Comelec Registrar.'
19. The second search warrant on respondent's residence yielded to more firearms and
thousands of rounds of ammunition. These guns were used by respondent to terrorize
the population and make the people afraid to complain against respondent's massive
vote buying and cheating in today's elections. Respondent's bribery of the teachers
ensured the implementation of his vote-buying ballot box switching, impersonations,
and other cheating schemes.
Attached as Annexes `I-1' to I-2' are the pertinent Receipts of the guns and
ammunitions seized from respondent. Attached as Annex "J" is a Certification to the
same effect.
20. The above acts committed by respondent are clear grounds for disqualification
under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code for giving money to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions; for committing acts of
terrorism to enhance his candidacy; and for spending in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by the Election Code. There are only 97,000
registered voters in Meycauayan versus respondent's expenses of at least
P10,000,000.00 as admitted above. (Emphasis supplied).
On May 15, 1995, Alarilla filed a Very Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Suspend Proclamation.
The COMELEC (First Division) granted the motion after finding that there was a
"probable commission of election offenses which are grounds for disqualification
pursuant to the provisions of section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), and
the evidence in support of disqualification is strong." It directed the Municipal Board of
Canvassers "to complete the canvassing of election returns of the municipality of
Meycauayan, but to suspend proclamation of respondent Florentino P. Blanco should
he obtain the winning number of votes for the position of Mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan until such time when the petitions for disqualification against him shall have
been resolved."

On May 25, 1995, Blanco filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside the Order suspending his
proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed his Answer to the petition to disqualify him.
On May 30, 1995, the COMELEC (First Division) heard the petition to disqualify Blanco.
The parties thereafter submitted their position papers. [if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] Blanco even
replied to the position paper of Alarilla on June 9, 1995.
On August 15, 1995, the COMELEC (First Division) disqualified Blanco on the ground
of vote-buying, viz.:[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
xxxxxxxxx
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVES to
DISQUALIFY Respondent Florentino P. Blanco as a candidate for the Office of Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan in the May 8, 1995 elections for having violated Section 261 (a)
of the Omnibus Election Code. The Order suspending the proclamation of herein
Respondent is now made PERMANENT. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Meycauayan, Bulacan shall immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed
canvass of the election returns, determine the winner out of the remaining qualified
candidates who shall be immediately proclaimed.
SO ORDERED."
Blanco moved for reconsideration on August 19, 1995 in the COMELEC en banc.
Nolasco, as vice mayor, intervened in the proceedings.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] He moved for
reconsideration of that part of the resolution directing the Municipal Board of
Canvassers to "immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of
the election returns, determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates who
shall be immediately proclaimed." He urged that as vice-mayor he should be declared
mayor in the event Blanco was finally disqualified. The motions were heard on
September 7, 1995. The parties were allowed to file their memoranda with right of reply.
On October 23, 1995, the COMELEC en banc denied the motions for reconsideration.
In this petition for certiorari,[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] Blanco contends:
xxxxxxxxx
18. Respondent COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and acted arbitrarily in affirming en toto and adopting as its
own the majority decision of the First Division in that:
18.1 It upheld the validity of the May 17, 1995 order suspending proclamation of
Petitioner Blanco herein as the winning candidate for Mayor of Meycauayan without the
benefit of any notice or hearing in gross and palpable violation of Blanco's constitutional
right to due process of law.
18.2 It violated the provisions of COMELEC Res. No. 2050 as amended, prescribing
the procedure for disposing of disqualification cases arising out of the prohibited acts
mentioned in Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, which Resolution this Honorable
Tribunal explicitly sanctioned in the case of Lozano vs. Yorac. Moreover, it (COMELEC)
violated Blanco's right to equal protection of the laws by setting him apart from other
respondents facing similar disqualification suits whose case were referred by
COMELEC to the Law Department pursuant to Com. Res. No. 2050 and ordering their

ELECTION LAWS CASES

Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
proclamation -- an act which evidently discriminated against Petitioner Blanco herein.
18.3 It decided Petitioner Blanco's disqualification case in a SUMMARY PROCEEDING
in violation of law and the precedents which consistently hold that questions of VOTEBUYING, terrorism and similar such acts should be resolve in a formal election protest
where the issue of vote buying is subjected to a full-dress hearing instead of disposing
of the issue in a summary proceeding;
18.4 It declared Petitioner Blanco as having been involved in a conspiracy to engage in
VOTE-BUYING without that minimum quantum of proof required to establish a
disputable presumption of vote-buying in gross and palpable violation of the provisions
of Section 28, Rep. Act. 6646;
18.5 It ordered the proclamation of a SECOND PLACER as the duly elected Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, in gross violation and utter disregard of the doctrine laid down
by this Honorable Supreme Court in the case of LABO vs. COMELEC which was
reiterated only recently in the case of Aquino vs. Syjuco.
On the other hand, Nolasco contends in his petition for certiorari [if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] that
he should be declared as Mayor in view of the disqualification of Blanco. He cites
section 44 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
and our decision in Labo vs. COMELEC.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
We shall first resolve the Blanco petition.
Blanco was not denied due process when the COMELEC (First Division) suspended his
proclamation as mayor pending determination of the petition for disqualification against
him. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and sections 4 and 5 of the Rule 25 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure merely require that evidence of guilt should be strong to justify the
COMELEC in suspending a winning candidate's proclamation. It ought to be
emphasized that the suspension order is provisional in nature and can be lifted when
the evidence so warrants. It is akin to a temporary restraining order which a court can
issue ex-parte under exigent circumstances.
In any event, Blanco was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his
disqualification was not strong. On May 25, 1995, he filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside
the Order suspending his proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed his Answer to the
petition to disqualify him. The COMELEC heard the petition. Blanco thereafter
submitted his position paper and reply to Alarilla's position paper. The COMELEC
considered the evidence of the parties and their arguments and thereafter affirmed his
disqualification. The hoary rule is that due process does not mean prior hearing but only
an opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC gave Blanco all the opportunity to be heard.
Petitions for disqualification are subject to summary hearings.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Blanco also faults the COMELEC for departing from the procedure laid down in
COMELEC Resolution 2050 as amended, in disqualification cases. The resolution
pertinently provides:
xxxxxxxxx
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the

respondent candidate the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a

disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary
investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department
makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed
with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the
proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending
and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt
is strong."
It is alleged that the violation is fatal as it deprived Blanco of equal protection of our
laws.
We do not agree. It cannot be denied that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over
proclamation and disqualification cases. Article IX-C, section 2 of the Constitution
endows the COMELEC the all encompassing power to "enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election x x x." We have long ruled that this
broad power includes the power to cancel proclamations.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] Our laws are
no less explicit on the matter. Section 68 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code)
provides:
"Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated
any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6,
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a
foreign country shall not be qualified to run for an elective office under this Code, unless
said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the elections
laws."
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 likewise provides:
"Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."
Despite these laws and existing jurisprudence, Blanco contends that COMELEC must
follow the procedure in Resolution No. 2050 as amended. We hold that COMELEC

ELECTION LAWS CASES

Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
cannot always be straitjacketed by this procedural rule. The COMELEC has explained
that the resolution was passed to take care of the proliferation of disqualification cases
at that time. It deemed it wise to delegate its authority to its Law Department as partial
solution to the problem. The May 8, 1995 elections, however, did not result in a surfeit
of disqualification cases which the COMELEC cannot handle. Hence, its decision to
resolve the disqualification case of Blanco directly and without referring it to its Law
Department is within its authority, a sound exercise of its discretion. The action of the
COMELEC is in accord with Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646, viz:
"x x x.
"SEC. 28. Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Vote-selling. - The presentation of a
complaint for violations of paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881 supported by affidavits of complaining witness attesting to the offer or promise by
or of the voter's acceptance of money or other consideration from the relatives, leaders
or sympathizers of a candidate, shall be sufficient basis for an investigation to be
immediately conducted by the Commission, directly or through its duly authorized legal
officers under Section 68 or Section 265 of said Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. (emphasis
supplied)
"x x x."
Indeed, even Commissioner Maambong who dissented from the majority ruling, clings
to the view that "Resolution No. 2050 cannot divest the Commission of its duty to
resolve disqualification cases under the clear provision of section 6 of R.A. No. 6646." [if !
supportFootnotes][10][endif]
Clearly too, Blanco's contention that he was denied equal protection of
the law is off-line. He was not the object of any invidious discrimination. COMELEC
assumed direct jurisdiction over his disqualification case not to favor anybody but to
discharge its constitutional duty of disposing the case in a fair and as fast a manner as
possible.
Blanco also urges that COMELEC erred in using summary proceedings to resolve his
disqualification case. Again, the COMELEC action is safely anchored on section 4 of its
Rules of Procedure which expressly provides that petitions for disqualification "shall be
heard summarily after due notice." Vote-buying has its criminal and electoral aspects.
Its criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the
subject of summary hearing. However, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the
offender should be disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative
proceeding that is summary in character.
The next issue is whether there is substantial evidence to prove the vote buying
activities of Blanco. The factual findings of the COMELEC (First Division) are as follows:
[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]

"x x x
"Respondent argues that the claim of vote-buying has no factual basis because the
affidavits and sworn statements admitted as evidence against him are products of
hearsay; inadmissible because of the illegal searches; they violate the Rule of Res Inter
Alios Acta and the offense of vote-buying requires consummation.

We are not impressed.

A studied reading of the affidavits [Respondent's affidavit is unsigned] attached to the
Reply of the Respondent to the Position Paper of the Petitioner [Annexes 1, 2 and 3]
would reveal that they are in the nature of general denials emanating from individuals
closely associated or related to respondent Blanco.
The same holds true with the affidavits attached to Respondent's Position Paper
[Annexes 1, 2, 3 and 4]. Said affidavits were executed by Blanco's political leaders and
private secretary.
On the other hand, the affidavit of Romeo Burgos [Exhibit "E-1"] is rich in detail as to
how the alleged vote-buying was conducted.
Moreover, the same is corroborated by object evidence in the nature of MTB
[Movement for Tinoy Blanco] cards which were in the possession of the affiants and
allegedly used as a means to facilitate the vote-buying scheme.
There are also admissions of certain individuals who received money to vote for
Respondent [Annexes "E-2", "E-3", "E-4", "E-5", "E-6", "E-7", "E-8", "E-9" and "E-10"].
On the day of the elections, two individuals were apprehended for attempting to vote for
Respondent when they allegedly are not registered voters of Meycauayan. A criminal
complaint for violation of section 261 [2] of BP 881 was filed by P/Sr. Inspector Alfred S.
Corpus on May 9, 1995 with the Municipal Trial Court of Bulacan. The same was
docketed as Criminal Case 95-16996 [Exhibit F-2].
Again, similar pay envelopes with money inside them were found in the possession of
the suspected flying voters.
The incident was corroborated by Adriano Llorente in his affidavit narrating the same
[Exhibit "F-1"]. Llorente, a poll watcher of Petitioner, was the one who accosted the two
suspected flying voters when the latter attempted to vote despite failing to locate their
names in the voter's list.
From this rich backdrop of detail, We are disappointed by the general denial offered by
Respondent. In People of the Philippines vs. Navarro, G.R. No. 96251, May 11, 1993,
222 SCRA 684, the Supreme Court noted that "Denial is the weakest defense' [page
692].
In People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Precioso, et al., G.R. No. 95890, May 12,
1993, 221 SCRA 1993, the Supreme Court observed that,
`We have consistently ruled that denials if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence are negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses.
Ergo, as between the positive declarations of the prosecution witness and the negative

ELECTION LAWS CASES

Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
statements of the accused, the former deserves more credence." [page 754].'
However, Respondent conveniently resorts to section 33, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court which states that a declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of
the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included herein, may be given in
evidence against him [affiants who executed Exhibits E-1 to E-10] but not against
Respondent.
There is no merit in this contention.
The affiants are not the accused. Their participation in the herein case is in the nature
of witnesses who have assumed the risk of being subsequently charged with violating
Section 261 [1] of BP 881. In fact, their affidavits were sought by the Petitioner and not
by any law enforcement agency. Even Respondent admits this finding when he filed his
Reply to Petitioner's Position Paper and Motion to Refer for Preliminary Investigation
and Filing of Information in Court against the Persons Who Executed Exhibits E-1 to E10 for Having Admitted Commission of Election Offense. If they were the accused, why
file the motion? Would not this be redundant if not irrelevant?
xxx
Another telling blow is the unexplained money destined for the teachers. Why such a
huge amount? Why should the Respondent, a mayoralty candidate, and according to
his own admission, be giving money to teachers a day before the elections? What were
the peso bills doing in pay envelopes with the inscription "VOTE!!! TINOY", and kept in
shoe boxes with the word "Teachers" written on the covers thereof?
There is also something wrong with the issuance of the aforementioned MTB cards
when one considers the testimony of Burgos that more or less 50,000 of these cards,
which is equivalent to more or less 52% of the 97,000 registered voters of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, were printed by respondent; that there are only 443 precincts in Meycauayan;
that under the law, a candidate is allowed only one watcher per polling place and
canvassing area; and, finally, that there is no explanation at all by the respondent as to
what these "watchers" did in order to get paid P300.00 each.
xxx
Respondent also avers that for an allegation of vote-buying to prosper, the act of giving
must be consummated.
Section 281 [a] of BP 881 states "any person who gives, offers, or promises money x x
x." Section 28 of RA 6646 also states that "the giver, offeror, the promisor as well as the
solicitor, recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs [a] and [b] of section 261 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: x x x.
While the giving must be consummated, the mere act of offering or promising
something in consideration for someone's vote constitutes the offense of vote-buying.
In the case at bar, the acts of offering and promising money in consideration for the
votes of said affiants is sufficient for a finding of the commission of the offense of votebuying."
These factual findings were affirmed by the COMELEC en banc against the lone
dissent of Commissioner Maambong.

There is an attempt to discredit these findings. Immediately obvious in the effort is the
resort to our technical rules of evidence. Again, our ingrained jurisprudence is that
technical rules of evidence should not be rigorously applied in administrative
proceedings especially where the law calls for the proceeding to be summary in
character. More importantly, we cannot depart from the settled norm of reviewing
decisions of the COMELEC, i.e., that "this Court cannot review the factual findings of
the COMELEC absent a grave abuse of discretion and a showing of arbitrariness in its
decision, order or resolution."[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
We now come to the petition of Nolasco that he should be declared as mayor in the
event Blanco is finally disqualified.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] We sustain the plea. Section 44,
Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) is unequivocal, thus:
"x x x
"SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor,
and Vice Mayor.- (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or
mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor.
If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or
vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent
inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor,
vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the
said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to
their ranking as defined herein.
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest
ranking sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second
highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sangguniang members shall be
resolved by the drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their
predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall
be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning
candidate to the total number of registered voters in each distribution the immediately
preceding election."
In the same vein, Article 83 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing, the Local
Government Code of 1991 provides:
"x x x.
"ART. 83. Vacancies and Succession of Elective Local Officials.- (a) What constitutes
permanent vacancy - A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a
higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from

ELECTION LAWS CASES

Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the
functions of his office.
(b) Permanent vacancies in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor and vice
mayor (1) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice
governor or vice mayor concerned shall ipso facto become the governor or mayor. If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice
mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability,
the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall ipso facto become the governor,
vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the
said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to
their ranking as defined in this Article."
Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner in
case the winning candidate is disqualified. Thus, we reiterated the rule in the fairly
recent case of Reyes v. COMELEC,[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] viz:
"x x x x x x x x x
"We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in denying
petitioner Julius O. Garcia's petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the
disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.

Meycauyan, Bulacan. It concerns the right of suffrage which is the bedrock of

republicanism. Suffrage is the means by which our people express their sovereign
judgment. Its free exercise must be protected especially against the purchasing power
of the peso. As we succinctly held in People v. San Juan, [if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] "each time
the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to assert this sovereign will, that abiding credo
of republicanism is translated into living reality. If that will must remain undefiled at the
starting level of its expression and application, every assumption must be indulged in
and every guarantee adopted to assure the unmolested exercise of the citizen's free
choice. For to impede, without authority valid in law, the free and orderly exercise of the
right of suffrage, is to inflict the ultimate indignity on the democratic process."
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolution of the respondent COMELEC en banc
dated October 23, 1995 is affirmed with the modification that petitioner Edgardo C.
Nolasco is adjudged as Mayor of Meycauyan, Bulacan in view of the disqualification of
Florentino P. Blanco. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

"That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. The
doctrinal instability caused by see-sawing rulings has since been removed. In the latest
ruling on the question, this Court said:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just
that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or
plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the
circumstances.
"Garcia's plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes
cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified
and for that reason can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The subsequent
finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to
invalidate the votes cast for him."
Consequently, respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it
failed to follow the above doctrine, a descendant of our ruling in Labo v. COMELEC. [if !
supportFootnotes][15][endif]

A final word. The dispute at bar involves more than the mayoralty of the municipality of

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46863
November 18, 1939
IRINEO MOYA, petitioner, vs. AGRIPINO GA. DEL FIERO, respondent.

ELECTION LAWS CASES

Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
LAUREL, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the
above entitled case declaring the respondent, Agripino Ga. del Fierro, the candidateelect for the office of mayor of the municipality of Paracale, Province of Camarines
Norte, with a majority of three votes over his rival, Irineo Moya. In the general elections
held on December 14, 1937, the parties herein were contending candidates for the
aforesaid office. After canvass of the returns the municipal council of Paracale, acting
as board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as the elected mayor of said
municipality with a majority of 102 votes. On December 27, 1937, the respondent field a
motion of protest in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, the Court of
Appeals, on July 13, 1939 rendered the judgment hereinbefore mentioned which is
sought by the petitioner to be reviewed and reversed upon the errors alleged to have
been committed by the Court of Appeals:
1. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 8 ballots either inadvertently or
contrary to the controlling decisions of this Honorable Court.
2. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 3 ballots marked "R. del Fierro."
3. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 7 ballots marked "Rufino del
Firro."
4. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 72 ballots marked "P. del
Fierro."
Taking up seriatim the alleged errors, we come to the first assignment involving the
eight (8) ballots now to be mentioned. (1) With reference to ballot Exhibit F-175 in
precinct No. 2, alleged to have been inadvertently admitted in favor of the respondent,
such inadvertence raises a question of fact which could have been corrected by the
Court of Appeals and which could we are not in a position to determine in this
proceeding for review by certiorari. Upon the other hand, if the error attributed to the
Court of Appeals consisted in having admitted ballot Exhibit F-175 in precinct No. 2
instead of the ballot bearing the same number corresponding to precinct No. 1, and this
latter ballot clearly appears admissible for the respondent because the name written on
the space for mayor is "Primo del Fierro" or "Pimo de Fierro", the error is technical and
deserves but scanty consideration. (2) Ballot Exhibit F-26 in precinct No. 3 was
erroneously admitted for the respondent by the Court of Appeals, the name written on
the space for mayor being "G.T. Krandes." It is true that on the fourth line for the
councilor "Alcalde Pinong del Fierro": appears; but the intention of the elector is
rendered vague and incapable of ascertaining and the ballot was improperly counted
for the respondent. As to this ballot, the contention of the petitioner is sustained (3)
Ballot Exhibit F-77 in precinct No. 2 should also have been rejected by the Court of
Appeals. The ballot bears the distinguishing mark "O. K." placed after the name "M.
Lopis" written on space for vice-mayor. The contention of the petitioner in this respect is
likewise sustained. (4) Ballot Exhibit F-9 in precinct No. 2 was properly admitted for
respondent. On this ballot the elector wrote within the space for mayor the name of
Regino Guinto, a candidate for the provincial board and wrote the respondent's name
immediately below the line for mayor but immediately above the name "M. Lopez" voted

by him for vice-mayor. The intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for the
office of the mayor is clear under the circumstances. (5) Ballot F-131 in precinct No. 1
was also properly counted for the respondent. On this ballot the elector wrote the
respondent's name on the space for vice-mayor, but, apparently realizing his mistake,
he placed an arrow connecting the name of the respondent to the word "Mayor"
(Alcalde) printed on the left side of the ballot. The intention of the elector to vote for the
respondent for the office of mayor is thus evident, in the absence of proof showing that
the ballot had been tampered with. (6) Ballot F-7 in precinct No. 5 is admissible for the
respondent and the Court of Appeals committed no error in so adjudicating. Although
the name of the respondent is written on the first space for member of the provincial
board, said name is followed in the next line by "Bice" Culastico Palma, which latter
name is followed in the next line by word "consehal" and the name of a candidate for
this position. The intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for the office of
mayor being manifest, the objection of the petitioner to the admission of this ballot is
overruled. (7) Ballot F-1 in precinct No. 2 is valid for the respondent. On this ballot the
Christian name of the respondent was written on the second space for member of the
provincial board, but his surname was written on the proper space for mayor with no
other accompanying name or names. The intention of the elector being manifest, the
same should be given effect in favor of the respondent. (8) Ballot F-44 in precinct No. 2
wherein "Agripino F. Garcia" appears written on the proper space, is valid for the
respondent. In his certificate of candidacy the respondent gave his name as "Agripino
Ga. del Fierro." The conclusion of the trial court, upheld by the Court of Appeals, that
the letter "F" stands for "Fierro" and "Garcia" for the contraction "Ga." is not without
justification and, by liberal construction, the ballot in question was properly admitted for
the respondent.
The second error assigned by the petitioner refers to three ballots, namely, Exhibit F119 in precinct No. 1 Exhibit F-24 in precinct No. 2, and Exhibit F-6 in precinct No. 4.
These three ballots appear to be among the 75 ballots found by the Court of Appeals as
acceptable for the respondent on the ground that the initial letter "P" stands for "Pino" in
"Pino del Fierro" which is a name mentioned in the certificate of candidacy of the
respondent. The petitioner contends that the initial "R" and not "P". Even if we could
reverse this finding, we do not feel justified in doing so after examining the photostatic
copies of these ballots attached to the herein petition for certiorari. The second
assignment of error is accordingly overruled.
Upon the third assignment of error, the petitioner questions the correctness of the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in adjudicating to the respondent the seven ballots
wherein "Rufino del Fierro" was voted for the office of mayor. We are of the opinion that
the position taken by the Court of Appeals is correct. There was no other candidate for
the office of mayor with the name of "Rufino" or similar name and, as the respondent
was districtly identified by his surname on these ballots, the intention of the voters in
preparing the same was undoubtedly to vote for the respondent of the office for which
he was a candidate.lawphi1.net
The fourth assignment of error deals with the 72 ballots wherein "P. del Fierro" was

ELECTION LAWS CASES

Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
voted for the office of mayor, and it is the contention of the petitioner that said ballots
should not have been counted by the Court of Appeals in favor of the respondent. For
the identical reason indicated under the discussion of petitioner's second assignment of
error, namely, that "P" stands for "Pino" in "Pino del Fierro" which is a name mentioned
in the certificate of candidacy of the respondent, we hold that there was no error in the
action of the Court of Appeals in awarding the said ballots to the respondent.
With the exception of ballot marked as Exhibit F-26 in precinct No. 3 and ballot marked
as Exhibit F-77 in precinct No. 2, we are inclined to accept the rest of the disputed
ballots for the respondent not only for the specific reasons already given but also and
principally for the more fundamental reason now to be stated. As long as popular
government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the
modality and form devised, must continue to be the manes by which the great reservoir
of power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people
through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the common weal.
Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of
government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular
sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice in
his Government and whenever called upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it efficacy
and not to stifle it. This, fundamentally, is the reason for the rule that ballots should be
read and appreciated, if not with utmost, with reasonable, liberality. Counsel for both
parties have called our attention to the different and divergent rules laid down by this
Court on the appreciation of ballots. It will serve no good and useful purpose for us to
engage in the task of reconciliation or harmonization of these rules, although this may
perhaps be undertaken, as no two cases will be found to be exactly the same in factual
or legal environment. It is sufficient to observe, however, in this connection that
whatever might have been said in cases heretofore decided, no technical rule or rules
should be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if that intention is discoverable
from the ballot itself, not from evidence aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes to the
very root of the system. Rationally, also, this must be the justification for the suggested
liberalization of the rules on appreciation of ballots which are now incorporated in
section 144 of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357).
It results that, crediting the petitioner with the two ballots herein held to have been
erroneously admitted by the Court of Appeals for the respondent, the latter still wins by
one vote. In view whereof it becomes unnecessary to consider the counter-assignment
of errors of the respondent.
With the modification of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition for the writ of
certiorari is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement regarding costs.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33541 January 20, 1972

ELECTION LAWS CASES

Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
ABDULGAFAR PUNGUTAN, petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN ABUBAKAR, COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, and THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF SULU.
respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:p
The resolution of respondent Comelec 1 now assailed in this petition for review, was
undoubtedly motivated by the objective of insuring free, orderly and honest elections in
the discharge of its constitutional function to enforce and administer electoral laws. 2 It
excluded from the canvass for the election of delegates for the lone district of the
province of Sulu the returns from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67
precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for being spurious or manufactured and
therefore no returns at all. Unless set aside then, petitioner Abdulgafar Pungutan, who
otherwise would have been entitled to the last remaining seat for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, there being no question as to the election of the other two
delegates, 3 would lose out to respondent Benjamin Abubakar. Petitioner would thus
dispute the power of respondent Commission to exclude such returns as a result of oral
testimony as well as the examination of the fingerprints and signatures of those who
allegedly voted as the basis for the holding that no election in fact did take place. This
contention is, however, unavailing, in the light of our holding last month in Usman v.
Comelec. 4 The other principal question raised is whether the recognition of such
prerogative on the part of respondent Commission would contravene the constitutional
provision that it cannot pass on the right to vote. The appropriate answer as will be
made clear is likewise adverse to petitioner. Hence, respondent Commission must be
sustained.
The case had its origin from a petition filed on December 16, 1970, by respondent
Abubakar and the other candidates, 5 superseding an earlier one dated December 7,
1970 alleging that in the towns of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, no elections were in
effect held in view of massive violence, terrorism and fraud. 6 The respondents named
therein, including now petitioner Pungutan, answered on December 18, 1970 to the
effect that the elections were duly held in the above-mentioned municipalities and
denied the allegation as to the existence of massive fraud, terrorism and serious
irregularities. The case was duly heard, with oral testimony from five chairmen of certain
precincts in Tapul, five teachers from Parang, five teachers from Luuk and three
teachers from Siasi, followed by an examination of the precinct book of voters from said
towns and the fingerprints and signatures of those who voted, as shown at the back of
CE Form No. 1 and CE Form No. 39 for the 1970 elections for the Constitutional
Convention.
After reciting the relevant facts, respondent Commission came to this conclusion: "In
the light of the foregoing findings of the Commission with respect to the manner in
which the elections were conducted in Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, the Commission
is of the opinion that the elections in said municipalities were just as bad if not worse
than the elections in Karomatan, Lanao del Norte. Actually no elections were held in
said municipalities as the voting was done by persons other than the registered voters

while armed men went from precinct to precinct, prepared the ballots and dictated how
the election returns were to be prepared. The same reasons which compelled the
Commission to reject the returns from Karomatan and to consider said returns as no
returns at all or spurious or manufactured returns not one notch above returns prepared
at gunpoint (again paraphrasing in the reverse the second Pacis case) compel us with
much greater justification to find that the returns from Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk are
spurious returns or manufactured returns and no returns at all and that the elections in
said municipalities are sham." 7 The above findings of fact found support in the light of
the competent and credible evidence sustaining that the most flagrant irregularities did
attend the so-called elections in Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk.
As to Siasi: "In Siasi where there were 21,688 registered voters it was made to appear
that 20,970 had voted. However, the result of the examination of the thumbmarks and
signatures of those who voted compared with the fingerprints of the registered voters
appearing in their registration record, CE Form 1 showed that only 460 of the registered
voters had been definitely established to have actually voted, 131 identified through the
thumbmarks and 329 by their signatures. The 11,154 of those who voted were found to
be substitute voters: 7,557 were discovered to be voters voting in substitution of the
registered voters through their thumbmarks and 3,597 through their signatures. No
opinion was made with respect to the rest of the votes cast because not all of the
13,282 voters whose thumbprints could not be analyzed were referred to the NBI for
signature examination. Only 4,631 of these blurred thumbprints from 28 precincts were
referred to the NBI for signature examination. Examination of these 4,631 signatures
revealed that 3,597 were by persons other than the registered voters, only 329 were by
the register voters and no opinion could be rendered with respect to 705 for lack of
sufficient basis of comparison. In 26 precincts of Siasi there was 100% voting but not
necessarily by the registered voters. The overall average for the whole town is 96.6%
voting. There were 80 persons who were able to vote without any CE Form 1 or without
voting in the name of the voters registered in the precinct." 8
With respect to Tapul: "In Tapul where there were 12,223 registered voters it appeared
that 11,575 votes were cast. 197 persons were able to vote without CE Form No. 1
without using the names of registered voters in the precinct. When the thumbprints
corresponding to the 11,575 votes cast were examined by the Fingerprint Identification
Division of the Commission, only 3 were found to be identical with the thumbprints of
the registered voters in their registration record: one each in Precincts 8, 29 and 20-A.
5,300 thumbmarks were found to be not identical with the corresponding thumbmarks
of the registered voters in their registration records, CE Form 1. 6,199 thumbmarks,
however, could not be analyzed because they were blurred, smudged or faint. Of these
6,199 blurred thumbprints from 56 precincts, 4,187 from 31 precincts were referred to
the NBI handwriting experts for signature examination. The result of said examination
by the NBI of these 4,187 signatures showed that only 13 were found to be identical
with the signatures of the registered voters in their registration record, CE Form 1, while
2,897 were those of persons other than the registered voters. No opinion could be
rendered on 1,277 signatures for lack of sufficient basis of comparison." 9 Further: "It
appeared, therefore, that in the whole town of Tapul out of the 11,575 votes cast only 13

ELECTION LAWS CASES

Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
were definitely established as cast by the registered voters. 8,197 were definitely
established as cast by substitute voters. No opinion could be rendered with respect to
1,277 for lack of sufficient basis, 2,012 were not examined anymore since these were in
precincts where the number of substitute voting had been found to constitute a very
high percentage. It has been also established that on Election Day about one hundred
men armed with long arms were seen going around from precinct to precinct in Tapul
driving away the voters and instructing the teachers-inspectors on how to prepare the
election returns. Some of the ballot boxes were seen to have been brought to the
Municipal Treasurer's office early in the afternoon of Election Day hours before the
closing of voting. Nineteen (19) precincts of Tapul reported 100% voting while the overall percentage of voting in the whole municipality was 94.5%." 10
Then came the recital as to Parang: "In Parang, where there were 11,761 registered
voters in 67 precincts, it was made to appear that 11,083 votes were cast. 66 voters
who were not registered in the precinct were able to vote illegally without even using
the names of the registered voters therein. An examination of the thumbprints of those
who voted appearing in CE Form 39 or at the back of CE Form 1 compared with the
corresponding thumbprints of the registered voters appearing in their registration record
in CE Form 1 showed that only 39 thumbprints of the registered voters in his CE Form
1, while 4,698 were different from those of the registered voters. 6,539 thumbmarks
could not be analyzed because they were blurred, smudged or faint. However, only
2,647 of these 6,539 smudged thumbprints were referred to the NBI for signature
examination since the rest of said blurred thumbmarks were in precincts where a high
percentage of non-identical thumbmarks was already discovered. 1,573 signatures
were found to be by persons other than the registered voters and only 83 were found to
be identical with those of the registered voters. No opinion could be rendered with
respect to 991 signatures for lack of sufficient basis. In 20 precincts it was made to
appear that all the registered voters had voted. The overall percentage for the whole
town of Parang was 94%. The evidence also showed that in a number of precincts in
Parang armed men had entered the polling places and prepared the ballots. The
registered voters were not able to vote." 11 Lastly, as to Luuk: "In Luuk where there were
13,124 registered voters, 12,263 votes were cast. 281 persons who were not registered
voters in this precinct were able to vote illegally without even using the names of the
registered voters. The thumbprints of those who voted appearing in their voting record
either in CE Form 1 or in CE Form 39 compared with the thumbprints of the registered
voters appearing in the voter's registration record in CE Form 1 showed that only 22 of
the thumbmarks of those who voted were identical with the thumbmarks of the
registered voters, while 6,021 were found to be different from those of the registered
voters. 6,134 thumbmarks could not, however, be analyzed because they were found to
be blurred, smudged or faint. However, the signatures of those who voted in 13
precincts were examined by the NBI and it was found that the said signatures were
written by just a few persons as explained with greater particularity in the earlier pages
of this resolution." 12
In the light of the above and finding no need to determine how the election was in fact
conducted as to Pata, Patikul, Indanan, Panamao, South Ubian, Balimbing, Bongao
and Tandubas, it was the holding of the Commission in the resolution of May 14, 1971:

"1. To rule by unanimous vote that the returns from the 107 precincts of Siasi, 56
precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk are spurious and/or
manufactured returns or no returns at all and as such should be excluded from the
canvass for the election of delegates for the lone congressional district of the province
of Sulu; 2. To hold also by unanimous vote that further hearings on the petition of
[Benjamin Abubakar, et al] for the rejection or exclusion from the canvass of the returns
from Indanan, Panamao, Pata, Tandubas South Ubian, Patikul, Bongao and Balimbing
would no longer be necessary, it appearing that the results of the election would no
longer be affected by the returns from said municipalities after the rejection of the
returns from the four towns of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk and, therefore, for the
purpose of the completion of the canvass, to direct the Board of Canvassers to include
the returns from said municipalities in the canvass; 3. By majority vote of the members
of the Commission to direct the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu to reconvene in
Jolo and complete the canvass excluding from said canvass the returns from the towns
of Siasi, Parang, Tapul, and Luuk and to proclaim the 3rd winning candidate at 5:00
P.M. on May 28, 1971, unless restrained by the Supreme Court." 13 On May 22, 1971,
this petition for the review of the above resolution of May 14, 1971 of respondent
Commission was filed. Three days later, a resolution was adopted by this Court
requiring respondents to file an answer not later than June 4, 1971. Both respondent
Commission on Elections and respondent Abubakar duly filed their answers on said
date. Respondent Commission took pains to explain with even more detail why such a
resolution had to be issued considering the "massive voting anomalies ranging from
substitute voting to grabbing of ballots to preparation of election returns and other
election documents at gunpoint" thus justifying its conclusion that the elections in the
four towns amounted to a sham. The case was heard on June 8, 1971 with petitioner
Pungutan represented by Attorney Jose W. Diokno. Respondent Abubakar, represented
by Attorney Jovito R. Salonga, sought permission to submit a memorandum, which was
received by this Court on June 28, 1971. Petitioner was given the opportunity to reply
thereto, and he did so in his memorandum filed with this Court on October 18, 1971.
The case was deemed submitted on December 3, 1971. It is the decision of this Court,
as noted at the outset, after a careful study of the pleadings and in the light of our
decision last month in Usman v. Commission on Elections 14 that the challenged
resolution of respondent Commission of May 14, 1971 is in accordance with law. The
petition must therefore fail.
1. There is no merit to the contention that respondent Commission is devoid of power to
disregard and annul the alleged returns from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of
Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for being spurious or
manufactured. So we have held on facts analogous in character in the above Usman
decision rendered last month. Nor is it to be wondered at. Any other view would indict
itself for lack of fealty to reason and to the realities of the situation. It goes without
saying that what is contemplated in the law is that the electors in the exercise of their
free will can go to the polls and exercise their right of suffrage, with the boards of
inspectors crediting each candidate with the votes duly obtained after an honest count.
It is on that basis that election returns are to be made. Where no such election was in
fact held as was found by respondent Commission with respect to the four towns, it is

10

ELECTION LAWS CASES

Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
not only justified but it is its clear duty to stigmatize the alleged returns as clearly
spurious and manufactured and therefore bereft of any value. The words of Justice
Castro, in the Usman decision, referring to the election returns from Karomatan,
considered as likewise not entitled to credit because of their lack of integrity and
authenticity, are opposite: "These circumstances definitely point, not merely to a few
isolated instances of irregularities affecting the integrity and authenticity of the election
returns, but to an organized, well-directed large-scale operation to make a mockery of
the elections in Karomatan. We find and so hold that the election returns from the 42
precincts in question were prepared under circumstances conclusively showing that
they are false, and are so devoid of value as to be completely unworthy of inclusion in
the canvass. We have no alternative but to affirm the Comelec's finding that they are
spurious and manufactured." 15 Nor is it to be lost sight of that the power to reject
returns of such a character has been exercised most judiciously. Even a cursory
perusal of the mode and manner of inquiry conducted by respondent Commission
resulting in the challenged resolution should suffice to remove any doubt as to the
absence of any impropriety or improvidence in the exercise of such a prerogative.
Clearly, there was care and circumspection to assure that the constitutional objective of
insuring that an election be "free, orderly and honest" be realized. If, under the
circumstances disclosed, a different conclusion were arrived at, then certainly there is a
frustration of such an ideal. Moreover, this Court has not displayed any reluctance in
yielding the imprimatur of its approval to the action taken by respondent Commission in
the discharge of its constitutional function of the enforcement of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections. The long line of decisions especially so since Cauton v.
Commission on Elections, 16 is not susceptible of any other interpretation. Only thus
may there be an assurance that the canvassing and proclamation reflect with fidelity
and accuracy the true results of an election, in fact actually held. We do so again. As a
matter of fact, such a sympathetic approach to the results arrived at in the discharge of
its functions started with the leading case of Sumulong v. Commission on Elections. 17
As was so well put by Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad Santos: "The Commission on
Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in
our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered
with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created -- free, orderly and
honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are
clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere." 18
The same approach is reflected in the opinion of the Chief Justice in Lucman v.
Dimaporo when as he pointed out if "pursuant to our Administrative Law, the findings of
fact of administrative organs created by ordinary legislation will not be disturbed by
courts of justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial
evidence in support of such findings ... there is no reason to believe that the framers of
our Constitution intended to place the Commission on Elections created and
explicitly made 'independent' by the Constitution itself on a lower level than said
statutory administrative organs; ... ." 19

2. The right to vote has reference to a constitutional guarantee of the utmost

significance. It is a right without which the principle of sovereignty residing in the people
becomes nugatory. 20 In the traditional terminology, it is a political right enabling every
citizen to participate in the process of government to assure that it derives its power
from the consent of the governed. What was so eloquently expressed by Justice Laurel
comes to mind: "As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and
safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must continue
to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the
receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of
good government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the
adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised
citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established
authority." 21
How such a right is to be exercised is regulated by the Election Code. 22 Its enforcement
under the Constitution is, as noted, vested in respondent Commission. Such a power,
however, is purely executive or administrative. So it was characterized by the Chief
Justice in Abcede v. Imperial: 23 "Lastly, as the branch of the executive department
although independent of the President to which the Constitution has given the
'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely
'administrative questions.' ...."
It becomes obvious then why the right to vote, a denial of which should find redress in
the judiciary as the guardian of constitutional rights, is excluded from the authority
vested in respondent Commission. If the exclusion of the returns from the four towns in
Sulu involved a question as to such a right, then, clearly, what the Commission did was
beyond its competence. Such is not the case however. What is deemed outside such a
sphere is the determination of whether or not a person can exercise or is precluded
from exercising the right of suffrage. Thus, the question of inclusion or exclusion from
the list of voters is properly judicial. 24 As to whether or not an election has been held is
a question of a different type. It is properly within the administrative jurisdiction of
respondent Commission. If, as is our decision, no such voting did take place,
considering the massive irregularities that attended it in the four towns, then the
exclusion of the alleged returns is not tainted by infirmity. In that sense, the second
issue raised by petitioner that in so acting the respondent Commission exceeded its
constitutional power by encroaching on terrain properly judicial, the right to vote being
involved, is likewise to be resolved against him. At any rate, what was set forth by
Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Diaz v. Commission on Elections 25 would likewise dispose of
such a contention adverse to petitioner. Thus: "It is pleaded by respondents that the
rejection of the Sagada returns would result in the disfranchisement of a large number
of legitimate voters. But such disfranchisement would only be provisional, subject to the
final determination of the validity of the votes at the protest that may be filed with the
Constitutional Convention." 26
3. As to the plea in the prayer of the petition that in the event that the challenged

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
resolution of May 14, 1971 as to the power of respondent Commission is sustained, a
special election be called by it in all the 290 precincts in the four municipalities of Siasi,
Tapul, Parang and Luuk, it suffices to refer to our ruling in Usman v. Commission on
Elections, where a similar point was raised without success. So it should be in this
case. We see no reason to order such a special election. 27
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the resolution of the Commission on
Elections dated May 14, 1971 is affirmed. The Commission on Elections is directed to
order the board of canvassers to convene without delay and forthwith proceed with and
complete the canvass of the election returns from all the precincts of Sulu, excluding
therefrom all the election returns from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67
precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk, and thereafter proclaim the winning
candidate for the third Constitutional Convention seat allotted to the said province. This
decision is hereby declared immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

EN BANC
February 27, 1969
G.R. No. L-29333

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
MARIANO LL. BADELLES, protestant-appellant, vs. CAMILO P. CABILI, protegeeappellee.
G.R. No. L-29334
BONIFACIO P. LEGASPI and CECILIO T. BARAZON protestants-appellants, vs.
FELIX Z. ACTUB, PROVIDENCIO P. ABRAGAN, MANUEL F. CELDRAN, CASIMERO
P. CABIGON and BENITO ONG, protestees-appellees.
FERNANDO, J.:
Two election protests against the duly proclaimed Mayor and Councilors of Iligan City,
after the Nov. 14, 1967 elections, based on the allegations of flagrant violations of
certain mandatory provisions of the Election Code, to be more specifically set forth
hereafter, were dismissed in a single order by the Court of First Instance of Lanao del
Norte, the Honorable Teodulo C. Tandayag presiding. The cases are now before us on
appeal.
In one of them,[[1]] the election of Honorable Camilo P. Cabili to the Office of City Mayor
of Iligan City, was contested by protestant, now appellant, Mariano Badelles. In the
other,[[2]] the protestants are the now appellants, Bonifacio P. Legaspi and Cecilia T.
Barazon who along with the five protestees[[3]] were among those who were registered
candidates voted for in such election for councilors in the City of Iligan, with the
protestees being credited with the five highest number of votes, with protestants
Legaspi and Barazon obtaining sixth and seventh places, respectively.
In such order of dismissal, it was admitted that while irregularities as well as misconduct
on the part of election officers were alleged in the election protests filed, there was
however an absence of an allegation that they would change the result of the election in
favor of the protestants and against the protestees, that such irregularities would
destroy the secrecy and integrity of the ballots cast, or that the protestees knew of or
participated in the commission thereof. For the lower court then, the lack of a cause of
action was rather evident.
Hence the order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, which was sought to be fortified by the
invocation of the doctrines that voters should not be deprived of their right to vote
occasioned by the failure of the election officials to comply with the formal prerequisites
to the exercise of the right of suffrage and that the rules and regulations for the conduct
of elections while mandatory before the voting should be considered directory
thereafter. The validity of such order of dismissal is now to be inquired into by us in this
appeal.
In the petition of protestant Badelles, dated December 8, 1967, and marked as received
the next day by the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, 15th
Judicial District, it was stated that both he and protestee Camilo P. Cabili were the duly
registered candidates for the Office of City Mayor of Iligan City, both having filed their
respective certificates of candidacy in accordance with law and as such candidates
voted for in the November 14, 1967 election. It was then alleged that the Board of

Canvassers, on November 25, 1967, proclaimed as elected protestee for having

obtained 11,310 votes while protestant was credited with 8,966 votes. Protestant would
impugn the election of Cabili on the ground that there were "flagrant violation of
mandatory provisions of law relating to or governing elections ...." in that more than 200
voters were registered per precinct contrary to the provision limiting such number of
200 only and that no publication of the list of voters for each precinct was made up to
the election day itself, enabling persons who under the law could not vote being allowed
to do so. As a result of such alleged "flagrant violations of the laws relation to or
governing elections" around 8,300 individuals were allowed to vote illegally.
It was likewise asserted that not less than 8,000 qualified voters were unable to
exercise their right of suffrage in view of their failure, without any fault on their part, to
have the proper identification cards or the non-listing of their names in the list of voters.
It was stated further that even in the case of those individuals provided with
identification cards with their names included in the list of voters, they could not avail
themselves of their right of suffrage as their applications for registration could not be
found. Mention was also made of the fact that the final lists of voters and the
applications for registration were delivered to their respective precincts late on election
day itself thus preventing them from voting. Moreover, confusion, so it was alleged, was
caused by the excessive number of voters being listed and many having been assigned
to precincts other than the correct ones.
What was thus objected to is the fact that illegal votes were cast by those not qualified
to do so, numbering 8,300 or more and that an approximately equal number, who were
duly registered with the Commission on Elections, Iligan City, were unable to vote due
to the above circumstances. The proclamation then could not have reflected the true
will of the electorate as to who was the mayor elected, as the majority of protestee
Cabili over the protestant consisted of only 2,344 votes.
The prayer was among others for the proclamation of protestee as well as other
candidates for elective positions in the City of Iligan being set aside and declared null
and void, protestant pleading further that he be granted other such relief as may be
warranted in law and equity.
The protest of the candidates for councilor Legaspi and Barazon in the other case
against protestees[[4]] was in substance similarly worded. The prayer was for the
setting aside and declaring null and void the proclamation of protestees with protestants
seeking such other relief which should be theirs according to law and to equity.
In the first case, protestee Cabili moved to dismiss the petition on the following
grounds: "1. That the protest was filed beyond the reglementary period allowed by the
Revised Election Code; 2. That [the lower court] has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the present case, the Commission on Elections being the proper body to hear
the same; 3. That the complaint states no cause of action."[[5]] This very same grounds
were relied upon in a motion to dismiss by protestees Actub and Cabigon, filed in the
other suit.

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
As above noted, in a single order of March 23, 1968, the two above election protests
were dismissed, the lower court being of the opinion that neither petition alleged a
cause of action "to justify [it] to try the same." The first ground of the motion to dismiss
to the effect that the protests in both cases were filed beyond the reglementary period
was rejected. The claim as to lack of jurisdiction was likewise held to be without merit.
The single order of dismissal in both cases as indicated was based on the lack of a
cause of action.
The reasoning followed by the lower court in reaching the above conclusion that there
was no cause of action, proceeded along these lines: "Mere irregularities or misconduct
on the part of election officers which do not tend to affect the result of the elections are
not of themselves either ground for contest or for proper matters of inquiry... There is no
allegation in the protest that the alleged irregularities committed by the election officers
would tend to change the result of the election in favor of the protestants and against
the protestees. There is no allegation in the petition that the 8,000 voters who failed to
vote were all voters of protestants and the 8,300 illegal voters who voted were for the
protestees. There is, therefore, no legal and practical justification for the court to inquire
into the irregularities committed by the election officials, as alleged in the petition, for it
would not give any benefit in favor of the protestants to the end that they will be
declared the duly elected mayor and councilors, respectively, of this City."[[6]]
It was further stated in such order of dismissal: "There is no allegation in the petition
that the irregularities committed by the election officials have destroyed the secrecy and
integrity of the ballots cast. There is no allegation in the petition that the noncompliance of the election officials of the provisions of the election laws regarding the
registration of voters were intentional on their part for the purpose of committing frauds
for the benefit of the protestees. There is no allegation in the petition that because of
the alleged irregularities committed by the election officials in not following the
provisions of the election laws regarding the registration of voters and the distribution of
the precincts, that all the votes cast during said elections are illegal, nor is there an
allegation in the protests that the irregularities committed by the election officials would
affect the election in favor of the protestees."[[7]]
A greater regard for the cause of accuracy ought to have admonished the lower court
from asserting in an uncompromising tone the absence of an allegation that the
protestants in both cases failed to allege that if the facts pleaded by them were proved
the result would not have been different. It is true the complaints could have been more
explicitly worded, but as they stood, the absence of such a claim could not be so
confidently asserted.
To repeat, both protests were dismissed. We do not discount a certain degree of
plausibility attaching to the line of reasoning thus pursued by the lower court. We are
not unaware of the undeniable fact that both petitions were not distinguished by skill in
their drafting or precision in their terminology. Nonetheless the seriousness and gravity
of the imputed failure to have the elections conducted freely and honestly, with such

irregularities alleged, give rise to doubts, rational and honest, as to who were the duly
elected officials. Such allegations, it is to be stressed, would have to be accepted at
their face value for the purpose of determining whether there is a cause of action, a
motion to dismiss amounting to a hypothetical admission of facts thus pleaded. We
cannot in law and in conscience then sustain the order of dismissal.
Without the lower court having so intended, the dismissal would amount to judicial
abnegation of a sworn duty to inquire into and pass upon in an appropriate proceeding
allegations of misconduct and misdeeds of such character. Accordingly, we reverse.
Abes v. Commission on Elections[[8]] points the way, but the lower court was apparently
impervious to its teaching. It may not be controlling, but it furnishes more than a hint. It
would seem, though, that for the court below, its message did not ring out loud and
clear.
The opinion in the Abes case, penned by Justice Sanchez, starts thus: "Petitioner's cry
for relief, so their petition avers, is planted upon the constitutional mandate of free,
orderly, and honest elections. Specifically, they list a number of repressible acts."
Among those mentioned were that blank official registration forms were taken from the
office of the Quezon City Comelec Register several weeks before election day,
November 14, 1967; that active campaigning within the polling places by Nacionalista
leaders or sympathizers of Nacionalista candidates were allowed; that voters were
permitted to vote on mere mimeographed notices of certain Nacionalista candidates;
that voters were compelled to fill their official ballots on open tables, desks and in many
precincts outside the polling places; that thousands of voters sympathetic to the
Nacionalista candidates were allowed to vote beyond the hours for voting allowed by
law; that identification cards were delivered by partisan leaders of respondents
Nacionalista candidates, and those who did not signify their preference for Nacionalista
candidates were not given such cards; that the precinct books of voters were not sealed
within the deadline fixed by law; and that the resulting effect of irregularities was to
prevent full fifty-one per cent of the registered voters from voting.
One of the issues raised on the above facts is whether or not the Commission on
Elections could annul the aforesaid election in Quezon City on the above allegations of
fraud, terrorism and other illegal practices committed before and during the election.
The petition did not prosper; it was dismissed. The remedy, we held, lay not with the
Commission on Elections but with the courts of justice in an election protest.
In the language of Justice Sanchez: "The boundaries of the forbidden area into which
Comelec may not tread are also marked by jurisprudence. That Comelec is not the
proper forum to seek annulment of an election based on terrorism, frauds and other
illegal practices, is a principle emphasized in decisions of this Court." For as announced
in Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections,[[9]] assuming that there be a failure
to conduct an election in a free, orderly and honest manner, "the duty to cure or remedy
the resulting evil" did not rest with the Commission on Elections but in "some other
agencies of the Government." More specifically, with reference to provincial and
municipal officials, election contests "are entrusted to the courts." Then came this

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ELECTION LAWS CASES

Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
express affirmation: "The power to decide election contests necessarily includes the
power to determine the validity or nullity of the votes questioned by either of the
contestants." .
As so emphatically observed in the Abes opinion, "there has been neither deviation nor
retreat from the foregoing pronouncement." After which came the following: "The
ratiocination advanced that there was failure of election due to rampancy of terrorism,
frauds, and other irregularities, before and during elections, such that allegedly about
51% of the registered voters were not able to vote, will not carry the day for petitioners.
For, in the first place, this is grounded upon bare assertions. Respondents contest the
correctness thereof. And in the answer of respondents Amoranto, Mathay and others,
they aver that out of 162,457 registered voters in Quezon City, 100,382 voters actually
cast their votes about 62% of the registered voters. But above all, as pointed out in
City Board of Canvassers vs. Moscoso, [the] nullity of an election for municipal officials
should be determined in a petition contesting the election of municipal officers-elect to
be filed before the Court of First Instance."
Why an election protest is more fitly and appropriately the procedure for determining
whether irregularities or serious violations of the electoral law vitiated the conduct of
elections was clearly and succinctly explained in the Moscoso decision above cited, the
opinion coming from Justice Makalintal. [[10]] Thus: "The question of whether or not
there had been terrorism, vote-buying and other irregularities in the 1959 elections in
Tacloban City should be ventilated in a regular election protest, pursuant to section 174
of the Election Code, and not in a petition to enjoin the city board of canvassers from
canvassing the election returns and proclaiming the winning candidates for municipal
offices."
It would follow then that if the grievance relied upon is the widespread irregularities and
the flagrant violations of the election law, the proper remedy is the one availed of here,
the protest.

established authority. It is their undeniable right to have officials of their unfettered

choice. The election law has no justification except as a means for assuring a free,
honest and orderly expression of their views. It is of the essence that corruption and
irregularities should not be permitted to taint the electoral process.
It may not always be thus unfortunately. That should be the ideal however. If there be a
failure to observe the mandates of the Election Code, the aggrieved parties should not
be left remediless. Under the law as it stands, it is precisely an election protest that fitly
serves that purpose.
It was sought to be thus utilized in these two cases, perhaps in a rather awkward and
far from entirely satisfactory manner. Than itself is no reason for the courts to slam the
door against any opportunity for redress. Yet, that is what would happen if the order of
dismissal complained of were not set aside.
Hence the inevitability of its reversal. The scope of our decision must not be
misinterpreted however. All that it directs is that the protetees in both cases be required
to answer. Thereafter, if, as is not unlikely, there be a denial of the serious imputations
made as to the alleged irregularities, the lower court could properly inquire into what
actually transpired. After the facts are thus ascertained in accordance with the accepted
procedural rules, then the appropriate law could be applied.
It must be clearly emphasized that we do not at this stage intimate any view as to the
merit, or lack of it, of either protest. That would be premature to say the least. All we do
is to set aside the order of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, is reversed and the two cases
remanded to the lower court for proceeding and trial in accordance with this opinion and
the law. Without costs.

That such should be the case should occasion no surprise. Time and time again, [[11]]
we have stressed the importance of preserving inviolate the right of suffrage. If that
right be disregarded or frittered away, then popular sovereignty becomes a myth.
As Justice Laurel correctly pointed out: "As long as popular government is an end to be
achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised,
must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied
into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the
interest of good government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it
implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the
enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of
the established authority." [[12]]
A republic then to be true to its name requires that the government rests on the consent
of the people, consent freely given, intelligently arrived at, honestly recorded, and
thereafter counted. Only thus can they be really looked upon as the ultimate sources of

EN BANC
G.R. No. 104960 September 14, 1993

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
PHILIP G. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7,
TACLOBAN CITY, DONATO ADVINCULA, BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS,
PRECINCT No. 9, MALBOG, TOLOSA, LEYTE, and the MUNICIPAL REGISTRAR
COMELEC, TOLOSA, LEYTE, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
An event in this decade, which future generations would likely come to know simply as
the "EDSA People's Power Revolution of 1986," has dramatically changed the course of
our nation's history. So, too, not a few of our countrymen have by it been left alone in
their own personal lives. One such case is that of the petitioner in this special civil
action for certiorari.
The petitioner is Philip Romualdez, a natural born citizen of the Philippines, the son of
the former Governor of Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, and nephew of the then
First Lady Imelda Marcos. Sometime in the early part of 1980, the petitioner, in
consonance with his decision to establish his legal residence at Barangay Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte, 1 caused the construction of his residential house therein. He soon
thereafter also served as Barangay Captain of the place. In the 1984 Batasan Election
and 1986 "snap" Presidential Election, Romualdez acted as the Campaign Manager of
the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) in Leyte where he voted. 2
When the eventful days from the 21st to the 24th of February, 1986, came or were
about to come to a close, some relatives and associates of the deposed President,
fearing for their personal safety, whether founded or not, "fled" the country. Petitioner
Romualdez, for one, together with his immediate family, left the Philippines and sought
"asylum" in the United States which the United States (U.S.) government granted. 3
While abroad, he took special studies on the development of Leyte-Samar and
international business finance. 4
In the early part of 1987, Romualdez attempted to come back to the Philippines to run
for a congressional seat in Leyte. On 23 March 1987, he finally decided to book a flight
back to the Philippines but the flight was somehow aborted. 5
On 25 September 1991, Romualdez received a letter from Mr. Charles Cobb, District
Director of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, informing him that he
should depart from the U.S. at his expense on or before 23 August 1992, thus:
. . . Failure to depart on or before the specified date may result in the withdrawal of
voluntary departure and action being taken to effect your deportation. In accordance
with a decision made to your case, you are required to depart from the United States at
your expense on or before 23 August 1992. 6
Upon receipt of the letter, Romualdez departed from the U.S. for the Philippines,
arriving on December 1991 apparently without any government document. 7
When Romualdez arrived in the Philippines, he did not delay his return to his residence

at Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. During the registration of voters conducted by the

Commission on Election ("COMELEC") on 01 February 1992 for the Synchronized
National and Local Election scheduled for 11 May 1992, petitioner registered himself
anew as a voter at Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. The chairman of the Board
of Election Inspectors, who had known Romualdez to be a resident of the place and, in
fact, an elected Barangay Chairman of Malbog in 1982, allowed him to be registered.
Romualdez's registration, however, was not to be unquestioned. On 21 February 1992,
herein private respondent Donato Advincula ("Advincula") filed a petition with the
Municipal Trial Court of Tolosa, Leyte, praying that Romualdez be excluded from the list
of voters in Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, under BP 881 and RA 7166. 8
Advincula alleged that Romualdez was a resident of Massachusetts, U.S.A.; that his
profession and occupation was in the U.S.A.; that he had just recently arrived in the
Philippines; and that he did not have the required one-year residence in the Philippines
and the six-month residence in Tolosa to qualify him to register as a voter in Barangay
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. 9
On 25 February 1992, Romualdez filed an answer, contending that he has been a
resident of Tolosa, Leyte, since the early 1980's, and that he has not abandoned his
said residence by his physical absence therefrom during the period from 1986 up to the
third week of December 1991. 10
After due hearing, the Municipal Court of Tolosa, Leyte rendered a decision 11 on 28
February 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the court finds the respondent to be a
resident of Brgy. Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte and qualified to register as a voter thereat.
Hence, the instant petition for exclusion of Philip G. Romualdez from the list of voter of
Precinct No. 9, Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte is hereby ordered DENIED and petition
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Upon receipt of the adverse decision, Advincula appealed the case to the respondent
court.
On 03 April 1992, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision, 12 thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Philip Romualdez disqualified to register as
a voter for the 1992 elections and hereby reverses the decision of the lower court in
toto.
The Municipal Registrar of the Commission on Elections of Tolosa, Leyte, is hereby
ordered to delete and cancel the name of respondent Philip G. Romualdez from the list
of qualified voters registered February 1, 1992, at Precinct 9, barangay Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this recourse.
On 7 May 1992, this Court issued a temporary restraining order directing respondent
Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro Espino to cease and desist from enforcing
questioned decision. 13

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
The petitioner has raised several issues which have been well synthesized by the
Solicitor General into
(1) Whether or not the MTC and RTC acquired jurisdiction over, respectively, Case No.
01-S. 1992 and Case No. 92-03-42, the petition having been filed by one who did not
allege to be himself a registered voter of the municipality concerned; and
(2) Whether or not the respondent court erred in finding the petitioner to have
voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Anent the first issue, the petitioner assails for the first time the jurisdiction of the
respondent Court and the MTC of Tolosa, Leyte, in taking cognizance of the case,
despite an absence of any allegation in the petition filed with the MTC that Advincula
was himself a registered voter in Precinct No. 9 of Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte
conformably with Section 142 of the Omnibus Election Code. 14
When respondent Advincula filed the petition with the MTC for the exclusion of herein
petitioner Romualdez, the latter countered by filing his answer 15 and praying for the
denial of the petition, without raising the issue of jurisdiction. But what can be telling is
that when the MTC decision, denying the petition for disqualification, went on appeal to
the RTC, Romualdez, in his own appeal-memorandum, explicitly prayed that the MTC
decision be affirmed. This unassailable incident leads us to reiterate that "while lack of
jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the
proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such
lack of jurisdiction." 16 Undoubtedly, the petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the respondent not only by his active participation in the proceedings
thereat but, more importantly, in having sought an affirmative relief himself when the
appeal was made to the latter court whose jurisdiction he, in effect, invoked.
Furthermore, the question is not really as much the jurisdiction of the courts below as
merely the locus standi of the complainant in the proceedings, a matter that, at this
stage, should be considered foreclosed.
In any case, we consider primordial the second issue of whether or not Romualdez
voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Here,
this time, we find for the petitioner.
The Solicitor General himself sustains the view of petitioner Romualdez. Expressing
surprise at this stance given by the Solicitor General, respondent Advincula posits non
sequitur argument 17 in his comment assailing instead the person of Solicitor Edgar
Chua. If it would have any value, at all, in disabusing the minds of those concerned, it
may well be to recall what this Court said in Rubio vs. Sto. Tomas: 18
It is also incumbent upon the Office of the Solicitor General to present to the Court the
position that will legally uphold the best interest of the government, although it may run
counter to a client's position.
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus:

"(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile", which
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 19 "Domicile" denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. 20 That residence, in the case of the petitioner, was
established during the early 1980's to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile.
In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence
or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile. 21 In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual. 22
The political situation brought about by the "People's Power Revolution" must have truly
caused great apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern over the
safety and welfare of the members of their families. Their going into self-exile until
conditions favorable to them would have somehow stabilized is understandable.
Certainly, their sudden departure from the country cannot be described as "voluntary,"
or as "abandonment of residence" at least in the context that these terms are used in
applying the concept of "domicile by choice."
We have closely examined the records, and we find not that much to convince us that
the petitioner had, in fact, abandoned his residence in the Philippines and established
his domicile elsewhere.
It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as
a bounden duty of every citizen, enabling and requiring him to participate in the process
of government so as to ensure that the government can truly be said to derive its power
solely from the consent of the governed. 23 We, therefore, must commend respondent
Advincula for spending time and effort even all the way up to this Court, for as the right
of suffrage is not to be abridged, so also must we safeguard and preserve it but only on
behalf of those entitled and bound to exercise it.
WHEREFORE, finding merit on the petition the same is hereby GRANTED DUE
COURSE; of the Decision of the respondent Regional Trial Court dated 03 April 1992 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court
dated 28 February 1992 is hereby REINSTATED and the Temporary Restraining Order
issued by the Court in this case is correspondingly made PERMANENT. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 74-MJ July 30, 1976
SALVADOR LACSON, JR., complainant, vs. RAMON POSADAS, Municipal Judge,
of Talisay, Negros Occidental, respondent.

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
ANTONIO, J:
Respondent Municipal Judge Ramon Posadas, of Talisay Negros Occidental, is
charged in a verified complaint by Salvador Lacson, Jr. with (a) ignorance of the law, (b)
partiality, and (c) violation of the Election Code of 1971.
The Executive Judge, to whom this case was referred for investigation, report and
recommendation, found the charges of ignorance of the law and partiality to be without
factual basis. He, however, found that respondent Judge has failed to comply with the
requirements of Section 136 of the Election Code of 1971, which provides:
Any person who has been refused registration or whose name has been stricken out
from the permanent list of voters may at any time except sixty (60) days before a
regular election or twenty-five (25) days before a special election, apply to the proper
court for an order directing the election registration board or the board of inspectors as
the case may be, to include or reinstate his name in the permanent list of voters,
attaching to his application for inclusion the certificate of the Electron registration board
or the board of inspectors regarding his case and proof of service of a copy of his
application and of the notice of hearing thereof upon a member of the said board
(Emphasis supplied.)
In his report of July 17, 1972, the Investigating Judge stated:
Respondent disregarded this requirement and none of the petitions for inclusion based
on lack of forms contains the attached certificate of the Chairman or any member of the
Board of Inspectors of the precinct concerned to the effect that petitioner or petitioners
applied for registration on October 9, 1971 but were refused registration for lack of
registration forms. While it may be true that the various; petitions for inclusion contained
the sworn statement of Eduardo Belbes that a copy of the petition had been served on
the members of the Board of Inspectors of the corresponding precinct, yet this notice
applied to the original dates of hearing stated in the Petition and it is reasonable to
assume that on the dates at which the petitions were ordered reset for hearing by
respondent Judge, to wit: On October 18 for the petitions filed on October 14; and on
October 20 for the petitions filed on October 19, the Board of Inspectors were not
notified. This is impliedly admitted by respondent when he expressed the belief that
notice to the Election Registration Board alone was sufficient, and that the certificate of
the Board of Inspectors to the effect that the petitioners applied for registration in the
corresponding precinct on October 9, 1971, but were refused registration for lack of
forms was not necessary inasmuch as he relied on the testimonies of the petitioners
themselves on that point. Also, even if respondent was motivated by a desire to adhere
strictly to the requirement of Comelec Resolution No. RR-938 that inclusion cases be
decided within two (2) days from the filing of the petition, it would seem that respondent
acted rather hastily in resetting the inclusion cases filed in the afternoon of October 19,
1971 for hearing immediately the following morning or on October 20, 1971. This is
especially true of Election Cases Nos. 93 to 172, except Cases Nos. 162 to 172 (Exhs.
8A to 8K inasmuch as Mrs. Efren admittedly informed respondent of the filing of the
cases right the same morning of October 20. Hence it is not likely that the various

members of the Board of Inspectors could have been notified to appear and testify that
petitioners in fact appeared before their respective precincts and were denied
registration for lack of forms. caution dictated that this requirement or this procedure be
followed as this was one sure way of Identifying the petitioners and ascertaining
whether in fact they applied for and were refused registration for lack of forms. True,
inclusion and exclusion cases are summary in nature but the procedure adopted by
respondent Judge provided no safeguard whatsoever against indiscriminate inclusion.
For he admitted that as long as the petitioners were present when he called the
inclusion cases for hearing and the respondent Election Registration Board or the
members of the Board of Inspectors of the precincts concerned were not present he
considered the latter in default and summarily granted the petition. This could be the
only reason why practically all the inclusion cases resulted in the issuance of orders
directing the inclusion of the petitioners now marked as Exhs 'B', 'B-l' to 'B-54' and, as it
turned out, on appeal most of the petitions were dismissed either for failure of the
petitioners to appear or, as in Cases Nos. 136-153, because the Court found on the
basis of the testimony of the Chairman of Precinct No, 41 of Talisay that he even had a
surplus of seventeen (17) application forms. 1
In extenuation the Investigating Judge found also that respondent, in his aforesaid
actuations, did so without improper motive but in good faith.
In our republican system of government, the exercise by the people of their right of
suffrage is the expression of their sovereign will. It is, therefore, absolutely essential
that the free and voluntary use of this right be effectively protected by the law and by
governmental authority. As stated in an earlier case: 2
* * * The people in clothing a citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose of
securing a consistent and perpetual administration of the government they ordain,
charge him with the performance of a duty in the nature of a public trust, and in that
respect constitute him a representative of the whole people. This duty requires that the
privilege thus bestowed should be exercise, not exclusively for the benefit of the citizen
or class of citizens professing it, but in good faith and with an intelligent zeal for the
general benefit and welfare of the state. (U.S. vs. Cruikshank 92 U.S. 588.) In the last
analysis, therefore, the inclusion in or exclusion from the permanent electoral list of any
voter concerns not only the latter in his individual capacity but the public in general.
In the light of the statutory purpose, the seriousness of respondent's failure to comply
with the requirements of Section 136 of the electoral law becomes evident. His good
faith or lack of malice is of no avail, considering that in crimes which are mala prohibita
the act alone irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense. It appears, however,
that on April 8, 1974, the President of the Philippines promulgated Presidential Decree
No. 433, which grants general amnesty under certain conditions to public school
teachers, other government officials and employees, members of the armed forces of
the Philippines and other persons for violation of election laws and other related
statutes in connection with the elections of 1965, 1967, 1969, 1971, and the election of
delegates to the Constitutional Convention.

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
There is no question that as a consequence of the general amnesty all persons who
violated the election law on the dates and occasions therein mentioned are relieved of
their criminal liability. 3 In the case at bar, respondent is relieved of any criminal liability
for his aforecited infraction; however, in the public interest he should be admonished.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby admonished that he should exercise greater care
in the observance of the provisions of existing laws in the discharge of his judicial duty,
and warned that any subsequent misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47243
June 17, 1940
CIPRIANO ABAIL, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
COURT OF BACOLOD, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, ET AL., respondents-appellants.
In the year 1937 the total number of registered voters in the municipality of Talisay,
Negros Occidental, was 3,658. In 1938 the electoral census of the place, after the
registration on September 24 and October 1, 1938, showed that the number of
registered voters had increased to 18,288. A few days before the election for
Assemblymen on November 8, 1938, or on October 18, 1938, 17,344 petitions were
filed in the justice of the peace court of Bacolod. Negros Occidental, for the exclusion of
the names of an equal number of persons from the permanent list of registered voters
of Talisay, Negros Occidental, on the grounds that they were not residents of Talisay n
accordance with the Election Code, that they could not prepare their ballots
themselves, and that their registration as voters was not done in accordance with law.
The hearing of the petitions for exclusion was held on October 28, 1938. After attorneys
Hilado, Parreo, Remitio and Severino entered their appearance for the challenged
voters, the justice of the peace of Bacolod ascertained who of the challenged voters
were present in court and who were absent. Thereafter the said justice of the peace
declared those who were absent in default. Failing to obtain a reconsideration, the
attorneys for the challenged voters moved that, since the presentation of evidence had
not yet commenced, all the petitions be forwarded to the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental which was then presided over by two Judges. The attorneys for the
petitioners in the said 17,344 exclusion cases objected on the ground that the aforesaid
attorneys had no authority to represent those who were absent. Whereupon the justice
of the peace of Bacolod ruled that said attorneys could represent only the 87
challenged voters who were present in the court room and accordingly remanded their
cases to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. At the same time the justice
of the peace dismissed 253 of the petitions upon motion of the petition upon motion of
the petitioners themselves. Although no evidence was presented by the petitioners in
support of their petition against those who, were declared in default, the justice of the
peace of Bacolod ordered their exclusion from the list of voters on the ground that it
was the duty of the challenged voters appear in court in order to be personally
examined in accordance with section 118 (f) of the Election Code, as one of the
grounds for their exclusion from the list of voters was that they could not prepare their

ballots themselves, that is, that they could not read and write. The attorneys for the
challenged voters received notice of the decision of the justice of the peace of Bacolod
on November 2, 1938, when the present petition for certiorari was instituted in the Court
First Instance of Negros Occidental by the petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf
of the other challenged voters for the purpose of having the judgment of the justice of
the peace of Bacolod in the aforesaid exclusion proceedings set aside. After hearing,
the Honorable Judge Sotero Rodas of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
rendered judgment setting aside the decision of the respondent justice of the peace of
Bacolod and ordering the restoration of the excluded voters in the permanent electoral
census of Talisay, Negros Occidental. From this judgment the instant appeal was
brought, and the respondents-appellants make an elaborate assignment of nine errors.
In view of the result hereinbelow reached, we do not consider it necessary to consider
seriatim these errors.
While the present controversy may seem academic because the 1938 election is over,
we have nevertheless assumed the task of deciding the same on its merits in view of
the imperative necessity and importance of having a correct electoral census in the
municipality of Talisay, Negros Occidental, and for that matter in any municipality or city
in the Philippines, for use in future elections. In the scheme of our present republican
government, the people are allowed to have a voice therein through the instrumentality
of suffrage to be availed of by those possessing certain prescribe qualifications (Article
V, Constitution of the Philippines; sections 93 and 94, Election Code). The people in
clothing a citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose of securing a consistent
and perpetual administration of the government they ordain, charge him with the
performance of a duty in the nature of a public trust, and in that respect constitute him a
representative of the whole people. This duty requires that the privilege thus bestowed
should be exercised, not exclusively for the benefit of the citizen or class of citizens
professing it, but in good faith and with an intelligent zeal for the general benefit of the
state. (U.S. vs. Cruikshank, 92 U. S., 588.) In the last analysis, therefore, the inclusion
from the permanent electoral list of any voter concerns not only the latter in his
individual capacity but the public in general.
Section 113 of the Election Code provides that if the Judge of the Court of First Instance
is in the province, the proceedings for the inclusion from the list of voters shall, upon
petition of any interested party filed before the presentation of evidence, be remanded
to the said Judge who shall hear and decide the same in the first and last instance.
When, therefore, the attorneys for the challenged voters moved the justice of the peace
of Bacolod to remand all the exclusion cases to the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, then presided over by two Judges, it was mandatory on said justice of the
peace to grant the motion. Without deciding whether the attorneys who appeared for
the challenged voters were in fact authorized by all, it is our opinion that, in view of the
extraordinary circumstance that the challenged voters were more than seventeen
thousand and a representative number thereof were present, and in view of the nature
of the proceedings which affect public interest, it was error for the aforesaid justice of
the peace not to have remanded all the petitions for exclusion to the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental. Thereafter, in the interest of prompt and economical

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
administration of justice the necessary arrangement could have been made to enable
the corresponding judge of First Instance of the province to proceed to Talisay and hear
the cases there.
The judgment appealed from will accordingly be reversed and in the exercise of our
discretionary power (Cason vs. Rickards, 5 Phil., 611; Rementeria vs. Lara, 6 Phil., 532;
Agonoy vs. Ruiz, 11 Phil, 204; Muerteguy & Aboitiz vs. Delgado, 22 Phil., 109;
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Aldanese, 46 Phil., 713; Tinsay vs.
Yusay, 47 Phil., 639; Singh vs. Tan Chay, 51 Phil., 259; Province of Tayabas Perez, 56
Phil., 257), the case remanded to the Court First Instance of Negros Occidental with
instruction to hear and decide the petitions for exclusion of the merits, in the first and
last instance (section 113, Electoral Code), giving the parties every opportunity to
present their respective evidence. so that it may thereafter make such corrections in the
electoral census of Talisay, Negros Occidental, as may be proper (section 90, Electoral
Code), and to refer to the Solicitor-General such violations of the Election Law as might
have been committed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139357. May 5, 2000]
ABDULMADID P.B. MARUHOM, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
HADJI JAMIL DIMAPORO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
Whether or not a motion to dismiss, filed after an answer has been filed, is a prohibited
pleading in an election protest pending before the Regional Trial Court is the issue
posed in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction challenging the
Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated July 6, 1999[if !supportFootnotes]
[1][endif]
dismissing Comelec Case SPR No. 52-98.
The COMELECs challenged order summarizes the relevant facts of the controversy
thus:
1. Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for Mayor in the Municipality
of Marogong, Lanao del Sur and voted as such in the last May
11, 1998 national and local election (sic). Petitioner is a reelectionist and a veteran politician;
2. The election in Marogong functioned on May 11, 1998, and after the voting the ballot
boxes were transmitted to the Kalimodan Hall, Provincial
Capitol of Lanao del Sur at Marawi City where the automated
counting of votes and canvass of election returns were
centralized;
3. During the counting of votes, serious irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds
were committed at the instance of petitioner or his followers in
that votes actually casted (sic) for the private respondent were
not counted and credited in his favor thru (sic) the concerted
acts, conspiracy and manipulation of the Board of Election
Inspectors, military, Election Officer and the Machine Operator
who happens to be a nephew of the petitioner;
4. In Precincts Nos. 1A-1A1, 7A1, 8A, 10A-10A1 and 11A about 115 official ballots were
refused or rejected by the counting machine which the private
respondents watchers or representatives have requested and
insisted to be re-fed to the automated machine for the second
and third times pursuant to the provisions of Comelec
Resolution No. 3030 but their requests were not heeded by the
Election Officer and the Machine Operator, Solaiman Rasad,
who is a close kin of the Petitioner, and instead considered the
said ballots as finally rejected, while in Precincts Nos. 12A,
23A1 and 6A, around 56 ballots were found therein which were
not drawn from the official ballots and were included in the
counting of votes over the objection of the private respondents
watchers or representatives;
5. Before the termination of the counting of votes and the consolidation of the results,
the machine operator and the Election Officer carried away
from the Kalimodan Hall the diskette and brought the same to
the down town without the knowledge of the private
respondents watchers or representatives;

6. As a result of the foregoing irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the

petitioner was illegally proclaimed as winner because he
appeared to have obtained 2,020 votes while the private
respondent garnered 2,000 votes with a slight margin of only
20 votes;
7. After the counting of votes, the ballot boxes were kept at the Kalimodan Hall,
Provincial Capitol, Marawi City guarded and secured by military
and PNP personnel together with the watchers/representatives
of the petitioner and the private respondent and other
candidates or political parties until they were transported and
delivered to the respondent court at Malabang, Lanao del Sur
sometime on August 13, 1998 by 1Lt. Napisa AG together with
the duly authorized representatives of both parties.
xxx xxx xxx
1. On May 22, 1998, private respondent, knowing that he was cheated and the true
winner for Mayor, filed before this Honorable Commission a
petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner Abdulmadid
Maruhom as the duly elected Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del
Sur docketed as SPC No. 98-226.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
2. As precautionary measure to avoid any technicality, private respondent filed on May
25, 1998, an ordinary "Protest ad Cautelam" against the
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Malabang, Lanao del Sur entitled "Hadji Jamil D. Dimaporo vs.
Abdulmadid Maruhom" for election protest (Manual Judicial
Recount, revision and reappreciation of ballots) docketed as
Election Case No. 11-127.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
3. On June 1, 1998, petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom filed an answer with counterprotest in Election Case No. 11-127 special and affirmative
defenses and counter-protest.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] In his answer
petitioner prayed to hold in abeyance further proceedings since
the protest is ad cautelam or subject to the petition filed before
this Honorable Commission.
4. On July 2, 1998, before SPC No. 98-228 could be set for hearing by this Honorable
Commission, the private respondent as petitioner therein, filed
a motion to withdraw his petition in said SPC No. 98-228 albeit
said case was among those cases the proceedings of which
were ordered to be continued beyond June 30, 1998, under
Comelec Resolution No. 3049 promulgated on June 29, 1998.
[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
xxx
5. On July 17, 1998, an order was issued by this Honorable Commission, (First
Division) granting the private respondents motion to withdraw
petition in SPC No. 98-228 and considered the same
withdrawn.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] xxx.
6. Upon receipt of a copy of said order, dated July 17, 1998, private respondent filed an
urgent motion before the respondent court on July 27, 1998,
praying for the issuance of an order directing the proper

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
officials/officers concerned to bring and produce before said
court the ballot boxes subjects of the protest and counterprotest and to set the case for hearing as mandated by law.[if !
supportFootnotes][7][endif]
xxx
7. After the delivery of the ballot boxes involved in the protest and counter-protest, the
public respondent issued an order, dated August 17, 1998,
setting Election Case No. 11-127 for hearing (a) for the creation
of the Committee on Revision and appointment of the
Chairman and Members thereof; (b) making of the cash deposit
and payment of the revisors compensation; (c) partial
determination of the case, etc. on September 1, 1998, at 8:30
oclock in the morning.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
8. When the case was called for hearing on September 2, 1998, a Revision Committee
was created and its membership were duly appointed in open
court which committee was directed by the respondent court to
finish the revision of ballots, if possible, within 20 days from the
commencement of the revision[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] xxx
9. After the Revision Committee was directed by the respondent to commence the
revision of ballots, the petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom thru
counsel orally moved for the dismissal of the protest on the
grounds that (1) The ballot boxes containing the ballots in the
protested and counter-protested precincts have been violated;
(2) Automated counting of ballots does not contemplate a
manual recount of the ballots; and (3) Protestant is guilty of
forum shopping warranting summary dismissal of the petitioner
of the protest.
10. The private respondent thru (sic) undersigned counsel, vigorously opposed the said
oral motion to dismiss and orally argued that the motion is
clearly dilatory having been made only after the Revision
Committee has been ordered to commence the revision of
ballots on September 1, 1998 and maintained that (1) The
motion to dismiss is not allowed in an election protest; (2) The
sanctity and integrity of the ballot boxes subject matter of the
protest and counter-protest have been preserved and never
violated; (3) The automated counting of ballots does not
preclude the filing of the election protest for the judicial recount
and revision of ballots; and (4) The private respondent is not
guilty of forum shopping because his petition of protest is
clearly and explicitly a Protest Ad Cautelam in view of the
pendency of his petition before this Honorable Commission
which was withdrawn by the private respondent before it could
be set for hearing or acted upon by this Honorable
Commission.
11. After the oral arguments of both parties, the petitioners counsel asked that he be
given ample time to file a written Omnibus Motion to Dismiss
and the respondent court thru then Acting Presiding Judge

Rasad Balindong, issued an order dated September 2, 1998,

giving ten (10) days to Atty. Tingcap T. Mortaba to file an
Omnibus Motion in substantiation of all the oral motions he
made, furnishing a copy thereof to the undersigned counsel for
the private respondent who was likewise given an equal period
of time to comment.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
12. On September 11, 1998, petitioner filed his motion to dismiss [if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] and
on September 21, 1998, the private respondent filed a vigorous
opposition to motion to dismiss.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
13. During the hearing on the motion to dismiss and the opposition thereto on
September 21, 1998, the petitioners counsel requested for
ample time to file a rejoinder to the vigorous opposition to
motion to dismiss submitted by the private respondent which
was granted by the court and on September 28, 1998,
petitioner filed his rejoinder[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] and on October
5, 1998 private respondent filed his comment [if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
thereto and thereafter all incidents were submitted for
resolution of the court.
14. On November 10, 1998, the respondent court thru Honorable Presiding Judge
Moslemen T. Macarambon, issued the assailed order denying
the petitioners motion to dismiss for lack of merit and ordering
the Revision Committee to report to the court on November 19,
1998, at 8:30 oclock in the morning for their oath taking and to
receive the instruction of the court in the revision of the ballots
and other allied matters.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
15. On November 18, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
dated November 10, 1998,[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] and on November
23, 1998, private respondent filed a vigorous opposition [to
motion] for reconsideration.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
16. Finding no compelling reason to disturb its order dated November 10, 1998, the
respondent court issued the assailed order dated December 1,
1998 which denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit. In the same order, the respondent court reiterated its
previous order to the members of the Revision Committee to
take their oaths before Atty. Raqueza T. Umbaro or Atty. Khalil
Laguindab and thereafter to convene and start the revision of
ballots on December 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1998, morning and
afternoon.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
17. As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay of the proceedings of the case more
specifically the revision of ballots, the petitioner filed on
December 10, 1998, the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and on
December 11, 1998, petitioner filed an urgent motion before the
respondent court praying that further proceedings in Election
Case No. 11-127 be deferred until after protestees petition for
certiorari and prohibition before this Honorable Commission

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
shall have been finally resolved, copy of which was served
upon the undersigned counsel only on December 12, 1998, at
10:50 A.M.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] xxx
18. That before the undersigned counsel could file his opposition to said urgent motion
on December 14, 1998 and in the absence of a restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction issued by (the
COMELEC), the respondent judge already issued an order
granting the same motion and ordering the Revision Committee
to hold in abeyance the scheduled revision of ballots on
December 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1998, etc. until further order
from the court xxx.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]
Petitioner alleges that in dismissing the petition the COMELEC acted in excess of, or
with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
1.] holding that a motion to dismiss an election protest case filed in the Regional Trial
Court is a prohibited pleading;
2.] holding that the motion to dismiss filed after the answer is not allowed;
3.] failing to resolve the issues raised in SPR No. 52-98 which are sufficient legal bases
to dismiss Election Case No. 11-127.
In sum, petitioner insists that in refusing to pass upon the three (3) principal issues
raised in COMELEC Case SPR No. 52-98, to wit:
1. Whether or not public respondent acted in excess of, or with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that a
motion to dismiss an election protest case in the Regional Trial
Court is a prohibited pleading;
2. Whether or not public respondent acted in excess of, or with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in holding that a
motion to dismiss filed after the answer to an election protest
case in the Regional Trial court is not allowed; and
3. Whether or not public respondent gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in failing to resolve the relevant material and
substantial issues raised in SPR No. 52-98.
the COMELEC "abdicated its duty under its own rules of procedure and under the
Constitution and the election laws." Such abdication of duty, according to petitioner,
amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It must be borne in mind that the purpose of governing statutes on the conduct of
elections
[i]s to protect the integrity of elections to suppress all evils that may violate its purity and
defeat the will of the voters. The purity of the elections is one of
the most fundamental requisites of popular government. The
Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate must do
everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of
the votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties,

the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in

adopting means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created
to promote free, orderly and honest elections. The choice of
means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are
clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not
be interfered with.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
Section 2 (1) of Article IX of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." There can hardly be any doubt that the text
and intent of this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and
incidental powers for it to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.
In accordance with this intent, the Court has been liberal in defining the parameters of
the COMELECs powers in conducting elections. Sumulong v. COMELEC[if !supportFootnotes][22]
[endif]
aptly points out that
Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically not
from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on
Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with
political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual
experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a
peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political
questions xxx. There are no ready made formulas for solving
public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve
patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the
matter of the administration of laws relative to the conduct of
election xxx we must not by any excessive zeal take away from
the Commission on Elections that initiative which by
constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it.
Succinctly stated, laws and statutes governing election contests especially the
appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. [if !
supportFootnotes][23][endif]
An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the
need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative, [if !
supportFootnotes][24][endif]
much more so in this case considering that a mere twenty (20) votes
separates the winner from the loser of the contested election results.
The primordial issue to be resolved herein is whether or not the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing SPR No. 52-98.
In support of his cause, petitioner insists that there is "nothing irregular or anomalous in
the filing of the motion to dismiss" after the filing of the answer because in effect he is
merely insisting on a preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative defenses. Thus,
he claims that the summary dismissal of his motion to dismiss is tainted with grave

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
We disagree.
The filing of the motion to dismiss, in fact, appears to be part of a perfidious plot to
prevent the early termination of the proceedings in Election Case No. 4847 as
evidenced by a confluence of events clearly showing a pattern of delay employed by
petitioner to avert the revision ballots. These events, pointed out by private respondent [if
!supportFootnotes][25][endif]
and borne by the record, show that
1. It was only on September 1, 1999 after the creation of the Revision Committee and
the appointment of its Chairman and Members and after the
said committee was ordered by the trial court to commence the
revision and to render its report within 20 days that the
petitioner orally moved for the dismissal of the case on the
flimsy grounds that (1) the ballot boxes subject of the protest
and counter protest have been violated; (2) the automated
counting of ballots does not contemplate a manual recount of
ballots; and (3) protestant is guilty of forum-shopping
warranting summary dismissal of the protest;
2. After the oral arguments on the oral motion to dismiss the petitioner requested for
ample time within which to file an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss
and over the vigorous opposition of the private respondent the
same was granted by the court and the petitioner was given a
period of ten (10) days to file the same and the private
respondent was likewise given a period of ten (10) days to file
his comment;
3. On September 11, 1998, the motion to dismiss[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] and during the
hearing on the said motion and the opposition [if !supportFootnotes][27]
[endif]
thereto on September 21, 1998, the petitioner again asked
for ample time to file a rejoinder to the vigorous opposition to
motion to dismiss which was again granted by the court and it
was only on September 28, 1998 that said rejoinder was filed;
4. After a denial of the motion to dismiss on November 10, 1998, [if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] the
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on November 18,
1998;[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif]
5. When the motion for reconsideration was denied on December 1, 1998,[if !supportFootnotes]
[30][endif]
petitioner filed on December 18, 1998 before the
Commission on Elections a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for preliminary injunction and asked the trial court to
defer the proceedings of Election Case No. 11-27 until after his
petition shall have been finally resolved which was granted by
the trial court. Hence, the scheduled revision of the ballots on
December 14, 15, 16 and 17, 1998 was cancelled and the
proceedings of the case held in abeyance;[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif]
6. As the Comelec En Banc did not give due course to petitioners prayer for writ of

preliminary injunction, the trial court, upon motion of the private

respondent, issued an order for the revision of ballots on
February 8, 1999.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] On said day, neither the
petitioners counsel nor his designated revisors appeared,
instead the petitioner, assisted by his numerous armed men,
numbering around 30 stated (sic) in strategic places, prevented
the court personnel to enter the court premises. Were it not for
the maximum tolerance exercised by the PNP personnel and
the intervention of the local datus/leaders, there would have
been bloodshed;
7. On February 9, 1999, the petitioners counsel filed a withdrawal of appearance with
the attached letter-request of the petitioner asking for the
deferment of the revision of ballots for at least two (2) weeks to
enable him to engage the services of another counsel.
Considering that the incident was designed to delay the further
the early disposition of the case which would frustrate the ends
of justice, the court held in abeyance its ruling on the
withdrawal of appearance of and directed petitioners counsel to
handle the case after the appearance of a new counsel;[if !
supportFootnotes][33][endif]

8. To further delay the proceedings of the case, the petitioner filed a petition for transfer
of venue of the trial to from RTC, Branch 11, Malabang, Lanao
del Sur to Iligan City or in Metro Manila which the private
respondent did not oppose so as not to delay the early
resolution of this Honorable Supreme Court on the said
petition;
9. Again, the proceedings of the case was held in abeyance in view of the pendency of
the said petition for transfer of venue;
10. After the dismissal of the petition in Election Case No. 52-98, the petitioner filed the
instant petition for certiorari before this Honorable Supreme
Court with a prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order;
11. As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay of the proceedings of the case, the
petitioner filed an urgent motion before this Honorable
Supreme Court praying for the immediate issuance of a TRO
directing the Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch III, Iligan City to
cease, desist and refrain from conducting any further
proceedings of Election Case No. 4847 until the instant case
shall have been resolved. This Honorable Supreme Court,
without granting the prayer for TRO, directed the RTC, Branch
III, Iligan City not to promulgate any decision in the said
election case until further order[s] from this most Honorable
Court.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
It is clear, given the foregoing facts of this case, that the roundabout manner within
which petitioner virtually substituted his answer by belatedly filing a motion to dismiss
three (3) months later is a frivolous resort to procedure calculated to frustrate the will of

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
the electorate. As pointedly observed by the COMELEC in its challenged Resolution
dated July 6, 1999,[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] petitioner only filed his motion to dismiss "when
the results of the trial appear[ed] to be adverse to him"[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif] or right after
the creation of the Revision Committee had been ordered by the trial court. If petitioner
truly intended to move for the preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative
defenses as he claims, then he should have simultaneously moved for the preliminary
hearing of his special and affirmative defenses at the time he filed his answer.
Otherwise, he should have filed his motion to dismiss "within the time for but before
filing the answer" pursuant to Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Suffice it to state in this regard that such a whimsical change of mind by petitioner can
not be countenanced much more so in election cases where time is of the essence in
the resolution thereof. Indeed, the Omnibus Election Code states in no uncertain terms
that
SEC. 258. Preferential disposition of contests in courts. The RTC, in their respective
cases, shall give preference to election contests over all
other cases, except those of habeas corpus, and shall, without
delay, hear and within thirty (30) days from the date of their
submission for decision, but in every case within six (6) months
after filing, decide the same. xxx[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif] (emphasis
and italics supplied)
Petitioner further argues that his submissions that a.] the integrity of the ballot boxes
has been violated; b.] only rejected ballots or ballots manually counted are the proper
subjects of an election protest; and c.] private respondent is guilty of forum-shopping,
are enough grounds to dismiss the case.
We remain unconvinced.
As aptly observed by the COMELEC in the challenged Resolution, these grounds are
"evidentiary in nature and can be best ventilated during the trial of the case." [if !
supportFootnotes][38][endif]
It needs be stressed in this regard that the purpose of an election
protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of
canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate.[if !supportFootnotes][39][endif] In an election
contest where the correctness of the number of votes is involved, the best and most
conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves; where the ballots can not be produced
or are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence. [if !supportFootnotes][40][endif]
In this case, the counted official ballots are available and there is no evidence, other
than the bare allegation of petitioner, that the sanctity of the ballot boxes subject matter
of the protest have been violated or the official ballots contained therein impaired. The
best way, therefore, to test the truthfulness of petitioners claim is to open the ballot
boxes in the protested precincts followed by the examination, revision, recounting and
re-appreciation of the official ballots therein contained in accordance with law and
pertinent rules on the matter. Needless to state this can only be done through a fullblown trial on the merits, not a peremptory resolution of the motion to dismiss on the
basis of the bare and one-sided averments made therein.

Petitioners reliance on COMELEC Resolution No. 2868 [if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] to support his
restrictive claim that only rejected ballots or ballots manually counted in case of failure
of the automated counting machines are the proper subjects of an election protest, is
just as unpersuasive.
There is admittedly a lacuna leges in R.A. No. 8436 which prescribes the adoption of an
automated election system. However, while conceding as much, this Court ruled in
Tupay Loong v. COMELEC,[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif] that the Commission is nevertheless not
precluded from conducting a manual count when the automated counting system fails,
reasoning thus:
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the
error in counting is not machine related for human foresight is
not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law
cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the
problem. Section 2(1) of Article IX (C) of the Constitution gives
the COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the
text and intent of this provision is to give the COMELEC all the
necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective
of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in
defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the conduct
of our elections In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a
manual count was not only reasonable. It was the only way to
count the decisive local votes ... The bottom line is that by
means of the manual count, the will of the voters of Sulu was
honestly determined. We cannot kick away the will of the
people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A.
8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine
count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the
conduct of an election which is under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC
Our elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running for public
offices, candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post. Too
often, COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet
unforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of
our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not
be impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable. We cannot,
however, engage in a swivel chair criticism of these actions
often taken under very difficult circumstances.
Verily, the legal compass from which the COMELEC should take its bearings in acting
upon election controversies is the principle that "clean elections control the

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
appropriateness of the remedy."[if !supportFootnotes][43][endif]
Be that as it may, the fact is the averments in petitioners counter-protest and private
respondents protest already justified the determination of the issues through a judicial
revision and recounting of the ballots pursuant to Section 255 of the Omnibus Election
Code which provides that
Sec. 255. Judicial counting of votes in election contest.- Where allegations in a
protest or counter-protest so warrant or whenever in the
opinion of the court the interests of justice so require, it
shall immediately order the book of voters, ballot boxes and
their keys, ballots and other documents used in the election be
brought before it and that the ballots be examined and votes
recounted. (Italics supplied)
So too must fall petitioners procedural objection that private respondent should be
faulted for forum-shopping vis--vis this Courts pronouncement in Samad v.
COMELEC[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif] which states in no uncertain terms that
As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto
precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation
controversy, or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier
filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire
into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his
proclamation. The reason is that once the competent tribunal
has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition for
quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be
decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding. This
procedure will prevent confusion and conflict of authority.
Conformably, we have ruled in a number of cases that after a
proclamation has been made, a pre-proclamation case before
the COMELEC is no longer viable.
The rule admits of exceptions, however, as where: (1) the board of canvassers was
improperly constituted; (2) quo warranto was not the proper
remedy; (3) what was filed was not really a petition for quo
warranto or an election protest but a petition to annul a
proclamation; (4) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an
election protest was expressly made without prejudice to
the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad
cautelam; and (5) the proclamation was null and void.
Petitioners argument that the filing of a motion to dismiss in an election contest filed
with a regular court is not a prohibited pleading is well taken. As we pointed out in
Melendres, Jr. v. COMELEC: [if !supportFootnotes][45][endif]

Neither can petitioner seek refuge behind his argument that the motion to dismiss filed
by private respondent is a prohibited pleading under Section 1,
Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure because the said
provision refers to proceedings filed before the COMELEC. The
applicable provisions on the matter are found in Part VI of the
Rules of Procedure titled "PROVISIONS GOVERNING
ELECTION CONTESTS BEFORE TRIAL COURT" and as this
Court pointedly stated in Aruelo v. Court of Appeals[if !supportFootnotes]
[46][endif]

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it

provided that motions to dismiss and bill of
particulars are not allowed in election protests or
quo warranto cases pending before regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of a
certain pleading in the regular courts. The power to
promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice
and procedure in all courts is vested in the
Supreme Court.[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif]
The foregoing pronouncement, however, will not extricate petitioner from his
predicament because the denial of petitioners motion to dismiss was based on the fact
that the other grounds relied therein was considered unmeritorious and not because the
said motion is a prohibited pleading in electoral protest cases. While the challenged
COMELEC Resolution may not have been entirely correct in dismissing the petition in
this regard, the soundness of its discretion to accord unto the trial court the competence
to resolve the factual issues raised in the controversy cannot be doubted. Indeed, as
reasoned by the COMELEC, the Commission assumes the competence of the trial
court to handle electoral protest and cannot encroach on its original and exclusive
jurisdiction on electoral protest cases involving the contested mayoralty seat. To our
mind, the trial court should be allowed to resolve the case on the merits to be able to
rule on the factual and legal grounds raised by the petitioner as his defenses in his
Answer. Should the petitioner be dissatisfied with the outcome of the case in the lower
court, he can still appeal, as his relief, to this Commission within the reglementary
period provided by law.
Moreover at balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and
perception of how to interpret and apply the laws relating to elections; literal or liberal;
the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or the ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or
substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or
gently in favor of the voters obvious choice. In applying elections laws, it would be
far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but
little understood legalisms.[if !supportFootnotes][48][endif]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123037. March 21, 1997]
TEODORO Q. PEA, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL AND ALFREDO E. ABUEG, JR., respondents.
DECISION

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
TORRES, JR., J.:
Assailed herein is the October 12, 1995 Resolution [if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) dismissing the Petition Ad Cautelam of the
Petitioner Teodoro Q. Pea in HRET Case No. 95-014. Petitioner questioned the election
of the private respondent Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr. as Member of the House of
Representatives representing the Second District of the province of Palawan.
Petitioner and the private respondent were contenders for the said Congressional
Office in the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 12, 195, upon canvassing the votes cast,
the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan proclaimed the private respondent as
the winner.
On May 22, 1995, the instant petition was filed with the HRET, wherein the petitioner, as
protestant, averred that:
7. The elections in the precincts of the Second District of Palawan were tainted with
massive fraud, widespread vote-buying, intimidation and terrorism and other serious
irregularities committed before, during and after the voting, and during the counting of
votes and the preparation of election returns and certificates of canvass which affected
the results of the election. Among the fraudulent acts committed were the massive votebuying and intimidation of voters, disenfranchisement of petitioners known supporters
through systematic deletion of names from the lists of voters, allowing persons to vote
in excess of the number of registered voters, misappreciation, misreading and nonreading of protestants ballots and other irregularities.
8. According to the Statement of Votes by Precinct/Municipality/City, the protestee
allegedly obtained 52,967 votes, while the protestant allegedly obtained 46,023 votes,
or a difference of 6,944 votes. A copy of said document is attached hereto as Annex B.
9. Had the massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and other serious
irregularities not been committed, the result of the elections for Member of the House of
Representatives would have been different and the protestant would have garnered the
highest number of votes for the Office Member of the House of Representatives in the
Second District of Palawan, which was the true expression of the will of the voters of
the Province of Palawan.
10. The proclamation by the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Palawan that the protestee was allegedly the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives for the Second District of Palawan is contrary to law and to the true
expression of the will of the voters of the Province of Palawan.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
Private respondent-Protestee Abueg filed an Answer With Affirmative Defense,
Counterclaim and Counter-Protest[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] on June 5, 1995, to which Pea filed
a Reply on June 23, 1995. Subsequent to the filing of his Answer, Abueg filed a Motion
to Dismiss[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] the Petition on June 22, 1995, averring that the HRET has
not acquired jurisdiction over the petition, the same being insufficient in form and
substance. In essence, the motion to dismiss anchors its challenge on the fact that the
petition failed to allege the precincts where the massive fraud and disenfranchisement
of voters occurred, nor did it point out how many votes would be gained by the

protestant as a result of the same.

Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss [if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] on July 10,
1995, attaching thereto a Summary of Contested Precincts, naming 700 precincts
where election irregularities allegedly occurred.
In its Resolution of October 12, 1995, the respondent HRET ruled that although it had
jurisdiction over the petition, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives, the said
petition, however, fails to state a cause of action, and is therefore, insufficient in form
and substance, meriting its dismissal.
The HRET states pertinently:
There are 743 precincts in the second congressional district of Palawan which is
comprised of Puerto Princesa City and the municipalities of Aborlan, Balabac, Bataraza,
Brookes Point, Narra, Quezon, and Marcos (Ordinance appended to the 1973
Constitution). The Protestant failed to specify which are the 700 precincts, out of the
said 743 precincts, that are included in his protest; he even failed to allege the
municipalities where the protested precincts are located. Worse, the body of the Petition
does not even mention the 700 precincts. Reference to them is made only in the
Prayer. These omissions prevent Protestee from being apprised of the issues which he
has to meet and make it virtually impossible for the Tribunal to determine which ballot
boxes have to be collected.
The Supreme Court, in Fernando vs. Pastor M. Endencia, Judge of First Instance of
Bulacan, et. al. (No. 46099, 66 Phil 148, 150, August 30, 1938) observed that, [w]hile
the election law does not say so directly, it is clearly inferred from its relevant provisions
that where the grounds of contest are that legal votes were rejected and illegal votes
received, the motion of protest should state in what precincts such irregularities
occurred. xxx The specification in the motion of protest of the election precinct or
precincts where the alleged irregularities occurred, is required in order to apprise the
contestee of the issues which he has to meet. Xxx
In its more recent resolution in Grand Alliance for Democracy (GAD) vs. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 78302, May 26, 1987, 150 SCRA 665), the Supreme Court held that the
petition therein could have been dismissed outright as deficient in form and substance,
being couched in general terms only, without precise indication of the time, place and
manner of the commission of the alleged irregularities. Xxx
Similarly, this Tribunal, in dismissing an election protest, observed that the protest, in
general language, impugns, contests and protests the illegal, improper and fraudulent
electoral practices, acts and deeds of the protestee and impugns and contests all the
election returns in the lone district of Catanduanes. The tribunal held that this
scattershot allegation is not allowed in election contests and that it is necessary to
make a precise indication of the precincts protested and a specification of the claimed
offenses to have been committed by the parties. (Alberto vs. Tapia, HRET Case No. 37,
January 23, 1989)

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
While Protestant has attached as Annex A to his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss,
filed on 10 July 1995, a Summary of contested Precincts, the defects in his Protest
were not cured thereby as the Summary was submitted only after the Motion to Dismiss
had been filed. The Opposition and the attached Summary do not amend the original
Petition. There is not even a prayer in the Opposition suggesting such amendment.
Moreover, in a Resolution promulgated on 17 June 1995, the Commission on Elections
en banc (COMELEC) dismissed herein Petitioners Petition (SPA Case No. 95-258) to
declare a failure of elections in the second district of Palawan. Copy of said Resolution
was sent to Petitioner Peas Petition Ad Cautelam was thus converted into a regular
protest (not Ad Cautelam) effective upon the finality of the official COMELEC resolution,
thereby providing him an opportunity to amend it to cure the defects cited above,
Protestant took no positive and affirmative steps for that purpose.
Protestant alleges in his Opposition that Protestee has likewise failed to specify the 47
precincts he contests in his Counter-Protest. This omission merely renders Protestees
Counter-Protest defective for insufficiency in form and substance and for failure to state
a cause of action. It does not cure the fatal defects in Protestants Petition.
WHEREFORE, for failure of the petition (Protest) to state a cause of action because it
is fatally insufficient in form and substance, the Tribunal Resolved to GRANT
Protestees Motion to Dismiss and to DISMISS, as it hereby DISMISSES, the instant
Petition of Protest. As a logical consequence thereof and also for the same reason,
Protestees Counter-Protest is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was denied by the
respondent tribunal on November 14, 1995.
In this Petition for Certiorari, filed on December 29, 1995, petitioner argues that the
respondent HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to having acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the election protest of petitioner
considering that:
I
THE PETITION AD CAUTELAM DATED 22 MAY 1995 STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION
AND IS SUFFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PETITION WAS INITIALLY DEFECTIVE
BECAUSE IT FAILED TO SPECIFY THE CONTESTED PRECINCTS, SAID DEFECT
WAS CURED WHEN PETITIONER SUBMITTED A SUMMARY OF THE CONTESTED
PRECINCTS WHICH FORMS PART OF THE RECORD OF THE RESPONDENT
HRET.

It is the Petitioners view that the instant election protest is sufficient in form and
substance even while failing to specify the precincts where irregularities allegedly
occurred. Nowhere is it provided that the specification of the precincts is a jurisdictional
requirement that must be complied with in order that an election protest can be
entertained by the HRET. To support his submission, petitioner cites the cases of
Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil 781, Arao vs. COMELEC, 210 SCRA 790 and Gallares vs.
Casenas, 48 Phil 362, the latter stating that:
From a reading of the allegations of the protest, it may be seen that frauds, irregularities
and violations of the law are alleged therein, which, if true, would undoubtedly change
the result of the elections.
The fact that in the protest the number of votes which would result in favor of the
protestant after the judicial counting is not specified, does not affect the right of the
protestant, for it being known that said omission is a defect of the protest, the same
may be cured by a specification of the votes mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the
protest, without thereby adding new grounds for those already alleged by the
protestant.
Applying the same principle to the specification of precincts in the instant case, the
defect in the petition should have been cured by the opposition to the private
respondents Motion to Dismiss.
Moreover, the fact that the HRET did not summarily dismiss the Petition Ad Cautelam,
and instead, required the private respondent Abueg to file an Answer, the HRET has
thus made a prior determination that the petition is sufficient in form and substance.
We do not agree.
In the first place, in requiring the private respondent to answer the petition, the HRET
was not ruling on the formal and substantive sufficiency of the petition. The order to
require an answer is but a matter of course, as under the Revised Rules of Procedure
of the HRET, it is provided that:
RULE 22. Summons. - Upon the filing of the petition, the Clerk of the Tribunal shall
forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the protestee or respondent together
with a copy of the petition, requiring him within ten (10) days from receipt thereof to file
his answer.
As to the adequacy of the protest, we agree with respondent HRET in ruling for the
insufficiency of the same.
A perusal of the petition Ad Cautelam, reveals that Petitioner makes no specific mention
of the precincts where widespread election, fraud and irregularities occured. This is a
fatal omission, as it goes into the very substance of the protest. Under Section 21 of the
Revised Rules of Procedure of HRET, insufficiency in form and substance of the petition
constitutes a ground for the immediate dismissal of the Petition.

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance means that
the petition must be more than merely rhetorical. If the allegations contained therein are
unsupported by even the faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is no
other course than to dismiss the petition, otherwise, the assumptions of an elected
public official may, and will always be held up by petitions of this sort by the losing
candidate.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS the

present petition for lack of merit. The resolution of the respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal dated October 12, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Notably, the instant petition ad cautelam poses a more serious inadequacy than a mere
failure to specify the number of votes which would inure to the protestant, as was the
case in Gallares vs. Casenas, or the failure to impugn the validity of some of the ballots
cast, as in Yalung vs. Atienza, supra, both of which cases were decided in the 1920s.
The defect in the instant case arises from the failure to allege the contested precincts.
Only a bare allegation of massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and
other serious irregularities, without specification, and substantiation, of where and how
these occurences took place, appears in the petition. We cannot allow an election
protest based on such flimsy averments to prosper, otherwise, the whole election
process will deteriorate into an endless stream of crabs pulling at each other, racing to
disembank from the water.
On his second point of argument, Petitioner likewise fails to impress. The Court has
already ruled in Joker P. Arroyo vs. HRET,[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] that substantial
amendments to the protest may be allowed only within the same period for filing the
election protest, which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules of Procedure is ten (10) days
after proclamation of the winner.
While it is conceded that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not
be defeated by mere technical questions, the rule likewise stands, that in an election
protest, the protestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or
amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for filing of the protest.
[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]

Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the power to annul an election should be
exercised with the greatest care as it involves the free and fair expression of the
popular will. It is only in extreme cases of fraud and under circumstances which
demonstrate to the fullest degree a fundamental and wanton disregard of the law that
elections are annulled, and then only when it becomes impossible to take any other
step.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] xxx This is as it should be, for the democratic system is good for
the many although abhorred by a few.
EN BANC
In sum, this Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals
operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal.
Only where such a grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere
with the electoral tribunals judgment. There is such showing in the present petition.

G.R. Nos. 111624-25 March 9, 1995

ALFONSO C. BINCE, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF PANGASINAN, MUNICIPAL BOARDS
OF CANVASSERS OF TAYUG AND SAN MANUEL, PANGASINAN AND EMILIANO

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
MICU, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. and private respondent Emiliano S. Micu were among
the candidates in the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992 for a seat in the
Sanguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan allotted to its Sixth Legislative
District.
Ten (10) municipalities, including San Quintin, Tayug and San Manuel, comprise the
said district.
During the canvassing of the Certificates of Canvass (COC's) for these ten (10)
municipalities by respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) on May 20, 1992,
private respondent Micu objected to the inclusion of the COC for San Quintin on the
ground that it contained false statements. Accordingly, the COCs for the remaining nine
(9) municipalities were included in the canvass. On May 21, 1992, the PBC rules
against the objection of private respondent. 1 From the said ruling, private respondent
Micu appealed to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which docketed the case
as SPC No. 92-208.
On June 6, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution which reads:
Acting on the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu to the ruling of
the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan, dated May 21, 1992, the
Commission en banc tabulated the votes obtained by candidates Atty. Emiliano S. Micu
and Atty. Alfonso C. Bince for the position of Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of the
province of Pangasinan, using as basis thereof the statement of votes by precinct
submitted by the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan, as (sic) a result of said
examination, the Commission rules, as follows:
1. That the actual number of votes obtained by candidate Alfonso C. Bince in the
municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan is 1,055 votes whereas petitioner/appellant
Atty. Emiliano S. Micu obtained 1,535 votes for the same municipality.
Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the province of Pangasinan is
directed to CREDIT in favor of petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu with 1,535
votes and candidate Alfonso C. Bince with 1,055 votes in the municipality of San
Quintin, Pangasinan. 2
Twenty-one (21) days after the canvass of the COCs for the nine (9) municipalities was
completed on May 20, 1992, private respondent Micu together with the Municipal
Boards of Canvassers (MBCs) of Tayug and San Manuel filed with the PBC petitions for
correction of the Statements of Votes (SOVs) earlier prepared for alledged manifest
errors committed in the computation thereof.
In view of the motion of herein petitioner to implement the Resolution of June 6, 1992
which was alleged to have become final, the PBC, on June 18, 1992, credited in favor
of the petitioner and private respondent the votes for each as indicated in the said

resolution and on the basis of the COCs for San Quintin and the other nine (9)
municipalities, petitioner had a total of 27,370 votes while the private respondent had
27,369 votes. Petitioner who won by a margin of 1 vote was not, however, proclaimed
winner because of the absence of authority from the COMELEC.
Accordingly, petitioner filed a formal motion for such authority.
On June 29, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Supplemental Order 3
directing the PBC "to reconvene, continue with the provincial canvass and proclaim the
winning candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the Province of Pangasinan, and
other candidates for provincial offices who have not been proclaimed 4 as of that date.
In the meantime, on June 24, 1992, the PBC, acting on the petitions for correction of
the SOVs of Tayug and San Manuel filed by private respondent and the MBCs of the
said municipalities, rules "to allow the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the
municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan to correct the Statement of Votes
and Certificates of Canvass and on the basis of the corrected documents, the Board
(PBC) will continue the canvass and thereafter proclaim the winning candidate. 5
On June 25, 1992, petitioner Bince appealed from the above ruling allowing the
correction alleging that the PBC had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The appeal
was docketed as SPC No. 92-384.
On July 8, 1992, private respondent Micu filed before the COMELEC an urgent motion
for the issuance of an order directing the PBC to reconvene and proceed with the
canvass. He alleged that the promulgation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2489 on June
29, 1992 affirmed the ruling of the PBC dated June 24, 1992. Similarly, petitioner Bince
filed an urgent petition to cite Atty. Felimon Asperin and Supt. Primo. A. Mina, Chairman
and Member, respectively, of the PBC, for Contempt with alternative prayer for
proclamation as winner and Injunction with prayer for the issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO).
On July 9, 1992, the PBC Chairman, Atty. Felimon Asperin, filed a petition with the
COMELEC seeking a "definitive ruling and a clear directive or order as to who of the
two (2) contending parties should be proclaimed" 6 averring that "there were corrections
already made in a separate sheet of paper of the Statements of Votes and Certificates
of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan which corrections if to be
considered by the Board in its canvass and proclamation, candidate Emiliano will win
by 72 votes. On the other hand, if these corrections will not be considered, candidate
Alfonso Bince, Jr. will win by one (1) vote. 7 On even date, the COMELEC promulgated
its resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
(1) To RECONVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of
Votes, as corrected, of the municipalities comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan;
(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the provincial Board, 6th
District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of
Canvass, aforesaid; in accordance with the law, the rules and guidelines on canvassing
and proclamation. 8

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As directed therein, the PBC on July 21, 1992, by a vote of 2-1 with its Chairman Atty.
Felimon Asperin dissenting, proclaimed candidate Bince as the duly elected member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pangasinan. Assailing the proclamation of Bince,
private respondent Micu filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt and to Annul Proclamation
and Amended Urgent Petition for Contempt and Annul Proclamation on July 22 and 29,
1992, respectively, alleging that the PBC defied the directive of the COMELEC in its
resolution of July 9, 1992. Acting thereon, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution on
July 29, 1992, the decretal portion of which reads:
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES:
1. To direct Prosecutor Jose Antonio Guillermo and Supt. Primo Mina, vice-chairman
and secretayr, respectively, of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan, to
show cause why they should not be declared in contempt of defying and disobeying the
Resolution of this Commission dated 09 July 1992, directing them to RECOVENE
immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes as corrected, of the
Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the Municipalities comprising the 6th District of
Pangasinan; and to PROCLAIM the winning candidate of the Provincial Board, 6th
District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of
Canvass, aforesaid; instead they excluded the corrected Certificated of Canvass of the
Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan;
2. To ANNUL the proclamation dated 21 July 1992, by the said Provincial Board of
Canvassers (dissented by Chairman Felimon Asperin), of candidate Alfonso Bince;
3. To DIRECT the Provincial Board of Canvassers to recovene immediately and
proclaim the winning candidate for the second position of the Provincial Board, 6th
District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of
Canvass submitted by the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of all the municipalities in
the 6th District of Pangasinan, in accordance with law. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before this Court
seeking to set aside the foregoing resolution of the COMELEC, contending that the
same was promulgated without prior notice and hearing with respect to SPC No. 92208 and SPC No. 92-384. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 106291.
On February 9, 1993, the Court en banc 10 granted the petition ratiocinating that:
Respondent COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
annulling the petitioner's proclamation without the requisite due notice and hearing,
thereby depriving the latter of due process. Moreover, there was no valid correction of
the SOVs and COCs for the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel to warrant the
annullment of the petitioner's proclamation.
1. Petitioner had been proclaimed, had taken his oath of office and had assumed the
position of the second elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Pangasinan for its Sixth Legislative District. Such proclamation enjoys the
presumption of regularly and validity. The ruling of the majority of the PBC to proclaim
the petitioner is based on its interpretation of the 9 July 1992 Resolution of respondent
COMELEC which does not expressly single out the corrected COCs of Tayug and San

Manuel; since, as of that time, the only corrected COC which existed was that for San
Quintin, which was made by the PBC on 18 June 1992, the majority of the PBC cannot
be faulted for ruling the way it did. the 9 July 1992 Resolution (Rollo, p. 51) merely
directed it:
(1) To RECOVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes,
as corrected, of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the municipalities comprising
the 6th District of Pangasinan;
(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the Provincial Board, 6th
District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of
Canvass, aforesaid; in accordance with the law, the rules and guideline on canvassing
and proclamation. (Emphasis supplied)
The PBC thus had every reason to believe that the phrase "completed and corrected"
COCs could only refer to the nine 99) COCs for the nine municipalities, canvass for
which was completed on 21 May 1992, and that of San Quintin, respectively. Verily, the
above resolution is vague and ambiguous.
Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public
office is not property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution (Article III,
1987 Constitution), and one cannot acquire a vested right to public office (CRUZ, I.A.,
Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., 101), it is, nevertheless, a protected right (BERNAS J.,
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, vol. I, 1987 ed., 40, citing Segovia
vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 [1925] and Borja vs. Agoncillo, 46 Phil. 432 [1924]). Due process
in proceedings before the respondent COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions,
requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the COMELEC
possesses, in appropriate cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of
any candidate (Section 248, Omnibus Election Code [B.P. Blg. 881]), We had ruled in
Farinas vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 81763, 3 March 1988), Reyes vs.
Commission on Elections G.R. No. 81856, 3 March 1988) and Gallardo vs.
Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 85974, 2 May 1989) that the COMELEC is without
power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a
proclamation without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, the said motion to annul proclamation was treated by the respondent
COMELEC as a Special Case (SPC) because its ruling therein was made in connection
with SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384. Special Cases under the COMELEC
RULES OF PROCEDURE involve the pre-proclamation controversies (Rule 27 in
relation to Section 4(h)l Rule 1, and Section 4, Rule 7). We have categorically declared
in Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 105628, and companion cases, 6
August 1992) that pursuant to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, . . . the
commission en banc does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-proclamation
cases at the first instance. Such cases should first be referred to a division
Hence, the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to decide on the aforesaid to annul
the proclamation; consequently, its 29 July 1992 Resolution is motion is null and void.

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
For this reason too, the COMELEC en banc Resolution of 6 June 1992 in SPC No. 922()8 resolving the private respondent's appeal from the ruling of the PBC with respect to
the COC of San Quintin is similarly void.
2. It is to be noted, as correctly stressed by the petitioner, that there are no valid
corrected Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass for Tayug and San Manuel;
thus, any reference to such would be clearly unfounded. While it may be true that on 24
June 1992, the PBC, acting on simultaneous petitions to correct the SOVs and COCs
for Tayug and San Manuel ordered the MBCs for these two (2) municipalities to make
the appropriate corrections in the said SOVs and their corresponding COCs, none of
said Boards convened to the members of actually implement the order. Such failure
could have been due to the appeal seasonably interposed by the petitioner to the
COMELEC or the fact that said members simply chose not to act thereon. As already
adverted to the so-called "corrected" Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass
consist of sheets of paper signed by the respective Election Registrars of Tayug (Annex
"F-l" of Comment of private respondent; Annex "A" of Consolidated Reply of petitioner)
and San Manuel (Annex "F-2, Id.; Annex "B", Id.). These are not valid corrections
because the Election Registrars, as Chairmen of the MBCs cannot, by themselves, act
for their Section 225 of the respective Board. Section 225 of the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. Blg. 881) provides that "[A] majority vote of all the members of the board of
canvassers shall be necessary to render a decision." That majority means at least two
(2) of the three (3) members constituting the Board (Section 20(c) of the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646) provides that the "municipal board of canvassers
shall be composed of the election registrar or a representative of the Commission, as
chairman, the municipal treasurer, as vice-chairman, and the most senior district school
supervisor or in his absence a principal of the school district or the elementary school,
as members"). As to why the Election Registrars, in their capacities as Chairmen, were
7th only ones who prepared the so-called correction sheets, is beyond Us. There is no
showing that the other members of the Boards were no longer available. Since they are
from the Province of Pangasinan, they could have been easily summoned by the PBC
to appear before it and effect the corrections on the Statements of Votes and
Certificates of Canvass.
Besides, by no stretch of the imagination can these sheets of paper be considered as
the corrected SOVs and COCs. Corrections in a Statement of Vote and a Certificate of
Canvass could only be accomplished either by inserting the authorized corrections into
the SOV and COC which were originally prepared and submitted by the MBC or by
preparing a new SOV and COC incorporating therein the authorized corrections. Thus,
the statement in the 29 July 1992 Resolution of the COMELEC referring to "the
Certificates of Canvass of the municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San
Manuel" (Last clause, paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion, Annex "A" of Petition:
Rollo 15), is palpably unfounded. The Commission could have 7 been misled by Atty.
Asperin's ambiguous reference to "corrections already made in separate sheets of
paper of the Statements of Votes and Certificate of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel,
Pangasinan" (Quoted in the Resolution of 9 July 1992; Id., 50-51), in his petition asking
the COMELEC to rule on who shall be proclaimed. However, if it only took the trouble to

carefully examine what was held out to be as the corrected documents, respondent
COMELEC should not have been misled.
Even if We are to assume for the sake of argument that these sheets of paper
constitute sufficient corrections, they are, nevertheless, void and of no effect. At the
time the Election Registrars prepared them on 6 July 1992 respondent
COMELEC had not yet acted on the petitioner's appeal (SPC No. 92-384) from the 24
June 1992 ruling of the PBC authorizing the corrections. Petitioner maintains that until
now, his appeal has not been resolved. The public respondent, on the other hand,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, claims that the same had been:
. . . resolved in the questioned resolution of July 29, 1992, where COMELEC affirmed
respondents (sic) Board's correction that petitioner only received 2,415 votes in Tayug
and 2,179 in San Manuel (see p. 2, Annex "A", Petition) (Rollo, p. 71)
On the same matter, the private respondent asserts that:
This SPC-92-384, is however, deemed terminated and the ruling of the PBC is likewise
deemed affirmed by virtue of the 2nd par., Sec. 16, R.A. No. 7166, supra and Comelec
en banc Resolution No. 2489, supra, dated June 29, 1992 (Id., 36);
If We follow the respondent COMELEC's contention to its logical conclusion, it was only
on 29 July 1992 that SPC No. 92-384 was resolved; consequently, the so-called
"correction sheets" were still prematurely prepared. In any event, the COMELEC could
not have validly ruled on such appeal in its 29 July 1992 Resolution because the same
was promulgated to resolve the Urgent Motion For Contempt and to Annul Proclamation
filed by the private respondent. Furthermore, before the resolution of SPC No. 92-384
on the abovementioned date, no hearing was set or conducted to resolve the pending
motion. Therefore, on this ground alone, the 29 July 1992 Resolution, even if it was
meant to resolve the appeal, is a patent nullity for having been issued in gross violation
of the requirement of notice and hearing mandated by Section 246 of the Omnibus
Election Code, in relation to Section 18 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 6, Rule 27 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and for having been resolved by the COMELEC en
banc at the first instance. The case should have been referred first to a division
pursuant to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 constitution and Our ruling in Sarmiento
vs. Commission on Elections. Moreover, the COMELEC's claim that the questioned
resolution affirmed the correction made by the Board is totally baseless. The PBC did
not make any corrections. It merely ordered the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of
Tayug and San Manuel to make such corrections. As earlier stated, however, the said
MBCs did not convene to make these corrections. It was the Chairmen alone who
signed the sheets of paper purporting to be corrections.
For being clearly inconsistent with the intention and official stand of respondent
COMELEC, private respondent COMELEC private respondent's theory of termination
under the second paragraph of Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166, and the consequent
affirmance of the ruling of the PBC ordering the correction of the number of votes, must
necessarily fail.
The foregoing considered, the proclamation of the private respondent on, 13 August
1992 by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan is null and void.

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WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of the
respondent Commission on Elections of 29 July 1992 and the proclamation of the
private respondent on 13 August 1992 as the second Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan, representing its Sixth Legislative District
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and respondent Commission on Elections is DIRECTED
to resolve the pending incidents conformably with the foregoing disquisitions and
pronouncements.
No costs.
SO ORDERED. 11
On February 23, 1993, private respondent Micu filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion before
the COMELEC praying that the latter hear and resolve the pending incidents referred to
by this Court. Private respondent was obviously referring to SPC No. 92-208 and SPC
No. 92-384, both cases left unresolved by the COMELEC.
Consequently, the First Division of the COMELEC set the cases for hearing on March 8,
1993. During the hearing, both Micu and Bince orally manifested the withdrawal of their
respective appeals. Also withdrawn were the petitions to disqualify Atty. Asperin and to
cite the Board for contempt. The parties agreed to file their respective
memoranda/position papers by March 15, 1993.
Petitioner Bince filed his Position Paper on March 12, 1993 arguing that the withdrawal
of SPC No. 92-208 affirmed the ruling of the PBC dated May 21, 1992 and even if it
were not withdrawn, Section 16 of R.A. 7166 would have worked to terminate the
appeal. Bince likewise asserts that his appeal in SPC No. 92-384 became moot and
academic in view of this Court's ruling nullifying the June 24, 1992 order of the PBC
granting the petitions for correction of the SOVs and COCs of Tayug and San Manuel
aside from being superseded by the PBC ruling proclaiming him on July 21, 1992.
On the other hand, private respondent Micu, in his Position Paper filed on March 15,
1993 postulated that the petitions filed on June 11, 1992 for the correction of the SOVs
and COCs of Tayug and San Manuel under Section 6 of Rule 27 of the Comelec Rules
of Procedure, as well as the ruling of the PBC of June 24, 1992 granting the same were
valid so that the withdrawal of Bince's appeal in SPC No. 92-384 firmly affirmed the
PBC ruling of June 24, 1992 allowing the corrections.
On July 15, 1993, the First Division of the COMELEC promulgated a Resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Commission (First Division) holds that
the petitioner Alfonso C. Bince Jr. is entitled to sit as member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sixth District of Pangasinan.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to AFFIRM the proclamation of petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. by the Provincial Board

of Canvassers of Pangasinan on 21 July 1992 as the duly elected member of the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Sixth District of the Province of Pangasinan. 12
On July 20, 1993, private respondent Micu filed a Motion for reconsideration of the
above-quoted resolution.
On September 9, 1993, the COMELEC en banc granted the private respondentls
motion for reconsideration in a resolution which dispositively reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondent Emiliano S. Micu is granted. The Resolution of the Commission First
Division is hereby SET ASIDE. The proclamation of petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. on July
21, 1992 is hereby declared null and void. Accordingly, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers is hereby directed to reconvene, with proper notices, and to order the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Manuel and Tayug to make the necessary
corrections in the SOVs and COCs in the said municipalities. Thereafter, the Provincial
Board of Canvassers is directed to include the results in the said municipalities in its
canvass.
The PBC is likewise ordered to proclaim the second elected member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Sixth Legislative District of Pangasinan.
SO ORDERED. 13
This is the resolution assailed in the instant petition for certiorari.
We do not find merit in this petition and accordingly rule against petitioner.
Respondent COMELEC did not act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
in annulling the proclamation of petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. and in directing the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan to order the Municipal Boards of
Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel to make the necessary corrections in the SOVs
and COCs in said municipalities and to proclaim the winner in the sixth legislative
district of Pangasinan.
At the outset, it is worthy to observe that no error was committed by respondent
COMELEC when it resolved the "pending incidents" of the instant case pursuant to the
decision of this Court in the aforesaid case of Bince, Jr. v. COMELEC on February 9,
1993 Petitioner's contention that his proclamation has long been affirmed and
confirmed by this Court in the aforesaid case is baseless. In Bince, we nullified the
proclamation of private respondent because the same was done without the requisite
due notice and hearing, thereby depriving the petitioner of his right to due process. In
so doing, however, we did not affirm nor confirm the proclamation of petitioner, hence,
our directive to respondent COMELEC to resolve the pending incidents of the case so
as to ascertain the true and lawful winner of the said elections. In effect, petitioner's
proclamation only enjoyed the presumption of regularity and validity of an official act. It
was not categorically declared valid.
Neither can the COMELEC be faulted for subsequently annulling the proclamation of

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
petitioner Bince on account of a mathematical error in addition committed by
respondent MBCs in the computation of the votes received by both petitioner and
private respondent.
The petitions to correct manifest errors were filed on time, that is, before the petitioner's
proclamation on July 21, 1992. The petition of the MBC of San Manuel was filed on
June 4, 1992 while that of still, the MBC of Tayug was filed on June 5, 1992. Still,
private respondent's petition was filed with the MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel on June
10, 1992 and June 11, 1992, respectively, definitely well within the period required by
Section 6 (now Section 7), Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Section 6
clearly provides that the petition for correction may be filed at any time before
proclamation of a winner, thus:
Sec. 6. Correction of errors in tabulation or tallying of results by the board of
canvassers. (a) Where it is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors
were committed in the tabulation or tallying of election returns, or certificates of
canvass, during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns of one
precinct or two or more copies of a certificate of canvass was tabulated more than
once, (2) two copies of the election returns or certificate of canvass were tabulated
separately, (3) there had been a mistake in the adding or copying of the figures into the
certificate of canvass or into the statement of votes, or (4) so-called election returns
from non-existent precincts were included in the canvass, the board may, motu propio,
or upon verified petition by any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of
political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed.
(b) The order for correction must be in writing and must be promulgated.
(c) Any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties aggrieved
by said order may appeal therefrom to the Commission within twenty-four (24) hours
from the promulgation.
(d) Once an appeal is made, the board of canvassers shall not proclaim the winning
candidates, unless their votes are not affected by the appeal.
(e) The appeal must implead as respondents all parties who may be adversely affected
thereby.
(f) Upon receipt of the appeal, the Clerk of Court concerned shall forthwith issue
summons, together with a copy of the appeal, to the respondents.
(g) The Clerk of Court concerned shall immediately set the appeal for hearing.
(h) The appeal shall be heard an decided by he Commission en banc (Emphasis ours).
The rule is plain and simple. It needs no other interpretation contrary to petitioner's
protestation.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out of time, this incident
alone will not thwart the proper determination and resolution of the instant case on
substantial grounds. Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp of validity on a
palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable result of frustrating the people's will
cannot be countenanced. In Benito v. COMELEC, 14 categorically declared that:
. . . Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not on technicalities has been
consistently observed by this Court. In the case of Juliano vs. Court of Appeals (20

SCRA 808) cited in Duremdes vs. Commission on Elections (178 SCRA 746), this Court
had the occasion to declare that:
Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public interest, and
technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute
an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their
elective officials. And also settled is the rule that laws governing election contests must
be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (Gardiner v. Romulo, 26 Phil.
521; Galang v. Miranda, 35 Phil. 269; Jalandoni v. Sarcon, G.R. No.
L-6496, January 27, 1962; Macasunding v. Macalanang, G.R. No.
L-22779, March 31, 1965; Cauton v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-25467, April
27, 1967). In an election case the court has an imperative duty to ascertain all means
within its command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate (Ibasco v. Ilao,
G.R. No. L-17512, December 29, 1960). . . . (Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp.
818-819). (Emphasis ours)
In the later case of Rodriguez vs. Commission on Elections (119 SCRA 465), this
doctrine was reiterated and the Court went on to state that:
Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), this Court has made it clear
that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any
way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the
correct ascertainment of the results, This bent or disposition continues to the present.
(Id., at p. 474).
The same principle still holds true today. Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in
the election laws should not frustrate the determination of the popular will.
Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved is the allowance of the
correction of what are purely mathematical and/or mechanical errors in the addition of
the votes received by both candidates. It does not involve the opening of ballot boxes;
neither does it involve the examination and/or appreciation of ballots. The correction
sought by private respondent and respondent MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel is
correction of manifest mistakes in mathematical addition. Certainly, this only calls for a
mere clerical act of reflecting the true and correct votes received by the candidates by
the MBCs involved. In this case, the manifest errors sought to be corrected involve the
proper and diligent addition of the votes in the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel,
Pangasinan.
In Tayug, the total votes received by petitioner Bince was erroneously recorded as
2,486 when it should only have been 2,415. Petitioner Bince, in effect, was credited by
71 votes more.
In San Manuel, petitioner Bince received 2,179 votes but was credited with 6 votes
more, hence, the SOV reflected the total number of votes as 2,185. On the other hand,
the same SOV indicated that private respondent Micu garnered 2,892 votes but he
actually received only 2,888, hence was credited in excess of 4 votes.

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
Consequently, by margin of 72 votes, private respondent indisputably won the
challenged seat in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the sixth district of Pangasinan.
Petitioner's proclamation and assumption into public office was therefore flawed from
the beginning, the same having been based on a faulty tabulation. Hence, respondent
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the illegal
proclamation.
As a parting note, we reiterate' our concern with respect to insignificant disputes
plaguing this Court. Trifles such as the one at issue should not, as much as possible,
reach this Court, clog its docket, demand precious judicial time and waste valuable
taxpayers' money, if they can be settled below without prejudice to any party or to the
ends of justice.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125629. March 25, 1998]
MANUEL C. SUNGA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
FERDINAND B. TRINIDAD, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
seeks to annul and set aside, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the
COMELEC 2nd Division in Sunga v. Trinidad, SPA No. 95-213,[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
dismissing the petition for disqualification against private respondent Ferdinand B.
Trinidad pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 promulgated 3 November 1988,
as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 2050-A promulgated 8 August 1990, and 30
July 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 17 May 1996 Resolution
of the COMELEC 2nd Division.
Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor
in the Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the 8 May 1995 elections. Private
respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a candidate for reelection in the same municipality.
On 22 April 1995 Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint [if !supportFootnotes]
for disqualification against Trinidad, accusing him of using three (3) local
government vehicles in his campaign, in violation of Sec. 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP
Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as amended). On 7 May 1995, Sunga filed another
letter-complaint[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] with the COMELEC charging Trinidad this time with
violation of Sec. 261, par. (e) (referring to threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms
of coercion) of the Omnibus Election Code, in addition to the earlier violation imputed to
him in the first letter-complaint. This was followed by an Amended Petition [if !supportFootnotes][4]
[endif]
for disqualification consolidating the charges in the two (2) letters-complaint,
including vote buying, and providing more specific details of the violations committed by
Trinidad. The case was docketed as SPA No. 95-213.

equipment, vehicle owned by the government or any of its political subdivisions. The
Law Department likewise recommended to recall and revoke the proclamation of
Ferdinand B. Trinidad as the duly elected Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan; proclaim Manuel C.
Sunga as the duly elected Mayor; and, direct Sunga to take his oath and assume the
duties and functions of the office.
The COMELEC En Banc approved the findings of the Law Department and
directed the filing of the corresponding informations in the Regional Trial Court against
Trinidad. Accordingly, four (4) informations[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] for various elections
offenses were filed in the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The
disqualification case, on the other hand, was referred to the COMELEC 2nd Division for
hearing.
On 2 May 1996 Sunga filed a Second Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and
Annul the Proclamation with Urgent Motion for Early Resolution of the Petition. But in its
17 May 1996 Resolution, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petition for
disqualification, holding in its Resolution No. 2050 that

[2][endif]

In a Minute Resolution dated 25 May 1995,[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] the COMELEC 2nd

Division referred the complaint to its Law Department for investigation. Hearings were
held wherein Sunga adduced evidence to prove his accusations. Trinidad, on the other
hand, opted not to submit any evidence at all.
Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest
number of votes, while Sunga trailed second.
On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of
Trinidad. However, notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad was proclaimed the elected
mayor, prompting Sunga to file another motion to suspend the effects of the
proclamation. Both motions were not acted upon by the COMELEC 2nd Division.
On 28 June 1995 the COMELEC Law Department submitted its Report [if !
to the COMELEC En Banc recommending that Trinidad be charged in
court for violation of the following penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code: (a)
Sec. 261, par. (a), on vote buying; (b) Sec. 261, par. (e), on threats, intimidation,
terrorism or other forms of coercion; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (o), on use of any
supportFootnotes][6][endif]

1. Any complaint for disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of
the grounds specifically enumerated under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed
directly with the Commission before an election in which respondent is a candidate,
shall be inquired into by the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the
acts complained of have in fact been committed x x x x
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may
motu propio, or on motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law
Department of the Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its
exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal
infractions of the election laws x x x x
2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in
relation to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate
who has already been proclaimed as a winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification
case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law
Department of this Commission.
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the
respondent candidate, the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a
disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary
investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department
makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed
with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the
proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending
and said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is
strong.
As interpreted in the case of Silvestre v. Duavit, SPA 94-003, Resolution No. 2050
provides for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case in three cases: (1) The

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
disqualification case was filed before the election but remains unresolved until after the
election; (2) The disqualification case was filed after the election and before the
proclamation of winners; and (3) The disqualification case was filed after election and
after proclamation.

The issue in this case is whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed the disqualification case against private respondent
Trinidad.
The petition is partly meritorious.

If the instant case is deemed to have been filed upon receipt by the COMELEC of the
letter-complaint on April 26 1995, it nevertheless remained pending until after the
election. If it is deemed to have been filed upon filing of the amended petition on 11
May 1995, it was clearly filed after the election. In either case, Resolution No. 2050
mandates the dismissal of the disqualification case.

We find private respondents arguments on the propriety of the letters-complaint

puerile. COMELEC itself impliedly recognized in its Resolution that the petition was filed
before the 8 May 1995 election in the form of letters-complaint, thus

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the COMELEC En Banc,
Sunga filed the instant petition contending that the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the petition for disqualification in that: first, Sec. 6 of RA No.
6646 requires the COMELEC to resolve the disqualification case even after the election
and proclamation, and the proclamation and assumption of office by Trinidad did not
deprive the COMELEC of its jurisdiction; second, COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is
null and void as it contravenes Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646; third, the fact that COMELEC
authorized the filing of four (4) informations against private respondent for violation of
the penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code shows more than sufficient and
substantial evidence to disqualify Trinidad, and he should have been so disqualified;
and fourth, since Trinidad was a disqualified candidate, it is as if petitioner was the only
candidate entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.
In his 17-page Comment and Manifestation dated 3 December 1996, the
Solicitor General concurred with petitioners arguments.
Private respondent, on the other hand, postulates inter alia that Sungas letterscomplaint of 22 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 were not petitions for disqualification
because no filing fee was paid by Sunga; the letters-complaint were never docketed by
the COMELEC; and, no summons was ever issued by the COMELEC and private
respondent was not required to answer the letters-complaint. It was only on 13 May
1995 when petitioner filed the so-called Amended Petition, docketed for the first time as
SPA No. 95-213. Thus, the COMELEC correctly dismissed the disqualification case for
having been filed only after the 8 May 1995 elections and the proclamation of private
respondent on 10 May 1995, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2050.
COMELEC filed its Comment on 21 April 1997 relying heavily on Resolution No.
2050 and the Silvestre v. Duavit[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] ruling in support of the dismissal of
the disqualification case. The COMELEC insisted that the outright dismissal of a
disqualification case was warranted under any of the following circumstances: (a) the
disqualification case was filed before the election but was still pending (unresolved)
after the election; (b) the disqualification case was filed after the election but before the
proclamation of the winner; and, (c) the disqualification case was filed after the election
and after the proclamation of the winner.

This case originally came to the attention of this Commission on 26 April 1995 in a form
of letter from petitioner accusing respondent of utilizing government properties in his
campaign and praying for the latters immediate disqualification. Another letter dated 7
May 1995 and addressed to the COMELEC Regional Director of Region II reiterated
petitioners prayer while alleging that respondent and his men committed acts of
terrorism and violated the gun ban. Finally, on 11 May 1995, an Amended Petition was
filed with the Clerk of Court of the Commission containing substantially the same
allegations as the previous letters but supported by affidavits and other documentary
evidence.
That the Amended Petition was filed only on 11 May 1995, or after the elections,
is of no consequence. It was merely a reiteration of the charges filed by petitioner
against private respondent on 26 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 or before the elections.
Consequently, the Amended Petition retroacted to such earlier dates. An amendment
which merely supplements and amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates
back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of
limitations which expired after the service of the original complaint.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
The fact that no docket fee was paid therefor was not a fatal procedural lapse on
the part of petitioner. Sec. 18, Rule 42, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides,
If the fees above described are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action
thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or proceeding. The use of the
word may indicates that it is permissive only and operates to confer a discretion on the
COMELEC whether to entertain the petition or not in case of non-payment of legal fees.
That the COMELEC acted on and did not dismiss the petition outright shows that the
non-payment of fees was not considered by it as a legal obstacle to entertaining the
same. Be that as it may, the procedural defects have been cured by the subsequent
payment of docket fees, and private respondent was served with summons, albeit
belatedly, and he submitted his answer to the complaint. Hence, private respondent has
no cause to complain that no docket fee was paid, no summons served upon him, or
that he was not required to answer.
Neither do we agree with the conclusions of the COMELEC. We discern nothing
in COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 declaring, ordering or directing the dismissal of a
disqualification case filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the
election. What the Resolution mandates in such a case is for the Commission to refer
the complaint to its Law Department for investigation to determine whether the acts

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
complained of have in fact been committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified.
The findings of the Law Department then become the basis for disqualifying the erring
candidate. This is totally different from the other two situations contemplated by
Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a disqualification case filed after the election but before the
proclamation of winners and that filed after the election and the proclamation of
winners, wherein it was specifically directed by the same Resolution to be dismissed as
a disqualification case.
Moreover, Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v. Duavit infringes on
Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646,[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] which provides:
SEC. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong (underscoring supplied).
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and
hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered
thereon. The word shall signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory,
operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced. [if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] The
implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the
disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal
of the disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre v.
Duavit in effect disallows what RA No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a
quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is
invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings of
quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect harmony with
statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into
effect. By such interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the law
itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for
that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy
between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law
prevails.
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A
candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of
punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply because the
investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine before the
election if the offenses were indeed committed by the candidate sought to be
disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics
so that the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would
not be decided before the election. This scenario is productive of more fraud which
certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the law.

The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of
mayor did not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing
and eventually decide the disqualification case. In Aguam v. COMELEC [if !supportFootnotes][12]
[endif]
this Court held
Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is
with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The
fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the
exercise of such power. It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid
proclamation. Since private respondents petition before the COMELEC is precisely
directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry
into this issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to COMELEC x x
x x Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded from challenging the validity
thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects
may easily supervene.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to
prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for
violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed
elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no
longer be the subject of a separate investigation.
It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well as electoral
aspects. Its criminal aspect involves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the
accused candidate. Like in any other criminal case, it usually entails a full-blown
hearing and the quantum of proof required to secure a conviction is beyond reasonable
doubt. Its electoral aspect, on the other hand, is a determination of whether the offender
should be disqualified from office. This is done through an administrative proceeding
which is summary in character and requires only a clear preponderance of evidence.
Thus, under Sec. 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification
"shall be heard summarily after due notice." It is the electoral aspect that we are more
concerned with, under which an erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior
criminal conviction.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
It is quite puzzling that the COMELEC never acted on Sungas motion to
suspend the proclamation of Trinidad. The last sentence of Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646
categorically declares that the Commission may order the suspension of the
proclamation of a candidate sought to be disqualified whenever the evidence of his guilt
is strong. And there is not a scintilla of doubt that the evidence of Trinidads guilt was
strong as shown in the Report and Recommendation of the COMELEC Law
Department
Parenthetically, there is merit to petitioners petition against the respondent for
disqualification for the alleged commission of election offenses under Sec. 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, such as use of armed men and act of terrorism, intimidation

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
and coercion of voters, massive vote-buying and others, duly supported by affidavits of
witnesses and other documents. Consequently, the petitioners evidence supporting the
disqualification of respondent remain unrebutted simply because respondent has
expressly waived his right to present evidence in SPA No. 95-213 in his Manifestation
and objection to the presentation of evidence in SPA No. 95-213 dated 16 June 1995,
thus the waiver is the intentional relinquishing of a known right of respondent
TRINIDAD.

plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such
circumstances.

In fact, on the basis of this Report and Recommendation the COMELEC

directed the filing of four (4) criminal informations against Trinidad before the Regional
Trial Court, an indication that there was indeed prima facie evidence of violation of
election laws.

Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor,
Vice-Mayor. - (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the Governor or Mayor,
the Vice-Governor or Vice-Mayor concerned shall become the Governor or Mayor x x x
x
For purposes of this chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official
fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed
from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge
the functions of his office x x x x

However, Sungas contention that he is entitled to be proclaimed as the duly

elected Mayor of the Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the event that
Trinidad is disqualified finds no support in law and jurisprudence. The fact that the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later disqualified for the office to
which he was elected does not entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a
disqualified person may not be valid to install the winner into office or maintain him
there. But in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. [if !
supportFootnotes][14][endif]

Sunga totally miscontrued the nature of our democratic electoral process as well
as the sociological and psychological elements behind voters preferences. Election is
the process of complete ascertainment of the expression of the popular will. Its ultimate
purpose is to give effect to the will of the electorate by giving them direct participation in
choosing the men and women who will run their government. Thus, it would be
extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
whom have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.[if !

Also, what Sunga wants us to do is to disregard the express mandate of Sec.

44, RA No. 7160,[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] which provides in part

This provision is echoed in Art. 83 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Local Government Code of 1991.
The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal, thus admits no room
for interpretation but merely application. This is the basic legal precept. Accordingly, in
the event that Trinidad is adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy will be
created for failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the said office. In such eventuality,
the duly elected vice-mayor shall succeed as provided by law.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 17 May 1996 and 30 July
1996 Resolutions of the COMELEC are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. COMELEC is
ordered to REINSTATE SPA No. 95-213, "Manuel C. Sunga v. Ferdinand B. Trinidad,
for disqualification, and ACT on the case taking its bearings from the opinion herein
expressed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

supportFootnotes][15][endif]

While Sunga may have garnered the second highest number of votes, the fact
remains that he was not the choice of the people of Iguig, Cagayan. The wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser
because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the
person who has obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving
the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. [if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] In Aquino v.
COMELEC,[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] this Court made the following pronouncement:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just
that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 126669. April 27, 1998]
ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
FERDINAND D. MENESES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 127900. April 27, 1998]
FERDINAND D. MENESES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN, respondents.

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
[G.R. No. 128800. April 27, 1998]
ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
FERDINAND D. MENESES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 132435. April 27, 1998]
ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
FERDINAND D. MENESES, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Danilo Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and Ernesto Punzalan were among the
four (4) candidates for mayor of the municipality of Mexico, Pampanga during the May
8, 1995 elections.
On May 24, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed
Ferdinand Meneses as the duly elected mayor, having garnered a total of 10,301 votes
against Danilo Manalastas 9,317 votes and Ernesto Punzalans 8,612 votes.
On May 30, 1995, Danilo Manalastas filed an election protest docketed as
Election Case No. E-005-95 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, challenging the results of the elections in the municipalitys forty-seven (47)
precincts.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] In due time, Ferdinand Meneses filed his answer with
counter protest impugning the results in twenty-one (21) precincts [if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] of
the 47 protested by Manalastas.
On June 2, 1995, Ernesto Punzalan filed his own election protest docketed as
Election Case No. E-006-95, also before the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga,
questioning the results of the elections in one hundred and fifty seven (157) precincts. [if !
supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Meneses, on his part, filed an answer with counter-protest with respect
to ninety-six (96) precincts[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] of the 157 protested by Punzalan.
Since the two (2) election protests involved the same parties and subject matter,
they were ordered consolidated and were jointly tried by the RTC of San Fernando,
Pampanga, Branch 44.
Succinctly, the election contests sought the nullification of the election of
Meneses allegedly due to massive fraud, irregularities and other illegal electoral
practices during the registration and the voting as well as during the counting of votes
such as:
a. the registration of flying voters;
b. the preparation of ballots by persons other than the registered electors concerned;
c. the use of electoral fraudulent practice such as the lansadera;
d. false reading of votes for the petitioner/protestant;
e. the counting of illegal and marked ballots and stray votes as votes for the
respondent/protestee;

f. switching of ballots in favor of respondent/protestee;

g. tampering with the ballots for the petitioner/protestant after having been cast, so as
to annul the same or to substitute therefor illegal votes for respondent/protestee;
h. the adding of more votes to those actually counted for the respondent/protestee and
the reducing of the votes actually counted for the petitioner/protestant in the preparation
of the corresponding election return;
i. groups of two or more ballots for the respondent/protestee were written each group,
by only one (1) person;
j. one (1) ballot for the respondent/protestee written by two or more persons. [if !
supportFootnotes][5][endif]

By way of counter-protest to the two (2) election protests, Meneses alleged that
he, too, was a victim of massive fraud and illegal electoral practices such as:
a. The preparation of the ballots by persons other than the registered electors
concerned;
b. The use of electoral fraudulent practice known as the lansadera;
c. False reading of votes for the protestee;
d. The counting of illegal and marked ballots and stray votes for the protestant;
e. Switching of ballots in favor of of protestant;
f. Tampering with the ballots for the Protestee after having been cast, so as to annul the
same or to substitute therefor illegal votes for the protestant;
g. The adding of more votes to those actually counted for the protestant and the
reducing of the votes actually counted for the protestee in the preparation of the
corresponding election returns;
h. Group of two (2) or more ballots for protestant were written, each group, by only one
(1) person;
i. One (1) ballot for the protestant written by two (2) or more persons.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
Finding the protests and counter-protests sufficient in form and substance, the
trial court ordered a revision of the ballots. The result of said physical count coincided
with the figures reflected in the election returns, thus: Meneses - 10,301 votes;
Manalastas - 9,317 votes; and Punzalan - 8,612 votes.
After hearing the election protests, the trial court rendered judgment on
September 23, 1996 with the following findings, viz: that massive fraud, illegal electoral
practices and serious anomalies marred the May 8, 1995 elections; that ballots, election
returns and tally sheets pertaining to Precinct Nos. 8, 20, 41, 53, 68, 68-A and 70
disappeared under mysterious circumstances; and that filled-up ballots with undetached
lower stubs and groups of ballots with stubs cut out with scissors were found inside
ballot boxes. Because of these irregularities, the trial court was constrained to examine
the contested ballots and the handwritings appearing thereon and came up with the
declaration that Punzalan was the winner in the elections. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In EPC No. E-005-95 declaring Ferdinand D. Meneses as having garnered 7,719

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
votes or 33 votes more than the 7,686 votes received by Danilo D. Manalastas and
dismissing the instant protest.
2. In EPC No. E-006-95 declaring Ernesto M. Punzalan as the duly elected Municipal
Mayor of Mexico, Pampanga. Protestee Ferdinand D. Meneses is hereby ordered to
vacate his position and to cease and desist from further discharging the duties and
functions officially vested in the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Mexico, Pampanga
which now and henceforth, unless otherwise disqualified by law, are conferred unto and
in favor of Ernesto M. Punzalan, who is hereby ordered to act, perform and discharge
the duties, functions and responsibilities and all incidents appertaining to and in
connection with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Mexico, Pampanga, immediately
and after he shall have taken his oath of office as such.
3. The counterclaims interposed by Ferdinand D. Meneses in both cases are hereby
dismissed.
The authorities concerned are hereby ordered to enforce, implement and assist in the
enforcement and implementation of this Decision immediately after Ernesto M.
Punzalan shall have had taken his oath of office.
As soon as this Decision becomes final, let notice thereof be sent to the Commission on
Elections, Department of Interior and Local Governments and Commission on Audit.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
Immediately thereafter, Meneses filed a notice of appeal from the aforesaid
decision declaring Punzalan as the duly elected mayor of Mexico, Pampanga. The case
was docketed as EAC No. 48-96 by the COMELEC. Manalastas did not appeal from
the said decision.
On October 1, 1996, Punzalan filed a motion for execution pending appeal with
the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga. On the same day, the COMELEC issued an
order directing the RTC to elevate the entire records of the case.
On October 10, 1996, the RTC issued an order which granted Punzalans motion
for execution pending appeal. On the same date, Meneses filed before the COMELEC
a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction, docketed as SPR No. 47-96,
seeking the nullification of the RTCs order of execution pending appeal.
On October 11, 1996, the COMELEC issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from
enforcing its Order dated October 10, 1996.
On October 22, 1996, Meneses filed with the COMELEC a motion for contempt
against Punzalan, alleging that the latter was holding the office of mayor of Mexico,
Pampanga in violation of the TRO issued by the COMELEC.
On October 28, 1996, Punzalan filed before this Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and declaratory relief with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and

temporary restraining order, docketed as G.R. No. 126669, to set aside the COMELECs
TRO issued on October 11, 1996.
On November 7, 1996, the COMELEC issued two (2) orders, one which
submitted for resolution Meneses application for a writ of preliminary injunction and
motion for contempt and another which granted a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
the enforcement of the RTCs order of execution dated October 10, 1996.
On November 12, 1996, this Court issued a TRO directing the COMELEC to
cease and desist from enforcing the TRO it issued on October 11, 1996 in SPR No. 4796.
On November 21, 1996, Punzalan filed before this Court a supplement to the
petition seeking to declare as void the COMELECs preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction and to declare Meneses in contempt of court.
On January 9, 1997, the COMELEC issued an order which dispositively read as
follows:
Considering that the 7 November 1996 preliminary injunction of the Commission
was pursuant to its 11 October 1996 temporary restraining order, which was specifically
covered by the Supreme Courts temporary restraining order, the Commission will
respect and abide by the order of the Supreme Court. Considering, however, that the
temporary restraining order of the Supreme Court relates only to the implementation of
the order of execution of judgment pending appeal of the Regional Trial Court, the
Commission finds no legal impediment to proceed with the resolution of the main action
for certiorari pending before it and shall act accordingly.
On January 30, 1997, the COMELEC issued an order stating that: 1) it need not
act on Meneses motion reiterating the prayer to suspend pendente lite the
implementation of the Order dated January 9, 1997, and 2) the Order dated January 9,
1997 shall take effect thirty (30) days from notice thereof to the parties.
On February 10, 1997, Meneses filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 127900, which sought to set aside the COMELEC
Orders dated January 9 and 30, 1997.
On April 24, 1997, the COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition of
Meneses to set aside the RTCs order of execution pending appeal and allowing
Meneses to continue to discharge the duties and functions of municipal mayor of
Mexico, Pampanga, without prejudice to the resolution of his pending appeal from the
RTCs decision.
On April 28, 1997, Punzalan filed with this Court a petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 128000, which sought to nullify the COMELECs Resolution dated
April 24, 1997.

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
On December 8, 1997, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution in EAC No. 4896 setting aside the trial courts decision and affirming the proclamation of Meneses by
the MBC as the duly elected mayor of Mexico, Pampanga, thusly:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the court a quo in Election Protest
Case No. E-006-95 declaring protestant-appellee Ernesto M. Punzalan as the duly
elected Mayor of the Municipality of Mexico, Pampanga in the May 8, 1995 local
elections is hereby ANNULLED and SET-ASIDE.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission [First Division] hereby AFFIRMS the
proclamation of protestee-appellant Ferdinand D. Meneses by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor of Mexico, Pampanga but with the modification
that protestee-appellant received only 9,864 votes, or a deduction of 437 votes from his
original 10,301 votes. Further, this Commission [First Division] hereby COMMANDS
protestant-appellee Ernesto M. Punzalan to RELINQUISH his post in favor of protesteeappellant Ferdinand Meneses immediately upon finality of this Resolution. [if !supportFootnotes][8]
[endif]

Punzalan filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution. In its

Resolution dated February 13, 1998, the COMELEC denied said motion for lack of
merit.
Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, filed on February 16, 1998 and docketed as
G.R. No. 132435, to set aside the COMELECs resolutions of December 8, 1997 and
February 13, 1998. Thus, petitioner alleges:
1. that the decision (resolution) in question is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
2. that it was rendered in disregard of law and the evidence;
3. that the decision (resolution) in question is a prejudged decision; and
4. that the decision (resolution) in question is the culmination of a series of acts of the
public respondent favoring the private respondent.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
First. Punzalan maintains that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in declaring as valid the ballots credited to Meneses which did not bear the
signature of the BEI chairman at the back thereof, invoking the ruling of this Court in
Bautista v. Castro[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] wherein it was held that the absence of the
signature of the BEI chairman in the ballot given to a voter as required by law and the
rules as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal.
This contention is not meritorious.
While Section 24[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known
as An Act Providing For Synchronized National and Local Elections and For Electoral
Reforms, requires the BEI chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot, the

mere failure to do so does not invalidate the same although it may constitute an
election offense imputable to said BEI chairman. Nowhere in said provision does it state
that the votes contained therein shall be nullified. It is a well-settled rule that the failure
of the BEI chairman or any of the members of the board to comply with their mandated
administrative responsibility, i.e., signing, authenticating and thumbmarking of ballots,
should not penalize the voter with disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating the will of the
people.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
In the recent case of Marcelino C. Libanan v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and Jose T. Ramirez,[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] this Court affirmed the ruling
of the Tribunal in Libanan v. Ramirez[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] to the effect that a ballot without
BEI chairmans signature at the back is valid and not spurious, provided that it bears
any one of these other authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark; and
(b) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily
apparent, the presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots. The Court explained in this
wise:
What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that
a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these
authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or
initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the
COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the
presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots. It is only when none of these marks
appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection.
Similarly, Section 211 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines provides that in the reading and appreciation
of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is a clear and good
reason to justify its rejection. Certainly, the inefficiency of an election officer in failing to
affix his signature at the back of the ballot does not constitute as a good and clear
reason to justify the rejection of a ballot.
Second. Punzalan contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in declaring valid (a) the ballots wherein the signatures of the BEI chairmen
were different from their respective signatures appearing on several COMELEC
documents, (b) those group of ballots allegedly written by one (1) hand and (c) a
number of single ballots written by two (2) persons. He argues that the trial courts
findings on the authenticity of said handwritings must prevail over the findings of the
COMELEC because: 1) the finding of the Regional Trial Court was based first on the
findings of the revisors with the assistance of an expert witness in the person of Atty.
Desiderio Pagui; (2) the finding of the Regional Trial Court was arrived at after an
adversarial proceeding where both parties were represented by their lawyers and the
expert witness was cross-examined; and (3) on the other hand, the findings of the
public respondent were made unilaterally, without any hearing. and without the
presence of the lawyers of the parties and of the parties themselves.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
These arguments fail to persuade us.
The appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves a
question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency
tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country. It is the constitutional
commission vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests
involving regional, provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over
election protests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. Consequently, in
the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law,
the factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered by the said
Commission on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this
Court.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
Anent Punzalans assertion that the trial courts finding which was arrived at after
an adversarial proceeding wherein an expert witness testified and was cross-examined,
should not be interfered with by the COMELEC whose finding was arrived at without the
benefit of a hearing or the aid of an expert, it is axiomatic that the COMELEC need not
conduct an adversarial proceeding or a hearing to determine the authenticity of ballots
or the handwriting found thereon. Neither does it need to solicit the help of handwriting
experts in examining or comparing the handwriting. [if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] In fact, even
evidence aliunde is not necessary to enable the Commission to determine the
authenticity of the ballots and the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots as an
examination of the ballots themselves is already sufficient.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
In Erni v. COMELEC,[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] we held that:
x x x. With respect to the contention that a technical examination of the ballots should
have been ordered to determine whether they had been written by two or more
persons, or in groups written by only one hand, we hold that the Commission en banc
did not commit an abuse of its discretion in denying petitioner-protestees request. The
rule is settled that the Commission itself can make the determination without the need
of calling handwriting experts.
Nor was evidence aliunde necessary to enable the Commission to determine the
genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots, an examination of the ballots themselves
being sufficient. x x. x..[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]
In Bocobo v. COMELEC,[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] we likewise ruled that:
x x x. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or
comparing handwriting; this can be done by the COMELEC itself. We have ruled that
evidence aliunde is not allowed to prove that a ballot is marked, an inspection of the
ballot itself being sufficient (Penson v. Parungao, 52 Phil. 718). x x x.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
In the case at bar, the opinion of Atty. Pagui, who was claimed to be a
handwriting expert, was not binding upon the COMELEC especially so where the
question involved the mere similarity or dissimilarity of handwritings which could be
determined by a comparison of existing signatures or handwriting.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif]
Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence explicitly authorizes the court,

by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or

treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
In Lorenzo v. Diaz,[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] this Court enumerated the tools to aid one
in the examination of handwriting, thus:
The authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its
general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature.
Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm , presence of the pen, loops in the
strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between the questioned
signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the formers
authenticity. The result of examination of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit
of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other
factors that must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the condition of
the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is written is placed, his
state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, played an
important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is,
in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, or direct or circumstantial
competent evidence of the character of a questioned handwriting, much weight should
not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between the questioned
handwriting and an authentic one.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif]
Indeed, the haste and pressure, the rush and excitement permeating the
surroundings of polling places could certainly affect the handwriting of both the voters
and the election officers manning the said precincts. The volume of work to be done
and the numerous documents to be filled up and signed must likewise be considered.
Verily, minor and insignificant variations in handwriting must be perceived as indicia of
genuineness rather than of falsity.
In Go Fay v. Bank of the Philippine Islands,[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] this Court held
that carelessness, spontaneity, unpremeditation, and speed in signing are evidence of
genuineness. In U.S. v. Kosel,[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] it was ruled that dissimilarity in certain
letters in a handwriting may be attributed to the mental and physical condition of the
signer and his position when he signed. Grief, anger, vexation, stimulant, pressure and
weather have some influence in ones writing. Because of these, it is an accepted fact
that it is very rare that two (2) specimens of a persons signature are exactly alike.
On the issue of the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots, it is observed
that the specimens examined by Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, presented by Punzalan as an
expert witness, were mere certified true copies of the ballots and documents
concerned.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] This fact raised a cloud of doubt and made the findings
suspect. Consequently, the examination of the ballots themselves by the COMELEC
should not be brushed aside. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly
authorizes the court (the COMELEC in this case) to make itself the comparison of the
disputed handwriting with writings admitted as genuine by the party whom the evidence
is offered.

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive in the sense that they must be
accepted as true on the subject of their testimony, but are generally regarded as purely
advisory in character; the courts may place whatever weight they choose upon such
testimony and may reject it, if they find that it is consistent with the facts in the case or
otherwise unreasonable.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif]
In the same manner, whether or not certain ballots were marked had been
addressed by the COMELEC by personally and actually examining the ballots
themselves. We find no compelling reasons to disturb its findings.
In closing, we would like to stress a well-founded rule ensconced in our
jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation
of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. [if !supportFootnotes][30][endif]
An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel
uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative.
Prescinding from the foregoing, we find that respondent COMELEC did not act
with grave abuse of discretion in G.R. No. 132435. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 126669,
127900 and 128800 are rendered moot by the preceding disquisition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. No. 132435 is hereby
DISMISSED. The status quo order issued by this Court on February 24, 1998 is
LIFTED. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 126669, 127900 and 128800 are rendered moot
and academic by the foregoing disquisition.
Further, this decision is immediately executory in view of the shortness of time
between now and the next elections and to prevent the case from becoming moot and
academic.
SO ORDERED.

SERGIO BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE P. CASTRO, In His Capacity as

Presiding Judge of Branch IX (Quezon City), COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
RIZAL, and ROBERTO MIGUEL, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch 9, Quezon City rendered in an appealed
election case and which decision proclaimed herein private respondent Roberto Miguel
as the duly elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Teachers Village East, Quezon City,
in the Barangay Elections held on May 17, 1982, with a plurality of twenty-four (24)
votes over herein petitioner Sergio Bautista.

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
Both the petitioner Sergio Bautista and private respondent Roberto Miguel were
candidates for the office above mentioned. After canvass, petitioner Bautista was
proclaimed the winner by the Barangay Board of Canvassers on May 17, 1982 with a
plurality of two (2) votes.
On May 25, 1982, Roberto Miguel filed a protest before the City Court of Quezon City,
(docketed as Election Case No. 82-408) on the ground of fraud and illegal acts or
practices allegedly committed by Bautista. The latter filed an answer but filed no
counter protest.
It appears that the results of the election in all the four (4) voting centers in Bgy.
Teachers Village East, Quezon City were contested. A revision and recounting of the
ballots was conducted which resulted in a tie. The votes obtained by both of the
protagonists were as follows:
1. In Voting Center. No. 519:
MIGUEL = 126 votes
BAUTISTA = 180 votes
Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following
Exhs. a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, and o.
Protestee-appellee contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following
Exhs. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.
2. In Voting Center No. 520:
MIGUEL = 152 votes
BAUTISTA = 122 votes
Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following
Exhs. P, Q and R.
3. In Voting Center No. 521:
MIGUEL = 150 votes
BAUTISTA = 136 votes
Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following
Exhs. 6 and 7.
4. In Voting Center No. 522:
MIGUEL = 222 votes
BAUTISTA = 212 votes
Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following
Exhs. AA, BB, BB-1, BB-2 and CC.
Protestee-appellee contented the ruling of the lower court on the following
Exhs. 8, 9, 9-a 10, 10-a, 11, 11-a, 12, 12-a, 13, 14, 14-a, 15, 15-a, 16 and 16-a.
5. Total Votes in all Voting Centers Nos. 519, 520, 521 and 522:
MIGUEL = 650
BAUTISTA = 650 (pp. 11-12, Rollo)

Teachers Village East, Quezon City. (p. 12, Rollo)

From this decision of the city court, protestant Roberto Miguel filed an appeal to the
Court of First Instance of Rizal. * On July 29, 1982, judgment was rendered on the
appeal which, as stated in the first portion of this decision, declared protestant Roberto
Miguel the duly elected Barangay Captain of Bgy. Teachers Village East, Quezon City
and setting aside as null and void the proclamation of protestee Sergio Bautista. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring and proclaiming protestantappellant ROBERTO MIGUEL as the duly elected Barangay Captain of Barangay
Teachers Village East, Quezon City, in the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982
with a plurality of twenty-four (24) votes over and above his protagonist protesteeappellee SERGIO BAUTISTA; setting aside as null and void the proclamation of
protestee-appellee as the elected Barangay Captain made by the Barangay Board of
Canvassers on May 17, 1982; sentencing protestee-appellee to pay protestantappellant the costs and expenses that the latter has incurred in this protest, in
accordance with Sec. 7, of COMELEC Resolution no. 1568, to wit:

ballots:
ballots:

ballots:

ballots:

ballots:
ballots:

The trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, Roberto Miguel is hereby declared to have received the same number
of votes as the protestee Sergio Bautista for the position of Bgy. Captain of Bgy.

P 25.00 for filing and research fee for petition of

Protest
2,500.00 for cash deposit for expenses for revision of
ballots;
25.00 for appellant docket and research fee;
50.00 for appeal bond deposit;
P 2,600.00 Total
The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to furnish 4 copies of this Decision to the
Commission on Elections, the Ministry of Local Governments, the Commission on
Audit, and the Secretaries of the Sangguniang Bayan and Sangguniang Barangay, in
accordance with Sec. 15 of Comelec Resolution No. 1566.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 87-88, Rollo)
Petitioner Sergio Bautista filed the instant petition for review by certiorari on August 13,
1982 on the following questions of law:
1) Whether or not the supposed opinion of a person, who was brought by private
respondent but who was never presented as a witness, is competent and admissible
evidence to support the appellate court's (CFI) conclusion that no less than eighteen
(18) votes cast in favor of your petitioner were written by one and the same person.
2) Whether or not a ballot which does not contain the signature of the poll chairman be
considered a valid ballot.
3) Whether or not respondent Judge acted correctly in its appreciation of the contested
ballots (Exhibits "Z", "Z-I", "S", "5", "6", "7").
Considering that the term for the contested office had expired on June 7, 1988, 1 this
petition has become moot and academic. However, this case had already been
submitted for decision as early as December 19, 1984, prior to the expiration of the

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
contested office. Hence, We deem it proper to resolve this case on the merits and
determine the true winner of that elections.
Anent the first question, petitioner Bautista questions the reliance by respondent court
on the opinion of one Desiderio A. Pagui, who was never presented and qualified as an
expert witness. The report of Pagui allegedly appeared only in the records of the case
on file with the CFI which was attached in the Memorandum for Protestant Miguel.
The ballots involved in this objection of petitioner are exhibits "B" to "O" which all
pertained to voting center No. 519 and Exhibits "T", "T-l", "U", "U-l", "V" and "V-1" from
voting center No. 521. Respondent court ruled:
b) Exhs. B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N and O were counted by the lower court for
BAUTISTA, over the objection of protestant-appellant that these ballots were written by
a single hand. These ballots and the writings therein contained were the subject of
QUESTIONED HANDWRITINGS EXAMINATIONS and PDIL REPORT NO. 09-682 of
Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, Examiner of Questioned Documents (Ret. Chief Document
Examiner, NBI), who was allowed by the lower court to assist it in the appreciation of
ballots contested by either party as having been written by a single hand and to take
photographs of the questioned ballots, his report and photographs having been
submitted by protestant-appellant to this Court accompanying his memorandum. The
pertinent portions of the FINDINGS in the said report read as follows:
Comparative examinations between and among the various letter designs, their
structural constructions and other characteristics appearing in Exhibits "B" to "O"
inclusive, "T", "T-1", "U", "U-I", "V" and "V-l", reveal the existence of significant
identifying handwriting characteristics, more particularly in
l. general style of writings;
2. size and propertion (sic) of letter designs; base and height alignments; and
relationship between adjacent letters;
3. lateral spacing; and initial and terminal strokes;
4. structural constructions and more perplexed elements embedded in the structures of
letter forms; and such characteristics are exemplified in the following words/
names: . . .; and the scientific evaluation of the aforementioned writing characteristics
includes the consideration of the idiosyncrasies of natural variation as shown in the
numerous similar letter forms, although at some instances, the writer succeeded in
having changed the entire letter designs of certain letters (at different style), but
somehow certain significant writing characteristics reappeared in the various letters
during the process of writing, thus be able to connect one writing from the others as
having emanated from one source."
The probative value of the above-mentioned writing characteristics are further
augmented by the presence of unusual structural construction of letter forms and/or in
combinations with adjacent-letters, thus . . .

The CONCLUSION of the said report states:

The questioned handwritings appearing in Exhs. "B" to "O", inclusive, "T", "T-1", "U", "V"
and "V-l", were WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.
Notwithstanding this report, this Court has taken pains and meticulous effort to examine
with its naked eye the questioned ballots and handwritings, and compare the same with
each other in order to determine whether or not they were indeed written by a single
hand, and this Court is convinced beyond doubt that Exhs. B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K, L, M,
N and O, were written by a single hand, considering the remarkable similarity if not
almost identity of the writings on these ballots. The lower Court's ruling on these twelve
(12) ballots is hereby reversed, and the twelve (12) votes for protestee-appellee based
thereon should be deducted from him.
With respect to Exhs. I and J, this Court entertains some doubt on their having been
written by a single hand, and therefore resolves the doubt in favor of the validity of
these two (2) ballots, as votes for protestee-appellee. Therefore, the ruling of the lower
Court counting Exhs. I and J for protestee-appellee stands. (pp. 78-80, Rollo)
The contention of petitioner that respondent court relied on the report of an alleged
handwriting expert is misplaced. It should be noted that while respondent court
considered the report of Atty. Pagui, it did not rely solely on the said report. In the words
of respondent court, "(I)t has taken pains and meticulous effort to examine with its
naked eye the questioned ballots and handwritings and compare the same with each
other . . ." In fact, in its effort to determine the true value of the contested ballots and in
order not to disenfranchise bona fide voters, it counted certain ballots in favor of
petitioner which the alleged handwriting expert found as written by only one person. It
contradicted said report as regards Exhibits "I", "J", "V" and "V-1". The respondent court
was circumspect in relying on its own findings on whether or not these contested ballots
were prepared by one person. The ballots are the best evidence of the objections
raised. Resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while
probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting, this can
be done by the COMELEC (in this case, the court taking cognizance of the appeal in
this election protest) itself (Bocobo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 94173, November 21, 1990,
191 SCRA 576).
Petitioner also argues that respondent court misinterpreted and misapplied Section
36(f) of Comelec Resolution No. 1539. It allegedly failed to take into consideration the
other provisions of said Section 36 of the Resolution.
We do not agree. Section 36 in its entirety provides:
Sec. 36. Procedure in the casting of votes. (a) Identification of votes. The chairman
shall check in the certified list of voters the name of the person offering to vote. He shall
then announce the voter's name distinctly in a loud tone. If there is no challenge, or if
having been challenged and the question is decided in his favor, the voter shall be
allowed to vote and he shall affix his signature on the proper space of the Voting
Record (Comelec Form No. 5).

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
(b) Delivery of ballot. Before delivering the ballot to the voter, the Chairman shall, in
the presence of the voter, the other members of the board and the watchers present,
affix his signature at the back thereof and write the serial number of the ballot in the
space provided in the ballot, beginning with No. "1" for the first ballot issued, and so on
consecutively for the succeeding ballots, which serial number shall be entered in the
corresponding space of the voting record. He shall then fold the ballot once, and
without removing the detachable coupon, deliver it to the voter together with a ball pen.
(c) Instructions to the voter. If a voter so requests, the poll clerk shall instruct him on
how to fill the ballot. The voter shall be reminded that he should fill the ballot secretly
and return it folded so as not to show the names of the candidates he voted for. He
shall also be warned not to use any other ballot; not to show the content of his ballot;
not to put any mark thereon; not to erase, deface or tear the same; and not to remove
the detachable coupon.
(d) Preparing the ballot. Upon receiving the ballot, the voter shall fill the ballot
secretly.
(e) Returning the ballot. (1) In the presence of all the members of the Board, the
voter shall affix his right hand thumbmark on the corresponding space in the detachable
coupon; and shall give the folded ballot to the chairman; (2) The chairman shall without
unfolding the ballot or looking at its contents, and in the presence of the voter and all
the members of the Board, verify if it bears his signature and the same serial number
recorded in the voting record. (3) If the ballot is found to be authentic, the voter shall
then be required to imprint his right hand thumbmark on the proper space in the voting
record. (4) The chairman shall then detach the coupon and shall deposit the folded
ballot in the compartment for the valid ballot and the coupon in the compartment for
spoiled ballots. (5) The voter shall then leave the voting center.
(f) When ballot may be considered spoiled. Any ballot returned to the chairman with
its coupon already detached, or which does not bear the signature of the chairman, or
any ballot with a serial number that does not tally with the serial number of the ballot
delivered to the voter as recorded in the voting record, shall be considered as spoiled
and shall be marked and signed by the members of the board and shall not be counted.
The ballots concerned were marked Exhibits "BB", "BB-1" and "BB-2" from voting
center No. 522. The respondent court ruled that:
b) Exhs. BB, BB-l and BB-2 were counted by the lower court for BAUTISTA over the
objection of protestant-appellant that these ballots are not duly authenticated by the
absence of the signature of the Chairman of the Board of Election Tellers at the back
thereof. An examination of the back portion of these ballots reveals that it is completely
blank of any signature or initial. The mandatory requirement of authentication of ballots
is found in Sec. 14 of B.P. 222 and in Sec. 36 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539, and
the legal consequence for the absence of such authentication is stated precisely in Sec.
36, sub-par. (f), and generally in Sec. 152 of the 1978 Election Code, . . . (p. 84, Rollo)
The law (Sec. 14 of B.P. 222) and the rules implementing it (Sec. 36 of Comelec Res.
No. 1539) leave no room for interpretation. The absence of the signature of the
Chairman of the Board of Election Tellers in the ballot given to a voter as required by

law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal. This requirement is
mandatory for the validity of the said ballot.
As regards exhibit "Z" and "Z-l", respondent court reversed the decision of the trial court
which ruled that these were not marked ballots and hence, were valid votes for
petitioner BAUTISTA. In reversing the trial court, respondent court ruled that the
presence of an arrow with the words "and party," was meant for no other purpose than
to Identify the voter.
We agree. It cannot be said that these writings were accidental. As a general rule, a
voter must write on the ballot only the names of candidates voted for the offices
appearing thereon. Certain exceptions, however, are provided in Section 149 of the
Revised Election Code. For example, prefixes such as "Sr.," "Mr.", and the like and
suffixes such as "hijo", "Jr.", etc. will not invalidate the ballot (par. 5). Initials (paragraph
15), nicknames or appellation of affection and friendship will not invalidate the ballot, if
accompanied by the name or surname of the candidate, and above all, if they were not
used as a means to identify the voter. Even under a liberal view, the words written on
the ballots under consideration cannot be considered as falling within the exception to
the rule. Consequently, they are irrelevant expressions that nullified the ballots. (Lloren
v. CA, et al., No. L-25907, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 110). Hence, respondent court
excluded Exhibits "Z" and "Z-l".
Exhibit "S" (Voting Center No. 521) was excluded by respondent court as a vote for
petitioner. It held:
a) Exh. S was counted by the lower court for BAUTISTA over the objection of
protestant-appellant that this ballot was found in the small compartment of the ballot
box for spoiled ballots and the said ballots appear to be in excess of the number of
ballots actually used. The records show that as reflected in the MINUTES OF VOTING
AND COUNTING OF VOTES found inside the ballot box, (1) there were 311 voters who
cast their votes, and the ballots actually used bear Serial Nos. 1-311, (2) 1 voter did not
return his/her ballot, 8 ballots were spoiled ballots and 302 ballots appreciated by the
Board of Election Tellers. The questioned ballot, Exh. S, together with blank questioned
ballot, was found by the Committee in the small compartment for spoiled ballots. It does
clearly appear that these two (2) ballots, one of which is Exh. S, are in excess of the
311 ballots actually used and must be considered as "EXCESS BALLOTS" under Sec.
151 of the 1978 Election Code and "shall not be read in the counting of votes." In view
of the foregoing considerations, the ruling of the lower court on Exh. S is hereby
reversed, and this ballot shall not be counted as a vote of protestee-appellee and
therefore deducted from him. (pp. 81-82, Rollo)
We affirm.
Petitioner objects to respondent court's ruling rejecting Exh. "5". The word "BLBIOY"
was written in the spare for Barangay Captain. "BIBOY", petitioner's nickname was duly
registered in his certificate of candidacy. Section 155 (11) of the 1978 Election Code
provides:

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
11. The use of nicknames and appellations of affection and friendship, if accompanied
by the first name or surname of the candidate, does not annul such vote, except when
they were used as a means to identify the voter, in which case the whole ballot is
invalid: Provided, That if the nickname used is unaccompanied by the name or surname
of a candidate and it is the one by which he is generally or popularly known in the
locality and stated in his certificate of candidacy, the same shall be counted in favor of
said candidate, if there is no other candidate for the same office with the same
nickname.
While the name written was "BLBIOY", there was no doubt that the voter intended to
vote for "BIBOY", the nickname of which petitioner was popularly known and which
nickname was duly registered in his certificate of candidacy. Hence, the respondent
court's decision as regards Exhibit "5" is reversed and the vote is counted for petitioner.
Exhibit "6" was invalidated by both respondent court and the city court as stray vote on
the ground that petitioner's name, written as "Bo. Barangay Bautista" was placed on the
first line intended for councilmen. In the case of Farin v. Gonzales and CA, G.R. No. L36893, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 237, cited by petitioner, it was ruled that where
the name of a candidate is not written in the proper space in the ballot but is preceded
by the name of the office for which he is a candidate, the vote should be counted as
valid for such candidate. Such rule stems from the fact that in the appreciation of the
ballot, the object should be to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if
it could be determined with reasonable certainty. In this case, while the name of
petitioner was written in the space for barangay councilman, his name was preceded by
the name of the office for which he is being elected, that as Punong Barangay or
Barangay Captain (See Exh. "6"). The respondent court ruled that what was placed
before the name BAUTISTA was Bo. Barangay and not Po. Barangay for Punong
Barangay (or Barangay Captain). We believe however that the voter's intention to vote
for BAUTISTA as Barangay Captain was present and said vote should be counted in
favor of petitioner.
Respondent court correctly invalidated Exhibit "7". This ballot cannot be considered as
a vote for petitioner whose name was written seven (7) times in the ballot. The writing
of a name more than twice on the ballot is considered to be intentional and serves no
other purpose than to identify the ballot (Katigbak v. Mendoza, L-24477, February 28,
1967, 19 SCRA 543).
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of respondent court is MODIFIED as regards Exhibits "5"
and "6". Private respondent Roberto Miguel in declared the duly elected Barangay
Captain of Barangay Teachers Village East, Quezon City, with a plurality of twenty-two
(22) votes. The temporary restraining order issued Court on December 2, 1982 is
hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 166046
March 23, 2006
MARGARITO C. SULIGUIN, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, and
ECELSON C. SUMAGUE, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to
reverse the Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) En Banc in SPC No.

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
04-209 dated November 18, 2004 which denied petitioner Margarito Suliguins motion
for reconsideration of the July 21, 2004 Resolution 2 of the Comelecs First Division. The
Comelec nullified his proclamation as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of
Nagcarlan, Laguna.
The antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Margarito Suliguin was one of the candidates for the Sangguniang Bayan of
Nagcarlan, Laguna during the May 10, 2004 elections. At around 6:00 p.m. on said
date, respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) convened to canvass the
votes for all the candidates. Petitioner received 6,605 votes while respondent Ecelson
Sumague received 6,647 votes. However, in the Statement of Votes (SOV) covering
Precincts 1A to 19A, Sumague appears to have received only 644 votes when, in fact,
he received 844 votes. The MBOC failed to notice the discrepancy and proclaimed the
winning candidates at around 7:00 p.m. of May 13, 2004. Petitioner was proclaimed as
the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna, garnering a total of 6,605
votes.3
Thereafter, Sumague requested for a recomputation of the votes received by him and
Suliguin in a Letter4 dated May 15, 2004, it appearing that there was a mistake in
adding the figures in the Certificate of Canvass of votes. He pointed out that he officially
garnered 6,647 votes, as against petitioners 6,605 votes.
The MBOC summoned petitioner and respondent Sumague to a conference. Upon
review, the MBOC discovered that it had, indeed, failed to credit respondent Sumague
his 200 votes from Precincts 1A to 19A, and that with his 6,647 votes, he should have
been proclaimed as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna,
instead of petitioner Suliguin.
On May 26, 2004, the MBOC filed before the Comelec a "Petition to Correct Entries
Made in the Statement of Votes" for Councilor. The error was attributed to extreme
physical and mental fatigue which the members of the board experienced during the
election and the canvassing of votes.
In the meantime, on June 9, 2004, petitioner took his oath of office before Judge
Renato B. Bercades.5
On July 21, 2004, the Comelec (First Division) issued a Resolution 6 granting the petition
of the MBOC. The Commission nullified the proclamation of petitioner Suliguin as the
8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna during the May 10, 2004
National and Local Elections "for being based on an erroneous computation of votes." It
then ordered the MBOC of Nagcarlan, Laguna to reconvene and effect the necessary
corrections in the SOV, and forthwith proclaim Sumague as the 8th duly elected
Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna.7
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but the Comelec En Banc
denied the motion on November 18, 2004; hence, this petition. Petitioner alleges that

respondent Commission committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction in ruling against him. In support of his petition, he alleges that:
4.1 THE "PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES MADE IN THE STATEMENT OF VOTES
FOR COUNCILOR, NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA" WAS UNDISPUTEDLY FILED OUT OF
TIME, and
4.2 "THE PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES MADE IN THE STATEMENT OF VOTES
FOR COUNCILOR, NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA" WAS FILED BY THE MUNICIPAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS IN DEFIANCE OF EXISTING COMELEC RULES AND
REGULATIONS AND WAS OBVIOUSLY BIAS IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
CANDICATE ECELSON C. SUMAGUE.8
Petitioner argues that pursuant to Sections 35, 9 36(c) and (f)10 of Comelec Resolution
No. 6669 (General Instructions for Municipal/City/Provincial and District Boards of
Canvassers in Connection with the May 10, 2004 Elections), the MBOC should not
have entertained the letter-request of respondent Sumague as it was filed only on May
17, 2004, or four (4) days after the canvassing of votes was terminated and after he
(petitioner) was proclaimed winner as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of
Nagcarlan, Laguna. Furthermore, respondent Sumague never entered any objection
during the proceedings of the canvassing of votes. The MBOC itself filed the "Petition to
Correct Entries Made in the Statement of Votes" before the Comelec only on May 26,
2004, 13 days after the canvassing of votes was terminated. Petitioner maintains that
the Comelec should have denied the petition, since according to the Revised Comelec
Rules, it should have been filed not later than five (5) days following the date of the
proclamation.
Petitioner likewise questions the personality of the MBOC itself to file the petition before
the Comelec. He further argues that upon the proclamation of the winning candidates in
the election, the MBOC adjourns sine die and becomes functus officio.
The issue is whether or not respondent Comelec erred in granting the petition of the
MBOC to nullify petitioners proclamation as the 8th member of the Sangguniang Bayan
in Nagcarlan, Laguna.
The petition is bereft of merit.
In an election case, the Comelec is mandated to ascertain by all means within its
command who the real candidate elected by the electorate is. The Court frowns upon
any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free
and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of
the results.11 In the case at bar, the simple mathematical procedure of adding the total
number of votes garnered by respondent Sumague as appearing in the Statement of
Votes submitted to the Comelec would readily reveal the result that he has forty-two
(42) votes more than petitioner. Such result would, in effect, dislodge petitioner from
said post, and entitle respondent Sumague to occupy the eighth and last seat of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna. Petitioner himself never disputed the

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
discrepancy in the total number of votes garnered by respondent Sumague, and
instead questioned the personality of the MBOC to file the petition and insisted that
such petition was not filed on time.
Sections 312 and 413 of Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure explicitly provide that
such rules may be "liberally construed" in the interest of justice. Indeed, the Comelec
has the discretion to liberally construe its rules and, at the same time, suspend the rules
or any portion thereof in the interest of justice. 14 Disputes in the outcome of elections
involve public interest; as such, technicalities and procedural barriers should not be
allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the
electorate in the choice of their elective officials. Laws governing such disputes must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials
may not be defeated by mere technical objections.15
What is involved in the present petition is the correction of a manifest error in reflecting
the actual total number of votes for a particular candidate. Section 32, subparagraph 5
of Comelec Resolution No. 6669 includes mistake in the addition of the votes of any
candidate as a manifest error.16 As correctly cited by the Comelec,17 a manifest clerical
error is "one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding and is apparent
from the papers to the eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not include an error
which may, by evidence dehors the record be shown to have been committed."
The MBOC sought relief from the Comelec to reflect the true winner elected by the
voting public, to occupy the eighth position as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Nagcarlan, Laguna. In Carlos v. Angeles,18 the Court had the occasion to declare:
In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or selection of candidates to public
office by popular vote" through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of which
are determined through the will of the electorate. "An election is the embodiment of the
popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people." "Specifically, the
term election, in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and
counting of votes." The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality
of valid votes cast in the election. "Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are
filled by those who receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office. For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can de declared carried unless he or it receives a
majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election."19
We quote, with approval, the ruling of the Comelec (First Division) granting the petition
of the MBOC:
A careful perusal of the records show that there was, indeed, an honest error committed
by petitioner MBOC in the computation of votes for candidate Ecelson Sumague which
resulted in the erroneous proclamation of respondent as one of the winners for the said
office.
"A manifest clerical error is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding
and is apparent from the papers to the eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not

include an error which may, by evidence dehors the record be shown to have been
committed."
The contention of respondent that the instant petition should be dismissed for being
filed out of time cannot be given merit because his proclamation was flawed. It must be
stressed that "a proclamation based on faulty tabulation of votes is flawed, and a
petition to correct errors in tabulation under Section 7, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, even if filed out of time, may be considered, so as not to thwart the
proper determination and resolution of the case on substantial grounds and to prevent a
stamp of validity on a palpably void proclamation based on an erroneous tabulation of
votes."
Furthermore, "where the proclamation is flawed because it was based on a clerical
error or mathematical mistake in the addition of votes and not through the legitimate will
of the electorate, there can be no valid proclamation to speak of and the same can be
challenged even after the candidate has assumed office."
There is no showing that petitioner MBOC acted with manifest bias and committed a
grave abuse of discretion. "Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an invasion of positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law." Petitioner MBOC is merely doing its function that is mandated by law to canvass
votes in the election returns submitted to it in due form, adding or compiling the votes
cast for each candidate as shown in the face of such returns and eventually proclaim
the winning candidates. Respondent miserably failed to prove that petitioner exhibited
manifest bias thereby thwarting his chances of winning the last slot for Sangguniang
Bayan Member. "Absent a strong showing to the contrary, the court must accept the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and strong evidence is
necessary to rebut this presumption."
Likewise, it cannot be said that petitioner MBOC violated the sanctity of the ballots.
Unlike the Board of Election Inspectors which counts the votes from the precinct levels,
the MBOC computes the votes as appeared in the election returns.
Finally, a subsequent annulment of the proclamation of the respondent does not
constitute a clear violation of his right. In the first place, there is no valid proclamation to
speak of. He was not elected by a majority or plurality of voters. His alleged right was
based on an erroneous proclamation. By any mathematical formulation, the respondent
cannot be construed to have obtained such plurality of votes; otherwise, it would be
sheer absurdity to proclaim a repudiated candidate as the choice of the voters. "Where
a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the
proclaimed candidates assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the
power to make such declaration a nullity." Respondent also cannot claim that he was
denied of his right to due process of law since he was given the opportunity to be
heard. He was duly notified by petitioner MBOC of the erroneous computation which
resulted in his proclamation and was afforded the opportunity to be heard by this

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
Commission.
"The COMELEC exercises immediate supervision and control over the members of the
Boards of Election Inspectors and Canvassers. Its statutory power of supervision and
control includes the power to revise, reverse or set aside the action of the boards, as
well as to do what boards should have done, even if questions relative thereto have not
been elevated to it by an aggrieved party, for such power includes the authority to
initiate motu proprio or by itself steps or actions that may be required pursuant to law."20
Petitioner posits that the Comelecs reliance in the ruling of this Court in Bince, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections21 is misplaced since, unlike the present petition, petitioner
therein was an affected candidate who filed his petition on time.
The argument of petitioner does not persuade. The Court, in Bince, Jr. v. Commission
on Elections,22 declared that:
Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out of time, this incident
alone will not thwart the proper determination and resolution of the instant case on
substantial grounds. Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp of validity on a
palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable result of frustrating the peoples will
cannot be countenanced. In Benito v. COMELEC, we categorically declared that:
x x x Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not on technicalities has been
consistently observed by this Court. In the case of Juliano vs. Court of Appeals (20
SCRA 808) cited in Duremdes v. Commission on Elections (178 SCRA 746), this Court
had the occasion to declare that:
Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public interest, and
technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute
an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their
elective officials. And also settled is the rule that laws governing election contests must
be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (Gardiner v. Romulo, 26 Phil.
521; Galang v. Miranda, 35 Phil. 269; Jalandoni v. Sarcon, G.R. No. L-6496, January
27, 1962; Macasunding v. Macalaang, G.R. No. L-22779, March 31, 1965; Cauton v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-25467, April 27, 1967). In an election case, the
court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means within its command who is the
real candidate elected by the electorate. (Ibasco v. Ilao, G.R. No. L-17512, December
29, 1960). x x x (Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 818-819). (Italics ours)

the election laws should not frustrate the determination of the popular will.
Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved is the allowance of the
correction of what are purely mathematical and/or mechanical errors in the addition of
the votes received by both candidates. It does not involve the opening of ballot boxes;
neither does it involve the examination and/or appreciation of ballots. The correction
sought by private respondent and respondent MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel is
correction of manifest mistakes in mathematical addition. Certainly, this only calls for a
mere clerical act of reflecting the true and correct votes received by the candidates by
the MBCs involved. In this case, the manifest errors sought to be corrected involve the
proper and diligent addition of the votes in the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel,
Pangasinan.23
The Court made a similar pronouncement in Tatlonghari v. Commission on Elections, 24
to wit:
The argument is devoid of merit. For one thing, records indicate that respondents
assumption of office was effected by a clerical error or simple mathematical mistake in
the addition of votes and not through the legitimate will of the electorate. Thus,
respondents proclamation was flawed right from the very beginning. Having been
based on a faulty tabulation, there can be no valid proclamation to speak of insofar as
respondent Castillo is concerned. As this Court once said:
"x x x Time and again, this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that Comelec
is with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The
fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the
exercise of such power. It, of course, may not be availed of where there has been a
valid proclamation. Since private respondents petition before the Comelec is precisely
directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry
into this issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to Comelec.
xxx
"We have but to reiterate the oft-cited rule that the validity of a proclamation may be
challenged even after the irregularly proclaimed candidate has assumed office.
xxx
"It is, indeed, true that, after proclamation, the usual remedy of any party aggrieved in
an election is to be found in an election protest. But that is so only on the assumption
that there has been a valid proclamation. Where as in the case at bar the proclamation
itself is illegal, the assumption of office cannot in any way affect the basic issues."
(Aguam v. Commission on Elections, 23 SCRA 883 [1968]; cited in Agbayani v.
Commission on Elections, 186 SCRA 484 [1990]).25

In the later case of Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections (119 SCRA 465), this
doctrine was reiterated and the Court went on to state that:
Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), this Court has made it clear
that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any
way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the
correct ascertainment of the results. This bent or disposition continues to the present.
(Id., at p. 474).

Thus, the Comelec was correct in annulling the proclamation of petitioner for being
based on an erroneous computation of votes. As the Court declared in Espidol v.
Commission on Elections,26 where the proclamation is null and void, the proclaimed
candidates assumption of office cannot deprive the Commission the power to declare
such proclamation a nullity. We emphasized that a defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.27

The same principle still holds true today. Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in

In fine, the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in annulling the

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
proclamation of petitioner. In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden is on the part
of petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing
the impugned order. Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is
not enough, it must be so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and
so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.28
To the credit of the MBOC, when it realized that it made a mistake in computing the
total number of votes for respondent Sumague, it took swift action and called the
attention of the Comelec by filing the Petition to Correct Entries Made in the Statement
of Votes for Councilor.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
in SPC No. 04-209 dated July 21, 2004 and November 18, 2004 are AFFIRMED. The
Status Quo Order issued by the Court dated January 11, 2005 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
CONSTANCIO D. PACANAN, JR., Petitioner vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
FRANCISCO M. LANGI, SR.,
Respondents
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari which seeks to set aside 1) the Order [ dated
March 17, 2008 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) First Division and 2) the

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
Resolution dated January 21, 2009 of the Comelec En Banc dismissing petitioner
Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr.s appeal from the Decision [of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 27, Catbalogan, Samar, in Election Case No. 07-1, which declared
private respondent Francisco M. Langi, Sr. as the winning Mayor of Motiong, Samar.
In the Order of March 17, 2008, the Comelec First Division dismissed the appeal for
failure to pay the correct appeal fee as prescribed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure
within the five-day reglementary period.
In the assailed Resolution dated January 21, 2009, the Comelec En Banc denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration, declaring that the Comelec did not acquire
jurisdiction over the appeal because of the non-payment of the appeal fee on time, and
that the Comelec First Division was correct in dismissing the said appeal.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr. and private respondent Francisco M. Langi, Sr.
were candidates for mayor in the municipality of Motiong, Samar during the May 14,
2007 elections. After the canvassing of votes, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBC) of Motiong, Samar proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected mayor, having
garnered a total of 3,069 votes against private respondents 3,066 votes.
Thereafter, private respondent filed with the RTC a Protest dated May 25, 2007 which
was docketed as Election Case No. 07-1, contesting the results of the elections in ten
(10) of the forty-nine (49) precincts in Motiong, Samar, and alleging acts of violence and
intimidation and other election irregularities in the appreciation of the votes by the MBC.
Thereafter, petitioner filed his Verified Answer with Counter-Protest dated June 4, 2007,
asserting that private respondents allegations of threat and intimidation, fraud and other
irregularities in the conduct of elections were mere allegations unsupported by any
documentary evidence. Petitioner also disputed the election results with respect to
seven (7) precincts.
On January 7, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision in Election Case 07-1, which
declared private respondent as the winner in the May 14, 2007 mayoralty race for
Motiong, Samar with a plurality of six (6) votes, viz:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing Protestant Francisco M. Langi, Sr. having obtained
the over all total votes of 3,074 and the Protestees 3,068 total and final votes is
declared the winner in the Mayoralty contest in Motiong, Samar with a plurality of (6)
votes. Therefore the proclamation on May 17, 2007 is hereby annulled and declared
Francisco Langi, Sr. y Maceren as the duly elected Mayor of Motiong, Samar. The
winner is awarded the amount of P 32,510 as actual damages and no evidence aliunde
for damages for the court to award. xxx
On January 10, 2008, petitioner filed a notice of appeal and paid P3,000.00 appeal fee
per Official Receipt No. 6822663 before the RTC, Branch 27, Catbalogan, Samar. He

also appealed the RTC decision dated January 7, 2008 to the Comelec which docketed
the case as EAC No. A-13-2008. Out of the P3,000.00 appeal fee required by Section
3, Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, petitioner only paid the amount of
P1,000.00 (plus P200.00 to cover the legal research/bailiff fees) to the Cash Division of
the Comelec, per Official Receipt No. 0510287. The said payment was made on
February 14, 2008
On March 17, 2008, the Comelec First Division issued an Order dismissing the appeal,
viz.:
Pursuant to Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which provide for the payment of appeal fee in the amount of
P3,000.00 within the period to file the notice of appeal, and Section 9 (a), Rule
22 of the same Rules which provides that failure to pay the correct appeal fee
is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal, the Commission (First Division)
RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant case for
Protestee-Appellants failure to pay the correct appeal fee as prescribed by the
Comelec Rules of Procedure within the five-(5)-day reglementary period.
SO ORDERED.
On March 28, 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[if !supportFootnotes]
[9][endif] which the Comelec En Banc denied in the Resolution[if !supportFootnotes][10]
[endif] dated January 21, 2009, declaring that the appeal was not perfected on time for
non-payment of the complete amount of appeal fee and for late payment as well. The
Comelec En Banc held that the Comelec did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal
because of the non-payment of the appeal fee on time. Thus, the Comelec First
Division correctly dismissed the appeal.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari raising the following grounds:
The respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that the correct appeal
fee was not paid on time.
The respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in failing to consider that assuming
that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time, the alleged non-payment of
the correct appeal fee is not in anyway attributable to herein petitioner.
The respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in failing to consider that assuming
that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time, there are highly justifiable
and compelling reasons to resolve the subject case on the merits in the
interest of justice and public interest.
Petitioner further claims that he paid a total of P4,215.00 for his appeal, as follows:

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ELECTION LAWS CASES

Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
a. To RTC on January 10, 2008 ------ P3,000.00
10.00
5.00
TOTAL P3,015.00
b. To Comelec on February 14, 2008 -- P1,000.00
50.00
150.00
TOTAL P1,200.00
Petitioner submits that it is incumbent upon the RTC to transmit to the Comelec the
entire P3,000.00 appeal fee that he paid on January 10, 2008. Petitioner also advances
another interpretation of the Comelec Rules that the RTC is under obligation to remit to
the Comelec the P2,000.00 representing the excess amount of the P1,000.00 appeal
fee. Thus, petitioner claims that he must be deemed to have complied, in full or at least
substantially, with the Comelec Rules on the payment of appeal fees.
Petitioner maintains that the alleged non-payment of the correct appeal fee is not due to
his own fault or negligence. He claims that the laws on appeals in election protest
cases are not yet well-established, thus, he must not be made to suffer for an oversight
made in good faith. The Resolution No. 8486 of July 15, 2008 adopted by the Comelec
to clarify the rules on compliance with the required appeal fees in election cases should
not be applied retroactively to the subject election protest.
Lastly, petitioner invokes liberality in the application of the election law. He asserts that
the popular will of the people expressed in the election of public officers should not be
defeated by reason of sheer technicalities. Petitioner argues that the true will of the
people of Motiong in the May 14, 2007 elections should be determined by ordering the
Comelec to give due course to his appeal and to resolve the same on the merits.
In his Comment, respondent Langi, Sr. states that the petition was just a mere rehash
of the Motion for Reconsideration that petitioner filed with the Comelec En Banc.
Respondent maintains that for the Comelec to exercise its authority to administer
proceedings, grant leniency, issue orders, and pass judgment on issues presented, it
must first be shown that it has acquired the requisite jurisdiction over the subject matter
pursuant to the initiatory acts and procedural compliance set as conditions precedent.
Respondent also argues that the negligence and mistakes of petitioners counsel bind
petitioner. He then reiterates the cases where this Court held that the non-payment or
insufficiency of payment of filing fees is a valid ground for the dismissal of the appeal
and that the subsequent full payment thereof does not cure the jurisdictional defect.
We grant the petition.

Section 3, Rule 22 (Appeals from Decisions of Courts in Election Protest Cases) of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates that the notice of appeal must be filed within
five (5) days after promulgation of the decision, thus:
SEC. 3. Notice of Appeal. Within five (5) days after promulgation of the decision of the
court, the aggrieved party may file with said court a notice of appeal, and serve a copy
thereof upon the attorney of record of the adverse party.
Moreover, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the Comelec rules require the payment
of appeal fees in appealed election protest cases, the amended amount of which was
set at P3,200.00 in Comelec Minute Resolution No. 02-0130,[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] to wit:
SEC. 3. Appeal Fees. The appellant in election cases shall pay an appeal
fee as follows:
[if !supportLists](a)
[endif]For election cases appealed from Regional
Trial Courts.P3,000.00 (per appellant)
For election cases appealed from courts of limited jurisdiction..P3,000.00 (per
appellant)
SEC. 4. Where and When to Pay. The fees prescribed in Sections 1,
2 and 3 hereof shall be paid to, and deposited with, the Cash Division of the
Commission within a period to file the notice of appeal.
Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC also provide the procedure for
instituting an appeal and the required appeal fees to be paid for the appeal to be given
due course, to wit:
SEC. 8. Appeal. An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the
Commission on Elections, within five days after promulgation, by filing a notice
of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served on the
adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.
SEC. 9. Appeal fee. The appellant in an election contest shall pay to
the court that rendered the decision an appeal fee of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal.
A reading of the foregoing provisions reveals that two different tribunals (the trial court
that rendered the decision and the Comelec) require the payment of two different
appeal fees for the perfection of appeals of election cases. This requirement in the
payment of appeal fees had caused much confusion, which the Comelec addressed
through the issuance of Comelec Resolution No. 8486. Thus, to provide clarity and to
erase any ambiguity in the implementation of the procedural rules on the payment of
appeal fees for the perfection of appeals of election cases, the resolution provides:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections is vested with appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by

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ELECTION LAWS CASES

Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
trial courts of general jurisdiction, and those involving elective barangay
officials, decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction;
WHEREAS, Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 07-4-15 (Rules
of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective
Municipal and Barangay Officials) promulgated on May 15, 2007 provides in
Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 thereof the procedure in instituting the appeal and
the required appeal fees to be paid for the appeal to be given due course, to
wit:
Section 8. Appeal. An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the
Commission on Elections, within five days after promulgation, by filing a notice
of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served on the
adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.
Section 9. Appeal Fee. The appellant in an election contest shall pay
to the court that rendered the decision an appeal fee of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal.

Appeal with the lower court. If no payment is made within the prescribed period, the
appeal shall be dismissed pursuant to Section 9(a) of Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 9. Grounds for Dismissal of Appeal. The appeal may be dismissed upon
motion of either party or at the instance of the Commission on any of the following
grounds:
(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal fee; xxx
That if the appellant failed to pay the P1,000.00 appeal fee with the lower court within
the five (5) day period as prescribed by the Supreme Court New Rules of Procedure but
the case was nonetheless elevated to the Commission, the appeal shall be dismissed
outright by the Commission, in accordance with the aforestated Section 9(a) of Rule 22
of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
The Education and Information Department is directed to cause the publication of this
resolution in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

WHEREAS, payment of appeal fees in appealed election protest

cases is also required in Section 3, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure the amended amount of which was set at P3,200.00 in COMELEC
Minute Resolution No. 02-0130 made effective on September 18, 2002.

This resolution shall take effect on the seventh day following its publication.

WHEREAS, the requirement of these two appeal fees by two different

jurisdictions had caused confusion in the implementation by the Commission
on Elections of its procedural rules on payment of appeal fees for the
perfection of appeals of cases brought before it from the Courts of General
and Limited Jurisdictions.

Our ruling in the very recent case of Aguilar v. Comelec quoted hereunder, squarely
applies to the instant case:

WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the rules on compliance with the

required appeal fees for the proper and judicious exercise of the Commissions
appellate jurisdiction over election protest cases.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission hereby
RESOLVES to DIRECT as follows:
That if the appellant had already paid the amount of P1,000.00 before the Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court or lower courts within the fiveday period, pursuant to Section 9, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Cases
Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials (Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 07-4-15) and his Appeal was given due course by the Court,
said appellant is required to pay the Comelec appeal fee of P3,200.00 at the
Commissions Cash Division through the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department
(ECAD) or by postal money order payable to the Commission on Elections through
ECAD, within a period of fifteen days (15) from the time of the filing of the Notice of

SO ORDERED.

Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provide for the

following procedure in the appeal to the COMELEC of trial court decisions in
election protests involving elective municipal and barangay officials:
SEC. 8. Appeal. An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the
Commission on Elections, within five days after promulgation, by filing a notice
of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served on the
adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.
SEC. 9. Appeal fee. The appellant in an election contest shall pay to
the court that rendered the decision an appeal fee of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal.
Section 8 was derived from Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the
Constitution and Rule 40, Section 3, par. 1 and Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the
Rules of Court. Section 9 was taken from Rule 141, Sections 7(1) and 8(f) of
the Rules of Court.
It should be noted from the afore-quoted sections of the Rule that the
appeal fee of P1,000.00 is paid not to the COMELEC but to the trial court that

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ELECTION LAWS CASES

Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
rendered the decision. Thus, the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment
of the P1,000.00 appeal fee perfect the appeal, consonant with Sections 10
and 11 of the same Rule. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the records have
to be transmitted to the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department of the
COMELEC within 15 days. The trial court may only exercise its residual
jurisdiction to resolve pending incidents if the records have not yet been
transmitted and before the expiration of the period to appeal.
With the promulgation of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, the previous rule that
the appeal is perfected only upon the full payment of the appeal fee, now
pegged at P3,200.00, to the COMELEC Cash Division within the period to
appeal, as stated in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, no
longer applies.
It thus became necessary for the COMELEC to clarify the procedural
rules on the payment of appeal fees. For this purpose, the COMELEC issued
on July 15, 2008, Resolution No. 8486, which the Court takes judicial notice of.
The resolution pertinently reads:
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing resolution is consistent with A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC and
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended. The appeal to the
COMELEC of the trial courts decision in election contests involving municipal
and barangay officials is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and
the payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the court that rendered the
decision within the five-day reglementary period. The non-payment or the
insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the
COMELEC Cash Division, in accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, does not affect the perfection of
the appeal and does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal.
Following, Rule 22, Section 9 (a) of the COMELEC Rules, the appeal may be
dismissed. And pursuant to Rule 40, Section 18 of the same rules, if the fees
are not paid, the COMELEC may refuse to take action thereon until they are
paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding. In such a situation, the
COMELEC is merely given the discretion to dismiss the appeal or not.
Accordingly, in the instant case, the COMELEC First Division, may
dismiss petitioners appeal, as it in fact did, for petitioners failure to pay the
P3,200.00 appeal fee.
Be that as it may, the Court finds that the COMELEC First Division
gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order dismissing petitioners appeal.
The Court notes that the notice of appeal and the P1,000.00 appeal fee were,
respectively, filed and paid with the MTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on
April 21, 2008. On that date, the petitioners appeal was deemed perfected.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486 clarifying the rule on the payment of
appeal fees only on July 15, 2008, or almost three months after the appeal

was perfected. Yet, on July 31, 2008, or barely two weeks after the issuance of
Resolution No. 8486, the COMELEC First Division dismissed petitioners
appeal for non-payment to the COMELEC Cash Division of the additional
P3,200.00 appeal fee.
Considering that petitioner filed his appeal months before the
clarificatory resolution on appeal fees, petitioners appeal should not be
unjustly prejudiced by COMELEC Resolution No. 8486. Fairness and
prudence dictate that the COMELEC First Division should have first directed
petitioner to pay the additional appeal fee in accordance with the clarificatory
resolution, and if the latter should refuse to comply, then, and only then,
dismiss the appeal. Instead, the COMELEC First Division hastily dismissed the
appeal on the strength of the recently promulgated clarificatory resolution
which had taken effect only a few days earlier. This unseemly haste is an
invitation to outrage.
The COMELEC First Division should have been more cautious in
dismissing petitioners appeal on the mere technicality of non-payment of the
additional P3,200.00 appeal fee given the public interest involved in election
cases. This is especially true in this case where only one vote separates the
contending parties. The Court stresses once more that election law and rules
are to be interpreted and applied in a liberal manner so as to give effect, not to
frustrate, the will of the electorate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is
GRANTED. The July 31, September 4 and October 6, 2008 Orders and the
October 16 2008 Entry of Judgment issued by the COMELEC First Division in
EAC (BRGY) No. 211-2008 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the COMELEC First Division for disposition in accordance with
this Decision.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the appeal from the trial court decision to
the Comelec is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the
P1,000.00 appeal fee to the trial court that rendered the decision. With the promulgation
of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, the perfection of the appeal no longer depends solely on the
full payment of the appeal fee to the Comelec.
In the instant case, when petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal and paid the appeal fee of
P3,015.00 to the RTC on January 10, 2008, his appeal was deemed perfected.
However, Comelec Resolution No. 8486 also provides that if the appellant had already
paid the amount of P1,000.00 before the trial court that rendered the decision, and his
appeal was given due course by the court, said appellant is required to pay the
Comelec appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the Comelecs Cash Division through the Electoral
Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) or by postal money order payable to the
Comelec, within a period of fifteen (15) days from the time of the filing of the Notice of

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ELECTION LAWS CASES

Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
Appeal with the lower court. However, if no payment is made within the prescribed
period, the appeal shall be dismissed pursuant to Section 9 (a), Rule 22 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure, which provides:
SEC. 9. Grounds for Dismissal of Appeal. The appeal may be
dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of the Commission on
any of the following grounds:
(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal fee; xxx
Thus, when petitioners appeal was perfected on January 10, 2008, within
five (5) days from promulgation, his non-payment or insufficient payment of the appeal
fee to the Comelec Cash Division should not have resulted in the outright dismissal of
his appeal. The Comelec Rules provide in Section 9 (a), Rule 22, that for failure to pay
the correct appeal fee, the appeal may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at
the instance of the Comelec. Likewise, Section 18, Rule 40 thereof also prescribes that
if the fees are not paid, the Comelec may refuse to take action on the appeal until
the said fees are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding.
Here, petitioner paid P1,200.00 to the Comelec on February 14, 2008.
Unfortunately, the Comelec First Division dismissed the appeal on March 17, 2008 due
to petitioners failure to pay the correct appeal fee within the five-day reglementary
period. In denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, the Comelec En Banc, in the
Resolution dated January 21, 2009, declared that the Comelec did not acquire
jurisdiction over the appeal because of the non-payment of the appeal fee on time.
However, during the pendency of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
dated March 27, 2008, the Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 8486 to clarify the
implementation of the Comelec Rules regarding the payment of filing fees. Thus,
applying the mandated liberal construction of election laws the Comelec should have
initially directed the petitioner to pay the correct appeal fee with the Comelec Cash
Division, and should not have dismissed outright petitioners appeal. This would have
been more in consonance with the intent of the said resolution which sought to clarify
the rules on compliance with the required appeal fees.
In Barroso v. Ampig, Jr., we ruled, thus:
xxx An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed with a public interest.
The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by
the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the
correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning
candidate. An election contest therefore involves not only the adjudication of private
and pecuniary interests of rival candidates but paramount to their claims is the deep
public concern involved and the need of dispelling the uncertainty over the real choice
of the electorate. And the court has the corresponding duty to ascertain by all means
within its command who is the real candidate elected by the people.

Moreover, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a liberal construction. This
liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of the
objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections and for achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Comelec. Thus we have
declared:
It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule recognized by all
courts, that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by
mere technical objections. An election contest, unlike an ordinary action, is imbued with
public interest since it involves not only the adjudication of the private interests of rival
candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds
the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of
the office within their gift. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office for an
uncertain period one whose right to it is under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim
be immediately cleared not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public
interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure
which protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Order dated March 17, 2008 of the Comelec
First Division and the Resolution dated January 21, 2009 of the Comelec En Banc in
EAC No. A-13-2008 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the case be
REMANDED to the Comelec First Division for further proceedings, in accordance with
the rules and with this disposition. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 27 of Catbalogan,
Samar is DIRECTED to refund to petitioner Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr., the amount of
Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as the excess of the appeal fee per Official Receipt
No. 6822663 paid on January 10, 2008.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 184801
July 30, 2009
JONAS TAGUIAM, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANTHONY C.
TUDDAO, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and
writ of preliminary injunction1 assails the December 20, 2007 Resolution2 of the Second
Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPC No. 07-171 which granted
private respondent Anthony C. Tuddaos Petition for Correction of Manifest Error and
Annulment of Proclamation of petitioner Jonas Taguiam as the 12th winning candidate
for the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. Also assailed is the
October 9, 2008 Resolution3 of the COMELEC En Banc denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.4

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Tuguegarao City in Cagayan during the 2007 National and Local
Elections. On May 19, 2007, petitioner was proclaimed by the City Board of Canvassers
(CBOC) as the 12th ranking and winning candidate for the said position with 10,981
votes.5 Private respondent obtained 10,971 votes6 and was ranked no. 13.
On May 25, 2007, private respondent filed with the COMELEC a petition for correction
of manifest errors in the Election Returns and Statement of Votes for 27 clustered
precincts7 and for the annulment of the proclamation of the affected winning candidate
in Tuguegarao City. He alleged that he was credited with less votes in several
Statements of Votes by Precincts (SOVP) as compared with the tally of his votes in the
election returns ERs), whereas petitioner was credited with more votes. Private
respondent offered evidence in the following nine precincts: 0035A/0036A,
0061A/0063A, 69A/69B, 87A/87B, 192A/192B, 264A/265A, 324A/325B, 326A, and
328B.
Petitioner denied the allegations of private respondent and argued that the petition
should be dismissed for having been filed late or six days after the proclamation of the
winning candidates.8 Meanwhile, the members of the CBOC of Tuguegarao City denied
private respondents allegations of manifest errors in the SOVP; maintained that
petitioner garnered more votes than those obtained by private respondent; and that
they have properly performed their duties and functions.9
On December 20, 2007, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued the assailed
Resolution, to wit:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition filed by Anthony Tuddao for
Correction of Manifest Error and Annulment of Proclamation of Jonas Taguiam is
hereby GRANTED.
ACCORDINGLY, the City Board of Canvassers of Tuguegarao, Cagayan is hereby
DIRECTED to (i) RECONVENE after giving due notice to the concerned parties, (ii)
CORRECT the errors in the Statement of Votes by Precinct (SOVP), and thereafter
proclaim the 12th winning candidate for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan.1avvphi1
Let the City Board of Canvassers of Tuguegarao, Cagayan implement this Resolution
with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.10
The COMELEC held that the belated filing of private respondents petition cannot deter
its authority to ascertain the true will of the electorate and thereafter affirm such will.
Thus, after due proceedings, the COMELEC found private respondents allegations
duly substantiated with material evidence and confirmed the following:

A. With regard to the votes of private respondent:

Precinct
No.

SOVP
No.

ER No.

Votes
SOVP

1 69A/69B

15327

9602679

2 87A/87B

10543

3 192A/19
2B
4 326A

Votes in ER

Votes Affected

27

27

9602699

13

13

10531

9602801

20

19

-1

10532

9602921

43

53

+10

TOTAL

in

+9

B. With regard to the votes of petitioner:

Precinct
No.

SOVP
No.

ER No.

Votes in
SOVP

Votes
in ER

Votes Affected

1 35A/36A

10543

9602647

40

33

-7

2 61A/63A

10539

9602672

55

50

-5

3 264A/265
A

10528

9602871

39

29

-10

4 324A/325
A

10533

9602920

62

61

-1

5 328B

10527

9602924

33

32

-1

TOTAL

-24

The COMELEC concluded that nine votes should be added to the total number of votes
garnered by private respondent; while 24 votes should be deducted from the total
number of votes obtained by petitioner. Thus, the total number of votes obtained by
private respondent was 10,980, while the total number of votes received by petitioner
was 10,957. As such, private respondent was rightfully the 12th winning candidate for
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC En
Banc on October 9, 2008.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari11 raising the issue of whether or not the COMELEC

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
took cognizance of private respondents petition for correction of manifest errors in the
Election Returns and Statement of Votes despite its late filing.
Petitioner avers that private respondents petition for correction of manifest errors
should have been dismissed outright for failure to show any justification for its late filing;
that, if the petition had been properly dismissed, private respondent had other remedies
available, such as an election protest.
Rule 27, Section 5 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure expressly states that:
Pre-proclamation Controversies Which May Be Filed Directly with the Commission
(a) The following pre-proclamation controversies may be filed directly with the
Commission:
xxxx
2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying
of the results during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns or
certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once, (2) two or more copies of the
election returns of one precinct, or two or more copies of certificate of canvass were
tabulated separately, (3) there has been a mistake in the copying of the figures into the
statement of votes or into the certificate of canvass, or (4) so-called returns from nonexistent precincts were included in the canvass, and such errors could not have been
discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and
proclamation of the winning candidates had already been made.
xxxx
If the petition is for correction, it must be filed not later than five (5) days following the
date of proclamation and must implead all candidates who may be adversely affected
thereby.
While the petition was indeed filed beyond the 5-day reglementary period, the
COMELEC however has the discretion to suspend its rules of procedure or any portion
thereof. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure state, to wit:
Sec. 3. Construction. These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote the
effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the Commission.
Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. In the interest of justice and in order to obtain
speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any
portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.
Certainly, such rule of suspension is in accordance with the spirit of Section 6, Article
IX-A of the Constitution which bestows upon the COMELEC the power to "promulgate
its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices" to
attain justice and the noble purpose of determining the true will of the electorate.12

In Jaramilla v. Commission on Elections13 and Dela Llana v. Commission on Elections,14

the Court affirmed the COMELECs suspension of its rules of procedure regarding the
late filing of a petition for correction of manifest error and annulment of proclamation in
view of its paramount duty to determine the real will of the electorate. We have
consistently employed liberal construction of procedural rules in election cases to the
end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by
mere technical objections.15
In the instant case, records show that petitioner was declared the 12th winning
candidate based on SOVPs containing mathematical and clerical errors. The total
number of votes in the SOVPs of the identified precincts are markedly different from the
votes tabulated in their respective ERs, i.e., petitioner was given additional votes, while
private respondents votes were reduced, which altered the outcome of the election.
Petitioner was declared the last winning candidate for the position of Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Tuguegarao City, instead of private respondent.
In Torres v. Commission on Elections,16 the Court reiterated that while the remedy of the
losing party is an election protest after his opponent has already been proclaimed as
winning candidate, such recourse is on the assumption, however, that there has been a
valid proclamation. Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no
proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive
the COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity and annul the proclamation.17
It is significant to note that petitioner did not assail the factual findings of the COMELEC
of manifest error in the tabulation of votes but only raised issues on the foregoing
technicalities. Hence, the COMELECs unrebutted findings of fact are therefore
sustained.
Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. Grave abuse of discretion means such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as would amount to lack of jurisdiction; it
contemplates a situation where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by, or to act
at all in contemplation of law. In a certiorari proceeding, as in the instant case, it is
imperative for petitioner to show caprice and arbitrariness on the part of the court or
agency whose exercise of discretion is being assailed.18
For acting pursuant to its Constitutional mandate of determining the true will of the
electorate with substantiated evidence, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of COMELEC in annulling the proclamation of petitioner. Said proclamation is
flawed from the beginning because it did not reflect the true and legitimate will of the
electorate. Having been based on a faulty tabulation, there can be no valid
proclamation to speak of.19
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The December

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20, 2007 Resolution of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and the October 9, 2008 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 142907. November 29, 2000]
JOSE EMMANUEL L. CARLOS, petitioner, vs. HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, IN
HER CAPACITY AS THE ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT IN CALOOCAN CITY (BRANCH 125) and ANTONIO M. SERAPIO,
respondents.
DECISION

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case before the Court is an original special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order seeking to annul the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 125, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the proclamation of the Protestee, Jose
Emmanuel Carlos, by the Board of Canvassers is accordingly SET ASIDE.
The Court hereby FINDS the Protestant, ANTONIO SERAPIO, as the DULY ELECTED
MAYOR OF VALENZUELA CITY.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts
Petitioner Jose Emmanuel L. Carlos and respondent Antonio M. Serapio were
candidates for the position of mayor of the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila
(later converted into a City) during the May 11, 1998 elections.
On May 21, 1998, the Municipal Board of Canvassers, Valenzuela, Metro Manila
proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela having obtained 102,688
votes, the highest number of votes in the election returns.
On June 1, 1998, respondent Antonio M. Serapio who obtained 77,270 votes, the
second highest number of votes, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, an election protest challenging the results. Due to the inhibition of all judges of
the Regional Trial Court in Valenzuela, the case was ultimately assigned to the
Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 125, presided over by respondent Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles.
On June 26, 1998, petitioner filed with the trial court an answer with affirmative
defenses and motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion to dismiss by order dated
January 14, 1999. Petitioner elevated the order to the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) on petition for certiorari and prohibition, [if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] which, however,
has remained unresolved up to this moment.
In the course of the protest, the municipal treasurer of Valenzuela, who by law has
custody of the ballot boxes, collected the ballot boxes and delivered them to the
Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City. The trial court conducted a pre-trial conference of
the parties but it did not produce a substantial result as the parties merely paid
superficial service and only agreed on the following:
1. Both parties admit their capacity to sue and be sued;
2. Both parties admit that the protestant was a candidate during the May 11, 1998
election;

3. Both parties admit that the protestee has been proclaimed as the elected mayor of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on May 21, 1998;
4. Both parties admit that the protestee allegedly obtained 102,688 votes while the
protestant obtained 77,270 votes per canvass of election returns of the Board of
Canvassers.
The pre-trial was then concluded and the parties agreed to the creation of seven (7)
revision committees consisting of a chairman designa
ted by the court and two members representing the protestant and the protestee.
Meantime, on May 12, 1999, petitioner filed a consolidated motion that included a
prayer for authority to photocopy all the official copies of the revision reports in the
custody of the trial court. However, the trial court denied the issuance of such
authorization.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] The court likewise denied a motion for reconsideration
of the denial.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] Then petitioner raised the denial to the COMELEC on
petition for certiorari and mandamus,[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] which also remains unresolved
until this date.
The Revision Results
The revision of the ballots showed the following results:
(1) Per physical count of the ballots:
(a) protestant Serapio - 76,246 votes.
(b) protestee Carlos - 103,551 votes.
(2) Per revision, the court invalidated 9,697 votes of the protestant but validated 53
stray votes in his favor.
The court invalidated 19,975 votes of the protestee and validated 33 stray votes in his
favor.
The final tally showed:
(a) protestant Serapio - 66,602 votes.
(b) protestee Carlos - 83,609 votes, giving the latter a winning margin of 17,007 votes.
The Trial Courts Ruling
Nevertheless, in its decision, the trial court set aside the final tally of valid votes
because of its finding of significant badges of fraud, namely:
1. The keys turned over by the City Treasurer to the court did not fit into the padlocks of
the ballot boxes that had to be forcibly opened;
2. Seven (7) ballot boxes did not contain any ballot and two (2) ballot boxes out of the
seven (7) ballot boxes did not contain any election returns;
3. Some schools where various precincts were located experienced brownouts during
the counting of votes causing delay in the counting although there was no undue
commotion or violence that occurred;
4. Some of the assigned watchers of protestant were not in their posts during the
counting of votes.

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
On the basis of the foregoing badges of fraud, the trial court declared that there was
enough pattern of fraud in the conduct of the election for mayor in Valenzuela. The
court held that the fraud was attributable to the protestee who had control over the
election paraphernalia and the basic services in the community such as the supply of
electricity.

2. Whether the trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
when the court set aside the proclamation of petitioner and declared respondent
Serapio as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela City despite its finding that petitioner
garnered 83,609 valid votes while respondent obtained 66,602 valid votes, or a winning
margin of 17,007 votes.

On April 24, 2000, the trial court rendered a judgment ruling that the perpetuation of
fraud had undoubtedly suppressed the true will of the electorate of Valenzuela and
substituted it with the will of the protestee. Notwithstanding the plurality of valid votes in
favor of the protestee, the trial court set aside the proclamation of protestee Jose
Emmanuel Carlos by the Municipal Board of Canvassers and declared protestant
Antonio M. Serapio as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela City.

TRO Issued
On May 8, 2000, we issued a temporary restraining order ordering respondent
court to cease and desist from further taking cognizance of Election Protest No. 14-V98 more specifically from taking cognizance of and acting on the Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal filed by respondent Serapio on May 4, 2000.

Hearing news that the protestant had won the election protest, the protestee secured a
copy of the decision from the trial court on May 4, 2000. On the other hand, notice of
the decision was received by the protestant on May 03, 2000.
On May 4, 2000, protestant filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending
appeal. On May 4, 2000, the trial court gave protestee five (5) days within which to
submit his comment or opposition to the motion.
Petitioners Appeal to Comelec
Meantime, on May 04, 2000, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the decision of the
trial court to the Commission on Elections.
The Petition at bar
On May 8, 2000, petitioner filed the present recoursePetitioner raised the following legal
basis:
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to entertain special civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition;
(2) There are important reasons and compelling circumstances which justify petitioners
direct recourse to the Supreme Court;
(3) Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she declared
respondent Serapio as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela despite the fact that she
found that petitioner obtained 17,007 valid votes higher than the valid votes of
respondent Serapio;
(4) The assailed decision is contrary to law, based on speculations and not supported
by the evidence as shown in the decision itself.
The Issues
The issues raised are the following:
1. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review, by petition for certiorari as a
special civil action, the decision of the regional trial court in an election protest case
involving an elective municipal official considering that it has no appellate jurisdiction
over such decision.

Respondents Position
On May 15, 2000, respondent Serapio filed his comment with omnibus motion to
lift the temporary restraining order and to declare petitioner in contempt of court for
violating the rule against forum shopping. He submitted that Comelec and not the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the present petition for certiorari assailing the
decision dated April 24, 2000 of the regional trial court. Assuming that this Court and
Comelec have concurrent jurisdiction and applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
the Comelec has jurisdiction since petitioner has perfected his appeal therewith before
the filing of the instant petition. Certiorari cannot be a substitute for an appeal; the
present petition is violative of Revised Circular No. 28-91 on forum-shopping; issues
raised are factual, not correctible by certiorari; and that the temporary restraining order
should be lifted, the petition dismissed, and petitioner and counsel should be made to
explain why they should not be punished for contempt of court.
The Courts Ruling

We find the petition impressed with merit.

The Supreme Court is vested with original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus against the decision of the regional trial court in the election
protest case before it, regardless of whether it has appellate jurisdiction over such
decision.
Article VIII, Section 5 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
xxx
Rule 65, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides
that:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings
of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
By Constitutional fiat, the Commission on Election (Comelec) has appellate jurisdiction
over election protest cases involving elective municipal officials decided by courts of
general jurisdiction, as provided for in Article IX (C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) x x x.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.
In like manner, the Comelec has original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving election cases in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
This point has been settled in the case of Relampagos vs. Cumba, where we held:
In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the court must, as it now does, abandon the
ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases. We now hold that the last paragraph of
Section 50 of B. P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:
The Commission is vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.
Remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2),
Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply
put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. (Emphasis
ours).
Consequently, both the Supreme Court and Comelec have concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of
general jurisdiction (regional trial courts) in election cases involving elective municipal
officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
the case.
Ergo, this Court has jurisdiction over the present petition of certiorari as a special civil
action expressly conferred on it and provided for in the Constitution.
Relative to the appeal that petitioner filed with the COMELEC, the same would not bar

the present action as an exception to the rule because under the circumstances, appeal
would not be a speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
exception is sparingly allowed in situations where the abuse of discretion is not
only grave and whimsical but also palpable and patent, and the invalidity of the
assailed act is shown on its face.
II. Certiorari lies. The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Its decision is void.
The next question that arises is whether certiorari lies because the trial court committed
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in deciding the
way it did Election Protest Case No. 14-V-98, declaring respondent Serapio as the duly
elected mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
In this jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of candidates to public
office by popular vote[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] through the use of the ballot, and the elected
officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate. [if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] An
election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of
the people.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] Specifically, the term election, in the context of the
Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the
holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes. [if !supportFootnotes][22]
[endif]
The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes
cast in the election.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] Sound policy dictates that public elective offices
are filled by those who receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office. For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a
majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. [if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] In case of
protest, a revision or recount of the ballots cast for the candidates decides the election
protest case. The candidate receiving the highest number or plurality of votes shall be
proclaimed the winner. Even if the candidate receiving the majority votes is ineligible or
disqualified, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes or the second
placer, can not be declared elected.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] The wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as
now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a
plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. [if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] In other words, a defeated candidate
cannot be deemed elected to the office.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif]
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers
should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the
true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. Laws governing election
contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice
of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. In an election case,
the court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means within its command who is
the real candidate elected by the electorate. The Supreme Court frowns upon any
interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and
intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
results.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif]
In this case, based on the revision of ballots, the trial court found that:
First, by canvass of the Municipal Board of Canvassers the results were:
Carlos - 102,668 votes
Serapio - 77,270 votes, or a winning margin of 25,418 votes
Ramon Ignacio - 20 votes.
and consequently, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner Carlos the duly
elected mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Second, by physical count of the ballots, the results were:
Carlos - 103,551 votes
Serapio - 76,246 votes, or a winning margin of 27,305 votes.
Third, by revision of the ballots, the trial court found in a final tally that the valid votes
obtained by the candidates were as follows:
Carlos - 83,609 votes
Serapio - 66,602 votes, or a winning margin of 17,007 votes.
Consequently, the final tally clearly showed petitioner Carlos as the overwhelming
winner in the May 11, 1998 elections.
However, the trial court set aside the final tally of votes because of what the trial court
perceived to be significant badges of fraud attributable to the protestee. These are:
First: The failure of the keys turned over by the City Treasurer to the trial court to fit the
padlocks on the ballot boxes that compelled the court to forcibly open the padlocks. The
trial court concluded that the real keys were lost or the padlocks substituted pointing to
possible tampering of the contents of the ballot boxes.
Procedurally, the keys to the ballot boxes were turned over by the Board of Election
Inspectors from the precinct level to the Municipal Board of Canvassers and finally to
the municipal treasurer for safekeeping. The three-level turn-over of the keys will not
prevent the possibility of these keys being mixed up. This is an ordinary occurrence
during elections. The mere inability of the keys to fit into the padlocks attached to the
ballot boxes does not affect the integrity of the ballots. At any rate, the trial court easily
forced open the padlocks and found valid votes cast therein;
Second: Seven (7) ballot boxes were found empty. Thus, the trial court concluded that
there were missing ballots and missing election returns. This is pure speculation without
factual basis. The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is
without rudder or compass.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] On the other hand, the Summary of Votes
as revised does not show any unaccounted precinct or whether there was any
precinct without any ballot or election returns. It is a standard procedure of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) to provide extra empty ballot boxes for the use of
the Board of Election Inspectors or the Board of Canvassers, in case of necessity.

The empty ballot boxes found could be the empty reserve ballot boxes that were not
used by the Board of Election Inspectors or the Board of Canvassers since there was
neither proof nor even a claim of missing ballots or missing election returns.
Third: Some schoolhouses experienced brownout during the counting of votes. There
was nothing extraordinary that would invite serious doubts or suspicion that fraud was
committed during the brownout that occurred. Indeed, one witness stated that it was the
first time that he observed brownout in Dalandanan Elementary School and another
stated that the brownout was localized in Coloong Elementary School. Since counting
of votes lasted until midnight, the brownouts had caused only slight delay in the
canvassing of votes because the election officials availed themselves of candles,
flashlights and emergency lights. There were no reports of cheating or tampering of the
election returns. In fact, witnesses testified that the counting of votes proceeded
smoothly and no commotion or violence occurred. So, the brownouts had no effect on
the integrity of the canvass.
Fourth: The absence of watchers for candidate Serapio from their posts during the
counting of votes. This cannot be taken against candidate Carlos since it is the
candidates own look-out to protect his interest during the counting of votes and
canvassing of election returns. As long as notices were duly served to the parties, the
counting and canvassing of votes may validly proceed in the absence of watchers.
Otherwise, candidates may easily delay the counting of votes or canvassing of returns
by simply not sending their watchers. There was no incomplete canvass of returns,
contrary to what the trial court declared. The evidence showed complete canvass in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif]
We cannot allow an election protest on such flimsy averments to prosper,
otherwise, the whole election process will deteriorate into an endless stream of crabs
pulling at each other, racing to disembank from the water.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif]
Assuming for the nonce that the trial court was correct in holding that the final tally of
valid votes as per revision report may be set aside because of the significant badges of
fraud, the same would be tantamount to a ruling that there were no valid votes cast at
all for the candidates, and, thus, no winner could be declared in the election protest
case. In short, there was failure of election.
In such case, the proper remedy is an action before the Commission on Elections en
banc to declare a failure of election or to annul the election. [if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] However,
the case below was an election protest case involving an elective municipal position
which, under Section 251 of the Election Code, falls within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the appropriate regional trial court.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
Nonetheless, the annulment of an election on the ground of fraud, irregularities and
violations of election laws may be raised as an incident to an election contest. Such
grounds for annulment of an election may be invoked in an election protest case.

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However, an election must not be nullified and the voters disenfranchised whenever it is
possible to determine a winner on the basis of valid votes cast, and discard the illegally
cast ballots. In this case, the petitioner admittedly received 17,007 valid votes more
than the protestee, and therefore the nullification of the election would not lie. The
power to nullify an election must be exercised with the greatest care with a view not to
disenfranchise the voters, and only under circumstances that clearly call for such
drastic remedial measure.[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif]
As heretofore stated, in this jurisdiction, elections are won on the basis of a majority or
plurality of votes cast and received by the candidates. The right to hold an elective
office is rooted on electoral mandate, not perceived entitlement to the office. [if !
supportFootnotes][36][endif]

More importantly, the trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of election. [if

supportFootnotes][37][endif]

Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that:

Sec. 6. Failure of Election.If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting,
or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns or in the custody of canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect,
and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of
the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested
party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably
close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, RA 7166 provides that:
Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections.-- The postponement,
declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in
Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the
Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members. The causes for the
declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on
the day of the election. (Emphasis supplied).
It is the Commission (Comelec) sitting en banc that is vested with exclusive jurisdiction
to declare a failure of election.[if !supportFootnotes][38][endif]
In a petition to annul an election under Section 6, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, two
conditions must be averred in order to support a sufficient cause of action. These are:
(1) the illegality must affect more than 50% of the votes cast and (2) the good
votes can be distinguished from the bad ones. It is only when these two conditions
are established that the annulment of the election can be justified because the
remaining votes do not constitute a valid constituency.[if !supportFootnotes][39][endif]

We have held that: To declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must occur: first,
no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if
there were voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and, second,
the votes not cast would affect the result of the election. [if !supportFootnotes][40][endif] Neither of
these conditions was present in the case at bar.
More recently, we clarified that, Under the pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus
Election Code, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of elections may be
declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed
by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes.[if !supportFootnotes][41][endif]
Thus, the trial court in its decision actually pronounced a failure of election by
disregarding and setting aside the results of the election. Nonetheless, as herein-above
stated, the trial court erred to the extent of ousting itself of jurisdiction because the
grounds for failure of election were not significant and even non-existent. More
importantly, the commission of fraud can not be attributed to the protestee. There was
no evidence on record that protestee had a hand in any of the irregularities that
protestant averred. It is wrong for the trial court to state that the protestee had control
over the election paraphernalia or over electric services. The Commission on Elections
has control over election paraphernalia, through its officials and deputies.[if !supportFootnotes][42]
[endif]
The Comelec can deputize with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.[if !supportFootnotes][43][endif] On the other hand, electric utility services in Metro
Manila, including Valenzuela are under the control of its franchise holder, particularly
the Manila Electric Company, a public service company, certainly not owned or
controlled by the protestee. In fact, during election period, Comelec has control over
such utilities as electric and even telephone service. [if !supportFootnotes][44][endif] What is
important, however, is that the voters of Valenzuela were able to cast their votes freely
and fairly. And in the election protest case, the trial court was able to recount and
determine the valid votes cast.
Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to declare a failure of election, the extent of
that power is limited to the annulment of the election and the calling of special elections.
[if !supportFootnotes][45][endif]
The result is a failure of election for that particular office. In such
case, the court can not declare a winner.[if !supportFootnotes][46][endif] A permanent vacancy is
thus created. In such eventuality, the duly elected vice-mayor shall succeed as provided
by law.[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif]

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We find that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision proclaiming respondent Serapio the duly
elected mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on the basis of its perception of the voice of
the people of Valenzuela, even without a majority or plurality votes cast in his favor. In
fact, without a single vote in his favor as the trial court discarded all the votes. Thus, the
decision is not supported by the highest number of valid votes cast in his favor. This
violated the right to due process of law of petitioner who was not heard on the issue of
failure of election, an issue that was not raised by the protestant. A decision is void for
lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard. [if
!supportFootnotes][48][endif]
The trial court can not decide the election protest case outside the
issues raised. If it does, as in this case, the trial court is ousted of its jurisdiction.
Likewise, it is a basic principle that a decision with absolutely nothing to support it is
void.[if !supportFootnotes][49][endif] A void decision may be assailed or impugned at any time either
directly or collaterally, by means of a petition filed in the same case or by means of a
separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is
invoked.[if !supportFootnotes][50][endif] Here, the trial court indulged in speculations on its view of
the voice of the people, and decided the case disregarding the evidence, but on its own
intuition, ipse dixit.[if !supportFootnotes][51][endif] How was this voice communicated to the trial
court? Certainly not by competent evidence adduced before the court as it should be,
but by extra-sensory perception. This is invalid in law. Contrary to its own finding that
petitioner obtained 83,600 valid votes against 66,602 valid votes for the respondent as
second placer, or a plurality of 17,007 votes, the trial court declared the second placer
as the winner. This is a blatant abuse of judicial discretion by any account. It is a raw
exercise of judicial function in an arbitrary or despotic manner, amounting to evasion of
the positive duty to act in accord with law.[if !supportFootnotes][52][endif]
In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden is on petitioner to prove not merely
reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent Judge. By grave abuse of discretion is
meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of
discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law.[if !supportFootnotes][53][endif] We must emphasize that election to office
is determined by the highest number of votes obtained by a candidate in the election.

a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice of this decision. The judge shall
report to this Court on the decision rendered within five (5) days from rendition
submitting a copy thereof to the Office of the Clerk of Court en banc.
This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125629. March 25, 1998]
MANUEL C. SUNGA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
FERDINAND B. TRINIDAD, respondents.

The Judgment
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court ANNULS and DECLARES
VOID the decision dated April 24, 2000 of the trial court in Election Protest Case No. V14-98.
The temporary restraining order we issued on May 8, 2000, is made permanent.
Let Election Protest Case No. V-14-98 be remanded to the trial court for decision within

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
seeks to annul and set aside, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the
COMELEC 2nd Division in Sunga v. Trinidad, SPA No. 95-213,[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
dismissing the petition for disqualification against private respondent Ferdinand B.

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
Trinidad pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 promulgated 3 November 1988,
as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 2050-A promulgated 8 August 1990, and 30
July 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 17 May 1996 Resolution
of the COMELEC 2nd Division.
Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor
in the Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the 8 May 1995 elections. Private
respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a candidate for reelection in the same municipality.
On 22 April 1995 Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint [if !supportFootnotes]
for disqualification against Trinidad, accusing him of using three (3) local
government vehicles in his campaign, in violation of Sec. 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP
Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as amended). On 7 May 1995, Sunga filed another
letter-complaint[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] with the COMELEC charging Trinidad this time with
violation of Sec. 261, par. (e) (referring to threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms
of coercion) of the Omnibus Election Code, in addition to the earlier violation imputed to
him in the first letter-complaint. This was followed by an Amended Petition [if !supportFootnotes][4]
[endif]
for disqualification consolidating the charges in the two (2) letters-complaint,
including vote buying, and providing more specific details of the violations committed by
Trinidad. The case was docketed as SPA No. 95-213.
[2][endif]

In a Minute Resolution dated 25 May 1995,[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] the COMELEC 2nd

Division referred the complaint to its Law Department for investigation. Hearings were
held wherein Sunga adduced evidence to prove his accusations. Trinidad, on the other
hand, opted not to submit any evidence at all.
Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest
number of votes, while Sunga trailed second.
On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of
Trinidad. However, notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad was proclaimed the elected
mayor, prompting Sunga to file another motion to suspend the effects of the
proclamation. Both motions were not acted upon by the COMELEC 2nd Division.
On 28 June 1995 the COMELEC Law Department submitted its Report [if !
to the COMELEC En Banc recommending that Trinidad be charged in
court for violation of the following penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code: (a)
Sec. 261, par. (a), on vote buying; (b) Sec. 261, par. (e), on threats, intimidation,
terrorism or other forms of coercion; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (o), on use of any
equipment, vehicle owned by the government or any of its political subdivisions. The
Law Department likewise recommended to recall and revoke the proclamation of
Ferdinand B. Trinidad as the duly elected Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan; proclaim Manuel C.
Sunga as the duly elected Mayor; and, direct Sunga to take his oath and assume the
duties and functions of the office.
supportFootnotes][6][endif]

The COMELEC En Banc approved the findings of the Law Department and
directed the filing of the corresponding informations in the Regional Trial Court against
Trinidad. Accordingly, four (4) informations[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] for various elections
offenses were filed in the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The
disqualification case, on the other hand, was referred to the COMELEC 2nd Division for
hearing.
On 2 May 1996 Sunga filed a Second Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and
Annul the Proclamation with Urgent Motion for Early Resolution of the Petition. But in its
17 May 1996 Resolution, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petition for
disqualification, holding in its Resolution No. 2050 that
1. Any complaint for disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of
the grounds specifically enumerated under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed
directly with the Commission before an election in which respondent is a candidate,
shall be inquired into by the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the
acts complained of have in fact been committed x x x x
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may
motu propio, or on motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law
Department of the Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its
exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal
infractions of the election laws x x x x
2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in
relation to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate
who has already been proclaimed as a winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification
case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law
Department of this Commission.
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the
respondent candidate, the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a
disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary
investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department
makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed
with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the
proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending
and said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is
strong.
As interpreted in the case of Silvestre v. Duavit, SPA 94-003, Resolution No. 2050
provides for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case in three cases: (1) The
disqualification case was filed before the election but remains unresolved until after the
election; (2) The disqualification case was filed after the election and before the
proclamation of winners; and (3) The disqualification case was filed after election and
after proclamation.
If the instant case is deemed to have been filed upon receipt by the COMELEC of the

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
letter-complaint on April 26 1995, it nevertheless remained pending until after the
election. If it is deemed to have been filed upon filing of the amended petition on 11
May 1995, it was clearly filed after the election. In either case, Resolution No. 2050
mandates the dismissal of the disqualification case.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the COMELEC En Banc,
Sunga filed the instant petition contending that the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the petition for disqualification in that: first, Sec. 6 of RA No.
6646 requires the COMELEC to resolve the disqualification case even after the election
and proclamation, and the proclamation and assumption of office by Trinidad did not
deprive the COMELEC of its jurisdiction; second, COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is
null and void as it contravenes Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646; third, the fact that COMELEC
authorized the filing of four (4) informations against private respondent for violation of
the penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code shows more than sufficient and
substantial evidence to disqualify Trinidad, and he should have been so disqualified;
and fourth, since Trinidad was a disqualified candidate, it is as if petitioner was the only
candidate entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.
In his 17-page Comment and Manifestation dated 3 December 1996, the
Solicitor General concurred with petitioners arguments.
Private respondent, on the other hand, postulates inter alia that Sungas letterscomplaint of 22 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 were not petitions for disqualification
because no filing fee was paid by Sunga; the letters-complaint were never docketed by
the COMELEC; and, no summons was ever issued by the COMELEC and private
respondent was not required to answer the letters-complaint. It was only on 13 May
1995 when petitioner filed the so-called Amended Petition, docketed for the first time as
SPA No. 95-213. Thus, the COMELEC correctly dismissed the disqualification case for
having been filed only after the 8 May 1995 elections and the proclamation of private
respondent on 10 May 1995, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2050.
COMELEC filed its Comment on 21 April 1997 relying heavily on Resolution No.
2050 and the Silvestre v. Duavit[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] ruling in support of the dismissal of
the disqualification case. The COMELEC insisted that the outright dismissal of a
disqualification case was warranted under any of the following circumstances: (a) the
disqualification case was filed before the election but was still pending (unresolved)
after the election; (b) the disqualification case was filed after the election but before the
proclamation of the winner; and, (c) the disqualification case was filed after the election
and after the proclamation of the winner.
The issue in this case is whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed the disqualification case against private respondent
Trinidad.
The petition is partly meritorious.

We find private respondents arguments on the propriety of the letters-complaint

puerile. COMELEC itself impliedly recognized in its Resolution that the petition was filed
before the 8 May 1995 election in the form of letters-complaint, thus:
This case originally came to the attention of this Commission on 26 April 1995 in a form
of letter from petitioner accusing respondent of utilizing government properties in his
campaign and praying for the latters immediate disqualification. Another letter dated 7
May 1995 and addressed to the COMELEC Regional Director of Region II reiterated
petitioners prayer while alleging that respondent and his men committed acts of
terrorism and violated the gun ban. Finally, on 11 May 1995, an Amended Petition was
filed with the Clerk of Court of the Commission containing substantially the same
allegations as the previous letters but supported by affidavits and other documentary
evidence.
That the Amended Petition was filed only on 11 May 1995, or after the elections,
is of no consequence. It was merely a reiteration of the charges filed by petitioner
against private respondent on 26 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 or before the elections.
Consequently, the Amended Petition retroacted to such earlier dates. An amendment
which merely supplements and amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates
back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of
limitations which expired after the service of the original complaint.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
The fact that no docket fee was paid therefor was not a fatal procedural lapse on
the part of petitioner. Sec. 18, Rule 42, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides,
If the fees above described are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action
thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or proceeding. The use of the
word may indicates that it is permissive only and operates to confer a discretion on the
COMELEC whether to entertain the petition or not in case of non-payment of legal fees.
That the COMELEC acted on and did not dismiss the petition outright shows that the
non-payment of fees was not considered by it as a legal obstacle to entertaining the
same. Be that as it may, the procedural defects have been cured by the subsequent
payment of docket fees, and private respondent was served with summons, albeit
belatedly, and he submitted his answer to the complaint. Hence, private respondent has
no cause to complain that no docket fee was paid, no summons served upon him, or
that he was not required to answer.
Neither do we agree with the conclusions of the COMELEC. We discern nothing in
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 declaring, ordering or directing the dismissal of a
disqualification case filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the
election. What the Resolution mandates in such a case is for the Commission to refer
the complaint to its Law Department for investigation to determine whether the acts
complained of have in fact been committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified.
The findings of the Law Department then become the basis for disqualifying the erring
candidate. This is totally different from the other two situations contemplated by
Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a disqualification case filed after the election but before the
proclamation of winners and that filed after the election and the proclamation of
winners, wherein it was specifically directed by the same Resolution to be dismissed as

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
a disqualification case.
Moreover, Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v. Duavit infringes on
Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646,[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] which provides:
SEC. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong (underscoring supplied).
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and
hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered
thereon. The word shall signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory,
operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced. [if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] The
implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the
disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal
of the disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre v.
Duavit in effect disallows what RA No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a
quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is
invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings of
quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect harmony with
statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into
effect. By such interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the law
itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for
that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy
between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law
prevails.
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A
candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of
punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply because the
investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine before the
election if the offenses were indeed committed by the candidate sought to be
disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics
so that the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would
not be decided before the election. This scenario is productive of more fraud which
certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the law.
The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of
mayor did not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing
and eventually decide the disqualification case. In Aguam v. COMELEC[if !supportFootnotes][12]
[endif]
this Court held

Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is
with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The
fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the
exercise of such power. It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid
proclamation. Since private respondents petition before the COMELEC is precisely
directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry
into this issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to COMELEC x x
x x Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded from challenging the validity
thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects
may easily supervene.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to
prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for
violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed
elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no
longer be the subject of a separate investigation.
It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well as electoral
aspects. Its criminal aspect involves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the
accused candidate. Like in any other criminal case, it usually entails a full-blown
hearing and the quantum of proof required to secure a conviction is beyond reasonable
doubt. Its electoral aspect, on the other hand, is a determination of whether the offender
should be disqualified from office. This is done through an administrative proceeding
which is summary in character and requires only a clear preponderance of evidence.
Thus, under Sec. 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification
"shall be heard summarily after due notice." It is the electoral aspect that we are more
concerned with, under which an erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior
criminal conviction.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
It is quite puzzling that the COMELEC never acted on Sungas motion to
suspend the proclamation of Trinidad. The last sentence of Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646
categorically declares that the Commission may order the suspension of the
proclamation of a candidate sought to be disqualified whenever the evidence of his guilt
is strong. And there is not a scintilla of doubt that the evidence of Trinidads guilt was
strong as shown in the Report and Recommendation of the COMELEC Law
Department.
Parenthetically, there is merit to petitioners petition against the respondent for
disqualification for the alleged commission of election offenses under Sec. 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, such as use of armed men and act of terrorism, intimidation
and coercion of voters, massive vote-buying and others, duly supported by affidavits of
witnesses and other documents. Consequently, the petitioners evidence supporting the
disqualification of respondent remain unrebutted simply because respondent has
expressly waived his right to present evidence in SPA No. 95-213 in his Manifestation
and objection to the presentation of evidence in SPA No. 95-213 dated 16 June 1995,
thus the waiver is the intentional relinquishing of a known right of respondent
TRINIDAD.

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In fact, on the basis of this Report and Recommendation the COMELEC
directed the filing of four (4) criminal informations against Trinidad before the Regional
Trial Court, an indication that there was indeed prima facie evidence of violation of
election laws.
However, Sungas contention that he is entitled to be proclaimed as the duly
elected Mayor of the Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the event that
Trinidad is disqualified finds no support in law and jurisprudence. The fact that the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later disqualified for the office to
which he was elected does not entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a
disqualified person may not be valid to install the winner into office or maintain him
there. But in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. [if !
supportFootnotes][14][endif]

Sunga totally miscontrued the nature of our democratic electoral process as well
as the sociological and psychological elements behind voters preferences. Election is
the process of complete ascertainment of the expression of the popular will. Its ultimate
purpose is to give effect to the will of the electorate by giving them direct participation in
choosing the men and women who will run their government. Thus, it would be
extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
whom have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.[if !

Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor,
Vice-Mayor. - (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the Governor or Mayor,
the Vice-Governor or Vice-Mayor concerned shall become the Governor or Mayor x x x
x
For purposes of this chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official
fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed
from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge
the functions of his office x x x x
This provision is echoed in Art. 83 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Local Government Code of 1991.
The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal, thus admits no room
for interpretation but merely application. This is the basic legal precept. Accordingly, in
the event that Trinidad is adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy will be
created for failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the said office. In such eventuality,
the duly elected vice-mayor shall succeed as provided by law.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 17 May 1996 and 30 July
1996 Resolutions of the COMELEC are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. COMELEC is
ordered to REINSTATE SPA No. 95-213, "Manuel C. Sunga v. Ferdinand B. Trinidad,
for disqualification, and ACT on the case taking its bearings from the opinion herein
expressed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

supportFootnotes][15][endif]

While Sunga may have garnered the second highest number of votes, the fact
remains that he was not the choice of the people of Iguig, Cagayan. The wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser
because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the
person who has obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving
the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. [if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] In Aquino v.
COMELEC,[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] this Court made the following pronouncement:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just
that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or
plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such
circumstances.
Also, what Sunga wants us to do is to disregard the express mandate of Sec.
44, RA No. 7160,[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] which provides in part -

EN BANC
G.R. No. 106270-73 February 10, 1994
SULTAN MOHAMAD L. MITMUG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LUMBA-BAYABAO, LANAO DEL SUR,
and DATU GAMBAI DAGALANGIT, respondents.
Pimentel, Apostol, Layosa & Sibayan Law Office for petitioner.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro & Arcilla for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The turnout of voters during the 11 May 1992 election in Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del
Sur, was abnormally low. As a result, several petitions were filed seeking the
declaration of failure of election in precincts where less than 25% of the electorate

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
managed to cast their votes. But a special election was ordered in precincts where no
voting actually took place. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that for as
long as the precincts functioned and conducted actual voting during election day, low
voter turnout would not justify a declaration of failure of election. We are now called
upon to review this ruling.
Petitioner SULTAN MOHAMAD L. MITMUG and private respondent DATU GAMBAI
DAGALANGIT were among the candidates for the mayoralty position of LumbaBayabao during the 11 may 1992 election. There were sixty-seven (67) precincts in the
municipality.
As was heretofore stated, voter turnout was rather low, particularly in forty-nine (49)
precincts where the average voter turnout was 22.26%, i.e., only 2,330 out of 9,830
registered voters therein cast their votes. Five (5) of these precincts did not conduct
actual voting at all. 1
Consequently, COMELEC ordered the holding of a special election on 30 May 1992 in
the five (5) precincts which failed to function during election day. On 30 July 1992
another special election was held for a sixth precinct. 2
In the interim, petitioner filed a petition seeking the annulment of the special election
conducted on 30 May 1992 alleging various irregularities such as the alteration,
tampering and substitution of ballots. But on 13 July 1992, COMELEC considered the
petition moot since the votes in the subject precincts were already counted. 3
Other petitions seeking the declaration of failure of election in some or all precincts of
Lumba-Bayabao were also filed with COMELEC by other mayoralty candidates, to wit:
1. SPA No. 92-324: On 6 June 1992, private respondent Datu Gamba Dagalangit filed
an urgent petition praying for the holding of a special election in Precinct No. 22-A
alleging therein that when the ballot box was opened, ballots were already torn to
pieces. On 14 July 1992, the petition was granted and a special election for Precinct
No. 22-A was set for 25 July 1992. 4
2. SPC No. 92-336: On 16 June 19992, Datu Elias Abdusalam, another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to declare failure of election in twenty-nine (29) more
precincts as a result of alleged tampering of ballots 5 and clustering of precincts. 6 On 16
July 1992, the petition was dismissed. COMELEC ruled that there must be a situation
where there is absolute inability to vote before a failure of election can be declared. 7
Since voting was actually conducted in the contested precincts, there was no basis for
the petition.
3. SPA No 92-368: On 20 June 1992, private respondent filed another petition, this time
seeking to exclude from the counting the ballots cast in six (6) precincts on the ground
that the integrity of the ballot boxes therein was violated. 8 Again, on 14 July 1992,
COMELEC considered the petition moot, as the issue raised therein was related to that
of SPA No. 92-311 which on 9 July 1992 was already set aside as moot. 9

4. SPA No. 92-347: On 1 July 1992, Datu Bagato Khalid Lonta, a fourth mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition which in the main sought the declaration of failure of election
in all sixty-seven (67) precincts of
Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur, on the ground of massive disenfranchisement of
voters. 10 On 9 July 1992, COMELEC dismissed the petition, ruling that the allegations
therein did not support a case of failure of election. 11
On 8 July 1992, petitioner filed a motion to intervene in these four (4) petitions. 12 But
COMELEC treated the same as a motion for reconsideration and promptly denied it
considering that under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure such motion was a
prohibited pleading. 13
Thereafter, a new board of Election Inspectors was formed to conduct the special
election set for 25 July 1992. Petitioner impugned the creation of this Board.
Nevertheless, on 30 July 1992, the new Board convened and began the canvassing of
votes. Finally, on 31 July 1992, private respondent was proclaimed the duly elected
Mayor of Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur.
On 3 August 1992, petitioner instituted the instant proceedings seeking the declaration
of failure of election in forty-nine (49) precincts where less than a quarter of the
electorate were able to cast their votes. He also prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin private respondent from assuming office.
On 10 August 1992, petitioner lodged an election protest with the Regional trial Court of
Lanao del Sur disputing the result not only of some but all the precincts of LumbaBayabao, del Sur. 14
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that with the filing of an election protest,
petitioner is already deemed to have abandoned the instant petition.
It may be noted that when petitioner filed his election protest with the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Sur, he informed the trial court of the pendency of these
proceedings. Paragraph 3 of his protest states "[T]hat on August 3, 1992, your
protestant filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R.
No. 106270 assailing the validity of the proclamation of the herein protestee. . . ." 15
Evidently, petitioner did not intend to abandon his recourse with this Court. On the
contrary, he intended to pursue it. Where only an election protest ex abundante ad
cautela is filed, the Court retains jurisdiction to hear the petition seeking to annul an
election. 16
The main issue is whether respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying motu proprio and without due notice and
hearing the petitions seeking to declare a failure of election in some or all of the
precincts in Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur. After all, petitioner argues, he has
meritorious grounds in support thereto, viz., the massive disenfranchisement of voters
due to alleged terrorism and unlawful clustering of precincts, which COMELEC should
have at least heard before rendering its judgment.

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
Incidentally, a petition to annul an election is not a pre-proclamation controversy.
Consequently, the proclamation of a winning candidate together with his subsequent
assumption of office is not an impediment to the prosecution of the case to its logical
conclusion. 17
Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing
of a verified petition to declare a failure to elect, notices to all interested parties
indicating therein the date of hearing should be served through the fastest means
available. 18 The hearing of the case will also be summary in nature. 19
Based on the foregoing, the clear intent of the law is that a petition of this nature must
be acted upon with dispatch only after hearing thereon shall have been conducted.
Since COMELEC denied the other petitions 20 which sought to include forty-three (43)
more precincts in a special election without conducting any hearing, it would appear
then that there indeed might have been grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitions.
However, a closer examination of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, particularly Sec.
2, Rule 26, thereof which was lifted from Sec. 6, B.P. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, indicates otherwise. It reads
Sec. 2. Failure of election. If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud
or other analogous causes the election in any precinct has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting,
or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns or in the custody of canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect,
and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of
the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested
party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably
close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election,
two (2) conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precinct or
precincts on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless
results in failure to elect; and, second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the
election. 21
In the case before us, it is indubitable that the votes not cast will definitely affect the
outcome of the election. But, the first requisite is missing, i.e., that no actual voting took
place, or even if there is, the results thereon will be tantamount to a failure to elect.
Since actual voting and election by the registered voters in the questioned precincts
have taken place, the results thereof cannot be disregarded and excluded. 22
COMELEC therefore did not commit any abuse of discretion, much less grave, in
denying the petitions outright. There was no basis for the petitions since the facts

alleged therein did not constitute sufficient grounds to warrant the relief sought. For, the
language of the law expressly requires the concurrence of these conditions to justify the
calling of a special election. 23
Indeed, the fact that a verified petition is filed does not automatically mean that a
hearing on the case will be held before COMELEC will act on it. The verified petition
must still show on its face that the conditions to declare a failure to elect are present. In
the absence thereof, the petition must be denied outright.
Considering that there is no concurrence of the two (2) conditions in the petitions
seeking to declare failure of election in forty-three (43) more, precincts, there is no more
need to receive evidence on alleged election irregularities.
Instead, the question of whether there have been terrorism and other irregularities is
better ventilated in an election contest. These irregularities may not as a rule be
invoked to declare a failure of election and to disenfranchise the electorate through the
misdeeds of a relative few. 24 Otherwise, elections will never be carried out with the
resultant disenfranchisement of innocent voters as losers will always cry fraud and
terrorism.
There can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been
defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be accorded
respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority
of registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning
candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual number
of ballots cast. 25 Thus, even if less than 25% of the electorate in the questioned
precincts cast their votes, the same must still be respected. There is prima facie
showing that private respondent was elected through a plurality of valid votes of a valid
constituency.
WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion, the Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 154198. January 20, 2003]
PETRONILA S. RULLODA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(COMELEC), ELECTION OFFICER LUDIVICO L. ASUNCION OF SAN JACINTO,
PANGASINAN; BARANGAY BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF BRGY. STO. TOMAS,
SAN JACINTO, PANGASINAN, Board of Election Tellers of Prec. Nos. 30A/30A1,
31A, 31A1, and 32A1, and REMEGIO PLACIDO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido
were the contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto,

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
Pangasinan. On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed away at the
Mandaluyong City Medical Center.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
His widow, petitioner Petronila Betty Rulloda, wrote a letter to the Commission on
Elections on June 25, 2002 seeking permission to run as candidate for Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband. [if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] Petitioners
request was supported by the Appeal-Petition containing several signatures of people
purporting to be members of the electorate of Barangay Sto. Tomas.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
On July 14, 2002, Election Officer Ludivico L. Asuncion issued a directive to the
Chairman and Members of the Barangay Board of Canvassers of Sto. Tomas as
follows:
Just in case the names BETTY or PETRONILA or the surname RULLODA is written on
the ballot, read the same as it is written but add the words NOT COUNTED like BETTY
NOT COUNTED or RULLODA NOT COUNTED.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
Based on the tally of petitioners watchers who were allowed to witness the canvass of
votes during the July 15, 2002 elections, petitioner garnered 516 votes while
respondent Remegio Placido received 290 votes.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] Despite this, the
Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas. [if !
supportFootnotes][6][endif]

After the elections, petitioner learned that the COMELEC, acting on the separate
requests of Andres Perez Manalaysay and Petronila Rulloda to be substituted as
candidates for Barangay Chairman of Barangay La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and
Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan, respectively, issued Resolution No.
5217 dated July 13, 2002 which states:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
ADOPT the recommendation of the Law Department as follows:
1. To deny due course the Certificates of Candidacy of ANDRES PEREZ
MANALAYSAY and PETRONILA S. RULLODA; and
2. To direct the Election Officer of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and San Jacinto, Pangasinan
to delete the name of ANDRES PEREZ MANALAYSAY, candidate for Barangay
Chairman in Barangay La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija; and the name of
PETRONILA S. RULLODA, candidate for Barangay Captain in Barangay Sto. Tomas,
San Jacinto, Pangasinan.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
The above-quoted Resolution cited as authority the COMELECs Resolution No. 4801
dated May 23, 2002, setting forth the guidelines on the filing of certificates of candidacy
in connection with the July 15, 2002 synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan elections, more particularly Section 9 thereof which reads:
Sec. 9. Substitution of candidates. There shall be no substitution of candidates for
barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to annul Section 9 of
Resolution No. 4801 and Resolution No. 5217, both of the COMELEC, insofar as they
prohibited petitioner from running as substitute candidate in lieu of her deceased
husband; to nullify the proclamation of respondent; and to proclaim her as the duly
elected Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.
Private respondent Remegio Placido filed his Comment, arguing that since the

barangay election is non-partisan, substitution of candidates is not allowed. Moreover,

petitioner did not file any certificate of candidacy; hence, there was only one candidate
for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, namely, respondent Placido.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
Public respondent COMELEC also filed its Comment. It contends that its Resolution
No. 4801 was issued not pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but as an incident of its
inherent administrative functions over the conduct of the barangay elections. Therefore,
the same may not be the subject of review in a petition for certiorari. Further, the
COMELEC alleges that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to petitioners certificate of candidacy and in proclaiming respondent considering
that he was the only candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
We find merit in the petition.
At the outset, there is no dispute that petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent
got only 290 votes. Respondents did not deny this in their respective Comments.
In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of candidates to public
office by popular vote through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials which are
determined through the will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the
popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. The winner is the
candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all republican forms of
government the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast
in the election.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Respondents base their argument that the substitution of candidates is not allowed in
barangay elections on Section 77 of the Omnibus Elections Code, which states:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. If
after the last day of the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause,
only a person belonging to, and certified by the same political party may file a certificate
of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The
substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate
of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later
than mid-day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur
between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be
filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a
candidate or, in the case of candidates to be voted by the entire electorate of the
country, with the Commission.
Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay election is non-partisan,
there can be no substitution because there is no political party from which to designate
the substitute. Such an interpretation, aside from being non sequitur, ignores the
purpose of election laws which is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the
voters.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] It is a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable
mandate of the people. It is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so
construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the
ballot.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
Contrary to respondents claim, the absence of a specific provision governing

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
substitution of candidates in barangay elections can not be inferred as a prohibition
against said substitution. Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into the law
where the same is not written. Indeed, there is more reason to allow the substitution of
candidates where no political parties are involved than when political considerations or
party affiliations reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.
Private respondent likewise contends that the votes in petitioners favor can not be
counted because she did not file any certificate of candidacy. In other words, he was
the only candidate for Barangay Chairman. His claim is refuted by the Memorandum of
the COMELEC Law Department as well as the assailed Resolution No. 5217, wherein it
indubitably appears that petitioners letter-request to be allowed to run as Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband was treated as a certificate of
candidacy.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the contested
election. Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to
stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests
must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers must
yield if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate
in the choice of their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the
law that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in
an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Resolution No. 5217 of the Commission on Elections, insofar as it denied due
course to petitioners certificate of candidacy, is declared NULL and VOID. The
proclamation of respondent Remegio L. Placido as Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas,
San Jacinto, Pangasinan is SET ASIDE, and the Board of Canvassers of the said
Barangay is ORDERED to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Barangay Chairman
thereof.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86362-63 October 27, 1989
RAMON D. DUREMDES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF
ILOILO, LAKAS NG BANSA and CIPRIANO B. PENAFLORIDA, respondents.
Panganiban, Benitez, Barinaga & Bautista Law Offices, Lead Counsel for petitioner.
Nery D. Duremdes Co-counsel for petitioner.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro & Arcilla Law Offices for private respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
At stake in this election controversy is the Vice-gubernatorial position of the Province of
Iloilo.
The chronology of the facts and of the case follows:
1. In the 18 January 1988 elections, petitioner Ramon D. DUREMDES, private

respondent Cipriano B. PENAFLORIDA, and Rufino Palabrica ran for the office of ViceGovernor of the Province of Iloilo.
DUREMDES was the official candidate of the Liberal Party (LP) and PDP-Laban
coalition, while PENAFLORIDA was the official candidate of the Lakas ng Bansa
(Lakas).
2. During the canvass of votes by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Iloilo, which
lasted from 20 January to 31 January 1988, PENAFLORIDA objected verbally to some
110 election returns from various precincts, which he followed up with written
objections. The Board overruled the same in separate Orders either because they were
not timely filed or that the formal defects did not affect the genuineness of the returns,
or that in case of allegations of tampering, no evidence was presented to support the
charge. The Board thus ordered the inclusion of the questioned election returns. This
was reflected in a separate column under the heading "Contested/Deferred Votes" in
the "Certificate of Votes of Candidates" (Form No. 13A, Annex "K," Petition, p. 60
Rollo).
3. Under date of 29 January 1988, PENAFLORIDA and the Lakas filed with the
COMELEC an "Appeal by Way of a Petition for Review," from the aforesaid rulings of
the Board pleading, among others, for the exclusion of the questioned election returns
and for PENAFLORIDA's proclamation as the elected Vice-Governor of Iloilo (Annex
"L," Ibid., p. 62, Rollo).
4. On 30 January 1988, PENAFLORIDA filed, also with the COMELEC, a Petition
seeking the annulment of election returns and the suspension of the proclamation of
any candidate, docketed as SPC Case No. 88-448 (Annex "Q," Ibid., p. 96, Rollo).
5. On 31 January 1988, in a "Certification of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the
Winning Candidates for Provincial Offices" (Form No. 26, Annex "N," Ibid., p. 84, Rollo),
the Board proclaimed DUREMDES as the duly elected Vice- Governor, together with
the duly elected Governor and only eight (8) members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Iloilo. Certified to was that DUREMDES had garnered 157,361 votes
(the number of his uncontested votes) in 2,377 precincts.
Apparently, the Board had made the proclamation upon DUREMDES' "Manifestation
and Motion," dated the same day, 31 January 1988, that "the contested returns will not
adversely affect the uncontested results of the election (See Section 245, Omnibus
Election Code) ... because of the absolute certainty that candidate Ramon Duremdes
has obtained the highest number of votes, whether or not the contested votes were
excluded."
6. The tabulated data in the Certificate of Votes of Candidates (Annex "K," Petition) is
reproduced below in so far as the protagonists herein are concerned, with the totals
and/or remainders supplied by us:
Non-Contested

Contest

Deferred
Votes

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
No pronouncement as to costs. (pp. 137-138, Rollo) (Italics ours).
13. On 27 September 1988, PENAFLORIDA moved for reconsideration, whereupon,
the Second Division certified and elevated the case to the COMELEC en banc.
PENAFLORIDA
150,075
+ 4,427 14. On 4 October 1988, PENAFLORIDA filed a Motion to Suspend Implementation of
the Second Division Resolution of 20 September 1988 pending resolution of his Motion
7,286
17,800 for Reconsideration, which suspension was granted by the COMELEC on 5 October
1988.
15. In the meantime, on 10 December 1988, the Board reconvened for the purpose of
6. On 2 February 1988, DUREMDES took his oath and assumed office (Annex "O,"
proclaiming the 9th and 10th placers for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Iloilo. It was
Ibid.).
at the scheduled promulgation of 15 December 1988 that the Chairman of the Board
7. Also on 2 February 1988, an "Intervention with Motion to Dismiss" was filed by
openly admitted the existence of discrepancies between the entries of votes in the
DUREMDES and two other candidates for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, seeking the
Statement of Votes and the votes reflected in the questioned election returns (P. 6,
denial of PENAFLORIDA's Petition for Annulment before the COMELEC, for lack of
COMELEC en banc Decision).
merit.
16. On 12 January 1989, the COMELEC en banc rendered the assailed Per Curiam
8. On 12 February 1988, Perla S. Zulueta (also an Intervenor in SPC Case No. 88-448),
Decision with the following disposition:
filed SPC Case No. 88-653 pleading that she be proclaimed as one of the winning
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
candidates in the 10-member Iloilo Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
rendered:
9. On 8 March 1988, PENAFLORIDA filed an Amended Petition challenging, in addition,
1. Affirming the following parts of the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the Second
the legality of the composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, "a ground just
Division promulgated on 20 September 1988:
known lately," and praying for a recanvassing of the objected election returns.
1. Sustaining and affirming the rulings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Iloilo on
10. On 4 April 1988, the COMELEC granted a Motion for the consolidation of SPC Case
the objections interposed by petitioner on the inclusion in the canvass of the questioned
No. 88-653 with SPC Case No. 88-448.
returns.
11. On 20 June 1988, PENAFLORIDA filed with the COMELEC a Supplemental Petition
2. Directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers to immediately reconvene and to
('in amplification of the Amended petition for verification and correction") charging,
include in the canvass the questioned election returns and thereafter to proclaim the
among others, that DUREMDES was proclaimed "on the basis of increased votes in the
winning candidates for the Ninth (9th) and Tenth (10th) slots for the Sangguniang
unofficial and separately tallied Statement of Votes, more than what was actually
Panlalawigan of the Province of Iloilo; and
reflected in the Election Returns."
3. Directing the Law Department of the Commission to conduct a thorough investigation
12. On 20 September 1988, the COMELEC (Second Division), after hearing, issued a
into the matter of the reported falsification of the transcripts of the stenographic notes of
Per Curiam Resolution, sustaining the rulings of the Board of Canvassers on
Stenographer Nelly Escana to determine the parties responsible therefor and to cause
PENAFLORIDA's objections as well as DUREMDES' proclamation. The decretal portion
the fling of the necessary criminal complaint against those probably guilty thereof as the
of that Resolution reads:
evidence may warrant, and if the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation or
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
any other investigative arm of the Government for that purpose is necessary, to request
1. Sustaining and affirming the rulings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Iloilo on
for such assistance.
the objections interposed by petitioner on the inclusion in the canvass of the questioned
2. Reversing that part of the dispositive portion which reads:
returns;
2. Sustaining the proclamation of the winning candidate for Vice- Governor and setting
2. Sustaining the proclamation of the winning candidate for Vice- Governor;
aside the proclamation of Intervenor Ramon Duremdes as Vice-Governor of Iloilo.
3. Directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers to immediately reconvene and to
3. Declaring as null and void the proclamation of Intervenor Ramon Duremdes;
include in the canvass the questioned election returns; and thereafter to proclaim the
4. Directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Iloilo to immediately reconvene and
winning candidates for the Ninth (9th) and Tenth (10th) slots for the Sangguniang
to include in the canvass of votes for Vice-Governor the questioned/contested returns.
Panlalawigan of the Province of Iloilo; and
For that purpose, the Board shall make a formal tabulation of the results of the
4. Directing the Law Department of the Commission to conduct a thorough investigation
contested returns and shall prepare a new Statement of Votes and Certificate of
into the matter of the reported falsification of the transcripts of the stenographic notes of
Canvass; and
Stenographer Nelly C. Escana to determine the parties responsible therefor and to
5. Directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers to thereafter proclaim the winning
cause the filing of the necessary criminal complaint against those probably guilty
candidate for Vice-Governor of Iloilo (pp. 38-40, Rollo). (Italics ours)
thereof as the evidence may warrant, and if the assistance of the National Bureau of
His proclamation having been nullified by the COMELEC, DUREMDES avails of this
Investigation or any other investigative arm of the Government for that purpose is
recourse.
necessary, to request for such assistance.
DUREMDES

157,361

13,373

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
On 17 January 1989, the Court ordered that the status quo existing prior to the
promulgation of the above COMELEC en banc Decision be maintained until further
orders.
DUREMDES faults the COMELEC with grave abuse of discretion for having
disregarded the well-settled doctrines (1) that matters of protest, objections or issues
not originally raised before the Board of Canvassers upon the opening of the returns,
cannot be raised for the first time before the COMELEC; and (2) that after a
proclamation has been made, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable, the
proper recourse, being an election protest.
It is true that, before the Board of Canvassers, PENAFLORIDA did not raise in issue the
matter of the discrepancies between the number of votes appearing in the Statement of
Votes and that in the Election Returns. As a matter of fact that matter is not even listed
as one of the issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversies under
Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. 1
Nonetheless, as aptly stated in the assailed COMELEC en banc Decision:
Indeed, errors in the Statement of Votes do not indubitably appear to be issues that
may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy under Section 243 of the Omnibus
Election Code. In this respect, the law is silent as to when the same may be raised. We
are, however, not unmindful of the fact that the statement of votes supports the
certificate of canvass and shall be the basis of proclamation (Sec. 231, paragraph 2).
Consequently, any error in the Statement of Votes would affect the proclamation made
on the basis thereof. The true will of the electorate may thus be not fully and faithfully
reflected by the proclamation (at pp. 7-8).
We find no grave abuse of discretion in the foregoing COMELEC pronouncement. The
Statement of Votes is a tabulation per precinct of the votes garnered by the candidates
as reflected in the election returns. Its preparation is an administrative function of the
Board of Canvassers. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, "it is a purely mechanical
act of the Board of Canvassers in the performance of which the Commission has direct
control and supervision," pursuant to Section 227 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Sec. 227. Supervision and control over board of canvassers. The Commission shall
have direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers.
xxx xxx xxx
By virtue of that power, added to its overall function to "decide all questions affecting
elections" (Article IX[C] Section 2[3], 1987 Constitution), a question pertaining to the
proceedings of said Board may be raised directly with the COMELEC as a preproclamation controversy.
Sec. 241. Definition. A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be
raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political
parties before the board or directy with the Commission, or any matter raised under
Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the exploration, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of the election returns (Omnibus Election Code). (Italics
supplied).
When so elevated, the COMELEC acts in the exercise of its original jurisdiction for
which reason it is not indispensable that the issue be raised before the Board of
Canvassers during the canvassing. The COMELEC is not discharging its appellate

jurisdiction under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code, which has to do with
contests regarding the inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of any election returns, with
a prescribed appellate procedure to follow. 2
Cognizance may also be taken of the fact that at the time PENAFLORIDA filed the
Supplemental Petition on 20 June 1988, there was no clear-cut rule on the matter. It
was only in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which took effect on 15 November
1988, wherein it was provided under subparagraph (2), paragraph (a), Section 4 of Rule
27, that the matter of correction of the statement of votes may be the subject of a preproclamation case which may be filed directly with the Commission. Nonetheless, there
should be no question, considering the aforequoted Section 241 in relation to Section
227 of the Omnibus Election Code, that the issue is one that can be raised directly with
the COMELEC. It is a procedure that best recommends itself specially considering that
the Statement of Votes is a vital component in the electoral process. It supports the
Certificate of Canvass and is the basis for proclamation.
SEC. 231. Canvass by the board.
xxx xxx xxx
The respective board of canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass duly signed
and affixed with the imprint of the thumb of the right hand of each member, supported
by a statement of the votes received by each candidate in each polling place and, on
the basis thereof, shall proclaim as elected the candidates who obtained the highest
number of votes cast in the province, city, municipality or barangay. Failure to comply
with this requirement shall constitute an election offense.
xxx xxx xxx
DUREMDES also calls attention to Rule 13, Section 1 (g) of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, which does not allow the filing of supplemental pleadings. As stated
heretofore, however, these Rules took effect only on 15 November 1988, or five months
after the Supplemental Petition was filed. Said rule, therefore, cannot be given
retroactive effect the legal truth being that laws of procedure may be retroactively
applied provided no substantial rights are impaired (Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 30821, December 14,1988).
That discrepancies exist between the entries in the Statement of Votes and that
reflected in the questioned election returns, was openly admitted by the Chairman of
the Board of Canvassers at the scheduled promulgation on 15 December 1988 of the
9th and 10th placers of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (p. 6, COMELEC Decision).
What is more, it is also admitted by the parties except that PENAFLORIDA assails the
correctness of the Statement of Votes, while DUREMDES maintains its correctness but
avers the possibility of the tampering of the questioned election returns (p. 7, Ibid.).
Under the circumstances, therefore, and considering that any error in the Statement of
Votes would affect the proclamation made on the basis thereof, and primordially, in
order to determine the true will of the electorate, the COMELEC Decision ordering the
Board of Canvassers to reconvene and prepare a new Statement of Votes and
Certificate of Canvass should be upheld.
The Commission on Elections has ample power to see to it that elections are held in a
clean and orderly manner and it may decide all questions affecting the elections. It has
original jurisdiction on all matters relating to election returns, including the verification of
the number of votes received by opposing candidates in the election returns as

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
compared to the statement of votes in order to insure that the true will of the people is
known. Such clerical error in the statement of votes can be ordered corrected by the
COMELEC (Villaroya vs. Comelec, L-79646- 47,13 November 1987,155 SCRA 633).
It is DUREMDES' further submission that his proclamation could not be declared null
and void because a pre-proclamation controversy is not proper after a proclamation has
been made, the proper recourse being an election protest. This is on the assumption,
however, that there has been a valid proclamation. Where a proclamation is null and
void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's
assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity
and annul the proclamation (Aguam vs. COMELEC, L- 28955, 28 May 1968, 23 SCRA
883).
DUREMDES' proclamation must be deemed to have been null and void. It was made
on 31 January 1988 after PENAFLORIDA had filed with the COMELEC on 29 January
1988 an "Appeal by Way of a Petition for Review" from the rulings of the Board, and on
30 January 1988, a Petition for the annulment of' election returns and the suspension of
the proclamation of any candidate (SPC Case No. 88-448). The COMELEC had not
resolved either Petition at the time the proclamation was made. Pursuant to Sections
245, supra, and 238 of the Omnibus Election Code, therefore, the Board of Canvassers
should not have proclaimed any candidate without waiting for the authorization by the
COMELEC. Any proclamation thus made is void ab initio.
SEC. 238. Canvass of remaining or unquestioned returns to continue. In cases
under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 hereof, the board of canvassers shall continue
the canvass of the remaining or unquestioned election returns. If, after the canvass of
all the said returns, it should be determined that the returns which have been set aside
will affect the result of the election, no proclamation shall be made except upon orders
of the Commission after due notice and hearing. Any proclamation made in violation
hereof shall be null and void.
In this case, with 110 contested election returns and 25,930 ballots questioned
(COMELEC Resolution, September 20,1988, p. 4, p. 115, Rollo), DUREMDES' margin
of 7,286 non-contested votes could very well be off-set.
Moreover, DUREMDES' proclamation was made on the basis of an official canvass of
the votes cast in 2,377 precincts only (Annex "N," Petition), when there were actually
2,487 precincts. The votes in 110 precincts, therefore, were not included, which is
exactly the number of 110 election returns questioned by PENAFLORIDA. Further,
DUREMDES was certified to have garnered 157,361 votes (ibid.), which number
represents the non-contested votes only, and clearly excludes the totality of the
"contested/deferred votes" of the candidates concerned.
DUREMDES' proclamation having been based on an incomplete canvass, no grave
abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the COMELEC for directing the Provincial Board
of Canvassers of Iloilo "to immediately reconvene and to include in the canvass of votes
for Vice-Governor the questioned/contested returns." All the votes cast in an election
must be considered because to disregard returns is in effect to disenfranchise the
voters (Mutuc vs. COMELEC, L-28517, February 21, 1968, 22 SCRA 662). A canvass
can not be reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless all returns are considered
and none is omitted (Datu Sinsuat vs. Pendatun, L-31501, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA
630).

Over and above all else, the determination of the true will of the electorate should be
the paramount consideration.
Election contests involve public interest. Technicalities and procedural barriers should
not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will
of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials ... Laws governing election
contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice
of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. In an election case
the court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means within its command who is
the real candidate elected by the electorate" (Juliano vs. CA and Sinsuat, 20 SCRA
808, 818-19, July 28,1967).
WHEREFORE, absent any grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Commission on Elections, this Petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The status
quo Order heretofore issued is hereby ordered LIFTED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 134913. January 19, 2001]
ZAIPAL D. BENITO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, IBRAHIM
PAGAYAWAN, and the MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF CALANOGAS,
LANAO DEL SUR, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking the reversal of an en banc Resolution[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] dated
August 10, 1998 by the public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC, for
brevity) which dismissed SPA No. 98-333, a petition to declare a failure of elections and
to call for a special elections in several precincts in the Municipality of Calanogas,
Lanao del Sur.
The facts are:
Petitioner ZAIPAL D. BENITO and private respondent IBRAHIM PAGAYAWAN
were two (2) of eight (8) candidates vying for the position of municipal mayor in
Calanogas, Lanao del Sur during the May 11, 1998 elections. Of the municipalitys
election precincts, five (5) were clustered in Sultan Disimban Elementary School. These
were precincts 15A (Barangay Tagoranao), 6A/6A1 (Barangay Luguna), 17A (Barangay
Tambak), 2A/2A1 (Barangay Calalanoan), and 13A (Barangay Pindulonan). The
election in the first three (3), namely precincts 15A, 6A/6A1 and 17A are the subject of
BENITOs petition to declare failure of elections filed before the respondent COMELEC.
On the day of the election, voting started peacefully at the polling place. Shortly
before noon, however, the proceedings were interrupted when some thirty (30) armed
men appeared at the school premises and fired shots into the air. This sowed panic
among the voters and election officials, causing them to scatter in different directions. A
spot report[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] issued by the commanding officer of the Alfa Company,
28th Infantry Battalion, 4th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army, Captain Benedicto S.
Manquiquis summarized the incident in the following manner:
00a 1113009 May 98, election held at Sultan Disimban Elem school comprising Brgys
Luguna, Calalanoan, Pindolonan, Tagoranao, and Tambak. All of Calanogas Lanao del
Sur was suspended when more or less 30 armed men with cal. 30 LMG under

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
Mayoralty candidate Jabbar Macapodi Maruhom fired shots on the air which cause the
voters and BEIs to scamper in different direction
(signed)
BENEDICTO S. MANQUIQUIS
CAPT (INF) PA
CO, A CO, ISIB, 4ID
Both parties contest alleged events transpiring after the interruption of the
voting. By petitioners account, the ballot boxes and other election materials were taken
to the municipal hall by the military forces providing security. From then on, the voting
allegedly never resumed, even when voters who had not yet cast their ballots returned
to their respective polling places after the lawless elements had left.
In direct opposition, private respondent avers that voting in fact resumed when
the armed men left at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon. There were no further
untoward incidents until voting closed at 3:00 oclock. As proof, private respondent
submitted a Final Incident Report[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] issued by the same Captain
Manquiquis, the full text of which is hereunder reproduced:
HEADQUARTERS
ALFA COMPANY, 28TH INFANTRY BATTALION, 4TH INF DIV, PA
Calanugas, Lanao del Sur
28A- 11 May 1998
SUBJECT: Final Incident Report
TO: Atty. Wynnie Asdala
Head, COMELEC Task Force Team
Marawi City
THRU: Acting Election Officer
Calanugas, Lanao del Sur
1. 00A 111200H May 98, election held at Sultan Disimban Elementary School
comprising Brgys Laguna, Calalanoan, Pindulonan, Tagoranao and Tambak all of
Calanugas, Lanao del Sur was suspended when more or less thirty (30) armed men
equipped with HPFAs including Cal. .30 LMG under Mayoralty Candidate Jabbar
Macapodi Maruhom fired shots on the air which cause the voters and BEIs to scamper
into different directions.
2. That about one (1) hour thereafter, the voting resumed in an orderly and peaceful
manner until about 1500H same day without any trouble or untoward incident. After
1500H when no voter was in the premises of the voting precincts, the casting of votes
was closed by the different BEIs.
(signed)
BENEDICTO S. MANQUIQUIS
Capt (INF) PA
Commanding Officer
These turn of events, notwithstanding, the ballot boxes for the five (5) precincts
in Disimban Elementary School were taken together with those from the nineteen (19)
other precincts of Calanogas, to Marawi City for counting. The votes from precincts
15A, 6A/6A1 and 17A were excluded upon objection by petitioners counsel who, it is
claimed, arrived only after the ballots from the other nineteen (19) precincts had already
been tabulated.

After counting, these results emerged:

CANDIDATE
NO.
OF
VOTES
Ibrahim Pagayawan 927
Zaipal Benito
879
Amoran Macaborod 524
Jabbar Maruhom
(no
data
available)
Private respondent won over petitioner by forty-eight (48) votes.
On the other hand, the total votes cast for the three (3) excluded precincts
numbered forty-one (41) only, which is broken down as follows:
PRECINCT
NO. OF REGISTERED VOTERS
15A
177
6A/6A1
225
17A
188
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
TOTAL 590
Considering that private respondent would still lead petitioner by seven
(7) votes even if all forty-one (41) votes from the three (3) excluded precincts were
counted in the latters favor, private respondent was proclaimed mayor of Calanogas.
On May 25, 1998, petitioner filed an amended petition [if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] to
declare failure of election and to call a special elections in precincts 15A, 6A/6A1 and
17A, docketed as SPA No. 98-333. He also filed a separate petition [if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] for
the annulment of the proclamation of private respondent, docketed as SPC No. 98-159.
On June 10, 1998, the COMELEC issued an Order[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
consolidating SPC No. 98-159 with SPA No. 98-333. On June 29, 1998, it also issued
Resolution No. 3049[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] wherein SPA No. 98-333 and SPA No. 98-159
were included among those cases certified as active even beyond June 30, 1998.
Abbreviating the proceedings, after the parties had filed their respective
answers, replies, memoranda, and other related pleadings, on August 10, 1998, the
COMELEC issued the assailed resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
Precincts 6A/6A1, 15A and 17A functioned on 11 May 1998 elections. The Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Calanogas, Lanao del Sur is hereby ordered to reconvene and
count the remaining uncounted votes for the three precincts aforementioned.
Thereafter, they shall proclaim the three other un-proclaimed municipal councilors and
enter the correct votes garnered by the parties in the Consolidation of Votes and
Proclamation.
Considering that the remaining uncounted votes will no longer affect the lead of
the winning candidate for the position of mayor, the Commission hereby affirms
the proclamation made by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Calanogas,
Lanao del Sur.
Hence, the instant petition.
The following issues are submitted for our resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION (A) IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION OF PETITIONER DOCKETED AS SPA NO. 98-333
(INCLUDING SPC 98-159 WHICH WAS CONSOLIDATED TO SPA 98-333 BY ORDER
OF THE COMELEC ON JUNE 10, 1998) FOR LACK OF MERIT AND (B) IN
DECLARING THAT THE ELECTIONS IN PRECINCTS 6A & 6A1, 15A AND 17A HAVE
CONTINUED AN HOUR AFTER THEY WERE SUSPENDED ON THE BASIS OF THE
ALLEGED FINAL REPORT OF CAPTAIN MANQUIQUIS;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT
HOLDING A SPECIAL ELECTION IN PRECINCT NOS. 15A, 6A & 6A1 AND 17A ON
GROUND OF FAILURE OF ELECTION OR OF A SUSPENDED ELECTION BEFORE
THE CLOSING OF THE VOTING AT 3:00 OCLOCK IN THE AFTERNOON OF THE
MAY 11, 1998 ELECTION DAY ON GROUND OF THREATS, VIOLENCE AND
TERRORISM; AND
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT
ANNULLING THE CERTIFICATE OF PROCLAMATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
DATED MAY 15, 1998.
It is the COMELEC en banc which has the exclusive power to postpone, to
declare a failure of election, or to call a special election.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] In relation
thereto, Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] provides:
SEC. 6. Failure of Election.If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting,
or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect,
and in any such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party
and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the
date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not
later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Elucidating on the aforesaid provision, we held in Hassan v. Commission on
Elections[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] that two (2) pre-conditions must exist before a failure of
election may be declared, thus: (1) no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts
due to force majeure, violence or terrorism; and (2) the votes not cast therein are
sufficient to affect the results of the election. The cause of such failure may arise before
or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Coming to the merits of the petition, we are not sufficiently persuaded that the
public respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying BENITOs petition
to declare a failure of election in precincts 15A, 6A/6A1 and 17A of Calanogas. Grave
abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to

perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] It is

not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused its discretion; such
abuse must be grave.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
It is obvious at the outset that petitioner raises issues foreign to the remedy he
seeks. He avers that a failure of elections must be declared in the precincts in question
since the voting therein was interrupted by the sudden and threatening arrival of armed
goons of a rival candidate. He unequivocally states that there was never any
resumption of voting since the ballot boxes and other election materials were taken into
custody by the military and brought to the municipal hall. In contrast, it is private
respondents contention that, in truth, voting resumed peacefully at about one oclock in
the afternoon on election day or after the departure of the armed men. It is clear to us
that whether there was a resumption of voting is essentially a question of fact. Such are
not proper subjects of inquiry in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
In the same vein, neither may petitioner ask us to judge which of the two (2)
incident reports issued by Captain Manquiquis should be given more credence. In this
connection, it will not be amiss to point out that the purported inconsistency between
the two reports appear to be more imaginary than real. Petitioner characterizes the final
incident report as a product of falsification on the ground that its alleged time and date
of execution was at OOA 111200H May 98 whereas the handwritten spot report was
prepared at OOa 111300H May 98. How then, petitioner bewails, could such a final
report have been issued ahead of the initial report? We disagree with petitioner; we
have read the final incident report and conclude that the time stated therein referred not
to the time of execution of the said report but to the time of the occurrence of the
incident. We note that this is an approximation of the time when the armed strangers
appeared and disrupted the theretofore peaceful conduct of the elections.
Similarly, nor would it be proper for us to pass upon the authenticity of the
contradictory affidavits supposedly executed by the members of the board of election
inspectors of the affected precincts. Both parties seek to introduce into evidence
affidavits ostensibly executed by the same persons yet whose recitations are
contradictory to each other. As regards the incident reports, evaluation of evidentiary
matters is beyond the province of a writ of certiorari.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] In any event, we
find that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to give credit to
either partys version. Naturally, petitioner and private respondent attest to the
authenticity of the affidavits favorable to them. To illustrate, petitioner insists that the
genuineness of the affidavits attached to the amended petition he filed before the
COMELEC is allegedly confirmed by the second set of affidavits[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] in
turn repudiating those relied upon by private respondent in his answer.[if !supportFootnotes][17]
[endif]
Just as the COMELEC was reluctant to treat petitioners claim as gospel truth, so
too do we hesitate to accord weight to this rigmarole of sworn statements. As aptly held
by the COMELEC,
In his reply, petitioner vehemently denied the allegation of respondent that the voting in
the three precincts continued. He again presented the affidavits of the members of the
different BEIs saying that they did not execute the affidavits presented by respondent
Pagayawan and that their signatures therein were forged. On its face, however, the
signatures appear to have been made by the same persons. This notwithstanding, WE
shall not base our resolution of this case on the affidavits submitted by the members of

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
the different BEIs for the reason that they are contradictory to each other but rather on
the merits of the pleadings and other evidences presented.
In dismissing BENITO's petition for lack of merit, the COMELEC further ruled
thus:
It is noteworthy to mention that of all the five precincts whose elections were held in
Disimban Elementary School, petitioner Benito claimed only three precincts failed to
function therein. In fact he reiterated this in his reply though averring that he has no
objection to Macaborods prayer that failure of election be likewise declared in precinct
nos. 2A/2A1 and 13A and that special election be also held therein. Records of the
case per pleadings of the parties show that results of the elections in nineteen (19)
precincts out of the twenty two (22) precincts were already counted. Verification on the
project of precincts also showed that there were actually five precincts whose polling
places were in Disimban Elementary School. Per report of the Acting Election Officer of
Calanogas, it was only the counting of votes in precincts 6A/6A1, 15A, and 17A which
was actually objected to by the counsels of petitioner. The strong objections to the
counting of the three precincts prompted by Atty. Wynne Asdala (COMELEC TASK
FORCE) and Col. Atienza (PA) to suspend the counting of votes for the municipality of
Calanogas.
The Commission gives more weight to the report made by Captain Manquiquis whose
final report to the Commission says that the voting resumed an hour after the firing
occured which disrupted the voting in all the five precincts clustered in Disimban
Elementary School. His final report dated 11 May 1998 confirms that no failure of
elections in the five precincts occured. This is buttressed by the fact that counsels of
petitioner and all other parties and candidates during the counting did not question the
counting of votes for precincts 2A/2A1 and 13A whose polling place were also in the
same school. This fact gives us the impression that indeed voting in all the five
precincts resumed after peace and order was re-established in Disimban Elem. School.
There was no objection raised to the count of votes in the said two precincts during the
counting of votes at the counting center. So why a selective objection to the three
precincts herein? Even candidate Macaborod did not object to the count of the other
two precincts namely 2A/2A1 and 13A. If votes for precincts 2A/2A1 and 13A were
counted, the same must also be done for precincts 6A/6A1, 15A, and 17A
notwithstanding the fact that only very few voters cast their votes. The disruption of
voting in all these precincts was caused by the same act: firing guns to intimidate all the
voters therein to stop them from casting their votes. If voters in these precincts really
wanted to vote ,they could have done so after the cessation of the terroristic acts. In
precinct 15A, at 11:45 A.M., only one vote was cast therein. Lack of interest may have
been the problem herein that the cause alluded to by petitioner.
After a careful consideration of the parties submissions, we find that the
COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying BENITOs petition to declare
a failure to election and to call a special election. It is indeed odd that petitioner singles
out only precincts 15A, 6A/6A1 and 17A as the subjects of his petition when there were
two (2) other precincts in the same school.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] It was only in his reply
with memorandum[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] did he signify his lack of objection to a declaration
of failure of election in precincts 2A/2A1 and 13A, as prayed for by candidate Amoran
Macaborods answer with counter-petition.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] Likewise, he never

objected to the inclusion of the two (2) other precincts during the canvassing and
counting of votes.
Petitioner attempts to overcome the oversight by alleging that he had no
opportunity to object thereto because his counsel, Atty. Hussein N. Mambuay, was not
present, allegedly because the latter did not possess the prescribed identification for
lawyers. In this regard, we have reviewed the record and we concur with private
respondent that this claim of petitioner appears to be a mere afterthought. Petitioner
never raised this particular issue in his earlier pleadings filed with the COMELEC. Be
that as it may, his counsel should have exercised more prudence in securing
beforehand his proper identification papers.
In a sense, petitioner equates failure of elections to the low percentage of votes
cast vis--vis the number of registered voters in the subject election precincts. However,
[t]here can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been
defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be accorded
respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority
of registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning
candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual number
of ballots cast. Thus, even if less than 25% of the electorate in the questioned precincts
cast their votes, the same must still be respected. xxxx[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
As we also explained in Sardea v. Commission on Elections,[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
The power to throw out or annul an election should be exercised with the utmost care
and only under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt either that the
disregard of the law had been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is
impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any
certain result whatsoever, or that the great body of voters have been prevented by
violence, intimidation and threats from exercising their franchise [citations omitted]
xxx xxx xxx xxx
There is failure of elections only when the will of the electorate has been muted and
cannot be ascertained. If the will of the people is determinable, the same must as far as
possible be respected.
A final observation: petitioner should not ask us to declare a failure of elections
in the questioned precincts simply because public respondent COMELEC declared a
failure in other precincts in Lanao del Sur. In the recently decided case of
Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections,[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] we unanimously[if !
supportFootnotes][24][endif]
upheld the very same Omnibus Order[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] dated July 14,
1998 relied upon by petitioner, on these premises:
Petitioners argument that respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion by failing
to declare a total failure of elections in the entire province of Lanao del Sur and to
certify the same to the President and Congress so that the necessary legislation may
be enacted for the holding of a special election, likewise fails to persuade.
No less than the petitioner himself concedes that there was total failure of elections in
twelve (12) municipalities and partial failure in eleven (11). Yet he now insists a total
failure of elections should have been declared in the entire province of Lanao del Sur.
Suffice it to state that the propriety of declaring whether or not there has been a total
failure of elections in the entire province of Lanao del Sur is a factual issue which this
Court will not delve into considering that the COMELEC, through its deputized officials

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
in the field, is in the best position to assess the actual conditions prevailing in that area.
Absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, the findings of fact of the COMELEC
or any administrative agency exercising particular expertise in its field of endeavor, are
binding on the Court. There is no cogent reason to depart from the general rule in this
case.
Hence, in view of all the foregoing, we find no reason to disturb the Resolution of
COMELEC under review.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139357. May 5, 2000]
ABDULMADID P.B. MARUHOM, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
HADJI JAMIL DIMAPORO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
Whether or not a motion to dismiss, filed after an answer has been filed, is a prohibited
pleading in an election protest pending before the Regional Trial Court is the issue
posed in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction challenging the
Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated July 6, 1999[if !supportFootnotes]
[1][endif]
dismissing Comelec Case SPR No. 52-98.
The COMELECs challenged order summarizes the relevant facts of the controversy
thus:
1. Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for Mayor in the Municipality
of Marogong, Lanao del Sur and voted as such in the last May
11, 1998 national and local election (sic). Petitioner is a reelectionist and a veteran politician;
2. The election in Marogong functioned on May 11, 1998, and after the voting the ballot
boxes were transmitted to the Kalimodan Hall, Provincial
Capitol of Lanao del Sur at Marawi City where the automated
counting of votes and canvass of election returns were
centralized;
3. During the counting of votes, serious irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds
were committed at the instance of petitioner or his followers in
that votes actually casted (sic) for the private respondent were
not counted and credited in his favor thru (sic) the concerted
acts, conspiracy and manipulation of the Board of Election
Inspectors, military, Election Officer and the Machine Operator
who happens to be a nephew of the petitioner;
4. In Precincts Nos. 1A-1A1, 7A1, 8A, 10A-10A1 and 11A about 115 official ballots were
refused or rejected by the counting machine which the private
respondents watchers or representatives have requested and
insisted to be re-fed to the automated machine for the second
and third times pursuant to the provisions of Comelec
Resolution No. 3030 but their requests were not heeded by the
Election Officer and the Machine Operator, Solaiman Rasad,

who is a close kin of the Petitioner, and instead considered the

said ballots as finally rejected, while in Precincts Nos. 12A,
23A1 and 6A, around 56 ballots were found therein which were
not drawn from the official ballots and were included in the
counting of votes over the objection of the private respondents
watchers or representatives;
5. Before the termination of the counting of votes and the consolidation of the results,
the machine operator and the Election Officer carried away
from the Kalimodan Hall the diskette and brought the same to
the down town without the knowledge of the private
respondents watchers or representatives;
6. As a result of the foregoing irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the
petitioner was illegally proclaimed as winner because he
appeared to have obtained 2,020 votes while the private
respondent garnered 2,000 votes with a slight margin of only
20 votes;
7. After the counting of votes, the ballot boxes were kept at the Kalimodan Hall,
Provincial Capitol, Marawi City guarded and secured by military
and PNP personnel together with the watchers/representatives
of the petitioner and the private respondent and other
candidates or political parties until they were transported and
delivered to the respondent court at Malabang, Lanao del Sur
sometime on August 13, 1998 by 1Lt. Napisa AG together with
the duly authorized representatives of both parties.
xxx xxx xxx
1. On May 22, 1998, private respondent, knowing that he was cheated and the true
winner for Mayor, filed before this Honorable Commission a
petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner Abdulmadid
Maruhom as the duly elected Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del
Sur docketed as SPC No. 98-226.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
2. As precautionary measure to avoid any technicality, private respondent filed on May
25, 1998, an ordinary "Protest ad Cautelam" against the
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Malabang, Lanao del Sur entitled "Hadji Jamil D. Dimaporo vs.
Abdulmadid Maruhom" for election protest (Manual Judicial
Recount, revision and reappreciation of ballots) docketed as
Election Case No. 11-127.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
3. On June 1, 1998, petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom filed an answer with counterprotest in Election Case No. 11-127 special and affirmative
defenses and counter-protest.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] In his answer
petitioner prayed to hold in abeyance further proceedings since
the protest is ad cautelam or subject to the petition filed before
this Honorable Commission.
4. On July 2, 1998, before SPC No. 98-228 could be set for hearing by this Honorable
Commission, the private respondent as petitioner therein, filed
a motion to withdraw his petition in said SPC No. 98-228 albeit

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said case was among those cases the proceedings of which
were ordered to be continued beyond June 30, 1998, under
Comelec Resolution No. 3049 promulgated on June 29, 1998.
[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
xxx
5. On July 17, 1998, an order was issued by this Honorable Commission, (First
Division) granting the private respondents motion to withdraw
petition in SPC No. 98-228 and considered the same
withdrawn.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] xxx.
6. Upon receipt of a copy of said order, dated July 17, 1998, private respondent filed an
urgent motion before the respondent court on July 27, 1998,
praying for the issuance of an order directing the proper
officials/officers concerned to bring and produce before said
court the ballot boxes subjects of the protest and counterprotest and to set the case for hearing as mandated by law.[if !
supportFootnotes][7][endif]
xxx
7. After the delivery of the ballot boxes involved in the protest and counter-protest, the
public respondent issued an order, dated August 17, 1998,
setting Election Case No. 11-127 for hearing (a) for the creation
of the Committee on Revision and appointment of the
Chairman and Members thereof; (b) making of the cash deposit
and payment of the revisors compensation; (c) partial
determination of the case, etc. on September 1, 1998, at 8:30
oclock in the morning.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
8. When the case was called for hearing on September 2, 1998, a Revision Committee
was created and its membership were duly appointed in open
court which committee was directed by the respondent court to
finish the revision of ballots, if possible, within 20 days from the
commencement of the revision[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] xxx
9. After the Revision Committee was directed by the respondent to commence the
revision of ballots, the petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom thru
counsel orally moved for the dismissal of the protest on the
grounds that (1) The ballot boxes containing the ballots in the
protested and counter-protested precincts have been violated;
(2) Automated counting of ballots does not contemplate a
manual recount of the ballots; and (3) Protestant is guilty of
forum shopping warranting summary dismissal of the petitioner
of the protest.
10. The private respondent thru (sic) undersigned counsel, vigorously opposed the said
oral motion to dismiss and orally argued that the motion is
clearly dilatory having been made only after the Revision
Committee has been ordered to commence the revision of
ballots on September 1, 1998 and maintained that (1) The
motion to dismiss is not allowed in an election protest; (2) The
sanctity and integrity of the ballot boxes subject matter of the
protest and counter-protest have been preserved and never
violated; (3) The automated counting of ballots does not

preclude the filing of the election protest for the judicial recount
and revision of ballots; and (4) The private respondent is not
guilty of forum shopping because his petition of protest is
clearly and explicitly a Protest Ad Cautelam in view of the
pendency of his petition before this Honorable Commission
which was withdrawn by the private respondent before it could
be set for hearing or acted upon by this Honorable
Commission.
11. After the oral arguments of both parties, the petitioners counsel asked that he be
given ample time to file a written Omnibus Motion to Dismiss
and the respondent court thru then Acting Presiding Judge
Rasad Balindong, issued an order dated September 2, 1998,
giving ten (10) days to Atty. Tingcap T. Mortaba to file an
Omnibus Motion in substantiation of all the oral motions he
made, furnishing a copy thereof to the undersigned counsel for
the private respondent who was likewise given an equal period
of time to comment.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
12. On September 11, 1998, petitioner filed his motion to dismiss [if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] and
on September 21, 1998, the private respondent filed a vigorous
opposition to motion to dismiss.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
13. During the hearing on the motion to dismiss and the opposition thereto on
September 21, 1998, the petitioners counsel requested for
ample time to file a rejoinder to the vigorous opposition to
motion to dismiss submitted by the private respondent which
was granted by the court and on September 28, 1998,
petitioner filed his rejoinder[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] and on October
5, 1998 private respondent filed his comment [if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
thereto and thereafter all incidents were submitted for
resolution of the court.
14. On November 10, 1998, the respondent court thru Honorable Presiding Judge
Moslemen T. Macarambon, issued the assailed order denying
the petitioners motion to dismiss for lack of merit and ordering
the Revision Committee to report to the court on November 19,
1998, at 8:30 oclock in the morning for their oath taking and to
receive the instruction of the court in the revision of the ballots
and other allied matters.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
15. On November 18, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
dated November 10, 1998,[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] and on November
23, 1998, private respondent filed a vigorous opposition [to
motion] for reconsideration.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
16. Finding no compelling reason to disturb its order dated November 10, 1998, the
respondent court issued the assailed order dated December 1,
1998 which denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit. In the same order, the respondent court reiterated its
previous order to the members of the Revision Committee to
take their oaths before Atty. Raqueza T. Umbaro or Atty. Khalil

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
Laguindab and thereafter to convene and start the revision of
ballots on December 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1998, morning and
afternoon.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
17. As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay of the proceedings of the case more
specifically the revision of ballots, the petitioner filed on
December 10, 1998, the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and on
December 11, 1998, petitioner filed an urgent motion before the
respondent court praying that further proceedings in Election
Case No. 11-127 be deferred until after protestees petition for
certiorari and prohibition before this Honorable Commission
shall have been finally resolved, copy of which was served
upon the undersigned counsel only on December 12, 1998, at
10:50 A.M.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] xxx
18. That before the undersigned counsel could file his opposition to said urgent motion
on December 14, 1998 and in the absence of a restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction issued by (the
COMELEC), the respondent judge already issued an order
granting the same motion and ordering the Revision Committee
to hold in abeyance the scheduled revision of ballots on
December 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1998, etc. until further order
from the court xxx.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]
Petitioner alleges that in dismissing the petition the COMELEC acted in excess of, or
with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
1.] holding that a motion to dismiss an election protest case filed in the Regional Trial
Court is a prohibited pleading;
2.] holding that the motion to dismiss filed after the answer is not allowed;
3.] failing to resolve the issues raised in SPR No. 52-98 which are sufficient legal bases
to dismiss Election Case No. 11-127.
In sum, petitioner insists that in refusing to pass upon the three (3) principal issues
raised in COMELEC Case SPR No. 52-98, to wit:
1. Whether or not public respondent acted in excess of, or with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that a
motion to dismiss an election protest case in the Regional Trial
Court is a prohibited pleading;
2. Whether or not public respondent acted in excess of, or with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in holding that a
motion to dismiss filed after the answer to an election protest
case in the Regional Trial court is not allowed; and
3. Whether or not public respondent gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in failing to resolve the relevant material and
substantial issues raised in SPR No. 52-98.
the COMELEC "abdicated its duty under its own rules of procedure and under the
Constitution and the election laws." Such abdication of duty, according to petitioner,
amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It must be borne in mind that the purpose of governing statutes on the conduct of

elections
[i]s to protect the integrity of elections to suppress all evils that may violate its purity and
defeat the will of the voters. The purity of the elections is one of
the most fundamental requisites of popular government. The
Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate must do
everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of
the votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties,
the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in
adopting means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created
to promote free, orderly and honest elections. The choice of
means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are
clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not
be interfered with.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
Section 2 (1) of Article IX of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." There can hardly be any doubt that the text
and intent of this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and
incidental powers for it to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.
In accordance with this intent, the Court has been liberal in defining the parameters of
the COMELECs powers in conducting elections. Sumulong v. COMELEC[if !supportFootnotes][22]
[endif]
aptly points out that
Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically not
from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on
Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with
political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual
experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a
peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political
questions xxx. There are no ready made formulas for solving
public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve
patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the
matter of the administration of laws relative to the conduct of
election xxx we must not by any excessive zeal take away from
the Commission on Elections that initiative which by
constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it.
Succinctly stated, laws and statutes governing election contests especially the
appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. [if !
supportFootnotes][23][endif]
An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the
need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative, [if !
supportFootnotes][24][endif]
much more so in this case considering that a mere twenty (20) votes
separates the winner from the loser of the contested election results.
The primordial issue to be resolved herein is whether or not the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing SPR No. 52-98.
In support of his cause, petitioner insists that there is "nothing irregular or anomalous in

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
the filing of the motion to dismiss" after the filing of the answer because in effect he is
merely insisting on a preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative defenses. Thus,
he claims that the summary dismissal of his motion to dismiss is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
We disagree.
The filing of the motion to dismiss, in fact, appears to be part of a perfidious plot to
prevent the early termination of the proceedings in Election Case No. 4847 as
evidenced by a confluence of events clearly showing a pattern of delay employed by
petitioner to avert the revision ballots. These events, pointed out by private respondent [if
!supportFootnotes][25][endif]
and borne by the record, show that
1. It was only on September 1, 1999 after the creation of the Revision Committee and
the appointment of its Chairman and Members and after the
said committee was ordered by the trial court to commence the
revision and to render its report within 20 days that the
petitioner orally moved for the dismissal of the case on the
flimsy grounds that (1) the ballot boxes subject of the protest
and counter protest have been violated; (2) the automated
counting of ballots does not contemplate a manual recount of
ballots; and (3) protestant is guilty of forum-shopping
warranting summary dismissal of the protest;
2. After the oral arguments on the oral motion to dismiss the petitioner requested for
ample time within which to file an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss
and over the vigorous opposition of the private respondent the
same was granted by the court and the petitioner was given a
period of ten (10) days to file the same and the private
respondent was likewise given a period of ten (10) days to file
his comment;
3. On September 11, 1998, the motion to dismiss[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] and during the
hearing on the said motion and the opposition [if !supportFootnotes][27]
[endif]
thereto on September 21, 1998, the petitioner again asked
for ample time to file a rejoinder to the vigorous opposition to
motion to dismiss which was again granted by the court and it
was only on September 28, 1998 that said rejoinder was filed;
4. After a denial of the motion to dismiss on November 10, 1998, [if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] the
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on November 18,
1998;[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif]
5. When the motion for reconsideration was denied on December 1, 1998,[if !supportFootnotes]
[30][endif]
petitioner filed on December 18, 1998 before the
Commission on Elections a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for preliminary injunction and asked the trial court to
defer the proceedings of Election Case No. 11-27 until after his
petition shall have been finally resolved which was granted by
the trial court. Hence, the scheduled revision of the ballots on
December 14, 15, 16 and 17, 1998 was cancelled and the
proceedings of the case held in abeyance;[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif]
6. As the Comelec En Banc did not give due course to petitioners prayer for writ of

preliminary injunction, the trial court, upon motion of the private

respondent, issued an order for the revision of ballots on
February 8, 1999.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] On said day, neither the
petitioners counsel nor his designated revisors appeared,
instead the petitioner, assisted by his numerous armed men,
numbering around 30 stated (sic) in strategic places, prevented
the court personnel to enter the court premises. Were it not for
the maximum tolerance exercised by the PNP personnel and
the intervention of the local datus/leaders, there would have
been bloodshed;
7. On February 9, 1999, the petitioners counsel filed a withdrawal of appearance with
the attached letter-request of the petitioner asking for the
deferment of the revision of ballots for at least two (2) weeks to
enable him to engage the services of another counsel.
Considering that the incident was designed to delay the further
the early disposition of the case which would frustrate the ends
of justice, the court held in abeyance its ruling on the
withdrawal of appearance of and directed petitioners counsel to
handle the case after the appearance of a new counsel;[if !
supportFootnotes][33][endif]

8. To further delay the proceedings of the case, the petitioner filed a petition for transfer
of venue of the trial to from RTC, Branch 11, Malabang, Lanao
del Sur to Iligan City or in Metro Manila which the private
respondent did not oppose so as not to delay the early
resolution of this Honorable Supreme Court on the said
petition;
9. Again, the proceedings of the case was held in abeyance in view of the pendency of
the said petition for transfer of venue;
10. After the dismissal of the petition in Election Case No. 52-98, the petitioner filed the
instant petition for certiorari before this Honorable Supreme
Court with a prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order;
11. As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay of the proceedings of the case, the
petitioner filed an urgent motion before this Honorable
Supreme Court praying for the immediate issuance of a TRO
directing the Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch III, Iligan City to
cease, desist and refrain from conducting any further
proceedings of Election Case No. 4847 until the instant case
shall have been resolved. This Honorable Supreme Court,
without granting the prayer for TRO, directed the RTC, Branch
III, Iligan City not to promulgate any decision in the said
election case until further order[s] from this most Honorable
Court.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
It is clear, given the foregoing facts of this case, that the roundabout manner within
which petitioner virtually substituted his answer by belatedly filing a motion to dismiss
three (3) months later is a frivolous resort to procedure calculated to frustrate the will of
the electorate. As pointedly observed by the COMELEC in its challenged Resolution

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
dated July 6, 1999,[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] petitioner only filed his motion to dismiss "when
the results of the trial appear[ed] to be adverse to him"[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif] or right after
the creation of the Revision Committee had been ordered by the trial court. If petitioner
truly intended to move for the preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative
defenses as he claims, then he should have simultaneously moved for the preliminary
hearing of his special and affirmative defenses at the time he filed his answer.
Otherwise, he should have filed his motion to dismiss "within the time for but before
filing the answer" pursuant to Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Suffice it to state in this regard that such a whimsical change of mind by petitioner can
not be countenanced much more so in election cases where time is of the essence in
the resolution thereof. Indeed, the Omnibus Election Code states in no uncertain terms
that
SEC. 258. Preferential disposition of contests in courts. The RTC, in their respective
cases, shall give preference to election contests over all
other cases, except those of habeas corpus, and shall, without
delay, hear and within thirty (30) days from the date of their
submission for decision, but in every case within six (6) months
after filing, decide the same. xxx[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif] (emphasis
and italics supplied)
Petitioner further argues that his submissions that a.] the integrity of the ballot boxes
has been violated; b.] only rejected ballots or ballots manually counted are the proper
subjects of an election protest; and c.] private respondent is guilty of forum-shopping,
are enough grounds to dismiss the case.
We remain unconvinced.
As aptly observed by the COMELEC in the challenged Resolution, these grounds are
"evidentiary in nature and can be best ventilated during the trial of the case." [if !
supportFootnotes][38][endif]
It needs be stressed in this regard that the purpose of an election
protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of
canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate.[if !supportFootnotes][39][endif] In an election
contest where the correctness of the number of votes is involved, the best and most
conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves; where the ballots can not be produced
or are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence. [if !supportFootnotes][40][endif]
In this case, the counted official ballots are available and there is no evidence, other
than the bare allegation of petitioner, that the sanctity of the ballot boxes subject matter
of the protest have been violated or the official ballots contained therein impaired. The
best way, therefore, to test the truthfulness of petitioners claim is to open the ballot
boxes in the protested precincts followed by the examination, revision, recounting and
re-appreciation of the official ballots therein contained in accordance with law and
pertinent rules on the matter. Needless to state this can only be done through a fullblown trial on the merits, not a peremptory resolution of the motion to dismiss on the
basis of the bare and one-sided averments made therein.
Petitioners reliance on COMELEC Resolution No. 2868 [if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] to support his
restrictive claim that only rejected ballots or ballots manually counted in case of failure
of the automated counting machines are the proper subjects of an election protest, is
just as unpersuasive.
There is admittedly a lacuna leges in R.A. No. 8436 which prescribes the adoption of an

automated election system. However, while conceding as much, this Court ruled in
Tupay Loong v. COMELEC,[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif] that the Commission is nevertheless not
precluded from conducting a manual count when the automated counting system fails,
reasoning thus:
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the
error in counting is not machine related for human foresight is
not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law
cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the
problem. Section 2(1) of Article IX (C) of the Constitution gives
the COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the
text and intent of this provision is to give the COMELEC all the
necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective
of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in
defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the conduct
of our elections In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a
manual count was not only reasonable. It was the only way to
count the decisive local votes ... The bottom line is that by
means of the manual count, the will of the voters of Sulu was
honestly determined. We cannot kick away the will of the
people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A.
8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine
count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the
conduct of an election which is under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC
Our elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running for public
offices, candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post. Too
often, COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet
unforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of
our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not
be impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable. We cannot,
however, engage in a swivel chair criticism of these actions
often taken under very difficult circumstances.
Verily, the legal compass from which the COMELEC should take its bearings in acting
upon election controversies is the principle that "clean elections control the
appropriateness of the remedy."[if !supportFootnotes][43][endif]
Be that as it may, the fact is the averments in petitioners counter-protest and private
respondents protest already justified the determination of the issues through a judicial
revision and recounting of the ballots pursuant to Section 255 of the Omnibus Election
Code which provides that
Sec. 255. Judicial counting of votes in election contest.- Where allegations in a
protest or counter-protest so warrant or whenever in the
opinion of the court the interests of justice so require, it
shall immediately order the book of voters, ballot boxes and

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Maria Ayra Celina Batacan 2SR
their keys, ballots and other documents used in the election be
brought before it and that the ballots be examined and votes
recounted. (Italics supplied)
So too must fall petitioners procedural objection that private respondent should be
faulted for forum-shopping vis--vis this Courts pronouncement in Samad v.
COMELEC[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif] which states in no uncertain terms that
As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto
precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation
controversy, or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier
filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire
into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his
proclamation. The reason is that once the competent tribunal
has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition for
quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be
decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding. This
procedure will prevent confusion and conflict of authority.
Conformably, we have ruled in a number of cases that after a
proclamation has been made, a pre-proclamation case before
the COMELEC is no longer viable.
The rule admits of exceptions, however, as where: (1) the board of canvassers was
improperly constituted; (2) quo warranto was not the proper
remedy; (3) what was filed was not really a petition for quo
warranto or an election protest but a petition to annul a
proclamation; (4) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an
election protest was expressly made without prejudice to
the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad
cautelam; and (5) the proclamation was null and void.
Petitioners argument that the filing of a motion to dismiss in an election contest filed
with a regular court is not a prohibited pleading is well taken. As we pointed out in
Melendres, Jr. v. COMELEC: [if !supportFootnotes][45][endif]
Neither can petitioner seek refuge behind his argument that the motion to dismiss filed
by private respondent is a prohibited pleading under Section 1,
Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure because the said
provision refers to proceedings filed before the COMELEC. The
applicable provisions on the matter are found in Part VI of the
Rules of Procedure titled "PROVISIONS GOVERNING
ELECTION CONTESTS BEFORE TRIAL COURT" and as this
Court pointedly stated in Aruelo v. Court of Appeals[if !supportFootnotes]
[46][endif]

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it

provided that motions to dismiss and bill of
particulars are not allowed in election protests or
quo warranto cases pending before regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of a
certain pleading in the regular courts. The power to
promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice

and procedure in all courts is vested in the

Supreme Court.[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif]
The foregoing pronouncement, however, will not extricate petitioner from his
predicament because the denial of petitioners motion to dismiss was based on the fact
that the other grounds relied therein was considered unmeritorious and not because the
said motion is a prohibited pleading in electoral protest cases. While the challenged
COMELEC Resolution may not have been entirely correct in dismissing the petition in
this regard, the soundness of its discretion to accord unto the trial court the competence
to resolve the factual issues raised in the controversy cannot be doubted. Indeed, as
reasoned by the COMELEC, the
Commission assumes the competence of the trial court to handle electoral protest and
cannot encroach on its original and exclusive jurisdiction on
electoral protest cases involving the contested mayoralty seat.
To our mind, the trial court should be allowed to resolve the
case on the merits to be able to rule on the factual and legal
grounds raised by the petitioner as his defenses in his Answer.
Should the petitioner be dissatisfied with the outcome of the
case in the lower court, he can still appeal, as his relief, to this
Commission within the reglementary period provided by law.
Moreover
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of
how to interpret and apply the laws relating to elections; literal
or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or the
ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in
isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against
or gently in favor of the voters obvious choice. In applying
elections laws, it would be far better to err in favor of
popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms.[if !supportFootnotes][48][endif]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129783. December 22, 1997]
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and JOSE T. RAMIREZ, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The 28th May 1997 decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET), which affirmed the proclamation of herein private respondent Jose Tan
Ramirez declaring him to be the duly elected Representative of Eastern Samar for
having obtained the plurality of votes over petitioner Marcelino Libanan, and the 20th
June 1997 resolution of the HRET, which denied with finality petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, are sought to be annulled in this special civil action for certiorari.

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Petitioner Marcelino Libanan and private respondent Jose Ramirez were among the
candidates for the lone congressional seat of Eastern Samar in the May 1995 elections.
After the canvass of the returns was made on 13 May 1995, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Eastern Samar proclaimed respondent Ramirez to have been duly
elected Representative of the District with a total of forty-one thousand five hundred
twenty-three (41,523) votes, compared to petitioner's forty thousand eight hundred
sixty-nine (40,869) votes, or a margin of six hundred fifty-four (654) votes over those of
petitioner.
Petitioner Libanan seasonably filed an election protest before the HRET claiming,
among other things, that the 08th May 1995 elections in Eastern Samar were marred by
massive electoral irregularities perpetrated or instigated by respondent Ramirez, as well
as his leaders and followers, in the twenty-three (23) municipalities of the lone district of
Eastern Samar with the aid, in various instances, of peace officers supposedly charged
with maintaining an orderly and honest election. Petitioner contested seventy-nine (79)
precincts in five (5) municipalities. He also maintained that the election returns and/or
ballots in certain precincts were tampered with, substituted, or systematically marked in
favor of respondent Ramirez. Libanan prayed that, after due proceedings, the HRET
should issue an order to annul the election and proclamation of Ramirez and to
thereafter so proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District
of Eastern Samar.
In his answer and counter-protest, with a petition for preliminary hearing on the special
and affirmative defenses, respondent Ramirez denied the charges. He counterprotested the results of the elections in certain precincts where, he claimed, Libanan
engaged in massive vote buying, lansadera, terrorism and tearing of the list of voters to
disenfranchise voters therein listed. Accordingly, he prayed, inter alia, for the dismissal
of the protest and the confirmation of his election as the duly elected representative of
the Lone District of Eastern Samar.
After some peripheral issues were settled by the HRET, the revision of ballots in the
protested precincts commenced on 20 February 1996. The HRET noted that Libanan
contested a total of seventy-nine (79) precincts. It was noted during the revision,
however, that six (6) of the contested precincts, namely, Precincts Nos. 14, 15, 16, 18,
19 and 20 of Arteche, were found to have been merged during the 08 May 1995
elections into three (3) precincts, i.e., Precincts Nos. 14 and 19, Precincts Nos. 15 and
16 and Precincts Nos. 18 and 20. Thus, only seventy-six (76) ballot boxes were actually
opened for revision, one of which, Precinct No. 4-1 of Guiuan, did not contain any
ballot.
On 22 February 1996, while the revision of the counter-protested precincts was being
held, Ramirez filed an "Urgent Motion to Withdraw/Abandon Counter-Protest in Specific
Municipalities/Precincts" praying that he be granted leave to withdraw and abandon
partially his counter-protest in certain precincts. [if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] Libanan filed an
opposition thereto but the motion was eventually granted by the Chairman of the HRET
and subsequently confirmed in a resolution by the tribunal.
On 21 March 1996, the HRET designated a Hearing Commissioner and a Deputy
Hearing Commissioner for the reception of evidence. Following that reception, the
respective memoranda of Libanan and Ramirez were filed.
The evidence and the issues submitted by the parties for consideration by the HRET

related mainly to the proper appreciation of the ballots objected to, or claimed by, the
parties during the revision. No evidence was presented in support of the other
allegations of the protest (like the alleged tampering of election returns) and of the
counter-protest (such as the alleged tearing of some of the pages of the computerized
list of voters to disenfranchise legitimate voters and the use of goons to terrorize and
compel voters to vote for Libanan), nor were these issues discussed in the memoranda
of the parties. The HRET thus concentrated, such as can be rightly expected, its
attention to the basic appreciation of ballots. [if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
The particular matter focused in this petition deals with what petitioner claims to be
spurious ballots; on this score, the HRET has explained:
"No spurious ballot was found in this case. For a ballot to be rejected for being
spurious, the ballot must not have any of the following authenticating marks: a) the
COMELEC watermark; b) the signatures or initial of the BEI Chairman at the back of
the ballot; and c) red and blue fibers. In the present case, all the ballots examined by
the Tribunal had COMELEC watermarks.
"The Tribunal did not adopt protestant's submission in his Memorandum that the
absence of thumbmark or BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the ballot rendered
the ballot spurious. The applicable law on this issue is Sec. 24, R.A. 7166. It reads:
"'In every case before delivering an official ballot to the voter, the Chairman of the Board
of Election Inspectors shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back
thereof. Failure to so authenticate shall be noted in the minutes of the board of election
inspectors and shall constitute an election offense punishable under Section 263 and
264 of the Omnibus Election Code.'
"As may be gleaned above, unlike the provision of Section 210 of the Omnibus Election
Code where the BEI Chairman was required to affix his right thumbmark at the back of
the ballot immediately after it was counted, the present law no longer requires the
same.
"Anent the BEI Chairman's signature, while Section 24 of R.A. 7166 provides that
failure to authenticate the ballot shall constitute an election offense, there is nothing in
the said law which provides that ballots not so authenticated shall be considered
invalid. In fact, the members of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
agreed during their deliberation on the subject that the absence of the BEI Chairman's
signature at the back of the ballot will not per se make a ballot spurious.
"Moreover, while Rep. Palacol, then Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms, mentioned during his sponsorship speech that one of the salient
features of the bill filed was 'to require the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors
to authenticate a ballot given to a voter by affixing his signature on (sic) the back
thereof and to consider any ballot as spurious,' R.A. 7166, as approved, does not
contain any provision to that effect. Clearly, therefore, the Congress as a whole (House
of Representatives and Senate) failed to adopt the proposal of Rep. Palacol that ballots
without the BEI Chairman's signature at the back will be declared spurious. What is
clearly provided under the said law is the sanction imposable upon an erring Chairman
of the BEI, and not the disenfranchisement of the voter." [if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
In its assailed decision, the HRET ruled in favor of respondent Ramirez; it concluded:
"WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Tribunal Resolved to DISMISS the instant
election protest, including the parties' mutual claims for damages and attorney's fee;

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AFFIRM the proclamation of Protestee Jose Tan Ramirez; and DECLARE him to be the
duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Eastern Samar, for having obtained
a plurality of 143 votes over second placer Protestant Marcelino Libanan." [if !supportFootnotes]
[4][endif]

Petitioner Libanan moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the HRET arguing,
among other grounds, [if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] that the absence of the BEI Chairman's
signature at the back of the ballots could not but indicate that the ballots were not those
issued to the voters during the elections. He averred that the law would require the
Chairman of the BEI to authenticate or sign the ballot before issuing it to the voter.
Acting on petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the HRET credited petitioner Libanan
with thirty (30) votes because of the error in the computation of the base figure and
rejected twelve (12) ballots for respondent Ramirez. Respondent Ramirez,
nevertheless, remained to be the winner with a lead of ninety-nine (99) votes in his
favor. As regards the absence of BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the ballots,
the HRET stressed:
"Fraud is not presumed. It must be sufficiently established. Moreover, Section 211 of
the Omnibus Election Code provides in part that 'in the reading and appreciation of
ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good reason
to justify its rejection.' In the instant case, there is no evidence to support protestant's
allegation that the ballots he enumerated in his Motion for Reconsideration are
substitute ballots. The absence of the BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the ballot
cannot be an indication of ballot switching or substitution. At best, such absence of BEI
Chairman's signature is a prima facie evidence that the BEI Chairmen concerned were
derelict in their duty of authenticating the ballots. Such omission, as stated in the
Decision, is not fatal to the validity of the ballots." [if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
Thus, the present recourse.
A perusal of the grounds raised by petitioner to annul the HRET decision and resolution
boils down to the issue of whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that the absence of the signature of the Chairman of the BEI in the
ballots did not render the ballots spurious.
Petitioner Libanan contends that the three hundred eleven (311) ballots (265 of which
have been for private respondent Ramirez) without the signature of the Chairman of the
BEI, but which had the COMELEC water-marks and/or colored fibers, should be
invalidated. It is the position of petitioner that the purpose of the law in requiring the BEI
Chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot when he issues it to the voter is
"to authenticate" the ballot and, absent that signature, the ballot must be considered
spurious.
Prefatorily, the Court touches base on its jurisdiction to review and pass upon decisions
or resolutions of the electoral tribunals.
The Constitution mandates that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and
the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall each, respectively, be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. [if !
supportFootnotes][7][endif]
In Laza tin vs. HRET, [if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] the Court has observed that "The use of the word 'sole' emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as 'intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it

had remained originally in the legislature.' Earlier this grant of power to the legislature
was characterized by Justice Malcolm as ''full, clear and complete.' Under the amended
1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and
it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the Legislature and
the Electoral Commission. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution." [if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power
to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a
matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . . . the
power granted to the Electoral Tribunal x x x excludes the exercise of any authority on
the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the
same."
The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional cases. In
Robles vs. HRET, [if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] the Court has explained that while the judgments
of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so, however, but only
"in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a
determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero,
upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power
as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has
to be a remedy for such abuse."
In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, [if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] the Court has
ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference
except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of
power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not, to paraphrase it
in Co vs. HRET, [if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] venture into the perilous area of correcting
perceived errors of independent branches of the Government; it comes in only when it
has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or
glaring that no less than the Constitution itself calls for remedial action.
In the instant controversy, it would appear that the HRET "reviewed and passed upon
the validity of all the ballots in the protested and counter-protested precincts, including
those not contested and claimed by the parties." [if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] The Tribunal,
added, that "(t)his course of action was adopted not only to give effect to the intent of
each and every voter, but also to rectify any mistake in appreciation, deliberate or
otherwise, committed at the precinct level and overlooked during the revision stage of
this case." [if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] In holding that the absence of the signature of the
Chairman of the BEI at the back of the ballot does not invalidate it, the HRET has
ratiocinated in this wise:
"No spurious ballot was found in this case. For a ballot to be rejected for being
spurious, the ballot must not have any of the following authenticating marks: a) the
COMELEC watermark; b) the signatures or initial of the BEI Chairman at the back of
the ballot; and c) red and blue fibers. In the present case, all the ballots examined by
the Tribunal had COMELEC watermarks.
"xxx xxx xxx

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"Anent the BEI Chairman's signature, while Section 24 of R.A. 7166 provides that
failure to authenticate the ballot shall constitute an election offense, there is nothing in
the said law which provides that ballots not so authenticated shall be considered
invalid. In fact, the members of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
agreed during their deliberation on the subject that the absence of the BEI Chairman's
signature at the back of the ballot will not per se make a ballot spurious.
"Moreover, while Rep. Palacol, then Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms, mentioned during his sponsorship speech that one of the salient
features of the bill filed was 'to require the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors
to authenticate a ballot given to a voter by affixing his signature on (sic) the back
thereof and to consider any ballot as spurious,' R.A. 7166, as approved, does not
contain any provision to that effect. Clearly, therefore, the Congress as a whole (House
of Representatives and Senate) failed to adopt the proposal of Rep. Palacol that ballots
without the BEI Chairman's signature at the back will be declared spurious. What is
clearly provided under the said law is the sanction imposable upon an erring Chairman
of the BEI, and not the disenfranchisement of the voter." [if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
The pertinent provision of the law, Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166, provides:
"SEC. 24. Signature of Chairman at the back of Every Ballot. - In every case before
delivering an official ballot to the voter, the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors
shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back thereof. Failure to
authenticate shall be noted in the minutes of the Board of Election Inspectors and shall
constitute an election offense punishable under Section 263 and 264 of the Omnibus
Election Code."
There is really nothing in the above law to the effect that a ballot which is not so
authenticated shall thereby be deemed spurious. The law merely renders the BEI
Chairman accountable for such failure. The courts may not, in the guise of
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and embrace situations neither provided
nor intended by the lawmakers. Where the words and phrases of a statute are not
obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be
determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words,
there should be no room for construction. [if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
As so aptly observed by the Solicitor-General, House Bill ("HB") No. 34811 (which later
become R.A. No. 7166), approved by the House of Representatives on third reading,
was a consolidation of different bills. Two of the bills consolidated and considered in
drafting H.B. No. 34811 were H.B. 34639 and H.B. No. 34660. Section 22 of the two
latter bills provided that:
"In every case before delivering an official ballot to the voter, the chairman of the Board
of Election Inspectors shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back
thereof. Any ballot which is not so authenticated shall be deemed spurious. Failure to
so authenticate shall constitute an election offense." [if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
During the deliberation of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, held on 08
August 1991, the members agreed to delete the phrase "Any ballot which is not so
authenticated shall be deemed spurious." Pertinent portions of the transcript of
stenographic notes ("TSN") taken during the Meeting of the Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms read:
"THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Congressman Mercado.

"HON. MERCADO. I think, Section 22, we go to the intent of the provision. I think the
intent here is to sanction the inspector so I would propose a compromise. The ballot
should not be deemed as spurious. However, it would rather be failure of the inspector
to, or the chairman to affix his signature would rather be a circumstance which would
aggravate the crime, which would aggravate the election offense, on the part of the
inspector, but not to disenfranchise the voter. Because the intention here is to punish
the election inspector for not affixing the signature. Why should we punish the voter? So
I think the compromise here . . .
"THE CHAIRMAN. A serious election offense.
"HON. MERCADO. Yes, it should be a serious election offense on the part of the
chairman for not affixing the signature, but not to make the ballot spurious.
"HON. RONO. Mr. Chairman.
"THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Congressman Rono.
"HON. RONO. One thing that we have to guard against is when we deal with the ballot
and the right to suffrage, we should not really make law that would prevent the flexibility
of the Commission on Elections, and the Supreme Court from getting other extraneous
efforts to confirm authenticity or the spuriousness of the ballot, by making a provision
that by that single mistake or inadvertence of the chairman we make the ballot
automatically spurious is dangerous. It should be ... what I'm saying is that the
Commission or the proper bodies by which this matter will be taken up may consider it
as one of the evidences of spuriousness but not per se or ipso facto it becomes; it
should look for other extraneous evidence. So what I am suggesting is let us give them
this kind of flexibility before we determine or before we say that this ballot is spurious,
we give the COMELEC some flexibility in the determination of other extraneous
evidence.
"HON. GARCIA. May I offer a suggestion?
"THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Congressman Garcia.
"HON. GARCIA. That the fact that a ballot does not contain the signature, I think, initial
will not be sufficient, the signature of the Chairman should be noted in the minutes.
Noted in the minutes. So that in case of protest, there is basis.
"HON. RONO. Oo, may basis na. Iyon lang. I think that would solve our problem.
"THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
"MR. MONSOD. Your honor, we're willing to accept that amendment. Take out that
sentence spurious, with the introduction of the proposed measure x x x." [if !supportFootnotes][18]
[endif]

The TSN of the proceedings of the Bicameral conference Committee on Election Law,
held on 29 October 1991, in turn, would show these exchanges:
"CHAIRMAN GONZALEZ: Are there anything more ?
"HON. ROCO. There is a section in the Senate version about the ballot being signed at
the back.
"CHAIRMAN GONZALEZ. Counter side.
"HON. ROCO. If it is not signed then it is being spurious which is a very dangerous, I
(think) (it) is a very dangerous provision and so...
"MR. MONSOD. We agree with the House version that anyway when chairman of BEI
doesn't sign subject to an election offense. But it should not be a basis for
disenfranchisement of the voter. So, we believe we set this in the hearings in the House

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that we should strike out that sentence that says that this ballot is automatically
spurious." [if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
Thus, the final draft, which was later to become R.A. No. 7166, no longer included the
provision "Any ballot not so authenticated shall be deemed spurious." The intention of
the legislature even then was quite evident.
The reliance on Bautista vs. Castro [if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] by petitioner, is misdirected. It
must be stressed that B.P. Blg. 222, [if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] otherwise known as the
"Barangay Election Act of 1982," approved on 25 March 1982, itself categorically
expresses that it shall only be "applicable to the election of barangay officials." Section
14 of B.P. Blg. 222 and its implementing rule in Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution No.
1539 have both provided:
Section 14 of B.P. 222:
"Sec. 14. Official barangay ballots.- The official barangay ballots shall be provided by
the city or municipality concerned of a size and color to be prescribed by the
Commission on Elections.
"Such official ballot shall, before it is handed to the voter at the voting center, be
authenticated in the presence of the voter, the other Tellers, and the watchers present
by the Chairman of the Board of Election Tellers who shall affix his signature at the back
thereof."
Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539:
"Sec. 36. Procedure in the casting of votes. - x x x
"b. Delivery of ballot. - Before delivering the ballot to the voter, the chairman shall, in the
presence of the voter, the other members of the board and the watchers present, affix
his signature at the back thereof and write the serial number of the ballot in the space
provided in the ballot, beginning with No. '1' for the first ballot issued, and so on
consecutively for the succeeding ballots, which serial number shall be entered in the
corresponding space of the voting record. He shall then fold the ballot once, and
without removing the detachable coupon, deliver it to the voter, together with a ball pen.
"x x x x x x x x x.
"e. Returning the ballot. (1) In the presence of all the members of the Board, the voter
shall affix his right hand thumbmark on the corresponding space in the detachable
coupon, and shall give the folded ballot to the chairman. (2) The chairman shall without
unfolding the ballot or looking at its contents, and in the presence of the voter and all
the members of the Board, verify if it bears his signature and the same serial number
recorded in the voting record. (3) If the ballot is found to be authentic, the voter shall
then be required to imprint his right hand thumbmark on the proper space in the voting
record. (4) The chairman shall then detach the coupon and shall deposit the folded
ballot in the compartment for valid ballot and the coupon in the compartment for spoiled
ballots. (5) The voter shall then leave the voting center.
"f. When ballot may be considered spoiled. Any ballot returned to the chairman with its
coupon already detached, or which does not bear the signature of the chairman, or any
ballot with a serial number that does not tally with the serial number of the ballot
delivered to the voter as recorded in the voting record, shall be considered as spoiled
and shall be marked and signed by the members of the board and shall not be
counted." [if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
The difference in the rules may not be too difficult to discern. The stringent

requirements in B.P. Blg. 222 should be justifiable considering that the official barangay
ballots would be provided by the city or municipality concerned with the COMELEC
merely prescribing their size and color. Thus, the official ballots in B.P. Blg. 222, being
supplied and furnished by the local government themselves, the possibility of the ballots
being easily counterfeited might not have been discounted. The absence of
authenticating marks prescribed by law, i.e., the signature of the chairman of the Board
of Election Tellers at the back of the ballot, could have well been really thought of to be
fatal to the validity of the ballot.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166, upon the other hand, contains no similar stringent
provisions such as that seen in Section 36(f) of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539. The
pertinent part in Resolution No. 2676 on the requirement of the signature of the
chairman is found in Section 73 thereof which merely provides:
"Sec. 73. Signature of chairman at the back of every ballot. -- In every case, the
chairman of the board shall, in the presence of the voter, authenticate every ballot by
affixing his signature at the back thereof before delivering it to the voter. FAILURE TO
SO AUTHENTICATE SHALL BE NOTED IN THE MINUTES OF THE BOARD AND
SHALL CONSTITUTE AN ELECTION OFFENSE."
Again, in Resolution No. 2738, [if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] promulgated by the COMELEC on 03
January 1995, [if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] which implemented, among other election laws, R.A.
No. 7166 (that governed the election for Members of the House of Representatives held
on 08 May 1995), the relevant provision is in Section 13 which itself has only stated:
"Sec. 13. Authentication of the ballot.-- Before delivering a ballot to the voter, the
chairman of the board shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back
thereof."
It would appear evident that the ruling in Bautista vs. Castro was prompted because of
the express declaration in Section 36(f) of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539,
implementing Section 14 of B.P. Blg. 222, that: "Any ballot returned to the chairman . . .
which does not bear the signature of the chairman . . . shall be considered as spoiled . .
. and shall not be counted." This Court thus stated in Bautista:
"The law (Sec 14 of B.P. Blg. 222) and the rules implementing it (Sec. 36 of Comelec
Res. No. 1539) leave no room for interpretation. The absence of the signature of the
Chairman of the Board of Election Tellers in the ballot given to a voter as required by
law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal. This requirement is
mandatory for the validity of the said ballot."
It should be noteworthy that in an unsigned 3rd April 1990 resolution, in "Jolly
Fernandez vs. COMELEC," [if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] the Court en banc had the opportunity to
debunk the argument that all ballots not signed at the back thereof by the Chairman
and the Poll Clerk were to be considered spurious for non-compliance with Section 15
of R.A. No. 6646, [if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] i.e., "The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987," reading
as follows:
"Sec. 15. - Signature of Chairman and Poll Clerk at the Back of Every Ballot. - In
addition to the preliminary acts before the voting as enumerated in Section 191 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, the chairman and the poll clerk of the board of election inspectors
shall affix their signatures at the back of each and every official ballot to be used during
the voting. A certification to that effect must be entered in the minutes of the voting."
The Court declared:

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"The cardinal objective in the appreciation of the ballots is to discover and give effect to
the intention of the voter. That intention would be nullified by the strict interpretation of
the said section as suggested by the petitioner for it would result in the invalidation of
the ballot even if duly accomplished by the voter, and simply because of an omission
not imputable to him but to the election officials. The citizen cannot be deprived of his
constitutional right of suffrage on the specious ground that other persons were
negligent in performing their own duty, which in the case at bar was purely ministerial
and technical, by no means mandatory but a mere antecedent measure intended to
authenticate the ballot. A contrary ruling would place a premium on official ineptness
and make it possible for a small group of functionaries, by their negligence - or, worse,
their deliberate inaction - to frustrate the will of the electorate." [if !supportFootnotes][27][endif]
Petitioner Libanan suggests that the Court might apply the "ruling" of respondent HRET
in the case of Yap vs. Calalay (HRET Case No. 95-026). He states that "it is the HRET
itself, ironically, that deals the coup de grace to its ruling in HRET Case No. 95-020."
The "ruling" cited by petitioner is actually a "Confidential Memorandum," [if !supportFootnotes][28]
[endif]
dated 28 April 1997, from a certain Atty. Emmanuel Mapili addressed to "PA
Committees in HRET Case No. 95-026 (Yap vs. Calalay)" which has for its subject
"(n)ew rulings to be followed in the appreciation of ballots in HRET Case No. 95-026
(Yap vs. Calalay) and other concerns." Petitioner Libanan quotes the pertinent portion
of the said Memorandum, viz:
"WHEREFORE, the Tribunal Resolved that the following rules and guidelines on the
appreciation of ballots shall be given effect in the resolution of this case and shall be
applied prospectively to other pending cases:
"1. The absence of the signature of the BEI Chairman at the back of the ballot shall
nullify the same and all the votes therein shall not be counted in favor of any
candidate." [if !supportFootnotes][29][endif]
Reliance by petitioner on this alleged "ruling," obviously deserves scant consideration.
What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that
a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these

authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or
initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and, (c) in those cases where the
COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the
presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots. [if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] It is only when none of
these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to
rejection.
It is quite clear, in the opinion of the Court, that no grave abuse of discretion has been
committed by respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in its issuance of
the assailed decision and resolution.
One other important point. Regarding the membership of certain Justices of this Court
in the HRET and their participation in the resolution of the instant petition, the Court
sees no conflict at all, and it, therefore, rejects the offer of inhibition by each of the
concerned justices. As early as Vera vs. Avelino, [if !supportFootnotes][31][endif] this Court,
confronted with a like situation, has said unequivocally:
"x x x Mulling over this, we experience no qualmish feelings about the coincidence.
Their designation to the electoral tribunals deducted not a whit from their functions as
members of this Supreme Court, and did not disqualify them in this litigation. Nor will
their deliverances hereat on a given question operate to prevent them from voting in the
electoral forum on identical questions; because the Constitution, establishing no
incompatibility between the two roles, naturally did not contemplate, nor want, justices
opining one way here, and thereafter holding otherwise, pari materia, in the electoral
tribunal, or vice-versa." [if !supportFootnotes][32][endif]
Such has thus been, and so it is to be in this petition, as well as in the cases that may
yet come before the Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

92