Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the
petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for
having received the most number of votes;

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45081

(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;

July 15, 1936

(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled,

passed the following resolution:

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and
DIONISIO C. MAYOR,respondents.

[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS
DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO
PROTESTA.

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.

Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra

quienes no se hubiere presentado debidamente una protesta
antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la
presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.

LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of
the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua,
another respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the National
Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.

Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.

(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before
the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of
Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said
respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first
district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified;

The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents
are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara,
and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first
district of the Province of Tayabas;

(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution,

paragraph 6 of which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya
presentado en o antes de este dia.

(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the
respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the
Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted
in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period
during which protests against the election of its members should be presented;
(b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for,
the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of
the prescribed period;

if the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such
proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should
be respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the
Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of
the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should
be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it
involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.

(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an
"Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or
constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election
of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation;

On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of
the respondent Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses:

(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a
"Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";

(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to
decide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December
9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against
the election of any member of the National Assembly, it acted within its
jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by the
Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the power
and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting
its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to
dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to
take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasijudicial functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the
Commonwealth Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial
cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;

(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission
promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's
"Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the
writ prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral
Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National
Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the
proceedings of said election contests, which power has been reserved to the
Legislative Department of the Government or the National Assembly;

(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming
the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest
had thus far been filed, could not and did not deprive the electoral Commission of
its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the time that
might be set by its own rules:

(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the
Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of
controversies submitted to them for decision and to matters involving their
internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only

(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial

functions, created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person"
within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against
which prohibition would lie.

( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior

tribunal, corporation, board or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516
of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections
1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of
section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;

The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf
on March 2, 1936, setting forth the following as his special defense:

(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the
73rd Congress of the united States) has no application to the case at bar.

(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on
December 9, 1935, there was no existing law fixing the period within which
protests against the election of members of the National Assembly should be
filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of protests
against the election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral
Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the
Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;

The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision,
the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the
respondent Electoral Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the
merits of the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.

(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral
Commission on December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules
of the said Electoral Commission;

The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal
propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the
affirmative,

(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest
filed by said respondent and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the
Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not
reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;

2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein
petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution
of the National Assembly?

(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National
Assembly of the election of its members, and that such confirmation does not
operate to limit the period within which protests should be filed as to deprive the
Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto;

We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the
controversy. However, the question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel
justified in evading the issue. Being a case prim impressionis, it would hardly be
consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question and
leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of
counsel were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our
consideration.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the

Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose decision are final and
unappealable;

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It

obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for
an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of
the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our
Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in
the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may
become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of twothirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has
also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the
other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense
that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the
appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is
essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts
other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to
appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial
department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the
law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.

however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and

function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to
specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets
forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers
and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers
would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and
restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living
constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its
historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for
a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is
granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This
is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
governments of the government.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,
allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several
departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and
the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.
In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and
perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty

But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our
Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James
Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the
people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be
ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their
constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and
hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.

were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in
justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types
of constitutional government, the framers of our constitution adopted the American type
where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In
some countries which have declined to follow the American example, provisions have
been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to
interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be
the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is
logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly
provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap.
IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose
constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in
Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3,
Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29,
1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial
constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our
case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional
arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the
Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will
determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would
not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run
prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer
them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional
system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the
admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935,
confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the
Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date
as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by
the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of
the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission
to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the
Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But,
if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of
regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution
of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day
for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave
constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral
Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican government
established in our country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we
shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific
purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral
Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The
Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it

Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the
second proposition and determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein
petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on
December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges
on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the

Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the
National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest
number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that
we delve into the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the
intention of its framers and the people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate
its full meaning, import and significance.

Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction
of the legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated
one each from the two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be
designated one each from the two major parties in the House of Representatives, and in
awarding representation to the executive department in the persons of two
representatives to be designated by the President.

The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec.
7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I
of the Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of
the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress
of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word
"sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be
the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ."
apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s
therein specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the
Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and
complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886,
888.)

The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all
cases contesting the election of any of their members shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each House, by three members elected
by the members of the party having the largest number of votes therein, three
elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes,
and as to its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice.

Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As
submitted to the Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the
proposed Article on the Legislative Department, reads as follows:

The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction

as proposed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably
inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931),
was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power
to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to
be designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the
proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the
Electoral Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of
adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to
the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads as follows:

The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding
contested elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed
by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which
sub-committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a
Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear legislature but also against the
election of executive officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation is required,
as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings against specified executive and judicial
officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed
of three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the
legislature to which the contest corresponds, three members to be designed by the
majority party and three by the minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless
the Chief Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall preside. The foregoing
proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the

(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be
judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the
party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected
by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and
three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.

During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and
others, proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in
lieu thereof the following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge
of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating
remarks were made on the floor of the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934,
as to the scope of the said draft:
xxx

xxx

Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is
elected? What happens with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does
anybody confirm their election? The municipal council does this: it makes a
canvass and proclaims in this case the municipal council proclaims who has
been elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case;
there is no need on the part of the Electoral Commission unless there is a
contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the gentleman from
Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another who was
declared elected. From example, in a case when the residence of the man who
has been elected is in question, or in case the citizenship of the man who has
been elected is in question.

xxx

Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the
meaning of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The
elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly
and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz
whether the election and qualification of the member whose elections is not
contested shall also be judged by the Electoral Commission.

However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may
do so by certain maneuvers upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted
to the assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission all the
powers exercised by the assembly referring to the elections, returns and
qualifications of the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be
judged.

Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is
nothing to be judged; that is why the word "judge" is used to indicate a
controversy. If there is no question about the election of a member, there is
nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be
determined.

Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.

Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.

Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission
shall confirm also the election of those whose election is not contested?

Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the
gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask
more questions from the delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of
the draft cites cases contesting the election as separate from the first part of the
sections which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.

Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the

action of the House of Representatives confirming the election of its members is
just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not
necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has been elected, that is
sufficient, unless his election is contested.

Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested
elections are already included in the phrase "the elections, returns and
qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections" was inserted merely for the
sake of clarity.

Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed
that for purposes of the auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a
legislative body, because he will not authorize his pay.

Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own
instance, refuse to confirm the elections of the members."

Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.

Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral

Commission has power and authority to pass upon the qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly even though that question has not been
raised.

Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?

THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.

Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only
judge.

Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.

In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the
Sponsorship Committee in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates
Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference
between the original draft and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the
Sponsorship Committee said:

Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this
power is granted to the assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have
the right to contest the election and qualification of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is
retained as it is, even if two-thirds of the assembly believe that a member has not
the qualifications provided by law, they cannot remove him for that reason.

xxx

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the
Electoral Commission.

xxx

xxx

Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la

objecion apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula
del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly" parece que da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de
determinar tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados y
para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si
enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All cases contesting
the election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran
solamente a los casos en que haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before the
amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted upon the following interpellation
also took place:

Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.

Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the
right to question the eligibility of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the
Electoral Commission and make the question before the Electoral Commission.

El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera

El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the
election is contested or not contested.

El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.

El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y
otros tres a la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, no cree Su Seoria que esto
equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?

The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of
the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen
by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having
the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest
number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its
chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the election,
returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.

El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta

constituido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la
minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran la cuestion
sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para
dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos
hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del
partidismo?

When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style
Committee, through President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the
Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase
"judge of" and the words "the elections", which was accordingly accepted by the
Convention.

El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.
xxx

xxx

The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent,
impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of
government.

xxx

The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to

restore the power to decide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a
vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).

Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI,
pages 57, 58), gives a vivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes
by political parties in the disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the
following passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum
of March 14, 1936:

In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft
by reducing the representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the
Electoral Commission to two members each, so as to accord more representation to the
majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76)
against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission.

153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive
judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year
1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in the determination of controverted
elections, and rights of membership. One of the standing committees appointed
at the commencement of each session, was denominated the committee of
privileges and elections, whose functions was to hear and investigate all
questions of this description which might be referred to them, and to report their
proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When
an election petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and
their witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence,

As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members
of the National Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed
of three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the
National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second
largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by
the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.

together with their opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were
considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode of
proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this court was
adopted, the case was heard and decided by the house, in substantially the
same manner as by a committee. The committee of privileges and elections
although a select committee. The committee of privileges and elections although
a select committee was usually what is called an open one; that is to say, in order
to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members named was required to be
present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the committee
and vote if they pleased.

155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville
brought in a bill which met with the approbation of both houses, and received the
royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the celebrated law since known
by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of
the nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the security of the
constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable,
that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success of the remedy, may have
led many of the contemporaries of the measure to the information of a
judgement, which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of the
day, and has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was
objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice of the common
pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles
James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an
essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one
of the most important rights and jurisdictions of the house of commons.

154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the
right of membership gradually assumed a political character; so that for many
years previous to the year 1770, controverted elections had been tried and
determined by the house of commons, as mere party questions, upon which the
strength of contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir
Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government, resigned his office
in consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell
remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted under this system, that
"Every principle of decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted,
from whence the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too successfully,
induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in
questions of higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a
distinguished member of the house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy
for the evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the
house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or returns
of members to serve in parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the
motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the following
terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the principal
dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is
scandalously notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of
the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act by the
principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our own inclinations; nay,
it is well known, that in every contested election, many members of this house,
who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors,
enlist themselves as parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the
partial management of the very business, upon which they should determine with
the strictest impartiality."

As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the
non-partisan settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its
prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from
a rota in accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful,
the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections
Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt
Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions
Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5,
c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada,
election contests which were originally heard by the Committee of the House of
Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of
Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house, are since
1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests
against the election of members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the
Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution
of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of
May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or
National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative
contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution
of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the
Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.

10

The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the
legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the
presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes
received by each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate
provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United
States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral
Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members elected by
the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to
be selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be
binding unless rejected by the two houses voting separately. Although there is not much
of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in this regard, judging
from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member of that body on the part of the
Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate
Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] Relentless Partisanship of Electoral
Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.

their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral
Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and
minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations
was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership
three justices of the Supreme Court.

The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in
their majority men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were
familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the world. When ,
therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional
organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must
have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the
experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral
Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our
Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members
of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that
body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the
constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom
and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4,
1861.)

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to
be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction
upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis,
45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede
the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the
proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay
down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the
commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be
invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the
regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of
our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be
frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of
powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral
Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in
reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and
whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended
to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of
the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary

authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned
to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government,
it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any
other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under
Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its
compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the
legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was
to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial
tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary
constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative
contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through

11

the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection,
to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not
be permitted.

same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by
the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much
to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In the
third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the
exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or
unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may
exercise jurisdiction.

We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the
petitioner regarding the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and
independence of the national Assembly as a coordinate department of the government
and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be practically
an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests against members of
the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the
Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to
limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled
rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is
also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the
absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in
filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.

But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are
considerations of equitable character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of
the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated
on November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions
mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly
convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of
the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The
protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was
filed on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral
Commission was formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the
Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as
the last day for the filing of election protest. When, therefore, the National Assembly
passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the
National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that
said body had actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified copies
of official records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the
record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme
Court the six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission
were respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly confirming non-protested elections of members of the National
Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests, the
result would be that the National Assembly on the hypothesis that it still retained the
incidental power of regulation in such cases had already barred the presentation of
protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate
on the mode and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction
by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been contemplated, and
should be avoided.

It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral
Commission may abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any
reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members
of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the
concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the
second place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral
Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is
political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy.
All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the
judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission
reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified
cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases
entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the government were designed by the
Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within
its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with the

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of
members against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on

12

December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of
election contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of
confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to
decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the
legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority
incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the
time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the
returns of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal
purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of
January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest
filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not
required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a
matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to
entitle a member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to
any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December
6, 1935).

making each house the sole judge of the election, return and qualifications of its
members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to
respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the election
of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the
filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or
approving the returns of such members against whose election no protests had been
filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further
protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs.
Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, p. 89;
Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature;
Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp.
637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature,
Record First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine
Legislature, Record First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has
repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to
have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all
contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of
that power. There was thus no law nor constitutional provisions which authorized the
National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for
the filing of contests against the election of its members. And what the National Assembly
could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.

Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the
Congress of the United States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a
member-elect to take his seat. The return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and
the member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from
the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21,
pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases
of contested elections where the decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In
England, the judges' decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the
Speaker of the House of Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such
certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same upon the Journals, and
to give such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ for a
new election, or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may
require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or
decision of the particular house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any
actual alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative
Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).

Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally
the theory of separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the
judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and
duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the
agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the
only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries.

Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the
Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests against the election of any of its
members should be filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law

13

(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and
appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no
one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is
the source of all authority.

resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its
members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or
bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not,
is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy
the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with

specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of
classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the
governments.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member
against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and
cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the
time within which protests against the election of any member of the National
Assembly should be filed.

(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went
into effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members.

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest
filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A.
Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in
any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time
as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission
was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied
power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner
of filing protests.

In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral

Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority
under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether
the Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within the
purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have
an independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid
of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the
National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations
regarding the manner of conducting said contests.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied,
with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of
the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the
sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but
also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by

Separate Opinions

14

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

The Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law, also contained a
provision to the effect that the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall
be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members.
Notwithstanding this provision, the Philippine Legislature passed the Election Law,
section 478 of which reads as follows:

I concur in the result and in most of the views so ably expressed in the preceding
opinion. I am, however, constrained to withhold my assent to certain conclusions therein
advanced.

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall by resolution respectively

prescribe the time and manner of filing contest in the election of members of said
bodies, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds,
to be required, if any, and shall fix the costs and expenses of contest which may
be paid from their respective funds.

The power vested in the Electoral Commission by the Constitution of judging of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly, is judicial in nature. (Thomas vs.Loney, 134 U.S., 372; 33 Law. ed.,
949, 951.) On the other hand, the power to regulate the time in which notice of a
contested election may be given, is legislative in character. (M'Elmoyle vs. Cohen, 13
Pet., 312; 10 Law. ed., 177; Missouri vs. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496; 50 Law. ed., 572.)

The purpose sought to be attained by the creation of the Electoral Commission was not
to erect a body that would be above the law, but to raise legislative elections contests
from the category of political to that of justiciable questions. The purpose was not to
place the commission beyond the reach of the law, but to insure the determination of
such contests with the due process of law.

It has been correctly stated that the government established by the Constitution follows
fundamentally the theory of the separation of powers into legislative, executive, and
judicial. Legislative power is vested in the National Assembly. (Article VI, sec. 1.) In the
absence of any clear constitutional provision to the contrary, the power to regulate the
time in which notice of a contested election may be given, must be deemed to be
included in the grant of legislative power to the National Assembly.

Section 478 of the Election Law was in force at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, Article XV, section 2, of which provides that

The Constitution of the United States contains a provision similar to the that found in
Article VI, section 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines. Article I, section 5, of the
Constitution of the United States provides that each house of the Congress shall be the
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members. Notwithstanding
this provision, the Congress has assumed the power to regulate the time in which notice
of a contested election may be given. Thus section 201, Title 2, of the United States
Code Annotated prescribes:

All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered,
modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and all references in such laws
to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so
far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under
this Constitution.

Whenever any person intends to contest an election of any Member of the House
of Representatives of the United States, he shall, within thirty days after the
result of such election shall have been determined by the officer or board of
canvassers authorized by law to determine the same, give notice, in writing, to
the Member whose seat he designs to contest, of his intention to contest the
same, and, in such notice, shall specify particularly the grounds upon which he
relies in the contest. (R. S., par. 105.)

The manifest purpose of this constitutional provision was to insure the orderly processes
of government, and to prevent any hiatus in its operations after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. It was thus provided that all laws of the Philippine
Islands shall remain operative even after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, unless inconsistent with the Constitution, and that all references in such laws
to the government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as
applicable, to refer to the government and corresponding officials under the Constitution.
It would seem to be consistent not only with the spirit but the letter of the Constitution to

15

hold that section 478 of the Election Law remains operative and should now be
construed to refer to the Electoral Commission, which, in so far as the power to judge
election contests is concerned, corresponds to either the Senate or the House of
Representative under the former regime. It is important to observe in this connection that
said section 478 of the Election Law vested the power to regulate the time and manner in
which notice of a contested election may be given, not in the Philippine Legislature but in
the Senate and House of Representatives singly. In other words, the authority to
prescribe the time and manner of filing contests in the elections of members of the
Philippine Legislature was by statute lodged separately in the bodies clothed with power
to decide such contests. Construing section 478 of the Election Law to refer to the
National Assembly, as required by Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the authority to prescribe the time and manner of filing
contests in the election of members of the National Assembly is vested in the Electoral
Commission, which is now the body clothed with power to decide such contests.
In the light of what has been said, the resolution of the National Assembly of December
3, 1935, could not have the effect of barring the right of the respondent Pedro Ynsua to
contest the election of the petitioner. By the same token, the Electoral Commission was
authorized by law to adopt its resolution of December 9, 1935, which fixed the time with
in which written contests must be filed with the commission.
Having been filed within the time fixed by its resolutions, the Electoral Commission has
jurisdiction to hear and determine the contest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua
against the petitioner Jose A. Angara.

16

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,

JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 160261

x---------------------------------------------------------x

November 10, 2003

G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE
FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitionersin-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003

x---------------------------------------------------------x

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR.,
FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM
BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS,
DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA
SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL
DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO
AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS
LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO

G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZONABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-inintervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS

17

SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT,

AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO
BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS,
RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS,
ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS
BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN,
PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS,
CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE
VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN,
ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA
SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT
REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING
MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO
DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA,
JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO,
JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003

x---------------------------------------------------------x

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG,

RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO
SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO
MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA,
WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q.
GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P.
GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG,
DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE
DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA
CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH
LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA,
JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA,
MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C.
DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA,
NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P.
SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x

18

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003

G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL
MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003

x---------------------------------------------------------x
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA,
DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES,
SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R.
DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRREPADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY
THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT
COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE,
JR. respondents.

G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N.
MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE
ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003

x---------------------------------------------------------x

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.

G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x

x---------------------------------------------------------x

19

G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN

DRILON, respondents.

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL
M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG,
PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF
LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC.
[YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF
ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC],
REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,
[MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION
INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN,
CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY
AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE
NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU
CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR
FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT,respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

x---------------------------------------------------------x

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate
and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the
independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective
constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for
its resolution.

G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE

Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times
turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is
confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has

20

drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to
vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.

Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present
controversy subject of the instant petitions whether the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether
the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps
even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme

Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address
all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at
the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is
neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public
interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever
mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among
the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power
assigned to it by the sovereign people.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully
calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches
must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as
they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people,
mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches
where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized
to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and wellbeing of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment
of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least

one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles
of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

ARTICLE XI

21

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official

more than once within a period of one year.

Impeachment shall be
initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment
filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof or by a
verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment
filed by at least one-third
(1/3) of all the Members of
the House.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress
of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001,
superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress.
The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules
are shown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES

12TH CONGRESS NEW

RULES

RULE II

RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION

OF IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST
Section 2. Mode of
Initiating Impeachment.

THE SAME OFFICIAL

Section 16.
Impeachment
Proceedings Deemed
Initiated. In cases where
a Member of the House
files a verified complaint of
impeachment or a citizen
files a verified complaint
that is endorsed by a
Member of the House
through a resolution of
endorsement against an
impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings
against such official are
deemed initiated on the day
the Committee on Justice
finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution
against such official, as the
case may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date
the House votes to overturn
or affirm the finding of the
said Committee that the
verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may
be, is not sufficient in
substance.
In cases where a verified
complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may

22

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment

complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal
of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 8 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

be, by at least one-third

(1/3) of the Members of the
House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the
filing of such verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the
Secretary General.

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of
the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement
by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within
ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.

RULE V

Section 17. Bar Against

Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. Within a
BAR AGAINST
period of one (1) year from
IMPEACHMENT
the date impeachment
Section 14. Scope of Bar. proceedings are deemed
initiated as provided in
No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings,
against the same official
as such, can be initiated
more than once within the
against the same official.
period of one (1) year.
(Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003
for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not
yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article
XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on
October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the
second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B.
Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.13

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, 2 sponsored by

Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF)."3

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of
which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution

23

that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year."

of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development

Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint
be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty
as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies
to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he
"himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to
bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been
violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules
adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and
prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof
be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing
respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3)
and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it
off the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are
consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House
of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members
of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting
respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting
to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and
Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy
Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives,
they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings
are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment
complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right
to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that
they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity
of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as
"a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment
complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and
(2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of,
hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of
prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting
any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers,
alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting
respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the
Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting
respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the
same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens
and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member
of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is,
that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest
and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second
impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as

citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of
public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment
complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from
conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of
the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner
Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has
recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases

24

Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of

Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea,
alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of
their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which
they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of
Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of
Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is
mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in
its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and
that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the
second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus
standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of
whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law
and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the
examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void
for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be
declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their
petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all
citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of
Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of
Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second
impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second
impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in
interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised
in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental
importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second
impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void;
(2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the
Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers,
pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint
as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of
Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate
President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment
against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be
prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that
the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance
and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial
interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in
discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a
writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the
impeachment complaint due course.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three
of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second
impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261
likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules
as null and void for being unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition
for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the
second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as
they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged
abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."

25

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were
filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket
number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative
inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the
constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent,
be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution." 22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a)
consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file
their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for
oral arguments on November 5, 2003.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a
motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to
the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for
lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet
to be forwarded to the Senate.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin
M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are
plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the
filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its
constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its
receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues
raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of
Representatives.

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and
Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban
inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R.
Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status
quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would
unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for
the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial
determination.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of
October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House
of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the
petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral
arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal
experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to
maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf
to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.

On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in
G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein
Incorporated Petition in Intervention."

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker
Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance,
submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less
prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal
branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally
mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and
Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of
the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole
power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang

Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003,
World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-inIntervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,
160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and
Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.

26

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the
arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and
Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued
by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial
review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who
can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be
exercised by this Court at this time.

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)

a) locus standi of petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose
P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did
not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power
includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:

c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of

the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In
cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ
which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent
units thereof.

f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section

3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the
instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against
the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as
follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review
extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential
pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3)
the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and

perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through
their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their
sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended
to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If
these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be

Judicial Review

27

inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by

which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for
then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United
States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its
historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from
section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper
allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary
consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." 26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly
conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it
was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review
was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the
supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws
of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance
of the constitution, have that rank.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to

determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution
itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational
way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries,
it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what
is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument
by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics
and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.24(Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States

confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all
written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and
that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.28(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935
Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate
constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and
former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative
branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review
in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

28

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only

when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis
supplied)

xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral

component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the
corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of
government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people
for which it serves.

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of

government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in
our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance
of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of
the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in
the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general
set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas
corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees,
and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because
the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court
said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The
Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the
questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the
rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof
during the martial law regime. x x x

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x
judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of
powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government
through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary in that balancing
operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by
"any branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the
so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for
which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent,
former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:

xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In
other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not

29

a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction

or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This
is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court
apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing
a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The
object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming
that such matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of
constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through

Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The
primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure
the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of
the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying
the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its
meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to
be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given
theirordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution
is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain
that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as
much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common
use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on
the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these
are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran
declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have
dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one
person without considering that it could also affect others. When they
adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision
should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by

30

itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and

jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De
Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the
Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial
review.

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one
provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate
the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular
subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the
whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to
stand together.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that
impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any
question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond
the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to
try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it;
and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions
relative to impeachment proceedings.49

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one
which may make the words idle and nugatory.45(Emphasis supplied)

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are

outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority
opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to
the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to
try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is
the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and
difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US
Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of
impeachment.

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is
available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court
expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when
other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of
the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We
think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its
face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American

Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that
the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under
Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total
exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the
impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily
confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional
questions incident to impeachment proceedings.

31

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of
dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have
only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As
held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this
Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly
applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and
needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the
United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words
of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."

standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the
power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in
support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial
review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of
mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern
the exercise of the power of judicial review.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their
finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call
upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever
possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively,
recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride." 56

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial
review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled
that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate
or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the
exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify
an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held
that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this
Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing
the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the
House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution.
In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in
the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the
political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to
judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives
in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial
review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative
power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the
courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the
National Assembly.

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned
safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave
the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for
certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57"judicially discoverable

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial
review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances.
Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and
that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is
only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in
the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded
definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine
Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the
manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of
one and the same official.

32

independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act

beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners
do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct
personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito
Mendoza similarly contends.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since
this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens,
legislators in cases involving paramount public interest70 and transcendental
importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the
limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given
to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the
same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception
that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same
remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself
invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review,
like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations,
namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2)
the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties,
and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.68 (Italics in the original)

There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on
standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure 73 while the latter has constitutional
underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the
Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by
locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been
noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its
constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions
relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity
to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only
certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial
consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the
proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.

Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether
a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 69

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits

are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a
law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who
actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such
parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues

33

upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."

enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a
general interest common to all members of the public.80

xxx

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit
should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given
their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.

On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the
party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to
the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which
he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us
asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they
invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights as taxpayers; members of
Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal
profession which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the
House of Representatives.

While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it
is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests, 85 the
mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal
profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although
undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It
is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions
shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court
in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves
this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when
specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a
statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or
any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or
act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons
intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all
concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit, 88 for
a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under
the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were
before the court.89Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently
represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before
this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitionersadditionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition
will stand.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds
are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose,
or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he
must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure
of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the

34

The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of
transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum
on his standing.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et.

al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens
to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority
members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites
for intervention had been complied with.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive

determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are
instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the
presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any
other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein
are indeed of transcendental importance.

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,
160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave
to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment
complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed
by the Constitution.

In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of
a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to
the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public. 91 Such
liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an
interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the
existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In
petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus
have standing.

Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,

Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a
legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby
granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose
of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President
Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President
does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment
court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of
Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed.
For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand,
his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be
permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of
the law authorizing intervention.92

Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while
he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for
bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek
to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional
issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of
petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted
the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public

moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money
is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection
against abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such
funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any

35

improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from

wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.94 (Citations omitted)

presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that
even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise
the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.

In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of
petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being
deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar
does not suffice to clothe him with standing.

The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of
their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their
constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the
questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of
Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would
continue to suffer their injuries.

Ripeness and Prematurity

Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses
of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously
discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the
power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning
impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the
judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot
be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.

In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to
be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when
the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is
questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment
complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have
already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v.
Macapagal holds, has been complied with.

Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the
term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of
Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature
or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.99 (Italics in the original)

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are
premature. Amicus curiaeformer Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there
may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final
arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in
the House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who
suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage
signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and
opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to
raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or
reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved
political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political
question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases,
however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court

36

assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or

functions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana
v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was
ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took
cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it
being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience

during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but
the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general
set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas
corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial
law failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no
authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was
not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an
encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged
further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the
members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the
Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start
with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the
Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on
September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious
reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had
apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when
martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published
anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because
our main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who
succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of
wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June
1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had
barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon
the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional
Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own
colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution
was taken over by representatives of Malacaang. In 17 days, they finished what
the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to
accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was
presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President
issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some
provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less

The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to
take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice
Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's
power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual
comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the
service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary
has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of reason
and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most
powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I
will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

37

public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was

presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a
plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous
by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft
of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that
Malacaang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended
indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the
people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the
questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of
its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission
on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or
barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be
propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was
unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum
should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was
filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be
suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the
Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President
declaring that the new Constitution was already in force because the
overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the
Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I
proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed
the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973
Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the
members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big
difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of
justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question.
Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in
which the plea of "political question" was set up. There have been a
number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue
was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it
faced the following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political
question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual
controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable.
There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a
judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was
unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife
what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we
cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband.
There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to
enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."

A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null
and void. The main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a
political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:

The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15,
the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the
Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of
any referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they
participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum
proceeding.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical
questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has,
also another important function. The powers of government are generally

38

considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and
the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent
of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a
given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases

but where there is a question as to whether the government had authority
or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of
jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the
duty to decide.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the

agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In
other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not
a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This
is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.

xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the
Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political
question doctrine?

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the

courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by
claiming that such matters constitute a political question.

MR. CONCEPCION. No.

FR. BERNAS. It is not.

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may
have an initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the
original; emphasis supplied)

MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion,

amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do
away with the political question doctrine.

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion

further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:

MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial
power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower
courts as may be created by law.

When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is

judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power
includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make may
not cover all possible areas.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from
the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify
political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?

39

MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly
political questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis
supplied)

obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by

no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it
is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief
Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not
intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered
that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2)
those which "are not truly political questions."

And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable
and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue
presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers,
in proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)

Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the
doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly
political in nature.

Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions
and non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two species of
political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American
case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:

As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law,
this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not
truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is

found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
thepotentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)

In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes,
held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and
broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous
constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. 106 x
xx

Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
(2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3)
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are
interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the
others are also present.

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this
Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must
perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he
political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial
determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that

40

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial
review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they
should pass upon a constitutional issue.

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for

impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude
a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the
boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both
positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or
even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a nonjusticiable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section
1, Article VIII.

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable

political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then
our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this
standard to the present controversy.

Lis Mota

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a

governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v.
Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute

valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a

constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless
such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised,if the record
also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its
judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will
be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such
question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with
Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the
Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where
this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory
and violative of due process, to wit:

IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted

by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section
3, Article XI of the Constitution.

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a
judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be
an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of
judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely
raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]

V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of

Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over
which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this
issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which
the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent
is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. 113

41

Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees

may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the
second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon
which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining
whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this
Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a
rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
applied."119

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is

not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the aforequoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation
must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under
the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the
right not be compelled to testify against one's self. 123

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other
reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a
Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative
inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the
rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the
doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the judiciary.121

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while
joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument
that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not
fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied
opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and
resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second
impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's
opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and
distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is
required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by
the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition which
would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.

Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed

by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute
the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the
application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With
the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said
Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of
Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement
which states that:

En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has
already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI
thereof provides:

"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the

abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix
William B. Fuentebella x x x"124

42

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in
order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of
Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint
be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of
Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement, they concede that the
second impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House
Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:

Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the
determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors
Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the
latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced
by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are,
constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of
Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and
(2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of
the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement
by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within
ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.

Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the
Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases
of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the
power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.

Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for
Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more
representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint
as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment.
Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment
signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives
as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution,
such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member
whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.

On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral
compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all
the Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like
saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses
because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court.
Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can
jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be
referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII,
Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is
duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus
curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not
be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."

While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed
limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more
compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the
present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and
Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for
invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as
the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught
the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the
other petitioners as well.

Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government
cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the

43

authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the
controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the
discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness." 129 After
all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary]
their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their
varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to
render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be
equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his]
office."130

such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the

Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must
simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of
justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and
collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any
case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective
and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the
Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such,
absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules
can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication
of a senatorial election contest.

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been
settled in the case ofAbbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners
filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or
Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case
No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as
respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its
three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide
the matter. This Court held:

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any

Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate
without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed
mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no
alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but
which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.

Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of

them, is nothing short ofpro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as
established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of
his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to
exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court,
the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the
judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence.
The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if
shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the
original)

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not
prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the
performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being
expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises
its power of judicial review.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest
that would involve all Senatorselect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the
1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate
will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling

In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars"
of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice
Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:

44

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly,
non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is
legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real,
earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that,
by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the
courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'

7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court
will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which
the question may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v.
TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated
into the following categories:

2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of
a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts
of the case

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus,
if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional
question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its
decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed
because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of
the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one
who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications
of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one
who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official
interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . .
In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a
citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional.
In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not
entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise
of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of
one who has availed himself of its benefits.

4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136

45

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the
possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts
between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the
appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario
that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and
abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable
official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to
enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial
authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.

manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging
disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine
in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public
officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise
the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws,
not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting
under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of
Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist
encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their
own personal beliefs.142

Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the
Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason
for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases.
Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if
not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure

for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress

x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not

regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the
constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but
also political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even
where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the
necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the
other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least
quasi-validation, follows." 138

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that

Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3
(5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not
mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a
collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that
initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of
the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified
complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all
the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the
one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end
there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's
claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the
establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate
branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty
under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no
reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate

The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort
to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.

46

That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner
Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on
the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he
(Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the
instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating"
included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed
the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to
file the complaint and take initial action on it.

MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the
substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many
proposals and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a
resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished
the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took charge
of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang
Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers
several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation,
action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on
the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the
Senate.

"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin,

to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the
English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action,"
which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated
during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:

xxx
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of
acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of
the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those
deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment.
The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the
Committee on Justice.

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of

the approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will
just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the
Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out
earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And
what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution
containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives
Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when
the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House
reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say
"impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The
language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there
is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on

Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could
cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard
Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation,
the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body
who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only
approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the
Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words because we have to
be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the
House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me.
The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my
proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to
indicate this on record.

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the
intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be
pried from its records:

47

xxx

not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of
a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the
Constitution."145

MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval
of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is
only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of
Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father

Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word
"initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the
filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision,

that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which
read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on
line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then
capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so
that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE
ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."

During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word
"initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House
of Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the
filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries
with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of
Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a
verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention
again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any
way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam
President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The
object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is
"impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the
term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case
is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision
provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the
Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of
impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a
case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A
proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium,
means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a
beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and
consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member
of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the
House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by

the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint.
In his amicus curiaebrief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason
in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text
of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all
that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the
complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does

48

Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution
of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to
the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint
by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the
Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If
at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are
prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an
impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully
impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case"
before the Senate as impeachment court.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives
shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading
of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulisby equating
"impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the
complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House
proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the
"impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution
passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been
done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation
or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is
filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which
triggers the series of steps that follow.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by
the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two
former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers
to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of
said complaint.

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment

proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once
the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House.
These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term
"initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus
when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary toinitiate impeachment proceedings," this
was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does
not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. 146 Thus the
line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it
means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee
on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common
understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the
Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand
it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse
meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers
confuse it.

In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use
contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI,
citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to
Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue
expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the
properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he
states that this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to
actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know
more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and
disinterestedness.148

49

Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at
present only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has
not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not
simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the Constitutional
Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least

one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles
of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.

Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is
clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules
governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress
has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental
law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without
need of referendum.

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3
of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:

In Osmea v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of
Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted
"disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission
on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this
Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the
construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature,
the question becomes judicial in nature. InArroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States
v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that
while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it
may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only
within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of the
Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the
Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the
Rules of Congress, viz:

Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are
non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of
separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in
the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an
impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases
involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment
of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded.

50

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window
to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court
first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional
rules. It held:

power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."

"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine
the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the
House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity
of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was
examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not
ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and
(3) its method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained.
By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by
the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.154

Rule XV

xxx

"x x x

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to

categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will
cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution
was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935
and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or
any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power
to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive
exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse
of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking
powers of the judiciary vis--vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of
government.155

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the

names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do
not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to
the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and
announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House
Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question,
therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker
may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor
what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the
journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such
a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question
is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine
its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and
it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better,
more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a
different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to
make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous

xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a
mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this
disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike
down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its
officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking

51

powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their
more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected by
the people.156

distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue

reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the
lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)

xxx
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here,
the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.

The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice.
. . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the
Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis--vis the other
branches of government. This provision was dictated by our experience under
martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is
needed to abort abuses in government. x x x

Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for
arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of
the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution
simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole
power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme
Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a
constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with
regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our
Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that
"exclusive power" is to be exercised.

xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of
government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution
transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by
our distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached
constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987
Constitution, there is a shift in stress this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what
it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a
past that petrifies the present.

The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which
state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the
House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee
on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3)
by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of
the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give
the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the
parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will
not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if
we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be
sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not
defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator
Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is

Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

52

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken
thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.

"non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move
that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the
constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is
concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence
in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and
duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction
or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an
issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and
competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of
powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that
squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for
it to pass upon that problem head on.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices
of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August
5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003
violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion

The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of
impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without
basis in fact and in law.

If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon
that takes the center stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people
with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to
demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of
us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally
exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate
what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved.
Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the
Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their
voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the
academe and denominations of faith offered suggestions for a return to a state of
normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any
perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the
merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the
Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond
this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn
justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business
of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the
government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by
the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent
effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the
impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have
actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said
issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the
truth.

Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been
constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of
any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the
impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present
petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for
non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction,"

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and
been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the

53

personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the
course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by
whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered
judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield
judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is
involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the
validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the
Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary
from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution
now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality
when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.

the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section
3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system
which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral
authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands.
Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in
protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has
discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases
especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not
above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the
Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law
is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once
again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this
Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many
feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a
blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is
equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to
discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon
each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28,
2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of

54

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The
further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy
in the instant case, although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial
functions. While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to
restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C.
J., 6580, its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction
may issue to . . . inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether excercising
functions judicial or ministerial, which are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such
tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil
Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the
statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent
Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the
Constitution is a fortiorari "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The statutory rule,
therefore, in the jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to
courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent
them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in
appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his
authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs.
Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45459

March 13, 1937

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,

vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
Vicente Sotto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent
Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the
respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of
the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would
order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila
of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic
Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty,
requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to
the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the
respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the
postage stamps for printing as follows:

The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by
the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is
violative of the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, which provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of
any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.

"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The
stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches.
The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were

55

The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of

church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this
principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of
mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for
ocassions might arise when the estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a
weapon in the furtherance of their recognized this principle of separation of church and
state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty of
Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in
President McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied
in the constitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It
is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All
the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to
support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized
implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious
liberty, not mere religious toleration.

Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by

constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation
to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day,
Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of
the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral results. The law
allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious
worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132
and 133, Revised Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage
stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature.
This Act is as follows:
No. 4052. AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND
PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE
INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST
OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound

reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a
profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its
influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble
of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a
government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the
blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they
thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact,
certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted
exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the
Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec.
344, par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher,
minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or
to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI,

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made
immediately available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs,
and other expenses incident thereto.
SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the
amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government.
SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to
the Treasury.

56

SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.

Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the
capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the
issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an
event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman
Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion
that the Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of
incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one
which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose
should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated.
(Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

Approved, February 21, 1933.

It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of
plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident
thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner
indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The
printing and issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to have been approved
by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made
part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the
Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He
estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at
P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.

We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to
maintain inviolate the complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to
infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the
scene of religious intolerance and prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of
our political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead
to the belief that the Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or
institution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of
the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has been no
constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse
postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor
judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the
petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the
unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the
court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of
Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage
stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase
"advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It
does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for
the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however,
the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On
the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936,
incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and
selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this
country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of
international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the
Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines,
June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps as
actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice
as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of
Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress,

The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

57

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 95221(RA 9522) adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines and
classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.

EN BANC
G.R No. 187167

August 16, 2011

The Antecedents

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS,

PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE
OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA
MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA,
JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA
BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE
DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III,
GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA
MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA
MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA
PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES
MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE
MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE
TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO
VELOSO III, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON.
ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING &
RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS,Respondents.

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) 2 demarcating the maritime
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS
I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial
sea," the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void
during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile.
Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for
legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical
errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now
under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with
the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), 5 which
the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the
water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the
Philippines7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental
shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized
the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified
adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough
Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime
zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities
as "citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators,"9 as the case may be, assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces
Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine states sovereign
power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the
Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the countrys waters

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

58

landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining
Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free
policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions. 13

2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies
to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as "regime of

islands" not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress their argument of territorial diminution,
petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included its failure to
reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS IIIs framework of
regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal.

The Ruling of the Court

On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this
suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test
the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522
unconstitutional.

Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1)
the petitions compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review
grounded on petitioners alleged lack of locus standiand (2) the propriety of the writs of
certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits,
respondents defended RA 9522 as the countrys compliance with the terms of UNCLOS
III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add
that RA 9522 does not undermine the countrys security, environment and economic
interests or relinquish the Philippines claim over Sabah.

On the Threshold Issues

Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and
taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of legislative
prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and
implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners locus standi as
citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case
which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution.
Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other
litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit, thus satisfying
one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.17

Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners
assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the
islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn
under the Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners prayer for an injunctive writ.

The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition

Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes

The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:

In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a
strict observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the
writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting
prejudice on the part of petitioners.18

1. Preliminarily
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and

59

Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court
exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition,
viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the
constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of
government.20 Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which,
while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance
in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take
cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter
of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such
law.

and archipelagic States graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine
lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States
parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are
drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the
breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on
archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the territorial sea,
the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be
measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis
supplied)

RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional

RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Countrys
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States
parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental
shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope
of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treatybased rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous
zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the
exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national

territory"21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory
under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of
national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that
this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the
Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the
time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners
argue that from the Treaty of Paris technical description, Philippine sovereignty over
territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago,
embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.22

Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all
the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of
the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is
the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot
be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the
Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago." 24

Petitioners theory fails to persuade us.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral
treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial
waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from
the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and
continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of
decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating
the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement
or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology,
States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and
prescription,25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or
enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and

60

continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are
instead governed by the rules on general international law.26

Extent of
maritime area
using RA 3046,
as amended,
taking into
account the
Treaty of Paris
delimitation (in
square nautical
miles)

RA 9522s Use of the Framework

of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
with the Philippines Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands framework
to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of
the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over that area.27 Petitioners add that the KIGs
(and Scarborough Shoals) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in
the loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.28 A comparison of the configuration of the baselines
drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by
each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional
deliberations, vis--vis the Philippines obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.

Internal or
archipelagic
waters

166,858

171,435

Territorial Sea

274,136

32,106

Exclusive
Economic
Zone

1avvphi1

The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA
9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine
basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the
length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the maximum
length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This
undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners argument branding RA
9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines claim over the KIG, assuming that
baselines are relevant for this purpose.

Extent of
maritime area
using RA 9522,
taking into
account
UNCLOS III (in
square nautical
miles)

TOTAL

382,669
440,994

586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under
RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation
under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic
zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime
boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.30

Petitioners assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters"
under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by
optimizing the location of basepoints, increasedthe Philippines total maritime space
(covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216
square nautical miles, as shown in the table below: 29

61

Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because
the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself.
Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and
jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise
exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands"
under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596
and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the
Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would
have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of
UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47
(2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical
miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up
to 125 nautical miles.31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG 32 and the
Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, 33 such that
any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably
"depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took
pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys
and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them
inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law
which states: "The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent

62

from the general configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat
magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin
masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim
them as our own.

be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as
prescribed by Article 47.35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "Regime[s]
of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121" 36 of UNCLOS
III manifests the Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally
formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," such as
portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones.37

This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is
defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo
ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa
ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya
kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong
dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United
Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the
archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)

Statutory Claim Over Sabah under

RA 5446 Retained

Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS IIIs
limits. The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of
basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents:

Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the
Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446,
which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:

1avvphi1

[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw
the outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the
manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by
R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit:

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Actis without prejudice to the delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)

1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to
Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x x. This exceeds the maximum length
allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that "The length of
such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent
of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that
length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles."

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not

Incompatible with the Constitutions
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law
unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting
these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including
overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine
internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the
Constitution.38

2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be

skipped or deleted from the baselines system. This will enclose an additional
2,195 nautical miles of water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not
established by geodetic survey methods. Accordingly, some of the points,
particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to

63

Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution 39 or

as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air
space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:

incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its
sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with
customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international
community.

Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters
and of their bed and subsoil.

The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the
right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser
footing vis--vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the
right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits.
The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III
was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the
waters landward of their baselines,regardless of their depth or distance from the coast,
as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the
recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and the waters enclosed by their
baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate
islands under UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing
the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States
territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under
UNCLOS III.47

1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed

by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described
as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters,
as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall
not in other respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including
the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty
over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources
contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration

of Principles and State Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence
considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling
legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x." 49 Article II
provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as
well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v.
Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of
Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the
claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the
protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 51 ) and subsistence
fishermen (Article XIII, Section 752 ), are not violated by RA 9522.

The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and
international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary,
if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious
international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of
navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the
competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating
routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now
pending in Congress.41

In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive
economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and nonliving resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international
community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime
delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it
and will refuse to be bound by it.

In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS
III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic
waters, subject to the treatys limitations and conditions for their exercise. 42 Significantly,
the right of innocent passage is a customary international law,43 thus automatically

64

UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates
a sui generis maritime space the exclusive economic zone in waters previously part
of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit
the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. 53 UNCLOS III, however,
preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone
beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress
was not bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS
III55 and we find petitioners reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing
this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this
option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an
archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable
baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is
measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the
seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine
areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the countrys case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress
wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and
adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. RA
9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its
maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.

65

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

as parens patriae, with an even greater stress on family unity under the present
Constitution, did weigh in the balance the opposing claims and did come to the
conclusion that the welfare of the child called for the mother to be entrusted with such
responsibility. We have to affirm.

SECOND DIVISION
The appealed decision made clear: "There is no controversy as to the facts. " 1 The
insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff,
Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time the complaint was filed on October 10,
1964. The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured
himself and instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her
minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint by the mother,
with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of such sum. She filed the bond required by
the Civil Code. Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in question by
invoking the terms of the insurance policy. 2

G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974

MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.
Seno, Mendoza & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.

After trial duly had, the lower court in a decision of May 10, 1965, rendered judgment
ordering the defendant to deliver the proceeds of the policy in question to plaintiff. Its
main reliance was on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code. The former provides: "The
father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining
to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First
Instance." 3 The latter states: "The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or
may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in
ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority
and whose company he lives; ... 4

Emilio Benitez, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:p
The disputants in this appeal from a question of law from a lower court decision are the
mother and the uncle of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy
issued on the life of her deceased father. The dispute centers as to who of them should
be entitled to act as trustee thereof. The lower court applying the appropriate Civil Code
provisions decided in favor of the mother, the plaintiff in this case. Defendant uncle
appealed. As noted, the lower court acted the way it did following the specific mandate of
the law. In addition, it must have taken into account the principle that in cases of this
nature the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. It is not an unreasonable
assumption that between a mother and an uncle, the former is likely to lavish more care
on and pay greater attention to her. This is all the more likely considering that the child is
with the mother. There are no circumstances then that did militate against what conforms
to the natural order of things, even if the language of the law were not as clear. It is not to
be lost sight of either that the judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency of the State

Conformity to such explicit codal norm is apparent in this portion of the appealed
decision: "The insurance proceeds belong to the beneficiary. The beneficiary is a minor
under the custody and parental authority of the plaintiff, her mother. The said minor lives
with plaintiff or lives in the company of the plaintiff. The said minor acquired this property
by lucrative title. Said property, therefore, belongs to the minor child in ownership, and in
usufruct to the plaintiff, her mother. Since under our law the usufructuary is entitled to
possession, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the insurance proceeds. The trust,
insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void.
In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file

66

an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court
to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00." 5

family relations may press their respective claims. It would be more in consonance not
only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be
preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother.
Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the
instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the
validity of her plea. In a recent case, 9 there is this quotation from an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power
of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no
affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to
the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is
this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State shall strengthen the
family as a basic social institution." 10 If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family
as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case
were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the
lower court to decide as it did.

It is very clear, therefore, considering the above, that unless the applicability of the two
cited Civil Code provisions can be disputed, the decision must stand. There is no
ambiguity in the language employed. The words are rather clear. Their meaning is
unequivocal. Time and time again, this Court has left no doubt that where codal or
statutory norms are cast in categorical language, the task before it is not one of
interpretation but of application. 6So it must be in this case. So it was in the appealed
decision.
1. It would take more than just two paragraphs as found in the brief for the defendantappellant 7 to blunt the force of legal commands that speak so plainly and so unqualifiedly.
Even if it were a question of policy, the conclusion will remain unaltered. What is paramount,
as mentioned at the outset, is the welfare of the child. It is in consonance with such primordial
end that Articles 320 and 321 have been worded. There is recognition in the law of the deep
ties that bind parent and child. In the event that there is less than full measure of concern for
the offspring, the protection is supplied by the bond required. With the added circumstance
that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal
care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified by
the assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to the trust imposed by the deceased
is much less in the case of a mother than in the case of an uncle. Manresa, commenting on
Article 159 of the Civil Code of Spain, the source of Article 320 of the Civil Code, was of that
view: Thus "El derecho y la obligacion de administrar el Patrimonio de los hijos es una
consecuencia natural y lgica de la patria potestad y de la presuncin de que nadie cuidar
de los bienes de acqullos con mas cario y solicitude que los padres. En nuestro Derecho
antiguo puede decirse que se hallaba reconocida de una manera indirecta aquelia doctrina, y
asi se desprende de la sentencia del Tribunal Supremeo de 30 de diciembre de 1864, que se
refiere a la ley 24, tit. XIII de la Partida 5. De la propia suerte aceptan en general dicho
principio los Codigos extranjeros, con las limitaciones y requisitos de que trataremos mis
adelante." 8

WHEREFORE, the decision of May 10, 1965 is affirmed. Costs against defendantappellant.

2. The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It is buttressed

by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting
as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is
a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, as it did occur here, that

67

G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973

the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal
Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision. 9. Pursuant to
the said Order dated June 24, 1969, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution [was
issued] dated June 26, 1969, .... 10. On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of
Execution dated June 26, 1969, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served
notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks, specially on the "monies
due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the
amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution"; the Philippine Veterans Bank received
the same notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969 .... 11. The funds of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans
Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly
appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances
of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, as per Certification dated July 3, 1969 by the AFP
Controller,..." 2. The paragraph immediately succeeding in such petition then alleged: "12.
Respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias
writ of execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence, the
Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and
void." 3 In the answer filed by respondents, through counsel Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B.
Fernan, the facts set forth were admitted with the only qualification being that the total award
was in the amount of P2,372,331.40. 4

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY,
and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT, Court of
First Instance of Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND
INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for
petitioner.
Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenges
the validity of an order issued by respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, 1 declaring a decision final and executory and of
an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
subsequently issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged ground being excess of jurisdiction, or
at the very least, grave abuse of discretion. As thus simply and tersely put, with the facts
being undisputed and the principle of law that calls for application indisputable, the outcome
is predictable. The Republic of the Philippines is entitled to the writs prayed for. Respondent
Judge ought not to have acted thus. The order thus impugned and the alias writ of execution
must be nullified.

The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing
this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What was done by respondent Judge is not in
conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. .
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of
sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives
its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation of
Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." 5 Sociological
jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent
decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, 6 with its
affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored

In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 1969, a summary of facts
was set forth thus: "7. On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings
No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and
International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the
arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. 8. On
June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring

68

for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental
efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if
such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not
thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the
least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the
absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well
be imagined." 7

In the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why the Republic of the Philippines
could rightfully allege a legitimate grievance.
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and setting
aside both the order of June 24, 1969 declaring executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as
well as the alias writ of execution issued thereunder. The preliminary injunction issued by
this Court on July 12, 1969 is hereby made permanent.

This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the
revised charter. It is therein expressly provided: "The State may not be sued without its
consent." 8 A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic concept is that
public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued
had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case
of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, 9 such a well-settled doctrine was restated
in the opinion of Justice Teehankee: "The universal rule that where the State gives its consent
to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action
'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public
funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions
and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by
the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by
law." 10 Such a principle applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that had
accrued in favor of an employee. Director of Commerce and Industry v.
Concepcion, 11 speaks to that effect. Justice Malcolm as ponente left no doubt on that score.
Thus: "A rule which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public
officers, although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these
employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its
sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the
Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is
prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they
remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although
the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another
reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids
it." 12

Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J, took no part.

69

G.R. No. L-1648

August 17, 1949

three apartment buildings. Defendant Moore and Tillman themselves did not occupy any
part of the premises in question.

PEDRO SYQUIA, GONZALO SYQUIA, and LEOPOLDO SYQUIA, petitioners,

vs.
NATIVIDAD ALMEDA LOPEZ, Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, CONRADO V.
SANCHEZ, Judge of Court of First Instance of Manila, GEORGE F. MOORE, ET
AL., respondents.

Under the theory that said leases terminated six months after September 2, 1945, when
Japan surrendered, plaintiffs sometime in March, 1946, approached the predecessors in
office of defendants Moore and Tillman and requested the return of the apartment
buildings to them, but were advised that the U. S. Army wanted to continue occupying
the premises. On May 11, 1946, said plaintiffs requested the predecessors in office of
Moore and Tillman to renegotiate said leases, execute lease contract for a period of
three years and to pay a reasonable rental higher than those payable under the old
contracts. The predecessors in office of Moore in a letter dated June 6, 1946, refused to
execute new leases but advised that "it is contemplated that the United States Army will
vacate subject properties prior to 1 February 1947." Not being in conformity with the
continuance of the old leases because of the alleged comparatively low rentals being
paid thereunder, plaintiffs formally requested Tillman to cancel said three leases and to
release the apartment buildings on June 28, 1946. Tillman refused to comply with the
request. Because of the alleged representation and assurance that the U.S. Government
would vacate the premises before February 1, 1947, the plaintiffs took no further steps to
secure possession of the buildings and accepted the monthly rentals tendered by the
predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman on the basis of a month to month lease
subject to cancellation upon thirty days notice. Because of the failure to comply with the
alleged representation and assurance that the three apartment buildings will be vacated
prior to February 1, 1947, plaintiffs on February 17, 1947, served formal notice upon
defendants Moore and Tillman and 64 other army officers or members of the United
States Armed Forces who were then occupying apartments in said three buildings,
demanding (a) cancellation of said leases; (b) increase in rentals to P300 per month per
apartment effective thirty days from notice; (c) execution of new leases for the three or
any one or two of the said apartment buildings for a definite term, otherwise, (d) release
of said apartment buildings within thirty days of said notice in the event of the failure to
comply with the foregoing demands. The thirty-day period having expired without any of
the defendants having complied with plaintiffs' demands, the plaintiffs commenced the
present action in the Municipal Court of Manila in the form of an action for unlawful
detainer (desahucio) against Moore and Tillman and the 64 persons occupying
apartments in the three buildings for the purpose of having them vacate the apartments,
each occupants to pay P300 a month for his particular apartment from January 1, 1947
until each of said particular defendant had vacated said apartment; to permit plaintiffs
access to said apartment buildings for the purpose of appraising the damages sustained

Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha for petitioner.

J. A. Wolfson for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
For the purposes of this decision, the following facts gathered from and based on the
pleadings, may be stated. The plaintiffs named Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo, all
surnamed Syquia, are the undivided joint owners of three apartment buildings situated in
the City of Manila known as the North Syquia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and
Michel Apartments located at 1131 M. H. del Pilar, 1151 M. H. del Pilar and 1188 A.
Mabini Streets, respectively.
About the middle of the year 1945, said plaintiffs executed three lease contracts, one for
each of the three apartments, in favor of the United States of America at a monthly rental
of P1,775 for the North Syquia Apartments, P1,890 for the South Syquia Apartment, and
P3,335 for the Michel Apartments. The term or period for the three leases was to be "for
the duration of the war and six months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the United
States of America." The apartment buildings were used for billeting and quartering
officers of the U. S. armed forces stationed in the Manila area.
In March 1947, when these court proceedings were commenced, George F. Moore was
the Commanding General, United States Army, Philippine Ryukus Command, Manila,
and as Commanding General of the U. S. Army in the Manila Theatre, was said to control
the occupancy of the said apartment houses and had authority in the name of the United
States Government to assign officers of the U. S. Army to said apartments or to order
said officers to vacate the same. Erland A. Tillman was the Chief, Real Estate Division,
Office of the District Engineers, U. S. Army, Manila, who, under the command of
defendant Moore was in direct charge and control of the lease and occupancy of said

70

as the result of the occupancy by defendants; that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs
whatever damages may have been actually caused on said property; and that in the
event said occupants are unable to pay said P300 a month and/or the damages
sustained by said property, the defendants Moore and Tillman jointly and severally be
made to pay said monthly rentals of P300 per month per apartment from January 1, 1947
to March 19, 1947, inclusive, and/or the damages sustained by said apartments, and that
defendants Moore and Tillman be permanently enjoined against ordering any additional
parties in the future from entering and occupying said premises.

the name of the U. S. Government even though no suit can be brought against the
Government itself, but inasmuch as the plaintiffs in the present case are bringing this
action against officers and agents of the U. S. Government not only to recover the
possession of the three apartment houses supposedly being held illegally by them in the
name of their government, but also to collect back rents, not only at the rate agreed upon
in the lease contracts entered into by the United States of America but in excess of said
rate, to say nothing of the damages claimed, as a result of which, a judgment in these
proceedings may become a charge against the U. S. Treasury, then under the rule laid
down in the case of Land vs. Dollar, 91 Law. ed., 1209, the present suit must be
regarded as one against the United States Government itself, which cannot be sued
without its consent, specially by citizens of another country.

Acting upon a motion to dismiss filed through the Special Assistant of the Judge
Advocate, Philippine Ryukus Command on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction
over the defendants and over the subject matter of the action, because the real party in
interest was the U.S. Government and not the individual defendants named in the
complaint, and that the complaint did not state a cause of action, the municipal court of
Manila in an order dated April 29, 1947, found that the war between the United States of
America and her allies on one side and Germany and Japan on the other, had not yet
terminated and, consequently, the period or term of the three leases had not yet expired;
that under the well settled rule of International Law, a foreign government like the United
States Government cannot be sued in the courts of another state without its consent; that
it was clear from the allegations of the complaint that although the United States of
America has not been named therein as defendant, it is nevertheless the real defendant
in this case, as the parties named as defendants are officers of the United States Army
and were occupying the buildings in question as such and pursuant to orders received
from that Government. The municipal court dismissed the action with costs against the
plaintiffs with the suggestion or opinion that a citizen of the Philippines, who feels
aggrieved by the acts of the Government of a foreign country has the right to demand
that the Philippine Government study his claim and if found meritorious, take such
diplomatic steps as may be necessary for the vindication of rights of that citizen, and that
the matter included or involved in the action should be a proper subject matter of
representations between the Government of the Government of the United States of
America and the Philippines. Not being satisfied with the order, plaintiffs appealed to the
Court of Manila, where the motion to dismiss was renewed.

The plaintiffs as petitioners have brought this case before us on a petition for a writ of
mandamus seeking to order the Municipal Court of Manila to take jurisdiction over the
case. On October 30, 1947, counsel for respondents Almeda Lopez, Sanchez, Moore
and Tillman filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds. The case was orally argued on
November 26, 1947. On March 4, 1948, petitioners filed a petition which, among other
things, informed this Court that the North Syquia Apartments, the South Syquia
Apartments and Michel Apartments would be vacated by their occupants on February 29,
March 31, and May 31, 1948, respectively. As a matter of fact, said apartments were
actually vacated on the dates already mentioned and were received by the plaintiffowners.
On the basis of this petition and because of the return of the three apartment houses to
the owners, counsel for respondents Almeda Lopez, Sanchez, Moore and Tillman filed a
petition to dismiss the present case on the ground that it is moot. Counsel for the
petitioners answering the motion, claimed that the plaintiffs and petitioners possession of
the three apartment houses, reserving all of their rights against respondents including the
right to collect rents and damages; that they have not been paid rents since January 1,
1947; that respondents admitted that there is a total of P109,895 in rentals due and
owing to petitioners; that should this case be now dismissed, the petitioners will be
unable to enforce collection; that the question of law involved in this case may again
come up before the courts when conflicts arise between Filipino civilian property owners
and the U.S. Army authorities concerning contracts entered into in the Philippines
between said Filipinos and the U.S. Government. Consequently, this Court, according to
the petitioners, far from dismissing the case, should decide it, particularly the question of
jurisdiction.

The Court of First Instance of Manila in an order dated July 12, 1947, affirmed the order
of the municipal court dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. It conceded that under the doctrine
laid down in the case of U. S. vs. Lee, 106 U. S., 196 and affirmed in the case of Tindal
vs. Wesley, 167 U. S., 204 ordinarily, courts have jurisdiction over cases where private
parties sue to recover possession of property being held by officers or agents acting in

71

On June 18, 1949, through a "petition to amend complaint" counsel for the petitioners
informed this court that petitioners had already received the U. S. Army Forces in the
Western Pacific the sum of P109,895 as rentals for the three apartments, but with the
reservation that said acceptance should not be construed as jeopardizing the rights of
the petitioners in the case now pending in the courts of the Philippines or their rights
against the U. S. Government with respect to the three apartment houses. In view of this
last petition, counsel for respondents alleging that both respondent Moore and Tillman
had long left the Islands for other Army assignments, and now that both the possession
of the three apartments in question as well as the rentals for their occupation have
already been received by the petitioners renew their motion for dismissal on the ground
that this case has now become moot.

rights which may have been invaded by the officers of the government professing to act
in its name. In such a case the officials or agents asserting rightful possession must
prove and justify their claim before the courts, when it is made to appear in the suit
against them that the title and right of possession is in the private citizen. However, and
this is important, where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery
of possession of the property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or
financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the
government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the
courts except with the consent of said Government. (See case of Land vs. Dollar, 91
Law. ed., 1209.)
From a careful study of this case, considering the facts involved therein as well as those
of public knowledge of which we take judicial cognizance, we are convinced that the real
party in interest as defendant in the original case is the United States of America. The
lessee in each of the three lease agreements was the United States of America and the
lease agreement themselves were executed in her name by her officials acting as her
agents. The considerations or rentals was always paid by the U. S. Government. The
original action in the municipal court was brought on the basis of these three lease
contracts and it is obvious in the opinion of this court that any back rentals or increased
rentals will have to be paid by the U. S. Government not only because, as already stated,
the contracts of lease were entered into by such Government but also because the
premises were used by officers of her armed forces during the war and immediately after
the terminations of hostilities.

The main purpose of the original action in the municipal court was to recover the
possession of the three apartment houses in question. The recovery of rentals as
submitted by the very counsel for the petitioner was merely incidental to the main action.
Because the prime purpose of the action had been achieved, namely, the recovery of the
possession of the premises, apart from the fact that the rentals amounting to P109,895
had been paid to the petitioners and accepted by them though under reservations, this
Court may now well dismiss the present proceedings on the ground that the questions
involved therein have become academic and moot. Counsel for the petitioners however,
insists that a decision be rendered on the merits, particularly on the question of
jurisdiction of the municipal court over the original action, not only for the satisfaction of
the parties involved but also to serve as a guide in future cases involving cases of similar
nature such as contracts of lease entered into between the Government of the United
States of America on one side and Filipino citizens on the other regarding properties of
the latter. We accept the suggestion of petitioners and shall proceed to discuss the facts
and law involved and rule upon them.

We cannot see how the defendants and respondents Moore and Tillman could be held
individually responsible for the payments of rentals or damages in relation to the
occupancy of the apartment houses in question. Both of these army officials had no
intervention whatsoever in the execution of the lease agreements nor in the initial
occupancy of the premises both of which were effected thru the intervention of and at the
instance of their predecessors in office. The original request made by the petitioners for
the return of the apartment buildings after the supposed termination of the leases, was
made to, and denied not by Moore and Tillman but by their predecessors in office. The
notice and decision that the U. S. Army wanted and in fact continued to occupy the
premises was made not by Moore and Tillman but by predecessors in office. The refusal
to renegotiate the leases as requested by the petitioners was made not by Moore but by
his predecessors in office according to the very complaint filed in the municipal court.
The assurance that the U. S. Army will vacate the premises prior to February 29, 1947,
was also made by the predecessors in office of Moore.

We shall concede as correctly did the Court of First Instance, that following the doctrine
laid down in the cases ofU. S. vs. Lee and U. S. vs. Tindal, supra, a private citizen
claiming title and right of possession of a certain property may, to recover possession of
said property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the Government who are said to
be illegally witholding the same from him, though in doing so, said officers and agents
claim that they are acting for the Government, and the court may entertain such a suit
altho the Government itself is not included as a party-defendant. Of course, the
Government is not bound or concluded by the decision. The philosophy of this ruling is
that unless the courts are permitted to take cognizance and to assume jurisdiction over
such a case, a private citizen would be helpless and without redress and protection of his

72

As to the defendant Tillman, according to the complaint he was Chief, Real State
Division, Office of the District Engineer, U. S. Army, and was in direct charge and control
of the leases and occupancy of the apartment buildings, but he was under the command
of defendant Moore, his superior officer. We cannot see how said defendant Tillman in
assigning new officers to occupy apartments in the three buildings, in obedience to order
or direction from his superior, defendant Moore, could be held personally liable for the
payment of rentals or increase thereof, or damages said to have been suffered by the
plaintiffs.

government for the rooms or apartments assigned to them by order of their superior
officer was fair and reasonable or not, and whether the period of lease between their
government and the owners of the premises had expired, and whether their occupancy
of their rooms or apartments was legal or illegal? And if they dismissed these seemingly
idle speculations, assuming that they ever entered their minds, and continued to live in
their apartments unless and until orders to the contrary were received by them, could
they later be held personally liable for any back rentals which their government may have
failed to pay to the owners of the building, or for any damages to the premises incident to
all leases of property, specially in the absence of proof that such damages to property
had been caused by them and not by the previous occupants, also army officers who are
not now parties defendant to this suit? Incidentally it may be stated that both defendants
Moore and Tillman have long left these Islands to assume other commands or
assignments and in all probability none of their 64 co-defendants is still within this
jurisdiction.

With respect to defendant General Moore, when he assumed his command in Manila,
these lease agreement had already been negotiated and executed and were in actual
operation. The three apartment buildings were occupied by army officers assigned
thereto by his predecessors in office. All that he must have done was to assign or billet
incoming army officers to apartments as they were vacated by outgoing officers due to
changes in station. He found these apartment buildings occupied by his government and
devoted to the use and occupancy of army officers stationed in Manila under his
command, and he had reasons to believe that he could continue holding and using the
premises theretofore assigned for that purpose and under contracts previously entered
into by his government, as long as and until orders to the contrary were received by him.
It is even to be presumed that when demand was made by the plaintiffs for the payment
of increased rentals or for vacating the three apartment buildings, defendant Moore, not
a lawyer by profession but a soldier, must have consulted and sought the advise of his
legal department, and that his action in declining to pay the increased rentals or to eject
all his army officers from the three buildings must have been in pursuance to the advice
and counsel of his legal division. At least, he was not in a position to pay increased
rentals above those set and stipulated in the lease agreements, without the approval of
his government, unless he personally assumed financial responsibility therefor. Under
these circumstances, neither do we believe nor find that defendant Moore can be held
personally liable for the payment of back or increased rentals and alleged damages.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold that the
real party defendant in interest is the Government of the United States of America; that
any judgment for back or increased rentals or damages will have to be paid not by
defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by the said U. S.
Government. On the basis of the ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar already cited, and
on what we have already stated, the present action must be considered as one against
the U. S. Government. It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal
Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The
question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the
action. The U. S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is
essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen
filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of citizen
filing an action against a foreign government without said government's consent, which
renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of
the law behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem
it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof.

As to the army officers who actually occupied the apartments involved, there is less
reason for holding them personally liable for rentals and supposed damages as sought
by the plaintiffs. It must be remembered that these army officers when coming to their
station in Manila were not given the choice of their dwellings. They were merely assigned
quarters in the apartment buildings in question. Said assignments or billets may well be
regarded as orders, and all that those officers did was to obey them, and, accordingly,
occupied the rooms assigned to them. Under such circumstances, can it be supposed or
conceived that such army officers would first inquire whether the rental being paid by the

In conclusion we find that the Municipal Court of Manila committed no error in dismissing
the case for lack of jurisdiction and that the Court of First Instance acted correctly in
affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal. Case dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

73

G.R. No. 142396

February 11, 2003

"During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986, upon the introduction of
Jose Iigo, the defendant expressed his interest in buying caviar. As a matter of fact, he
bought two kilos of caviar from plaintiff and paid P10,000.00 for it. Selling caviar, aside
from that of Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other Iranian products was his business
after the Khomeini government cut his pension of over $3,000.00 per month. During their
introduction in that meeting, the defendant gave the plaintiff his calling card, which
showed that he is working at the US Embassy in the Philippines, as a special agent of
the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, of the United States, and
gave his address as US Embassy, Manila. At the back of the card appears a telephone
number in defendants own handwriting, the number of which he can also be contacted.

KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
6425, otherwise also known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," was filed against
petitioner Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 151, of Pasig City. The criminal charge followed a "buy-bust operation"
conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of Minucher, an Iranian
national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been seized.
The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who would,
in due time, become one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On 08 January
1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the two accused.

"It was also during this first meeting that plaintiff expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa
for his wife and the wife of a countryman named Abbas Torabian. The defendant told him
that he [could] help plaintiff for a fee of $2,000.00 per visa. Their conversation, however,
was more concentrated on politics, carpets and caviar. Thereafter, the defendant
promised to see plaintiff again.
"On May 19, 1986, the defendant called the plaintiff and invited the latter for dinner at
Mario's Restaurant at Makati. He wanted to buy 200 grams of caviar. Plaintiff brought the
merchandize but for the reason that the defendant was not yet there, he requested the
restaurant people to x x x place the same in the refrigerator. Defendant, however, came
and plaintiff gave him the caviar for which he was paid. Then their conversation was
again focused on politics and business.

On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Manila for damages on account of what he claimed to have
been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC
detailed what it had found to be the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

"On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's residence for 18 years
at Kapitolyo, Pasig. The defendant wanted to buy a pair of carpets which plaintiff valued
at $27,900.00. After some haggling, they agreed at $24,000.00. For the reason that
defendant did not yet have the money, they agreed that defendant would come back the
next day. The following day, at 1:00 p.m., he came back with his $24,000.00, which he
gave to the plaintiff, and the latter, in turn, gave him the pair of carpets.

"The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian national. He came to the
Philippines to study in the University of the Philippines in 1974. In 1976, under the
regime of the Shah of Iran, he was appointed Labor Attach for the Iranian Embassies in
Tokyo, Japan and Manila, Philippines. When the Shah of Iran was deposed by Ayatollah
Khomeini, plaintiff became a refugee of the United Nations and continued to stay in the
Philippines. He headed the Iranian National Resistance Movement in the Philippines.

1awphi1.nt

"At about 3:00 in the afternoon of May 27, 1986, the defendant came back again to
plaintiff's house and directly proceeded to the latter's bedroom, where the latter and his
countryman, Abbas Torabian, were playing chess. Plaintiff opened his safe in the
bedroom and obtained $2,000.00 from it, gave it to the defendant for the latter's fee in
obtaining a visa for plaintiff's wife. The defendant told him that he would be leaving the
Philippines very soon and requested him to come out of the house for a while so that he
can introduce him to his cousin waiting in a cab. Without much ado, and without putting

"He came to know the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the latter was brought to his
house and introduced to him by a certain Jose Iigo, an informer of the Intelligence Unit
of the military. Jose Iigo, on the other hand, was met by plaintiff at the office of Atty.
Crisanto Saruca, a lawyer for several Iranians whom plaintiff assisted as head of the antiKhomeini movement in the Philippines.

74

on his shirt as he was only in his pajama pants, he followed the defendant where he saw
a parked cab opposite the street. To his complete surprise, an American jumped out of
the cab with a drawn high-powered gun. He was in the company of about 30 to 40
Filipino soldiers with 6 Americans, all armed. He was handcuffed and after about 20
minutes in the street, he was brought inside the house by the defendant. He was made
to sit down while in handcuffs while the defendant was inside his bedroom. The
defendant came out of the bedroom and out from defendant's attach case, he took
something and placed it on the table in front of the plaintiff. They also took plaintiff's wife
who was at that time at the boutique near his house and likewise arrested Torabian, who
was playing chess with him in the bedroom and both were handcuffed together. Plaintiff
was not told why he was being handcuffed and why the privacy of his house, especially
his bedroom was invaded by defendant. He was not allowed to use the telephone. In
fact, his telephone was unplugged. He asked for any warrant, but the defendant told him
to `shut up. He was nevertheless told that he would be able to call for his lawyer who
can defend him.

During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, filed a special appearance for
Scalzo and moved for extension of time to file an answer pending a supposed advice
from the United States Department of State and Department of Justice on the defenses
to be raised. The trial court granted the motion. On 27 October 1988, Scalzo filed
another special appearance to quash the summons on the ground that he, not being a
resident of the Philippines and the action being one in personam, was beyond the
processes of the court. The motion was denied by the court, in its order of 13 December
1988, holding that the filing by Scalzo of a motion for extension of time to file an answer
to the complaint was a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons which
could likewise be construed a waiver of the requirement of formal notice. Scalzo filed a
motion for reconsideration of the court order, contending that a motion for an extension of
time to file an answer was not a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons
since it did not seek an affirmative relief. Scalzo argued that in cases involving the United
States government, as well as its agencies and officials, a motion for extension was
peculiarly unavoidable due to the need (1) for both the Department of State and the
Department of Justice to agree on the defenses to be raised and (2) to refer the case to
a Philippine lawyer who would be expected to first review the case. The court a quo
denied the motion for reconsideration in its order of 15 October 1989.

"The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant invited him to come out to
meet his cousin, his safe was opened where he kept the $24,000.00 the defendant paid
for the carpets and another $8,000.00 which he also placed in the safe together with a
bracelet worth $15,000.00 and a pair of earrings worth $10,000.00. He also discovered
missing upon his release his 8 pieces hand-made Persian carpets, valued at $65,000.00,
a painting he bought for P30,000.00 together with his TV and betamax sets. He claimed
that when he was handcuffed, the defendant took his keys from his wallet. There was,
therefore, nothing left in his house.

Scalzo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. No.
17023, assailing the denial. In a decision, dated 06 October 1989, the appellate court
denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Scalzo then elevated the
incident in a petition for review on certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 91173, to this Court. The
petition, however, was denied for its failure to comply with SC Circular No. 1-88; in any
event, the Court added, Scalzo had failed to show that the appellate court was in error in
its questioned judgment.

"That his arrest as a heroin trafficker x x x had been well publicized throughout the world,
in various newspapers, particularly in Australia, America, Central Asia and in the
Philippines. He was identified in the papers as an international drug trafficker. x x x

Meanwhile, at the court a quo, an order, dated 09 February 1990, was issued (a)
declaring Scalzo in default for his failure to file a responsive pleading (answer) and (b)
setting the case for the reception of evidence. On 12 March 1990, Scalzo filed a motion
to set aside the order of default and to admit his answer to the complaint. Granting the
motion, the trial court set the case for pre-trial. In his answer, Scalzo denied the material
allegations of the complaint and raised the affirmative defenses (a) of Minuchers failure
to state a cause of action in his complaint and (b) that Scalzo had acted in the discharge
of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of
the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo interposed a counterclaim of
P100,000.00 to answer for attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation.

In fact, the arrest of defendant and Torabian was likewise on television, not only in the
Philippines, but also in America and in Germany. His friends in said places informed him
that they saw him on TV with said news.
"After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian, they were brought to Camp Crame
handcuffed together, where they were detained for three days without food and water." 1

75

Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of the civil case,
Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent
of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic
immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note No. 414 of the United States
Embassy, dated 29 May 1990, addressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the
Philippines and a Certification, dated 11 June 1990, of Vice Consul Donna Woodward,
certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. In an order of 25 June
1990, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

`The Clerk of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to take note of the lien of the
Court on this judgment to answer for the unpaid docket fees considering that the plaintiff
in this case instituted this action as a pauper litigant." 2
While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence presented by
him that he was a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity as such, it ruled that he,
nevertheless, should be held accountable for the acts complained of committed outside
his official duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic
immunity during his term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil
jurisdiction of the "Receiving State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention.

On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with this Court,
docketed G.R. No. 94257 and entitled "Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., vs. Hon. Wenceslao Polo,
et al.," asking that the complaint in Civil Case No. 88-45691 be ordered dismissed. The
case was referred to the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 22505, per
this Courts resolution of 07 August 1990. On 31 October 1990, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision sustaining the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the
dismissal of the complaint against him. Minucher filed a petition for review with this
Court, docketed G.R. No. 97765 and entitled "Khosrow Minucher vs. the Honorable
Court of Appeals, et. al." (cited in 214 SCRA 242), appealing the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. In a decision, dated 24 September 1992, penned by Justice (now Chief Justice)
Hilario Davide, Jr., this Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and remanded
the case to the lower court for trial. The remand was ordered on the theses (a) that the
Court of Appeals erred in granting the motion to dismiss of Scalzo for lack of jurisdiction
over his person without even considering the issue of the authenticity of Diplomatic Note
No. 414 and (b) that the complaint contained sufficient allegations to the effect that
Scalzo committed the imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his
official duties and, absent any evidence to the contrary, the issue on Scalzos diplomatic
immunity could not be taken up.

Hence, this recourse by Minucher. The instant petition for review raises a two-fold issue:
(1) whether or not the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, following the decision
rendered by this Court in G.R. No. 97765, should have precluded the Court of Appeals
from resolving the appeal to it in an entirely different manner, and (2) whether or not
Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule of res judicata, would
require 1) the finality of the prior judgment, 2) a valid jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties on the part of the court that renders it, 3) a judgment on the merits, and
4) an identity of the parties, subject matter and causes of action. 3 Even while one of the
issues submitted in G.R. No. 97765 - "whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that private respondent Scalzo is a diplomat immune from civil suit
conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations" - is also a pivotal
question raised in the instant petition, the ruling in G.R. No. 97765, however, has not
resolved that point with finality. Indeed, the Court there has made this observation -

The Manila RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case. On 17 November 1995,
the trial court reached a decision; it adjudged:

"It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent himself, in his Pre-trial Brief
filed on 13 June 1990, unequivocally states that he would present documentary evidence
consisting of DEA records on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on his
position and duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right to
present evidence in support of his position, which is the basis for the alleged diplomatic
immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the belated motion to dismiss cannot be relied
upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair resolution of the issue of diplomatic immunity." 4

"WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby

rendered for the plaintiff, who successfully established his claim by sufficient evidence,
against the defendant in the manner following:
"`Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and compensatory damages of
P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million; exemplary damages in the sum
of P100,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of P200,000.00 plus costs.

76

Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the
Philippines is a signatory, grants him absolute immunity from suit, describing his
functions as an agent of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency as "conducting
surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the
source of prohibited drugs being shipped to the U.S., (and) having ascertained the target,
(he then) would inform the Philippine narcotic agents (to) make the actual arrest." Scalzo
has submitted to the trial court a number of documents -

repeatedly urged the Department of Foreign Affairs to take appropriate action to inform
the trial court of Scalzos diplomatic immunity. The other documentary exhibits were
presented to indicate that: (1) the Philippine government itself, through its Executive
Department, recognizing and respecting the diplomatic status of Scalzo, formally advised
the "Judicial Department" of his diplomatic status and his entitlement to all diplomatic
privileges and immunities under the Vienna Convention; and (2) the Department of
Foreign Affairs itself authenticated Diplomatic Note No. 414. Scalzo additionally
presented Exhibits "9" to "13" consisting of his reports of investigation on the surveillance
and subsequent arrest of Minucher, the certification of the Drug Enforcement
Administration of the United States Department of Justice that Scalzo was a special
agent assigned to the Philippines at all times relevant to the complaint, and the special
power of attorney executed by him in favor of his previous counsel6 to show (a) that the
United States Embassy, affirmed by its Vice Consul, acknowledged Scalzo to be a
member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in
the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988, (b) that, on
May 1986, with the cooperation of the Philippine law enforcement officials and in the
exercise of his functions as member of the mission, he investigated Minucher for alleged
trafficking in a prohibited drug, and (c) that the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs
itself recognized that Scalzo during his tour of duty in the Philippines (14 October 1985
up to 10 August 1988) was listed as being an Assistant Attach of the United States
diplomatic mission and accredited with diplomatic status by the Government of the
Philippines. In his Exhibit 12, Scalzo described the functions of the overseas office of the
United States Drugs Enforcement Agency, i.e., (1) to provide criminal investigative
expertise and assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies on narcotic and drug
control programs upon the request of the host country, 2) to establish and maintain
liaison with the host country and counterpart foreign law enforcement officials, and 3) to
conduct complex criminal investigations involving international criminal conspiracies
which affect the interests of the United States.

1. Exh. '2' - Diplomatic Note No. 414 dated 29 May 1990;

2. Exh. '1' - Certification of Vice Consul Donna K. Woodward dated 11 June
1990;
3. Exh. '5' - Diplomatic Note No. 757 dated 25 October 1991;
4. Exh. '6' - Diplomatic Note No. 791 dated 17 November 1992; and
5. Exh. '7' - Diplomatic Note No. 833 dated 21 October 1988.
6. Exh. '3' - 1st Indorsement of the Hon. Jorge R. Coquia, Legal Adviser,
Department of Foreign Affairs, dated 27 June 1990 forwarding Embassy Note
No. 414 to the Clerk of Court of RTC Manila, Branch 19 (the trial court);
7. Exh. '4' - Diplomatic Note No. 414, appended to the 1st Indorsement (Exh. '3');
and
8. Exh. '8' - Letter dated 18 November 1992 from the Office of the Protocol,
Department of Foreign Affairs, through Asst. Sec. Emmanuel Fernandez,
addressed to the Chief Justice of this Court.5

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of centuries-old

customary law and, by the time of its ratification on 18 April 1961, its rules of law had
long become stable. Among the city states of ancient Greece, among the peoples of the
Mediterranean before the establishment of the Roman Empire, and among the states of
India, the person of the herald in time of war and the person of the diplomatic envoy in
time of peace were universally held sacrosanct.7 By the end of the 16th century, when
the earliest treatises on diplomatic law were published, the inviolability of ambassadors
was firmly established as a rule of customary international law.8Traditionally, the exercise
of diplomatic intercourse among states was undertaken by the head of state himself, as

The documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the United States Embassy
accordingly advised the Executive Department of the Philippine Government that Scalzo
was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his
arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988; (2)
that the United States Government was firm from the very beginning in asserting the
diplomatic immunity of Scalzo with respect to the case pursuant to the provisions of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and (3) that the United States Embassy

77

being the preeminent embodiment of the state he represented, and the foreign secretary,
the official usually entrusted with the external affairs of the state. Where a state would
wish to have a more prominent diplomatic presence in the receiving state, it would then
send to the latter a diplomatic mission. Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the
functions of the diplomatic mission involve, by and large, the representation of the
interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state. 9

function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective
fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the
home government.14 These officials are not generally regarded as members of the
diplomatic mission, nor are they normally designated as having diplomatic rank.
In an attempt to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented Diplomatic Notes Nos.
414, 757 and 791, all issued post litem motam, respectively, on 29 May 1990, 25 October
1991 and 17 November 1992. The presentation did nothing much to alleviate the Court's
initial reservations in G.R. No. 97765, viz:

The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a)
ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state,10 (b) envoys,11 ministers
or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs 12 accredited to
the ministers of foreign affairs.13 Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the
diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff. Only the
heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of
the administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic
rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for immunity to
the members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an understanding that
the same be restrictively applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the
Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. The
Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or members of the
diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from all others. It might
bear stressing that even consuls, who represent their respective states in concerns of
commerce and navigation and perform certain administrative and notarial duties, such as
the issuance of passports and visas, authentication of documents, and administration of
oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges
accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of
representing their states in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining
whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not
he performs duties of diplomatic nature.

"While the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the public respondent gravely abused
its discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 88-45691 on the basis of an erroneous
assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, the private respondent is clothed
with diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person.
"x x x x x x x x x
"And now, to the core issue - the alleged diplomatic immunity of the private respondent.
Setting aside for the moment the issue of authenticity raised by the petitioner and the
doubts that surround such claim, in view of the fact that it took private respondent one (1)
year, eight (8) months and seventeen (17) days from the time his counsel filed on 12
September 1988 a Special Appearance and Motion asking for a first extension of time to
file the Answer because the Departments of State and Justice of the United States of
America were studying the case for the purpose of determining his defenses, before he
could secure the Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Manila, and even granting for
the sake of argument that such note is authentic, the complaint for damages filed by
petitioner cannot be peremptorily dismissed.
"x x x x x x x x x

Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he was an Assistant Attach
of the United States diplomatic mission and was accredited as such by the Philippine
Government. An attach belongs to a category of officers in the diplomatic establishment
who may be in charge of its cultural, press, administrative or financial affairs. There could
also be a class of attaches belonging to certain ministries or departments of the
government, other than the foreign ministry or department, who are detailed by their
respective ministries or departments with the embassies such as the military, naval, air,
commercial, agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or the like. Attaches
assist a chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him, but their main

78

"There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts imputed to him were
done in his official capacity. Nothing supports this self-serving claim other than the socalled Diplomatic Note. x x x. The public respondent then should have sustained the trial
court's denial of the motion to dismiss. Verily, it should have been the most proper and
appropriate recourse. It should not have been overwhelmed by the self-serving
Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and whose authenticity has not
yet been proved. The undue haste with which respondent Court yielded to the private
respondent's claim is arbitrary."

Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive

branch of the government. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 15 the Court has
recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst
apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain
exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should behoove the Philippine government,
specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be most circumspect, that should
particularly be no less than compelling, in its post litem motam issuances. It might be
recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the
territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the
exercise of territorial jurisdiction.16 The government of the United States itself, which
Scalzo claims to be acting for, has formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomatic
agent. The State Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status to a person who
possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title and "performs duties of diplomatic
nature."17 Supplementary criteria for accreditation are the possession of a valid
diplomatic passport or, from States which do not issue such passports, a diplomatic note
formally representing the intention to assign the person to diplomatic duties, the holding
of a non-immigrant visa, being over twenty-one years of age, and performing diplomatic
functions on an essentially full-time basis.18 Diplomatic missions are requested to provide
the most accurate and descriptive job title to that which currently applies to the duties
performed. The Office of the Protocol would then assign each individual to the
appropriate functional category.19

A significant document would appear to be Exhibit No. 08, dated 08 November 1992,
issued by the Office of Protocol of the Department of Foreign Affairs and signed by
Emmanuel C. Fernandez, Assistant Secretary, certifying that "the records of the
Department (would) show that Mr. Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., during his term of office in the
Philippines (from 14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as an Assistant
Attach of the United States diplomatic mission and was, therefore, accredited diplomatic
status by the Government of the Philippines." No certified true copy of such "records,"
the supposed bases for the belated issuance, was presented in evidence.

But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was
sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the
country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo
was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the
complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of
State Immunity from Suit.
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a longstanding rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal
immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit20 and, with the emergence of democratic states,
made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also
distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity.21 If the acts giving rise to a suit are
those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a
diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by
the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a

79

representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription
is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is,
under the maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign
equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.22 The implication, in broad terms,
is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to
pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the
state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. 23

property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of

authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional
provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling
is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice.
"x x x x x x x x x
"(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the
public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed
the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where
the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a
well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in
bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction." 27

In United States of America vs. Guinto,24 involving officers of the United States Air Force
and special officers of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators charged with the duty
of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs, this Court has
ruled "While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for
acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. x x x. It cannot for a
moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when
they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for
discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded
for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. x x x As
they have acted on behalf of the government, and within the scope of their authority, it is
that government, and not the petitioners personally, [who were] responsible for their
acts."25

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but
only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending
state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy
between the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve officers and personnel of the
United States, stationed within Philippine territory, under the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement. While evidence is wanting to show any similar agreement between the
governments of the Philippines and of the United States (for the latter to send its agents
and to conduct surveillance and related activities of suspected drug dealers in the
Philippines), the consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of
the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts
heretofore elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of communication between
agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the
Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the
participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust
operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be
inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication
that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities
within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug
suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who
would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on

This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf vs. Court of
Appeals26 elaborates:
"It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such
for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. As was clearly set forth
by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al., vs. Aligaen, et
al. (33 SCRA 368): `Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an
action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated
by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule
of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at
law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the
ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and

80

Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then
becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be
said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to
conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled
to the defense of state immunity from suit.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

81

G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995

In its Motion to Dismiss, private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no
jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity pursuant to the 1946
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In support thereof,
private respondent attached a letter from the Department of Foreign Affairs dated August
26, 1991, which acknowledged its immunity from suit. The letter confirmed that private
respondent, being a special fund administered by the United Nations, was covered by
the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of which the
Philippine Government was an original signatory (Rollo, p. 21).

ELDEPIO LASCO, RODOLFO ELISAN, URBANO BERADOR, FLORENTINO

ESTOBIO, MARCELINO MATURAN, FRAEN BALIBAG, CARMELITO GAJOL,
DEMOSTHENES MANTO, SATURNINO BACOL, SATURNINO LASCO, RAMON
LOYOLA, JOSENIANO B. ESPINA, all represented by MARIANO R.
ESPINA,petitioner,
vs.
UNITED NATIONS REVOLVING FUND FOR NATURAL RESOURCES EXPLORATION
(UNRFNRE) represented by its operations manager, DR. KYRIACOS LOUCA,
OSCAR N. ABELLA, LEON G. GONZAGA, JR., MUSIB M. BUAT, Commissioners of
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City
and IRVING PETILLA, Labor Arbiter of Butuan City, respondents.

On November 25, 1991, respondent Labor Arbiter issued an order dismissing the
complaints on the ground that private respondent was protected by diplomatic immunity.
The dismissal was based on the letter of the Foreign Office dated September 10, 1991.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, an appeal was filed with the
NLRC, which affirmed the dismissal of the complaints in its Resolution dated January 25,
1993.

QUIASON, J.:
Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari without first seeking a reconsideration of
the NLRC resolution.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside
the Resolution dated January 25, 1993 of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City.

II

We dismiss the petition.

Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that decisions of
the NLRC are final and executory. Thus, they may only be questioned
through certiorari as a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to
correct its assigned errors (Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA
37 [1993]).

Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the United
Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a
special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a
joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in
Dinagat Island.

In the case at bench, petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration is fatal to the
instant petition. Moreover, the petition lacks any explanation for such omission, which
may merit its being considered as falling under the recognized exceptions to the
necessity of filing such motion.

Petitioners are the complainants in NLRC Cases Nos. SRAB 10-03-00067-91 to 10-0300078-91 and SRAB 10-07-00159-91 for illegal dismissal and damages.

82

Notwithstanding, we deem it wise to give due course to the petition because of the
implications of the issue in our international relations.

Sec. 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever

located and by whomsoever held shall enjoy immunity from every form of
legal process except insofar as in any particular case they have
expressly waived their immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver
of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution (Emphasis
supplied).

Petitioners argued that the acts of mining exploration and exploitation are outside the
official functions of an international agency protected by diplomatic immunity. Even
assuming that private respondent was entitled to diplomatic immunity, petitioners insisted
that private respondent waived it when it engaged in exploration work and entered into a
contract of employment with petitioners.

Sec. 5. The premises of the specialized agencies shall be inviolable. The

property and assets of the specialized agencies, wherever located and
by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition,
confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by
executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action (Emphasis
supplied).

Petitioners, likewise, invoked the constitutional mandate that the State shall afford full
protection to labor and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all (1987 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 3).
The Office of the Solicitor General is of the view that private respondent is covered by
the mantle of diplomatic immunity. Private respondent is a specialized agency of the
United Nations. Under Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations:

As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution, the Philippine Government

adopts the generally accepted principles of international law (1987 Constitution, Art. II,
Sec. 2). Being a member of the United Nations and a party to the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the
Philippine Government adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations
and its specialized agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law.

1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of its Members such

privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its
purposes.

In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242, (1972), we had occasion to rule
that:

2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of

the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as
are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in
connection with the organization.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of

separation of powers thatdiplomatic immunity is essentially a political
question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to
accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the
principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General or other
officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled
principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and
detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the
government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that "in

Corollary to the cited article is the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, to which the Philippines was a signatory
(Vol. 1, Philippine Treaty Series, p. 621). We quote Sections 4 and 5 of Article III thereof:

83

such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action
of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an
antagonistic jurisdiction (Emphasis supplied).

Our courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly waived its
immunity, which is not so in the case at bench (Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, Art. III, Sec. 4).

We recognize the growth of international organizations dedicated to specific universal

endeavors, such as health, agriculture, science and technology and environment. It is not
surprising that their existence has evolved into the concept of international immunities.
The reason behind the grant of privileges and immunities to international organizations,
its officials and functionaries is to secure them legal and practical independence in
fulfilling their duties (Jenks, International Immunities 17 [1961]).

Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its

presence here is by virtue of a joint project entered into by the Philippine Government
and the United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its mission is not to
exploit our natural resources and gain pecuniarily thereby but to help improve the quality
of life of the people, including that of petitioners.
This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. Section 31 of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations states that
"each specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of:
(a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the
specialized agency is a party."

Immunity is necessary to assure unimpeded performance of their functions. The purpose

is "to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international
practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member
States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their
functions" (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130
[1990]).

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

In the International Catholic Migration Commission case, we held that there is no conflict
between the constitutional duty of the State to protect the rights of workers and to
promote their welfare, and the grant of immunity to international organizations. Clauses
on jurisdictional immunity are now standard in the charters of the international
organizations to guarantee the smooth discharge of their functions.

SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by the letter of
the Department of Foreign Affairs, recognizing and confirming the immunity of
UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations where the Philippine Government was a party. The issue whether an
international organization is entitled to diplomatic immunity is a "political question" and
such determination by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and quasi-judicial
agencies (The Holy See v. Hon. Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr., G.R. No. 101949, Dec. 1, 1994;
International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, supra).

84

G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995

In a Memorandum dated March 9, 1990, petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to
the charges against him. 3 After evaluating petitioner's answer, explanations and other
evidence, IRRI issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner on December 7, 1990. 4

ERNESTO L. CALLADO, petitioner,

vs.
INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, respondent.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint on December 19, 1990 before the Labor Arbiter for
illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
On January 2, 1991, private respondent IRRI, through counsel, wrote the Labor Arbiter to
inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges
as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the
same. 6

ROMERO, J.:
Did the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this
dispute which arose from an employer-employee relationship?
We rule in the negative and vote to dismiss the petition.

IRRI likewise wrote in the same tenor to the Regional Director of the Department of
Labor and Employment. 7

Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI from April 11, 1983 to
December 14, 1990. On February 11, 1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official
trip to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an
accident.

While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an
Order issued by the Institute on August 13, 1991 to the effect that "in all cases of
termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity," 8 and, accordingly, considered the
defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case. The dispositive portion
of the Labor arbiter's decision dated October 31, 1991, reads:

Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the

IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager in a Memorandum dated
March 5, 1990. 1 In view of the aforesaid findings, he was charged with:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

ordering respondent to reinstate complainant to his former position
without loss or (sic) seniority rights and privileges within five (5) days
from receipt hereof and to pay his full backwages from March 7, 1990 to
October 31, 1991, in the total amount of P83,048.75 computed on the
basis of his last monthly salary. 9

(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of
liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of your failure to report to your
supervisors the failure of your vehicle to start because of a problem with
the car battery which, you alleged, required you to overstay in Manila for
more than six (6) hours, whereas, had you reported the matter to IRRI,
Los Baos by telephone, your problem could have been solved within
one or two hours;

The NLRC found merit in private respondent' s appeal and, finding that IRRI did not
waive its immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the
complaint dismissed. 10
Hence, this petition where it is contended that the immunity of the IRRI as an
international organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not

(3) Gross and habitual neglect of your duties. 2

85

be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its
Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D.
1620." 11

government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to

accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the
principal law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his
direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not
so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarass the executive arm of the
government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in
such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action
of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an
antagonistic jurisdiction. 15

It is also petitioner's position that a dismissal of his complaint before the Labor Arbiter
leaves him no other remedy through which he can seek redress. He further states that
since the investigation of his case was not referred to the Council of IRRI Employees and
Management (CIEM), he was denied his constitutional right to due process.
We find no merit in petitioner's arguments.

Further, we held that "(t)he raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of
unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned.

IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed.

The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to . . . and IRRI is clearly

necessitated by their international character and respective purposes.
The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the
host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the
Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of
immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in
accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control
by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization,
and to ensure the unhampered the performance of their functions. 16

Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3 provides:

Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity
from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as
that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the
Institute or his authorized representatives.
In the case of International Catholic Migration Commission v. Hon. Calleja, et al. and
Kapisanan ng Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI v. Secretary of Labor and Employment and
IRRI, 12 the Court upheld the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. After the Court noted the
letter of the Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of Labor dated June 17, 1987,
where the immunity of IRRI from the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment
was sustained, the Court stated that this opinion constituted "a categorical recognition by the
Executive Branch of the Government that . . . IRRI enjoy(s) immunities accorded to
international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question
conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political department of
Government. 13 We cited the Court's earlier pronouncement in WHO v. Hon. Benjamin
Aquino, et al., 14 to wit:

The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its
Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its position
clear. Through counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter categorically informing him
that the Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity. In the second place, petitioner's
reliance on the Memorandum with "Guidelines in handling cases of dismissal of
employees in relation to P.D. 1620" dated July 26, 1983, is misplaced. The Memorandum
reads, in part:

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of

separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political
question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the

Time and again the Institute has reiterated that it will not use its immunity
under P.D. 1620 for the purpose of terminating the services of any of its
employees. Despite continuing efforts on the part of IRRI to live up to this
undertaking, there appears to be apprehension in the minds of some

86

IRRI employees. To help allay these fears the following guidelines will be
followed hereafter by the Personnel/Legal Office while handling cases of
dismissed employees.

than the mandatory term "shall" in the last paragraph of the memo.
Certainly the memo cannot be considered as the express waiver by the
Director General as contemplated by P.D. 1620, especially since the
memo was issued by a former Director-General. At the very least, the
express declaration of the incumbent Director-general supersedes the
1983 memo and should be accorded greater respect. It would be equally
important to point out that the Personnel and Legal Office has been nonexistent since 1988 as a result of major reorganization of the IRRI. Cases
of IRRI before DOLE are handled by an external Legal Counsel as in this
particular
case. 18 (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

2. Notification/manifestation to MOLE or labor arbiter
If and when a dismissed employee files a complaint against the Institute contesting the
legality of dismissal, IRRI's answer to the complaint will:
1. Indicate in the identification of IRRI that it is an international organization
operating under the laws of the Philippines including P.D. 1620. and

The memorandum, issued by the former Director-General to a now-defunct division of

the IRRI, was meant for internal circulation and not as a pledge of waiver in all cases
arising from dismissal of employees. Moreover, the IRRI's letter to the Labor Arbiter in
the case at bench made in 1991 declaring that it has no intention of waiving its immunity,
at the very least, supplants any pronouncement of alleged waiver issued in previous
cases.

2. Base the defense on the merits and facts of the case as well as the
legality of the cause or causes for termination.
3) Waiving immunity under P.D. 1620

Petitioner's allegation that he was denied due process is unfounded and has no basis.

If the plaintiff's attorney or the arbiter, asks if IRRI will waive its immunity
we may reply that the Institute will be happy to do so, as it has in the past
in the formal manner required thereby reaffirming our commitment to
abide by the laws of the Philippines and our full faith in the integrity and
impartially of the legal system. 17 (Emphasis in this paragraphs ours)

It is not denied that he was informed of the findings and charges resulting from an
investigation conducted of his case in accordance with IRRI policies and procedures. He
had a chance to comment thereon in a Memorandum he submitted to the Manager of the
Human Resource and Development Department. Therefore, he was given proper notice
and adequate opportunity to refute the charges and findings, hereby fulfilling the basic
requirements of due process.

From the last paragraph of the foregoing quotation, it is clear that in cases involving
dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is
discretionary on its part.

Finally, on the issue of referral to the Council of IRRI Employees and Management
(CIEM), petitioner similarly fails to persuade the Court.

We agree with private respondent IRRI that this memorandum cannot, by any stretch of
the imagination, be considered the express waiver by the Director-General. Respondent
Commission has quoted IRRI's reply thus:

The Court, in the Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI case, 19 held:
Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute with
management as, in fact, there had been organized a forum for better
management-employee relationship as evidenced by the formation of the
Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM) wherein "both

The 1983 . . . is an internal memo addressed to Personnel and Legal

Office and was issued for its guidance in handling those cases where
IRRI opts to waive its immunity. It is not a declaration of waiver for all
cases. This is apparent from the use of the permissive term "may" rather

87

management and employees were and still are represented for purposes
of maintaining mutual and beneficial cooperation between IRRI and its
employees." The existence of this Union factually and tellingly belies the
argument that Pres. Decree No. Decree No. 1620, which grants to IRRI
the status, privileges and immunities of an international organization,
deprives its employees of the right to self-organization.
We have earlier concluded that petitioner was not denied due process, and this,
notwithstanding the non-referral to the Council of IRRI Employees and Management.
Private respondent correctly pointed out that petitioner, having opted not to seek the help
of the CIEM Grievance Committee, prepared his answer by his own self. 20 He cannot now
fault the Institute for not referring his case to the CIEM.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

88

[G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000]

2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one

thousand two hundred twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97)
board feet of illegally-sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27,
being driven by one Constancio Abuganda and owned by [a
certain] Manuela Babalcon. "

FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of

ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO
ABUGANDA, respondents.

.[3]

Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to
present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team
seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR
(Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan. Seizure receipts were issued
but the drivers refused to accept the receipts. . Felipe Calub, Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial
Prosecutors Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda, in
Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 [78), Presidential Decree
705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code. Mis sc

DECISION

.[4]

QUISUMBING, J.:

[5]

For review is the decision dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by herein petitioners
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul the Order dated
May 27, 1992, by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order
had denied petitioners (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein
private respondents, as well as (b) petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order of said trial court dated April 24, 1992, granting an application for a
Writ of replevin.. h Y
.[1]

[6]

On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon
and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub
this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and
Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public Prosecutor.

[2]

The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:

[7]

On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143,
was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan
and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Barangay
Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products with an
equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly
filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia,
and several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for violation of Section 68
[78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code.

On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows:
"1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one
thousand and twenty six (1,026) board feet of illegally sourced
lumber valued at P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon and
owned by [a certain] Jose Vargas.

.[8]

89

In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda
were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court
ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in
order that the necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao
and all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code.
For it appeared that it was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and
ordered that cut timber be loaded on it.

appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his
duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and disposition of
illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that purpose is
not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or
policies on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative
Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said.
For it prescribes the guidelines in the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of
conveyances used in the commission of offenses penalized under Section 68
[78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277.

.[9]

Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle

owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the
recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an application
for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial
court granted the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ in
an Order dated April 24, 1992. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which
was denied by the trial court.

.[14]

Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed to

observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series
of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR
Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render a
report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover,
petitioners failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the admission
of petitioners counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to the
seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to
follow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject vehicles
could not be considered in custodia legis.

.[10]

[11]

Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application for
Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court
issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting further
proceedings in the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents
from taking or attempting to take the motor vehicles and forest products
seized from the custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the
petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest products seized
are kept in a secured place and protected from deterioration, said property
being in custodia legis and subject to the direct order of the Supreme Court.
In a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the Court referred said
petition to respondent appellate court for appropriate disposition.

.[15]

Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners claim that

private respondents complaint for replevin is a suit against the State.
Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the principle of
state immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit had
not yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government. Moreover,
according to respondent appellate court, there could be no pecuniary liability
nor loss of property that could ensue against the government. It reasoned that
a suit against a public officer who acted illegally or beyond the scope of his
authority could not be considered a suit against the State; and that a public
officer might be sued for illegally seizing or withholding the possession of the
property of another.

[12]

.[13]

On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit. It
ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority
granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does
not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to the

.[16]

90

Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based

on the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and held in custody
because they were contradicted by its own findings. Their petition was found
without merit. Rtc spped

The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances
used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78. Section 78
states:

.[17]

[18]

Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors:

Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and or Collecting Timber, or Other

Forest Products without License. Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any
forestland, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Codeslx mis

.[19]

(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

MERE SEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO
SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED BY
EXECUTIVE ORDER 277 DOES NOT PLACE SAID
CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS;
(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE FOR THE
SUBJECT CONVEYANCE TO BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS
LAWFUL SEIZURE BY THE DENR PURSUANT TO SECTION
68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277;
AND

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the

government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found.
This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the
penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of
the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were
loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no
permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest
products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally
sourced. Thus there was a prima facieviolation of Section 68 [78] of the
Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons
responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public
prosecutor.

(3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THE COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST THE
PETITIONERS IS NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.
In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:
(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN
143, is in custodia legis.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded
vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State.
We will now resolve both issues.
91

The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in

the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised
Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They
read as follows: Sc

favor of the government or disposed of in accordance with

pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. -- The
Secretary or his duly authorized representative such as the
forest officers and/or natural resources officers, or deputized
officers of the DENR are authorized to seize said conveyances
subject to policies and guidelines pertinent thereto. Deputized
military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending
illegal logs and other forest products and their conveyances
shall notify the nearest DENR field offices, and turn over said
forest products and conveyances for proper action and
disposition. In case where the apprehension is made by DENR
field officer, the conveyance shall be deposited with the nearest
CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may be, for
safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured.
[Emphasis supplied.]

Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or

His Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In
all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest
products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or
air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same
in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the
matter.
Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. -- A forest officer
or employee of the Bureau [Department] or any personnel of the
Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest
even without warrant any person who has committed or is
committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this
Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the
Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the
offense... [Emphasis supplied.]

Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without

pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said
timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was
allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code. Slxs c
Note further that petitioners failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained.
Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a
written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the
seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the
impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of
the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the
petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary
nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private
respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The

Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements
Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows:
Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture.
-- All conveyances used in the transport of any forest product
obtained or gathered illegally whether or not covered with
transport documents, found spurious or irregular in accordance
with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of P.D. No. 705, shall be confiscated in
92

seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a
violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a
confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected
under the circumstances.

". . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by

unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for
violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment,
attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from the
presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their
execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and
forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple
devise of a writ of replevin..." Scslx

Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was
in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed
in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is
property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the
custody of the law, and not otherwise.

.[21]

On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the
two impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit against the
State?

.[20]

In Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264,

promulgated on July 28, 1999, the case involves property to be seized by a
Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property were already impounded
by the DENR due to violation of forestry laws and, in fact, already forfeited in
favor of the government by order of the DENR. We said that such property
was deemed in custodia legis. The sheriff could not insist on seizing the
property already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The appropriate action
should be for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by way of
partial Sheriffs Return, and wait for the judges instructions on the proper
procedure to be observed.

Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its
consent. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a
suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. .
However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally
applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and
without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the acts for
which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in
the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in
nature. In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry
Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties
and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their
authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit
against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It
cannot prosper without the States consent.
.[22]

[23]

[24]

[25]

Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the
subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we
elucidated further:

Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the
Solicitor Generals line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of
administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be
raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss. If not
.[26]

93

invoked at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived
and the court could take cognizance of the case and try it. Mesm
[27]

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET ASIDE. Consequently, the
Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992,
and the Writ of replevin issued in the Order dated April 24, 1992,
are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan,
Branch 29, is directed to take possession of the subject motor vehicle, with
plate number FCN 143, for delivery to the custody of and appropriate
disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be provided the
Honorable Secretary of Justice for his appropriate action, against any and all
persons responsible for the abovecited violation of the Revised Forestry
Code.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

94

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9990

by E.J.L. Ruiz as President and P.D. Panlilio as Architect. When the defendants-officials
paid the Allied Technologists the contract price for the architectural engineering service,
they retained 15 per cent of the sum due, for the reason that defendant Panlilio has
asserted that he is the sole and only architect of the Veterans Hospital to the exclusion of
plaintiffs Ruiz and Herrera, assertion aided and abetted by defendant Jimenez. Unless
defendants are prevented from recognizing defendant Panlilio as the sole architect of the
contract and from paying the 15 per cent retained, plaintiffs will be deprived of the
monetary value of their professional services and their professional prestige and
standing would be seriously impaired.

September 30, 1957

ENRIQUE J. L. RUIZ and JOSE V. HERRERA, in their behalf and as minority

stockholders of the Allied Technologists, Inc., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
HON. SOTERO B. CABAHUG, Secretary of National Defense, Col. NICOLAS
JIMENEZ, Head of the Engineer Group, Office of the Secretary of National Defense,
THE FINANCE OFFICER of the Department of National Defense, the AUDITOR of
the Department of the National Defense, PABLO D. PANLILIO and ALLIED
TECHNOLOGISTS INC., defendants-appellees.

Under the second cause of action the following facts are alleged: Under Title II of the
contract entered into between plaintiffs and the Secretary of National Defense, at any
time prior to six months after completion and acceptance of the work under Title I, the
Government may direct the Allied Technologists, Inc. to perform the services specified in
said Title II. But notwithstanding such completion or acceptance, the Government has
refused to direct the plaintiffs to perform the work, entrusting such work to a group of
inexperienced and unqualified engineers.

Diokno and Sison for appellants.

L. D. Panlilio for appellee Pablo Panlilio.
Manuel Sales for defendant Allied Technologists, Inc.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrocio Padilla and Assistant Solicitor Jose G. Bautista
for appellees Hon. Sotero Cabahug and Col. Nicolas Jimenez, et al.

The prayer based on the first cause of action is that defendants desist from recognizing
Panlilio as the sole and only architect of the Veterans Hospital and from paying him 15
per cent retained as above indicated, and that after hearing Ruiz, Herrera and Panlilio be
recognized as the architects of the Veterans Hospital. Under the second cause of action
it is prayed that the defendants be directed to turn over the supervision called for by Title
II of the contract.

LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing plaintiffs'
amended complaint.
The facts upon which plaintiffs' first cause of action are based are allowed as follows:

The court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground that the suit involved is one
against the Government, which may not sued without its consent. It is held that as the
majority of the stockholders of the Allied Technologists, Inc. have not joined in the action,
the minority suit does not lie. It dismissed the second cause of action on the ground that
the optional services under Title II have already been performed.

On July 31, 1950 the Secretary of National Defense accepted the bid of the Allied
Technologists, Inc., to furnish the architectural and engineering services in the
construction of the Veterans Hospital at a price of P302,700. The plans, specifications,
sketches and detailed drawings and other architectural requirements submitted by the
Allied Technologists through thereof its architects, Messrs. Enrique J. L. Ruiz, Jose V.
Herrera and Pablo D. Panlilio were approved by the United States Veterans
Administration in Washington, D.C. Because of the technical objection to the capacity of
the Allied Technologists, Inc. to practice architecture and upon the advice of the
Secretary of Justice, the contract was signed on the part of the Allied Technologists, Inc.

On this appeal the plaintiffs assign the following errors:

I

95

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRESENT SUIT IS ONE
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE VALIDLY
ENTERTAINED BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS
CONSENT.

Jimenez is claimed to have "aided and abetted defendant Panlilio in depriving the Allied
Technologists, Inc. and its two architects (Ruiz and Herrera) of the honor and benefit due
to them under the contract Annex `C` thereof." It is further claimed by plaintiffs that the
defendant-officials are about to recognize Panlilio as the sole architect and are about to
pay him the 15 per cent which they had retained, and thus deprive plaintiffs of their right
to share therein and in the honor consequent to the recognition of their right. The suit,
therefore, is properly directed against the officials and against them alone, not against
the Government, which does nor have any interest in the outcome of the controversy
between plaintiffs on the one hand, and Panlilio on the other. The suit is between these
alone, to determine who is entitled to the amount retained by the officials; and if the latter
did aid and abet Panlilio in his pretense, to the exclusion and prejudice of plaintiffs, it is
natural that they alone, and not the Government, should be the subject of the suit. He
said officials chosen not to take sides in the controversy between the architects, and had
disclaimed interest in said controversy, the suit would have been converted into one of
interpleader. But they have acted to favor one side, and have abetted him in his effort to
obtain payment to him of the sum remaining unpaid and credit for the work, to the
exclusion of the plaintiffs. Hence, the suit.

II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ACT 3038, AS
AMENDED BY COMMONWEALTH ACT 327 ARE APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE; IT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED WITH
THE AUDITOR GENERAL.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MINORITY SUIT IS UNTENABLE.
IV

1wphl.nt

We are not wanting in authority to sustain the view that the State need not be a party in
this and parallel cases.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

INJUNCTION.

There is no proposition of law which is better settled than the general rule that a
sovereign state and its political subdivision cannot be sued in the courts except
upon the statutory consent of the state. Numerous decisions of this court to that
effect may be cited; but it is enough to note that this court, in banc in a recent
case, State vs. Woodruff (Miss.), 150 So. 760, Hasso held; and therein overruled
a previous decision which had adjudicated that such consent could be worked
out of a statute by implication, when express consent was absent from the terms
of that statute.

Evidently, the plaintiffs-appellants do not question the dismissal of the second cause of
action. So, the appeal has relation to the first cause of action only.
A careful study of the allegations made in the amended complaint discloses the following
facts and circumstances: The contract price for the architectural engineering services
rendered by the Allied Technologists, Inc. and the plaintiffs is P231,600. All of that sum
has been set aside for payment to the Allied Technologists, Inc. and its architects, except
the sum of P34,740, representing 15 per cent of the total costs, which has been retained
by the defendants-officials. Insofar as the Government of the Philippines is concerned,
the full amount of the contract price has been set aside and said full amount authorized
to be paid. The Government does not any longer have any interest in the amount, which
the defendants-officials have retained and have refused to pay to the plaintiffs, or to the
person or entity to which it should be paid. And the plaintiffs do not seek to sue the
Government to require it to pay the amount or involve it in the litigation. The defendant

But the rule applies only when the state or its subdivision is actually made a party
upon the record, or is actually necessary to be made a party in order to furnish
the relief demanded by the suit. It does not apply when the suit is against an
officer or agent of the state, and the relief demanded by the suit requires no
affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the state in its political
capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made defendants disclaim

96

any personal interest in themselves and claim to hold or to act only by virtue of a
title of the state and as its agents and servants.
Thus it will be found, as illustrative of what has been above said, that nearly all
the cases wherein the rule of immunity from suit against the state or a
subdivision thereof, has been applied and upheld, are those which demanded a
money judgment, and wherein the discharge of the judgment, if obtained, would
require the appropriation or an expenditure therefrom, which being legislative in
its character is a province exclusively of the political departments of the state.
And in the less frequent number of cases where no money judgment is
demanded, and the rule of immunity is still upheld, it will be found in them that
the relief demanded would be, nevertheless, to require of the state or its political
subdivision the affirmative performance of some asserted obligation, belong to
the state in its political capacity.
When, therefore, officers or agents of the state, although acting officially and not
as individuals, seize the private property of a citizen, the state having no valid
right or title thereto, or trespass upon that property or damage it, the jurisdiction
of the courts to eject the officers or agents, is as well settled in the jurisprudence
of this country as is the general rule first above mentioned; for in such a suit no
relief is demanded which requires any affirmative action on the part of the state.
Such a suit is only to the end that the officers and agents of the state stay off the
property of the citizen and cease to damage that property, the state having no
right or title thereto." (State Mineral Lease Commission vs. Lawrence [1934], 157
So. 897, 898-899.).
We hold that under the facts and circumstances alleged in the amendment complaint,
which should be taken on its face value, the suit is not one against the Government, or a
claim against it, but one against the officials to compel them to act in accordance with the
rights to be established by the contending architects, or to prevent them from making
payment and recognition until the contending architects have established their respective
rights and interests in the funds retained and in the credit for the work done. The order of
dismissal is hereby reversed and set aside, and the case is remanded to the court a
quo for further proceedings. With costs against the defendants-appellees.
1wphl

97

G.R. No. L-16524

June 30, 1964

August 30, 1957 and says that "there was no longer any necessity for this Honorable
Court (the lower court) to declare Monetary Board Resolution No. 286 dated May 3,
1951, as illegal. There is no dispute about this."

FRANCISCO S. OLIZON, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellant.

Despite the above admission, however, the Bank still refused to grant the refund on the
ground that the claim for the same had already prescribed. It vigorously argued the
theory that "for purposes of recovering a tax paid illegally or erroneously ..., the action
should be filed within five (5) years, from the date of payment of the tax." It arrived at the
said period on the reasoning that since the tax code does not provide for the same, the
deficiency should be governed by Article 1149 of the Civil Code which says:

Bienvenido L. Garcia for plaintiff-appellee.

Nat. M. Balboa and F. E. Evangelista for defendant-appellant.
REGALA, J.:

All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must
be brought within five years from the time the right by action accrues.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, rendered in
Case No. 40215, ordering the appellant Central Bank to refund to the herein appellee the
sum of P9,713.94 plus interest, cost and attorney's fees.

After the dispute was tried in the lower court, the trial judge rejected the appellant's
theory and ruled that the prescriptive period was ten (10) years, holding that the
obligation to refund was one created by law and which, therefore, under Article 1144 of
the Civil Code, prescribed in ten years. Hence, this appeal.

The facts giving rise to this suit, as recited in the lower court decision and borne by the
records transmitted to Us, are as follows:
... . The defendant on March 21, 1952, December 4, 1952, November 25, 1953,
and January 4, 1955, collected from the plaintiff (herein appellee) the amounts of
P3,186.24, P840.65, P2,488.98, and P2,734.53, under Central Bank Official
Receipts Nos. 047895, 052279, 491743, and 663339, respectively, in payment of
Special Excise Tax on Foreign Exchange covering transactions, the details of
which are described in said receipts, that those amounts, as admitted by the
defendant, were collected pursuant to its Monetary Board Resolution No. 286,
dated May 3, 1951 (Answer to Request for Admission, par. 7); That on March 10,
1958, plaintiff requested the defendant to refund to him the amounts
abovestated, plus the sum of P463.54, which is supported by a statement from
the Philippine National Bank; subsequently, requests were made by the plaintiff
citing various rulings of the Supreme Court in support thereof but the Central
Bank refused to accede to these requests.

During the pendency of the appeal, however, this Court handed down its decision in the
case of Belman Cia, Inc. v. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-15044, May 30, 1960, expressly
ruling (in the Resolution to a Motion for reconsideration filed thereto by the same Central
Bank herein) that the prescriptive period is six (6) years.
Plaintiff-appellee has filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that this action
was still timely because, it is argued, the period of prescription applicable to the
case is ten (10) years from date of payment. To support this contention, Article
1144, paragraph (2) is cited, which provides:
"ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from
the time the right of action accrues:

The Central Bank concedes the illegality of the resolution under which it made the levy. It
expressly adverts to the cases of PNB v. Zulueta, G.R. No. L-7271, August 30, 1957, 55
O.G. pp. 222-231 and PNB and Central Bank v. Union Books, Inc. G.R. No. L-8490,

(1) ...
(2) Upon an obligation created by law.

98

since, it is claimed, the payment here was made by reason of a mistake in the
interpretation of Republic Act 601, the obligation to return arises by virtue of
Article 2155, in relation to Article 2154 of the New Civil Code and is, therefore,
one created by law.

It likewise admits that the Monetary Board Resolution on the authority of which it exacted
the said amount is illegal.
We respectfully contend that there was no longer any necessity for this
Honorable Court (the lower court) to declare Monetary Board Res. 286 dated
May 3, 1951, as illegal. There is no dispute about this. No allegation can be
found in defendant's pleadings (Answer to Request for Admission, and Answer to
Interrogatories) to the effect that defendant still upholds the validity of said
resolution. ... (pp. 239-240, Record on Appeal)

Movant-appellee is partly correct. However, Articles 2154 and 2155 relied upon,
specifically refer to obligations of the nature of solutio indebiti which are
expressway classified as quasi-contracts under Section 2, Chapter I of Title XVII
Of the New Civil Code. Consequently, the law regarding prescription applicable
to the action herein involved is not Article 1144 (2) cited by the movant, but Article
1145 (2) of the New Civil Code providing:

Lastly, it admits its obligation to refund as well as the timeliness of the claim of the same.

(1) "ART. 1145. The following actions mug be commenced within six years:

As shown by the letter of the Philippine National Bank to the Legal Counsel of the
Central Bank dated June 15, 1959, the remittances of the foreign exchange
involved in the collection bills with respect to the seven items were made on
various dates between August 23, 1949 and November 28, 1949. If the dollar
proceeds for the account of Francisco Olizon were all in 1949, before the
effectivity of the special excise tax law (March 28, 1951), therefore, the
assessment and collection of the exchange taxes in question were erroneous
and illegal. In accordance with Arts. 2154 and 2155 of the new Civil Code of the
Philippines,there would be an obligation on the part of defendant Central Bank to
refund the said amounts received by reason of a mistake in the construction or
application of a doubtful question of law (p. 6, Memorandum in lieu of Oral
Argument.)

(2) ...
(3) Upon a quasi-contract."
In view of the ruling in the above-mentioned the Central Bank filed a memorandum
conceding the refundability of all the claims except for the amount of P436.54. The Bank
claims that "there is no way to determine whether the action for refund of this amount
has already prescribed or not" as the papers necessary for its proper processing were no
longer available or have been lost. Further more, however, of the claims it concedes to
have been filed within the prescriptive period and of which it accepts the obligation to
refund, the Bank asserts "should be refunded" only "upon presentation of satisfactory
proof."

It has been verified from the Foreign Department, Philippine National Bank, that
all foreign exchange (U.S. dollars) involved in said collection bills were remitted
to the United States on the various dates between August 28, 1949 and
November 28, 1949, before March 28, 1951, when the Exchange Tax Law took
effect.(pp. 6-7, Statement of Facts, Appellant's Brief). (Emphasis in the above
two paragraphs supplied.)

We do not understand just what exactly the appellant Bank means by the "presentation
of satisfactory proof." It admits it received from the appellee the of P9,713.94.
On various dates and under Central Bank Official receipts hereunder indicated,
plaintiff-appellee paid as 17% special excise tax through the Philippine National
Bank, in settlement of various collection bills, due to foreign suppliers from
plaintiff-appellee the total sum of P9,713.94, itemized as follows: (Statement of
Facts, Appellant's Brief, p. 5.) (Emphasis supplied)

In the face of all these admissions, We do not see what else needs be proved. This case
was submitted on the issue of prescription the appellant contending that the period was
five (5) years. It now admits its error and accepts the correct period to be six years.

99

Therefore, insofar as this suit is concerned, the inquiry need not go beyond determining
whether the claim, for refund was filed within the six-year period or not. And, since the
Bank explicitly and unequivocably confirms that the claims were made within that time, it
ought not be too technical, but, on the contrary, it should earnestly endeavor to remove
or overcome the minor technicalities that might stand in the way of a prompt refund.

terminated and the appellee would hardly have time to explain or defend himself from the
countersuit.

It is next urged that inasmuch as the amounts here involved have already been turned
over to the national treasury the present action may no longer be maintained since it
would, in effect, be a suit against the State without its consent.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Labrador, Barrera and Dizon, JJ., took no part.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from and the awards made
thereunder are hereby affirmed. Costs against the appellant.

1wph1.t

We cannot agree to the proposition. This suit is brought against the Central Bank of the
Philippines, an entity authorized by its charter to sue and be sued. The consent of the
State to thus be sued, therefore, has been given. As We said in the case of Central
Azucarera San Pedro v. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-7713, September 29, 1958, in suits for
refund, "being a corporation that may sue and be sued, the Central Bank is the proper
party defendant pursuant to section 5 of Republic Act No. 601, which provides that "the
refund of taxes pursuant to sections two and three of this Act shall be made by the
Central Bank of the Philippines."
In the memorandum submitted in lieu of oral argument, the appellant Bank represented
for the first time that the plaintiff-appellee has an outstanding liability of P4,963.62 by way
of unpaid 17% special excise tax on the remittance of foreign exchange to import cotton
goods and gladiolus bulbs." It then urged that whatever term this Court should order to
be refunded should be set off against the said "outstanding liability" of the appellee.
The representation impresses Us as untenable. The matter of appellee's outstanding
unpaid accounts with the Bank is a fit subject for a counter-claim and the Rules of Court
provide for the manner by which they may be impleaded or raised in this suit. These
rules were devised not only to provide a more adequate and elastic procedure for the
prompt dispatch of litigation, but more importantly, to fully protect the rights of the parties.
Verily, therefore, the public policy involved in the observance of those rules should not be
lightly estimated. Within the perspective of the foregoing discussion therefore, it would
seem that the appellant has not only withheld proper deference for the rules; it has been
unfair to the appellee as well. For in raising a counterclaim at so late a stage in the
proceeding as the period for oral argument, it denies to the appellee full and complete
protection of his rights since by then the proceedings in the court have practically

100

G.R. No. L-15751

January 28, 1961

pending result of an administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil Service
rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to
sue and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for
the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing government functions.
For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter,
before the case could be heard, petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion" asking for a
preliminary hearing on the question of jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for
suspension of the trial of the case on the merits pending the determination of such
jurisdictional question. The motion was granted, but after hearing, the trial judge of the
Industrial Court in an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction of the court
on the theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in
nature," and, consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal. Reconsideration of this order
having been also denied by the court in banc, the petitioners brought the case to this
Court through the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.

BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO

LEDESMA, petitioners,
vs.
THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), PACIFICO
ADVINCULA, ROBERTO MENDOZA, PONCIANO ARGANDA and TEODULO
TOLERAN, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Eulogio R. Lerum for respondents.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul Certain
orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to restrain it from further
proceeding in the action for unfair labor practice pending before it on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. Giving due course to the petition, this Court ordered the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for without bond.

We find the petition to be meritorious.

The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code
of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the
direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged
with the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those
processes, required by the National Government and such other work of the same
character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive
Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It has no
corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations
Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service
bureau and obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit.

The action in question was upon complaint of the respondents Bureau of Printing
Employees Association (NLU) Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda
and Teodulo Toleran filed by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against
herein petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the
Department of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of
Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been
engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the
Bureau of Printing particularly the members of the complaining association petition, in the
exercise of their right to self-organization an discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of
their employment in order to discourage them from pursuing the union activities.

It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of Printing receives
outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular
working days and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its
functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing
is done only when the interest of the service so requires (sec. 566, Rev. Adm. Code). As
a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such
payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current
appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau

Answering the complaint, the petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and
Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to the and, by
way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents Pacifico
Advincula, Roberto Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were suspended

101

are wholly proprietary in character. Anent the additional work it executes for private
persons, we find that such work is done upon request, as distinguished from those
solicited, and only "as the requirements of Government work will permit" (sec. 1654, Rev.
Adm. Code), and "upon terms fixed by the Director of Printing, with the approval of the
Department Head" (sec. 1655, id.). As shown by the uncontradicted evidence of the
petitioners, most of these works consist of orders for greeting cards during Christmas
from government officials, and for printing of checks of private banking institutions. On
those greeting cards, the Government seal, of which only the Bureau of Printing is
authorized to use, is embossed, and on the bank cheeks, only the Bureau of Printing can
print the reproduction of the official documentary stamps appearing thereon. The volume
of private jobs done, in comparison with government jobs, is only one-half of 1 per cent,
and in computing the costs for work done for private parties, the Bureau does not include
profit because it is not allowed to make any. Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is
allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an
industrial or business concern. The additional work it executes for private parties is
merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in
character, there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function
are separate and distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions.

cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection. (See Metran vs.
Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz. 2835; Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River
Workers' Union, et. al., G.R. Nos. L-10943-44, December 28, 1957).

From what has been stated, it is obvious that the Court of Industrial Relations did not
acquire jurisdiction over the respondent Bureau of Printing, and is thus devoid of any
authority to take cognizance of the case. This Court has already held in a long line of
decisions that the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint
for unfair labor practice filed against institutions or corporations not organized for profit
and, consequently, not an industrial or business organization. This is so because the
Industrial Peace Act was intended to apply only to industrial employment, and to govern
the relations between employers engaged in industry and occupations for purposes of
gain, and their industrial employees. (University of the Philippines, et al. vs. CIR, et al.,
G.R. No. L-15416, April 28, 1960; University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, et al., G.R.
No. L-13748, October 30, 1959; La Consolacion College vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-13282, April
22, 1960; See also the cases cited therein.) .

Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.

The record also discloses that the instant case arose from the filing of administrative
charges against some officers of the respondent Bureau of Printing Employees'
Association by the Acting Secretary of General Services. Said administrative charges are
for insubordination, grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to public service committed by
inciting the employees, of the Bureau of Printing to walk out of their jobs against the
order of the duly constituted officials. Under the law, the Heads of Departments and
Bureaus are authorized to institute and investigate administrative charges against erring
subordinates. For the Industrial Court now to take cognizance of the case filed before it,
which is in effect a review of the acts of executive officials having to do with the discipline
of government employees under them, would be to interfere with the discharge of such
functions by said officials. WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of prohibition is granted.
The orders complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice
against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the
respondent court.

Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the
Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court). Any suit, action or
proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or
proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government

102

G.R. No. L-23139

December 17, 1966

MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU of CUSTOMS, defendants-appellees.
Alejandro Basin, Jr. and Associates for plaintiff-appellant.
Felipe T. Cuison for defendants-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville" sometime in
November of 1962, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The
shipment arrived at the Port of Manila on April 10, 1963, and was discharged to the
custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then
handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the
broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment.
On April 4, 1964 Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to
recover the value of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other
damages.
On April 20, 1964 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that not being persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued.
After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25, 1964, dismissed the complaint
on the ground that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is
suable. Plaintiff appealed to Us from the order of dismissal.
Raised, therefore, in this appeal is the purely legal question of the defendants' suability
under the facts stated.
Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that defendant
Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is
discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals.

103

The Rules of Court, in Section 1, Rule 3, provide:

bidding and subject to the approval of the department head, contract with any
private party for the service of receiving, handling, custody and delivery of
articles, and in such event, the contract may include the sale or lease of
government-owned equipment and facilities used in such service.

SECTION 1. Who may be parties.Only natural or juridical persons or entities

authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.

In Associated Workers Union, et al. vs. Bureau of Customs, et al., L-21397, resolution of
August 6, 1963, this Court indeed held "that the foregoing statutory provisions
authorizing the grant by contract to any private party of the right to render said arrastre
services necessarily imply that the same is deemed by Congress to be proprietary or
non-governmental function." The issue in said case, however, was whether laborers
engaged in arrastre service fall under the concept of employees in the
Government employed in governmental functions for purposes of the prohibition in
Section 11, Republic Act 875 to the effect that "employees in the Government . . . shall
not strike," but "may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the
obligation to strike or to join in strike," which prohibition "shall apply only to employees
employed in governmental functions of the Government . . . .

Accordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person; (2) a juridical person
or (3) an entity authorized by law to be sued. Neither the Bureau of Customs nor (a
fortiori) its function unit, the Customs Arrastre Service, is a person. They are merely parts
of the machinery of Government. The Bureau of Customs is a bureau under the
Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Revised Administrative Code); and as stated, the
Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of Custom, set up under Customs
Administrative Order No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962 (Annex "A" to Motion to Dismiss, pp.
13-15, Record an Appeal). It follows that the defendants herein cannot he sued under the
first two abovementioned categories of natural or juridical persons.
Nonetheless it is urged that by authorizing the Bureau of Customs to engage in arrastre
service, the law therebyimpliedly authorizes it to be sued as arrastre operator, for the
reason that the nature of this function (arrastre service) is proprietary, not governmental.
Thus, insofar as arrastre operation is concerned, appellant would put defendants under
the third category of "entities authorized by law" to be sued. Stated differently, it is argued
that while there is no law expressly authorizing the Bureau of Customs to sue or be sued,
still its capacity to be sued is implied from its very power to render arrastre service at the
Port of Manila, which it is alleged, amounts to the transaction of a private business.

Thus, the ruling therein was that the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case, but not that the Bureau of Customs can be sued. Said issue
of suability was not resolved, the resolution stating only that "the issue on the personality
or lack of personality of the Bureau of Customs to be sued does not affect the jurisdiction
of the lower court over the subject matter of the case, aside from the fact that
amendment may be made in the pleadings by the inclusion as respondents of the public
officers deemed responsible, for the unfair labor practice acts charged by petitioning
Unions".

The statutory provision on arrastre service is found in Section 1213 of Republic Act 1937
(Tariff and Customs Code, effective June 1, 1957), and it states:

Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in
nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function
is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of
the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. This is the doctrine
recognized in Bureau of Printing, et al. vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Association, et
al., L-15751, January 28, 1961:

SEC. 1213. Receiving, Handling, Custody and Delivery of Articles.The Bureau

of Customs shall have exclusive supervision and control over the receiving,
handling, custody and delivery of articles on the wharves and piers at all ports of
entry and in the exercise of its functions it is hereby authorized to acquire, take
over, operate and superintend such plants and facilities as may be necessary for
the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles, and the convenience and
comfort of passengers and the handling of baggage; as well as to acquire fire
protection equipment for use in the piers: Provided, That whenever in his
judgment the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles can be carried
on by private parties with greater efficiency, the Commissioner may, after public

The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the

Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the
Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary,
Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and
binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National

104

Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by
law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized
to undertake . . . ." (Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has no corporate existence,
and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act.
Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service
bureau and, obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary
profit.
xxx

xxx

declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed. And this checking up requires
that the landed merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the
customs premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre
operations.1
Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a
necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs,
so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For
otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing
itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the
necessary means to that end.

xxx

. . . Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing

jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern.
The additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its
function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there
is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are
separate and distinct from those emoloyed in its general governmental functions.
xxx

xxx

And herein lies the distinction between the present case and that of National Airports
Corporation vs. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 203, on which appellant would rely. For there, the Civil
Aeronautics Administration was found have for its prime reason for existence not a
governmental but a proprietary function, so that to it the latter was not a mere incidental
function:

xxx
Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under
Section 3, to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and to grant
concessions rights, and under Section 4, to charge landing fees, royalties on
sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies, and rentals for the
use of any property under its management.

Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical

personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of
Court.) Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect,
would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and
the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much
less over its objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz. 2835; Angat River
Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers Union, et al., G.R. Nos. L10943-44, December 28, 1957.)

These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in our opinion,
the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the
power to transact private business. . . .

The situation here is not materially different. The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of
the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm. Code), with no personality of its own
apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of
assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and
customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this
function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. For practical reasons said revenues
and customs duties can not be assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer's
or ship agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported and imposing
the duty provided in the Tariff law. Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the

xxx

xxx

xxx

The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity.
Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National Airports
Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what
is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather
the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. . . .

105

Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for obvious reasons of public
policy, cannot be sued without its consent. Plaintiff should have filed its present claim to
the General Auditing Office, it being for money under the provisions of Commonwealth
Act 327, which state the conditions under which money claims against the Government
may be filed.
It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suit are
strictly construed and that waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not
be lightly inferred. (49 Am. Jur., States, Territories and Dependencies, Sec. 96, p. 314;
Petty vs. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Com., 359 U.S. 275, 3 L. Ed. 804, 79 S. Ct. 785).
From the provision authorizing the Bureau of Customs to lease arrastre operations to
private parties, We see no authority to sue the said Bureau in the instances where it
undertakes to conduct said operation itself. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the
machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to
express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime governmental
function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellant. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ.,
concur.
Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.
Castro, J., reserves his vote.

106

Adventor Fernandez, and the Requisitioning Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S.

Lepatan. ... It was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
Antonio V. Raquiza. It is noted in the approval of the said requisition that "This is an
exception to the telegram dated Feb. 21, 1967 of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications." ... So, a canvass or public bidding was conducted on May 5, 1967 ... .
The committee on award accepted the bid of the Singkier Motor Service [owned by
respondent Felipe Singson] for the sum of P43,530.00. ... Subsequently, it was approved
by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications; and on May 16, 1967 the
Secretary sent a letter-order to the Singkier Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu requesting it
to immediately deliver the items listed therein for the lot price of P43,530.00. ... It would
appear that a purchase order signed by the District Engineer, the Requisitioning Officer
and the Procurement Officer, was addressed to the Singkier Motor Service. ... In due
course the Voucher No. 07806 reached the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for preaudit. He then made inquiries about the reasonableness of the price. ... Thus, after
finding from the indorsements of the Division Engineer and the Commissioner of Public
Highways that the prices of the various spare parts are just and reasonable and that the
requisition was also approved by no less than the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications with the verification of V.M. Secarro a representative of the Bureau of
Supply Coordination, Manila, he approved it for payment in the sum of P34,824.00, with
the retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00. ... His reason for withholding the 20%
equivalent to P8,706.00 was to submit the voucher with the supporting papers to the
Supervising Auditor, which he did. ... The voucher ... was paid on June 9, 1967 in the
amount of P34,824.00 to the petitioner [respondent Singson]. On June 10,1967, Highway
Auditor Sayson received a telegram from Supervising Auditor Fornier quoting a
telegraphic message of the General Auditing Office which states: "In view of excessive
prices charge for purchase of spare parts and equipment shown by vouchers already
submitted this Office direct all highway auditors refer General Office payment similar
nature for appropriate action." ... In the interim it would appear that when the voucher
and the supporting papers reached the GAO, a canvass was made of the spare parts
among the suppliers in Manila, particularly, the USI (Phil.), which is the exclusive dealer
of the spare parts of the caterpillar tractors in the Philippines. Said firm thus submitted its
quotations at P2,529.64 only which is P40,000.00 less than the price of the Singkier. ... In
view of the overpricing the GAO took up the matter with the Secretary of Public Works in
a third indorsement of July 18, 1967. ... The Secretary then circularized a telegram
holding the district engineer responsible for overpricing." 4 What is more, charges for
malversation were filed against the district engineer and the civil engineer involved. It was the

G.R. No. L-30044 December 19, 1973

LORENZO SAYSON, as Highway Auditor, Bureau of Public Highways, Cebu First
Engineering District; CORNELIO FORNIER, as Regional Supervising Auditor,
Eastern Visayas Region; ASTERIO, BUQUERON, ADVENTOR FERNANDEZ,
MANUEL S. LEPATAN, RAMON QUIRANTE, and TEODULFO REGIS, petitioners,
vs.
FELIPE SINGSON, as sole owner and proprietor of Singkier Motor
Service, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for
petitioners.
Teodoro Almase and Casiano U. Laput for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:
The real party in interest before this Court in this certiorari proceeding to review a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu is the Republic of the Philippines,
although the petitioners are the public officials who were named as respondents 1 in
a mandamus suit below. Such is the contention of the then Solicitor General, now Associate
Justice, Felix V. Makasiar, 2 for as he did point out, what is involved is a money claim against
the government, predicated on a contract. The basic doctrine of non-suability of the
government without its consent is thus decisive of the controversy. There is a governing
statute that is controlling. 3 Respondent Felipe Singson, the claimant, for reasons known to
him, did not choose to abide by its terms. That was a fatal misstep. The lower court, however,
did not see it that way. We cannot affirm its decision.
As found by the lower court, the facts are the following: "In January, 1967, the Office of
the District Engineer requisitioned various items of spare parts for the repair of a D-8
bulldozer, ... . The requisition (RIV No. 67/0331) was signed by the District Engineer,

107

failure of the Highways Auditor, one of the petitioners before us, that led to the filing of the
mandamus suit below, with now respondent Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier Motor
Service, being adjudged as entitled to collect the balance of P8,706.00, the contract in
question having been upheld. Hence this appeal by certiorari.

that certain administrative proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, the proper forum
in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the
party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General. Even had there been
such, the court to which the matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower
court could not legally act on the matter. What transpired was anything but that. It is quite
obvious then that it does not have the imprint of validity.

1. To state the facts is to make clear the solidity of the stand taken by the Republic. The
lower court was unmindful of the fundamental doctrine of non-suability. So it was
stressed in the petition of the then Solicitor General Makasiar. Thus: "It is apparent that
respondent Singson's cause of action is a money claim against the government, for the
payment of the alleged balance of the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau
of Public Highways. Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim, although as will be
shown hereunder, the claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law,
morals or public policy, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such
claim against the State but a ordinary action for specific performance ... . Actually, the
suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for
payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court
except with the consent of the State ... . In other words, the respondent should have filed
his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 ... which
prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government may be
filed ...." 5 Commonwealth Act No. 327 is quite explicit. It is therein provided: "In all cases
involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the
Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and
holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other persons,
office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time
the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by
him." 6 Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party aggrieved by the final
decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim may, within thirty days
from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the President of the United
States, pending the final and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or
(b) To the President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the
appellant is a private person or entity." 7

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu of September 4, 1968
is reversed and set aside, and the suit for mandamus filed against petitioners,
respondents below, is dismissed. With costs against respondent Felipe Singson.

2. With the facts undisputed and the statute far from indefinite or ambiguous, the
appealed decision defies explanation. It would be to disregard a basic corollary of the
cardinal postulate of non-suability. It is true that once consent is secured, an action may
be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require

108

G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972

On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later
amended on April 17, 1959 upon motion of the defendants, against the Republic of the
Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for
the recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed
by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory
damages in the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages
in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of the
suit.

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,defendants-appellees.

Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying the material
allegations of the complaint and interposing the following affirmative defenses, to wit: (1)
that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the
Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery of any amount which might
be due the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against
the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid
basis since as to these items the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and
(4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area
involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the
defendants.

MAKALINTAL, J.:p
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case
No. R-5977, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the
Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18060, which
superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T-3435) issued to her by the
Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the
government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate.
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot,
with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo
Avenues.

During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for the defendants notwithstanding due
notice, so the trial court proceeded to receive the plaintiff's evidence ex parte. On July
29, 1959 said court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of
her lot in question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent;
that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's claim
for compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the same being a money claim
against the government; and that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed, nor
did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its consent
to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure a
reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently
certified the case to Us, there being no question of fact involved.

It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in bad
condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now," and
"that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the formal construction in
1925." *
On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting
payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The
claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement
dated December 9, 1958. A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to Amigable's
counsel by the Office of the President on January 7, 1959.

The issue here is whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under
the facts of the case.

109

In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, 1 involving a claim for payment
of the value of a portion of land used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City,
this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held that where the government takes
away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal
process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit
against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from
suit without its consent. We there said: .

convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road
purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation
which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for
the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. 2
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal
interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is
made by the government. 3 In addition, the government should pay for attorney's fees, the
amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.

... . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for

property taken for public use were to be respected, as it should, then a
suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the
procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would
have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed
by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of
the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so
condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the
judgment." If there were an observance of procedural regularity,
petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable
then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law
requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if
not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom
if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that
when the government takes any property for public use, which is
conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially
ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court.
There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still
be appropriately invoked.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded
to the court a quo for the determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to
which the appellant is entitled as above indicated. No pronouncement as to costs.

Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her
certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion
of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As
registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land
in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither

110

G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985

Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent
thereto, the company received from the United States two telegrams requesting it to
confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company
complied with the requests. [In its complaint, the company alleges that the United States
had accepted its bids because "A request to confirm a price proposal confirms the
acceptance of a bid pursuant to defendant United States' bidding practices." (Rollo, p.
30.) The truth of this allegation has not been tested because the case has not reached
the trial stage.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS

and ROBERT GOHIER,petitioners,
vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal
and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Manalo & Feliciano Law for petitioners.

In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I. Collins,
Director, Contracts Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific,
Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one of the petitioners herein. The
letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because
of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at
the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said that the
projects had been awarded to third parties. In the abovementioned Civil Case No. 779-M,
the company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William
I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy.
The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the
projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the
defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third
parties for work on the projects.

Albert, Vergara, Benares, Perias & Dominguez Law Office for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain the respondent judge
from trying Civil Case No. 779M of the defunct Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The factual background is as follows:
At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic,
Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement
between the Philippines and the United States.

The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the
jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of
defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the
individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign
sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of
action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)

Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the following
projects
1. Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines.
2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline
revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay,
Philippines.

Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the
motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved
twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain

111

perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the trial court.

appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor services within the

Subic Bay Area, a U.S. Naval Reservation, it is evident that it can bring
an action before our courts for any contractual liability that that political
entity may assume under the contract. The trial court, therefore, has
jurisdiction to entertain this case ... (Rollo, pp. 20-21.)

The petition is highly impressed with merit.

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International
Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the
activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary
acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure
imperil The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States,
the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor
Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209 [1984].)

The reliance placed on Lyons by the respondent judge is misplaced for the following
reasons:
In Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States of America, supra, plaintiff brought suit in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to collect several sums of money on account of a
contract between plaintiff and defendant. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over defendant and over the subject matter of
the action. The court granted the motion on the grounds that: (a) it had no jurisdiction
over the defendant who did not give its consent to the suit; and (b) plaintiff failed to
exhaust the administrative remedies provided in the contract. The order of dismissal was
elevated to this Court for review.

The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity when he said
in his Order denying the defendants' (now petitioners) motion: " A distinction should be
made between a strictly governmental function of the sovereign state from its private,
proprietary or non- governmental acts (Rollo, p. 20.) However, the respondent judge also
said: "It is the Court's considered opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of
wharves or shoreline is certainly not a governmental function altho it may partake of a
public nature or character. As aptly pointed out by plaintiff's counsel in his reply citing the
ruling in the case of Lyons, Inc., [104 Phil. 594 (1958)], and which this Court quotes with
approval, viz.:

In sustaining the action of the lower court, this Court said:

It appearing in the complaint that appellant has not complied with the
procedure laid down in Article XXI of the contract regarding the
prosecution of its claim against the United States Government, or, stated
differently, it has failed to first exhaust its administrative remedies against
said Government, the lower court acted properly in dismissing this case.
(At p. 598.)

It is however contended that when a sovereign state enters into a

contract with a private person, the state can be sued upon the theory that
it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can be implied
that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract. ...

It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State immunity from suit
was purely gratuitous and, therefore, obiter so that it has no value as an imperative
authority.

xxx xxx xxx

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level
of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only

We agree to the above contention, and considering that the United States
government, through its agency at Subic Bay, entered into a contract with

112

when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the
exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the
naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines,
indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for
nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof. (At p.

323.)
In Syquia,the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the contracts
notwithstanding the States was not deemed to have given or waived its consent to be
sued for the reason that the contracts were forjure imperii and not for jure gestionis.

That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a
contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil.
312 (1949). In that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the United
States of America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover
possession of the premises on the ground that the term of the leases had expired. They
also asked for increased rentals until the apartments shall have been vacated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are
set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.

The defendants who were armed forces officers of the United States moved to dismiss
the suit for lack of jurisdiction in the part of the court. The Municipal Court of Manila
granted the motion to dismiss; sustained by the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs went
to this Court for review on certiorari. In denying the petition, this Court said:
On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we
hold that the real party defendant in interest is the Government of the
United States of America; that any judgment for back or Increased rentals
or damages will have to be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman
and their 64 co-defendants but by the said U.S. Government. On the
basis of the ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar already cited, and on
what we have already stated, the present action must be considered as
one against the U.S. Government. It is clear hat the courts of the
Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction
over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of
jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action.
The U.S. Government has not , given its consent to the filing of this suit
which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not
only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without
the latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign
government without said government's consent, which renders more
obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles
of law behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance

113

G.R. No. 76607 February 26, 1990

Luna, Sison & Manas Law Office for petitioners.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE

REEVES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch LVII, Regional Trial Court,
Angeles City, ROBERTO T. VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO
C. DEL PILAR, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state
immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the complaints
below but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against
it to which it has not consented. It is now contesting the denial of its motions by
the respondent judges.

G.R. No. 79470 February 26, 1990

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANTHONY LAMACHIA, T/SGT. USAF, WILFREDO
BELSA, PETER ORASCION AND ROSE CARTALLA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RODOLFO D. RODRIGO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 7, Regional Trial
Court (BAGUIO CITY), La Trinidad, Benguet and FABIAN GENOVE, respondents.

In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air
Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by
them for contracts for barber services in the said base.
On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area
Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids for such contracts through its contracting
officer, James F. Shaw. Among those who submitted their bids were private
respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar.
Valencia had been a concessionaire inside Clark for 34 years; del Pilar for 12
years; and Tanglao for 50 years.

G.R. No. 80018 February 26, 1990

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TOMI J. KINGI, DARREL D. DYE and STEVEN F.
BOSTICK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSEFINA D. CEBALLOS, As Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
66, Capas, Tarlac, and LUIS BAUTISTA, respondents.
G.R. No. 80258 February 26, 1990

The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the private
respondents, who claimed that he had made a bid for four facilities, including the
Civil Engineering Area, which was not included in the invitation to bid.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL P. C. CARNS, AIC

ERNEST E. RIVENBURGH, AIC ROBIN BLEVINS, SGT. NOEL A. GONZALES, SGT.
THOMAS MITCHELL, SGT. WAYNE L. BENJAMIN, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA, as Presiding Judge, Branch 62
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Angeles City, and RICKY SANCHEZ, FREDDIE
SANCHEZ AKA FREDDIE RIVERA, EDWIN MARIANO, AKA JESSIE DOLORES
SANGALANG, ET AL., respondents.

The private respondents complained to the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX). The
latter, through its representatives, petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M.
Smouse explained that the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to
Dizon as a result of the February 24, 1986 solicitation. Dizon was already operating
this concession, then known as the NCO club concession, and the expiration of
the contract had been extended from June 30, 1986 to August 31, 1986. They
further explained that the solicitation of the CE barbershop would be available
only by the end of June and the private respondents would be notified.

114

On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to
compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to defendant
Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the
private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the
concessions pending litigation. 1

therefore, indeed a commercial transaction has been entered, and

for purposes of the said solicitation, would necessarily be entered
between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants.
The Court, further, is of the view that Article XVIII of the RP-US
Bases Agreement does not cover such kind of services falling under
the concessionaireship, such as a barber shop concession. 2

Upon the filing of the complaint, the respondent court issued an ex parte order
directing the individual petitioners to maintain the status quo.

On December 11, 1986, following the filing of the herein petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order
against further proceedings in the court below. 3

On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the
petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit
against the United States of America, which had not waived its non-suability. The
individual defendants, as official employees of the U.S. Air Force, were also
immune from suit.

In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion
for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay
Air Station in Baguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation, from the
testimony of Belsa Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had poured urine into the
soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers.
Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a
board of arbitrators conformably to the collective bargaining agreement between
the Center and its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and
recommended his dismissal. This was effected on March 5, 1986, by Col. David C.
Kimball, Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force
Base. Genove's reaction was to file Ms complaint in the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City against the individual petitioners. 4

On the same date, July 22, 1986, the trial court denied the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction.
On October 10, 1988, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss,
holding in part as follows:
From the pleadings thus far presented to this Court by the parties,
the Court's attention is called by the relationship between the
plaintiffs as well as the defendants, including the US Government, in
that prior to the bidding or solicitation in question, there was a
binding contract between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants,
including the US Government. By virtue of said contract of
concession it is the Court's understanding that neither the US
Government nor the herein principal defendants would become the
employer/s of the plaintiffs but that the latter are the employers
themselves of the barbers, etc. with the employer, the plaintiffs
herein, remitting the stipulated percentage of commissions to the
Philippine Area Exchange. The same circumstance would become in
effect when the Philippine Area Exchange opened for bidding or
solicitation the questioned barber shop concessions. To this extent,

On March 13, 1987, the defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved
to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia, as an officer of the U.S. Air Force
stationed at John Hay Air Station, was immune from suit for the acts done by him
in his official capacity. They argued that the suit was in effect against the United
States, which had not given its consent to be sued.
This motion was denied by the respondent judge on June 4, 1987, in an order
which read in part:

115

It is the understanding of the Court, based on the allegations of the

complaint which have been hypothetically admitted by
defendants upon the filing of their motion to dismiss that
although defendants acted initially in their official capacities, their
going beyond what their functions called for brought them out of
the protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in
the beginning. Thus, the allegation that the acts complained of were
illegal, done. with extreme bad faith and with pre-conceived sinister
plan to harass and finally dismiss the plaintiff, gains significance. 5

On May 7, 1987, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, having been retained to
represent the defendants, filed with leave of court a motion to withdraw the answer
and dismiss the complaint. The ground invoked was that the defendants were
acting in their official capacity when they did the acts complained of and that the
complaint against them was in effect a suit against the United States without its
consent.
The motion was denied by the respondent judge in his order dated September 11,
1987, which held that the claimed immunity under the Military Bases Agreement
covered only criminal and not civil cases. Moreover, the defendants had come
under the jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their answer. 7

The petitioners then came to this Court seeking certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction.

Following the filing of the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, we issued on October 14, 1987, a temporary restraining
order. 8

In G.R. No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'
Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust
operation conducted by the individual petitioners herein, namely, Tomi J. King,
Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the U.S. Air Force and special
agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators (AFOSI). On the basis of the
sworn statements made by them, an information for violation of R.A. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against Bautista in the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac. The above-named officers testified against him at
his trial. As a result of the filing of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his
employment. He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual
petitioners herein claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed. 6

In G.R. No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents
against the herein petitioners (except the United States of America), for injuries
allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the
defendants. 9 There is a conflict of factual allegations here. According to the plaintiffs,
the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit
them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The
defendants deny this and claim the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by
the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest, The defendants stress that
the dogs were called off and the plaintiffs were immediately taken to the medical
center for treatment of their wounds.

During the period for filing of the answer, Mariano Y. Navarro a special counsel
assigned to the International Law Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate of
Clark Air Base, entered a special appearance for the defendants and moved for an
extension within which to file an "answer and/or other pleadings." His reason was
that the Attorney General of the United States had not yet designated counsel to
represent the defendants, who were being sued for their official acts. Within the
extended period, the defendants, without the assistance of counsel or authority
from the U.S. Department of Justice, filed their answer. They alleged therein as
affirmative defenses that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of the
laws of the Philippines inside the American bases pursuant to the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement.

In a motion to dismiss the complaint, the United States of America and the
individually named defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the
United States, which had not given its consent to be sued. The defendants were
also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the
performance of their official functions.
The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in its order dated August 10,
1987, reading in part as follows:

116

The defendants certainly cannot correctly argue that they are

immune from suit. The allegations, of the complaint which is sought
to be dismissed, had to be hypothetically admitted and whatever
ground the defendants may have, had to be ventilated during the
trial of the case on the merits. The complaint alleged criminal acts
against the individually-named defendants and from the nature of
said acts it could not be said that they are Acts of State, for which
immunity should be invoked. If the Filipinos themselves are duty
bound to respect, obey and submit themselves to the laws of the
country, with more reason, the members of the United States Armed
Forces who are being treated as guests of this country should
respect, obey and submit themselves to its laws. 10

As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the
justification given by Justice Holmes that "there can be no legal right against the
authority which makes the law on which the right depends." 12 There are other
practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state
sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in
the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the
language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." 13
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for
acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if
the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount
needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as
against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. 14 In such a
situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been
filed without its consent.

and so was the motion for reconsideration. The defendants submitted their answer
as required but subsequently filed their petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction with this Court. We issued a temporary restraining order on
October 27, 1987. 11
II

The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty"

because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it
by simply invoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic
societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its
citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be
sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state may not
be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it
consents.

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article
XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles
of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under
Article II, Section 2. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier
embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our
resolve to abide by the rules of the international community.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this
doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed
incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of
its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the
state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with
other states.

The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly.

Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is
implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No.
3083, under which the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued
upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or
implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties."

117

In Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 15 a special law was passed to

enable a person to sue the government for an alleged tort. When the government
enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied
consent.16 Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening
itself to a counterclaim. 17

Justice Hilado speaking for the Court, cited Coleman v. Tennessee,

where it was explicitly declared: 'It is well settled that a foreign
army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be
stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is
exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place.' Two
years later, in Tubb and Tedrow v. Griess, this Court relied on the
ruling in Raquiza v. Bradford and cited in support thereof excerpts
from the works of the following authoritative writers: Vattel,
Wheaton, Hall, Lawrence, Oppenheim, Westlake, Hyde, and McNair
and Lauterpacht. Accuracy demands the clarification that after the
conclusion of the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement,
the treaty provisions should control on such matter, the assumption
being that there was a manifestation of the submission to
jurisdiction on the part of the foreign power whenever appropriate.
More to the point is Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, where plaintiffs as
lessors sued the Commanding General of the United States Army in
the Philippines, seeking the restoration to them of the apartment
buildings they owned leased to the United States armed forces
stationed in the Manila area. A motion to dismiss on the ground of
non-suability was filed and upheld by respondent Judge. The matter
was taken to this Court in a mandamus proceeding. It failed. It was
the ruling that respondent Judge acted correctly considering that
the 4 action must be considered as one against the U.S.
Government. The opinion of Justice Montemayor continued: 'It is
clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court
of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful
detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and
interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government
has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is
essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not
only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government
without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen firing an action
against a foreign government without said government's consent,
which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of
his country. The principles of law behind this rule are so elementary
and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite

The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by
the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. 18 We have
held that not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of
its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary
acts. 19 As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only
where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant. 20
In the case of the United States of America, the customary rule of international law
on state immunity is expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty.
Article III thereof provides as follows:
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights,
power and authority within the bases which are necessary for the
establishment, use, operation and defense thereof or appropriate for
the control thereof and all the rights, power and authority within the
limits of the territorial waters and air space adjacent to, or in the
vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provide access to them
or appropriate for their control.
The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon, 21 along with several other
decisions, to support their position that they are not suable in the cases below, the
United States not having waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is emphasized
that in Baer, the Court held:
The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign
state without its consent is appropriate. More specifically, insofar as
alien armed forces is concerned, the starting point is Raquiza v.
Bradford, a 1945 decision. In dismissing a habeas corpus petition
for the release of petitioners confined by American army authorities,

118

authorities in support thereof then came Marvel Building

Corporation v. Philippine War Damage Commission, where
respondent, a United States Agency established to compensate
damages suffered by the Philippines during World War II was held
as falling within the above doctrine as the suit against it would
eventually be a charge against or financial liability of the United
States Government because ... , the Commission has no funds of its
own for the purpose of paying money judgments.' The Syquia ruling
was again explicitly relied upon in Marquez Lim v. Nelson, involving
a complaint for the recovery of a motor launch, plus damages, the
special defense interposed being 'that the vessel belonged to the
United States Government, that the defendants merely acted as
agents of said Government, and that the United States Government
is therefore the real party in interest.' So it was in Philippine Alien
Property Administration v. Castelo, where it was held that a suit
against Alien Property Custodian and the Attorney General of the
United States involving vested property under the Trading with the
Enemy Act is in substance a suit against the United States. To the
same effect is Parreno v. McGranery, as the following excerpt from
the opinion of justice Tuazon clearly shows: 'It is a widely accepted
principle of international law, which is made a part of the law of the
land (Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution), that a foreign state
may not be brought to suit before the courts of another state or its
own courts without its consent.' Finally, there is Johnson v. Turner,
an appeal by the defendant, then Commanding General, Philippine
Command (Air Force, with office at Clark Field) from a decision
ordering the return to plaintiff of the confiscated military payment
certificates known as scrip money. In reversing the lower court
decision, this Tribunal, through Justice Montemayor, relied
on Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, explaining why it could not be
sustained.

It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not confer on the
United States of America a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in
the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated
from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United
States in the discharge of their official functions.
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be
deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract
in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its
sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. This was
our ruling in United States of America v. Ruiz, 22 where the transaction in question
dealt with the improvement of the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay. As
this was a clearly governmental function, we held that the contract did not operate to
divest the United States of its sovereign immunity from suit. In the words of Justice
Vicente Abad Santos:
The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in
the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is
a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and
equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not
petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because
the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure
gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to
acts jure imperii The restrictive application of State immunity is now
the rule in the United States, the United kingdom and other states in
Western Europe.
xxx xxx xxx
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent

119

to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not

apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval
base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and
the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial
or business purposes.

they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and
later testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties
as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts
imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. As we
observed in Sanders v. Veridiano: 24
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have
to conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued
as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on
behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it
is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is
responsible for their acts.

The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the
discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States.
However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be
summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable to the
United States of America, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the
defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the
United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy
the judgment.

The private respondent invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the
government liable if it acts through a special agent. The argument, it would seem,
is premised on the ground that since the officers are designated "special agents,"
the United States government should be liable for their torts.

In Festejo v. Fernando, 23 a bureau director, acting without any authority whatsoever,

appropriated private land and converted it into public irrigation ditches. Sued for the
value of the lots invalidly taken by him, he moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the suit was in effect against the Philippine government, which had not
given its consent to be sued. This Court sustained the denial of the motion and held
that the doctrine of state immunity was not applicable. The director was being sued in
his private capacity for a personal tort.

There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and liability and a

misconception that the two terms are synonymous. Suability depends on the
consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established
facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is
liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to
be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself
to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

With these considerations in mind, we now proceed to resolve the cases at hand.
III

The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be
held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the
accepted forms of consent.

It is clear from a study of the records of G.R. No. 80018 that the individually-named
petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they
conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter testified
against him at his trial. The said petitioners were in fact connected with the Air
Force Office of Special Investigators and were charged precisely with the function
of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and
prosecuting those guilty of such acts. It cannot for a moment be imagined that

120

Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if
he is so denominated, as in the case at bar. No less important, the said provision
appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its inhabitants and,
hence, applies only to the Philippine government and not to foreign governments
impleaded in our courts.

In G.R. No. 79470, private respondent Genove was employed as a cook in the Main
Club located at the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center, also known as the Open Mess
Complex, at John Hay Air Station. As manager of this complex, petitioner
Lamachia is responsible for eleven diversified activities generating an annual
income of $2 million. Under his executive management are three service
restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a Class VI store, a coffee and pantry shop, a
main cashier cage, an administrative office, and a decentralized warehouse which
maintains a stock level of $200,000.00 per month in resale items. He supervises
167 employees, one of whom was Genove, with whom the United States
government has concluded a collective bargaining agreement.

We reject the conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special
counsel of the Office of the Sheriff Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base was a
submission by the United States government to its jurisdiction. As we noted
in Republic v. Purisima, 25 express waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere
counsel of the government but must be effected through a duly-enacted statute.
Neither does such answer come under the implied forms of consent as earlier
discussed.

From these circumstances, the Court can assume that the restaurant services
offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise
undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary capacity. Such
services are not extended to the American servicemen for free as a perquisite of
membership in the Armed Forces of the United States. Neither does it appear that
they are exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known
that they are available to the general public as well, including the tourists in
Baguio City, many of whom make it a point to visit John Hay for this reason. All
persons availing themselves of this facility pay for the privilege like all other
customers as in ordinary restaurants. Although the prices are concededly
reasonable and relatively low, such services are undoubtedly operated for profit,
as a commercial and not a governmental activity.

But even as we are certain that the individual petitioners in G.R. No. 80018 were
acting in the discharge of their official functions, we hesitate to make the same
conclusion in G.R. No. 80258. The contradictory factual allegations in this case
deserve in our view a closer study of what actually happened to the plaintiffs. The
record is too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their
official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident in
question occurred. Lacking this information, this Court cannot directly decide this
case. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess
and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of the evidence that
has yet to be presented at the trial. Only after it shall have determined in what
capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident in question will this
Court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable.

The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine
of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by
Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if it be established that they were
acting as agents of the United States when they investigated and later dismissed
Genove. For that matter, not even the United States government itself can claim
such immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with
Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of
its sovereign immunity from suit.
But these considerations notwithstanding, we hold that the complaint against the
petitioners in the court below must still be dismissed. While suable, the petitioners
are nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot be

121

allowed on the strength of the evidence before us, which we have carefully
examined.

The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as we
have done in G.R. No. 79470, except for the paucity of the record in the case at
hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop
concessions is not before us. This means that, as in G.R. No. 80258, the
respondent court will have to receive that evidence first, so it can later determine
on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek. Accordingly,
this case must also be remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

The dismissal of the private respondent was decided upon only after a thorough
investigation where it was established beyond doubt that he had polluted the soup
stock with urine. The investigation, in fact, did not stop there. Despite the
definitive finding of Genove's guilt, the case was still referred to the board of
arbitrators provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. This board
unanimously affirmed the findings of the investigators and recommended
Genove's dismissal. There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings. The
petitioners acted quite properly in terminating the private respondent's
employment for his unbelievably nauseating act. It is surprising that he should still
have the temerity to file his complaint for damages after committing his utterly
disgusting offense.

IV
There are a number of other cases now pending before us which also involve the
question of the immunity of the United States from the jurisdiction of the
Philippines. This is cause for regret, indeed, as they mar the traditional friendship
between two countries long allied in the cause of democracy. It is hoped that the
so-called "irritants" in their relations will be resolved in a spirit of mutual
accommodation and respect, without the inconvenience and asperity of litigation
and always with justice to both parties.

Concerning G.R. No. 76607, we also find that the barbershops subject of the
concessions granted by the United States government are commercial enterprises
operated by private person's. They are not agencies of the United States Armed
Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American
servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their
customers and offer not only the basic haircut and shave (as required in most
military organizations) but such other amenities as shampoo, massage, manicure
and other similar indulgences. And all for a fee. Interestingly, one of the
concessionaires, private respondent Valencia, was even sent abroad to improve
his tonsorial business, presumably for the benefit of his customers. No less
significantly, if not more so, all the barbershop concessionaires are under the
terms of their contracts, required to remit to the United States government fixed
commissions in consideration of the exclusive concessions granted to them in
their respective areas.

WHEREFORE, after considering all the above premises, the Court hereby renders
judgment as follows:
1. In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent
judge is directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil
Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order dated December 11,
1986, is LIFTED.
2. In G.R. No. 79470, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No.
829-R(298) is DISMISSED.
3. In G.R. No. 80018, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No.
115-C-87 is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated
October 14, 1987, is made permanent.

This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint
filed by the private respondents in the court below. The contracts in question
being decidedly commercial, the conclusion reached in the United States of
America v. Ruiz case cannot be applied here.

4. In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent

court is directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil

122

Case No. 4996. The temporary restraining order dated October 27,
1987, is LIFTED.
All without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

123

G.R. No. 129406

March 6, 2006

Following the sequestration process, PCGG representatives sat as members of the

Board of Directors of NOGCCI, which passed, sometime in October 1986, a resolution
effecting a corporate policy change. The change consisted of assessing a monthly
membership due of P150.00 for each NOGCCI share. Prior to this resolution, an investor
purchasing more than one NOGCCI share was exempt from paying monthly membership
due for the second and subsequent shares that he/she owned.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and ROBERTO S.
BENEDICTO, Respondents.

Subsequently, on March 29, 1987, the NOGCCI Board passed another resolution, this
time increasing the monthly membership due from P150.00 to P250.00 for each share.

DECISION

As sequestrator of the 227 shares of stock in question, PCGG did not pay the
corresponding monthly membership due thereon totaling P2,959,471.00. On account
thereof, the 227 sequestered shares were declared delinquent to be disposed of in an
auction sale.

GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify
and set aside the March 28, 19951 and March 13, 19972 Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan, Second Division, in Civil Case No. 0034, insofar as said resolutions
ordered the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to pay private
respondent Roberto S. Benedicto or his corporations the value of 227 shares of stock of
the Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI) at P150,000.00 per share,
registered in the name of said private respondent or his corporations.

Apprised of the above development and evidently to prevent the projected auction sale of
the same shares, PCGG filed a complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 5348. The complaint,
however, was dismissed, paving the way for the auction sale for the delinquent 227
shares of stock. On August 5, 1989, an auction sale was conducted.

The facts:

On November 3, 1990, petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered

into a Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 0034. The agreement contained a
general release clause5 whereunder petitioner Republic agreed and bound itself to lift the
sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI shares, among other Benedictos properties,
petitioner Republic acknowledging that it was within private respondent Benedictos
capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from business and the exercise of
his profession.6 Implied in this undertaking is the recognition by petitioner Republic that
the subject shares of stock could not have been ill-gotten.

Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff, v. Roberto S.
Benedicto, et al., defendants, is a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
reconstitution and damages. The case is one of several suits involving ill-gotten or
unexplained wealth that petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, filed with the
Sandiganbayan against private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto and others pursuant to
Executive Order (EO) No. 14,3 series of 1986.
Pursuant to its mandate under EO No. 1,4 series of 1986, the PCGG issued writs placing
under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and other properties, real and
personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto, or of
corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest. Among the
properties thus sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares
in NOGCCI owned by private respondent Benedicto and registered in his name or under
the names of corporations he owned or controlled.

In a decision dated October 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan approved the Compromise

Agreement and accordingly rendered judgment in accordance with its terms.
In the process of implementing the Compromise Agreement, either of the parties would,
from time to time, move for a ruling by the Sandiganbayan on the proper manner of
implementing or interpreting a specific provision therein.

124

On February 22, 1994, Benedicto filed in Civil Case No. 0034 a "Motion for Release from
Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends" praying, inter alia, that his
NOGCCI shares of stock be specifically released from sequestration and returned,
delivered or paid to him as part of the parties Compromise Agreement in that case. In a
Resolution7 promulgated on December 6, 1994, the Sandiganbayan granted Benedictos
aforementioned motion but placed the subject shares under the custody of its Clerk of
Court, thus:

On April 1, 1996, PCGG filed a Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration, 10 praying
for the setting aside of the Resolution of February 23, 1996. On April 11, 1996, private
respondent Benedicto filed a Motion to Enforce Judgment Levy. Resolving these two
motions, the Sandiganbayan, in its second assailed Resolution 11 dated March 13, 1997,
denied that portion of the PCGGs Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration
concerning the subject 227 NOGCCI shares and granted Benedictos Motion to Enforce
Judgment Levy.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the said "Motion for Release From
Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends" is hereby GRANTED and it
is directed that said shares/dividends be delivered/placed under the custody of the Clerk
of Court, Sandiganbayan, Manila subject to this Courts disposition.

Hence, the Republics present recourse on the sole issue of whether or not the public
respondent Sandiganbayan, Second Division, gravely abused its discretion in holding
that the PCGG is at fault for not paying the membership dues on the 227 sequestered
NOGCCI shares of stock, a failing which eventually led to the foreclosure sale thereof.

On March 28, 1995, the Sandiganbayan came out with the herein first assailed
Resolution,8 which clarified its aforementioned December 6, 1994 Resolution and
directed the immediate implementation thereof by requiring PCGG, among other things:

The petition lacks merit.

To begin with, PCGG itself does not dispute its being considered as a receiver insofar as
the sequestered 227 NOGCCI shares of stock are concerned.12 PCGG also
acknowledges that as such receiver, one of its functions is to pay outstanding debts
pertaining to the sequestered entity or property,13 in this case the 227 NOGCCI shares in
question. It contends, however, that membership dues owing to a golf club cannot be
considered as an outstanding debt for which PCGG, as receiver, must pay. It also claims
to have exercised due diligence to prevent the loss through delinquency sale of the
subject NOGCCI shares, specifically inviting attention to the injunctive suit, i.e., Civil
Case No. 5348, it filed before the RTC of Bacolod City to enjoin the foreclosure sale of
the shares.

(b) To deliver to the Clerk of Court the 227 sequestered shares of [NOGCCI] registered in
the name of nominees of ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO free from all liens and
encumbrances, or in default thereof, to pay their value at P150,000.00 per share which
can be deducted from [the Republics] cash share in the Compromise Agreement.
[Words in bracket added] (Emphasis Supplied).
Owing to PCGGs failure to comply with the above directive, Benedicto filed in Civil Case
No. 0034 a Motion for Compliance dated July 25, 1995, followed by an Ex-Parte Motion
for Early Resolution dated February 12, 1996. Acting thereon, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated yet another Resolution9 on February 23, 1996, dispositively reading:

The filing of the injunction complaint adverted to, without more, cannot plausibly tilt the
balance in favor of PCGG. To the mind of the Court, such filing is a case of acting too
little and too late. It cannot be over-emphasized that it behooved the PCGGs fiscal
agents to preserve, like a responsible father of the family, the value of the shares of stock
under their administration. But far from acting as such father, what the fiscal agents did
under the premises was to allow the element of delinquency to set in before acting by
embarking on a tedious process of going to court after the auction sale had been
announced and scheduled.

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the instant motion for early resolution and considering
that, indeed, the PCGG has not shown any justifiable ground as to why it has not
complied with its obligation as set forth in the Order of December 6, 1994 up to this date
and which Order was issued pursuant to the Compromise Agreement and has already
become final and executory, accordingly, the Presidential Commission on Good
Government is hereby given a final extension of fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof
within which to comply with the Order of December 6, 1994 as stated hereinabove.

The PCGGs posture that to the owner of the sequestered shares rests the burden of
paying the membership dues is untenable. For one, it lost sight of the reality that such

125

dues are basically obligations attached to the shares, which, in the final analysis, shall be
made liable, thru delinquency sale in case of default in payment of the dues. For another,
the PCGG as sequestrator-receiver of such shares is, as stressed earlier, duty bound to
preserve the value of such shares. Needless to state, adopting timely measures to
obviate the loss of those shares forms part of such duty and due diligence.

assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan did no more than to direct PCGG to comply
with its part of the bargain under the compromise agreement it freely entered into with
private respondent Benedicto. Simply put, the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
have firm basis in fact and in law.
Lest it be overlooked, the issue of liability for the shares in question had, as both public
and private respondents asserted, long become final and executory. Petitioners
narration of facts in its present petition is even misleading as it conveniently fails to make
reference to two (2) resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan. We refer to that courts
resolutions of December 6, 199418 and February 23, 199619 as well as several intervening
pleadings which served as basis for the decisions reached therein. As it were, the
present petition questions only and focuses on the March 28, 1995 20 and March 13,
199721 resolutions, which merely reiterated and clarified the graft courts underlying
resolution of December 6, 1994. And to place matters in the proper perspective, PCGGs
failure to comply with the December 6, 1994 resolution prompted the issuance of the
clarificatory and/or reiteratory resolutions aforementioned.

The Sandiganbayan, to be sure, cannot plausibly be faulted for finding the PCGG liable
for the loss of the 227 NOGCCI shares. There can be no quibbling, as indeed the graft
court so declared in its assailed and related resolutions respecting the NOGCCI shares
of stock, that PCGGs fiscal agents, while sitting in the NOGCCI Board of Directors
agreed to the amendment of the rule pertaining to membership dues. Hence, it is not
amiss to state, as did the Sandiganbayan, that the PCGG-designated fiscal agents, no
less, had a direct hand in the loss of the sequestered shares through delinquency and
their eventual sale through public auction. While perhaps anti-climactic to so mention it at
this stage, the unfortunate loss of the shares ought not to have come to pass had those
fiscal agents prudently not agreed to the passage of the NOGCCI board resolutions
charging membership dues on shares without playing representatives.

For sure, even if the Sandiganbayan were wrong in its findings, which does not seem to
be in this case, it is a well-settled rule of jurisprudence that certiorari will issue only to
correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Corollarily, errors of procedure or
mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions are beyond the corrective hand of
certiorari.14 The extraordinary writ of certiorari may be availed only upon a showing, in the
minimum, that the respondent tribunal or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion.15

In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes
state immunity from suit.22 As argued, the order for it to pay the value of the delinquent
shares would fix monetary liability on a government agency, thus necessitating the
appropriation of public funds to satisfy the judgment claim.23 But, as private respondent
Benedicto correctly countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the exceptions to
the state immunity principle, i.e., when the government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case
No. 0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case,
immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked.24 For, as jurisprudence teaches, when
the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a
private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself
to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it. 25 Petitioner
Republics act of filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its
immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up
its immunity against private respondent Benedictos prayers in the same case.

The term "grave abuse of discretion" connotes capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a lack of jurisdiction. 16 The abuse must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.17 Sadly, this is completely absent in the present case. For, at bottom, the

In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto,

petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the
same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or
agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional
legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and
obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent,

Given the circumstances leading to the auction sale of the subject NOGCCI shares,
PCGGs lament about public respondent Sandiganbayan having erred or, worse still,
having gravely abused its discretion in its determination as to who is at fault for the loss
of the shares in question can hardly be given cogency.

126

precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the
citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such
contract,26 breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the other party to
the agreement.
Finally, it is apropos to stress that the Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 0034
envisaged the immediate recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth without further litigation by
the government, and buying peace on the part of the aging Benedicto. 27 Sadly, that
stated objective has come to naught as not only had the litigation continued to ensue,
but, worse, private respondent Benedicto passed away on May 15, 2000, 28 with the trial
of Civil Case No. 0034 still in swing, so much so that the late Benedicto had to be
substituted by the administratrix of his estate.29
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

127

G.R. No. L-11154

March 21, 1916

intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said
avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so
that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance
and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before
reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having
sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was
already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post place there.

E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
Crossfield and O'Brien for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Avancea for defendant..

By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that,
according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he was
taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in the left
parietal region, a would in the same place and in the back part of his head, while
blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.

TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the
cause.

The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the
grey matter and brain was had suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of the night
in question, which was the time set for performing the operation, his pulse was so
weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little hope that he would live.
His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer
skin in such manner that it might be regarded as double and the would be
exposed to infection, for which reason it was of the most serious nature.

Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages
which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint,"
and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twentyone days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as
claimed by plaintiff in his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in
finding that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; (b) in holding that the
Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff
as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of
the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of
P14,741.

At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed
that the plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature
that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination
of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and
nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his
eyes and in his mental condition. This latter weakness was always noticed when
the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor, especially when he attempted to
use his money for mathematical calculations.

The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are as follows:

According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's

mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that after
having received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical condition had
undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and
ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best

It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding
on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura,
passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour,
upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern

128

constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the
income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his
efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had before done, climb up
ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts of the building.

An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the

Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear
in said suit.
Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands
by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on March twenty-fifth,
nineteen hundred and thirteen;

As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as
a contractor, he had to dissolved the partnership he had formed with the
engineer. Wilson, because he was incapacitated from making mathematical
calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his mental faculties, and
he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco
building."

Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to
determine the amount of damages, if any, to which the claimant is entitled; and

We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that
the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.

Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommended

that an Act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in
the courts against the Government, in order that said questions may be decided:
Now, therefore,

The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by
the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the
P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was
incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in the record which would
justify us in increasing the amount of the first. As to the second, the record shows, and
the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per
month. The court, however, limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which
the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was error,
because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period
of six months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two months and
twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was spent in his home, would not
prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages
sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is P18,075.

By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature,

that:
SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in
order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision,
and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to
defendant said Government at the same.
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.

As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or

employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is
legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom.

Enacted, February 3, 1915.

Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from suit
or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be held

Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:

129

that the Act created any new cause of action in favor of the plaintiff or extended the
defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized.

officers at the state fair, a state institution created by the legislature for the purpose of
improving agricultural and kindred industries; to disseminate information calculated to
educate and benefit the industrial classes; and to advance by such means the material
interests of the state, being objects similar to those sought by the public school system.
In passing upon the question of the state's liability for the negligent acts of its officers or
agents, the court said:

All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual
without its consent. It is also admitted that the instant case is one against the
Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the plaintiff was entirely
voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the consent, and
render judgment accordingly.

No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by reason of the

misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or
agents. (Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall., 269; Clodfelter vs. State, 86 N. C., 51,
53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158;
Green vs. State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203;
Story on Agency, sec. 319.)

The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix
the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E.
Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two questions
submitted to the court for determination. The Act was passed "in order that said
questions may be decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the
negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we
have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the
collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that
amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.

As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where
the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915,
thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor,
or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a
remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the
court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.

The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal and
State Governments in the United States," we may look to the decisions of the high courts
of that country for aid in determining the purpose and scope of Act No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its
officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative
enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says Justice Story, "does not undertake to
guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that
would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses,
which would be subversive of the public interest." (Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103
Minn., 491, citing U. S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers vs. States,
20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)

In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16, 1915, the
Act of 1913, which authorized the bringing of this suit, read:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town of
Summit, Waukesha County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court or courts and in
such form or forms as he may be advised for the purpose of settling and
determining all controversies which he may now have with the State of
Wisconsin, or its duly authorized officers and agents, relative to the mill property
of said George Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State of Wisconsin on the
Bark River, and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the lower end of

In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover damages
from the state for personal injuries received on account of the negligence of the state

130

Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use of the waters of said Bark River and
Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of Waukesha, Wisconsin.

liability or cause of action against the state where none existed before, but
merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have existed
if the statute had not been enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am.
St. Rep., 158; Melvin vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)

In determining the scope of this act, the court said:

A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court "jurisdiction of all
claims against the commonwealth, whether at law or in equity," with an exception not
necessary to be here mentioned. In construing this statute the court, in Murdock Grate
Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass., 28), said:

Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability
on the part of the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just
as it would stand between private parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or
was intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity from suit. It simply
gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's
controversies with the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion
that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well
established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only question
to be settled. The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass
upon the question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the
absence of the state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature had intended to
change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to declare liability on the
part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to mere inference,
but would have done so in express terms. (Murdock Grate Co. vs.
Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A., 399.)

The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against the state a
new and heretofore unrecognized class of liabilities, but only an intention to
provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized existing liabilities can be
adjudicated.
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had, by the terms
of the statute of New York, jurisdiction of claims for damages for injuries in the
management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained, Chief Justice Ruger
remarks: "It must be conceded that the state can be made liable for injuries arising from
the negligence of its agents or servants, only by force of some positive statute assuming
such liability."

In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied upon and
considered, are as follows:

It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's
liability to any cause not previously recognized, we will now examine the substantive law
touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and
employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:

All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for
negligence against the state not allowed by the state board of examiners, are
hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions herein contained, to bring suit
thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of competent
jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final judgment. The rules of practice in
civil cases shall apply to such suits, except as herein otherwise provided.

The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not
when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it
pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding
article shall be applicable.

And the court said:

The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, arising
under different facts, and in both it was held that said statute did not create any

131

That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to
another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3,
Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or negligence,
takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It
follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not
responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of
acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to
their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the
part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight
humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the
general weal an that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these
latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the
civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person
capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain,
January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)

That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which
arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas in the first article thereof. No. 1902,
where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an act or
omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence, shall be obliged
to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the
persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the following articles refers
to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain
fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage,
because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused
by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption
gives way to proof, however, because, as held in the last paragraph of article
1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned
in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer in
a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the
father in a proper case, guardians and owners or directors of an establishment or
enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts through the agency of a
special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or negligence,
which is the original basis of this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with
the state.
That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set
forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private
parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by
branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of
the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of
its executive powers, yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages
said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official, acting in
the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain
property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it
acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these
words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent

132

thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to
any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on
his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally
pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations."
(Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle
laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage
case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a
special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform
some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim,
and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public
official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to
the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility.
Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity
to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to,
has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903
of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only
liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the
acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the
meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance
of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs
in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the
amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the
negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating
sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely
with the Legislature and not with the courts.

133

G.R. No. L-30098 February 18, 1970

THE COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS and the AUDITOR
GENERAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch IX, sitting in Quezon City, TESTATE ESTATE OF N. T. HASHIM
(Special Proceedings No. 71131 of the Court of First Instance of Manila)
represented by its Judicial Administrator, Tomas N. Hashim, TOMAS N. HASHIM,
personally, and as Judicial Administrator of the Estate of Hashim, Special
Proceedings No. 71131 of the Court of ]First instance of Manila, ALL THE LEGAL
OR TESTAMENTARY HEIRS of the Estate of Hashim, MANUELA C. FLORENDO,
personally as Deputy Clerk, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch
IX, BENJAMIN GARCIA as "Special Sheriff" appointed by respondent Judge
Lourdes P. San Diego, BENJAMIN V. CORUA, personally and as Chief
Documentation Staff, Legal Department, Philippine National Bank, and the
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, the Court declares null and void
the two questioned orders of respondent Court levying upon funds of petitioner Bureau of
Public Highways on deposit with the Philippine National Bank, by virtue of the
fundamental precept that government funds are not subject to execution or garnishment.
The background facts follow:
On or about November 20, 1940, the Government of the Philippines filed a complaint for
eminent domain in the Court of First Instance of Rizal1 for the expropriation of a parcel of
land belonging to N. T. Hashim, with an area of 14,934 square meters, needed to construct a
public road, now known as Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. On November 25, 1940, the
Government took possession of the property upon deposit with the City Treasurer of the sum
of P23,413.64 fixed by the Court therein as the provisional value of all the lots needed to
construct the road, including Hashim's property. The records of the expropriation case were
destroyed and lost during the second world war, and neither party took any step thereafter to
reconstitute the proceedings.

Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.

Paredes, Poblador, Nazareno, Abada and Tomacruz for respondent Judge Lourdes P.
San Diego.

In 1958, however, the estate of N.T. Hashim, deceased, through its Judicial
Administrator, Tomas N. Hashim, filed a money claim with the Quezon City Engineer's
Office in the sum of P522,620.00, alleging said amount to be the fair market value of the
property in question, now already converted and used as a public highway. Nothing
having come out of its claim, respondent estate filed on August 6, 1963, with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, assigned to Branch IX, presided by
respondent judge,2 a complaint for the recovery of the fair market price of the said property
in the sum of P672,030.00 against the Bureau of Public Highways, which complaint was
amended on August 26, 1963, to include as additional defendants, the Auditor General and
the City Engineer of Quezon City.3

Jesus B. Santos for respondent Testate estate of N. T. Hashim.

Jose A. Buendia for respondent Manuela C. Florendo.
Emata, Magkawas and Associates for respondent legal heir Jose H. Hashim.
Alberto O. Villaraza for respondents Estate of N.T. Hashim and Tomas N. Hashim.
Conrado E. Medina for respondent Philippine National Bank.

The issues were joined in the case with the filing by then Solicitor General Arturo A.
Alafriz of the State's answer, stating that the Hashim estate was entitled only to the sum
of P3,203.00 as the fair market value of the property at the time that the State took
possession thereof on November 25, 1940, with legal interest thereon at 6% per annum,

Benjamin V. Corua for and in his own behalf.

134

and that said amount had been available and tendered by petitioner Bureau since 1958.
The parties thereafter worked out a compromise agreement, respondent estate having
proposed on April 28, 1966, a payment of P14.00 per sq. m. for its 14,934 sq.m.-parcel of
land or the total amount of P209,076.00, equivalent to the land's total assessed
value,4 which was confirmed, ratified and approved in November, 1966 by the Commissioner
of Public Highways and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. On November 7,
1966, the Compromise Agreement subscribed by counsel for respondent estate and by then
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, now a member of this Court, was submitted to the lower
Court and under date of November 8, 1966, respondent judge, as prayed for, rendered
judgment approving the Compromise Agreement and ordering petitioners, as defendants
therein, to pay respondent estate as plaintiff therein, the total sum of P209,076.00 for the
expropriated lot.

Garcia, as special sheriff, on October 17, 1968, it sent a letter to the officials of the
Bureau of Public Highways notifying them of the notice of garnishment.
Under date of October 16, 1968, respondent estate further filed with the lower Court
an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an order ordering respondent bank to release and
deliver to the special sheriff, respondent Garcia, the garnished amount of P209,076.00
deposited under the account of petitioner Bureau, which motion was granted by
respondent judge in an order of October 18, 1968. On the same day, October 18, 1968,
respondent Corua allegedly taking advantage of his position, authorized the issuance of
a cashier's check of the bank in the amount of P209,076.00, taken out of the funds of
petitioner Bureau deposited in current account with the bank and paid the same to
respondent estate, without notice to said petitioner.

On October 10, 1968, respondent estate filed with the lower Court a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution, alleging that petitioners had failed to satisfy the judgment
in its favor. It further filed on October 12, 1968, an ex-parte motion for the appointment of
respondent Benjamin Garcia as special sheriff to serve the writ of execution. No
opposition having been filed by the Solicitor General's office to the motion for execution
at the hearing thereof on October 12, 1968, respondent judge, in an order dated October
14, 1968, granted both motions.

Later on December 20, 1968, petitioners, through then Solicitor General Felix V.
Makasiar, wrote respondent bank complaining that the bank acted precipitately in having
delivered such a substantial amount to the special sheriff without affording petitioner
Bureau a reasonable time to contest the validity of the garnishment, notwithstanding the
bank's being charged with legal knowledge that government funds are exempt from
execution or garnishment, and demanding that the bank credit the said petitioner's
account in the amount of P209,076.00, which the bank had allowed to be illegally
garnished. Respondent bank replied on January 6, 1969 that it was not liable for the said
garnishment of government funds, alleging that it was not for the bank to decide the
question of legality of the garnishment order and that much as it wanted to wait until it
heard from the Bureau of Public Highways, it was "helpless to refuse delivery under the
teeth" of the special order of October 18, 1968, directing immediate delivery of the
garnished amount.

On the same date, October 14, 1968, respondent Garcia, as special sheriff, forthwith
served a Notice of Garnishment, together with the writ of execution dated October 14,
1968, issued by respondent Manuela C. Florendo as Deputy Clerk of Court, on
respondent Philippine National Bank, notifying said bank that levy was thereby made
upon funds of petitioners Bureau of Public Highways and the Auditor General on deposit,
with the bank to cover the judgment of P209,076.00 in favor of respondent estate, and
requesting the bank to reply to the garnishment within five days. On October 16, 1968,
three days before the expiration of the five-day deadline, respondent Benjamin V. Corua
in his capacity as Chief, Documentation Staff, of respondent bank's Legal Department,
allegedly acting in excess of his authority and without the knowledge and consent of the
Board of Directors and other ranking officials of respondent bank, replied to the notice of
garnishment that in compliance therewith, the bank was holding the amount of
P209,076.00 from the account of petitioner Bureau of Public Highways. Respondent
bank alleged that when it was served with Notice to Deliver Money signed by respondent

Petitioners therefore filed on January 28, 1969 the present action against respondents, in
their capacities as above stated in the title of this case, praying for judgment declaring
void the question orders of respondent Court. Petitioners also sought the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the immediate reimbursement of the
garnished sum of P209,076.00, constituting funds of petitioner Bureau on deposit with
the Philippine National Bank as official depository of Philippine Government funds, to the
said petitioner's account with the bank, so as to forestall the dissipation of said funds,
which the government had allocated to its public highways and infrastructure projects.
The Court ordered on January 31, 1969 the issuance of the writ against the principal

135

respondents solidarily, including respondent judge therein so that she would take
forthwith all the necessary measures and processes to compel the immediate return of
the said government funds to petitioner Bureau's account with respondent bank. 5

Neither may the State impugn the validity of the compromise agreement executed by the
Solicitor General on behalf of the State with the approval of the proper government
officials, on the ground that it was executed only by the lawyer of respondent estate,
without any showing of having been specially authorized to bind the estate thereby,
because such alleged lack of authority may be questioned only by the principal or client,
and respondent estate as such principal has on the contrary confirmed and ratified the
compromise agreement. 11 As a matter of fact, the Solicitor General, in representation of the
State, makes in the petition no prayer for the annulment of the compromise agreement or of
the respondent court's decision approving the same.

In compliance with the writ, respondent bank restored the garnished sum of P209,076.00
to petitioner Bureau's account with it.6 The primary responsibility for the reimbursement of
said amount to petitioner Bureau's account with the respondent bank, however, rested solely
on respondent estate, since it is the judgment creditor that received the amount upon the
questioned execution.

On the principal issue, the Court holds that respondent Court's two questioned orders (1)
for execution of the judgment, in pursuance whereof respondent deputy clerk issued the
corresponding writ of execution and respondent special sheriff issued the notice of
garnishment, and (2) for delivery of the garnished amount of P209,076.00 to respondent
estate as judgment creditor through respondent special sheriff, are null and void on the
fundamental ground that government funds are not subject to execution or garnishment.

Strangely enough, as appears now from respondent bank's memorandum in lieu of oral
argument,7 what respondent bank did, acting through respondent Corua as its counsel, was
not to ask respondent estate to reimburse it in turn in the same amount, but to file with the
probate court with jurisdiction over respondent estate, 8 a motion for the estate to deposit the
said amount with it, purportedly in compliance with the writ. Respondent estate
thereupon deposited with respondent bank as a savings account the sum of P125,446.00, on
which the bank presumably would pay the usual interest, besides. As to the balance of
P83,630.00, this sum had been in the interval paid as attorney's fees to Atty. Jesus B. Santos,
counsel for the estate, by the administrator, allegedly without authority of the probate
court.9 Accordingly, respondent estate has not reimbursed the respondent bank either as to
this last amount, and the bank has complacently not taken any steps in the lower court to
require such reimbursement.

1. As early as 1919, the Court has pointed out that although the Government, as plaintiff
in expropriation proceedings, submits itself to the jurisdiction of the Court and thereby
waives its immunity from suit, the judgment that is thus rendered requiring its payment of
the award determined as just compensation for the condemned property as a condition
precedent to the transfer to the title thereto in its favor, cannot be realized upon
execution.12 The Court there added that it is incumbent upon the legislature to appropriate
any additional amount, over and above the provisional deposit, that may be necessary to pay
the award determined in the judgment, since the Government cannot keep the land and
dishonor the judgment.

The ancillary questions now belatedly raised by the State may readily be disposed of.
Petitioners may not invoke the State's immunity from suit, since the case below was but
a continuation in effect of the pre-war expropriation proceedings instituted by the State
itself. The expropriation of the property, which now forms part of Epifanio, de los Santos
Avenue, is a fait accompli and is not questioned by the respondent state. The only
question at issue was the amount of the just compensation due to respondent estate in
payment of the expropriated property, which properly pertained to the jurisdiction of the
lower court. 10 It is elementary that in expropriation proceedings, the State precisely submits
to the Court's jurisdiction and asks the Court to affirm its lawful right to take the property
sought to be expropriated for the public use or purpose described in its complaint and to
determine the amount of just compensation to be paid therefor.

In another early case, where the government by an act of the Philippine Legislature,
expressly consented to be sued by the plaintiff in an action for damages and waived its
immunity from suit, the Court adjudged the Government as not being legally liable on the
complaint, since the State under our laws would be liable only for torts caused by its
special agents, specially commissioned to carry out the acts complained of outside of
such agents' regular duties. We held that the plaintiff would have to look to the legislature
for another legislative enactment and appropriation of sufficient funds, if the Government
intended itself to be legally liable only for the damages sustained by plaintiff as a result of
the negligent act of one of its employees. 13

136

Philippine Government, respondent bank and its officials should be the first ones to know that
all government funds deposited with it by any agency or instrumentality of the government,
whether by way of general or special deposit, remain government funds, since such
government agencies or instrumentalities do not have any non-public or private funds of their
own.

The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion
of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends
when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on
obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of Public funds must be covered
by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

Their second contention that said government funds lost their character as such "the
moment they were deposited with the respondent bank", 17 since the relation between a
depositor and a depository bank is that of creditor and debtor, is just as untenable, absolutely.
Said respondents shockingly ignore the fact that said government funds were deposited with
respondent bank as the official depositary of the Philippine Government. Assuming for the
nonce the creation of such relationship of creditor and debtor, petitioner Bureau thereby held
a credit against respondent bank whose obligation as debtor was to pay upon demand of said
petitioner-creditor the public funds thus deposited with it; even though title to the deposited
funds passes to the bank under this theory since the funds become mingled with other funds
which the bank may employ in its ordinary business, what was garnished was not the bank's
own funds but the credit of petitioner bureau against the bank to receive payment of its funds,
as a consequence of which respondent bank delivered to respondent estate the garnished
amount of P209,076.00 belonging to said petitioner. Petitioner bureau's credit against
respondent bank thereby never lost its character as a credit representing government funds
thus deposited. The moment the payment is made by respondent bank on such deposit, what
it pays out represents the public funds thus deposited which are not garnishable and may be
expended only for their legitimate objects as authorized by the corresponding legislative
appropriation. Neither respondent bank nor respondent Corua are the duly authorized
disbursing officers and auditors of the Government to authorize and cause payment of the
public funds of petitioner Bureau for the benefit or private persons, as they wrongfully did in
this case.

Thus, as pointed out by the Court in Belleng vs. Republic, 14 while the State has given its
consent to be sued in compensation cases, the pauper-claimant therein must look specifically
to the Compensation Guarantee Fund provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act for the
corresponding disbursement in satisfaction of his claim, since the State in Act 3083, the
general law waiving its immunity from suit "upon any money claim involving liability arising
from contract express or implied," imposed the limitation in Sec. 7 thereof that "no execution
shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the
(Philippines) under the provisions of this Act;" and that otherwise, the claimant would have to
prosecute his money claim against the State under Commonwealth Act 327.
This doctrine was again stressed by. the Court in Republic vs. Palacio, 15 setting aside as
null and void the order of garnishment issued by the sheriff pursuant to the lower Court's writ
of execution on funds of the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund in the account of the Government's
Irrigation Service Unit with the Philippine National Bank. The Court emphasized then and reemphasizes now that judgments against the State or its agencies and instrumentalities in
cases where the State has consented to be sued, operate merely to liquidate and establish
the plaintiff's claim; such judgments may not be enforced by writs of execution or garnishment
and it is for the legislature to provide for their payment through the corresponding
appropriation, as indicated in Act 3083.

3. Respondents bank and Corua next pretend that refusal on their part to obey
respondent judge's order to deliver the garnished amount, "which is valid and binding
unless annulled, would have exposed them for contempt of court." 18 They make no
excuse for not having asked the lower court for time and opportunity to consult petitioner
Bureau or the Solicitor General with regard to the garnishment and execution of said
deposited public funds which were allocated to specific government projects, or for not having
simply replied to the sheriff that what they held on deposit for petitioner Bureau were nongarnishable government funds. They have not given any cogent reason or explanation,
charged as they were with knowledge of the nullity of the writ of execution and notice of

2. Respondent bank and its Chief, Documentation Staff, respondent Corua have
advanced two specious arguments to justify their wrongful delivery of the garnished
public funds to respondent estate. Their first contention that the said government funds
by reason of their being deposited by petitioner Bureau under a current account subject
to withdrawal by check, instead of being deposited as special trust funds, "lost their kind
and character as government funds," 16 is untenable. As the official depositary of the

137

garnishment against government funds, for in the earlier case of Republic vs. Palacio, supra,
they had then prudently and timely notified the proper government officials of the attempted
levy on the funds of the Irrigation Service Unit deposited with it, thus enabling the Solicitor
General to take the corresponding action to annul the garnishment for their failure to follow
the same prudent course in this case. Indeed, the Court is appalled at the improper haste and
lack of circumspection with which respondent Corua and other responsible officials of
respondent bank precipitately allowed the garnishment and delivery of the large amount
involved, all within the period of just four days, even before the expiration of the five-day
reglementary period to reply to the sheriff's notice of garnishment. Failure on the State's part
to oppose the issuance of the writ of execution, which was patently null and void as an
execution against government funds, could not relieve them of their own responsibility.

rather agreed to pay therefor the greatly revised and increased amount of P209,076.00 at
P14.00 per square meter, not to mention the consequential benefits derived by said
respondent from the construction of the public highway with the resultant enhanced value of
its remaining properties in the area.

5. The manner in which respondent bank's counsel and officials proceeded to comply
with the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the Court commanding
respondent estate, its judicial administrator and respondents bank and Corua, in
solidum, to reimburse forthwith the account of petitioner Bureau in the garnished amount
of P209,076.00, does not speak well of their fidelity to the bank's interests. For while
respondent bank had restored with its own funds the said amount of P209,076.00 to
petitioner Bureau's account, it has not required respondent estate as the party primarily
liable therefor as the recipient of the garnished amount to reimburse it in turn in this
same amount. Rather, said bank officials have allowed respondent estate to keep all this
time the whole amount of P209,076.00 wrongfully garnished by it. For as stated above,
respondent bank allowed respondent estate merely to deposit with it as a savings
account, of respondent estate, the lesser sum of P125,446.00 on which the bank
presumably has paid and continues paying respondent estate, besides the usual interest
rates on such savings accounts, and neither has it taken any steps to require
reimbursement to it from respondent estate of the remainder of P83,630.00 which
respondent estate of its own doing and responsibility paid by way of attorney's fees.

4. Respondents bank and Corua further made common cause with respondent estate
beyond the legal issues that should solely concern them, by reason of their having
wrongfully allowed the garnishment and delivery of government funds, instead assailing
petitioners for not having come to court with "clean hands" and asserting that in fairness,
justice and equity, petitioners should not impede, obstruct or in any way delay the
payment of just compensation to the land owners for their property that was occupied
way back in 1940. This matter of payment of respondent estate's judgment credit is of no
concern to them as custodian and depositary of the public funds deposited with them,
whereby they are charged with the obligation of assuring that the funds are not illegally
or wrongfully paid out.

It thus appears that all this time, respondent bank has not been reimbursed by
respondent estate as the party primarily liable for the whole amount of P209,076.00
wrongfully and illegally garnished and received by respondent estate. This grave breach
of trust and dereliction of duty on the part of respondent bank's officials should be
brought to the attention of respondent bank's Board of Directors and management for the
appropriate administrative action and other remedial action for the bank to recover the
damages it has been made to incur thereby.

Since they have gone into the records of the expropriation case, then it should be noted
that they should have considered the vital fact that at the time that the compromise
agreement therein was executed in November, 1966, respondent estate was well aware
of the fact that the funds for the payment of the property in the amount of P209,076.00
still had to be released by the Budget Commissioner and that at the time of the
garnishment, respondent estate was still making the necessary representations for the
corresponding release of such amount, pursuant to the Budget Commissioner's
favorable
recommendation.19 And with regard to the merits of the case, they should have likewise
considered that respondent estate could have no complaint against the fair attitude of the
authorities in not having insisted on their original stand in their answer that respondent estate
was entitled only to the sum of P3,203.00 as the fair market value of the property at the time
the State took possession thereof on November 25, 1940, with legal interests thereon, but

6. The Solicitor General has likewise questioned the legality of respondent Court's Order
of October 14, 1968, appointing respondent Garcia as "special sheriff" for the purpose of
effecting service of the writ of execution, simply on respondent estate's representation
that it was desirable "for a speedy enforcement of the writ."

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The Court finds this general practice of the lower courts of appointing "special sheriffs"
for the service of writs of execution to be unauthorized by law. The duty of executing all
processes" of the courts in civil cases, particularly, writs of execution, devolves upon the
sheriff or his deputies, under Section 183 of the Revised Administrative Code and Rule
39, section 8 of the Rules of Court. Unlike the service of summons which may be made,
aside from the sheriff or other proper court officers, "for special reasons by any person
especially authorized by the judge of the court issuing the summons" under Rule 14,
section 5 of the Rules of Court, the law requires that the responsibility of serving writs of
execution, which involve the taking delivery of money or property in trust for the judgment
creditor, should be carried out by regularly bonded sheriffs or other proper court officers.
(Sections 183 and 330, Revised Administrative Code). The bond required by law of the
sheriff is conditioned inter alia, "for the delivery or payment to the Government, or the
persons entitled thereto, of all the property or sums of money that shall officially come
into his or their (his deputies') hands" (Section 330, idem), and thus avoids the risk of
embezzlement of such properties and moneys.

None of the above contingencies having been shown to be present, respondent Court's
order appointing respondent Garcia as "special sheriff" to serve the writ of execution was
devoid of authority.
7. No civil liability attaches, however, to respondents special sheriff and deputy clerk,
since they acted strictly pursuant to orders issued by respondent judge in the discharge
of her judicial functions as presiding judge of the lower court, and respondent judge's
immunity from civil responsibility covers them, although the said orders are herein
declared null and void. 20
ACCORDINGLY, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted. The respondent
court's questioned Orders of October 14, and 18, 1968, are declared null and void, and
all further proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-7441 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City, Branch IX are abated. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
heretofore issued is made permanent, except as to respondent judge who is excluded
therefrom, without prejudice to any cause of action that private respondents may
have, inter se. Respondent estate and respondent Tomas N. Hashim as prayed for by
respondent Philippine National Bank in its Answer, are ordered jointly and severally to
reimburse said respondent bank in the amount of P209,076.00 with legal interest until
the date of actual reimbursement. Respondents Estate of N. T. Hashim, Philippine
National Bank and Benjamin Corua are ordered jointly to pay treble costs.

Section 185 of the Revised Administrative Code restrictively authorizes the judge of the
Court issuing the process or writ to deputize some suitable person only "when the sheriff
is party to any action or proceeding or is otherwise incompetent to serve process
therein." The only other contingency provided by law is when the office of sheriff is
vacant, and the judge is then authorized, "in case of emergency, (to) make a temporary
appointment to the office of sheriff ... pending the appointment and qualification of the
sheriff in due course; and he may appoint the deputy clerk of the court or other officer in
the government service to act in said capacity." (Section 189, idem).

The Clerk of Court is directed to furnish copies of this decision to the Board of Directors
and to the president of respondent Philippine National Bank for their information and
appropriate action. So ordered.

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