Sherluck Jun C.

Villegas
Agrarian Law
1. APO Fruits Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI) are the
registered owners of five parcels of agricultural lands located in, Davao
Province.
On 12 October 1995, AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the
above parcels of land to the government. On 16 October 1996, AFC and HPI
received separately from PARO of Davao province a notice of land
acquisition and valuation, informing AFC that the value of the properties
has been placed at P86,900,925.88 or P165,484.47 per hectare while HPI's
properties were valued at P164,478,178.14.
AFC rejected the valuation for both TCTs No. T-113366 and No.
113359, and applied for the shifting of the mode of acquisition for TCT No.
113359 from Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to Voluntary Land
Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme. HPI also rejected the valuation of its
three parcels of land covered by TCTs No. T-10361, No. T-10362 and No. T10363.
Owing to the rejection by both AFC and HPI of LBP's valuation, the
DAR requested LBP to deposit the amounts equivalent to their valuations
in the names and for the accounts of AFC and HPI. AFC thereafter
withdrew the amount of P26,409,549.86, while HPI withdrew the amount
of P45,481,706.76, both in cash from LBP. The DAR PARO then directed the
Register of Deeds of Davao to cancel the TCTs of AFC and HPI to the said
properties and to issue a new one in the name of the Republic of the The
SAC rendered a decision dated 25 September 2001 fixing the just
compensation for the 1,388.6027 hectares of lands and its improvements
owned by the plaintiffs.

LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 5 October 2001 on the

ground that the trial court based its valuation on the value of residential
and industrial lands in the area forgetting that the lands involved are
agricultural. On December 5, 2001, the trial court modified its decision
ordering the DAR to pay interest.
LBP filed a Notice of Appeal and was given due course in the Order
of the RTC dated 15 May 2002. In the same Order, the RTC set aside its
Order dated 5 December 2001 granting execution pending appeal.
On 28 March 2003, LBP filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court
of Appeals assailing the 4 November 2002 and 12 February 2003 orders of
the trial court. The Court of Appeals granted said petition for being
meritorious. AFC and HPI filed a joint Motion for Reconsideration which
the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 21 June 2004.
Issue: Whether or not there is payment of Just Compensation.
Held: The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also
the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as
the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or
more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It is not the taker's gain
but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of
the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and
ample.
2. DAR vs. Sarangani Agricultural Co.

Facts: Respondents are the owners of the lands in question which have
been reclassified from agricultural into non-agricultural uses by virtue of a
municipal zoning ordinance (MZO), and are included in the
comprehensive land use plan of the Municipality of Alabel, approved by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani. A portion of the area
involving 376.5424 hectares, however, was covered by the CARL
commercial farms deferment scheme.
On July 2, 1998, respondent Sarangani Agricultural Company, Inc.
(SACI) filed an application for land use conversion of various parcels of
land with an aggregate area of 1,005 hectares covering lot No. 1-C, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 10, 2, 39, 53, 806 and 807. Meanwhile, members of the Sarangani
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (SARBAI) sent a letterpetition to the DAR Secretary opposing the application for land use
conversion filed by SACI. They alleged that its members were merely forced
to sign the waiver of rights. Later, an "Urgent Petition for the Denial of
Land Use Conversion Application of Banana Commercial Farm of SACI"
was filed by SARBAI.
SACI contended among others that 1) the banana plantations will be
transformed into a socialized housing subdivision which will be made
available to the displaced workers and the other low income earners of
Alabel; 2) at the time the application for land use conversion was filed, no
Notice of Coverage was ever issued by DAR, and the subsequent issuance
of such notice was highly irregular because the same may be issued only
after the final resolution of the application for land use conversion; and 3)
the previous Order of Deferment cannot be a legal barrier to the filing of an
application for land use conversion.
It also enjoined the DAR Secretary and all officers and employees
acting on his behalf from proceeding with the distribution of petitioners'
lands under compulsory acquisition provided in Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 6657.
Actions already taken in pursuance of the June 16, 1998 Notice of Coverage
under CARP are also nullified for DAR's failure to observe due process
therein.

Issues: Whether or not the notice of coverage was illegal for failure of the
DAR to observe due process.
Held: On due process issue, a notice of coverage is not an indispensable
requirement before DAR can acquire the subject lots or commercial farms,
which are covered by a deferment period under the CARL or R.A. No 6657
upon its effectivity on June 15, 1998.
The process of acquisition of commercial farms by DAR is specifically
provided under Article III, Section 9 of A.O. 9, that in VOS and CA, the
Order of Deferment previously issued over the landholding shall serve,
upon the expiration of the deferment period of the subject commercial
farm, as the Notice of Coverage. It is unnecessary for petitioner to issue a
notice of coverage to respondents in order to place the properties in
question under CARP coverage. Hence, the contention by respondents that
due process was not duly observed by petitioner must fail. Accordingly, the
denial of the application for conversion must be upheld.
3. Gerardo Castillo vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: On December 8, 1995, a Deed of Cancellation of Mortgage and a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 28, 1995, in favor of respondent
Nigaderio Pangilinan, were presented simultaneously before the ROD of
Nueva Ecija. Thereafter, a new TCT was issued in Pangilinan's name.
Petitioner alleged that when he visited the land, he was driven away
by Pangilinan and Cua and also discovered that the land was already
fenced with wooden posts and barbed wire. He reported the incident to the
Philippine National Police Station in Gapan, Nueva Ecija and also alleged
that upon learning of the sale, he sent two letters to Pangilinan demanding
to vacate the property, informing Pangilinan that he was exercising his
right of redemption. He also tendered a payment of P50,000 which he
deposited with Security Bank, Gapan Branch. The said money was
consigned with the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator in
Cabanatuan City.

Petitioner filed before the PARAD a Petition for Redemption and

Ejectment, who dismissed the case on the ground that Castillo had no
cause of action against Pangilinan since he was not the latter's tenant. On
reconsideration and after the impleaded Pajota and Cua, the PARAD
reversed his decision. He ruled that Castillo was a tenant entitled to
exercise the right of redemption under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 3844.
The DARAB ruled that only a bona fide tenant who cultivates the land
himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm household may
exercise the right of redemption granted by Sec 12 R.A. No. 3844. Based on
the records, Castillo was gainfully employed as a manager of Warner
Lambert Philippines during the period when he should have been
cultivating the land. Thus, he could not have cultivated the land himself as
his employment required him to report for office work regularly.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is a bona fide tenant of Respondent Pajota,
and whether he can avail the right of redemption in a lease contract he
entered into.
Held: The element of personal cultivation by the petitioner was not proven.
There is a dearth of evidence on record to show that the petitioner
personally cultivated the lands. Much less was it shown that he was
assisted by his sons in his farm work. This is fatal to the petitioner's cause
as without the element of personal cultivation, a person cannot be
considered a tenant even if he is so designated in the written agreement of
the parties.
The Kasunduan Buwisan sa Sakahan entered into by Pajota and the
petitioner can not by itself prove that the petitioner is a bona fide tenant. To
determine whether a tenancy relationship exists, the concurrence of all the
following essential requisites must be established by substantial evidence:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2)
the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal

cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is
shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

4. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. The Honorable Bernardo V.

Saludanes
Facts: The instant case stemmed from twenty one (21) petitions for just
compensation filed on April 6, 1999 by several landowners with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, sitting as a Special Agrarian
Court. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), herein petitioner, and the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) were impleaded as respondents.
The petitions involve several tracts of land forming part of a banana
plantation operated by the AMS Group of Companies, one of herein
respondents. Pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP), the landowners offered to sell these parcels of land to the
government.
The Special Agrarian Court consolidated the cases and named a
panel of Commissioners to receive and evaluate evidence on the amount of
compensation to be paid to the landowners. After trial, the Special
Agrarian Court admitted and approved the Appraisal Report of the
Commissioners. On February 7, 2000, the said court rendered its joint
Decision fixing, as it has judiciously determined, the just compensation for
the landholdings and the improvements of all the herein petitioners in all
these above-captioned docketed agrarian cases.
Petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by
the Special Agrarian Court. The LBP filed with the same court a Notice of
Appeal. A few days after. The DAR also filed its Notice of Appeal. Both
notices of appeal was denied by the SAC.

Issue: Whether or not the untimely filing of the petition for certiorari be
exempt from the operation of Section 4, Rule 65 by reasons of justice and
equity.
Held: We deny the petition outright. Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 4.
When and where petition filed. The petition may be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or
not, the sixty day period shall be counted notice of the denial of said
motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the
act or omission of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer, or
person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, if it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency,
and unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be
filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time shall be granted except for compelling reasons
and in no case exceeding 15 days.
5. Alejandro Moraga vs. Sps. Julian and Felicidad Somo, et al.
Facts: The property in dispute is a parcel of agricultural land consisting of
1.7467 hectares which is located in Pandayan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, and
covered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-5926 in the name of
Victoriano Ipapo who died on 6 June 1976. This property was tenanted by
Alejandro Moraga, the deceased father of petitioner Enrique Moraga.

On 7 March 1973, Victoriano Ipapo sold the landholding to his

daughters Felicidad, Carmelita, and Herminigilda, and their respective
spouses, Julian Somo, Reynaldo Fernandez and Gil San Diego
(respondents) for P10,000.00 per Bilihan Tuluyan of even date, with the
knowledge and consent of Alejandro Moraga as admitted in his affidavit.
In the meantime, respondents filed an application for retention with
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) which was opposed by
petitioner Enrique Moraga. In an Order dated 22 February 1994, the
Regional Director of DAR Region III granted the application for retention
by respondents.
Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform who affirmed
the decision of the Regional Director in an Order dated 14 October 1994.
In a Decision dated 28 September 1995, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the two appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38445, thus affirming the
rulings of the DARAB and the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. The decision
became final and executory since no either motion for reconsideration nor
appeal from the same were ever filed by any party.
In a Decision dated 23 November 1995, the Provincial Adjudicator,
opined that the case for redemption has been rendered moot and academic
inasmuch as respondents, by virtue of the said ruling of the Court of
Appeals, had acquired vested rights over the subject property.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above
decision. The Court of Appeals did not budge from its stand and denied
the motion in a Resolution dated 11 January 2005.
Issues: Whether or not petitioner shall remain as tenant of the landholding
entitled to security of tenure.
Held: Contrary to what petitioner believed, the said portion of the body of
the decision is merely anobiter dictum. In fact, the dispositive portion of the
decision categorically upholds the eviction of petitioner. If indeed, it was
pronounced in the said decision that petitioner were to remain as tenant,
then the dispositive portion of the same would not have upheld petitioner's

eviction. It should be remembered that while the body of a decision, order

or resolution might create some ambiguity regarding which way the court's
reasoning propenderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally
invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those
rights, and imposes the corresponding duties and obligations.