News Criteria

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COMMERCIAL NEWS CRITERIA AND

INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM
Asle Rolland
Published online: 17 Feb 2007.
To cite this article: Asle Rolland (2006) COMMERCIAL NEWS CRITERIA AND INVESTIGATIVE
JOURNALISM, Journalism Studies, 7:6, 940-963, DOI: 10.1080/14616700600980710
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COMMERCIAL NEWS CRITERIA AND

INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM
Downloaded by [University of Volda] at 11:33 19 April 2015
Asle Rolland
Since the 1980s, the commercialisation of the media in Norway has prompted two opposing
theories concerning the impact of commercial news criteria; the first suggests it restrains, the
second that it stimulates, investigative journalism. But the two theories draw the same normative
conclusion, namely that commercialisation has negative implications for the contribution of
media to democracy. This article presents the two theories, and puts their empirical assumptions
to the test, using the distribution of awards for outstanding investigative journalism as a yardstick.
The test results are discussed in the light of economic theory. It seems that critics of media
commercialisation have placed too much emphasis on the cost-cutting aspect of a capitalist
economy, and too little on capitalism as the free-market innovation machine. The conclusion is
that commercial news criteria stimulate investigative journalism more than they restrain it, and
that investigative journalisms contribution to democracy is more positive than negative.
KEYWORDS commercialisation; investigative journalism; journalism awards; media and
democracy; monopoly and competition; news criteria
Introduction
In many countries, among them Norway, the 1980s was the decade when the
Masters of Business Administration (MBAs) began to rule the newsroom (Underwood,
1993). As a result, the news media are undergoing a profound change in the way they
carry out their missions (Stepp, 2000). The new rulers have caused a move away from
reliance on craft norms defining what is newsworthy and how to report, toward a
journalism based on serving the marketplace (McManus, 1995, p. 301). Market concerns
now determinate operation and content (Picard, 2004, p. 54) in all news media, having
been conquered by the MBAs.
In Norway, critics of media commercialisation have been concerned with the
consequences for investigative journalism and democracy. This has resulted in two
theories which make adverse judgements of investigative journalisms value for
democracy. They also make adverse judgements of commercialisations consequences
for investigative journalism. However, from this they draw the same normative conclusion,
that the commercialisation of the media has proved negative for democracy.
Theory I is based on the following logic:
.
.
.
Investigative journalism is positive for democracy.

Media commercialisation has restrained investigative journalism.
Hence media commercialisation has been negative for democracy.
This theory may be attributed to journalism professor Sigurd Allern. It seems to have
its strongest position in the journalist (education) community.
Journalism Studies, Vol. 7, No 6, 2006
ISSN 1461-670X print/1469-9699 online/06/060940-24
2006 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14616700600980710
COMMERCIAL NEWS CRITERIA
Theory II is based on a different logic:
.
.
.
Investigative journalism is negative for democracy.

Media commercialisation has stimulated investigative journalism.
Hence media commercialisation has been negative for democracy.
This theory may be attributed to political science professor yvind sterud, who led
the recently completed grand study of Power and Democracy in Norway (cp. Engelstad
and sterud, 2004). It seems to have its strongest position in the political (science)
community.
The distribution of support for the two theories is perfectly in accord with Public
Choice theory that regardless of where they operate, in the market or elsewhere, actors
pursue their self-interest. The journalism professors theory implies that media commercialisation increases the power of politicians over journalists. Hence journalists and
journalism professors warn against commercialisation of media. The political science
professors theory implies that media commercialisation increases the power of journalists
over politicians. Hence politicians and political scientists warn against media commercialisation. Apparently media commercialisation has the power to unite both journalistic and
political communities. It seems to threaten both, and provides them with a common
enemy. No doubt that explains why the two theories coexist peacefully, with nobody
calling attention to the fact that if one is correct, the other must be wrong.
Investigative reporting is distinctive in that it publicizes information about
wrongdoing that affects the public interest (Waisbord, 2001, p. 1). The media are
institutions for news collection (Lippmann, 1922; Nimmo, 1964; Tunstall, 1971) and news
selection , or gatekeeping (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Gaunt, 1990; White, 1950). Investigating clearly belongs to the first category, reporting to the latter. What actually happened
when the MBAs took control over the newsrooms may therefore, according to the two
theories, be expressed like this:
.
.
Theory I: Media commercialisation led to a relative shift from news collection and
investigating to news selection and reporting.
Theory II: Media commercialisation led to a relative shift from news selection and
reporting to news collection and investigating.
Each theory may have some empirical support, but they cannot both be equally
true. Theory II is false to the extent that Theory I is proven true, and vice versa. The falsified
theory must alter its syllogism. Thus if commercialisation actually restrains investigative
journalism, as Theory I presupposes, Theory II must be altered to Theory III:
.
.
.
Investigative journalism is negative for democracy.

Media commercialisation restrains investigative journalism.
Hence media commercialisation is positive for democracy.
Conversely, if commercialisation stimulates investigative journalism, as Theory II

presupposes, Theory I must be altered to Theory IV:
.
.
.
Investigative journalism is positive for democracy.

Media commercialisation stimulates investigative journalism.
Hence media commercialisation is positive for democracy.
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Whether Theory III and IV are acceptable alternatives depends on the order of goals
and means. Is the goal to improve democracy or is the real but un-stated goal to restrain
commercialisation? The answer determines whether Theories III/IV can be viewed as
relieving or disappointing as expressions of a certain truth.
While the concern for democracy is normative, the empirical issue at stake is
whether media commercialisation restrains or stimulates investigative journalism. This
article attempts to provide an answer.
The Two Theories
Theory I
Commercial news criteria. Allern argues that commercial news criteria invariably
replace investigative journalism with journalistic superficiality and vanity:
Some kinds of potential news stories are left aside, not because they lack relevance, but
because they require digging and journalistic resources: time, staff and money. Budgetconsciousness means that certain kinds of news stories, those that cost little to produce ,
tend to have an easier time making their way into news columns and newscasts. The
traditional news criteria . . . may therefore be supplemented with a set of commercial
news criteria:
.
.
The more resources * time, personnel and budget * it costs to cover, follow up or
expose an event, etc., the less likely it will become a news story.
The more journalistically a news source or sender has prepared a story for publication
(the costs for such treatment being borne by the sender), the greater the likelihood that
it will become news.
The more selectively a news story is distributed, e.g., in a manner that allows a journalist
to present the story as his or her own work, under a personal by-line, the more likely it
will become news.
The more a news mediums strategy is based on arousing sensations to catch public
attention, the greater the likelihood of a media twist, where entertaining elements
count more than criteria like relevance, truth and accuracy. (Allern, 2002; cp. Allern, 2000,
2001)
Allern admits that commercial motives may result in quality journalism, requiring
great editorial resources, but only when journalists aim to satisfy social elites. When not
serving elites, commercial news criteria imply cost reductions in order to increase the
profit.
Market-driven journalism. Allern echoes the work of John H. McManus, who argues
that market-driven journalism (McManus, 1994) is governed by this principle:
The probability of an event/issue becoming news is: Inversely proportional to harm the
information might cause investors or sponsors, and inversely proportional to the cost of
uncovering it, and inversely proportional to the cost of reporting it, and directly

proportional to the expected breadth of appeal of the story to audiences advertisers will
pay to reach. (McManus, 1995, p. 327; cp. McManus, 1992, p. 799; 1994, p. 87)
The market-driven news media objective is supposedly to produce the least

expensive mix of content that protects the interests of sponsors and investors while
garnering the largest audience the advertisers will pay to reach (McManus, 1994, p. 85; cp.
McManus, 1992, p. 799). The most important news is often the most expensive to
discover, because powerful interests want it hidden. Independent, particularly investigative, surveillance of a community is expensive (McManus, 1992, p. 800). Market-driven
media will therefore rather rely on other news organizations than hire adequate staff to
infiltrate the community.
Commercialisation. An echo of Allern and McManus, Robert G. Picard has explored
how commercialism has diminished the importance of public service. According to Picard
it has become increasingly clear that the responses of some newspaper managers to
economic pressures
Are affecting journalistic quality, producing practices that diminish the social value of
newspaper content and that divert the attention of newspaper personnel from
journalism to activities primarily related to the business interests of the press. This
situation has promoted self-interested behaviour aimed at exploiting market potential,
and there is a growing conflict between the role of newspapers as servants of readers
and the exploitation of readers to seek additional commercial gain. (Picard, 2004, p. 54)
As a result,
The primary content of newspapers today is commercialised news and features designed
to appeal to broad audiences, to entertain, to be cost effective and to maintain readers
whose attention can be sold to advertisers. The result is that stories that may offend are
ignored in favour of those more acceptable and entertaining to larger numbers of
readers, that stories that are costly to cover are downplayed or ignored and that stories
creating financial risks are ignored. This leads to homogenisation of newspaper content,
to coverage of safe issues and to a diminution of the range of opinion and ideas
expressed. (Picard, 2004, p. 61)
Theory II
The government-funded study of Power and Democracy in Norway, conducted in
1998 2003, came to the opposite conclusion (NOU, 2003; sterud et al., 2003). Drawing
on Slaatta (2003), the power analysts distinguished between two media orders, the old
that contributed to a viable democracy, and the new that supposedly has contributed to
its decay. The two media orders are summed up in Rolland (2005a) like this:
The old media order.
1.
The media were chained to and mouthpieces for other political institutions. The party press
and the states broadcasting monopoly prevailed. Politicians controlled the political media.
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
The media were loyal to the politicians. The party press knew what happened behind
closed doors, but respected its sources and revealed nothing that could embarrass them.
Its task was to maximize confidence in the politicians of their own party.
The media were rational, factual, and informative. The dominant narrative form of political
journalism was the report, based on craft norms of objectivity and impartiality. The voters
should be enabled to control what the politicians had said and done in the parliament or
local council.
The media were ideology oriented. The party newspapers commented and interpreted the
objective political reports in accordance with party principles. By doing so the
newspapers linked their readers to the long-term ideologies and programmes of their
parties.
The media were non-commercial, and public service was given priority. The media
legitimacy was based on providing a public service. Craft norms protected the public
service principle. Making profit was not an end in itself, but a means for public service
ends.
The media presented politics in accordance with terms set by the parties and politicians.
Reporting implied that the source, not the journalist, was in power. The media were totally
predictable for the politicians, did not threaten political stability nor challenge the agenda
the politicians themselves had set.
The new media order. The new media order emerged in the 1980s to become the
dominant paradigm from the 1990s onwards. Its main features are the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
From political chains to political independence. The media have been emancipated from
their political chains. They have gained independence from the political parties, and
journalism has become professionalized on the medias own terms. The term mouthpiece has become the worst invective in the crafts vocabulary.
From loyalty to exposure of the politicians. Emancipated from the parties the media are free
to strike in all directions. No politicians are above criticism or safe behind closed doors.
Unbound criticism of power has replaced reporting. The superior aim is to expose power
abuse. The party press and the state broadcasting monopoly created confidence in the
politicians; the politically independent media foster mistrust in them.
From rational and factual information to emotional and engaging entertainment. The
weight of the arguments is no longer sufficient; media appeal is also necessary for political
positions. Politicians have become sales products with emotional media determining who
is to be liked.
From ideologies to issues and persons. The media reinforce the de-politication of the party
political struggle, as party programmes do not commit them nor do they pass on a party
view in their reporting. Issues and persons have become more important in politics
because they have become more important in the media. Issues developing in the pace
set by the media news rhythm, a pace the politicians cannot neglect unpunished, overrun
long-term alternatives.
From public service to profit. The media have moved from political to commercial chains.
Profit is the new, the superior media aim, putting editorial freedom under pressure. For the
MBAs a media firm is a business, not a public service institution.
From party to media terms for the presentation of politics. Having been mouthpieces for
other political institutions the media are now themselves the main arena for the political
power game. The new journalism side with the people and expose the power abuse of the
mighty. However, the journalists are also paternalists, defining themselves as the
guardians of the people against the rulers. As a result the media have become an
unpredictable power factor for the political decision makers.
The spiral of cynicism. The study of Power and Democracy echoes the debate
about game framing versus issue framing in political journalism. Under the old order the
media reported political issues. Under the new order they expose that politics is merely a
power game. The effect of game framing is a spiral of cynicism (Capella and Jamieson,
1997), growing distrust in politics and politicians (Stromback, 2000, p. 225). There is an
abundance of evidence that games are replacing issues in political journalism (cp. the
overview in Stromback, 2002, p. 42). In Norway the resulting distrust was documented by
the power and democracy study in Strmsnes (2003).
Horse race journalism, the declaration of winners and losers of political events
defined as contests, does not require much investigation. It rather belongs to the third
feature of the new media order: From rational and factual information to emotional and
engaging entertainment. But politics is obviously also a power game, particularly
strategic in post-modern election campaigns (Aardal et al., 2004; Farrell, 1996; Norris,
1997). When the game itself is the consequential issue for the voters, game framing will be
due to the second feature: From loyalty to exposure of the politicians. It will be
investigative journalism.
Past and Present

Theory II clearly describes an historical development. It is not equally clear that
Theory I does so. Theory I may compare the new media order with a never-existing
theoretical abstract, an ideal where the journalists are effectively governed by a craft
norm to serve the public interest. It is therefore possible that the two theories agree
about the old political order, when the media were not merely performing a public
service, but also a service for the political parties, and when there was a conflict
between serving the public and serving the party, the latter had priority (Rolland, 2005a).
Theory I may even find support in the fifth feature of Theory IIs new media order, that
the media political chains have been replaced with commercial ones. Theory I can
agree that chained media only report; only unchained media also investigate. Hence it is
not contrary to Theory I if the transition from old to new media order has been from
reporting to more reporting.
If so, the theories merely disagree about what happened when the old order was
abolished:
.
.
For Theory II continued emphasis on reporting would have been desirable, but
unfortunately commercialisation has also stimulated investigative journalism.
For Theory I a development from reporting to more investigating would have been
desirable, but unfortunately commercialisation has led to continued emphasis on
reporting.
The implication of that, however, is that the old political media order will not
distinguish between the theories. We must examine the new commercial order.
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The Two Theories Put to the Test
Push and Pull to Commercialise
When media market researcher Sigurd Hst in the 1980s analysed the commercialisation of the Norwegian media, his indicator was the increased editorial use of market
research (Hst, 1986). In the United States, Randal A. Beam has studied how newspapers
use readership research (Beam, 1995) in order to find out what it means to be a marketoriented newspaper (Beam, 1998). Market-driven is a news organization driven by
customer demand :
Typically, a market-driven organization selects target markets for its product, identifies
the wants and needs of potential customers in its target markets, and seeks to satisfy
those wants and needs as efficiently as possible. For a news organization, a strong market
orientation implies that the newspaper, magazine, or television station will aggressively
seek to determine the kinds of information that readers or viewers say they want or need
and will provide it. (Beam, 2003, p. 368)
According to James T. Hamilton (2004, p. 7), commercialisation implies that the five
Ws of the craft norm *who, what, where, when, why *are replaced by a different set of
five Ws, those asked in the market: Who cares about a particular piece of information?
What are they willing to pay to find it, or what are others willing to pay to reach them?
Where can media outlets or advertisers reach these people? When is it profitable to
provide the information? Why is it profitable?
What drives the commercial news organization to serve the market is the profit
motive . It is driven beyond what is necessary to provide reasonable returns to owners, to
support reinvestment that improves newspapers, and to achieve financial strength that
allows some independent choice and action (Picard, 2004, p. 56).
The decision to commercialise a news organization may be the result of threats and
opportunities, push and pull, forced upon the organization from outside (driven by
customer demand), and/or a voluntary change of goal, motivation and strategy (the profit
motive). Thus Picard (2004, pp. 54, 55) explains it as (1) response to pressure from outside
and (2) change of goal, motivation and strategy:
1.
2.
Economic pressures are becoming the primary forces shaping the behaviour of
American newspaper companies, and as this has been the case for two decades
publishers are convinced that newspapers must be managed differently to respond to
the challenges.
As a result, many publishers have adopted a range of strategies that have further
commercialised the industry, making commercial considerations equal to or, in some
cases, more important than editorial quality or social concerns.
The commercial opportunities presumably threatening the public interest are

summed up like this:
The driving forces for these changes were the increasing resources available to
newspapers because of the explosive and progressive growth of advertising after World
War II, the establishment of local newspaper monopolies through the closure of
secondary newspapers, and the growth of large, publicly traded newspaper firms
beginning in the 1970s. (Picard, 2004, p. 56)
Picard echoes among others McManus, who in 1992 noted that while at the
national level, news consumers enjoy unprecedented choice, competition is often
limited and sometimes nonexistent in the local municipalities, the level with the greatest
impact on consumers daily lives (McManus, 1992, p. 791). A similar development has
taken place in Norway. The advertising market has grown tremendously since its take-off
in the mid-1950s (Helgesen, 2004, p. 17), private commercial broadcasting has been
introduced, even the licence-financed, advertising-free state broadcaster NRK now has
some market income from sponsorship, most of the newspaper circulation is controlled by
the three large media concerns. At the national level there is more competition than ever.
At the regional and local levels, however, there is less competition than ever, the dominant
market form being monopoly (Rolland, 2002).
Conditions for Commercial News Criteria

The definition of market-driven journalism as driven by consumer demand, and
commercial journalism as driven by the profit motive, give directions for analysing the
impact of commercial news criteria on investigative journalism. Both theories presuppose
that commercial news criteria now rule the game. However, they disagree as to whether
these criteria restrain or stimulate investigative journalism.
In order to find out which is the true and which is the false theory we must therefore
first identify the conditions where commercial news criteria are most likely to occur.
Thereafter we must examine the occurrence of investigative journalism .
.
.
Theory I is confirmed if there is least investigative journalism under the conditions where
commercial news criteria are most likely to occur.
Theory II is confirmed if there is most investigative journalism under the conditions
where commercial news criteria are most likely to occur.
The definition of market-driven journalism indicates that commercial news criteria

are most likely to occur in competitive markets. Compare with McManus (1994), pp. 4 5),
who lists six market characteristics as particularly important:
.
.
.
.
.
.
Quality and value are defined by consumers, rather than producers or government (the
media must satisfy their customers, not journalists or third parties).
Responsiveness to consumers (sales depend upon customer demand; thereby
customers discipline the producers and drive inferior commodities from the market).
Self-correction (producers must deliver, or change their deliveries according to
customer demand, or new producers will enter and replace them).
Constant motivation to excel (because of competition there is constant pressure to
produce new and improved commodities at stable or lower costs).
Efficient allocation of societys resources (societys scarce resources will be allocated to
those who produce what the consumers value).
Freedom of choice (producers are free to offer products, and consumers are free to
choose between them).
Competition should create an economic pressure that leaves the media with no
choice but to adopt commercial news criteria or face replacement. Competition
947
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constitutes the push that threatens the craft norm by requiring commercialisation as a
defensive measure.
Monopoly markets are not driven by customer demand. Monopoly markets are
supply-driven. Quality and value may be equal to the craft norms of the producers *the
media themselves *or defined by third parties like the government. The producers are
not responsive to the consumers, who are either forced to pay regardless of their
consumption (typically the broadcasting licence fee), or they have the limited choice
between purchasing what is offered and abstaining from consumption altogether. Selfcorrection is prevented by barriers to market entry. There is no competition and therefore
no constant motivation to excel. The allocation of societys resources is inefficient.
Consumers have no freedom of choice and therefore no power, no exit option to
strengthen their voice or punish producers who do not deliver (Hirschman, 1970).
This indicates that the old craft norm of journalism *publish what the producers
consider being in the public interest *is most likely to occur in monopoly markets. There
the producers enjoy the brute force of monopoly (Reith, 1924) and can give their
audiences what they objectively need, not merely what they subjectively want.
From these considerations we may draw the conclusion that if commercial news
criteria restrain investigative journalism (Theory I) there should be less investigative
journalism in competitive than in monopoly media markets. Conversely, if commercial
news criteria stimulate investigative journalism (Theory II) there should be more
investigative journalism in competitive than in monopoly media markets.
The supporters of Theory II would probably accept this as a valid test. However, it is
not likely that the supporters of Theory I would. According to Theory I neither monopoly
nor competitive markets operate properly (McManus, 1994, p. 4). They are both sellers
markets where the buyers, the news consumers, have negligible power.
Monopoly is obviously a sellers market, in which the media are free to exploit their
customers, and as Picard shows, this has resulted in excessive profit rates (Picard, 2004,
p. 56). It is less obvious that competitive markets are. McManus invested great effort into
explaining why. His main argument is that the news media operate in four markets, and
the three markets not directly involving the news buyers *the stock market, the
advertising market, and the source market *are partly alone and certainly together
more important for the news media than the audience market (McManus, 1994, p. 5). To
this he adds the characteristics of news as commodity: it is never a search or
inspection good, rarely an experience good, and mostly a credence good that
must be consumed on faith (McManus, 1992, p. 792). It is supply-driven.
For Picard, the commercial news criteria have emerged due to the changing
business model of newspapers, based on large audiences that are satisfied with
average quality. The result of these developments has been a perceived diminution of
quality and diversity as commercial media emphasize serving broad audiences and
providing content that will not lead to reductions in audiences and advertisers (Picard,
2004, pp. 58, 62, 63). Allern, as we have seen, argues that with commercial news criteria
investigative journalism will only occur among producers going upmarket to serve social
elites.
According to Theory I, then, it seems that commercial news criteria will be most
common when the producers have much and the consumers little freedom of choice.
Hence the commercial criteria will most frequently appear in monopoly markets. In
competitive markets their occurrence depends on whether the producers aim to satisfy
mass audiences or social elites. Mass audiences may not object to investigative journalism,
but nor do they demand it. There is no reason to serve them with more if average quality is
sufficient. Elite audiences, however, demand investigative journalism. This will therefore
most likely appear in markets driven by elite customers.
The two theories have adverse implications for where commercial news criteria most
frequently occurs. According to Theory I they will be most common in monopoly markets.
According to Theory II they will be most common in competitive markets. Theory I will
base its assumption on the pull from the market caused by tempting monopolistic
opportunities. Theory II will base it on the push from the market caused by competitive
pressure.
However, the two theories also contain adverse opinions on the impact of
commercial news criteria on investigative journalism . For that reason a test showing the
occurrence of investigative journalism in monopoly and competitive markets is insufficient
to distinguish between them. They will merely interpret the outcome differently; hence
the test will either prove both to be right, or both to be wrong. Thus if the test shows
there is less investigative journalism in monopoly than competitive markets, this will
accord with Theory I assuming the commercial news criteria are most likely to occur in
monopoly markets *as well as with Theory II assuming the commercial news criteria are
most likely to occur in competitive markets. If, however, the test shows there is more
investigative journalism in monopoly than competitive markets, both theories are equally
wrong: Theory I is disproved because there is most investigative journalism in markets
where commercial news criteria are most common, and Theory II is disproved because
there is least investigative journalism in markets where commercial news criteria are most
common.
Commercial Motivation Indicator

In order to distinguish between the theories, then, it is necessary to supplement
analysis of the market structure (monopoly or competition) with a more direct measure of
the media commercial orientation and motivation. Beam argues that the professional
and market-driven models must be considered ideal types, or rather, the degree to
which an organization is market oriented is a continuous variable, with some organizations
embracing the market model more strongly than others (Beam, 2003, p. 372). Beam
therefore distinguishes between newspapers with strong and weak market orientations, those with strong orientation paying extraordinarily close attention to readers or
viewers desires when making decisions about content (2003, p. 369) and aggressively
seeking to provide what their audiences want (2003, p. 368).
However, this study will divert from Beam when it comes to indicators for
commercial orientation. Beam identified extraordinary commercial aggressiveness by
surveying editors, who were asked to what extent they agreed with 15 statements
indicating market orientation (2003, p. 374). This study will instead use dependence on
market income as an indicator. From this perspective all the Norwegian news media fall in
one of two categories:
1.
2.
News media that are 100 per cent financed by the market.
News media that are partly or predominantly financed by the state.
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It is assumed that the media in category 1 have the strongest motives to

commercialise their news production. They are totally dependent on the market for their
income (push), and the market is their only opportunity for further growth (pull). In
this category we find leading and monopoly newspapers with circulation (above 6000, socalled number two newspapers with circulation) above 80,000, plus advertising-funded
private national, regional, and local broadcasters: nationally state-licensed television (TV2,
TVN, TV3) and radio (P4, Kanal 24), regionally private television, locally private radio (in
addition to the local commercial radio stations there are stations that are owned and
funded by non-profit organisations).
The state-financed media in category 2 *the state-owned broadcaster NRK and
newspapers receiving state press subsidies *are assumed to have weaker motives to
commercialise their news. The push is weaker: market-leading and monopoly newspapers
lose the state subsidy, introduced in 1969, if their circulation exceeds 6000, number two
newspapers lose it if it passes 80,000, or they succeed in becoming market leaders or
monopolies, and sell more than 6000. Even these newspapers may want and need
commercial success, but their pull is rather to limit growth. The former state broadcasting
monopoly, NRK, has been turned into a limited company (1996), and its programmes are
now partly financed by sponsoring and teletext advertising (cp. Syvertsen and Karlsen,
2000). However, the general assembly of the limited company NRK is still the Cabinet
Minister for Culture, the main source of income is still the licence fee, and radio and
television advertising is still banned. The purpose of the limited company was not to
introduce the profit motive, but to enable NRK to supplement the licence fee with income
from commercial subsidiaries, which in turn could increase the amount and quality of the
ordinary programme production. These commercial activities are perfectly in line with
what has been described as the non-commercialism of the old media order, when profit
was not a motive in itself, but recognised as necessary means for ideal (political) ends.
Investigative Journalism Indicator

This study diverts from Beam (2003) not only in the expression of indicators for
commercial orientation, but also in the selection of indicators defining investigative
journalism practice. Beam analysed the content of six papers with strong and six with
weak commercial orientation. This study uses awards for investigative journalism as an
indicator. The Norwegian Foundation for Investigative Journalism (Stiftelsen for en Kritisk
og Underskende Presse, SKUP) is dedicated to the promotion of investigative journalism
in Norway. SKUP was established in 1990, i.e. under the new commercial media order,
and is a non-governmental organisation receiving no funds from governmental institutions. Every year since 1991 SKUP has awarded a prize to last years best investigative
story, as well as diplomas to a number of further stories, for excellence in investigative
reporting (http://www.skup.no/Info_in_English).
Co-financing the prize are the Norwegian associations of journalists and editors. The
prize is prestigious and the competition fierce; SKUP calls it the Norwegian championship
in journalism. The competition is open to all journalists and editors in the Norwegian press,
television, and radio, as well as others using journalistic methods. Participating in the
competition are investigators having submitted their own work with a methodology
report for consideration, or others have proposed them. The present SKUP jury is headed
by a respected journalism college lecturer, and has members from leading media firms.
Using awards as an indicator implies that quality is defined relative to the craft norm.
The alternative is the market-driven quality concept, defining it as the ability to satisfy
the needs and demands of the consumers. From the alternative perspective commercial
success in itself may indicate quality. In this case, however, that would beg the question.
The antagonism against the new media order is motivated exactly by fear that the craft
norm must give way to the market quality concept.
The media firms employing the winners of the SKUP prizes and diplomas are the
units of the present analysis. The total number of awards, 1991 2004, is 93, but four went
to magazines or books. Journalists working in newspapers or broadcasting won the
remaining 89. They are the awards, and the media, that are covered by this study. As no
private radio station or private regional television station ever won an award, these media
are excluded even from the denominator of the analyses. This may imply that the study
overestimates the occurrence of investigative journalism in commercially motivated media
firms, as most private radio stations fall in this category, as well as its occurrence in
monopoly markets, as most private regional television stations fall in that category.
However, the vast majority of the more than 300 stations in these two categories are not
news organizations at all. The national radio stations P4 and Kanal 24 are obliged by their
broadcast licences to produce news, but they merely add two stations to the
denominators of the commercially motivated and competitive firms categories.
Test 1: Market Structure

Test 1 is the distribution of SKUP awards across media operating in monopolistic and
competitive markets. As stated already, this test will either prove both theories to be right,
or both to be wrong, as they have contrary implications for the occurrence of commercial
news criteria but the same implication for the occurrence of investigative journalism.
The classification of the market structure as monopolistic or competitive is not
unproblematic. Hence it may be argued that state-owned, licence-financed broadcaster
NRK and state-licensed but privately owned and advertising-financed TV2 are not
competitors but have a duopoly, where NRK has a monopoly on the licence fee and is
independent of the market (a modest market income merely adds to a politically secured
financial base), while TV2 has a monopoly on nationwide advertising, its commercial
competitors having considerably lower penetration. However, NRK and TV2 certainly
compete in two of the markets identified by McManus, the source market (where
particularly the market for transmission rights also involves their economic strength) and
the audience market. A major argument for breaking the broadcasting monopoly in the
1980s was that NRK needed competition, and NRK immediately answered by introducing
audience market share as a major goal in its strategic steering documents (cp. NRK, 2004).
From the content and audience point of view, which is most relevant for investigative
journalism, NRK and TV2 must therefore be treated as competitors.
Where newspapers are concerned, it may be argued that the monopoly does not
exist (Rolland, 2002), as newspapers either operate on a national or a regional or a local
level, and the vertical competition between newspapers at different levels may substitute
horizontal competition between newspapers at the same level (the umbrella or ring
model; Bridges et al. 2002; Compaine, 1980; Hst, 2000; Lacy and Martin, 2004; Rosse and
Dertouzos, 1978). Particularly for investigative journalism this seems a valid argument, as
what it uncovers at the local level may be of relevance even at the national level, which is
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TABLE 1
SKUP award winners, 1991 2004, in monopoly and competitive markets
Type of media firm
Broadcaster
Newspaper
Total
Monopoly market
Competitive market
Total
0
5
5
21
63
84
21
68
89
rarely the case for local routine reporting. Still a newspaper must decide at what level it
will employ most of its resources. This study therefore adopts a horizontal definition of
market structure, classifying as monopolistic municipalities where one, and as competitive
municipalities where two or more newspapers are published. However, even this
definition has a vertical implication: classified as competitive are even municipalities
with one (daily) newspaper covering the whole town (usually even its surroundings) and
another (weekly) newspaper covering only a part of it (a suburb, for instance), although it
could be argued that each paper has monopoly on its level.
Given these conditions, the distribution of SKUP awards, 1991 2004, across
monopolistic and competitive markets is as shown in Table 1.
Eighty-four of 89 awards, or 94 per cent, went to news organizations operating in
competitive markets. All the awards won by broadcasters, and 63 of 68 awards won by
newspapers, went to firms with horizontal competitors as defined above.
In 1997, 146 of 221 Norwegian newspapers (dailies and non-dailies) were
monopolies (NOU, 2000, p. 38, Table 4.6). The remaining 75 newspapers were published
in 24 competitive markets, i.e. an average of three newspapers per competitive market.
Using 1997 as a frame of reference for 1991 2004:
.
.
.
The average monopoly newspaper won 0.03 SKUP awards.

The average competitive newspaper won 0.8 awards.
The average competitive newspaper won 27 times as many awards as did the average
newspaper monopoly.
The distribution of SKUP awards overwhelmingly supports previous research

showing that as newspaper competition increases, the likelihood of producing quality
journalism *as measured by winning Pulitzer Prizes *also increases (White and
Andsager, 1990, p. 912, cp. the financial commitment theory, e.g. Lacy and Blanchard,
2003; Lacy and Martin, 2004).
Table 1 confirms both Theory I and Theory II. There is a reduction in investigative
journalism in monopoly markets due to the pressure of commercial news criteria, as
outlined in Theory I. Theory II is confirmed due to a reduction in investigative journalism
practice even in the apparent absence of commercial criteria. However, the two theories
are not equally confirmed. Theory I personifies the concept of monopoly as a greedy
institution expected to utilize to the utmost this ability to exploit the consumer and to
maximize profits by restricting production (Hirschman, 1970, p. 57). The typical
Norwegian monopoly newspaper is a medium-sized or small firm, operating in a
medium-sized or small market, often with a very weak economy (NOU, 2000, p. 139),
many of them entitled to state press subsidy and depending on it for their survival.
Currently, the small non-dailies are the only ones with success in an otherwise falling
newspaper market (Hst, 2005), but they are very far from the image we have of the
greedy and ruthless monopolist. Closer to that image is Adresseavisen , Norways sixth
largest newspaper (85,000), published in the fourth largest market, Trondheim, with a
population of 145,000. The concentration of ownership in that market is so great that the
Power and Democracy study declared it a disaster area for media pluralism (stbye,
2000). Still Adresseavisen is one of many larger newspapers with falling circulation,
currently down to 91 per cent of the peak year 1997 (Hst, 2005, p. 5, Table A). Is
Adresseavisen therefore exploiting its monopoly and restraining its activities to news
selection and reporting in order to consolidate the situation? Adresseavisen won two of
the five SKUP awards that went to monopoly papers, in 2003 and 2004.
These conditions taken into consideration, Test 1 does not support the presupposition of Theory I that Norwegian media monopolies exploit their consumers by using
commercial news criteria that promote news selection and reporting, and restrain
news collection and investigating. The typical Norwegian monopoly is a small firm
without resources to investigate (in their small and transparent markets there may not be
much worth investigating either), and larger monopolies, having the resources, apparently
do investigate. Furthermore, although ad hoc explanations may be offered for the lack of
investigation in monopolistic markets, the large number of awards being won by media in
competitive markets is in itself sufficient to indicate the impact of a functioning capitalist
economy upon journalism. Competitive markets are basic to capitalist economy; the
monopoly being either a political construct, or the unwanted result of mergers and
acquisitions, or competitive success, to be counteracted by political interference. Test 1
therefore shows that when the media operate in functioning markets, the result is
investigative journalism (which may surprise Allern, former editor-in-chief of the newspaper Klassekampen or The Class Struggle). Altogether therefore Test 1 supports Theory II
more than it supports Theory I.
Test 2: Commercial Motivation

Media with weak and strong commercial motivation may be present in both
monopoly and competitive markets. The distribution of SKUP awards across levels of
commercial motivation is shown in Table 2.
Sixty-six of 89 awards, or 74 per cent, went to media firms with strong commercial
motivation. Decisive for this, however, is the distribution of prizes won by newspapers.
Sixty of 68 awards (88 per cent) here went to newspapers receiving no production subsidy
from the state. Broadcasting, however, had the opposite distribution. State broadcaster
NRK won 2.5 times more prizes than commercial TV2.
The distribution among broadcasters apparently supports Theory I; in particular the
point made by McManus that market-driven media will produce the least expensive mix of
content that garners the largest audience advertisers will pay to reach. TV2 depends on
TABLE 2
SKUP award winners, 1991 2004, with weak and strong commercial motivation
Type of media firm
Broadcaster
Newspaper
Total
Weak
Strong
Total
15
8
23
6
60
66
21
68
89
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advertisers for their economy; hence they may be careful not to offend advertisers by
investigating their actions. However, TV2 depends also on the state, and that even more
decisively, as the state may withdraw its licence to broadcast at any time it is up for
renewal. The state has also shown itself able and willing to do so: when the national
commercial radio channel P4s licence ran out in 2003, the state refused to renew it and
gave it to a new applicant, Kanal 24, entering the competition with a concept tailor-made
to satisfy the political authorities, P4s main argument for renewal being they had proven
to satisfy the listeners. Although P4 was saved by a new radio licence, with less than
national coverage but sufficient to maintain its position as the listeners absolute favourite
of the two, this experience may have confirmed an impression at TV2 that investigating
the state may not be wise either. With double dependency TV2 should be reluctant to
investigate both kinds of societal powers, the private and economic as well as the public
and political. If so, NRK has greater freedom of action. Firstly, without advertising income
and protected by the licence fee NRK is free to investigate all private and economic
powers. Secondly, NRK has no licence to renew but law protects its existence. It therefore
appears easier for the state to punish TV2 than its own broadcasting company.
Given these dependencies, however, it is more impressive that TV2 has won six SKUP
awards, than that NRK has won 15 awards. NRK is also by far the largest company of the
two (Harrie, 2003). While TV2 basically is a television channel (the TV2 Group owns a lot
more, but of little relevance here) with a turnover of t208 million in 2002, NRK with a
turnover of 451 million operates two nationwide television channels, three nationwide
radio channels, six digital radio channels (one of them exclusively devoted to news), and
16 regional stations producing both radio and television, some of them incidentally
winning SKUP awards. If we disregard the six experimental digital channels, the number of
SKUP awards per channel or station was six for TV2 (1 channel) and 0.7 for NRK (21
channels and stations). Counted like this, even the distribution of awards won by
broadcasters supports Theory II.
However, while this recalculation of the awards to broadcasters uncovers support to
Theory II, it may be argued that the distribution of awards to newspapers conceals support
to Theory I. Using the state press subsidy to distinguish between the categories implies a
strong correlation between levels of commercial motivation and resources for investigative journalism: newspapers with weak motivation are more likely to lack the resources,
newspapers with strong motivation are more likely to have them. However, the state
subsidy itself may compensate for this. On the other hand, dependency on state subsidies
may have the same effect on the willingness to risk investigating the state, as was
suggested for TV2. However, being economically secured by the state should reduce the
risk of investigating the advertisers, and the subsidised newspapers have considerably less
advertising income to lose, which incidentally was the main reason for the introduction of
the state press subsidy. Furthermore, few of the subsidised papers *mainly those in the
capital or operating at the national level *have reasons for investigating the state. Most of
them are number two or monopoly papers in medium-sized and small local markets,
where the local authorities are the public powers to be examined. Even relative to the local
authorities state support may be an advantage. Access to state support should therefore
give these newspapers some independence of local authorities as well as of local
advertisers, enable them to avoid capture by local powers leading to the treason of the
press (Furhoff, 1963). In short, it should reduce the risk of local investigative journalism.
Despite the objections it is therefore reasonable to maintain the conclusion that can
be drawn directly from Table 2, that newspapers with strong commercial motivation are
much more likely to conduct investigative journalism than newspapers with weak
commercial motivation. This is further sustained when we take the number of newspapers
in each category into consideration. In 1999, 128 newspapers received state production
subsidies, 95 did not. Using that year as a frame of reference:
.
.
.
The average newspaper with a weak commercial motivation won 0.06 SKUP awards.
The average newspaper with a strong commercial motivation won 0.68 SKUP awards.
The average newspaper with a strong commercial motivation won 11 times as many
awards as did the average newspaper with a weak commercial motivation.
This supports the findings of Beam (2003). His hypothesis was that newspapers
with a relatively strong market orientation should place less emphasis on investigative
journalism (often a form of public-affairs content) than newspapers with a relatively weak
market orientation (Beam, 2003, p. 373), cp. Theory I. The hypothesis was not confirmed:
newspapers with strong market orientation had four times as many items of special
reports, investigations on their main display pages, and 2.4 times as many special
reports, investigations on page 1 only. The papers with strong market orientation also
had twice as many news analyses on their main display pages, where they also offered 1.7
times as much advice to their readers (Beam, 2003, p. 379, Table 3 recalculated). Beam
argues that both types of paper had very little of this, hence the figures are so small that
it would be hazardous to make much of these differences (2003, p. 379). However, in
Table 4 on p. 380 he offers a statistically significant difference between large papers:
recalculated it shows that large papers with strong market orientation had 5.3 times as
many special reports, investigations on their main display pages than large papers with
weak market orientation.
Beam must therefore draw the conclusion that
Contrary to expectations, the market-driven newsrooms seemed somewhat more
inclined to produce the most expensive content that newspapers create: special reports
or investigations . . . This study provides no evidence that market-driven news organizations are more likely to steer clear of this kind of expensive journalism. In fact, the
discussion of professional control earlier in the article does not suggest that marketdriven journalism is necessarily cheap journalism, though critics often equate the two.
(Beam, 2003, p. 382)
Details of the top five recipients of SKUP awards for investigative journalism in
Norway, 1991 2004, are shown in Table 3.
Together the top five won 65 or 73 per cent of the 89 SKUP awards that went to
media firms. Only one of the top five (NRK) had a weak commercial motivation. Fifty or 77
per cent of the awards won by the top five firms went to the four firms with a strong
commercial motivation. If we compare state-owned NRK with its main competitor in the
audience market, the private and commercial Schibsted Group, we see that NRK with 21
nationwide or regional outlets won 15 awards. Schibsted owns shares of numerous
Norwegian (and foreign) media firms, but restricted to the three 100 per cent-owned
newspapers Schibsted won 32 awards. The average number of awards per media outlet
was thus 0.7 for NRK and 10.7 for Schibsted.
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TABLE 3
Top five recipients of SKUP awards for investigative journalism, 1991 2004
Awards
Media type
Name
21
Newspaper
VG
Competitive
Strong
15
Broadcaster
NRK
Competitive
Weak
12
Newspaper
Dagens
Competitive
Nringsliv
Strong
11
Newspaper Aftenposten Competitive
Strong
Broadcaster
Strong
TV2
Market
structure
Competitive
Commercial
motivation
Comment
Norways largest newspaper,
peak circulation 390,000
(2002), tabloid, financed
primarily by selling single
copies to the readers, owned
by Norways largest and
Scandinavias fourth largest
media company, Schibsted
Norways largest broadcaster,
21 (27) channels and stations,
state owned, primarily
financed by licence fee
Norways largest financial
newspaper, current circulation
70,000
Norways leading subscription
newspaper, separate morning
and afternoon editions, current
circulation 250,000 (morning,
peak 1998) and 150,000
(evening, peak 1993),
primarily advertising funded,
owned by Schibsted
Time-limited monopoly on
nationwide commercial
television, advertising funded,
partly owned by Schibsted
Concluding Discussion
Any use of indicators involves uncertainty. For instance, how representative are the
six newspapers studied by Beam (2003) for newspapers with strong/weak commercial
orientation? How representative are the analysed issues of the six newspapers? Obviously
awards, too, involve uncertainty. The SKUP jury has not the universe of investigative
journalism at its disposal, nor does it select a representative sample for evaluation. Its
sample is rather based on self-selection. Lacking resources, even news organizations
favourable to investigative journalism may be reluctant to allow their journalists entry into
competitions (they have resources for the investigation, not for the methodology report
afterwards). Thus David C. Coulson found that most newspapers had policies, usually
informal, that encouraged prize seeking . . . Lack of policy was most prevalent among the
smallest papers. An explanation of this difference is that large newspapers have the staff
and resources to devote to seeking prizes. By contrast, small daily staffs often are stretched
too thin for the papers to be as concerned about awards competitions (Coulson, 1989, p.
146). Not surprisingly therefore, 173 of the Pulitzer Prizes between 1990 and 2002 were
won by metropolitan dailies, 12 by medium-size newspapers and seven by small
newspapers, while 106 Polk awards between 1990 and 2002 went to metropolitan dailies,
six to medium-size papers and four to small dailies (Bogart, 2004, p. 50).
Here it must be underlined that resource differences merely create uncertainty to

the extent that they influence the decision to enter the competition. Resource differences
obviously makes an impact on the ability to conduct investigative journalism, too, but this
is hardly an argument against the use of awards as an indicator. Investigative journalism
requires greater resources almost by definition; hence prize-winning news stories use
more sources, more research techniques and contain more information than does ordinary
reporting (Hansen, 1990, 1991). The issue at stake is not which media firms have the
greatest resources to investigate. Most likely the commercially oriented news media are
the wealthiest, as they give profit the highest priority. The issue at stake is whether they
abstain from using their resources, which they prefer to spend on dividends to the owners
(Theory I), or they spend it on investigative journalism in order to further increase their
profit (Theory II, which at this point must coincide with the financial commitment theory
as well as the influence model of media business; cp. Lacy, 1992, 2000; Litman and Bridges,
1986; Meyer, 2004; Rosenstiel and Mitchell, 2004).
McManus, too, is sceptical about journalism prizes as indicators of quality, and
maintains that awards reflect single instances of quality by a reporter rather than
consistent performance by a news department (McManus, 1995, p. 319; cp. McManus,
1992, p. 793). True, but the more prizes won by different journalists from the same news
organization, the more likely is it that it provides a good environment for investigative
journalism.
It may also be objected that since there is an element of news selection even in
investigative journalism *the selection of issues for investigation *commercialisation
may influence this selection in a way that makes the investigations irrelevant for
democracy. There may be power abuse and other scandals of public interest in other
parts of society too, e.g. in the market and commercial companies, civil society and
voluntary associations, and commercially oriented media may be more inclined to
investigate improprieties in these spheres than in politics and government. SKUP awards
are made for journalistic methodology, not journalisms contribution to democracy.
James T. Hamilton (2004, p. 10ff.) may be interpreted to argue along those lines.
Drawing on Anthony Downs (1957), he maintains that the market caters well for three of
the four reasons why people desire information *i.e. for consumption, production, and
entertainment *as the supply of such information is based on expressed consumer
demands. Hence it may be argued that in these three information markets commercially
oriented media will respond adequately even to the demand for investigative journalism.
However, the market caters not so well for the fourth reason identified by Downs, that of
being able to function as a democratic citizen. Hamilton repeats Downs well-known
argument why it is rational for citizens to stay politically ignorant (the impact of their vote
on the outcome of elections is infinitesimal), and rational ignorance among the
consumers generates rational omissions among reporters. The result may be less than
optimal amounts and types of public affairs coverage (2004, p. 12). We may add:
commercially oriented media may supply less than optimal amounts of investigative
journalism on public affairs.
However, Hamilton also argues that being able to cast a rational vote is merely one
of several reasons for seeking politically relevant information: for some individuals
knowledge about politics is inherently interesting, and a third demand for political
coverage lies in the human elements of drama embedded in political races (2004, p. 12).
Therefore commercially oriented media will supply hard news information *like the
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results of political investigations *to the extent that this is desired by consumers who pay
sufficiently for such information or are interesting target groups for advertisers (2004,
p. 19).
Content analysis of the SKUP awards, for instance like Moore and Lambs (2005)
examination of the Pulitzer Prizes, will provide an answer as to whether hard news of
democratic relevance is likely to be under-represented and soft news over-represented
in the investigations of commercially oriented media. Such analysis has not been carried
out for this study. A simple classification of the awards won by the two top recipients, the
newspaper VG (21 awards) with strong and the broadcaster NRK (15 awards) with weak
commercial motivation, indicates however that about 30 of their total 36 awards were won
by stories relevant to democracy (the stories involved criticism of public authorities, public
service provision or political parties). There was no indication that commercial VG was less
inclined to criticise public authorities than non-commercial NRK, but then it must also be
taken into consideration that NRK is 100 per cent owned by public authorities. Apparently
confirming that commercially motivated media are less likely to serve democracy was,
however, number three on the all-time SKUP ranking, Dagens Nringsliv (DN ). At least
eight of the newspapers 12 awards are for stories presumably of negligible political
importance. Yet these awards were not for investigations that may be classified as soft
news. The typical DN award was for exposure of scandals in business and the market.
Business-owned DN being tough on business is perhaps not advantageous for the paper
in the advertising market, but it must build credibility in its target market of readers who
are also investors.
Altogether therefore Test 1 and Test 2 overwhelmingly support Theory II. The
distribution of SKUP awards clearly indicates that competitive markets, functioning as
intended, encourage news collection and investigation much more than does nonfunctioning (monopolistic) markets and dependency on the state. Commercial news
criteria do not restrain journalism to inexpensive news selection and reporting , as
presupposed by Theory I.
For the adherents of Theory II, the politicians and political scientists, this suggests
that competitive media markets, and media depending on those markets for their survival,
are negative for democracy. The market then releases commercial news criteria that
stimulate news collection and investigative journalism, which undermines respect for and
confidence in political institutions and authorities.
For the adherents of Theory I, however, journalists and journalism professors, the
findings suggest that competitive media markets, and media depending on them for
survival, are positive for democracy. The market then releases commercial news criteria
that stimulate news collection and investigative journalism, which serves both voters, and
democracy. The distribution of SKUP awards therefore indicates that Theory I should be
altered to Theory IV: (1) investigative journalism is positive for democracy; (2)
commercialisation of the media stimulates investigative journalism; (3) hence commercialisation of the media is positive for democracy.
However, although they clearly support Theory II the most, Tests 1 and 2 may also
give some support to Theory I. Theory II is supported provided that the market functions,
but particularly McManus and Picard are concerned that the news market does not
function. Coinciding with the switch to commercial news criteria is the concentration of
news control: the formation of chains, the disappearance of local competition. Norwegian
monopolies have rarely won SKUP awards. Even the two diplomas won by monopoly
paper Adresseavisen may be the result of market pressure: the demand for Adresseavisen is
decreasing and the newspaper must do something. Would Adresseavisen investigate if
circulation were increasing? It is also conspicuous that the tabloid VG won 21 and
Aftenposten only 11 of Schibsteds awards, and that NRK won 15 and TV2 only six of the
awards that went to broadcasters. About 75 per cent of VG s income comes from selling
single copies to the consumers, more than 60 per cent of Aftenposten s income is from
advertising. NRK is licence funded, TV2 advertising funded. McManus and Picard argue
that selling consumers to the advertisers is a major reason for the media not to invest in
investigative journalism, and the distribution of awards to advertising versus consumerfunded outlets seems to confirm this.
A further argument is that commercial and downmarket VG may have invested
heavily in investigative journalism merely in order to win readers from its smaller but more
upmarket tabloid competitor Dagbladet , once virtually the only Norwegian newspaper
to investigate (Rolland, 2005b). However, competitive and market-driven VG may also
have considered itself compelled to go upmarket in order to meet increasing audience
demand. Then the market development since the MBAs entered the newsroom has not
been as presupposed by Theory I. For instance Picard, as we have seen, argues that while
the early business model was based upon small audiences that represented the
politically, socially and economically active members of the community . . . the primary
content of newspapers today is commercialised news and features designed to appeal to
broad audiences, to entertain, to be cost effective and to maintain readers whose
attention can be sold to advertisers (Picard, 2004, pp. 58, 61). This may correctly describe
the newspaper markets development across the last two centuries, but it does not
describe its development for the last two decades: in Norway the share of the population
with a university degree almost doubled between 1983 and 2003, from 12.2 to 23.5 per
cent (SSB, 2004). Coinciding with the switch to commercial news criteria is therefore also a
fundamental market change: the market itself is going upmarket. Another argument
against Theory I is that conservative auntie Aftenposten , Norways largest marketplace,
according to polls is the absolute favourite of the radical Norwegian journalists (polls
indicate that about 70 per cent of them vote for socialist parties): 33 per cent consider
advertising-funded Aftenposten their most important medium; only 10 per cent have
consumer-funded VG in that position.
It was stated at the outset that the interest conflict between journalists and
politicians seems to explain the normative difference between Theory I and II (whether
investigative journalism is good or bad for democracy). It remains to explain the empirical
difference, why commercial news criteria are supposed to restrain investigative journalism
according to Theory I and to stimulate it according to Theory II. It may be found in the
economist William J. Baumols book The Free-market Innovation Machine: analyzing the
growth miracle of capitalism (2002). Here Baumol maintains that analysts have paid too
little attention to the innovative and qualitative side of capitalism, and too much attention
to the price variable. Prices and directly related variables are still at the heart of
microeconomics, while the theory of innovation remains in the outskirts (2002, p. 7).
Baumol therefore wants to reinstall The Free-market Innovation Machine as the foremost
feature of capitalist economy. What separates capitalism from other economies is not costsaving efficiency, but innovation leading to continuous improvement and growth.
It seems that Underwood, McManus and Allern are among those having paid too
much attention to the price variable. They take for granted that the MBAs ruling the
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newsroom will only be concerned with bringing costs down, and overlook that the MBAs
may be equally concerned with bringing the quality up (which however has captured the
attention of the financial commitment theory, assuming that as newsroom budgets
increase, there is also an increase in quality, audience utility, and market performance).
What costs are concerned, they have assumed that the MBAs will only be interested in the
immediate bottom-line, and neglect the cost in diminished reader loyalty and reduced
cohort replacement due to quality deterioration (Kim and Meyer, 2005).
News quality, in the economic self-interests of commercial media as well as their
advertisers, is being able to provide unique information that attracts the interests of
consumers of the news. Monopolies invariably deliver unique information; hence it is
sufficient for them to select and report what is already known to other news organizations,
but not to the monopolys consumers. Competitive news organizations, however, must
ensure uniqueness by collecting information and investigating matters themselves. The
news will stay unique until the next deadline, when a competitor wanting a share of the
profit it creates, copies it. Innovation and copying is the capitalist mode of production.
However, the competitor, too, must investigate in order to add value that attracts
attention. Even the imitator must innovate. Obviously originators know the news may be
copied; hence they, too, will conduct new investigations before the next deadline. Or the
competitor decides not to copy, and counterattacks by innovative product differentiation
(Porter, 1980), giving the consumers the choice between different news agendas.
This, however, makes it difficult to follow Theory II when it claims that investigative
journalism is negative for democracy. It seems rather that investigative reporting is one of
the most important contributions that the press makes to democracy (Waisbord, 2001, p.
2). Investigative journalism performs a service for the monitorial citizen (Schudson,
1998), not necessarily deferential, nor partisan or even informed, as citizens
previously were supposed to be, but monitoring the society sufficiently to detect major
threats towards themselves and their surroundings. Apparently the commercialised
American media system performs satisfactorily: The quantity and quality of news that
various media venues supply collectively is adequate for citizenship needs (Graber, 2004,
p. 563). The new commercial media order in Norway also passes the test. Analyses of the
parliamentary election in 2001 (Aardal et al., 2004) indicated this, and so does the present
study of the distribution of SKUP awards for investigative journalism.
REFERENCES
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COMMERCIAL NEWS CRITERIA AND

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COMMERCIAL NEWS CRITERIA AND

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Investigative journalism is positive for democracy.

COMMERCIAL NEWS CRITERIA

Theory II is based on a different logic:

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Investigative journalism is negative for democracy.

Investigative journalism is negative for democracy.

Conversely, if commercialisation stimulates investigative journalism, as Theory II

Investigative journalism is positive for democracy.

The Two Theories

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COMMERCIAL NEWS CRITERIA

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The market-driven news media objective is supposedly to produce the least

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COMMERCIAL NEWS CRITERIA

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Past and Present

The Two Theories Put to the Test

Push and Pull to Commercialise

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The commercial opportunities presumably threatening the public interest are

COMMERCIAL NEWS CRITERIA

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Conditions for Commercial News Criteria

The definition of market-driven journalism indicates that commercial news criteria

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COMMERCIAL NEWS CRITERIA

Commercial Motivation Indicator

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It is assumed that the media in category 1 have the strongest motives to

Investigative Journalism Indicator

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COMMERCIAL NEWS CRITERIA

Test 1: Market Structure

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The average monopoly newspaper won 0.03 SKUP awards.

The distribution of SKUP awards overwhelmingly supports previous research

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COMMERCIAL NEWS CRITERIA

Test 2: Commercial Motivation

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COMMERCIAL NEWS CRITERIA

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Newspaper Aftenposten Competitive

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COMMERCIAL NEWS CRITERIA

Here it must be underlined that resource differences merely create uncertainty to

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COMMERCIAL NEWS CRITERIA

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COMMERCIAL NEWS CRITERIA

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COMMERCIAL NEWS CRITERIA

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