THE PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT OF MINUSTAH IN

HAITI

THESIS

Written By
RIZKA KHAIRANI
NIM 071012079

BACHELOR PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES
UNIVERSITAS AIRLANGGA

THE PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT OF MINUSTAH IN HAITI

THESIS

Written for one of the requirements to complete Bachelor Degree

in International Relations at Faculty of Social and Political
Sciences, Universitas Airlangga

Written by
RIZKA KHAIRANI
NIM 071012079

BACHELOR PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES
UNIVERSITAS AIRLANGGA
Even Semester 2013/2014

ii

PAGE OF APPROVAL

Thesis with the title:

The Peacekeeping Deployment of MINUSTAH in Haiti

Written by :
Rizka Khairani
071012079

Agreed to be submitted for

Thesis Defense
Even Semester 2013/2014

Surabaya, 21 May 2014

Supervisor,

Sartika Soesilowati, Ph.D

NIP. 196407301995122001

Acknowledging,
Head of Bachelor Program of International Relations

M. Muttaqien, S.IP, MA, Ph.D

NIP. 197301301999031001
iii

PAGE OF ENDORESEMENT BOARD OF EXAMINERS

This thesis has been defended before the Board of Examiners

on Wednesday, 21 May 2014, at 13.00 WIB in the Cakra Court-room
Faculty of Social and Political Science
Universitas Airlangga

Commission examiners

Chairman,

I Basis Susilo, M.A

NIP: 19540808 198103 1 007

Member I,

Member II,

Vinsensio Dugis, Ph.D

IGede Wahyu Wicaksana, Ph.D

NIP:19650113 199101 1 001

NIP: 19790602 200710 1001

iv

NO PLAGIARISM STATEMENT PAGE

Some parts or all of the contents of this thesis with the title
The Peacekeeping Deployment of MINUSTAH in Haiti
was never submitted to obtain an academic degree in the field of study and / or other
university and never published / written by individuals other than the author except
when written with the format of the quote in contents of the thesis. If it is found that
my statement is not true, then I am willing to accept sanctions in accordance with
applicable provisions of Universitas Airlangga Surabaya

Surabaya, 28 May 2014

Rizka Khairani
NIM: 071012079

DEDICATION PAGE
I dedicate this writing to my mother and father, Umi dan Ayah
Fikriyati Hapsari and Adi Susilo
The two most inspirational people in my life,
And to my loveable yet annoying little brother and sister
Ahmad Afifuddin and Salsabila Yasmin
You are all my everything.
Always and forever.

Your proud daughter and sister.

vi

INSPIRATIONAL PAGE

Work Hard, Play Hard, Pray Hard

vii

FOREWORD
Security has always been at the front and foremost of any political policies
made by states. Although the concept of security has changed through time, the media
to intercept and give the sense of security has mostly been dominated by the actions
of the United Nations especially through the deployment of peace enforcement
troops. Some states view that it should be the goal of all states to give this sense of
security, especially to others less fortunate than some. Some states view this as a
power struggle to reassure their position in the global world through their role as
contributor or leader of such troops. It is in these assumptions of altruims and alterego of states and their reasonings of peacekeeping deployment that the writer takes
great curiosity. The great difference between the usual place of deployment and Haiti
is also a great concern when writing this thesis.
Of course, in writing this thesis, the writer could not have done it alone. This
thesis is a special dedication towards the parents of the writers, who have, for the last
22 years have taken great care and patience when dealing with the writer. Through all
the advice, through all the understanding, there really is no better set of parents that
can truly help and lead the writer though life. To my little brother and sister, know
that no matter what I do, I can only hope that I can be a good example for you. This
also would not be complete without the help of Dra. Sartika Soesilowati, M.A, Ph.D,
in supervising this thesis.
Also for my first family in Surabaya, HITEN, you guys rawwk. Thank you for
being my trash can for when it feels like I would just give up in writing this thesis.
viii

My second family, DJAMBOELS, you guys truly have been there for me when I was
just down and wanted to thrown everything up. A special shout out to Elsa, my best
friend, seems like we see each other everyday but we always manage to talk our ears
off at night. Another shout out to Dije, Angga, Wede, Cesar, Adis, Vida, Tegar.
Seems like those late night outings and venting helped me clear my head. You guys
also helped me to find a new perspective when dealing with things. A huge hug is
also necessary for my Wrong Family that makes me feel so right. Those 3 weeks
together just truly made us a big family that is spread out across Indonesia: Ano,
Adis, Acha, Oliv, Tegar, Papih Yos, Mamih Venty, Indra dan Yoyo. Thanks for
always making me laugh, smile and giving support through this process, sometimes
people think Ive gone insane becuase I laugh at my cellphone. But of course, without
the guidance of Allah SWT, this thesis would truly be hard to complete.
Last but not least, the writer knows that this thesis is far from perfect. There are
many faults, mistakes and problems might be left unanswered but hopefully the little
knowledge given through this writing would be beneficial for future writings to
come.

Writer,
RIZKA KHAIRANI
E-mail: rizka.khairani24@gmail.com

ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS
COVER .....................................................................................................................................i
TITLE ......................................................................................................................................ii
PAGE OF APPROVAL ........................................................................................................ iii
PAGE OF ENDORESEMENT ................................................................................... ..........iv
NO PLAGIARISM STATEMENT PAGE ............................................................... ...........v
DEDICATION PAGE ................................................................................................. ..........vi
MOTTO ........................................................................................................................ ........ vii
FOREWORD................................................................................................................ ........viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................ .........x
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. .........xii

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 1

I.1 Background ..................................................................................................... 1
I.2 Research Problem ......................................................................................... 9
I.3 Aim of Research ............................................................................................ 10
I.4 Theoretical Framework................................................................................ .... 10
I.4.1 Humanitarian Intervention ................................................................ 10
I.4.2 Responsibility to Protect (R2P).. ...................................................... 12
I.4.3 Peacekeeping and Conflict Escalation .............................................. 14
I.4.4 English School Theory of International Relations .......................... 16
1.5 Theoretical Synthesis ......................................................................................17
I.5 Hypothesis........................................................................................................19
I.6 Method of Analysis ...................................................................................... ...19
I.6.1 Concept Operationalization ............................................. ...............19
I.6.1.1 Human Security.. .... ..19
I.6.1.2 Mandate of the UNSC .........................................................22
I.6.1.3 Civil War ..............................................................................22
I.6.2 Research Approach ....................................................................... ...23
I.6.3 Scope of Research ............................................................................24
I.6.4 Data Collection Technique ............................................................ ..24
I.6.5 Data Analysis Technique.. ....24
I.6.6 Research Overview. ......25

CHAPTER II LEGAL BACKGROUND OF INTERVENTION OF

MINUSTAH IN HAITI .. ............ 26
II.1 United Nations Charter as the source of International Law in
intervention ..................... ................................................................................... 26
II.2 Peacekeeping in the UN Charter . 29
II.2.1 History of Peacekeeping Opearation ................................................30

II.2.2MINUSTAH as a Peacekeeping Operation ..................................... 33

CHAPTER III MORAL JUSTIFICATION OF MINUSTAH IN HAITI .. .. 37

III.1 Socio-Historical Background of Haiti before MINUSTAH 37
III.2 Conflict Escalation of Haiti .............. ....................................................... .....47

CHAPTER IV POLITICAL PROCESS OF UNSC RESOLUTION 1542 ..49

IV.1 Interest of Powers in the UNSC ........... ..................................................... ... 49
IV.1.1 Power of the P5 members in the UNSC ...........................................49
IV.1.2 Middle Power in the UNSC ..............................................................51
IV.2 Mission in Haiti before MINUSTAH ................ ........................................ ..53
IV.3 Statements by UNSC members in meetings .................................................54
IV.4 Significant actors in the making of the MINUSTAH mandate in 2004 ........61
IV.4.1 Brazils interest in MINUSTAH .....................................................62
IV.4.2 United States interest in MINUSTAH ...........................................63

BAB V CONCLUSION .................................................................................. .. 65

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................xiii
ATTACHMENT
Attachment 1Resolution 1973 (2011) on Libya...........................................xxv
Attachment 2United Nation Charter ...........xxxiii
Attachment 3Resolution 1542 (2004) on Haiti ..........................................................liii
Attachment 4 Statement by the President of the Security Council at the 4917th
meeting of the Security Council ..............................................................................lvi

xi

The Peacekeeping Deployment of MINUSTAH in Haiti in 2004

ABSTRACT
United Nations role of deploying peace enforcement troops in the world is
critically important in maintaining international peace and stability. Whether or not a
conflict is regarded as an emergency and be given mandate of peacekeeping has a lot
of determining factors. This can be analyzed through the legitimacy in terms of the
moral justification, the legality and the political process. The long and rigorous
process in authorizing a peacekeeping operation has also been seen as a playing arena
for other states to put their interest at play. Between 1993 and 2001, six different
United Nations Peacekeeping Missions were deployed to Haiti but each was then
pulled back with an urgency to exit rapidly. It was only from 2004, that the
international community through the resolution of the United Nation Security Council
(UNSC), legalized resolution number 1542 from the UNSC as a long-term
commitment in order to secure the future of Haiti. The lack of history of a civil war or
any peace settlements to observe or implement are some of the differences between
MINUSTAH and other peacekeeping forces in the world. Haitis domestic problem is
a multidimensional in terms that it is caused by social-economic disparity and its lack
of institutional stability thus supporting violence in the slum areas of the capital to
develop. This research aims to analyze the reasoning, from the legality, moral
justification and the political process from the UNSC in the deployment of the
MINUSTAH operation in Haiti. In giving the example, the writer will also attempt to
analyze the political process through one non-permanent member of the UNSC,
Brazil and one permanent member of the UNSC, and also the United States. This
research uses the descriptive approach in describing the factors contributing to the
deployment with the results being the UN Charter as a whole has articles that trumps
others making the notion of sovereignty and peaceful means as conflict resolution
absolete. The moral justification and domestic problems were deemed as being
eligable to be intervened becuase MINUSTAH is a fourth geeneration peacekeeping
and the political process of the deployment showing a large political interest of the
contirbutors.
Keywords: Peacekeeping, Haiti,
Responsibility to protect, conflict.

MINUSTAH,

xii

Humanitarian

Intervention,

Chapter I
Introduction
I.1 Background
The United Nation (UN), responds to different conflicts and crisis arising in
the world in different manners. Some are deemed dangerous enough and deserve a
peace enforcement troops whilst others are seen by the UN as being small enough
to be handled by the host state itself thus desiring no intervention. The reason of
deployment therefore can be varied depending on the situation and context and the
deciding actors. Political interest in peacekeeping that can be seen later on in the
political process of the making of the mandate,gives meaning and values to
humanitarian crises, making a definition of what is worthy enough to be deployed
a peacekeeping troops or not.
One example of the veto power of the deciding powerbetween the
permanent 5 members (P5) of the Security Council, is the case of the deployment
of troops under NATO in Libya, under the UNSC Resolution number 19731
established in 2011 stating the No-Fly-Zone in Libya, and the lack thereof in the
humanitarian crisis in Syria. This is especially strange since the situations of both
countries in regards to its humanitarian crisis and the governments response to
protesters are greatly similar. Both Syria and Libya seems to have similar causes
and effects and which both government thoroughly push and oppress the
demonstration done by the civilians resulting in many lives lost. Civil uprising
1

United
Nations,
UN
Resolution
1973
(2011)

Nato,
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR-1973.pdf
accessed on 1st May 2014

and mass protests were spreading everywhere, but the interesting thing is how
both cases do not receive the same treatment in terms of humanitarian intervention
mandated by the UN. In response to Gaddafis ruthless oppression of his own
people, the UN passed the resolution that gives the mandate for military
involvement of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO began its
military attacks against Gaddafi forces with the objective of protecting civilians in
Libya. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon held up the historic Resolution
number 1973 by stating that the justification for the use of force in Libya was
based on humanitarian grounds. 2 Syria on the other hand, has had no international
intervention made against the al-Assad regime. The humanitarian crisis in Syria,
although receiving similar condemnation from the international community has
not passed the UNSC decision making process due to the veto of both Russia and
China. They claimed that the Syrian crisis did not meet the definition of a threat to
global peace and security. The reasoning, according to opponents, was the lack of
prioritizing on the part of the UNSC to set up a dialogue with the Syrian
government, as well as concerns over previous implementation of the UNSC
resolution in Libya.3
The Charter of the UN4, especially Article 24 of the Charter states how
peacekeeping is the deployment of troops into a host state that has violated
humanitarian rights of its citizens, endorsed by the mandate from the UNSC to
help the parties to a conflict to resolve a conflict peacefully. The presence of these
2

UN News Center. Libya: Ban welcomes Security Council authorization of measures to

protect
civilians,2011,http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37809&Cr=libya&Cr1.
Accessed on 20th March 2014.
3
Luis Peral, R2P in Syria How to Surmount the Inaction of the UN Security Council?,
European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2011.
4
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and Statue of the International Court of Justice,San
Franciso, 1945, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf accessed at 14 March 2014

people, soldiers, military observers or civilian police, encourage warring parties

not to use arms but rather keep negotiating for peaceful settlement of disputes.
International intervention is thus deemed as being legitimate if they were
deployed for the sake of saving lives in humanitarian crisis.
The Security Council has 15 members.

The United Nations Charter

designates five States as permanent members and the General Assembly elects 10
other members for two-year terms. Besides having the 5 permanent members in
the UNSC, the council also have 10 other non-permanent members with the
duration of 2 years in the council. The 10 members are chosen in the goal of
having regional balance and some are middle powers. In order for a resolution to
pass, it has to be agreed by the 5 permanent members of the UNSC, and at a
minimal agreement by 4 of the 10 non-permanent members, thus all in all it has to
be agreed upon by 9 of the UNSC members. 5
The post-Cold War era has resulted in the increasing number of the
conduct of belligerent non-governmental actors within a state, most likely in the
form of intra-state war and domestic civil war. It is in conditions of internal chaos
that these actors flourish.

Intra-state conflicts and humanitarian catastrophes

constitutes as threats to international peace and security and is one of the major
sources of instability throughout a region. The end of the cold war also meant that
the UN Security Council, once paralyzed by US and USSR vetoes, was finally
able to make intervention policies once it can be seen that the two superpowers
were not polarized anymore. This led to the concept of the Responsibility to

Christian Stock, New Horizons and Old Problems for UN Peacekeeping. University ErlangenNrnberg, 2011.

Protect (R2P), established in 2001, which asserts that if a state is failing to protect
its citizens from mass atrocities and peaceful measures are not working, the
international community has the responsibility to intervene: first diplomatically,
then more coercively, and as a last resort with military force. 6
Unlike in the Cold War era, where the main goal of the peacekeepers
would be to resolves disputes and conflicts between states, the post-Cold-War not
only forces the peacekeepers to have the role of traditional peacekeeping but also
assist in the rebuilding of the civil infrastructure, administer humanitarian aid and
supervise elections and ensure fair and peaceful transitions of power, like in the
case of the peacekeeping troops in Haiti, Mission des Nations Unies pour la
Stabilisation en Hati (MINUSTAH) or in English : UN Stabilization Mission in
Haiti.

Picture I.1: Map of Haiti7

James D Fearon, and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." The American
Political Science Review 97.1 (2003): 75
7
http://blog.education.nationalgeographic.com/ accessed on 3 January 2014

Haiti, a country locating in Central America, ever since the early years of
its independence has been on an instable state, from economic, political, social
sector and has become the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, with the
highest levels of income inequality.8 Even though, the problems are domestic,
these intrastate conflicts are not just dangerous in its domestic realms itself but
also be in danger of disrupting other national interest of neighboring states like
economic activities, in terms of companies, traders and investors. It can also cause
huge migration flows, as Haiti's borders are near the US and other American
states, it may create instability. The combination of poverty and violence has
resulted in waves of refugees fleeing the country and large numbers of internal
displacements. For example, following the 1991 coup in which 1,500 died, 40,000
fled the country and 20,000 to 30,000 fled the capital.9There may also be a strong
possibility that these conflicts create border instabilities and in international
politics, diverting governments from constructive cooperation in the region and
internationally.
International interventions started in Haiti in 1990, after the coup of
Aristidewhere Haiti has requested the UN to observe the presidential election, the
result of this election was the appointment Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the head of
state.10 This did not last long as the 1991 coup headed by General Cdras ended
the democratic rule. After some diplomatic arrangements, in 1993, General
Cdras agreed that Mr. Aristide would return to Haiti in October. The United

Library of Congress Federal Research Division, Country Profile: Haiti, 2006.

Robert Fatton Jr., Haiti's Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy, Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002.
10
Morris, J. Force and Democracy: UN/US Intervention in Haiti, International Peacekeeping,
2(3): (1995): 391-412.
9

Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), led by the US, was established to assist in
modernizing the armed forces and in creating a new police force. After the
mandate ended, the UNMIH took over in 1995 to assist the Government in
maintaining the secure and stable environment established by the force, and to
help create a national civil police force. In June 1996, UNMIH was replaced
in its functions by the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH),
which was followed by other operations like the United Nations Transition
Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) in July 1997 the United Nations Civilian
Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) in November 1997 and the Civilian
Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) in March 2000 and terminated in 2001. In
2004, escalating violence came to a head, with armed gangs and former police and
soldiers taking the town of Gonaves.As a result, then President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide left the country, a UN-sanctioned Multinational Interim Force was
deployed (succeeded on 1 June 2004 by MINUSTAH), and a transitional
government was installed. 11
One of the most important distinctions is the fact that Haiti is not a war
zone. There is not a situation like in Darfur or in Somalia where there is
constant fighting and a lack of a government, resulting in gross act of violation of
humanitarian right. Haitis instability stem from the many small neighborhood
gangs and there is not a usual post-conflict agreement to supervise and control.
What is happening in Haiti is a series of fighting between gangs and supporters
from the government clamoring for political power. Haitis other sources of
insecurity are related to its low economic development which in turns causes state
11

Damrosch, L. F. (ed.), Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (Council

on Foreign Relations Press: New York,(1993):127

led forces including the Haiti National Police (HNP) to not function maximally,
and Haitis lack of political institution that can causes anarchy of power to thrive
in society.12The parties at conflict in Haiti are the various urban gangs and armed
political groups operating in the capital and other cities. Some urban gangs are
mainly political in nature fighting in support of various powerful individuals or
factions while some are criminal organizations engaged in inter-gang fighting,
clashes with the HNP and MINUSTAH and at times partake in politically-related
fighting out of personal gain.13Haiti does indeed have its problems, but it can be
seen as a domesticlingering political and governance crisis which results
degradation of the economy and the safety of the society. The origins of the crisis
go back to the troubled past of Haiti that was filled with dictatorship history and
coups. Ordinarily UN peacekeeping missions get deployed in a post conflict or a
conflict situation. Haiti cannot really be described as either.14
According to the UN Peacekeeping Year in Review 2013, the total number
of troops that are stationed in Haiti is 12.5% (12,552 troops out of 99,329
peacekeeping troops across the World), which makes it the third largest
peacekeeping troops in terms of size worldwide after Darfur and Sudan 15. This is
interesting considering that it only has an area of just 27,750 sq km (which is
slightly smaller than Maryland). Violence and murder rates of the population, as
one of the considerations when deploying PKO, are also particular low in Haiti in
12

Lopez-Claros, A. 2007. The humanitarian response index 2007. Palgrave MacMillan: New
York.
13
Spoiling Security in Haiti: LatinAmerica/Caribbean Report No. 13, International Crisis Group,
May 31, 2005
14

Human Security Report, Oxford University Press, 2005.

MINUSTAH by the Numbers, Center for Economic and Policy Research
http://hcvanalysis.wordpress.com/2011/12/12/minustah-by-the-numbers-haiti-occupied-by-thirdlargest-un-peacekeeping-contingent-in-the-world-and-it-is-not-even-a-war-zone/ accessed on 2
January 2014
15

comparison with other neighboring states. Haiti's homicide rate in 2003 was 6.9
per 100,000 people. That compares to Jamaica at 52, Trinidad at 35, and the
Bahamas at 28 and Brazil at 23. The rate for the U.S. colonies of Puerto Rico and
U.S. Virgin Islands (2007 statistics) is 26 and 39, respectively16. In no other
country has the UN made so many efforts to keep peace. Throughout the 1990s, 5
peacekeeping operations were deployed to Haiti.17
A peacekeeping operation (PKO) on the other hand has to go through a
few considerations before they can be agreed upon and deployed to the host
country. It has to be able to claim legal justification and moral legitimacy for
humanitarian intervention from the international community.18 Legal justification
can be seen through the analysis of the international law regarding humanitarian
intervention, especially in the UN Charter whilst moral legitimacy is seen to be
fulfilled when genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic
cleansing occurs.19The question of the reasoning of deployment then comes to
mind when addressing MINUSTAH.

It is worth noting that in the political

process, we not only analyze the states of the permanent 5 but also the other states
that have a significant role in the deployment of the PKO. In this case the writer
believe that Brazil is a good example of how political interest might be a variable
since Brazil is the leader and one of the biggest contributor of troops to
MINUSTAH With more than 2,000 troops Brazil also constitutes the largest

16

2003 Global Study on Homicide by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODP).
Malone, D. Decision Making in the UN Security Council. The Case of Haiti. 1990-1997, 1998.
18
Holzgrefe, J. L. and Robert O. Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political
Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
19
UN Document A/59/2005, United Nations, In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development
and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for Decision by
Heads of State and Government in September 2005, http://www.un.org/largerfreedomaccessed on
3 March 2014
17

troop contributor to MINUSTAH. Aside from that, the writer will also analyze the
dynamic inside the permanent 5 members of the UNSC whilst making the
mandate of MINUSTAH.
1.2 Research Problem
Based on the brief background above, Haiti has therefore not fulfilled the
normal criteria for a state to be intervened but on the other hand was deployed a
large number of troops, thus the main problem of this research is, what is the
reasoning of the United Nation Security Council to intervene in Haiti?
1.3 Aim of Research
This thesis seeks to pinpoint and analyzethe reasoning of deployment that
correlates to MINUSTAHs intervention in Haiti, from legality, moral
justification and the political interest of some states in MINUSAH, from some of
the most significant actors in thenon-permanent member and the dynamics of the
permanent 5 members in making this mandate for MINUSTAH in 2004.
1.4 Theoretical Framework
To analyze reasoning behind the reasoning of the deployment of the
humanitarian interventionof MINUSTAH in Haiti, the writer will analyze the
legality through the articles in the UN Charter, the moral justificationthrough the
means of pinpointing the particular stage of conflict escalation in the domestic
scale of Haiti and the political process that coincides with the political interest of
the members of the UNSC in 2004 using the theories below:
1.4.1 Humanitarian Intervention

The UN in upholding its responsibility of protecting international actors

not only has a responsibility towards state actors, but also non-state actors,
particularity individuals. The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights makes individualsat the center of protection and are provided internationallegal protection. This responsibility falls first and foremost into the hands of the
states, but occurrences may occur when a state is well beyond is capabilities to
ensure peace and security towards its citizen. Although sovereignty is at the
upmost center of international relations, when a state flagrantly violated human
rights throughgenocide or ethnic cleansing, there is a need to stop those things, it
is during those times that some kind of intervention is thus needed and is deemed
legitimate.
Humanitarian intervention is thus the justifiable use of force across state
borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread
and violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its
own citizens from treatment so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the
limits within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reasons and justice and
who themselves would be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive
government, without the permission of the state within whose territory force
is applied. 20 Other than those internal factors of the potentially-intervened states,
in order for an international intervention to take place there are a few criteria that
need to be fulfilled before external actors are deployed. They are: a legitimate
authority has to conduct the war, usually sanctioned by the UN, force has to be the
last resort and has to be proportional to the injuries and crimes perpetrated,

20

Holzgrefe and Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention.

10

intervention should be in the intention to make things better for the civilians, the
interveners has to assume the responsibility for the welfare of the people and for
establishing peace and have to end the intervention after completing their
humanitarian mission there has to be an exit strategy.

21

It is basically the theory

of intervention on the ground of humanity that recognizes the right of one state to
exercise an international control by military force over the acts of another in
regard to its internal sovereignty when contrary to the law of humanity.22
Humanitarian intervention is thus an activity taken by a state, or other actor,
which interferes in the domestic affairs of another state for moral reasons
concerning human rights.
1.4.2 Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
The Concept of Responsibility to Protect has a wide variety of definitions,
From the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, the High-Level Panel report, the Report of the Secretary-General,
and the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit23, the writer adopts the
conclusion by Carsten Stahn in stating that the most comprehensive definition can
be taken from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS). The ICISS shifted the focus from the right to intervene to the

responsibility to protect. Here, R2P views that the

responsibility to protect implies an evaluation of the issues from the
point of view of those seeking or needing support, rather than those
who may be considering intervention; secondly, the responsibility to
21

Anthony Oberschall, Conflict and Peace Building in Divided societies: Responses to ethnic
Violence. Routledge: Oxon, 2007.
22
Steve G. Simon, The Contemporary Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, 1993.
23

CarstenStahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm? The

American Journal of International Law, Vol.101.No.1, 2007.

11

protect acknowledges that the primary responsibility rests with the

state concerned, and that it is only if the state is unable or unwilling
to fulfill this responsibility , or is itself the perpetrator, that it
becomes the responsibility of the international community to act in
its place; thirdly, the responsibility to protect means not just the
responsibility to react , but the responsibility to prevent and the
responsibility to rebuild as well24.
From the quote above most can agree that the responsibility to protect the
sole responsibility to protect its people lie on the host state and only when a state
is unable to protect the right of life of its citizen then can external forces be
allowed to come. The responsibilities of the forces does not only finish at getting
the parties in conflict in agreement but also getting the parties to stop potential
conflicts and also the rebuilding of the infrastructures and human capital that
might have been lost in the conflict process. Morally, R2P can only be applied
when A state has done 4 humanitarian crimes, there are four R2P crimes,
genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

25

Here, the

military intervention is the last resorttobetaken by the international world.

This concept emerged in 1996, which assumes that the international
community should have the right to intervene when a state cannot fulfill and give
the people its essential needs. A states responsibility towards its people. In 2001,
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty released a
key report entitled The Responsibility to Protect, affirms that the international
community, through the legitimacy of UNSC, has the right to intervene militarily

24

Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, the

Responsibility to Protect, December 2001.
25
the World Summit High-level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2005.

12

when a population is suffering from serious harm due to insurgency or to state

failure. 26
R2P is basically the idea that a state should protect its citizens from mass
atrocities. State sovereignty implies responsibility, not a license to kill27 and
when that state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, the responsibility
becomes

that

of

others

--neighboring countries

or

the

international

community, not excluding use of force in extreme cases 28. For international
organizations such as the UN, R2P means 'the responsibility to warn, to
generate

effective

prevention strategies, and when necessary to mobilize

effective reaction'29. R2P therefore suggests interplay and an attempt to include all
actors who are willing and able to prevent a situation to become grave and
destabilize a whole region from happening again. Whether or not to send a
peacekeeping mission is decided in the arena of international politics, and in
the case of UN missions in the UN Security Council, where the mandate is
designed and discussed 30.
This norm can be analyzed in this research paper on whether it really is
within the responsibility of the international community in contributing the
peacekeeping force in Haiti that the international community claim is committing
mass atrocities and other severe acts of humanities towards its people. This

26

International Development Research Centre, International Commission on Intervention and

State Sovereignty,: The Responsibility to Protect. Ottawa, 2001.
27
Evans,G.
The
responsibility
to
protect,
2008,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5667&l=1&m=1accessed on 28 December 2013
28
Weiss, T. The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007.
29
International Crisi Group, The
Responsibility
to
Protect,
2008.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4521&l=1&gclid=CKzontWbzJYCFQ86EAo
dUDPxwQ Accessed on 28 December 2013
30
Pouligny, Peace operations seen from below: UN missions and local people, C. Hurst & Co:
London, 2006.

13

perspective can also be used in this research as a tool to analyze the compatibility
of the deployment of MINUSTAH to Haiti in 2004.
1.4.3 Peacekeeping and Conflict Escalation
The United Nation itself never clearly states peacekeeping in its charter
but the definition offered by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(UNDPKO) seems the most appropriate: peace-keeping operation; PKO
[noncombat military operations undertaken by outside forces with the consent of
all major belligerent parties and designed to monitor and facilitate the
implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to
reach a political settlement].31

Picture I.2: The position of Peacekeeping in the escalation of conflict32

31

United
Nations
Department
of
Peacekeeping
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/glossary/accessedon 3 January 2014
32
http://bookstore.usip.org/books/BookDetail.aspx?productID=51314

Operations.

14

The difference between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding

thus depends on the position of the conflict at hand in each country. Although the
three task of peace troops cannot be clearly separated because it is synergized and
integrated into 1 cycle, there are clear mandates for each peacemaking,
peacekeeping and peacebuilding troops at hand. Peacemaking refers to the efforts
to bring hostile parties to agreementby peaceful means, through diplomatic
negotiations and with their consent.Peace making addresses conflicts in progress,
attempting to bring them to a halt, using the tools of diplomacy and mediation.33
Whilst peacekeeping is in the fear that domestic situation could threaten peace and
international security. Peacekeeping is a noncombat military operations
undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties and
designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an existing truce
agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement. It is
done when conflict has broken out and the UN intervenes to assist in keeping
peace.34 The third stage is peacebuilding which occurs after both a ceasefire and a
political settlement have been reached.

Includes

building

institutions

of

governance, building a civil service and the judiciary, and strengthening the rule
of law Includes improving respect for human rights through the monitoring of,
education on, and investigation of past and existing abuses and providing
technical assistance for democratic transition.35Peacebuilding on the other hand is
a political process requiring ongoing political mediation, the strengthening of
national capacities at several levels for conflict management, and sensitivity to the
33

Lindenmayer, Elisabet & Kaye, Josie Lianna, A Choice for Peace?: The Story of Forty-one days
of Meditation in Kenya, 2009.
34
United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations Training. UN Peacekeeping Training
Manual. Nd
35
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/25354 (March 3, 1993).

15

political, historical, economic and cultural context and dynamics. 36 It entails a

range of activities aimed at making peace self-sustaining and reducing the risk of
relapse into conflict.37 Since this research will be mainly focused on the
peacekeeping operation (PKO) in Haiti, it is worth noting that indeed
peacekeeping troops will be mainly deployed in the event that there has been a
truce between warring parties which is mainly done after a certain civil war or
internal conflict has finished. 38
The conflict escalation process in this case will be used in determining the
situation and what kind of stage in the conflict escalation that entails the PKO to
take action in that specific country.
1.4.4 English School of International Relations
The English School theory was established in the 1960s and 1970s with
Martin Wight and Hedley Bull being some of the most prominent writers. The
English School examines the emergence, character, and effects of international
society, particularly its importance to world order.39
In Wights words, the English School has its origins of the rationalist
conception of international society. This conception was the middle bridge
between the realism doctrine and revolutionism doctrine. Relism states that states
especially the great powers are always in a competition for power which
makes everyday society provide for their own security. Revolutionism on the
36

Rep.
of
the
Panel
on
U.N.
Peace
Operations,

13,
www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/. Accesed on 29 December 2013
37
United
Nations
Department
of
Peacekeeping
Operations.
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/glossary/accessedon 3 January 2014
38
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
39
Bull, H., The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: MacMillan.
Palgrave MacMillan. 1977

16

other hand refers the belief that humanity has the capacity to move beyond
geopolitics to a condition in which all communities can co-exist amicably without
the threat or use of force. Rationalism, according to Wight, rejects both
perspectives while recognising that they have their respective strengths and have
left a distinctive mark on world politics. The essence of the doctrine is that states
may never succeed in eliminating war but they have reached important
agreements about how to control the use of force. States are not condemned to
compete for power and security; indeed, they form a society that preserves a
remarkably high level of order in the context of anarch. Political communities
have mitigated the effects of that struggle by agreeing on principles that provide
some measure of security for the parties involved. But achievements in that
domain are always precarious and they are unlikely to survive indefinitely.40
English School therefore uses rationalism as the media that rejects the optimism
of revolutionism and the pessimism of realism and occupying the middle ground
between them.
1.5 Theoretical Synthesis
Based on the proposed theories above, it can be assumed that MINUSTAH
is considered to be a peacekeeping operation and thus falls under the law of and
the legal process of peacekeeping. The English School Theory of International
Relations explains how the law and regulations are able to control states when
implementing their foreign policies. The middle ground between the vying
powerful states and the altruistic reasoning for policies are the main brunt of the
40

Wight, M., International Theory: The Three Traditions. Leicester: Leicester University Press.
1991.

17

theory and will be used throughout this thesis. The application of humanitarian
intervention and responsibility to protect goes hand in hand when a state justifies
its actions of intervention into another state and thus the criteria used in
determining the deployment can be used in terms of its legality and moral
justification. The theory of peacekeeping itself is common when determining what
kind of generation and mandates is to be applied into a specific peace keeping
operation mission. A specific mission may have different terms and mandates
according to its generation.

Picture I.3: Theoretical Thinking of the writer

18

I.6 Hypothesis
Based on the above explanation and proposed use of theory, it is that in
some events of the deployment of peacekeeping, there are more than just
liberalistic and altruistic (for the greater good of the international stability) views
of its deployment, rather some sort of national interest are existent and are
influencing in the development and mechanism of MINUSTAH.
If we are to look into the legality of the situation, the United Nations
Charter as the main source of international law in regards to the deployment of
MINUSTAH in Haiti would see that the peacekeeping intervention is based on the
Chapter VII of the Charter. Even though the Charter of the UN states that
intervention into another state is very much frowned upon in the international
world, there would come a time when humanitarian crisis and other violations of
human right is deemed as a justification of intervention. The basic assumption of
non-intervention of a state into another state thus not rigid, there are other articles
in the charter that would trump another article.
If we are to look into the moral justification of Haiti before 2004, even
though that Haiti is not a typical situation in which an intervention is deemed
necessary, there is a unique situation in Haiti. This uniqueness may stem from that
fact of how MINUSTAH is different in terms of its mandates and its generation of
peacekeeping.
Another hypothesis in the deployment of MINUSTAH if we are too
analyze the political process of the situation would suggest that the moral
justification of a states, in this case Haiti, is not solely for thesole purpose of

19

humanitarian. The writer suspects that there are other political interests at stake,
whether they are the non-permanent members of the UNSC at the time or one of
the permanent 5 members in 2004 at the time of the MINUSTAH deployment.
I.7Method of Analysis
I.7.1 Concept Operationalization
I.7.1.1Human security
The changing nature of the international world has made some significant
changes in the concept of security ashas been stipulated by the UNSC. Before the
Cold War, a threat to the international world might only be seen through the
reflection of inter-state wars, but now Council has broadened its concept of
security and with it the issues that are deemed to be threats to international peace
andsecurity. It is now more common for the UNSC to declare armed intra-state
conflict as threats to international peace and security under Article 39.41
The concept of Human security puts the fulfillment of individuals right at
the center of its goal but,does not undermine the role that state plays in its part,
thus is inseparable from the state. Human security means the security of such
chronic threats as from chronic and persistent poverty to ethnic violence, human
trafficking, climate change, health pandemics, international terrorism, and
sudden

economic and

financial

downturns and repressions. Although the

definition of repression itself is in some ways clouded by many perspectives,

ultimately it is some sort of situation where a state prevents its citizens from
enjoying all human rights. In this sense, the basic goal of any outside actions done
41

UN Charter Chapter VII article 39

20

from something other than that respective state itself, it has to have the goal of
ensuring human security towards the citizen of that state42. Human security is also
based on a multi-sectorial understanding of insecurities. Therefore, human
security entails a broadened understanding of threats and includes causes of
insecurity relating for instance to economic, food, health, environmental, personal,
community and political security.
Thus in essence, human security aims on giving human a state of peace of
mind in all sectors of their life. Individuals can attempt to secure themselves, but
when it comes to matters of national security, border invasion, and loss of
territory only states have the capacity and the authority to provide crucial
protection.
1.7.1.2Mandate of United Nation Security Council
A mandate is a result of a series of negotiation and compromises between
relevant actors, in the case of a peacekeeping mandate, the members of the
Security Council, regional bodies and other actors have put their most basic
interests into the mandate. A mandate is therefore the basic benchmark that allows
for one party to determine whether the peacekeeping operation (PKO) is of
success or failure, usually if there are changes in the future years, it can be seen
that the previous mandate has not achieved its maximal target or that the domestic
situation at hand has changed considerably. Due to its significant role, it is thus
necessary to look at how the goals of the mission are formulated.

42

Jorge Nef, Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability: The Global Political Economy of
Development and Underdevelopment, Second Edition, Ottawa: IDRC Books, 1999

21

Failed mandates can be the cause of points in the articles in the mandates
being too vague.43 Several actors might have different perspective on that goal
depending on their interpretations, as what happened in UNOSOM mandate in
Somalia (1993-1995). It is hence extremely important to not only state the need
for a mission, but also clear limitations and goals. 44
1.7.1.3 Civil War
In defining the definition, the writer draws upon the definition from
Fearon and Laitins 2003 paper which states that a civil war is : (1) fighting
between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, non-state groups who
sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use
violence to change government policies. (2) The conflict killed at least 1,000 over
its course, with a yearly average of at least 100. (3) At least 100 were killed on
both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels).45
It can also be called to have a characteristic of havinghumanitarian
suffering on an enormous scale, numerous armed factions, collapse of the civil
infrastructure, absence of governance and a legal system, absence of individual
security, possibility of ethnic cleansing and genocide, large numbers of displaced
civilians and refugees and unchallenged criminal activities in the host
nation.46After the 1994 IASC conference working paper, another term was coined
in favor of conflict zone and that is complex emergencies.47Because these
43

Jett, Dennis C. 1999 Why Peacekeeping Fails. New York: St. Martins Press.
D. JChristie, R. VWagner, & D. A. Winter, (Eds.). Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace
Psychology for the 21st Century. Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, 2001.
45
Fearon andLaitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." The American
46
MaryKaldor, New and Old Wars, Organized violence in a Global Era. Polity Press,1999.
47
AlexSchmid, Thesaurus and glossary for Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms.
Fewer And Ramsbotham and Woodhouse. (1998): 46
44

22

symptoms are so multidimensional, it will not only take one part of an

international organization, mainly the UN, to solve this crises but several different
areas and. A complex emergency is therefore is not just ahumanitarian or a
military problem, its containment requires more than the individual capability of a
single element of the response.
I.7.2 Research Approach
The approach of the research used will be the descriptive approach. In this
sense, the writer will attempt to describe and explain the relation between the
factors, in this how the variables of the Legality of the International law, the moral
justification in terms of domestic situation in Haiti and the political process in the
making of the mandate.
I.7.3 Scope of Research
For the purposes of this paper, peacekeeping operations will refer to those
operations

that

are

defined

as

such

by

the

UN

organization,

in

particularlyMINUSTAH. In explaining the historical situation in Haiti, the writer

will talk about the situation after the last PKO beforeMINUSTAH took over
(before 2004).
I.7.4 Data Collection Techniques
Data collecting according to Neuman can be defined into two types,
quantative data collecting and qualitative data collecting. Quantative data
collection will mostly use tools like, survey, and questionnaire and other things
that will result in a number that will be used in the research. Whilst qualitative
data colleting stresses on the importance of interpretation through interviews,
23

observation, focus discussion groups and literature study. In this case, the writer
will use qualitative data collecting, and due to the lack of resources and means to
go to Haiti and see first-hand interviews and observation, data collecting will
consists of mainly literature review,through books, printed media, and credible
online media.
I.7.5 Data Analysis Techniques
Data analysis technique is grouped into qualitative and quantitative
technique. Qualitative technique is the process of putting data coming from
interviews, field observation and other literature data, systematically. According
to Miles and Huberman, the activity of qualitative technique includes data
reduction, data display and conclusion drawing/ verification.

48

In this thesis. The

writer uses the technique of qualitative.

I.6.6 Research Overview
Chapter II

Provide the legal background of the intervention in Haiti and how

it has catapulted the deployment of MINUSTAH, particularly from
the international laws from the UN Charter.

Chapter III

Explain the legitimacy and moral justification of the intervention

of MINUSTAH in Haiti by analyzing its social and domestic
problems.

48

SingarimbunIrawati,PemanfaatanPerpustakaan.
(1995): 311

MetodePenelitianSurvei.

Jakarta: LP3ES

24

Chapter IV

Explain the relation of the political process and moral justification

of the MINUSTAH deployment with the national interest that is at
stake with some of the members of the UNSC in 2004.

Chapter V

Concludes the research and pinpoints the factors contributing to

deployment of MINUSTAH.

25

Chapter II
Legal Background of Humanitarian Intervention of MINUSTAH
The explanations in this chapter provides the correlations of the concept of
humanitarian intervention, the concept of responsibility to protect and
peacekeeping deployment in the events of domestic crisis that are deemed by the
UNSC as being a threat to international peace. The UN Charter, as the main
source of legal coding in defining the actions of the UN is used by the writer to
explain the legal justification in the deployment of MINUSTAH.
II.1 United Nations Charter as the main Source of International Law in
Humanitarian Intervention
The UN Charter49 delegates to the Council the primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security.50 The UN Charter itself
outlaws the use of force on the part of individual states, and it empowers the
Security Council to make all decisions on collective measures that involve
military force. Article 2(4) states that:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations.
The article stresses the prohibition of using force to intervene another
state, also goes along with Article 2(3), which insists that UN members settle their
interstate disputes by peaceful means. This is later reinforced in Article 2(7)
prohibits the UN from intervening in domestic affairs of states while

49
50

UN Charter
UN Charter

26

allowing for the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.51 Even
though this article outlaws the right of states to use force, article 24, 39, 42 deliver
the power to the Security Council. These sections of the Charter establish that the
Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security (Article 24) and that it can take what measures it deems necessary in
that pursuit, including military action against states or other threats (Article 24).52
Whilst in article 51 in regards to self-defense and the right of the UNSC to impose
coercive measures to maintain peace, according to article 39 and 42 of the UN
Charter. It can be concluded therefore, that the UN may interfere in the domestic
problems of a state if the establishment of the mission is based under Chapter
VII.53
One of the body that has a lot of authoritative in realizing the goals is the
United Nation Security Council (UNSC). The decision in the UNSC has a high
global significance. According to the UN Charter54, the Council acts on
behalf of all member states and its decisions are binding on all member states
and to some

extent,

non-members. UNSC in this case can issue

recommendations to disputing parties, recommendations to the General Assembly

as well as make mandatory decisions. It is in the council also that the power to
determine what constitutes a threat to international peace and security are very
much in the hands of the UNSC. The UNSC has many roles to be played by the
member states.
51

UN Charter
Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect, Foreign Affairs 81 , no.
6 ( 2002 ), (2002): 99 110 .
53
This chapter states the UNs powers to preserve international peace and security, and the
measures that it can take to maintain it.
54
UN Charter
52

27

Authorization for the use of force for humanitarian purposes is one of the
important functions that the UNSC has and does not want to lose, because it
shows that the UN is capable of addressing significant issues regarding security of
the international society.55 The United Nations is established for the purpose
of providing and maintaining of international peace and security, so authorization
of the use of force is an important function of the UN for the fulfilling its main
objective.
One of the first thing that will be done in response to this international norm
was to set down some specific parameters and circumstances in which
international society should assume responsibility for preventing, halting, and
rebuilding after a humanitarian emergency of the intervened. As stated in the
previous chapter, based on the World Summit High Level Meeting in 2005,
humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine should
be upheld when facing four crimes against humanity, and they are genocide,
ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

56

If those four things

were to happen then the responsibility to intervene and stop those humanitarian
crimes would fall on international society generally and the Security Council in
particular.
In deciding what constitutes threats to international peace and security, the
concept of security is very crucial. Throughout the years, the definition of
international threat has also evolved. Now, the UN Security Council includes
civil war, intrastate conflicts and the possession of weapons of mass
55

Jennifer M.Welsh,Authorizing Humanitarian Intervention, in United Nations and Global

Security, ed. Richard Price. Gordonsville, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004
56
World Summit High-level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2005.

28

destruction and humanitarian crisis into its interpretation of what constitutes

threats to international peace and security.57
II. 2 Peacekeeping in the UN Charter
Commonly referred to as Chapter VI-and-a-half activity, traditional
peacekeeping is seen to lie somewhere between Chapter VI of the UN Charter,
Pacific settlement of disputes and Chapter VII which provides for use of force
by the United Nations to uphold international peace and security. Since the end of
the Cold War, broader interpretation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter resulted
in the rise of the number of humanitarian interventions. The Security
Council started to decide what constitutes a threat to international peace and
security in a more flexible manner than during the Cold War. In Chapter
VII of the UN Charter the limits to state sovereignty are recognized. These limits
are at the points at which the UN Security Council determines a threat to
international peace and security under Chapter VII. Article II (VII) which sets
down the principal of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states also gives
the limits to this principle: This principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
MINUSTAH was authorized under article 7 of the UN Charter. This
article directly corresponds with article 41 and 42 which states that:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions,
and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply
such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
57

Welsh, Authorizing Humanitarian Intervention

29

relations58. Should the Security Council consider that measures

provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be
inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may
be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United
Nations.59
The article above basically states that although the council has the right to
intervene in another state in crisis situations, military intervention should be the
last resort and prioritizing other options first and foremost. Mandates given under
the auspices of Chapter VII of the UN Charter suggests that there is a possible
need to not only address the problems in non-militaristic way but also address the
problems at hand in a military way to reduce the instability in Haiti. It combines
assistance and the use of force owing due to its two roles as a peacekeeping and
peace enforcement mission and it also integrates many humanitarian actors, both
military and civilian.
II.2.1 History of Peacekeeping Operation
Based on Segals60 identification of peacekeeping evolutions, it can be seen
that throughout the years the basic concept of peacekeeping, like the situation and
condition of the international world itself, has progressed.
The first of these phases, labelled by Segal as observer missions, or first
generation peacekeeping,61

is conducted between 1946 and 1955. These

operations are characterized by the unarmed and impartial observer deploying in

small numbers to supervise a truce or monitor an armistice and the consent of the
58

Article 41, Chapter 7 UN Charter

Article 42, Chapter 7 UN Charter
60
Segal, The United Nations Peacekeeping Success but Peace Enforcement Failures Australian
International Law Journal ,(2000):182.
61
H McCoubrey, and N.D. White, The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulations of United Nations
Military Operations, 1996.
59

30

host country. In other words, the peacekeeping operations done at that time would
have no action in a political level and were merely a passive tool.
Phase two operations ran from 1956 to 1965 and saw a change from small,
unarmed groups to the deployment of armed forces but the arms carried were
strictly to be used in self-defense only but consent of the host country was still
needed. The principles of consent and impartiality and prohibition on the use of
force except in self-defense was also used. Phase three ran from 1966 to 1985 but
saw a decline in the deployment of the peacekeeping forces due to the Cold War.
Here it can be seen that these first generation peacekeeping troops were mainly
deployed in a warring state. 62
The fourth phase of peacekeeping from 1985 to 1990 also known as the
second generation peacekeeping, still relied upon consent of both the warring
parties. However, the operations were now not only focusing on subduing the
military violence but also took time to focus with elements of nation building.
Peacekeepers were also being used to implement and not merely monitor,
comprehensive settlements. This phase saw the transitions of the peacekeeping
troops as not only a passive tool, but taking on a more active role. 63
The advent of third generation peacekeeping, saw the consent of the state
being diminished. It also represents a period of time, a loss of impartiality. This
change was caused due to the fact that the nature of conflict in that time was
different. Increasingly peacekeepers are inserted into internal armed conflicts
rather than as a buffer between hostile States. Their missions are to disarm

62
63

Segal, The United Nations Peacekeeping Success but Peace Enforcement Failures
Segal, The United Nations Peacekeeping Success but Peace Enforcement Failures

31

belligerents, rebuild infrastructure, physically as well as organizationally, in

addition to providing security and basic administration for the State.

Some

scholars even go as far as saying that missions with extensive civilian functions,
including economic reconstruction, institutional reform, and election oversight
signicantly improve the chances of peacebuilding success whilst observer and
enforcement missions improve the chance for peace but of course not as
significantly as integrated missions.64
The most recent type of UN peacekeeping is represented by the UN
administrations in Kosovo and East Timor. Unlike earlier experiences of the
United Nations in governing a territory the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET, 1999-2002) and the United Nations
Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK, 1999-to date) were both established
under chapter VII by the Security Council which meant that the Security Council
has two forms of enforcement actions available to it.65 According to article 41,
actions not involving the use of armed force and according to article 42 military
actions by air, sea and land forces. Article 42 serves as the legal basis for the
military component of each administration but a closer analyses is required to see
whether article 41 is the legal basis of the civilian component.66
These kinds of missions have never been deployed in the history of United
Nations peacekeeping. In Kosovo and East-Timor, the UN took over the functions
of a state due to the fragility of the state. The UN then began to exercise all
legislative and executive powers of both territories. The administrations have been
64

M.W. Doyle, VN peacekeeping in Cambodia, UNTAC's civil mandate,Boulder London,

1995.
65
Multi-disciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons from Recent UN Experience, 1999
66
UN Charter Article 41 and 42

32

called by some new trusteeships, protectorate style forces or the fourth generation
of peacekeeping67. It can be seen that neither resolution 1244 in regard to
UNMIK, nor resolution 1272 in connection with UNTAET, specified which
article of the Charter authorized the Security Council to establish the missions.
Based on the above description, the writer concludes that MINUSTAH is
part of the fourth generation of peacekeeping which is characterized by
challenging goals and a complex mandates. These operations may be deployed
without the consent of warring parties and seek to provide assistance and
protection to civilians, force hostile groups to abandon violence, and collaborate
on

state

creation

and-or

reconstruction. Though it falls short of formally

exercising sovereignty, the Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en

Haiti (MINUSTAH) has typical fourth-generation tasks. 68
II.2.2 MINUSTAH as a form of Peacekeeping Operation
MINUSTAH is considered to be a humanitarian intervention and is part of
the responsibility to protect and is done through a mandate of the UNSC. Below is
a diagram which shows the correlation of humanitarian intervention, the
responsibility to protect and the deployment of MINUSTAH.

67

Multi-disciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons from Recent UN Experience, 1999.

Fishel, John T. & SANZ, Andrs, eds. Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case of Haiti.
Washington: National Defense University Press, 2007
68

33

Picture II: Relations of Peacekeeping with Humanitarian Intervention

and Responsibility to Protect.
Like previously stated, there are a few criteria in order for a mission to be
considered legitimate to be deployed. Consent of the parties; Impartiality; No use
of force except in self-defense and in defense of the mandate. In terms of consent
of the parties, here, the official government are defined by the United Nation
but no one really knows what are the parties involved, since Haiti has not declared
any armed conflict beyond the political conflict between the ruling political class,
the opposition and the masses which also intricate the problem of impartiality.
MINUSTAH was established to support the transitional government of Haiti
(TGOH) and the Haitian national police (HNP), recognized as the only legally

34

armed group in the country at the time.69In the sense of impartiality, it is thus
questionable since a mandate that only recognized TGOH and HNP, without
recognizing any other party, can hardly be considered completely impartial.
As for the consent of the parties although the president was nominated in
accordance with the Haitian Constitution, the prime minister who at that time was
responsible for running the government, was selected by a Conseil des Sages
(Council of the Wise) and imported from the Haitian diaspora. This process was
considered illegitimate by part of the population, since, according to Haitian
legislation, the prime minister should have been chosen by the president and
approved by the parliament.70
Haitis security challenges did not fit conventional approaches or doctrines
developed for international peace operations. Especially missions under Chapter
VI of the UN Charter. UN missions in Haiti, including MINUSTAH, did not
directly derive from an armed conflict between organized opposing forces. As
identified by the Center of International Cooperation, in one of its latest papers on
Haiti, the most salient political violence of the past three decades has involved
not well-organized combat operations, but mobilization of crowds from
among

the millions of extremely poor, on short notice by murky political

interests. Violent political activity often reflects intertwined criminal and political
insecurity.71

69

Jorge Heine and Andrew S. Thompson (eds.), Haitis Governance Challenges and
the International Community. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation/Wilfrid
Laurier Press, 2010.
70
Haitian Constitution 1987
71
Kjeksrud, Stian. "Using Force to Stabilize: Implications for the Integrated Mission in Haiti and
Beyond" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and

35

The United Nation, in this case represented by MINUSTAH needs to

realize the extent of its relationship with the Government and other related
political institutions of the State that has been collapsing for decades. In Haiti,
this problem is readily apparent as acting government at that time and the
absence national political will or capacity were mostly responsible for the
withdrawal of previous the international missions. The pride of being the first
nation to be independent by a slave rebellion made them distrustful of foreign
interventions that were to take part.72Haiti was neither at war nor in a typical postconict situation. There was no need for peacekeeping forces to act as a buffer
between two warring sides since the context in Haiti in 2004 was primarily one of
social insecurity, gang warfare and violent crime.

Practitioners, New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans,
2010, http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p414339_index.htmlaccessed on 14 February 2014
72
Mani, Rama. Dj vu or Something New? Lessons for Future Peacebuilding from Haiti in
Sicherheit und Frieden, Security and Peace, vol 1/2006, Jan 2006. http://www.sicherheit-undfrieden.nomos.de/fileadmin/suf/doc/SuF_06_01.pdf accessed on 15 April 2014

36

Chapter III
Moral Justification of MINUSTAH in Haiti
The domestic situation are one thing that really affects whether or not a
peacekeeping operation is deployed. The moral justification of MINUSTAH
intervention Haiti is seen in how the domestic circumstances of Haiti are in
correlations with the principles of the responsibilities to protect.
3.1 Socio-Historical Background of Haiti before the Peacekeeping in 2004
Haiti proclaimed its independence on January 1, 1804 making it the second
nation in the Americas to gain independence and the first nation governed by the
people of African descent. The fact that the Haitians overthrew the French and got
succeeded in fighting for their freedom would eventually affect in how the
Haitians view the interventions in the future, it also shows how tied they feel to
their roots in Africa. 73
Haiti is categorized as fragile, failing and failed in international
humanitarian and development circles.74 Foreign Policy magazine ranks 59 failed
states against 12 indicators in its Failed State Index. Haiti ranks seventh worse
among failed states just behind Somalia, Congo, Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe
and Afghanistan. In 2012 in a composite measure of human wellbeing, Haiti
ranked 161 worse off of 187 countries. No Latin American or Caribbean country
fell into this low development category.75 Also the are a major indicator of

73

R. Muggah, The perils of changing donor priorities: the Haiti case. In J. Welsh and N. Woods
(eds.) Exporting Good Governance. Chapter 8. Wilfred Laurier Press, Waterloo, 2008
74
Muggah, The perils of changing donor priorities: the Haiti case
75
The human development index (HDI). United Nation. UN Development Programme (UNDP),
2012

37

how well a country is governed. World Banks Worldwide Governance

Indicators reports six indexes compiled from composite scores derived from
multiple sources.
World Bank Governance Indicators
Percentage of countries worse than Haiti
Voice & accountability
30%
Political stability & absence of
violence
20%
Government effectiveness
5%
Regulatory quality
20%
Rule of law
5%
Corruption controls
8%
Picture III.1: World Banks Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
for1996-2011
Even though Haiti's economy in GDP increased during the 1970s, its
economy declined by an annual average of 1.5 in the 1980s and by 3.2 in the
1990s and declined again from 2000 to 2003 by 2%, Haiti's GDP was also
only US $346 in 2003, way below the average of US $3,273.

76In

the graphic

below, it also maps out the HDI of Haiti, which is one of the closes
measurement for poverty worldwide. Interestingly enough, the HDI has seen
some improvement from 1995-2003. By 2005, Haiti was ranked 153rd out of
177 countries by the UNDP Human Development Index, the lowest ranking
country in the Western hemisphere. Public services, such as health, sanitation
and education, are extremely weak.77

76

International Crisis Group. A New Chance for Haiti?, ICG Latin America/Caribbean Report
No10, Port-au-Prince/Brussels. 2004. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-americacaribbean/haiti/010-a-new-chance-for-haiti.aspx accessed on 10 February 2014
77
The human development index (HDI). United Nation.

38

Picture III.2: GDP per capita and HDI trends in Haiti 1970-200478

The Haitian Institute of Statistics and Information Technology estimated

that in 2001, 56 percent of the population was living on less than a dollar a day
and 76 percent on less than US$2, which is the international standard for
poverty.The World Bank estimated that GNI per capita in 2005 was US$450.
UNICEF estimated the 2005 under-five infant mortality rate at 120 per 1,000, as
compared to 43 in Guatemala.79
Amnesty International reports that the efforts of the UN and the Police
Force of Haiti has mostly failed from curbing the violent crime in Haiti. It states
that on average, 100 people were murdered in 2004 but not all were processed due
to the corrupt and ineffective police and courts of Haiti.80 Aside from that, Haiti
itself has a large and organized crime network, some member of the former armed
forces have joined together and formed armed brigades and claim that the

78

UNDP report 2005, World Bank Report 2005

United Nations Development Programme. 2006. Human Development Report 2006. Beyond
scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water crisis. New York. World Bank. Haiti Data Profile.
Available at: http://devdata.worldbank.org/ external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=HTI
accessed on 24 January 2014
80
Amnesty International Report 2005.
79

39

governmentowes them in ousting President Arisitde. Haiti is also a bridge for drug
trafficking, especially into the U.S, officials in the US estimates that around 8% of
the cocaine entering the US travels through Haiti.
Based on Haitis constitution, it guarantees the freedom of speech and
press which the government generally respect, but in some cases,like during the
second Aristide administration in 2000-2004, some members of the press were
killed for supporting opposition movements. Although the governments does not
censor radio, television or internet, it has so far in frequent times ignored the right
to assembly and organize.81
In the political sector, the governmental and political stability in the early
years of its independence in the nineteenth century was not apparent. The
constitution was never finalized and being treated as just a political game toy for
most political candidates, economic stagnation was everywhere and social
injustice was still apparent. The United States (US) seeing this violent instability,
intervened militarily. Here, the US occupation set the political conditions that
were in favor for the rise of the Duvaliers (Papa Doc and Baby Doc) who
ruled through a brutal dictatorship from 1957 through 1986. In ruling duration of
Duvalier, like their predecessors, the Duvaliers used the power of the state to
enrich themselves and repress the population.82 The governments preference
towards the interests of the minority upper class caused the foreign aid coming
into the country given to the rich instead of those in need and thus devastated the
economy, destroyed tourism, drove out foreign investors and ruined rural
81

Library of Congress Federal Research Division. Country Profile: Haiti. 2006.

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Haiti.pdf accessed on 15th February 2014
82
Library of Congress Federal Research Division. Country Profile: Haiti.

40

production.83 It was not until the late 1980s that economic disparities and
political corruption in Haiti reached ungovernable proportions, leading Baby Doc
to flee to France.84
After Duvaliers departure from presidency in 1986, there has been an
endless political transition punctuated by several military coups, outbursts of
violence and foreign military interventions. The UNs engagement came in two
waves: from 1990 to 2004 and from 2004 onwards. Between 1990 and 2004, the
UN was involved in a broad range of democracy promotion and state-building
activities in Haiti, many involved the use of militaristic measures against many
Haitian actors. 85
The United Nations first got involved in Haiti in 1990, with the
cooperation with the Organization of American States (OAS) in assisting in
monitoring the elections that brought to power Jean-Bertrand Aristide in
December 1990. Winning two-thirds of the vote, Aristide assumed office with an
unprecedented mandate, attesting to the appeal of his platform of dramatic social
change86. His victory was partly due to the fact that he had the support of the
group that had a nationalistic orientation, including merchant bourgeoisie, grassroots workers, peasants, and student organizations. Despite this popular appeal,
Aristides domestic opponents were strong and most used any means to get in

83

CarrolFaubert, Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries, Human Security,

Case Study: Haiti, 2006, http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/thematic/conflict/Haiti.pdf accessed
on 7 January 2014
84
Fuabert, Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries, Human Security, Case
Study: Haiti
85
Fuabert, Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries, Human Security, Case
Study: Haiti
86
Irwin Stotzky, Silencing the Guns in Haiti: the Promise of Deliberative Democracy. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1997.

41

power and his rule in Haiti was short-lived as he was forced to leave after a coup
dtat on 30 September 1991 and installed General Raoul Cdras as dictator.
The 1991 military coup and the aftermath of the Duvalier dictatorship
Haiti became the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, with the highest
levels of income inequality. Approximately 76 per cent of Haitians lived in
poverty, and only 39 per cent had access to safe water. Less than half of the adult
population could read and write. Haitians began to flee the country in the
thousands, many of them on makeshift rafts headed for the US.87 The continuing
breakdown in law and order, the rising insurgency and conditions of sheer
anarchy and chaos, as well as the worsening humanitarian crisis, causing
displacement of the population and increasing numbers of refugees crossing the
border made the situation not just a domestic problem but also constitute as a
threat to international peace and security.
The international community roundly criticized the coup and its ensuing
human rights violations. This prompted the United Nations, with the help of the
Organization of American States (OAS) to intervene the domestic matters of
Haiti. When the intervention failed, it called for a series of embargoes, but these
ultimately hurt the innocent Haitian civilians. Looking at these failures, the United
States perused a more militaristic option motivated primarily by concerns over
Haitian refugees and drug trafficking. 88
The international instability that was created by the coup was regarded as a
potential international peace, and thus a mission UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)

87
88

Stotzky, Silencing the Guns in Haiti: the Promise of Deliberative Democracy.

Stotzky, Silencing the Guns in Haiti: the Promise of Deliberative Democracy.

42

legalized by Security Council Resolution 867 (1993) and established in

Resolution 940 (1994) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter was deployed in
January 1995 with a mission of restoration of democracy, the establishment of
a secure and stable environment and the restructuring of the security forces

89

During that time, there was already another international civilian mission in Haiti,
UN-OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MCVIH) which was already
present in Haiti since 1993 with the aim to assist the professionalization of the
police in order to increase their ability and capacity to maintain order. After the
end of MICIVH mandate in 1996. Other missions following MCIVIH are the
United Nations Support mission (UNSMIH) in 1996 with the aim of helping to
maintain a secure and stable environment and promote institution-building.
The United Nations Transition Mission (UNTMIH) in 1997 was also deployed to
continue to professionalize the police force, and promote institution-building and
national reconciliation.

Another mission was MIPONUH followed by an

International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) in March 2000; its

mandate was to consolidate objectives reached by MIPONUH and MICIVIH, as
well as to reinforce the effectiveness of the Haitian police and judiciary and
promote human rights but the mission was terminated in 2001. On 29 February
2004, UN

Security

Council

adopted Resolution

1529

to authorize

Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to intervene in Haiti but was quickly

replaced by MINUSTAH on June 2004.

90

These comings and goings of the missions were for a number of reasons,
some left because their mandate was done and some left abruptly due to the
89
90

Bellamy, Understanding Peacekeeping

Library of Congress, Country Profile: Haiti.

43

failures that they faced. For example, under UN auspices, democratic elections
resulted in peaceful transition of leaders, but much of this progress was
superficial, and did not do anything to reflect substantive change in the
foundations of Haitis political system. Political and opposing parties behaved in
front of international auspices, but when these left, they once again struggled for
power. Also, UN forces and missions failed to implement most Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs effectively, which made
political opponents maintained ready access to arms. Finally, in the absence of
meaningful reform of the police and other political institutions, public insecurity
and human rights violations never completely vanished from the political
landscape, undermining the foundations for the rule of law and democracy.
The superficial nature of reform in Haiti became obvious in the 2000
presidential elections, in which Aristide and his Lavalas Party declared victory
amidst accusations of fraud and voter intimidation.91 According to the UN, voter
turnout in these presidential and parliamentary elections was only 10 per cent, and
the opposition opposed the results of the elections. After ineffective efforts to
mediate the crisis, tensions between Aristide and his opponents mounted,
culminating in violent protests between opposing parties in February of 2004.92
In early 2004, after years of clashes between Aristides supporters and its
main political opponents, consisted of armed gangs, former soldiers and police,
broke out in the city of Gonaves. The violence thus quickly spread across the
country and the anti-Aristide militias soon closed in on Port-au-Prince and

91
92

Library of Congress, Country Profile: Haiti.

Library of Congress, Country Profile: Haiti.

44

threatened to march on the capital. This resulted in the action of the OAS to call
upon the Security Council to take action to address the situation. On 29 February
2004, Aristide left Haiti for exile on a US aircraft. After arriving in the Central
African Republic he later moved to Jamaica a few weeks later. Although several
Caribbean leaders were angry at what some saw as Washingtons kidnapping of
Aristide, an investigation to look into the events into the events leading to
Aristides departure were never authorized and were blocked by the United States
and France.93
On the same day the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1529, which
authorized a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to intervene. This force were
comprised of a nearly 3,000 strong multinational interim force composed of
troops from the US (1,800), France (530), Chile (330) and Canada (150). On 30
April 2004, UN Security Council resolution 1542 established the UN Stabilization
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) this UN mission replaced MIF on 1 June 2004.
MINUSTAH includes more than 8,900 military personnel and 3,700 police from
more than 40 countries. Alongside leading the mission, Brazil provides one of the
largest contingents of forces, which numbers 1,200 troops. 94 Many of the soldiers
were provided by states from within the region, especially Brazil, Uruguay, Chile
and Argentina.
Here, the UN adopted its first fully integrated peace-support operation in
2004MINUSTAH. MINUSTAH was established as a joint military and civilian
mission with a mandate to help Haiti address a broad range of issues, including
93

Walter E. Kretchik, Haitis Quest for Democracy: Historical Overview. in Capacity-Building

for Peacekeeping: the Case of Haiti. John T. Fishel and Andrs Saenz, eds. Washington, D.C.:
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University Press, 2007.
94
Kretchik, Haitis Quest for Democracy: Historical Overview

45

peace and political stability, the re-establishment of the rule of law, the protection
of human rights, and social and economic development95.
MINUSTAH embodies to some extent the assumptions held by UN member
states that violence reduction and stability are precursors to restoring order,
democratic governance and development. The United Nation Resolution 154296,
highlighted the main function and duties of the MINUSTAH Peacekeepers.
MINUSTAHs first mandate stated that the mission should assist the transitional
government in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National
Police. assist
National

Police

the
with

transitional government
a

comprehensive

and

particularly the
sustainable

Haitian

Disarmament,

Demobilization and Reintegration programme for all armed groups and to assist
with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of lawincluding the reestablishment of the prison system.97
The parties in the past conflict that are still at odds today are the Armed
Forces of Haiti (FADH), the attachs, their armed

supporters,

Revolutionnaire

en

pour

lAvancement

et

Progrs

the

Front

Haiti (FRAPH),

paramilitary organization who supported the army, the economic elite a

majority of whom supported the military regime, and the mass population
the vast majority supporting the return of Aristide . But as of right now, the
significant number of violence in Haiti is not caused by the number of conflicts
between the political parties rather by the number of gang violence, but the
absence of the rule of law reinforced a climate of impunity, and crimes such as
95

U.N. 2004 Haiti Report

S/RES/1 42 (2004) www.minustah.org/pdfs/res/1 42 en.pdf accessed on 20 November 2013
97
UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1542, 30 April 2004, 7, I, (b), (c), (d).
96

46

kidnapping, robbery and rape increased. Armed gangs in the capital even become
some sort of "protector" towards the people living in that area, in exchange for
money. Aristide's supporters believe that he was kidnapped from the country, this
revenge was done in the form of the kidnap of civilians.
Several known human rights violators, including members of the former
paramilitary group the Front pour lavancement et le progrsdHati (FRAPH),
were members of anti-Aristide groups, and human rights abuses, including
killings and ill-treatment, were reported. 98
3.2 Conflict escalation of Haiti in Peacekeeping terms
Through this historical process, it has affected the Haitians in terms of its
conception of class inequalities, racism, sexism, political violence, poverty and
other social disparities. This has without a doubt shaped the perspective that some
Haitians have chosen in regards of international intervention. "One should admit
that history constitutes with the present, a continuum of experience and choices
that were taken and that impact the current situation. History has a certain level of
determinism in shaping the situation and characteristics of both the state and the
Haitian society".99
Hence, the legitimacy factor of the intervention of MINUSTAH to Haiti is
very much apparent. According to the 4 crimes of Responsibility to protect, an
intervention is only legitimate genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity happens. Instability in Haiti is mostly caused by criminality that

98

AI, Haiti: All armed groups must be disarmed.

Samuel Martinez, From Hidden Hand to Heavy Hand: Sugar, the State, and Migrant Labor in
Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Latin America Research Review, 1999.
99

47

increases daily, the unrestricted movement of civilian and military weapons, street
gangs and urban guerrillas, impunity and lack of judicial structures, numerous
prison escapes after the departure of M. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the deportation to
Haiti by the United States of criminals of Haitian origin, the silence of political
leaders, the extreme poverty of the population, illiteracy and ignorance, the
scarcity of business activities, the high level of unemployment and the HIV
pandemic.
Haitis conflict in terms of conflict escalation can be seen to be quite
ambiguous. Since there is not really a civil war, although conflicts and violence
are experienced everyday by the society, thus there is no peace treaty
implemented, it can neither be said to be in the definition of peacekeeping itself. If
it were to be called peacemaking, the violence has in actual reality experienced
the climax in the 2004 coup but since there is no peace treaty to be observed and
implemented, the function of the peacekeepers as the keeper of peace treaties is
not in actual works. On the other hand, it cannot be said to be at the stage of
peacebuilding either because there has not been a ceasefire nor a political
settlement have been reached. This goes back to the previous conclusion by the
writer in which MINUSTAH is a part of the fourth generation of peacekeeping
which is characterized by challenging goals and a complex mandates.

48

Chapter IV
Political Process of the Making of the MINUSTAH Mandate UNSC
Resolution Number 1542
This chapter aims to explain the national interest that is apparent in the
making of the mandate. This process is not only explained through the UNSC
Meetings, but also the meetings and agreement beforehand.
IV.1 Interest of Powers in the United Nation Security Council
IV. 1.1 Permanent 5 members of the UNSC
The United Nation has 6 main bodies to fulfill its purposes. The main body
that is responsible for the deployment of the Peacekeeping troops and thus the
maintenance of international peace and security is the United Nation Security
Council (UNSC). The UNSC is made up of 15 nations, 5 permanent members and
10 non-permanent members elected every 10 years. The authority of the UNSC
rests on the fact that it has the power to investigate, give recommendations to
settle disputes, and enact mandates. Issues that endanger the stability of the global
world are presented to the council by members and non-members of the UN.
These issues are brought to the attention of the council after measures are taken to
settle the dispute through a variety of peaceful means but were deemed

49

ineffective. This process enables the UNSC to enact mandates that are in full
consent with the parties involved that may include the possibility of military force
with the deployment of peacekeeping troops.
The importance of the P5 lies in their permanent status and right to veto,
which give them in-depth knowledge of the Security Councils aairs, missions,
and operating procedures, and enable close collaboration with other permanent
and elected members. This power of course does not undermine the power of the
non-permanent members of the UNSC because the no mandate will pass unless it
has been agreed with all P5 members and at least 4 non-permanent members.
The five permanent members of the Security Council are China, France,
Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States. The 10 nonpermanent members of the Council in 2004 were Algeria (2005), Angola (2004),
Benin (2005), Brazil (2005), Chile (2004), Germany (2004), Romania (2005),
Pakistan (2004), Philippines (2005) and Spain (2004).100 The non-permanent
members are elected for two-year terms by members of the UN General
Assembly. The distribution of countries represented in the non-permanent
members of the UNSC was to achieve a regional balance, with five Asian or
African members, two Latin American members, one east European, and two
members from Western Europe or other regions making up the mix of nonpermanent members.
The decision making process for a peacekeeping force to be deployed is
that it has to go through a majority of nine UNSC members, with a composition of
100

Martinez, Samuel.1999. From Hidden Hand to Heavy Hand: Sugar, the State, and Migrant
Labor in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Latin America Research Review.
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/org1405.doc.htm accessed on 21 January 2014

50

5 permanent member of the UNSC and a minimal of 4 members of the nonpermanent members. It can be said however that real power resides with the P5,
and their individual right of veto. As we saw, conflict between the P5 during the
cold war made the UNSC moribund as an instrument for managing international
security.
Even after the cold war, the P5 remain states with great power interests
and aspirations. Not all humanitarian crisis are given equal attention and help
because it cannot be denied that the politics and interest of the P5 play a great role
in the deployment of the peacekeeping force in the world. When a particular
humanitarian crisis is associated with a certain P5 member (or members), other
states may withhold their support or even threaten to veto the decision to
deploy, unless of course some kind of support is promised in exchange for their
interests elsewhere in the world. 101
In the UNSC, draft resolutions are made by one or more members of the
UNSC and circulated privately to the others. If it were to be changed, it would
have to go through a process called consultations and after it is agreed by all the
members of the draft resolution it is then formally proposed to the council.
The decision making process in the UNSC varies differently on
peacekeeping depending whether it needs UN troops or they are being contributed
by regional bodies. If member states or regional organizations are willing to
provide troops in order to conduct their own, Council Authorized, Chapter
VII peace operations, the decision-making process may not be subject to the

101

Sara Richey, Is United Nations Peacekeeping a Practical Policy Instrument?: Factors that
Influence the Success of Peacekeeping Operations. Senior Thesis. Indiana University, 2011.

51

kind of prolonged negotiation process as in instances when the UN is

actually tasked with executing the mandate.
IV.1.2 Middle Power effect in the UNSC
The term middle power refers to states situated in the middle grounds
between two other types of powers; the great and small powers. Therefore, a
middle power is a state which is neither a great power nor a small power. This
term is, however, relative and not self-evident. States can be defined as middle
powers in terms of the extent of its involvement, its interests, and its ability to
contribute to particular situations (functional);102 according to its tendency to
pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, its tendency to embrace
compromise positions in international disputes, and its tendency to embrace
notions of good international citizenship to guide its diplomacy (behavioral);
and that which, by reason of its size, its material resources, its willingness to
accept responsibility, its influence and its stability is close to being great power
(hierarchical).103
From an idealist standpoint, they (the middle power states) are the
most likely states to protect the international system, and thus more likely to
participate in multi-lateral activities such as peace-keeping because of their strong
commitment to international peace, but on the other hand because of the
aggregate power they can wield. Middle power interests are served by a
continuation of the international status quo because in the status quo they have

102
103

Adam Chapnick, The Middle Powers, Canadian Foreign Policy, 7, 2 (Winter 1999): 74.
Chapnick, The Middle Powers

52

achieved relative affluence and influence

104

decisions of states to intervene are

usually related to two issues: positive cost-and-benefit calculations, and their

moral obligations either towards the belligerents.105

IV.2 Mission in Haiti before MINUSTAH

If we were to look at the political process of the MINUSTAH mandate of
1542, it is necessary to look back a few years before hand. The writer will attempt
to look back in 2002 when the Organization of American States (OAS
_established a mission in Haiti, the Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy
in Haiti. Its main tasks were to promote good governance and assist in improving
the security situation. Even though, it did not have a military mandate, it later
supported to the work of the MIF and other representatives of the international
community after February 2004.106
In January 2004, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), after a meeting
with representatives from the OAS, the CARICOM, the US, Canada, France and
the EU, proposed a plan for a political solution to the Haitian crisis. Aristide
accepted the proposal, but another the opposition groups rejected it. The next
month, an international delegation including representatives from the CARICOM,
the US and Canada tried to get the parties to reach agreement on a revised version

104

Laura Neack, UN Peace-Keeping: in the interest of community or self? Journal of Peace

Research, v. 32, n. 2, (1995): 181-196,
105
RobertNalbandov, Battle of Two Logics: Appropriateness and Consequentiality in Russian
Interventions in Georgia. Caucasian Review of International Affairs, (2009): 23.
106
Permanent Council of the OAS, 2004A, Report on OAS Activities Involving Haiti from
November 11 2003 to March 10 2004, Report no: CP/doc.3849/04 corr.1

53

of the CARICOM plan. Still, the new version was rejected by the same opposition
group which only wanted Aristide to resign.107 Consequently, France and US,
called for Aristide to step down in which Aristide later abided by exiling.
After Aristides resignation, the UN Security Council authorized the
deployment of a US-led Multinational Interim Force (MIF) for three months
under Chapter VII.108 When the MIFs mission came to an end, the UN Security
Council voted to send a peacekeeping force, United Nations Stabilization Mission
in Haiti (MINUSTAH), to Haiti to take over from the MIF.
IV.3 Statements made by UNSC members in meetings
Before the meeting that legalized the 1542 mandate on the deployment of
MINUSTAH, The open debates organized by the Security Council on civilian
crisis management and rule of law and transitional justice in 2004, highlighted
some of the frustrations of developing countries on current international
approaches to the situations in post-conflict countries. Brazil even stated that
The United Nations has failed the people of Haiti in the past by
interpreting its role too strictly and focusing it excessively on
security issues. This time, in parallel with efforts to establish a
more secure environment, we need to launch a sustained programme
to assist Haitian society in the political, social and economic
areas. () I wish to emphasize the need to develop new and better
tools for addressing the structural problems at the root of tensions
that lead to violence and conflict. Poverty, disease, lack of
opportunity and inequality are some of the causes of conflicts,

107

International Crisis Group, A New Chance for Haiti?, ICG Latin America/Caribbean
Report No10, Port-au-Prince/Brussels, 2004
108
International Crisis Group, A New Chance for Haiti

54

particularly those within countries, which, regrettably, are

becoming ever more prevalent on our agenda. 109
The quote by Brazil shows how the missions in Haiti in the past failed
mainly due to its more militaristic approach and its lack of approach in what
Brazil calls, its root causes. This will be later developed in the paragraphs
below. Aside from the open debate in the UNSC, the political process of the
making of the mandate was very long and rigorous one.
On the 4917th meeting of the Security Council on 26 February 2004. This
meeting was a response to a letter submitted by representative of Jamaica, on
behalf of the States members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) on 23
February 2004 that requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council for the
purpose of considering the situation concerning Haiti in light of the steadily
deteriorating situation, which affected peace and security in the region 110 and also
a response to the letter on 25 February 2004 from the representative of France
addressed to the President of the Council.111
In the letter from the French representative, France advocated the
establishment of a transitional government of national unity in Haiti, and France
also proposed an initiative that broadened an earlier plan by CARICOM and
included: the immediate establishment of a civilian peacekeeping force to
guarantee the return to public order; international assistance to elections; the
delivery of international humanitarian aid; the dispatch of human rights observers

109

Security Council Ministerial Level Debate on Civilian aspects of conflict management

and
peace-building,
UN
Doc.
S/PV.5041,
22
September
2004,
17.
http://img.static.reliefweb.int/report/haiti/report-secretary-general-oas-activities-involving-haitimarch-11-may-13-2004 accesed on 28 March 2014.
110
S/2004/143.
111
S/2004/143.

55

and a long-term commitment to providing international aid for the economic and
social reconstruction of the country. France also stressed the importance of
diminishing the violence done by President Aristide and that the President should
take full responsibility of his actions. 112
At the meeting, statements were made by all Members of the Council, as
well as by the representatives of Argentina, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Canada, Cuba,
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Ireland (on behalf of the
European

Union),113

Jamaica

(on

behalf

of

the

Caribbean

Community(CARICOM)), Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela and the

Permanent Observer for the International Organization of la Francophone. For the
purpose of the chapter, the writer will only analyze the statements of the members
of the UNSC at the time and no other representatives that were not in the UNSC.
114

The representative of Haiti fully associated its position with the

CARICOM members which requested that the Security Council send an
international force to help restore peace that also correlates with the provisions of
the Charter of the United Nations. Haiti wanted the UNSC to condemn the acts of
violence, indicate its refusal to accept any form of Government resulting from an

112

S/2004/143.
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Albania, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Iceland and Liechtenstein aligned themselves with this
statement.
113

114

S/2004/143.

56

anti-democratic and anti-constitutional process, and demand that the opposition

accept a political compromise to resolve the crisis. 115
Many speakers also supported the efforts of CARICOM and OAS whilst
also stating that others that were not in agreement with the plan from CARICOM
and OAS rethink their decisions. 116Most speakers also welcomed the appointment
by the Secretary-General of a Special Adviser for Haiti. They underlined the need
for urgent international assistance and urged all actors to facilitate the work of
international agencies involved in humanitarian assistance. Many speakers urged
a broader engagement of the international community. 117
The representative of Spain supported the deployment of a civilian
peacekeeping force in accordance with the principles of the Charter to guarantee
security for humanitarian missions and for OAS and CARICOM mediation
missions.118 The representatives of Algeria and Brazil also stressed the urgency to
consider the deployment of an international force in Haiti in accordance with the
United Nations Charter.119 The representative of the Philippines proposed the
deployment of an international civilian police presence to restore order on the
ground and went even further as to make a coalition of the willing to arrest
continued violence and the breakdown of law and order.120The representative of
Angola expressed his readiness to support the deployment of an international

115

S/2004/143.
S/2004/143.
117
Von Einsiedel, Sebastian and David M. Malone. Peace and Democracy for Haiti: A UN
Mission Impossible? International relations. (2006): 1 3-174.
118
Einsiedel, Sebastian and Malone, Peace and Democracy for Haiti: A UN Mission Impossible?
119
Einsiedel, Sebastian and Malone, Peace and Democracy for Haiti: A UN Mission Impossible?
120
Einsiedel, Sebastian and Malone, Peace and Democracy for Haiti: A UN Mission Impossible?
116

57

force to support a political settlement.121The representative of Benin called for

robust measures to be employed.

122

The representative of Germany held that the

Council should be ready to assist in the stabilization efforts in all possible ways.123
The representative of Chile stresses the role of the regional organization to
for holding the negotiation process, but the Security Council should not discard a
more robust action should it become necessary.124 The representative of Pakistan
expressed his willingness to consider broader international engagement in support
of a political solution in accordance with the United Nations Charter. 125
The representative of the United States would also support the deployment
of an international force to support the implementation of a political agreement
between the warring parties. In addition, he proposed that OAS can help the
professionalization of the Haitian National Police, promote the rule of law, disarm
gangs and encourage a climate of security conducive to democratic activity.126
France on the other hand, agreed with an external force to be deployed but
not under the United Nations force, but would be authorized by the Security
Council and based upon a Council mandate. France believed that it could
complement to the political solution by supporting a government of national unity,
re-establish public order and support the humanitarian and human rights actions of
the international community on the ground. France was also willing to contribute

121

Einsiedel, Sebastian and Malone, Peace and Democracy for Haiti: A UN Mission Impossible?
Einsiedel, Sebastian and Malone, Peace and Democracy for Haiti: A UN Mission Impossible?
123
Paul Higate and Marsha Henryy, Insecure Spaces: Peacekeeping, Power and Performance in
Haiti, Kosovo, and Liberia. London: Zed Books, 1999.
124
Higate and Henryy, Insecure Spaces: Peacekeeping, Power and Performance in Haiti, Kosovo,
and Liberia
125
Higate and Henryy, Insecure Spaces: Peacekeeping, Power and Performance in Haiti, Kosovo,
and Liberia
126
S/2004/143.
122

58

to such a force, in addition, France also pushed for the proposals by OAS and
CARICOM relating to the establishment of a transitional government of national
unity.127
The representatives of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and
Romania also acknowledged the call for international involvement in Haiti and
expressed their readiness to consider proposals for an enhanced role of the
international community. 128The representative of China expressed his willingness
to participate in the efforts of the international community to help ease the current
situation in Haiti and to attain lasting peace, stability and development in that
country.129
Many speakers emphasized the importance of economic, social and
institutional development of Haiti, and underlined that a solution to the political
and humanitarian crises without addressing the economic issue is not the ideal
long terms solution. Due to the lack of initiatives from previous missions in Haiti
that failed to integrate the approach of the root problems, there needs to be more
improvement for the next mission in Haiti.
At the 4917th meeting of the Security Council on 26 February 2004, the
President of the meeting, (China) made a statement on behalf of the Council

130

which:
Expressed deep concern in regard to the deterioration of the political,
security and humanitarian environment in Haiti; supported CARICOM and
OAS as they continue to work towards a peaceful and constitutional
solution to the current impasse; called upon the parties to act
127

S/2004/143.
S/2004/143.
129
S/2004/143.
130
S/ PRST/2004/4.
128

59

responsibly by choosing negotiation instead of confrontation;

acknowledged the call for international involvement in Haiti; would
consider urgently options for international engagement, including that of
an international force in support of a political settlement in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations; called upon all sides in Haiti's
conflict to facilitate the distribution of food and medicine and ensure the
protection of civilians; called upon the Government and all other parties to
respect human rights and to cease the use of violence to advance
political goals; supported the Secretary-General's decision to name a
Special Advisor for Haiti.131

The writer thus mapped the statements made by members of the UNSC in
2004 in response to the situation in Haiti. Unanimously, there was a huge
condemnation from the UNSC members regarding the situation in Haiti.

Country

Year

Algeria

2005

Angola
Benin

2004
2005

Brazil

2005

Chile

2004

Germany

2004

Romania

2005

Pakistan

2004

Philippines 2005
Spain

2004

USA
China
UK
131

statements in the meeting

supported the deployment of a civilian
peacekeeping force
support the deployment of an international force
to support political settlement
called for robust measures
supported the deployment of a civilian
peacekeeping force
stresses the role of regional organizations, but
UNSC should not rule out anything more if it is
needed
UNSC should be ready to assist Haiti in all
possible ways
acknowledged the call for international
involvement in Haiti
willingness to consider broader international
engagement
proposed the deployment of an international
civilian peacekeeping
supported the deployment of a civilian
peacekeeping force
support the deployment of an international force
stresses the role of the OAS
willingness to participate in the efforts of the
international community
acknowledged the call for international

S/ PRST/2004/4.

60

France
Russia

Haiti

involvement in Haiti
External force but not under the United Nation
insist on the proposals of CARICOM and OAS
acknowledged the call for international
involvement in Haiti
UNSC to send an international force
UNSC to condemn the acts of violence, indicate
its refusal to accept any form of Government
resulting from an anti-democratic and anticonstitutional process, and demand that the
opposition accept a political compromise to
resolve the crisis.
Picture IV.1: Compilation of political interest in the UNSC 4917th
meeting
On the next meeting of the UNSC, on 29 February 2004 (4919thmeeting)

the President of the meeting got the focus of the other members to the letter dated
29 February 2004,132 from the Haiti. In this letter, the President of Haiti called on
Governments of friendly countries to urgently support the peaceful and
constitutional process that had begun in Haiti, and to this end, authorize security
forces to enter and operate in Haiti to conduct activities designed to bring about a
climate of security and stability, which would support the political process under
way, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and in general help the people of Haiti.
This meeting later passed on resolution 1529133. On the 4961st meeting of the
UNSC on 30 April 2004, resolution 1542 passed in which the mandate passed
unanimously.
IV.4 Significant Actors in the Making of the MINUSTAH Mandate in 2004
Like most regions, when an area in a specific region is in a state of
conflict, the neighboring states are also affected. There is a strong sense of
132
133

S/2004/143.
S/2004/143.

61

regional ownership of MINUSTAH based on the contributions of Member

States who have strong links with Haiti not only because of geographical
proximity but also because of cultural and historical bonds. The shared
commitment of Latin American states to development promotion in Haiti was
reected in the creation of an institutional mechanism named 2x9 to function
in the form of meetings between the deputy ministers of defence and of foreign
relations from the nine Latin American countries engaged in MINUSTAH and the
Haitian authorities. This mechanism was the media for Latin American states to
coordinate common positions in the UN Security Council regarding the situation
in Haiti.134
Combating poverty and hunger in Haiti, an issue not directly included in
MINUSTAHs mandate but shared by all Latin American states, did not exceed
the liberal agenda but created a shared space of conversation between Northern
and Southern worlds.This mission, arguably a very challenging one for the UN,
was almost entirely handed over to Latin American states, in particular Brazil,
Chile and Uruguay. Latin American countries contribute with 60% of UN troops
deployed in Haiti. Countries contributing military personnel (7,039 in all) include:
Argentina (558 including a field hospital), Bolivia (208), Brazil (2,200), Canada
(10), Chile (499), Croatia (3), Ecuador (67), France (2), Guatemala (118), Jordan
(728), Nepal (1,075), Paraguay (31), Peru (209), the Philippines (157), Sri Lanka
(959), United States (4), and Uruguay (1,135).135

134

Rut Diamint, The 2x9: An Incipient Security Community in Latin America?], Policy paper 18,
Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftun,2007 http://library.fes.de/pdf-les/bueros/la-seguridad/50501.pdf
accessed on 20 January 2014
135
U.N. Haiti Report, 2004, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/reports.shtml
accessed on 20 February 2014

62

IV.4.1 Brazils Interest in the deployment of MINUSTAH

Brazil has long expressed a strong desire to gain permanent membership in
the UN Security Council (UNSC). The country has held non-permanent
membership of the Security Council ten times, but has become increasingly
assertive and active in its international policies to gain permanent membership.
Brazils top role in MINUSTAH, from being its top contributor and the
leader in the mission is understood by top policy makers in the UNSC as being
decisive in preparing themselves to occupy a permanent seat on the United
Nations Security Council. It can be argued that Brazils participation in Haiti and
MINUSTAH in particular are hoped to bring some sort of legitimacy to its
aspiration of playing a leading role in South America. By being in charge of the
post-conflict reconstruction process in Haiti, Brazil is perceived as the leading
regional power coordinating a regional response to a major humanitarian crisis.
The assumption of the policy makers in Brazil are played out in logic with the
accomplishments of securing Haitis condition and to the region as a whole, will
be able to make Brazil a top candidate if it were to propose for a permanent
membership to the council.
IV.4.2 United States Interest in the Deployment of MINUSTAH
The United States have no doubt been at the front of the missions in Haiti,
this can be seen through its early historical interventions in Haiti. Starting from
1915 when the U.S intervened in Haiti and overthrew its government, and
controlled the country until 1934. Since then, the US has intervened twice
militarily. In 1994, the United States led a UN-authorized force in Haiti to remove

63

a military junta. In February, after the military coup toppled down Aristide, the
United States along with France and Canada, backed his opponents and then led a
UN Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to install the new government run by
Prime Minister Grard Latortue. In June 2004, the MIF was replaced by the
forces of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), led by Brazil. 136
Through its many support of interventions in Haiti, the united States have
no doubt big expectations for MINUSTAH to be deployed. Haiti, in the eyes of
US ambassadors, are very much in tune with the interests of the US. In a 2008,
former U.S. Ambassador to Haiti Janet Sanderson emphasizes that MINUSTAH
is an indispensable tool in realizing core USG policy interests in HaitiIt is a
financial and regional security bargain for the USG. It can be seen that
Sanderson believes that MINUSTAH protects U.S. interests by preventing social
and political movements from thwarting neoliberal policies and the postearthquake influx of corporations in the country, which are working on a variety
of development schemes on the island.
IV.4.3 France Interest in the Deployment of MINUSTAH
One relation that is hard to ignore when talking about Haiti and France is
the fact that Haiti was a colony of France and is one of the states that belongs in
the Francophone states. It is thus no mystery why even though Haiti is
geographically not near to France, France still believes that it should participate in
this peacekeeping operation, in the least give its vote to deploy MINUSTAH into
Haiti when voting in the UNSC.

136

Diamint, The 2x9: An Incipient Security Community in Latin America?

64

French defense policy maintains that the country faces no direct threats to
its vital interests near its borders, and that the main security risk now lies in the
regional conflicts that can jeopardize the quest for international stability.

137

In

particular, political turmoil in former French African colonies is seen as directly

affecting French interests. The French authorities also believe that threats are
increasingly likely to be asymmetric (focusing on areas where Western powers are
vulnerable, rather than traditional warfighting).This strategic analysis has had a
strong bearing on French military doctrine. The motives behind French
participation in humanitarian interventions are not solely security-centered.
Humanitarian action is an integral part of French culture and foreign policy, and
reflects a larger ambition to maintain Frances standing as a major power.

137

EirinMobekk. Recent experience of UN Integrated Missions in Security Sector Reform: the

Case of Haiti, Case Study Report from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed
Forces (DCAF), (2007):11-12.

65

Chapter V
Conclusion
The conclusion reached in analyzing the reasoning of United Nation
Security Council (UNSC) states in the deployment of peacekeeping operations
(PKO) are very much correlated with the realist perspective. Reasoning not only
comprises of the legal standings but also the domestic situation and the political
process used in determining the mechanisms and composition of the troops are
also a reflection of the political interests of the contributing states. MINUSTAH,
therefore is considered to be a humanitarian intervention and is part of the
responsibility to protect and is done through a mandate of the UNSC.
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been
in Haiti to help restore order since the collapse of former President Jean-Bertrand
Aristides government in 2004. States are motivated to form peacekeeping
missions for a variety of reasons but the goal is the same for each: to inuence the
future direction of the conict. The process of peacekeeping can be thought of as
the private provision of a public good. PKO in Haiti is the first PKO where the
majority of peacekeepers come from Latin America. One reason that the number
of troops in U.N. peace missions relates to the States pursuit of a deeper insertion
onto world affairs and the benefits generated as a result of that insertion.
Based on the legal standings of MINUSTAH, it can be seen that
MINUSTAH was deployed to Haiti under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, by
which the United Nation through the UNSC are able to impose measures on states
that have obligatory legal force and therefore need not depend on the consent of
the states involved. To do this, the Council must determine that the situation

66

constitutes a threat or breach of the international peace, or at least regional peace.

The Missions presence in Haiti is thus based on the proposition that since 2004,
violence in Haiti has threatened the international community.
Even though there is a provision for freedom of speech and assembly in
the Haiti constitution, it is still very problematic, there are also frequent attacks
from government officials when journalists are expressing different viewpoints
from the government. The history of Military coups and political violence
reoccurring throughout post-independence period. An armed rebellion ousted
Aristide in 2004. In the aftermath, there was prolonged violent armed conflict
among different factions competing for state power. As a result, the history of
factional and gang violence, often politically linked, and internal security
problems, means Haiti is more susceptible to future eruptions of violence. Since
colonization, Haiti has been a region of conflict. More recently, Haiti has been a
field of strife between its peoples, especially since the retrieval of Jean-Bertrand
Aristide from power in 1993, and the following peacekeeping operations
undertaken by the United Nations (UN). Safety and security are unsatisfactory,
institutionalization is needed in regards to law and democracy, the economy is not
sustainable and social wellbeing is not being fulfilled.
Even if the situation did not fit the definition of civil war, a large part of
the country was engaged in fighting. The situation continued to be incredibly
violent and bloody even after the conflict was considered to be terminated. This
goes back to the previous conclusion by the writer in which MINUSTAH is a part
of the fourth generation of peacekeeping which is characterized by challenging
goals and a complex mandates.

67

Looking at all the operational measures actually applied in the Haiti, it can
be concluded that there was a lot of political will to prevent to prevent the crisis
from escalating. Many of the international efforts were made at an early stage and
were too serious to merely be for show. That the international community then
deployed military troops with a Chapter VII mandate indicates that there was
some commitment, although the troops were mainly Latin American. However,
military intervention was never incompatible with the norm of non-intervention
because the interim government that took over immediately after Aristides
departure called for UN assistance as well as international forces.
The realist perspective and theory in international relations states that
power is the thing that states will strive for no matter the condition. In this case,
PKO as a high profile activity in the international world will no doubt have some
influence on the elevation of the states status. Status and influence in
international affairs is what states strive for, and therefore, participation in
peacekeeping may be motivated by national interest. A realist perspective of state
participation in PKO states that if a state's interest is linked to the continuation
of the international status quo, it will use whatever means at its disposal,
including peacekeeping, to preserve that favorable status quo. This was blatantly
seen in the case of Brazil in which it desires to preserve its status quo as a regional
power in Latin America and at the same time show its power and gain more
influence if it were to propose to be an additional member of the UNSC.
Leadership on Haiti within the Security Council and in the UN more
broadly reflects geo-strategic as well as more subtle international considerations
and linkages. The United States has often driven Haiti policy internationally,

68

fearing that turmoil there would result in refugee flows to Floridas shores, as was
the case in 1991 to 1994. France, with strong cultural and former colonial ties to
Haiti, has always asserted an interest and has often mobilized its European Union
partners to assist in sharing the burden. China objected to Haitis recognition of
Taiwan throughout the 1990s and sought to pressure Port-au- Prince into
abandoning its diplomatic and economic relationship with Taipei. In keeping with
the more sophisticated Chinese diplomacy of the twenty-first century, China is
now participating in MINUSTAH, seeking to induce Haitian gratitude in
friendlier ways.
Some motivations are internal: a decision to participate may derive from
the use of peacekeeping as a means of pursuing a countrys own unilateral
interests, in some cases states view a peacekeeping contribution to greater
international prestige or more inclusions in UN decision-making bodies; but on
the other hand, one cannot rule out the possibility that there may also be genuine
altruism mixed in with these motivations on specific occasions. Some
motivations, on the other hand, are external: states have been pressured by allies
into participating in intervening coalitions, or have altered their position based on
a specific conflict context as a result of changes in the interpretation of
international norms by their leading policy partner.

69

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Attachment I

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xxxiii

Attachment II

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xxxv

xxxvi

xxxvii

xxxviii

xxxix

xl

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Attachment III

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Attachment IV

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lix

SPRST

.pdf