Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
B O N AV E N T U R E M I N I N G
C O R P O R AT I O N ,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 174918

Present:
- versus -

JJ.

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

V. I . L . M I N E S , I N C O R P O R AT E D ,
Represented by its Corpora te
Promulgated:
S e c r e t a r y, R O X A N N A S . G O ,
August 13, 2008
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by the petitioner Bonaventure Mining Corporation (BMC),
[1]
to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 29,
[2]
of the Mines
2006 (CA Decision) which reversed the Decision
[3]
of the
Adjudication Board (MAB) and reinstated the Decision
Panel of Arbitrators upholding the EPA-IVA-63 of respondent V.I.L.

Mines, Incorporated (VMI), and canceling the EPA-IVA-72 of

petitioner BMC.
This case involves a conflict over mining claims between BMC
and VMI over a mountainous section that transcends the common
boundaries of the provinces of Quezon and Camarines Norte,
specifically within the municipal jurisdictions of Tagkawayan and
Guinigayangan in Quezon, and Labo and Sta. Elena in Camarines
[4]
Norte.
The facts are of record.
On February 20, 1995, Tapian Mining Corporation (now
Greenwater Mining Corporation [Greenwater]) filed an application for
a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with the
Central Office of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) covering
approximately 100,000 hectares in Tagkawayan, Quezon as well as in
the provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur. Before that
time, Greenwater had already filed other FTAA applications,
specifically in Marinduque, covering 73,000 hectares, and in the
Bulacan, Quezon and Rizal provinces totaling another 100,000
[5]
hectares.
On March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942 (R.A. No. 7942),
otherwise known as The Philippine Mining Act of 1995, was passed
by Congress. It provided for the maximum allowable area that may
be granted a qualified person under a FTAA, viz:
SECTION 34. Maximum Contract Area. The maximum
contract area that may be granted per qualified person, subject to
relinquishment shall be:
(a)
1,000 meridional blocks onshore;
(b)
4,000 meridional blocks offshore; or
(c)
Combinations of (a) and (b) provided that it shall not
exceed the maximum limits for onshore and offshore areas.

On March 12, 1996, the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR) issued the implementing rules and

regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 7942 in the form of Department
Administrative Order No. (DAO) 95-23. It gave FTAA applicants a
deadline of one (1) year from its date of effectivity within which to
divest or relinquish from their applications areas exceeding the
maximum provided by R.A. No. 7942. Section 257 of DAO 95-23
provides:
Section 257.
Mining/Quarrying Rights.

Non-impairment

of

Existing

x x x
All pending applications for MPSA/FTAA and exploration
permits issued prior to the promulgation of these implementing
rules and regulations shall be governed by the provisions of the
Act and these implementing rules and regulations; Provided,
however, that where the grant of such FTAA application/proposals
would exceed the maximum contract area restrictions contained in
Section 34 of the Act, t h e a p p l i c a n t / p r o p o n e n t s h a l l hhaav e o n e
y e a r, f r o m t h e e ff e c t i v i t y o f t h eesse i m p l e m e n t i n g r u l e s a n d
r e g u l a t i o n s , t o d i v e s t o r r e l i n qquui s h a p p l i c a t i o n s o r p o r t i o n s
t h e r e o f w h i c h , i f g r a n t e d , w o u l d e xxcce e d t h e m a x i m u m
c o n t r a c t a r e a a l l o w a n c e p r o v i ddeed u n d e r t h e A c t ; Provided,
finally, that this provision is applicable only to all FTAA
applications filed under DAO 63 prior to the approval of the Act.
(Emphasis supplied)
x x x

On August 27, 1996, Section 257 of DAO 95-23 was amended

by DAO 96-25 giving FTAA applicants an extension of one (1) year
within which to divest or relinquish excess areas from their
applications, viz:
Section
257.
Non-Impairment
Mining/Quarrying Rights.

of

Existing

x x x
All pending applications for MPSA/FTAA covering forest
land and other government reservations shall not be required to
re-apply for exploration permit p r o v i d e d , t h a t w h e r e t h e g r aannt o f
s u c h F TA A a p p l i c a t i o n s / p r o p o ssaal s w o u l d e x c e e d t h e
m a x i m u m c o n t r a c t a r e a r e s ttrri c t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n S e c t i o nn 3 4 o f
t h e A c t , t h e a p p l i c a n t / p r o p o n eennt s h a l l b e g i v e n a n e x t e n s i o n
o f o n e y e a r, r e c k o n e d f r o m S e p t e m b e r 1 3 , 1 9 9 6 , t o d i v e s t o r
relinquish in favor of governmen t, areas in excess of the

m a x i m u m a r e a a l l o w a n c e p r oovvi d e d u n d e r t h e A c t . (Emphasis
supplied)

On December 19, 1996, DAO 96-40, the revised IRR of R.A.

No. 7942, was issued. Among other provisions, DAO 96-40 reiterated
the deadline of one (1) year from September 13, 1996, or until
September 13, 1997, within which FTAA applicants may divest or
relinquish certain areas in their applications which exceed the
maximum allowable area under R.A. No. 7942. Section 272 of DAO
96-40 provides as follows:
Section
272.
Non-Impairment
Mining/Quarrying Rights.

of

Existing

x x x
All pending applications for MPSA/FTAA covering forest
land and Government Reservations shall not be required to
re-apply for Exploration Permit: Provided, That where the grant of
such FTAA applications/proposals would exceed the maximum
contract area restrictions contained in Section 34 of the Act,, t h e
a p p l i c a n t / p r o p o n e n t s h a l l b e ggiiv e n a n e x t e n s i o n o f o n e ( 1 )
y e a r, r e c k o n e d f r o m S e p t e m b e rr 1 3 , 1 9 9 6 , t o d i v e s t o r
relinquish pursuant to Depar tment Administrative Order No.
96-25 in favor of the Governm ent, areas in excess of the
m a x i m u m a r e a a l l o w a n c e p r oovvi d e d u n d e r t h e A c t . For this
purpose, a Special Exploration Permit of limited applications and
activities shall be issued by the Secretary upon the
recommendation of the Director, subject to the terms and
conditions specified in the Permit and pertinent provisions of
Chapter V hereof: Provided, That an area permission shall be
granted likewise by the Secretary to undertake limited exploration
activities in non-critical forest reserves and forest reservations and
such other areas within the jurisdiction of the Department. In other
areas, however, the applicant/proponent shall secure the necessary
area clearances or written consent by the concerned agencies or
parties, as provided for by law: Provided, further, That the time
period shall be deducted from the life of the MPSA/FTAA and
exploration costs can be included as part of pre-operating expenses
for purposes of cost recovery should the FTAA be approved:
Provided, finally, That this provision is applicable only to all
FTAA/MPSA applications filed under Department Administrative
Order No. 63 prior to the effectivity of the Act and these
implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x

On August 27, 1997, the DENR issued Department

Memorandum Order No. 97-07 (DMO 97-07), entitled Guidelines in

the Implementation of the Mandatory September 15, 1997 Deadline
for the Filing of Mineral Agreement Applications by Holders of Valid
and Existing Mining Claims and Lease/Quarry Applications and for
Other Purposes. DMO 97-07 provides, among others, for the
following: (1) the deadline for the relinquishment of excess areas
shall be on September 15, 1997 (September 13, 1997 falling on a
[6]
Saturday); (2) all applicants of FTAA applications filed under DAO
57 and DAO 63 with insufficient compliance of the mandatory
requirements shall submit, on September 15, 1997, a Status Report
indicating the requirements that have not been complied with and a
Letter with the undertaking that the said requirements will be
[7]
and (3)
completely complied with on or before October 30, 1997;
[8]
the deadlines prescribed shall not be subject to extension.
On September 17, 1996, St. Joe Mining Corporation filed an
Exploration Permit Application, denominated as EPA-IVA-24, with an
area of 11,340 hectares situated in Tagkawayan, Quezon which
overlaps the FTAA application of Greenwater.
On September 26, 1997, pursuant to DMO 97-07, Greenwater
[9]
dated September 10, 1997 with the MGB
filed a Letter of Intent
stating its intention to retain its first FTAA application in Marinduque
and to relinquish the areas in excess of the maximum allowable
81,000 hectares covered by its other FTAA applications including
those which cover areas of Quezon Province and Camarines Norte.
On October 22, 1997, OIC-Regional Director Reynulfo Juan
[10]
to Greenwater stating that the latter has fifteen (15)
sent a letter
days from receipt of the letter to submit the technical descriptions of
the areas Greenwater intends to relinquish with a warning that failure
to do so would cause the denial of the FTAA application in those
areas.

On November 10, 1997, VMI filed an Exploration Permit

[11]
denominated as EPA-IVA-63, with an area of 11,826
Application,
hectares. VMIs application covers areas included in Greenwaters
FTAA application in Quezon Province and Camarines Norte.
On December 8, 1997, MGB Region IV rejected EPA-IVA-24
of St. Joe Mining Corporation on the ground that it was filed at the
time that Greenwaters FTAA application was still valid and existing.
On February 23, 1998, OIC-Regional Director Reynulfo Juan
[12]
to Greenwater stating that due to failure to
sent another letter
comply with the directives in the letter dated October 22, 1997,
Greenwaters FTAA applications are deemed to have been
relinquished as provided for under DENR Memorandum Order No.
97-07.
On May 4, 1999, BMC filed an Exploration Permit
[13]
denominated as EPA-IVA-72, with an area of 9,794
Application,
hectares which almost completely overlaps the area covered by VMIs
application.
On October 4, 1999, VMI filed a petition for the cancellation of
BMCs exploration permit application claiming that it overlaps with
its prior and existing application. The petition was later amended on
February 28, 2000, to include the cancellation and confirmation of the
nullity of St. Joe Mining Corporations EPA-IVA-24.
On March 22, 2002, the Panel of Arbitrators rendered its
[14]
upholding the validity of VMIs exploration permit
Decision
application and declaring BMCs and St. Joe Mining Corporations
applications as null and void.
On July 5, 2002, BMC filed a Notice of Appeal and
Memorandum of Appeal with the MAB. On August 24, 2004, the

[15]
MAB rendered its Decision,
modifying the decision of the Panel
of Arbitrators. The MAB gave due course to BMCs application for
an exploration permit but allowed VMIs application to proceed, sans
the areas covered by BMCs application.
From this decision, VMI filed its Petition for Review with the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision of the MAB and reinstated the decision of the Panel of
Arbitrators.

Hence, BMC now comes to this Court raising the following issues:
A.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DENR MEMORANDUM
ORDER NO. 97-07 ON RETENTION REQUIREMENTS
WOULD CAUSE THE CANCELLATION OF THE FTAA
APPLICATION BY OPERATION OF LAW.
B.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT
THE DISPUTED AREA IS OPEN FOR MINING
APPLICATIONS AFTER 30 OCTOBER 1997 AND
CONSEQUENTLY UPHOLDING THE MINING APPLICATION
[16]
OF RESPONDENT AND CANCELING PETITIONERS.

VMI, however, questions the timeliness of the filing of the

petition. Hence, before we can consider the merits of the case, it is
imperative that the Court address this issue in view of the procedural
stricture that the timely perfection of an appeal is both a mandatory
and jurisdictional requirement.
In its Comment, VMI contends that BMC received a copy of
the CA Decision on September 5, 2006 and not on October 9, 2006 as
[17]
To support its claim, VMI presented a
alleged by BMC.
[18]
from the Makati Central Post Office dated October
Certification
5, 2005 stating that a copy of the CA Decision was served by Letter
Carrier Larry Lopez to BMCs counsel on September 5, 2006 but the
same was returned by the Letter Carrier to the sender, the Court of
Appeals, for the reason that counsel for BMC had allegedly MOVED
OUT of his address of record. Thus, the filing of the Petition only
on October 23, 2006 is out of time.
In its Reply, BMC alleges that the office address of its counsel,

Atty. Fernando Pearroyo (Atty. Pearroyo), is and has always been at

U n i t 2 0 1 Orient Mansions, Tordecillas St., Salcedo Village, Makati
City and at no time has Atty. Pearroyo ever transferred or moved out
[19]
BMC and Atty. Pearroyo further contend
of the said address.
that they are perplexed on how the alleged Letter Carrier from the
Makati Central Post Office could have delivered a copy of the CA
Decision on September 5, 2006 and be informed that Atty. Pearroyo
[20]
To prove the said allegations, BMC presented the
had moved out.
[21]
of Ms. Eloisa M. Josef, Building
following: 1) affidavit
Administrator of Orient Mansions; 2) pertinent portion of the security
[22]
[23]
of Orient Mansions; and 3) affidavit
of Mr. Jeffrey
logbook
A. Dalisay, the guard on duty on September 5, 2006.
According to VMI, the CA Decision which was received on
October 9, 2006 was the copy sent to BMC, whose address is at U n i t
2 0 1 Orient Mansions, Tordecillas St., Salcedo Village, Makati City.
Atty. Pearroyos office address is, however, at L / 2 Orient Mansions,
Tordecillas St., Salcedo Village, Makati City, which is the same
address used by the Court of Appeals when it mailed the CA Decision
to him and the same address stated in the Makati Central Post Office
[24]
Certification.
BMC counters, however, that the fact that the copy of the CA
Decision received on October 9, 2006 was addressed to BMC and not
to Atty. Pearroyo is of no significance since they actually share the
[25]
same office address.
We hold that the petition was filed out of time.
Well-settled is the rule that when a party is represented by
counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon
[26]
Accordingly, it is the date of service on counsel of
said attorney.

record of the notice of judgment which is considered the starting point

from which the period of appeal prescribed by law shall begin to
[27]
run.
T h e r e c o r d s o f t h i s c a s e c l e a r l y s h o w t h a t A t t y. P e a r r o y o s
address of record used in the proceedings below is L/2 and not
Unit 201 at the Orient Man sions.
In the proceedings before the Panel of Arbitrators, the
[28]
denying BMCs Motion for Reconsideration, from
Resolution
which BMC filed a Notice of Appeal, was furnished to Atty.
Pearroyo at L/2 Orient Mansions.
In the proceedings before the MAB, the Notice of Issuance of
[29]
informing the parties that a decision has been rendered
An Order
was likewise furnished to Atty. Pearroyo at L/2 Orient Mansions.
In the proceedings before the Court of Appeals, the Notice of
[30]
informing the parties of the resolution ordering BMC
Resolution
to comment on the petition for review filed by VMI indicates that
Atty. Pearroyos address is at L/2 Orient Mansions. This was
received by him since in compliance he filed a Comment in which he
[31]
[32]
Likewise, CA Form No. 1
informing
used the same address.
the parties of the resolution directing them to file their respective
memoranda was sent to him at L/2 Orient Mansions. This was
received by him for in compliance he filed a Memorandum in which
[33]
It was only in the Petition filed before
he used the same address.
this Court did Atty. Pearroyo use Unit 201 as his address after VMI
[34]
questioning the alleged date of
had already filed a Manifestation
receipt of the CA Decision. In fact, in the Reply, where he alleged
that his address of record has always been at Unit 201, he still

indicated L/2 as his address below his signature.

[35]

Hence, we cannot give credence to Atty. Pearroyos claim that

his address is and has always been at Unit 201. The fact that both
addresses refer to the same building does not obliterate the fact that
they are two different addresses. BMC and Atty. Pearroyo cannot
expect the public to assume that both addresses are one and the same
and neither can they be used interchangeably. It was incumbent upon
him to inform the Court of Appeals of the change of his address of
record from L/2 to Unit 201 at the Orient Mansions. His failure to do
so bears consequences which bind BMC.
The rule is that clients are bound by the actions of their counsel
in the conduct of their case. If counsel moves to another address
without informing the court of that change, such omission or neglect
is inexcusable and will not stay the finality of the decision. The court
cannot be expected to take judicial notice of the new address of a
[36]
lawyer who has moved.
In brief, the service of the CA Decision on September 5, 2006
at his address of record per the Makati Central Post Office
Certification should be the reckoning point from which BMCs period
to file the petition begins to run. Thus, the assailed CA Decision
became final and executory.
Nevertheless, we have reviewed the records and find that even
on its merits the instant petition is destined to fail for reasons we shall
discuss briefly.
Section 12 of DMO 97-07 reads:
SECTION 12. Divestment/Relinquishment of Areas in
Excess of Maximum FTAA Contract Area
All FTAA applications filed prior to the effectivity of the
Act which exceed the maximum contract area as set forth in
Section 34 of the Act and Section 51 of the IRR m u s t c o n f o r m t o
s a i d m a x i m u m o n o r b e f o r e S e pptte m b e r 1 5 , 1 9 9 7 . For this

purpose, all applicants who have not otherwise relinquished or

divested any areas held in excess of the allowable maximum by
September 15, 1997 m u s t r e l i n q u i s h / d i v e s t s a i d a r eeaas o n s u c h
d a t e in favor of the Government by filing a Declaration of Areas
Relinquished/Divested, containing the technical description of
such area/s, with the Bureau/concerned Regional Office. The
concerned applications shall be accordingly amended and areas
relinquished/divested shall be open for Mining Applications.
x x x
Failure to relinquish/divest areas in excess of the maximum
contract area as provided for in this section w i l l r e s u l t i n t h e
d e n i a l o r c a n c e l l a t i o n o f t h e FFT
TA A a p p l i c a t i o n a f t e r w h i c hh,,
t h e a r e a s c o v e r e d t h e r e b y s h a l l b e o p eenn f o r M i n i n g
A p p l i c a t i o n s . (Emphasis supplied)

BMC contends that based on the foregoing provision, the

inability of the FTAA applicant to submit the required documents is
only a ground for the MGB or the DENR to cancel or revoke its
FTAA application and an executive action is needed before the area
[37]
Accordingly,
becomes open for mining applications.
Greenwaters FTAA applications were cancelled and the areas
covered thereby became open to mining applications only fifteen days
after its receipt of the February 23, 1998 letter of OIC-Regional
Director Reynulfo Juan informing it that its FTAA applications have
been cancelled.
We find no merit to BMCs contention.
It is undisputed that Greenwater filed its Letter of Intent only on
September 26, 1997 or 11 days after the September 15, 1997
mandatory deadline set by Section 12 of DMO 97-07.
Section 12 of DMO 97-07 provides for the effect of failing to
relinquish excess areas within the deadline, that it will result in the
denial or cancellation of the FTAA application. No further
executive action is necessary since DMO 97-07 itself already
provided for the sanction of failing to meet the deadline. Any
executive action beyond the deadline would be a mere superfluity.

Section 12 of DMO 97-07 must be read in conjunction with

Section 14 which states that the deadlines therein are not subject to
extension, viz:
SECTION 14. No Extension of Periods
The deadline set at September 15, 1997 pursuant to Section
4 hereof and all other periods prescribed herein s h a l l n o t b e
s u b j e c t t o e x t e n s i o n . (Emphasis supplied)

DMO 97-07 was promulgated precisely to set a specific date for

all FTAA applicants within which to relinquish all areas in excess of
the maximum prescribed by law. Accordingly, the deadline cannot be
extended or changed except by amending DMO 97-07. OIC-Regional
Director Reynulfo Juan had no authority to extend the deadline set by
DMO 97-07. We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals:
The language of the memorandum order is plain, precise
and unequivocal the period cannot be extended. Beyond that, the
pending FTAA applications could no longer be officially acted
upon as they were deemed to have expired. D M O 9 7 - 0 7 c o u l d
only be extended by another mem orandum order or law
s p e c i f i c a l l y a m e n d i n g t h e d e a ddlli n e s e t f o r t h t h e r e i n . N o
g o v e r n m e n t o ff i c e r o r e m p l o y e e c a n d o s o .
x x x
It is Our considered view that the FTAA application of
Greenwater ipso facto expired when it did not take any step to
comply with the order.
There was no need for any
p r o n o u n c e m e n t o r o ff i c i a l a c t i o n . I f e v e r t h e r e w o u l d b e a nnyy
e x e c u t i v e a c t i o n , i t w o u l d o n l y b e t oo c e r t i f y t h a t t h e
a p p l i c a t i o n w a s a l r e a d y c a n cceel l e d a s O I C - R e g i o n a l D i r e cctto r
[38]
, it
Reynulfo Juan did when, on Ja nuary 23, 1998 (sic)
w r o t e G r e e n w a t e r t h a t i t s a p pplli c a t i o n o v e r t h e e x c e s s a r e a s
w a s c a n c e l l e d . No executive action can stretch the deadline
beyond what was stated in the memorandum order, DMO 97-07..
O I C - R e g i o n a l D i r e c t o r R e y nnuul f o J u a n v i o l a t e d D M O
9 7 - 0 7 , w h e n i n h i s O c t o b e r 2 2 , 1 9 9 7 L e t t e r, h e g a v e
G r e e n w a t e r a p e r i o d b e y o n d t h e d a t e o f t h e d e a d l i nnee w i t h i n
w h i c h t o s u b m i t t h e t e c h n i c a l ddees c r i p t i o n s o f t h e a r e a s i t
w a n t e d t o r e l i n q u i s h . By giving Greenwater a period extending

beyond October 30, 1997, he was in effect extending the deadline

set forth in Section 13 of DMO 97-07. That he could not lawfully
do.
H e h a d n o a u t h o r i t y e x t e n d i n g t h e d e a d l i n e b e c a u s e t h ee
memorandum order which he was supposed to implement
s t a t e d t h a t t h e p e r i o d p r e s ccrri b e d h e r e i n s h a l l n o t b e s u b j e c t t o
e x t e n s i o n . Beyond October 30, 1997 all FTAA applications
which failed to comply with the memorandum order expired and
[39]
(Emphasis
were deemed cancelled by operation of law.
supplied)

Finally, even equitable considerations do not favor the

petitioner. It is clear from the outset that Greenwater had already lost
interest in pursuing its FTAA application. After being given two (2)
years to comply with the requirements, Greenwater only filed its
Letter of Intent belatedly and did not take any further action nor
contested the letter dated February 23, 1998 of OIC-Regional Director
Reynulfo Juan informing it that its FTAA applications have been
deemed relinquished. It must be emphasized that Greenwater and the
public were aware of the deadline and the consequences of failing to
meet the same. Accordingly, VMI cannot be faulted for relying on the
fact that Greenwater did not comply with the requirements within the
deadline set by DMO 97-07 and had already lost interest, for all
intents and purposes, in the area it wished to apply for. VMI filed its
application on November 10, 1997, or almost 2 years ahead than
BMCs application which was filed on May 4, 1999. To rule now that
it is BMCs application which should be given due course on an
alleged technicality which has no clear basis in law or in the rules will
be highly inequitable.
I N V I E W W H E R E O F, the petition is DENIED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

R E Y N ATO S . P U N O

Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

A N TO N I O T. C A R P I O
Associate Justice

R E N ATO C . C O R O N A
S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
Justice

ADOLFO
Associate

T E R E S I TA J . L E O N A R D O - D E C A S T R O
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify
that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.

R E Y N ATO S . P U N O
Chief Justice

[1]

Rollo, pp. 52-70; penned by Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, concurred in

by Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Sesinando E. Villon.

[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]

Id. at 91-105; dated August 24, 2004.

Id. at 76-89; dated March 22, 2002.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 436.
Section 12 of DENR Department Memorandum Order No. (DMO)
97-07, August 27, 1997.

Id. at Section 13.

Id. at Section 14.
CA rollo, p. 43.

Id. at 44.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 48-49.
Rollo, pp. 76-89.
Id. at 91-105.
Id. at 16. (Boldfaced in the original)
Id. at 110.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 244-245.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 253-254.
Id. at 255-266.
Id. at 267-268.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 246-247.
Karen and Kristy Fishing Industry v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
172760-61, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 243, 250.
Cubar, et al. v. Hon. Mendoza, etc., et al., 205 Phil. 672, 676 (1983).
CA rollo, pp. 232-240; dated June 11, 2002.

Id. at 319; dated August 30, 2004.

[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]

Id. at 446; dated August 18, 2005.

Id. at 479.
Id. at 515; signed by Zamita T. Mationg, Acting Division Clerk of
Court of the Special Sixteenth Division of the Court of Appeals.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 663 to 670; dated October 23, 2006.
Rollo, p. 250.
Supra note 26 at 249.
Rollo, pp. 326-329.
Should be February 23, 1998.

Rollo, p. 66.