Labor Standards Cases

ARCO METAL PRODUCTS, CO., G.R. No.
170734
INC., and MRS. SALVADOR UY,
Petitioners,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
TINGA,
VELASCO, and
BRION, JJ.
- versus -
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA

SA ARCO METAL-NAFLU (SAMARMNAFLU),
Respondent.
Promulgated:
May 14, 2008
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This
treats
of
the
Petition
for
Review [1] of
the
Resolution[2] and
Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals dated 9 December 2005 and 29 September 2005,
respectively in CA-G.R. SP No. 85089 entitled
Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Arco Metal-NAFLU (SAMARM-NAFLU) v. Arco Metal

Products Co., Inc. and/or Mr. Salvador Uy/Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Apron M.
Mangabat,[4] which ruled that the 13th month pay, vacation leave and sick leave conversion
to cash shall be paid in full to the employees of petitioner regardless of the actual service
they rendered within a year.
Petitioner is a company engaged in the manufacture of metal products, whereas

respondent is the labor union of petitioners rank and file employees. Sometime in
December 2003, petitioner paid the 13 th month pay, bonus, and leave encashment of three
union members in amounts proportional to the service they actually rendered in a year,
which is less than a full twelve (12) months. The employees were:
1. Rante Lamadrid
2. Alberto Gamban
3. Rodelio Collantes
Sickness
27 August 2003 to 27 February 2004
Suspension 10 June 2003 to 1 July 2003
Sickness
August 2003 to February 2004
Respondent protested the prorated scheme, claiming that on several occasions

petitioner did not prorate the payment of the same benefits to seven (7) employees who
had not served for the full 12 months. The payments were made in 1992, 1993, 1994,
1996, 1999, 2003, and 2004. According to respondent, the prorated payment violates the
rule against diminution of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code. Thus, they filed a
complaint before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The parties
submitted the case for voluntary arbitration.
The voluntary arbitrator, Apron M. Mangabat, ruled in favor of petitioner and found
that the giving of the contested benefits in full, irrespective of the actual service rendered
within one year has not ripened into a practice. He noted the affidavit of Joselito Baingan,
manufacturing group head of petitioner, which states that the giving in full of the benefit
was a mere error. He also interpreted the phrase for each year of service found in the
pertinent CBA provisions to mean that an employee must have rendered one year of service
in order to be entitled to the full benefits provided in the CBA. [5]
Unsatisfied, respondent filed a Petition for Review [6] under Rule 43 before the Court of
Appeals, imputing serious error to Mangabats conclusion. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the CBA did not intend to foreclose the application of prorated payments of leave benefits to
covered employees. The appellate court found that petitioner, however, had an existing
voluntary practice of paying the aforesaid benefits in full to its employees, thereby rejecting
the claim that petitioner erred in paying full benefits to its seven
employees. The appellate court noted that aside from the affidavit of petitioners officer, it
has not presented any evidence in support of its position that it has no voluntary practice of
granting the contested benefits in full and without regard to the service actually rendered
within the year. It also questioned why it took petitioner eleven (11) years before it was able
to discover the alleged error. The dispositive portion of the courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the
instant
petition
is
hereby GRANTED and the Decision of Accredited Voluntary Arbiter Apron M.
Mangabat in NCMB-NCR Case No. PM-12-345-03, dated June 18, 2004 is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that the 13th month pay, bonus,
vacation leave and sick leave conversions to cash shall be paid to the
employees in full, irrespective of the actual service rendered within a year. [7]
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the decision but its motion was denied,
hence this petition.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the grant of
13th month pay, bonus, and leave encashment in full regardless of actual service rendered
constitutes voluntary employer practice and, consequently, the prorated payment of the said
benefits does not constitute diminution of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code. [8]
The petition ultimately fails.

First, we determine whether the intent of the CBA provisions is to grant full benefits
regardless of service actually rendered by an employee to the company. According to
petitioner, there is a one-year cutof in the entitlement to the benefits provided in the CBA
which is evident from the wording of its pertinent provisions as well as of the existing law.
We agree with petitioner on the first issue. The applicable CBA provisions read:
ARTICLE XIV-VACATION LEAVE
Section 1. Employees/workers covered by this agreement who have
rendered at least one (1) year of service shall be entitled to sixteen (16) days
vacation leave with pay for each year of service. Unused leaves shall not be
cumulative but shall be converted into its cash equivalent and shall become
due and payable every 1st Saturday of December of each year.
However, if the 1st Saturday of December falls in December 1,
November 30 (Friday) being a holiday, the management will give the cash
conversion of leaves in November 29.
Section 2. In case of resignation or retirement of an employee, his
vacation leave shall be paid proportionately to his days of service rendered
during the year.
ARTICLE XV-SICK LEAVE
rendered at least one (1) year of service shall be entitled to sixteen (16) days
of sick leave with pay for each year of service. Unused sick leave shall not
be cumulative but shall be converted into its cash equivalent and shall become
due and payable every 1st Saturday of December of each year.
Section 2. Sick Leave will only be granted to actual sickness duly

certified by the Company physician or by a licensed physician.
Section 3. All commutable earned leaves will be paid proportionately
upon retirement or separation.
ARTICLE XVI EMERGENCY LEAVE, ETC.
Section 1. The Company shall grant six (6) days emergency leave to
employees covered by this agreement and if unused shall be converted into
cash and become due and payable on the 1st Saturday of December each year.
rendered at least one (1) year of service shall be entitled to seven (7) days of
Paternity Leave with pay in case the married employees legitimate spouse
gave birth. Said benefit shall be non-cumulative and non-commutative and
shall be deemed in compliance with the law on the same.
Section 3. Maternity leaves for married female employees shall be in
accordance with the SSS Law plus a cash grant of P1,500.00 per month.
xxx
ARTICLE XVIII- 13TH MONTH PAY & BONUS
Section 1. The Company shall grant 13th Month Pay to all employees
covered by this agreement. The basis of computing such pay shall be the basic
salary per day of the employee multiplied by 30 and shall become due and
payable every 1st Saturday of December.
Section 2. The Company shall grant a bonus to all employees as
practiced which shall be distributed on the 2nd Saturday of December.
Section 3. That the Company further grants the amount of Two

Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P2,500.00) as signing bonus plus a free CBA
Booklet.[9] (Underscoring ours)
There is no doubt that in order to be entitled to the full monetization of sixteen (16)
days of vacation and sick leave, one must have rendered at least one year of service. The
clear wording of the provisions does not allow any other interpretation. Anent the
13th month pay and bonus, we agree with the findings of Mangabat that the CBA provisions
did not give any meaning diferent from that given by the law, thus it should be computed
at 1/12 of the total compensation which an employee receives for the whole calendar
year. The bonus is also equivalent to the amount of the 13 th month pay given, or in
proportion to the actual service rendered by an employee within the year.
On the second issue, however, petitioner founders.
As a general rule, in petitions for review under Rule 45, the Court, not being a trier
of facts, does not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court. [10] The rule, however, admits of
several exceptions, one of which is when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
that of the lower tribunals. Such is the case here, as the factual conclusions of the Court of
Appeals difer from that of the voluntary arbitrator.
Petitioner granted, in several instances, full benefits to employees who have not
served a full year, thus:
Name
1. Percival Bernas
2. Cezar Montero
3. Wilson Sayod
Reason
Sickness
Sickness
Sickness
Duration
July 1992 to November 1992
21 Dec. 1992 to February 1993
May 1994 to July 1994
4.
5.
6.
7.
Nomer Becina
Ronnie Licuan
Guilbert Villaruel
Melandro Moque
Suspension 1 Sept. 1996 to 5 Oct. 1996

Sickness
8 Nov. 1999 to 9 Dec. 1999
Sickness
23 Aug. 2002 to 4 Feb. 2003
Sickness
29 Aug. 2003 to 30 Sept. 2003[11]
Petitioner claims that its full payment of benefits regardless of the length of service
to the company does not constitute voluntary employer practice. It points out that the
payments had been erroneously made and they occurred in isolated cases in the years
1992, 1993, 1994, 1999, 2002 and 2003. According to petitioner, it was only in 2003 that
the accounting department discovered the error when there were already three (3)
employees involved with prolonged absences and the error was corrected by implementing
the pro-rata payment of benefits pursuant to law and their existing CBA. [12] It adds that the
seven earlier cases of full payment of benefits went unnoticed considering the proportion
of one employee
concerned (per year) vis vis the 170 employees of the company. Petitioner describes the
situation as a clear oversight which should not be taken against it. [13]To further bolster its
case, petitioner argues that for a grant of a benefit to be considered a practice, it should
have been practiced over a long period of time and must be shown to be consistent,
deliberate and intentional, which is not what happened in this case. Petitioner tries to make
a case out of the fact that the CBA has not been modified to incorporate the giving of full
benefits regardless of the length of service, proof that the grant has not ripened into
company practice.
We disagree.
Any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by employees cannot be reduced,
diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer. [14] The principle of non-diminution
of benefits is founded on the Constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare,[15] and to aford labor full protection.[16] Said mandate in turn is the
basis of Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be
rendered in favor of labor. Jurisprudence is replete with cases which recognize the right of
employees to benefits which were voluntarily given by the employer and which ripened into
company practice. Thus in Davao Fruits Corporation v.
[17]
Associated Labor Unions, et al.
where an employer had freely and continuously included in the computation of the
13th month pay those items that were expressly excluded by the law, we held that the act
which was favorable to the employees though not conforming to law had thus ripened into a
practice
and
could
not be
withdrawn,
reduced,
diminished,
discontinued
or
eliminated. In Sevilla Trading Company v. Semana,[18] we ruled that the employers act of
including non-basic benefits in the computation of the 13 th month pay was a voluntary act
and
had
ripened
into
company
practice
which
cannot
be
peremptorily
withdrawn. Meanwhile in DavaoIntegrated Port Stevedoring Services v. Abarquez,[19] the
Court ordered the payment of the cash equivalent of the unenjoyed sick leave benefits to its
intermittent workers after finding that said workers had received these benefits for almost
four years until the grant was stopped due to a diferent interpretation of the CBA provisions.
We
held
that
the
employer cannot
unilaterally withdraw the existing privilege of
commutation or conversion to cash given to said workers, and as also noted that the
employer had in fact granted and paid said cash equivalent of the unenjoyed portion of the
sick leave benefits to some intermittent workers.
In the years 1992, 1993, 1994, 1999, 2002 and 2003, petitioner had adopted a policy
of freely, voluntarily and consistently granting full benefits to its employees regardless
of the length of service rendered. True, there were only a total of seven employees who
benefited from such a practice, but it was an established practice nonetheless. Jurisprudence
has not laid down any rule specifying a minimum number of years within which a company
practice must be exercised in order to constitute voluntary company practice. [20] Thus, it can
be six (6) years,[21] three (3) years,[22] or even as short as two (2) years. [23] Petitioner cannot
shirk away from its responsibility by merely claiming that it was a mistake or an
error, supported only by an affidavit of its manufacturing group head portions of which read:
5. 13th month pay, bonus, and cash conversion of unused/earned
vacation leave, sick leave and emergency leave are computed and paid in full
to employees who rendered services to the company for the entire year and
proportionately to those employees who rendered service to the company for a
period less than one (1) year or twelve (12) months in accordance with the CBA
provision relative thereto.
6. It was never the intention much less the policy of the management
to grant the aforesaid benefits to the employees in full regardless of whether or
not the employee has rendered services to the company for the entire year,
otherwise, it would be unjust and inequitable not only to the company but to
other employees as well.[24]
In
cases
involving
money
claims
of
employees,
the
employer
has
the
burden of proving that the employees did receive the wages and benefits and that t
he same were paid in accordance with law.[25]
Indeed, if petitioner wants to prove that it merely erred in giving full benefits, it could have
easily presented other proofs, such as the names of other employees who did not fully
serve for one year and thus were given prorated benefits. Experientially, a perfect
attendance in the workplace is always the goal but it is seldom achieved. There must have
been other employees who had reported for work less than a full year and who, as a
consequence received only prorated benefits. This could have easily bolstered petitioners
theory of mistake/error, but sadly, no evidence to that efect was presented.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 85089 dated 29 September 2005 is and its Resolution dated 9 December
2005 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
DUTY
FREE
SERVICES, INC.,
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 174809

Present:
Petitioner,
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*
- versus -
ABAD, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 27, 2012

MANOLITO Q. TRIA,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
are
the
Court
of
Appeals
(CA)
Decision[1] dated May
31,
2006 and
Resolution[2] dated September 21, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70839. The assailed decision
affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Resolution [3]dated March 15, 2002
in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-009965-98, while the assailed resolution denied petitioner
Duty Free Philippines Services, Inc.s (DFPSIs) motion for reconsideration.
The facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:
Petitioner Duty Free Philippines Services, Inc. is a manpower agency

that provides personnel to Duty Free Philippines (DFP).
On March 16, 1989, [respondent] Manolo Tria was employed by

Petitioner and was seconded to DFP as a Warehouse Supervisor.
In an Audit Report, dated January 16, 1998, it was revealed that 1,020
packs of Marlboro bearing Merchandise Code No. 020101 under WRR No. 3604032 were not included in the condemnation proceedings held on December
27, 1996 and that there were glaring discrepancies in the related documents
which indicate a malicious attempt to conceal an anomalous irregularity. The
relevant Request for Condemnation was found to have been fabricated and all
signatories therein, namely, Ed Garcia, Stockkeeper; Catherino A. Bero, DIU
Supervisor; and Constantino L. Cruz, were held accountable for the irregular
loss of the unaccounted Marlboro KS Pack of 5
After further investigation, it was discovered that the subject

merchandise was illegally brought out of the warehouse and it was made to
appear that in all the documents prepared said goods were legally condemned
on December 27, 1996. Ed Garcia, one of the respondents in the Audit Review,
implicated [respondent] and [two] others. Garcia claimed that he was unaware
of the illegality of the transaction as he was only obeying the orders of his
superiors who included [respondent]. Garcia disclosed that it was [respondent]
who ordered him to look for a van for the supposed direct condemnation of
the subject merchandise.
Consequently, the Discipline Committee requested [respondent] to

submit a written reply/explanation regarding the findings in the Audit Report
and the allegations of Garcia.
[Respondent] denied his participation in the illegal transaction.

Although he admitted that he instructed Garcia to look for a van, it was for the
purpose of transferring the damaged merchandise from the main warehouse
to the proper warehouse for damaged goods.
On August 27, 1998, the DFP Discipline Committee [DFPDC] issued

a Joint Resolution holding [respondent] GUILTY OF DISHONESTY for (his) direct
participation in the fake condemnation and pilferage of the missing 1,020
Marlboro Pack of 5s cigarettes and orders (his) DISMISSAL from the service for
cause and for loss of trust and confidence, with forfeiture of all rights and
privileges due them from the company, except earned salaries and leave
credits.
On September
18,
1998,
Petitioner
sent
[respondent]
a memorandum terminating his employment with Petitioner and his
secondment to DFP on the basis of the findings and recommendation of the
(DFPs) Discipline Committee.
Aggrieved, [respondent] filed a Complaint against Petitioner for Illegal

Dismissal and for payment of backwages, attorneys fees and damages. [4]
On May 31, 1999, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision [5] finding respondent to
have been illegally dismissed from employment. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being considered, judgment is

hereby rendered ordering the respondent company to reinstate complainant
to his former position with all the rights, privileges, and benefits appertaining
thereto, including seniority, plus full backwages which as of May 31,
1999 already amount to P172,672.50. Further, the respondent is ordered to
pay complainant the equivalent of ten percent (10%) of the total backwages
as and for attorneys fees.
The claim for damages is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed [7] the LA decision, but deleted the award of attorneys fees.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied[8] on March 15, 2002.
When petitioner elevated the case to the CA, it denied for the first time the existence of
employer-employee relationship and pointed to DFP as respondents real employer. The
appellate court, however, considered said defense barred by estoppel for its failure to raise
the defense before the LA and the NLRC. [9] It nonetheless ruled that although DFPDC
conducted the investigation, petitioners dismissal letter efected respondents termination
from employment.[10] On the validity of respondents dismissal from employment, the CA
respected the LA and NLRC findings and reached the same conclusion that respondent was
indeed illegally dismissed from employment. [11] Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied in a Resolution[12] dated September 21, 2006.
Undaunted, petitioner elevates the case before the Court in this petition for review
on certiorari based on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER

DFPSI IS LIABLE FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL AND DECLARE THAT:
A.
DFPSI IS THE DIRECT EMPLOYER OF RESPONDENT INSTEAD

OF DUTY FREE PHILIPPINES (DFP); AND
B.
THE ISSUE AS TO WHO TERMINATED RESPONDENT WAS

RAISED ONLY FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND RULED CONTRARY TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON THE LIABILITY OF DFP, AS AN
INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND RULED CONTRARY TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT RESPONDENTS EMPLOYMENT WAS
ILLEGALLY TERMINATED.[13]
Petitioner insists that the CA erred in not considering its argument that it is not the employer
of respondent. It likewise faults the CA in not ruling on the liability of DFP as an
indispensable party.
We cannot sustain petitioners contention. In its Position Paper, [14] petitioner highlighted
respondents complicity and involvement in the alleged fake condemnation of damaged
cigarettes as found by the DFPDC. This, according to petitioner, was a just cause for
terminating an employee.
In its Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal, [15] petitioner insisted that there was basis for
the termination of respondents employment. Even in its Supplemental Appeal [16] with the
NLRC, petitioner reiterated its stand that respondent was terminated for a just and valid
cause and due process was strictly observed in his dismissal. It further questioned the
reinstatement aspect of the LA decision allegedly because of strained relations between
them.
With the aforesaid pleadings submitted by petitioner, together with the corresponding
pleadings filed by respondent, the LA and the NLRC declared the dismissal of respondent
illegal. These decisions were premised on the finding that there was an employer-employee
relationship. [17] Nowhere in said pleadings did petitioner deny the existence of said
relationship. Rather, the line of its defense impliedly admitted said relationship. The issue of
illegal dismissal would have been irrelevant had there been no employer-employee
relationship in the first place.
It was only in petitioners Petition for Certiorari before the CA did it impute liability on
DFP as respondents direct employer and as the entity who conducted the investigation and
initiated respondents termination proceedings. Obviously, petitioner changed its theory
when it elevated the NLRC decision to the CA. The appellate court, therefore, aptly refused
to consider the new theory ofered by petitioner in its petition. As the object of the pleadings
is to draw the lines of battle, so to speak, between the litigants, and to indicate fairly the
nature of the claims or defenses of both parties, a party cannot subsequently take a position
contrary to, or inconsistent, with its pleadings. [18] It is a matter of law that when a party
adopts a particular theory and the case is tried and decided upon that theory in the court
below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal. The case will be reviewed
and decided on that theory and not approached and resolved from a diferent point of view.
[19]
The review of labor cases is confined to questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
[20]
The alleged absence of employer-employee relationship cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.[21] The resolution of this issue requires the admission and calibration of
evidence and the LA and the NLRC did not pass upon it in their decisions. [22] We cannot
permit petitioner to change its theory on appeal. It would be unfair to the adverse party who
would have no more opportunity to present further evidence, material to the new theory,
which it could have done had it been aware earlier of the new theory before the LA and the
NLRC.[23] More so in this case as the supposed employer of respondent which is DFP was not
and is not a party to the present case.
In Pamplona Plantation Company v. Acosta,[24] petitioner therein raised for the first time in its
appeal to the NLRC that respondents therein were not its employees but of another
company. In brushing aside this defense, the Court held:
x x x Petitioner is estopped from denying that respondents worked for it. In

the first place, it never raised this defense in the proceedings before the Labor
Arbiter. Notably, the defense it raised pertained to the nature of respondents
employment, i.e., whether they are seasonal employees, contractors, or
worked under the pakyaw system. Thus, in its Position Paper, petitioner
alleged that some of the respondents are coconut filers and copra hookers
or sakadors; some are seasonal employees who worked as scoopers
orlugiteros;
some
are
contractors;
and
some
worked
under
the pakyaw system. In support of these allegations, petitioner even presented
the companys payroll which will allegedly prove its allegations.
By setting forth these defenses, petitioner, in effect, admitted

that respondents worked for it, albeit in different capacities. Such
allegations are negative pregnant denials pregnant with the
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied, and amounts to an acknowledgment

that respondents were indeed employed by petitioner. [25] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Also in Telephone Engineering & Service Co., Inc. v. WCC, et al., [26] the Court held that
the lack of employer-employee relationship is a matter of defense that the employer should
properly raise in the proceedings below. The determination of this relationship involves a
finding of fact, which is conclusive and binding and not subject to review by this Court. [27]
In this case, petitioner insisted that respondent was dismissed from employment for
cause and after the observance of the proper procedure for termination. Consequently,
petitioner cannot now deny that respondent is its employee. While indeed, jurisdiction
cannot be conferred by acts or omission of the parties, petitioners belated denial that it is
the employer of respondent is obviously an afterthought, a devise to defeat the law and
evade its obligations.[28]
It is a fundamental rule of procedure that higher courts are precluded from

entertaining matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings
below, but ventilated for the first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal.
[29]
Petitioner is bound by its submissions that respondent is its employee and it should not
be permitted to change its theory. Such change of theory cannot be tolerated on appeal, not
due to the strict application of procedural rules, but as a matter of fairness. [30]
As to the legality of respondents dismissal, it is well settled that under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised, the reason being that this Court is not a
trier of facts, and it is not for this Court to reexamine and reevaluate the evidence on record.
[31]
Findings of fact and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter as well as those of the NLRC or, for
that matter, any other adjudicative body which can be considered as a trier of facts on
specific matters within its field of expertise, should be considered as binding and conclusive
upon the appellate courts.[32]
Petitioner dismissed respondent from employment based on the recommendation of

the DFPDC holding respondent guilty of dishonesty for his direct participation in the fake
condemnation and pilferage of the missing 1,020 Marlboro Pack of 5 cigarettes.
[33]
Respondent was implicated in the anomalous transaction by his co-employees who
pointed to the former as the one who ordered the other suspects to look for a vehicle that
would be used to transport the subject cigarettes. This, according to the DFPDC, was odd
and strange. With this act alone and by reason of his position, the DFPDC concluded, and
affirmed by petitioner, that respondent definitely had knowledge of the fake condemnation.
From these circumstances, petitioner sustained the findings of dishonesty and dismissed
respondent from employment.
Again, we agree with the appellate court that DFPDCs conclusions are not supported
by clear and convincing evidence to warrant the dismissal of respondent. In illegal dismissal
cases, the employer is burdened to prove just cause for terminating the employment of its
employee with clear and convincing evidence. This principle is designed to give flesh and
blood to the guaranty of security of tenure granted by the Constitution to employees under
the Labor Code.[34] In this case, petitioner failed to submit clear and convincing evidence of
respondents direct participation in the alleged fake condemnation proceedings. To be sure,
unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions of employers do not provide for
legal justification for dismissing employees. In case of doubt, such cases should be resolved
in favor of labor, pursuant to the social justice policy of labor laws and the Constitution. [35]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated May 31, 2006 and Resolution dated September 21, 2006, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 70839, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ (at

large), KARL REICHL, and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE REICHL, accused.
KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE REICHL, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Batangas City in
Criminal Case Nos. 6428, 6429, 6430, 6431, 6432, 6433, 6434, 6435, 6436, 6437, 6438,
6439, 6528, 6529, 6530 and 6531 finding accused-appellants, Spouses Karl Reichl and
Yolanda Gutierrez de Reichl guilty of five (5) counts of estafa and one (1) count of syndicated
and large scale illegal recruitment. [1]
In April 1993, eight (8) informations for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment
and eight (8) informations for estafa were filed against accused-appellants, spouses Karl and
Yolanda Reichl, together with Francisco Hernandez. Only the Reichl spouses were tried and
convicted by the trial court as Francisco Hernandez remained at large.
The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of private complainants; a
certification from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) that Francisco
Hernandez, Karl Reichl and Yolanda Gutierrez Reichl in their personal capacities were neither
licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment; [2] the
receipts for the payment made by private complainants; and two documents signed by the
Reichl spouses where they admitted that they promised to secure Austrian tourist visas for
private complainants and that they would return all the expenses incurred by them if they
are not able to leave by March 24, 1993, [3] and where Karl Reichl pledged to refund to
private complainants the total sum of P1,388,924.00 representing the amounts they paid for
the processing of their papers.[4]
Private complainant Narcisa Hernandez, a teacher, was first to testify for the
prosecution. She stated that Francisco Hernandez introduced her to the spouses Karl and
Yolanda Reichl at the residence of a certain Hilarion Matira at Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas
City. At the time, she also saw the other applicants Melanie Bautista, Estela Manalo, Edwin
Coleng, Anicel Umahon, Analiza Perez and Maricel Matira. Karl and Yolanda Reichl told
Narcisa that they could find her a job as domestic helper in Italy. They, however, required
her to pay the amount of P150,000.00 for the processing of her papers and travel
documents. She paid the fee in three installments. She paid the first installment
of P50,000.00 on July 14, 1992, the second installment of P25,000.00 on August 6, 1992 and
the third in the amount of P75,000.00 on December 27, 1992. She gave the money to
Francisco Hernandez in the presence of the Reichl spouses at Matira's residence.Francisco
Hernandez issued a receipt for the first and second installment [5] but not for the
third. Narcisa was scheduled to leave on December 17, 1992 but was not able to do so. Karl
Reichl explained that she would get her transit visa to Italy in Austria, but she could not yet
leave for Austria because the hotels were fully booked at that time because of the Christmas
season.Narcisa's departure was again scheduled on January 5, 1993, but it still did not push
through. Narcisa stated that they went to Manila several times supposedly to obtain a visa
from the Austrian Embassy and Karl Reichl assured her that she would be able to leave once
she gets her visa. The accused set the departure of Narcisa and that of the other applicants
several times but these proved to be empty promises. In March 1993, the applicants met
with the three accused at the residence of private complainant Charito Balmes and asked
them to refund the payment if they could not send them abroad. The meeting resulted in an
agreement which was reduced into writing and signed by Karl Reichl. Mr. Reichl promised to
ensure private complainants' departure by April, otherwise, they would return their payment.
[6]
Private complainant Leonora Perez also gave the following testimony: In July 1992, her
sister, Analiza Perez, introduced her to Francisco Hernandez at their residence in Dolor
Subdivision, Batangas City. Francisco Hernandez convinced her to apply for a job in
Italy. When she accepted the ofer, Francisco Hernandez told her to prepare P150,000.00 for
the processing of her papers.In August 1992, Leonora, together with her sister and Francisco
Hernandez, went to Ramada Hotel in Manila to meet with Karl and Yolanda Reichl. At said
meeting, Leonora handed her payment of P50,000.00 to Yolanda Reichl. Yolanda assured her
that she would be able to work in Italy. Francisco Hernandez and the Reichl spouses told
Leonora to wait for about three weeks before she could leave. After three weeks, Francisco
Hernandez invited Leonora and the other applicants to the house of Hilarion Matira in
Batangas City to discuss some matters. Francisco Hernandez informed the applicants that
their departure would be postponed to December 17, 1992. December 17 came and the
applicants were still unable to leave as it was allegedly a holiday.Yolanda and Karl Reichl
nonetheless assured Leonora of employment as domestic helper in Italy with a monthly
salary of $1,000.00. Francisco Hernandez and the Reichl spouses promised the applicants
that they would leave for Italy on January 5, 1993. Some time in January 1993, Francisco
Hernandez went to the residence of Leonora and collected the sum of P50,000.00
purportedly for the plane fare. Francisco issued a receipt for the payment. When the
applicants were not able to leave on the designated date, Francisco Hernandez and the
spouses again made another promise. Tired of the recruiters' unfulfilled promises, the
applicants decided to withdraw their application. However, Karl Reichl constantly assured
them that they would land a job in Italy because he had connections in Vienna. The
promised employment, however, never materialized. Thus, Karl Reichl signed a document
stating that he would refund the payment made by the applicants plus interest and other
expenses. The document was executed and signed at the house of one of the applicants,
Charito Balmes, at P. Zamora St., Batangas City. [7]
Janet Perez, Leonora's sister, corroborated the latter's testimony that she paid a total
amount of P100,000.00 to the three accused.[8]
Private complainant Charito Balmes told a similar story when she testified before the
court. She said that Francisco Hernandez convinced her to apply for the job of domestic
helper in Italy and required her to pay a fee of P150,000.00. He also asked her to prepare
her passport and other papers to be used to secure a visa. On November 25, 1992, she
gave P25,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez. They proceeded to Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas
City and Francisco Hernandez introduced her to his business partners, spouses Karl and
Yolanda Reichl. Francisco Hernandez turned over the payment to the spouses so that they
could secure a visa for her. The Reichl spouses promised her an overseas job. They said she
and the other applicants would leave on December 17, 1992. On December 11, 1992,
Charito paid the amount of P70,300.00 to Francisco Hernandez in the presence of the
Reichls. Francisco Hernandez again handed the money to the spouses. On February 16,
1993, Charito paid P20,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez who delivered the same to the
spouses. Francisco Hernandez did not issue a receipt for the payment made by Charito
because he told her that he would not betray her trust. Like the other applicants, Charito
was not able to leave the country despite the numerous promises made by the
accused. They gave various excuses for their failure to depart, until finally the Reichls told
the applicants that Karl Reichl had so many business transactions in the Philippines that they
would not be able to send them abroad and that they would refund their payment
instead. Hence, they executed an agreement which was signed by Karl Reichl and stating
that they would return the amounts paid by the applicants. The accused, however, did not
comply with their obligation.[9]
Mrs. Elemenita Bautista, the mother of private complainant Melanie Bautista, also took
the witness stand. She stated that in May 1992, Melanie applied for an overseas job through
Francisco Hernandez. Francisco Hernandez told her to prepare P150,000.00 to be used for
the processing of her papers and plane ticket. On June 26, 1992, Melanie made the initial
payment ofP50,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez who was then accompanied by Karl and
Yolanda Reichl.[10] Upon receipt of the payment, Francisco Hernandez gave the money to
Yolanda Reichl. Melanie made two other payments: one on August 6, 1992 in the amount
of P25,000.00,[11] and another on January 3, 1993 in the amount of P51,000.00.[12] Three
receipts were issued for the payments.[13]
Rustico Manalo, the husband of private complainant Estela Abel de Manalo, testified that
his wife applied for the job of domestic helper abroad. In June 1992, Francisco Hernandez
introduced them to Karl and Yolanda Reichl who were allegedly sending workers to
Italy. Rustico and his wife prepared all the relevant documents, i.e., passport, police
clearance and marriage contract, and paid a total placement fee of P130,000.00.[14] They
paid P50,000.00 on June 5, 1992, P25,000.00 on August 8, 1992, and P55,000.00 on January
3, 1993. The payments were made at the house of Hilarion Matira and were received by
Francisco Hernandez who, in turn, remitted them to the Reichl spouses. Francisco Hernandez
issued a receipt for the payment. The Reichls promised to take care of Estela's papers and to
secure a job for her abroad. The Reichls vowed to return the payment if they fail on their
promise. As with the other applicants, Estela was also not able to leave the country. [15]
The defense interposed denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant Karl Reichl, an Austrian citizen, claimed that he entered the
Philippines on July 29, 1992. Prior to this date, he was in various places in Europe. He came
to the country on July 29, 1992 to explore business opportunities in connection with the
import and export of beer and sugar. He also planned to establish a tourist spot somewhere
in Batangas. Upon his arrival, he and his wife, Yolanda Reichl, stayed at the Manila
Intercontinental Hotel. On August 3, 1992, they moved to Manila Midtown Hotel. They stayed
there until August 26, 1992. After they left Manila Midtown Hotel, they went to another hotel
in Quezon City. Karl Reichl returned to Vienna on September 19, 1992.[16]
Mr. Reichl stated that he first met Francisco Hernandez through a certain Jimmy Pineda
around August 1992 at Manila Midtown Hotel. Francisco Hernandez was allegedly looking for
a European equipment to be used for the quarrying operation of his friend. Before accepting
the deal, he made some research on the background of the intended business. Realizing that
said business would not be viable, Karl Reichl advised Francisco Hernandez to instead look
for a second-hand equipment from Taiwan or Japan. He never saw Francisco Hernandez
again until he left for Vienna in September 1992.[17]
Karl Reichl returned to the Philippines on October 21, 1992. Francisco Hernandez
allegedly approached him and sought his help in securing Austrian visas purportedly for his
relatives. Karl Reichl refused and told him that he was planning to stay permanently in the
Philippines. On one occasion, Francisco Hernandez invited him to an excursion at Sombrero
Island. Francisco Hernandez told him that he would also bring some of his relatives with him
and he would introduce him to them. There he met Narcisa Hernandez and Leonora Perez.
Leonora Perez, together with Francisco Hernandez, later went to see Mr. Reichl at the house
of his in-laws at No. 4 Buenafe Road, Batangas City and asked him if he could help her
obtain an Austrian visa. Karl Reichl, however, was firm on his refusal.[18]
In his testimony before the trial court, Karl Reichl denied any knowledge about Francisco
Hernandez's recruitment activities. He said that Francisco Hernandez merely told him that
he wanted to help his relatives go to Europe. He further denied that he promised private
complainants that he would give them overseas employment. [19] As regards the document
where Mr. Reichl undertook to pay P1,388,924.00 to private complainants, he claimed that
he signed said document under duress. Francisco Hernandez allegedly told him that private
complainants would harm him and his family if he refused to sign it. He signed the document
as he felt he had no other option.[20]
Yolanda Gutierrez de Reichl corroborated the testimony of her husband and denied the
charges against her. She claimed that she was in Manila on the dates alleged in the various
informations, thus, she could not have committed the acts charged therein. Yolanda Reichl
further stated that she did not know of any reason why private complainants filed these
cases against her and her husband. She said that several persons were harassing her and
pressuring her to pay private complainants the sum of at least P50,000.00.[21]
After assessing the evidence presented by the parties, the trial court rendered a
decision convicting accused-appellants of one (1) count of illegal recruitment in large scale
and six (6) counts of estafa. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused spouses KARL REICHL and
YOLANDA GUTIERREZ REICHL 1. NOT GUILTY of the crime of syndicated and large-scale illegal recruitment as
charged in the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6435, 6437 and 6529;
2. NOT GUILTY of the crime of estafa as charged in the above-mentioned Criminal
Cases Nos. 6434, 6436 and 6528;
3. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of syndicated and large-scale

illegal recruitment, as charged, in the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos.
6429, 6431, 6433, 6439 and 6531;
4. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as charged, in the abovementioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6428, 6430, 6432, 6438 and 6530.
The Court hereby imposes upon the accused-spouses KARL REICHL and YOLANDA
GUTIERREZ REICHL the following sentences:
1. For the 5 ofenses, collectively, of syndicated and large-scale illegal recruitment
in Criminal Cases Nos. 6429, 6431, 6433, 6438 and 6531, to sufer the penalty of
life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00);
2. In Criminal Case No. 6428, there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, to sufer the indeterminate sentence of Six (6) Years of prision
correctional, as minimum to Sixteen (16) Years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Narcisa Hernandez in the amount
of P150,000.00;
circumstance, to sufer the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision
correctional as minimum to eleven (11) years of prision mayor, as maximum and
to indemnify the complainant Leonora Perez in the amount of P100,000.00;
correctional as minimum to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum and to indemnify the complainant Melanie Bautista in the amount
of P150,000.00;
correctional as minimum to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum and to indemnify the complainant Estela Abel de Manalo in the
amount of P130,000.00;
circumstance, to sufer the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years or prision
correctional as minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum and to indemnify the complainant Charito Balmes in the amount
of P121,300.00; and
7. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellants appealed from the decision of the trial court. They raise the
following errors:
1. The trial court erred in finding accused-appellant Karl Reichl guilty of the crimes
of estafa and illegal recruitment committed by syndicate and in large scale based
on the evidence presented by the prosecution which miserably failed to establish
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of illegal
recruitment on a large scale by cummulating five separate cases of illegal
recruitment each filed by a single private complainant.
3. The trial court erred in rendering as a matter of course an automatic guilty
verdict against accused-appellant for the crime of estafa after a guilty verdict in
a separate crime for illegal recruitment.It is submitted that conviction in the
latter crime does not ipso facto result in conviction in the former. [22]
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Article 38 of the Labor Code defines illegal recruitment as "any recruitment activities,
including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of (the Labor Code), to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority." The term "recruitment and
placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, including referrals, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not, provided that any person or
entity which, in any manner, ofers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. [23] The law imposes a
higher penalty when the illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large scale as
they are considered an ofense involving economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction,
enterprise or scheme. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3)
or more persons individually or as a group.[24]
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellants engaged in activities that fall within the definition of recruitment and
placement under the Labor Code. The evidence on record shows that they promised
overseas employment to private complainants and required them to prepare the necessary
documents and to pay the placement fee, although they did not have any license to do so.
There is illegal recruitment when one who does not possess the necessary authority or
license gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad. [25]
Accused-appellants assert that they merely undertook to secure Austrian visas for
private complainants, which act did not constitute illegal recruitment. They cite the
document marked at Exhibit "J" stating that they promised to obtain Austrian tourist visas
for private complainants. We are not convinced. Private complainants Narcisa Hernandez,
Leonora Perez and Charito Balmes categorically stated that Karl and Yolanda Reichl told
them that they would provide them overseas employment and promised them that they
would be able to leave the country on a specified date. We do not see any reason to doubt
the truthfulness of their testimony. The defense has not shown any ill motive for these
witnesses to falsely testify against accused-appellants if it were not true that they met with
the Reichl spouses and the latter represented themselves to have the capacity to secure
gainful employment for them abroad. The minor lapses in the testimony of these witnesses
pointed out by accused-appellants in their brief do not impair their credibility, especially
since they corroborate each other on the material points, i.e., that they met with the three
accused several times, that the three accused promised to give them overseas employment,
and that they paid the corresponding placement fee but were not able to leave the
country. It has been held that truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to give errorfree testimonies considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory.
[26]
Moreover, it was shown that Karl Reichl signed a document marked as Exhibit "C" where
he promised to refund the payments given by private complainants for the processing of
their papers. We are not inclined to believe Mr. Reichl's claim that he was forced by Francisco
Hernandez to sign said document. There is no showing, whether in his testimony or in that of
his wife, that private complainants threatened to harm them if he did not sign the
document. Mr. Reichl is an educated man and it cannot be said that he did not understand
the contents of the paper he was signing. When he affixed his signature thereon, he in efect
acknowledged his obligation to ensure the departure of private complainants and to provide
them gainful employment abroad. Such obligation arose from the promise of overseas
placement made by him and his co-accused to private complainants. The admission made
by accused-appellants in Exhibit "J" that they promised to obtain Austrian visas for private
complainants does not negate the fact that they also promised to procure for them overseas
employment. In fact, in Exhibit "J", accused-appellants admitted that each of the private
complainants paid the amount of P50,000.00. However, in Exhibit "C", which was executed
on a later date, accused-appellants promised to refund to each complainant an amount
exceeding P150,000.00. This is an acknowledgment that accused-appellants received
payments from the complainants not only for securing visas but also for their placement
abroad.
Accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi fail to impress us. The acts of
recruitment were committed from June 1992 until January 1993 in Batangas City. Karl Reichl
was in Manila from July 29, 1992 until September 19, 1992, and then he returned to the
Philippines and stayed in Batangas from October 21, 1992. Yolanda Reichl, on the other
hand, claimed that he was in Manila on the dates alleged in the various informations. It is of
judicial notice that Batangas City is only a few hours drive from Manila. Thus, even if the
spouses were staying in Manila, it does not prevent them from going to Batangas to engage
in their recruitment business. Furthermore, it appears that the three accused worked as a
team and they conspired and cooperated with each other in recruiting domestic helpers
purportedly to be sent to Italy. Francisco Hernandez introduced Karl and Yolanda Reichl to
the job applicants as his business partners. Karl and Yolanda Reichl themselves gave
assurances to private complainants that they would seek employment for them in
Italy. Francisco Hernandez remitted the payments given by the applicants to the Reichl
spouses and the latter undertook to process the applicants' papers. There being conspiracy,
each of the accused shall be equally liable for the acts of his co-accused even if he himself
did not personally take part in its execution.
Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellants of

illegal recruitment in large scale by cummulating the individual informations filed by private
complainants. The eight informations for illegal recruitment are worded as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6429
That on or about July 14, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy.
Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders
of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized
government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement
activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, ofering and promising for a fee to one Narcisa
Autor de Hernandez and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason
of which said Narcisa Autor de Hernandez relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or
gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.
That on or about July 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Dolor Subdivision,
Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from
the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity,
conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by
enlisting, contracting, procuring, ofering and promising for a fee to one Leonora Perez y
Atienza and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which
said Leonora Perez y Atienza relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said
accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.
That on or about June 26, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy.
activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, ofering and promising for a fee to one Melanie
Bautista y Dolor and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of
which said Melanie Bautista y Dolor relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave
the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency,
to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.
That on or about July 12, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy.
activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, ofering and promising for a fee to one
Annaliza Perez y Atienza and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by
reason of which said Annaliza Perez y Atienzarelying on these misrepresentations, paid
and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND (P160,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.
That on or about August 15, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop,
Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees
nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other
authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and
placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, ofering and promising for a fee to
one Edwin Coling y Coling and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by
reason of which said Edwin Coling y Coling relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or
gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Contrary to Law.
That on or about June 5, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy.
activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, ofering and promising for a fee to one Estela
Abel de Manalo and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of
which said Estela Abel de Manalo relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND (P130,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to

said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.
That on or about July 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Brgy. Sta. Rita
Karsada, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of
authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized
activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, ofering and promising for a fee to one Anicel
Umahon y Delgado and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason
of which said Anicel Umahon y Delgado relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or
gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND (P130,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Contrary to Law.
That on or about November 25, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at No. 40
P. Zamora Street, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, ofering and promising for a fee to one Charito
Balmes y Cantos and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of
which said Charito Balmes y Cantos relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave
the amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
PESOS (P121,300.00), Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation
of the said law.
Contrary to Law.
We note that each information was filed by only one complainant. We agree with
accused-appellants that they could not be convicted for illegal recruitment committed in
large scale based on several informations filed by only one complainant. The Court held
in People vs. Reyes:[27]
x x x When the Labor Code speaks of illegal recruitment committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group, it must be understood as referring to the number of
complainants in each case who are complainants therein, otherwise, prosecutions for single
crimes of illegal recruitment can be cummulated to make out a case of large scale illegal
recruitment. In other words, a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on
a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or
as a group.[28]
This, however, does not serve to lower the penalty imposed upon accusedappellants. The charge was not only for illegal recruitment committed in large scale but also
for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed
by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise
or scheme defined under the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Labor Code. It has been
shown that Karl Reichl, Yolanda Reichl and Francisco Hernandez conspired with each other in
convincing private complainants to apply for an overseas job and giving them the guaranty
that they would be hired as domestic helpers in Italy although they were not licensed to do
so. Thus, we hold that accused-appellants should be held liable for illegal recruitment
committed by a syndicate which is also punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of one
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) under Article 39 of the Labor Code.
Finally, we hold that the prosecution also proved the guilt of accused-appellants for the
crime of estafa. A person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be
convicted of estafa under Art. 315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code provided the elements of
estafa are present. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name, or falsely
pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud. The ofended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the accused-appellant and as a result thereof, the
ofended party sufered damages.[29] It has been proved in this case that accused-appellants
represented themselves to private complainants to have the capacity to send domestic
helpers to Italy, although they did not have any authority or license. It is by this
representation that they induced private complainants to pay a placement fee
ofP150,000.00. Such act clearly constitutes estafa under Article 315 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Cost against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 195419

Plaintif-Appellee,
Present:
- versus - CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
SERENO,
HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH, REYES, and
RONNIE ARINGOY y MASION, PERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ.
and NESTOR RELAMPAGOS (at large),
Accused.
HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH and Promulgated:

RONNIE ARINGOY y MASION,
Accused-Appellants. October 12, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a consolidated criminal case filed against the accused-appellants for the crimes of
Illegal Recruitment (Criminal Case No. 21930) and Trafficking in Persons (Criminal Case No.
21908).
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, in its Decision dated 29 November 2005
(RTC Decision),1 found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate, and sentenced each
of the accused to sufer the penalty of life imprisonment plus payment of fines and
damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) in Cagayan de Oro, in its Decision dated 26
February 2010 (CA Decision),2 affirmed in toto the RTC Decision. The accused-appellants
appealed to this Court by filing a Notice of Appeal3 in accordance with Section 3(c), Rule 122
of the Rules of Court.
The Facts
The findings of fact of the RTC, which were affirmed in toto by the CA, are as follows:
In the evening of June 3, 2005, while Lolita Sagadsad Plando, 23 years old, single,
was in Tumaga, Zamboanga City on her way to the house of her grandfather, she met
Ronnie MasionAringoy and Rachel Aringoy Caete. Ronnie greeted Lolita, Oy, its good
you are here (oy, maayo kay dia ka). Rachel asked Lolita if she is interested to work
in Malaysia. x x x Lolita was interested so she gave her cellphone number to Ronnie.
After their conversation, Lolita proceeded to her grandfathers house.
xxx
On June 4, 2005, at about 7:00 oclock in the morning, Lolita received a text message
from Ronnie Aringoy inviting her to go to the latters house. At 7:30 in the morning,
they met atTumaga on the road near the place where they had a conversation the
night before. Ronnie brought Lolita to the house of his sister in Tumaga. Lolita
inquired what job is available in Malaysia. Ronnie told her that she will work as a
restaurant entertainer. All that is needed is a passport. She will be paid 500
Malaysian ringgits which is equivalent to P7,000.00 pesos in Philippine currency.
Lolita told Ronnie that she does not have a passport. Ronnie said that they will look
for a passport so she could leave immediately. Lolita informed him that her younger
sister, Marife Plando, has a passport. Ronnie chided her for not telling him
immediately. He told Lolita that she will leave for Malaysia on June 6, 2005 and they
will go to HadjaJarma Lalli who will bring her to Malaysia. Ronnie sent a text message
to Lalli but the latter replied that she was not in her house. She was at the city
proper.
On June 5, 2005, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening, Ronnie Aringoy and
Rachel Aringoy Caete arrived on board a tricycle driven by Ronnie at the house where
Lolita was staying atSouthcom Village. Ronnie asked if Lolita already had a passport.
Lolita said that she will borrow her sisters passport. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita went
to Buenavista where Lolitas other sister, Gina Plando was staying. Her
sister Marife Plando was there at that time. Lolita asked Marife to let her
use Marifes passport. Marife refused but Lolita got the passport. Marifecried. Ronnie,
Rachel and Lolita proceeded to Tumaga. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita went to the house
of Hadja Jarma Lalli just two hundred meters away from the house of Ronnie
inTumaga. Ronnie introduced Lolita to Hadja Jarma, saying Ji, she is also interested in
going to Malaysia. Lolita handed a passport to Hadja Jarma telling her that it belongs
to her sisterMarife Plando. Hadja Jarma told her it is not a problem because they have
a connection with the DFA (Department of Foreign Afairs) and Marifes picture in the
passport will be substituted with Lolitas picture. Nestor Relampagos arrived driving
an owner-type jeep. Hadja Jarma introduced Nestor to Lolita as their financier who will
accompany them to Malaysia. x x x Lolita noticed three other women
in Hadja Jarmas house. They were Honey, about 20 years old; Michele, 19 years old,
and another woman who is about 28 years old. The women said that they are
from Ipil, Sibugay Province. Ronnie told Lolita that she will have many companions
going to Malaysia to work. They will leave the next day, June 6, and will meet at the
wharf at 2:30 in the afternoon.
On June 6, 2005, Lolita went to Zamboanga City wharf at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon
bringing a bag containing her make-up and powder. She met at the
wharf Hadja Jarma Lalli, Ronnie Aringoy, Honey and Michele. Ronnie gave to Lolita her
boat ticket for the vessel M/V Mary Joy bound for Sandakan, Malaysia; a passport in
the name of Marife Plando but with Lolitas picture on it, and P1,000.00 in
cash. Hadja Jarma, Lolita, Honey, Michele and two other women boarded the boat M/V
Mary Joy bound for Sandakan. Ronnie Aringoy did not go with them. He did not board
the boat. x x x After the boat sailed, Hadja Jarma Lalli and
Nestor Relampagos approached Lolita and her companions. Nestor told them that
they will have a good job in Malaysia as restaurant entertainers. They will serve food
to customers. They will not be harmed.
M/V Mary Joy arrived at the port of Sandakan, Malaysia at 10:00 oclock in the
morning of June 7, 2005. After passing through the immigration
office, Hadja Jarma Lalli, NestorRelampagos, Lolita, Honey, Michele and two other
women boarded a van for Kota Kinabalu. x x x At the hotel,
Nestor Relampagos introduced to Lolita and her companions a Chinese Malay called
Boss as their employer. After looking at the women, Boss brought Lolita, Honey,
Diane and Lorraine to a restaurant near the hotel. Diane and Lorraine were also
on baordM/V Mary Joy when it left the port of Zamboanga for Sandakan on June 6,
2005. When they were already at the restaurant, a Filipina woman working there said
that the place is a prostitution den and the women there are used as prostitutes.
Lolita and her companions went back to the hotel. They told Hadja Jarma and Nestor
that they do not like to work as prostitutes. x x x After about five minutes, another
person called boss arrived. x x x [T]hey were fetched by a van at about 7:00 oclock in
the evening and brought to Pipen Club owned by Boss Awa, a Malaysian. At the club,
they were told that they owe the club 2,000 ringgits each as payment for the amount
given by the club to Hadja Jarma Lalli and Nestor Relampagos. They will pay for the
said amount by entertaining customers. The customers will pay 300 ringgits for short
time services of which 50 ringgits will go to the entertainer, and 500 ringgits for over
night service of which 100 ringgits will be given to the entertainer. Pipen Club is a big
club in a two-storey building. There were about 100 women working in the club,
many of them were Filipina women.
Lolita Plando was forced to work as entertainer at Pipen Club. She started working at
8:30 in the evening of June 14, 2005. She was given the number 60 which was pinned
on her. That night, she had her first customer who selected her among the other
women at the club. He was a very big man, about 32 years old, a Chinese-Malay who
looked like a wrestler. The man paid for short time service at the counter. Lolita was
given by the cashier a small pink paper. She was instructed to keep it. A small yellow
paper is given to the entertainer for overnight services. The customer brought Lolita
to a hotel. She did not like to go with him but a boss at the club told her that she
could not do anything. At the hotel, the man poked a gun at Lolita and instructed her
to undress. She refused. The man boxed her on the side of her body. She could not
bear the pain. The man undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. He had
sexual intercourse with her every fifteen minutes or four times in one hour. When the
customer went inside the comfort room, Lolita put on her clothes and left. The
customer followed her and wanted to bring her back to the hotel but Lolita refused.
At about 1:00 oclock in the morning of June 15, 2005, Lolita was chosen by another
customer, a tall dark man, about 40 years old. The customer paid for an overnight
service at the counter and brought Lolita to Mariner Hotel which is far
from Pipen Club. At the hotel, the man told Lolita to undress. When she refused, the
man brought her to the comfort room and bumped her head on the wall. Lolita felt
dizzy. The man opened the shower and said that both of them will take a bath. Lolitas
clothes got wet. She was crying. The man undressed her and had sexual intercourse
with her. They stayed at the hotel until 11:00 oclock in the morning of June 15, 2005.
The customer used Lolita many times. He had sexual intercourse with her every hour.
Lolita worked at Pipen Club from June 14 to July 8, 2005. Every night, a customer
used her. She had at least one customer or more a night, and at most, she had
around five customers a night. They all had sexual intercourse with her. On July 9,
2005, Lolita was able to contact by cellphone at about 10:00 oclock in the morning
her sister Janet Plando who is staying atSipangkot Felda x x x. Janet is married to
Said Abubakar, an Indonesian national who is working as a driver in the factory.
x x x Lolita told Janet that she is in Labuan, Malaysia and beg Janet to save her
because she was sold as a prostitute. Janet told Lolita to wait because her husband
will go to Pipen Club to fetch Lolita at 9:00 oclock that evening of that day. x x x She
told Janet to instruct her husband to ask for No. 60 at Pipen Club. x x x At 9:00 oclock
in the evening, Lolita was told by Daddy Richard, one of the bosses at the club, that a
customer requested for No. 60. The man was seated at one of the tables. Lolita
approached the man and said, good evening. The man asked her is she is the sister
of Janet Plando. Lolita replied that she is, and asked the man if he is the husband of
her sister. He said, yes. The man had already paid at the counter. He stood up and
left the place. Lolita got her wallet and followed him. xx x Lolita told her sister about
her ordeal. She stayed at her sisters house until July 22, 2005. On July 21, 2005 at
7:00 oclock in the evening, a policeman went to her sisters house and asked if there
is a woman staying in the house without a passport. Her sister told the policeman
that she will send Lolita home on July 22. At dawn on July 22, Lolita and her brotherin-law took a taxi from Sipangkot Felda to Mananamblas where Lolita will board a
speedboat to Sibuto, Tawi-Tawi. x x x
Upon arrival in Zamboanga City on July 24, 2005, Lolita went directly to the house of
her eldest sister Alejandra Plando Maywila at Sta. Catalina, Zamboanga City. She left
her things at her sisters house and immediately went to the sister of
Ronnie Aringoy in Tumaga. Ronnie was not there. She asked Russel, niece of Ronnie,
to call for the latter. Ronnie arrived and said to her, so you are here, you arrived
already. He said he is not involved in what happened to her. Lolita asked Ronnie to
accompany her to the house of Nestor Relampagos because she has something to
get from him. Ronnie refused. He told Lolita not to let them know that she had
already arrived from Malaysia.
Lolita was advised to file a complaint with the police regarding her ordeal in Malaysia.
On August 2, 2005, at past 9:00 oclock in the morning, Lolita Plando went
to Zamboanga Police Office at Gov. Lim Avenue to file her complaint. x x x
In her Counter-Affidavit (Exh. 1; 1-A-Lalli), Hadja Jarma Lalli admitted that she met
Lolita Plando on June 6, 2005 on board M/V Mary Joy while the said vessel was at sea
on its way to Sandakan, Malaysia. The meeting was purely coincidental. By
coincidence also, Hadja Jarma, Nestor Relampagos and Lolita Plando boarded the
same van for Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. Upon arrival, they parted ways. They did not
see each other anymore at Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. She did not know what happened
to them. She went to Kota Kinabalu to visit his son-in-law. She denied having
recruited Lolita Plando for employment abroad (Exh. 1; 1-A). x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit (Exh. 1-Aringoy), Ronnie Aringoy affirmed that he personally

knows Lolita Plando since she was a teenager and he knows for a fact that her name
is Cristineand not Marife as she purports it to appear. Sometime in the first week of
June 2005, Lolita borrowed P1,000.00 from Ronnie because she wanted to go to
Malaysia to work as a guest relation officer (GRO). Ronnie lent her P1,000.00. He told
her that he knows a certain Hadja Jarma Lalli, distant neighbor, who frequents to
Malaysia and with whom she can ask pertinent information on job opportunities. The
entries in Philippine Passport No. MM401136 issued to Hadja Jarma Lalli on January
29, 2004 (Exh. 2; 2-A to 2-Q) showed that shetraveled to Malaysia no less than nine
(9) times within the period from March 2004 to June 2005.
xxx
Nora Mae Adling, ticketing clerk of Aleson Shipping Lines, owner of the vessel M/V
Mary Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to Sandakan, Malaysia route and of
M/V Kristel Jane 3, testified that Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her
travel to Sandakan, not only for herself but also for other women passengers.
xxx
Ronnie Aringoy submitted the Affidavit of his witness Rachel Caete (Exh. 2) and the
Joint Affidavits of witnesses Mercedita Salazar
and Estrella Galgan. Rachel Canete declared that Lolita Plando whom she knows
as Cristine Plando worked as a GRO (guest relation officer) and massage attendant at
Magic 2 Videoke and Massage Parlor, that Lolita Plando has four children sired by
diferent men; and that she knows for a fact that Lolita Plando has been going to and
from Malaysia to work in bars. When she testified in court, Rachel did not present
other evidence to substantiate her allegations. Mercedita Salazar
and Estrella Galgan declared in their Joint Affidavit that Lolita Plando who is known to
them as Marife Plando was their co-worker as massage attendant and GRO (guest
relation officer) at Magic 2 Massage Parlor and Karaoke bar where she used the
names Gina Plando and Cristine Plando. She worked in the said establishment for
nine months from February to October 2002. She has four children from four diferent
men. No other evidence was submitted in court to prove their assertions. 4
The Decision of the Trial Court
The Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision on 29 November 2005, with its dispositive
portion declaring:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH and RONNIE
ARINGOY y MASION GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 21908 of
the Crime of Trafficking in Persons defined in Section 3(a) and penalized under
Section 10(c) in relation to Sections 4(a) and 6(c) of Republic Act No. 9208 known as
the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 and in Criminal Case No. 21930 of the
crime of Illegal Recruitment defined in Section 6 and penalized under Section 7(b) of
Republic Act No. 8042 known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995 and SENTENCES each of said accused:
1.
In Criminal Case No. 21908, to sufer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay
a fine of P2,000,000.00 pesos;
2.
In Criminal Case No. 21930, to sufer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay
a fine of P500,000.00 pesos;
3.
To pay the ofended party Lolita Plando y Sagadsad, jointly and severally, the sum
of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4.
To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.5
The trial court did not find credible the denials of the accused-appellants over the candid,
positive and convincing testimony of complainant Lolita Plando (Lolita). The accused,
likewise, tried to prove that Lolita was a Guest Relations Officer (GRO) in the Philippines with
four children fathered by four diferent men. However, the trial court found these allegations
irrelevant and immaterial to the criminal prosecution. These circumstances, even if true,
would not exempt or mitigate the criminal liability of the accused. The trial court found that
the accused, without a POEA license, conspired in recruiting Lolita and trafficking her as a
prostitute, resulting in crimes committed by a syndicate. 6 The trial court did not pronounce
the liability of accused-at-large Nestor Relampagos (Relampagos) because jurisdiction was
not acquired over his person.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On 26 February 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC Decision and found
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment and
Trafficking in Persons.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
affirming in toto the RTC Decision.
The Ruling of this Court
We dismiss the appeal for lack of merit.
We modify and increase the payment of damages in the crime of Trafficking in Persons
from P50,000 to P500,000 for moral damages and P50,000 to P100,000 for exemplary
damages.
Grounds for Appeal
In his Appeal Brief,7 Ronnie Aringoy (Aringoy) admits that he referred Lolita to a
certain Hadja Jarma Lalli (Lalli), Aringoys neighbor who frequents Malaysia and from whom
Lolita could ask pertinent information on job opportunities.8 Aringoy claims that he learned
later that Lolita left for Malaysia.9 He denies knowing Relampagos to whom Lolita
paid P28,000 as placement fee for finding her work in Malaysia.10
Aringoy presented three witnesses: his niece

Rachel Aringoy Caete (Rachel), Mercedita Salazar (Mercedita), and Estrella Galgan (Estrella).
In her testimony, Rachel declared that: (1) Lolita is a GRO and Massage Attendant at Magic
2 Videoke and Massage Parlor; (2) Lolita has four children sired by diferent men; and (3)
Lolita has been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. Mercedita and Estrella, on the other
hand, declared in their testimonies that Lolita was their co-worker as Massage Attendant and
GRO in Magic 2 Massage Parlor and Karaoke Bar from February to October 2002.11
Aringoy assailed the credibility of Lolitas testimony because of inconsistencies with regard
to: (1) Lolitas grandfathers status and name; (2) the persons (Ronnie and Rachel) who
approached Lolita to talk about the job opportunity in Malaysia; (3) certain statements in
Lolitas testimony that were not alleged in her Sworn Statement; (4) payment of placement
fee of 28,000; and (5) names of the other female recruits who were with Lolita in the boat
going to Sandakan and Kota Kinabalu.12 Aringoylikewise claims that he was never included in
the initial complaint filed by Lolita, and Lolitas statements about her meetings with
him, Lalli and Relampagos on 3, 4, 5 and 6 June 2005 were not corroborated by any
witness.13
On the other hand, in her Appeal Brief,14 Lalli claims that she simply met Lolita on 6 June
2005 on board the ship M/V Mary Joy bound for Sandakan, Malaysia.15 Lallidenies having met
Lolita prior to their meeting on board M/V Mary Joy.16 Lalli claims she was going to Malaysia
to visit her daughter and son-in-law who was a Malaysian national. 17 Lalli further claims that
she only spoke to Lolita aboard the ship for idle conversation to pass away the time. 18 In this
conversation, she learned that Lolita was with a party of girls accompanied by Relampagos,
and the latter was bringing them to Malaysia to work as sales ladies. 19 Lalli admits that
Lolita, Relampagos and the other girls rode in Lallis van in Sandakan, driven by a friend
of Lallis son-in-law.20 They all rode together because Relampagos talked to the van driver,
requesting if he and his party of girls could board the van and pay their fare when they
reach the city proper of Kota Kinabalu.21 Lalli boarded the van with Lolita, Relampagos and
their companions.22 Upon reaching her destination, Lalli got of the van, leaving
Lolita, Relampagos and their other companions to continue their journey towards the city
proper of Kota Kinabalu.23 After spending several days in Malaysia with her daughter and
son-in-law, Lalli went to Brunei to visit a cousin on 12 June 2005, and headed back to
Malaysia on 14 June 2005.24
Lalli assails the credibility of Lolita due to inconsistencies in her testimony with regard to: (1)
Lolita not being in Southcom Village on 5 June 2005 at 6:00 p.m., as she claimed, but
in Buenavista Village; and (2) Lolitas claim that Lalli and Relampagos on 12 June 2005
brought the girls to Labuan, when in fact, Lalli was already in Brunei on 12 June 2005, as
evidenced by the stamp in her passport.25
Credibility of Testimonies
Both Aringoy and Lalli, in their respective Appeal Briefs, assail the testimony of Lolita due to
its alleged inconsistency on immaterial facts, such as the status of Lolitas grandfather, the
name of the village she was in, the date she was brought to Labuan, Malaysia, and the like.
In a long line of cases, the Court has ruled that inconsistencies pointed out by the accused in
the testimony of prosecution witnesses relating to minor details do not destroy the
credibility of witnesses.26 On the contrary, they indicate that the witnesses were telling the
truth and not previously rehearsed.27
The clear material inconsistency in this case, however, lies in the testimonies of
accused Aringoy and Lalli. Aringoy admitted that he referred Lolita to a
certain HadjaJarma Lalli, his neighbor who frequents Malaysia and with whom Lolita could
ask pertinent information on job opportunities.28 Lalli, on the other hand, denies having met
Lolita prior to their meeting on board M/V Mary Joy on 6 June 2005, 29 and claims that her
meeting with Lolita was purely coincidental.30 Lalli admits that, even if she metRelampagos,
Lolita and their companions only on that day on board M/V Mary Joy, she allowed these
people to ride with her in Malaysia using the van driven by the friend of Lallis son-inlaw.31 Lastly, Lalli claims that she often goes to Malaysia to visit her daughter and son-inlaw.32 However, this does not explain why Lalli purchased boat tickets, not only for herself,
but for the other women passengers going to Malaysia.33 From March 2004 to June
2005, Lalli traveled to Malaysia no less than nine (9) times.34 Nora Mae Adling, ticketing clerk
of Aleson Shipping Lines, owner of the vessel M/V Mary Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to
Sandakan, Malaysia route and of M/VKristel Jane 3, testified in open court
that Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to Sandakan, not only for
herself but also for other women passengers.35Clearly, it is not Lolitas testimony that is
materially inconsistent, but the testimonies of Lalli and Aringoy.
Aringoy presented his witnesses Rachel, Mercedita and Estrella to impeach the credibility of
Lolita by alleging that Lolita was a Massage Attendant and GRO in a
massageparlor and videoke bar. His witness Rachel further declared that Lolita, at the young
age of 23 years, already had four children sired by four diferent men, and had been
previously travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. These bare allegations were not supported
by any other evidence. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Lolita previously worked in
a Karaoke Bar and Massage Parlor and that she had four children from diferent men, such
facts cannot constitute exempting or mitigating circumstances to relieve the accused from
their criminal liabilities. It does not change the fact that the accused recruited Lolita to work
in Malaysia without the requisite POEA license, thus constituting the crime of illegal
recruitment. Worse, the accused deceived her by saying that her work in Malaysia would be
as restaurant entertainer, when in fact, Lolita would be working as a prostitute, thus,
constituting the crime of trafficking.
The facts found by the trial court, as affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, are, as a
general rule, conclusive upon this Court, in the absence of any showing of grave abuse of
discretion.36 The Court, however, may determine the factual milieu of cases or controversies
under specific circumstances, such as:
(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or

impossible;
(2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or

conjectures;
(4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on

misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee;
(7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court;
(8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of

specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant

facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a diferent conclusion; and
(10 when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
)
the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record.37
In this case, none of these exceptions to the general rule on conclusiveness of facts are
applicable. The Court gives weight and respect to the trial courts findings in criminal
prosecution because the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard
the witnesses in person and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial.38 For this reason, the Court adopts the findings of fact of the trial court, as
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, there being no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the lower courts.
Criminal Case No. 21930 (Illegal Recruitment)
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042) defines illegal recruitment, as follows:
[I]llegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,

transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contact
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or
not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines.
xxx
Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be

considered an ofense involving economic sabotage.
xxx
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of

three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code
of the Philippines, defines authority as follows:
Authority means a document issued by the Department of Labor authorizing a person

or association to engage in recruitment and placement activities as a private
recruitment entity.
Section 7 of RA 8042 provides for the penalty of illegal recruitment committed by a

syndicate (which constitutes economic sabotage), as follows:
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall
be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined therein.
It is clear that a person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement activities without
the requisite authority from the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), whether for
profit or not, is engaged in illegal recruitment. 39 The Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), an agency under DOLE created by Executive Order No. 797 to take
over the duties of the Overseas Employment Development Board, issues the authority to
recruit under the Labor Code. The commission of illegal recruitment by three or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another is deemed committed by a syndicate
and constitutes economic sabotage,40 for which the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of not less than 500,000 but not more than 1,000,000 shall be imposed. 41
The penalties in Section 7 of RA 8042 have already been amended by Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 10022, and have been increased to a fine of not less than 2,000,000 but not more
than 5,000,000. However, since the crime was committed in 2005, we shall apply the
penalties in the old law, RA 8042.
In People v. Gallo,42 the Court enumerated the elements of syndicated illegal recruitment, to
wit:
1.
the ofender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and
placement defined under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated
under Art. 34 of the Labor Code;
2.
he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully

engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and
3.
the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more persons

conspiring or confederating with one another.43
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines defines recruitment and placement as any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally
or abroad, whether for profit or not, provided, that any person or entity which, in any
manner, ofers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.
Clearly, given the broad definition of recruitment and placement, even the mere act of
referring someone for placement abroad can be considered recruitment. Such act of referral,
in connivance with someone without the requisite authority or POEA license, constitutes
illegal recruitment. In its simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who,
without authority from the government, give the impression that they have the power to
send workers abroad for employment purposes.44
In this case, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court,
found Lalli, Aringoy and Relampagos to have conspired and confederated with one another
to recruit and place Lolita for work in Malaysia, without a POEA license. The three elements
of syndicated illegal recruitment are present in this case, in particular: (1) the accused have
no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the accused engaged in this activity of
recruitment and placement by actually recruiting, deploying and transporting Lolita to
Malaysia; and (3) illegal recruitment was committed by three persons
(Aringoy, Lalliand Relampagos), conspiring and confederating with one another.
Aringoy claims and admits that he only referred Lolita to Lalli for job opportunities to
Malaysia. Such act of referring, whether for profit or not, in connivance with someone
without a POEA license, is already considered illegal recruitment, given the broad definition
of recruitment and placement in the Labor Code.
Lalli, on the other hand, completely denies any involvement in the recruitment and
placement of Lolita to Malaysia, and claims she only met Lolita for the first time by
coincidence on board the ship M/V Mary Joy. Lallis denial does not deserve credence because
it completely conflicts with the testimony of Aringoy who claims he referred Lolita
to Lalli who had knowledge of the job opportunities in Malaysia.
The conflicting testimonies of Lalli and Aringoy on material facts give doubt to the truth and
veracity of their stories, and strengthens the credibility of the testimony of Lolita, despite
allegations of irrelevant inconsistencies.
No improper motive could be imputed to Lolita to show that she would falsely testify against
the accused. The absence of evidence as to an improper motive entitles Lolitas testimony to
full faith and credit.45
Aringoy claims that no conspiracy existed in illegal recruitment, as he denies even
knowing Relampagos, who is currently at-large. Lalli denies any involvement in the illegal
recruitment, and claims that she only met Relampagos through Lolita on board the ship M/V
Mary Joy on 6 June 2005, and learned that Relampagos was bringing Lolita and their other
girl companions to Malaysia to work as sales ladies.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
In People v. Lago,46 the Court discussed conspiracy in this wise:
The elements of conspiracy are the following: (1) two or more persons came to an
agreement, (2) the agreement concerned the commission of a felony, and (3) the
execution of the felony was decided upon. Proof of the conspiracy need not be based
on direct evidence, because it may be inferred from the parties conduct indicating a
common understanding among themselves with respect to the commission of the
crime. Neither is it necessary to show that two or more persons met together and
entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or
objective to be carried out. The conspiracy may be deduced from the mode or
manner in which the crime was perpetrated; it may also be inferred from the acts of
the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest. 47
In this case, Lolita would not have been able to go to Malaysia if not for the concerted eforts
of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos. First, it was Aringoy who knew Lolita, since Aringoy was
a neighbor of Lolitas grandfather. It was Aringoy who referred Lolita to Lalli, a fact clearly
admitted by Aringoy. Second, Lolita would not have been able to go to Malaysia if Lalli had
not purchased Lolitas boat ticket to Malaysia. This fact can be deduced from the testimony
of Nora Mae Adling (Nora), ticketing clerk ofAleson Shipping Lines, owner of the vessel M/V
Mary Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to Sandakan, Malaysia route and of M/V Kristel Jane 3.
Nora testified in open court that Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to
Sandakan, not only for herself but also for other women passengers. Lallis claim that she
only goes to Malaysia to visit her daughter and son-in-law does not explain the fact why she
bought the boat tickets of the other women passengers going to Malaysia. In fact, it appears
strange that Lalli visited Malaysia nine (9) times in a span of one year and three months
(March 2004 to June 2005) just to visit her daughter and son-in-law. In Malaysia, it
was Relampagos who introduced Lolita and her companions to a Chinese Malay called Boss
as their first employer. When Lolita and her companions went back to the hotel to
tell Relampagos and Lalli that they did not want to work as prostitutes, Relampagos brought
Lolita and the girls on board a van to Sangawan China Labuan, where they stayed in a room
for one night. The next day, they were picked up by a van and brought to Pipen Club, where
Lolita and her companions worked as prostitutes. To date, accused Relampagos is at large
and has not been brought under the jurisdiction of the courts for his crimes.
Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing
oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal
proceedings.48 The unexplained flight of an accused person may as a general rule be taken
into consideration as evidence having a tendency to establish his guilt. 49 Clearly, in this
case, the flight of accused Relampagos, who is still at-large, shows an indication of guilt in
the crimes he has been charged.
It is clear that through the concerted eforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos, Lolita was
recruited and deployed to Malaysia to work as a prostitute. Such conspiracy
among Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos could be deduced from the manner in which the crime
was perpetrated each of the accused played a pivotal role in perpetrating the crime of illegal
recruitment, and evinced a joint common purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.
For these reasons, this Court affirms the CA Decision, affirming the RTC Decision, declaring
accused Ronnie Aringoy y Masion and Hadja Jarma Lalli y Purih guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate in Criminal Case No.
21930, with a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 imposed on each of the
accused.
Criminal Case No. 21908 (Trafficking in Persons)
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 (RA 9208), otherwise known as the Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2003, defines Trafficking in Persons, as follows:
Trafficking in Persons refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring,

or receipt of persons with or without the victims consent or knowledge, within
or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for
the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of RA 9208 enumerates the prohibited acts of Trafficking in Persons, one of which
is:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means,
including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or
training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage.
The crime of Trafficking in Persons is qualified when committed by a syndicate, as provided

in Section 6(c) of RA 9208:
(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is

deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.
Section 10(c) of RA 9208 provides for the penalty of qualified trafficking:
(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall sufer the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00).
The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act is a new law passed last 26 May 2003, designed to
criminalize the act of trafficking in persons for prostitution, sexual
exploitation,foced labor and slavery, among others.
In this case, Aringoy claims that he cannot be convicted of the crime of Trafficking in Persons
because he was not part of the group that transported Lolita from the Philippines to Malaysia
on board the ship M/V Mary Joy. In addition, he presented his niece, Rachel, as witness to
testify that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. On the other
hand, Lalli denies any involvement in the recruitment and trafficking of Lolita, claiming she
only met Lolita for the first time on board M/V Mary Joy going to Malaysia.
The testimony of Aringoys niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work
in bars cannot be given credence. Lolita did not even have a passport to go to Malaysia and
had to use her sisters passport when Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos first recruited her. It is
questionable how she could have been travelling to Malaysia previously without a passport,
as Rachel claims. Moreover, even if it is true that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to
work in bars, the crime of Trafficking in Persons can exist even with the victims consent or
knowledge under Section 3(a) of RA 9208.
Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only limited to
transportation of victims, but also includes the act of recruitment of victims for trafficking. In
this case, since it has been sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt, as discussed in
Criminal Case No. 21930, that all the three accused (Aringoy, Lalliand Relampagos)
conspired and confederated with one another to illegally recruit Lolita to become a prostitute
in Malaysia, it follows that they are also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Qualified Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate under RA 9208 because the crime
of recruitment for prostitution also constitutes trafficking.
When an act or acts violate two or more diferent laws and constitute two diferent ofenses,
a prosecution under one will not bar a prosecution under the other. 50 The constitutional right
against double jeopardy only applies to risk of punishment twice for the same ofense, or for
an act punished by a law and an ordinance.51 The prohibition on double jeopardy does not
apply to an act or series of acts constituting diferent ofenses.
DAMAGES
Lolita claimed actual damages of 28,000, which she allegedly paid to the accused as
placement fee for the work of restaurant entertainer in Malaysia. The trial court did not
award this amount to Lolita. We agree and affirm the trial courts non-award due to Lolitas
inconsistent statements on the payment of placement fee. In her sworn statement, Lolita
alleged that she paid 28,000 as placement fee to Lalli. 52 On cross-examination, however,
she admitted that she never paid 28,000 to the accused. 53
We, however, modify and increase the payment of damages in the crime of Trafficking in
Persons from 50,000 to 500,000 as moral damages and 50,000 to 100,000 as
exemplary damages.
The Civil Code describes moral damages in Article 2217:
Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical sufering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may
be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act for
omission.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are awarded in addition to the payment of moral
damages, by way of example or correction for the public good, as stated in the Civil Code:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or

correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal ofenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may
be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid
to the ofended party.
The payment of 500,000 as moral damages and 100,000 as exemplary damages for the
crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code,
which states:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal ofense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3
of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action
mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes
of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as
a prostitute without ones consent and to be sexually violated four to five times a day by
diferent strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced
physical sufering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation when she was trafficked as a prostitute in
Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was aggravated, being committed by a
syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is likewise justified.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 February 2010,
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City dated 29 November
2005, finding accused Lalli and Aringoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate, with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1.
In Criminal Case No. 21908, each of the accused is sentenced to sufer the penalty
of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of 2,000,000;
2.
In Criminal Case No. 21930, each of the accused is sentenced to sufer the penalty
of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of 500,000;
3.
Each of the accused is ordered to pay the ofended party Lolita Plando y Sagadsad,
jointly and severally, the sum of 500,000 as moral damages, and 100,000 as
exemplary damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons; and to pay the costs.
The Court cannot pronounce the liability of accused-at-large Nestor Relampagos as

jurisdiction over his person has not been acquired.
SO ORDERED.
SIAN CENTER FOR CAREER AND EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM AND SERVICES, INC.
(ACCESS), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
IBNO MEDIALES, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner ASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER & EMPLOYMENT
SYSTEM & SERVICES, INC. (ACCESS) seeks to modify the monetary awards against it in
the Decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated October 14,
1997, a case for illegal dismissal.
The records disclose that petitioner hired respondent IBNO MEDIALES to work as a
mason in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, with a monthly salary of 1,200 Saudi Riyals (SR). The
term of his contract was two (2) years, from February 28, 1995 until February 28,
1997.
On May 26, 1996, respondent applied with petitioner for vacation leave with pay which
he earned after working for more then a year. His application for leave was granted. While
en route to the Philippines, his co-workers informed him that he has been dismissed from
service. The information turned out to be true.
On June 17, 1996, respondent filed a complaint with the labor arbiter for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, refund of transportation fare, illegal deductions,
non-payment of 13th month pay and salary for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract.
[1]
On March 17, 1997, the labor arbiter found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal.
The dispositive portion reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the illegality of
complainants dismissal and ordering the respondent ACCESS and/or ABDULLAH
LELINA to pay the complainant the amount of SR 13,200 representing
complainants payment for the unexpired portion of his contract and refund
of the illegality deducted amount lessP5,000.00, the legally allowed placement fee.
Respondent are further ordered to pay attorneys fees equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the judgment award or the amount of SR 1,320, within ten
(10) days from receipt hereof.
All other issues are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERD. (emphasis supplied)
It is noteworthy, however, that in the body of his decision, the labor arbiter applied
Section 10 R.A. 8042,[2] the law relative to the protection of Filipino overseas-workers, and
computed private respondents salary for the unexpired portion of his contract as follows:
SR1,200 x 3 months = SR3,600.
On appeal by petitioner, the NLRC affirmed the factual findings of the labor arbiter but
modified the appealed decision by deleting the order of refund of excessive placement fee
for lack of jurisdiction.[3]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration with respect to the labor arbiters award
of SR13,200 in the dispositive portion of the decision, representing respondents salary for
the unexpired portion of his contract. invoking Section 10 R.A. 8042. Petitioner urged that its
liability for respondents salary is for only three (3) months. Petitioner claimed that it should
pay only SR 3.600 (SR 1,200 x 3 months) for the unexpired portion of respondents
employment and SR360 (10% of SR3,600) for attorneys fees.[4]
The NLRC denied petitioners motion. It ruled that R.A. 8042 does not apply as
respondents employment which started in February 1995 occurred prior to its
effectivity on July 15, 1995.[5]
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
In the case at bar, petitioners illegal dismissal from service is no longer
disputed. Petitioner merely impugns the monetary awards granted by the NLRC to private
respondent. It submits that although the unexpired portion of private respondents
employment contract is eight (8) months, [6] it is liable to pay respondent only three (3)
months of his basic salary, pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. 8042, or SR1,200 (monthly salary)
multiplied by 3 months, for a total of SR3,600. Petitioner claims that the NLRC erred in ruling
that as private respondents employment started only on February 28, 1995, R.A. 8042,
which took efect on July 15, 1995, would not apply to his case. Petitioner argues that it is
not the date of employment but the date of dismissal which should be considered in
determining the applicability of R.A. 8042. Petitioner prays that the award in the NLRC
Decision dated October 14, 1997, be changed to SR3,600 instead of 13,200 and
that the award of attorneys fees be deleted.
We affirm with modifications.
As a rule, jurisdiction is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the
action.[7] In the case at bar, private respondents cause of action did not accrue on the date
of his date of his employment or on February 28, 1995. His cause of action arose only from
the-time he was illegally dismissed by petitioner from service in June 1996, after his vacation
leave expired. It is thus clear that R.A. 8042 which took effect a year earlier in July
1995 applies to the case at bar.
Under Section 10 of R.A. 8042, a worker dismissed from overseas employment without
just, valid or authorized cause is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.
In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondents employment contract is
eight (8) months. Private respondent should therefore be paid his basic salary
corresponding to three (3) months or a total of SR3,600.[8]
We note that this same computation was made by the labor arbiter in the body of his
decision.[9] Despite said computation in the body of the decision, however, the labor arbiter
awarded higher sum (SR13,200) in the dispositive portion.
The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or
the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that
the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering
nothing. However, where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is
so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body
of the decision will prevail.[10]
We find that the labor arbiters award of a higher amount in the dispositive portion was
clearly an error for there is nothing in the text of the decision which support the award of
said higher amount. We reiterate that the correct award to private respondent for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract is SR3,600.
We come now to the award of attorneys fees in favor of private respondent. Article 2208
of the Civil Code allows attorneys fees to be awarded when its claimant is compelled to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of
an unjustified act or omission of the party for whom it is sought. Moreover, attorneys fees
are recoverable when there is sufficient showing of bad faith.[11] The Labor Code,[12] on the
other hand, fixes the attorneys fees that may be recovered in an amount which should not
exceed 10% of the total amount of wages awarded.
In the case at bar, petitioners bad faith in dismissing private respondent is
manifest. Respondent was made to believe that he would be temporarily leaving Jeddah,
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for a 30-day vacation leave with pay. However, while on board the
plane back to the Philippines, his co-employees told him that he has been dismissed from his
job as he was given only a one-way plane ticket by petitioner. True enough, private
respondent was not allowed to return to his jobsite in Jeddah after his vacation
leave. Thus, private respondent was compelled to file an action for illegal dismissal
with the labor arbiter and hence entitled to an award of attorneys fees.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission, dated October 14, 1997, is AFFIRMED with modifications: petitioner is
ordered to pay private respondent IBNO MEDIALES the peso equivalent of the amounts
of SR3,600 for the unexpired portion of his employment contract, and SR360 for attorneys
fees. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 77828 February 8, 1989

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER CHERYL AMPIL and MA. LOURDES A.
ZARAGOZA, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
This Petition for certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Decision dated 19 March
1987 of the public respondent Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), in
POEA Case No. L-86-01-026.
The pertinent facts follow:
Manuel Zaragoza had been an employee of petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
("Eastern") for several years, having served as engineer on board several of Eastern's
vessels since 1973. At the time of his death on 18 September 1983, Manuel Zaragoza was in
Kakogawa, Japan serving as Chief Engineer of the M/V Eastern Meteor, a vessel then owned
by Freesia Shipping Company S.A. and chartered by Eastern. A Death Certificate 1issued by
Dr. Masayuki Inoue of the Kakogawa Hospital stated that Zaragoza's death had been caused
by "myocardial infarction."
On 17 December 1985, Manuel Zaragoza's widow, private respondent Ma. Lourdes A.
Zaragoza, filed with the public respondent POEA a formal Complaint 2 (docketed as POEA
Case No. L-86-01-026) against Eastern, after the latter allegedly had refused to act favorably
on the widow's claim for gratuity arising from the death of her husband. Mrs. Zaragoza
alleged that the M/V Eastern Meteor having been registered with the Ministerio de Hacienda
y Tesoro of the Republic of Panama at the time of her husband's death, she was entitled to
receive from Eastern death benefits in the amount of P100,000.00 as provided under
Memorandum Circular No. 71 issued on 18 November 1981 by the former National Seamen
Board. Moral damages or P50,000.00 and attorney's fees were likewise sought by the widow.
In its Answer, 3 Eastern alleged, among other things, that no cause of ac ' petition existed
against it as the company had already paid Mrs. Zaragoza a cash benefit of P12,000.00 for
the death of her husband and an amount of P5,000.00 for funeral expenses. Eastern further
denied having incurred any additional liability under NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71,
alleging that "[the M/V Eastern Meteor] had been then also considered a vessel of the
Philippine registry." Eastern assailed the jurisdiction of the POEA over the complaint,
asserting that the company "is not engaged in overseas employment even as [it] admits
that [its] vessels are ocean-going vessels."
On 19 March 1987, public respondent POEA rendered a Decision 4 requiring petitioner to pay
to private respondent Mrs. Zaragoza P88,000.00 as the unpaid balance of her deceased
husband's death benefits, and dismissing the claim for moral damages for want of
jurisdiction.
From this judgment, Eastern came directly to this Court. We issued a Temporary Restraining
Order on 8 April 1987. 5
A preliminary point was raised by the Solicitor General in his Comment 6 on the Petition, that
Eastern had failed to exhaust administrative remedies in this case i.e., that petitioner
Company did not interpose an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission before
coming to this Court on certiorari. Inasmuch, however, as the petition at bar raises questions
essentially legal in nature, we do not consider the same as having been prematurely filed
with this Court. 7
We address first the issue of jurisdiction. Petitioner Company does not deny that Manuel
Zaragoza was its employee at the time of his death on 18 September 1983. Petitioner would
contend, however, that the company had neither been nor acted as an "overseas employer"
of Manuel Zaragoza, and that the latter had never been its "overseas employee." Hence,
petitioner concludes, private respondent's claim for death benefits should have been filed
with the Social Security System, not with the POEA.
The argument does not persuade. Applicable here and petitioner admits this in its Petition is
Executive Order No. 797 (promulgated 1 May 1982), which abolished the former National
Seamen Board and created in its place the present Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration. Section 4 (a) of Executive Order No. 797 expressly provides that the POEA
"shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims,
involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen. " This provision is
clarified substantially in the Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the
POEA, Section 1 (d), Rule 1, Book VI of which provides that "claims for death, disability and
other benefits arising out of [overseas] employment" fall within the POEA's original and
exclusive jurisdiction. The following definitions contained in Section 1, Rule II, Book I of said
POEA Rules and Regulations are also useful:
g. Contract Worker-means any person working or who has worked overseas
under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen.
xxx xxx xxx
x. Overseas Employment-means employment of a worker outside the
Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying international
waters, covered by a valid employment contract.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
We note that the statute and the relevant regulations refer to employment of Filipino
workers overseas, i.e., outside the Philippines. The statute and regulations do not limit their
coverage to non-Filipino employers. Filipinos working overseas share the same risks and
burdens whether their employers be Filipino or foreign.
Neither party disputes that Manuel Zaragoza, at the time of his death, was covered by an
existing contract of employment with Eastern and that the deceased was at that time
employed as a seaman (Chief Engineer) on board the M/V Eastern Meteor, which vessel-then
chartered by Eastern-was engaged in plying ocean routes, outside Philippine waters and
which, at the time of Zaragoza's demise, was berthed in a foreign port (Japan). In addition,
the record shows that Eastern submitted its shipping articles to public respondent POEA for
processing, formalization and approval, 8 apparently in recognition of POEA!s regulatory
authority over overseas employment under Executive Order No. 797. While not in itself
conclusive proof of employment by Eastern of people overseas, nevertheless, this latter
circumstance strongly suggests that Eastern must have regarded itself as engaged in such
employment, otherwise, it would not have found it necessary or useful to submit its shipping
articles to the POEA. We hold that the complaint of private respondent widow of Manuel
Zaragoza falls well within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of public respondent POEA. 9
We come to the issue regarding the amount of death benefits for which Eastern may be held
liable to private respondent. In assessing such amount, the POEA relied upon Memorandum
Circular No. 71 (efective 1 December 1981) issued by the now defunct National Seamen
Board (NSB):
SECTION D. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS DURING THE, TERM OF THE
CONTRACT.
1. In case of total and permanent disability or death of the seaman during the
term of his contract, the company II pay the ,seaman or his beneficial the
amount of:
P100,000.00-for masters and Chief Engineers
75,000.00 - for other officers
50,000.00 - for ratings
over and above the benefits which are provided for abd are the liabilities of
the Philippine government under the Philippine laws. Provided that when the
employment of a seaman is also covered by a collective bargaining
agreement or death/disability insurance which provides for higher benefits
than those enumerated above, in which case, the seaman or his
heirs/beneficiaries may elect under what scheme he is they are claiming.
Recovery under one scheme is a bar to any farther recovery; except where
there is a clear showing in the collective bargaining agreement and/or
death/disability insurance that benefits provided for in the collective
bargaining agreement and death/disability insurance are separate and distinct
from the abovementioned benefits. The exact amount of insurance that each
seaman is covered under this contract are as stipulated in Column J of
Appendix 2 of this contract. In addition to the above, the expenses for

hospitalization of the seaman shall be borne by the employer.
2. In lieu of paragraph 1 above, the liability of [an] employer of a Philippine
registered vessel (exceptforeign- owned vessels bareboat-chartered to a
Philippine shipping company) shall be governed by existing Philippine Laws
over and above the benefits granted [under] Philippine laws on social security
and employees' compensation benefits provided that the Philippine registered
vessel and any vessel bareboat- chartered to a Philippine Shipping Company
shall be manned by full Filipino crews. (Emphasis and brackets supplied).
It is the argument of Eastern here that NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71 collides with the
public law principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Eastern also argues that assuming
the validity of the Circular, its provisions (specifically paragraph 1) do not cover Eastern.
These arguments again do not persuade. Concerning the alleged unconstitutionality of NSB
Memorandum Circular No. 71, Article 20 of the Labor Code before its repeal by Executive
Order No. 797, provided in salient part:
Art. 20. National Seamen Board.-A National Seamen Board is hereby created
which shall develop and maintain a comprehensive program for Filipino
seamen employed overseas. It shall have the power and duty:
xxx xxx xxx
2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of
shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and
secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers
and secure compliance therewith;
xxx xxx xxx.
(Emphasis supplied)
The question of validity of the delegation of quasi-legislative power in favor of NSB's
successor, respondent POEA, embodied in the article quoted above, was addressed and
resolved in the affirmative by the Court inEastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, et al. 10 On the authority of this case, we hold that NSB
Memorandum Circular No. 71 was issued in a valid exercise by the NSB of its "power and
duty ... [to] secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and
[to] secure compliance therewith."
We consider next petitioner's argument that it is not covered by the provisions of NSB
Memorandum Circular No. 71. Eastern submitted in evidence Certificate of Philippine
Register Nos. ICGD-78-0428 dated 28 December 197811 and ICGD-84-0288 dated 7 August
1984 12 to show that this M/V Eastern Meteor was registered with the Philippine Coast Guard
in 1978 and again in 1984. Eastern further maintained that M/V Eastern Meteor had always
been fully manned by a Philippine crew. The record also shows, however, that this vessel
was at the same time also registered in the Republic of Panama as evidenced by the Patente
Permanente de Navegacion Servicio Internacional Nos. 7708-77 (dated 31 March
1977) 13 and 770877-A (dated 27 February 1987). 14 Petitioner had in fact paid taxes to the
Panamanian government in 1978, 1979 1981, 1982 and 1983, 15 presumably because the
M/V Eastern Meteor was during those years operating under a valid Panamanian navigation
license. It, therefore, appears that at the time of the death of Manuel Zaragoza, the Eastern
Meteor was both foreign-owned and foreign-registered on one hand and upon the other
band, simultaneously registered in the Philippines. Interpreting Section D of Memorandum
Circular No. 71, it appears clear that paragraph 1 covers Philippine seamen working in
foreign-registered ships while paragraph 2 applies to Philippine seamen working on
Philippine-registered vessels. The parenthetical phrase "except foreign-owned vessels
bareboat-chartered to a Philippine shipping company" in paragraph 2 precisely covers the
situation of the Eastern Meteor, that is, a foreign-owned vessel registered in a foreign
country (Panama), with a second registration in the Philippines; such a vessel is excepted
from coverage by paragraph 2, and hence covered by paragraph 1 instead. If the MN
Eastern Meteor had been registered only in Panama, there would have been no question that
it was covered by paragraph 1 of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71. It is well- known that
foreign-owned and foreign-registered vessels have frequently also secured Philippine
registration where the interest or convenience of the owners dictated such second or dual
registration. The efect of the parenthetical phrase in paragraph 2 is, as already indicated, to
bring such dual-registered vessel within the scope not of paragraph 2, but of paragraph 1.
The fact that POEA Memorandum Circular No. 6 (Series of 1986) in upgrading death benefits
(P250,000.00 for master and chief engineers) specified that such upgraded benefits "shall
be applicable to all Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel provided the cause of
action occurs on March 1, 1986 and thereafter" suggests to us the correctness of our above
reading of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71. The underlying regulatory policy, as we see it,
is that Filipino seamen working on ocean-going vessels should receive the same wages and
benefits, without regard to the nationality or nationalities of the vessels on which they serve.
We hold that the POEA correctly held private respondent Mrs. Zaragoza entitled to the
benefits given to Philippine seamen under the provisions of Section D. paragraph 1 of NSB
Memorandum Circular No. 71, i.e. (1) P100,000.00 death benefit, and in addition, (2) death
and related benefits provided under applicable ordinary laws of the Philippines administered
by the Social Security System.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Decision of the POEA in POEA
Case No. L-86-01-026 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order of 8 April 1987
is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154213
August 23, 2012
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME LTD. AND AGEMAR MANNING AGENCY,

INC., Petitioners,
vs.
EST ANISLAO SURIO, FREDDIE PALGUIRAN, GRACIANO MORALES, HENRY CASTILLO,
ARISTOTLE ARREOLA, ALEXANDER YGOT, ANRIQUE BA TTUNG, GREGORIO
ALDOVINO, NARCISO FRIAS, VICTOR FLORES, SAMUEL MARCIAL, CARLITO
PALGUIRAN, DUQUE VINLUAN, .JESUS MENDEGORIN, NEIL FLORES, ROMEO
MANGALIAG, JOE GARFIN and SALESTINO SUSA, Respondents.
*
PEREZ
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On appeal is the decision the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on December 21, 2001
affirming the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) declaring itself to
be without appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) involving petitioners complaint for disciplinary action
against respondents.1
Respondents were former crewmembers of MT Seadance, a vessel owned by petitioner
Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. and manned and operated by petitioner Agemar
Manning Agency, Inc. While respondents were still on board the vessel, they experienced
delays in the payment of their wages and in the remittance of allotments, and were not paid
for extra work and extra overtime work. They complained about the vessels inadequate
equipment, and about the failure of the petitioners to heed their repeated requests for the
improvement of their working conditions. On December 19, 1993, when MT Seadance
docked at the port of Brofjorden, Sweden to discharge oil, representatives of the
International Transport Federation (ITF) boarded the vessel and found the wages of the
respondents to be below the prevailing rates. The ensuing negotiations between the ITF and
the vessel owner on the increase in respondents wages resulted in the payment by the
vessel owner of wage diferentials and the immediate repatriation of respondents to the
Philippines.
Subsequently, on December 23, 1993, the petitioners filed against the newly-repatriated
respondents a complaint for disciplinary action based on breach of discipline and for the
reimbursement of the wage increases in the Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office of
the POEA.
During the pendency of the administrative complaint in the POEA, Republic Act No. 8042
(Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) took efect on July 15, 1995. Section 10
of Republic Act No. 8042 vested original and exclusive jurisdiction over all money claims
arising out of employer-employee relationships involving overseas Filipino workers in the
Labor Arbiters, to wit:
Section 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of
the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for
actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The jurisdiction over such claims was previously exercised by the POEA under the
POEA Rules and Regulations of 1991 (1991 POEA Rules).
On May 23, 1996, the POEA dismissed the complaint for disciplinary action. Petitioners
received the order of dismissal on July 24, 1996.2
Relying on Section 1, Rule V, Book VII of the 1991 POEA Rules, petitioners filed a partial
appeal on August 2, 1996 in the NLRC, still maintaining that respondents should be
administratively sanctioned for their conduct while they were on board MT Seadance.
On March 21, 1997, the NLRC dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction, 3 thus:
We dismiss the partial appeal.
The Commission has no jurisdiction to review cases decided by the POEA Administrator
involving disciplinary actions. Under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
the Labor Arbiter shall have jurisdiction over money claims involving employer-employee
relationship (sec. 10, R.A. 8042). Said law does not provide that appeals from decisions
arising from complaint for disciplinary action rest in the Commission.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, instant appeal from the Order of May 23, 1996 is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied their motion. They
received the denial on July 8, 1997.4
Petitioners then commenced in this Court a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus.
Citing St. Martin Funeral Homes v. National Labor Relations Commission, 5 however, the Court
referred the petition to the CA on November 25, 1998.
Petitioners contended in their petition that:
THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND/OR GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING
PETITIONERS APPEAL AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHEN IT REFUSED TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF PETITIONERS APPEAL DESPITE BEING EMPOWERED TO DO SO UNDER THE
LAW.6
On December 21, 2001, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus, holding
that the inclusion and deletion of overseas contract workers from the POEA
blacklist/watchlist were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POEA to the exclusion of the
NLRC, and that the NLRC had no appellate jurisdiction to review the matter, viz:
Section 10 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995, provides that:
"Money Claims Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the
complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any
law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for
actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
xxxx
Likewise, the Rules and Regulations implementing RA 8042 reiterate the jurisdiction of POEA,
thus:
"Section 28. Jurisdiction of the POEA. The POEA shall exercise original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide:
a) All cases, which are administrative in character, involving or arising out of violations of
rules and regulations relating to licensing and registration of recruitment and employment
agencies or entities; and
b) Disciplinary action cases and other special cases, which are administrative in character,
involving employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino migrant workers."
Further, Sections 6 and 7 Rule VII, Book VII of the POEA Rules & Regulations (1991) provide:
"Sec. 6. Disqualification of Contract Workers. Contract workers, including seamen, against
whom have been imposed or with pending obligations imposed upon them through an order,
decision or resolution shall be included in the POEA Blacklist Workers shall be disqualified
from overseas employment unless properly cleared by the Administration or until their
suspension is served or lifted.
Sec. 7. Delisting of the Contract Workers Name from the POEA Watchlist. The name of an
overseas worker may be excluded, deleted and removed from the POEA Watchlist only after
disposition of the case by the Administration."
Thus, it can be concluded from the afore-quoted law and rules that, public respondent has
no jurisdiction to review disciplinary cases decided by the POEA involving contract workers.
Clearly, the matter of inclusion and deletion of overseas contract workers in the POEA
Blacklist/Watchlist is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POEA to the exclusion of the
public respondent. Nor has the latter appellate jurisdiction to review the findings of the POEA
involving such cases.
xxx
In fine, we find and so hold, that, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public
respondent when it issued the assailed Decision and Order, dated March 21, 1997 and June
13, 1997, respectively, dismissing petitioners appeal from the decision of the POEA.
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition not impressed with merit, the same is hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.7
Issue
Petitioners still appeal, submitting to the Court the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW ON APPEAL CASES DECIDED BY
THE POEA ON MATTERS PERTAINING TO DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
They contend that both the CA and the NLRC had no basis to rule that the NLRC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal only because Republic Act No. 8042 had not provided for
its retroactive application.
Respondents counter that the appeal should have been filed with the Secretary of Labor who
had exclusive jurisdiction to review cases involving administrative matters decided by the
POEA.
Ruling
The petition for review lacks merit.
Petitioners adamant insistence that the NLRC should have appellate authority over the
POEAs decision in the disciplinary action because their complaint against respondents was
filed in 1993 was unwarranted. Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section 10,
transferred the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide money claims involving
overseas Filipino workers from the POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the law did not remove from
the POEA the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all disciplinary action
cases and other special cases administrative in character involving such workers. The
obvious intent of Republic Act No. 8042 was to have the POEA focus its eforts in resolving all
administrative matters afecting and involving such workers. This intent was even expressly
recognized in the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 promulgated on February 29, 1996, viz:
Section 28. Jurisdiction of the POEA. The POEA shall exercise original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide:
(a) all cases, which are administrative in character, involving or arising out of violations or
rules and regulations relating to licensing and registration of recruitment and employment
agencies or entities; and
(b) disciplinary action cases and other special cases, which are administrative in character,
involving employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino migrant workers.
Section 29. Venue The cases mentioned in Section 28(a) of this Rule, may be filed with the
POEA Adjudication Office or the DOLE/POEA regional office of the place where the
complainant applied or was recruited, at the option of the complainant. The office with which
the complaint was first filed shall take cognizance of the case.
Disciplinary action cases and other special cases, as mentioned in the preceding Section,
shall be filed with the POEA Adjudication Office.
It is clear to us, therefore, that the NLRC had no appellate jurisdiction to review the decision
of the POEA in disciplinary cases involving overseas contract workers.
Petitioners position that Republic Act No. 8042 should not be applied retroactively to the
review of the POEAs decision dismissing their complaint against respondents has no support
in jurisprudence. Although, as a rule, all laws are prospective in application unless the
contrary is expressly provided,8 or unless the law is procedural or curative in nature, 9 there is
no serious question about the retroactive applicability of Republic Act No. 8042 to the appeal
of the POEAs decision on petitioners disciplinary action against respondents. In a way,
Republic Act No. 8042 was a procedural law due to its providing or omitting guidelines on
appeal. A law is procedural, according to De Los Santos v. Vda. De Mangubat, 10 when it
Refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that
courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of
statues they may be given retroactive efect on actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely afected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Republic Act No. 8042 applies to petitioners complaint by virtue of the case being then still
pending or undetermined at the time of the laws passage, there being no vested rights in
rules of procedure.11 They could not validly insist that the reckoning period to ascertain
which law or rule should apply was the time when the disciplinary complaint was originally
filed in the POEA in 1993. Moreover, Republic Act No. 8042 and its implementing rules and
regulations were already in efect when petitioners took their appeal. A statute that
eliminates the right to appeal and considers the judgment rendered final and unappealable
only destroys the right to appeal, but not the right to prosecute an appeal that has been
perfected prior to its passage, for, at that stage, the right to appeal has already vested and
cannot be impaired.12 Conversely and by analogy, an appeal that is perfected when a new
statute afecting appellate jurisdiction comes into efect should comply with the provisions of
the new law, unless otherwise provided by the new law. Relevantly, petitioners need to be
reminded that the right to appeal from a decision is a privilege established by positive laws,
which, upon authorizing the taking of the appeal, point out the cases in which it is proper to
present the appeal, the procedure to be observed, and the courts by which the appeal is to
be proceeded with and resolved.13 This is why we consistently hold that the right to appeal is
statutory in character, and is available only if granted by law or statute. 14
When Republic Act No. 8042 withheld the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC in respect of
cases decided by the POEA, the appellate jurisdiction was vested in the Secretary of Labor in
accordance with his power of supervision and control under Section 38(1), Chapter 7, Title II,
Book III of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, to wit:
Section 38. Definition of Administrative Relationship. Unless otherwise expressly stated in
the Code or in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies,
administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows:
Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify
acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of
plans and programs. Unless a diferent meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law
governing the relationship of particular agencies, the word "control" shall encompass
supervision and control as defined in this paragraph. xxx.
Thus, Section 1, Part VII, Rule V of the 2003 POEA Rules and Regulations specifically
provides, as follows:
Section 1. Jurisdiction. The Secretary shall have the exclusive and original jurisdiction to
act on appeals or petition for review of disciplinary action cases decided by the
Administration.
In conclusion, we hold that petitioners should have appealed the adverse decision of the
POEA to the Secretary of Labor instead of to the NLRC. Consequently, the CA, being correct
on its conclusions, committed no error in upholding the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on December 21, 2001 by the Court of
Appeals; andORDER the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-50734-37 February 20, 1981

WALLEM PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. MINISTER OF LABOR, in his capacity as Chairman of the National
Seamen Board Proper, JAIME CAUNCA, ANTONIO CABRERA, EFREN GARCIA, JOSE
OJEDA and RODOLFO PAGWAGAN,respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with prayer that the Orders dated December
19, 1977 and April 3, 1979 of the National Seamen Board (NSB) be declared null and void.
Private respondents were hired by petitioner sometime in May 1975 to work as seamen for a
period of ten months on board the M/V Woermann Sanaga, a Dutch vessel owned and
operated by petitioner's European principals. While their employment contracts were still in
force, private respondents were dismissed by their employer, petitioner herein, and were
discharged from the ship on charges that they instigated the International Transport
Federation (ITF) to demand the application of worldwide ITF seamen's rates to their crew.
Private respondents were repatriated to the Philippines on October 27, 1975 and upon their
arrival in Manila, they instituted a complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal and
recovery of wages and other benefits corresponding to the five months' unexpired period of
their shipboard employment contract.
In support of their complaint, private respondents submitted a Joint Affidavit 1 stating the
circumstances surrounding their employment and subsequent repatriation to the Philippines,
material averments of which are herein below reproduced:
JOINTAFFIDAVIT
xxx xxx xxx
5. That aside from our basic monthly salary we are entitled to two (2) months
vacation leave, daily subsistence allowance of US$8.14 each, daily food
allowance of US$2.50. as well as overtime pay which we failed to receive
because our Shipboard Employment Contract was illegally terminated;
6. That while we were in Rotterdam, on or about July 9, 1975, representative
of the ITF boarded our vessel and talked with the Ship's Captain;
7. That the following day, the representatives of the ITF returned and was
followed by Mr. M.S.K. Ogle who is the Company's Administrative Manager,
again went to see the Captain;
8. That at around 7:00 in the evening all the crew members were called in the
Mess Hall where the ITF representatives informed us that they have just
entered into a "Special Agreement" with the Wallem Shipping Management,

Ltd., represented by Mr. M.S.K. Ogle, Administrative Manager, wherein new
salary rates was agreed upon and that we were going to be paid our salary
diferentials in view of the new rates;
9. That in the same meeting, Mr. M.S.K. Ogle also spoke where he told that a
Special Agreement has been signed and that we will be receiving new pay
rate and enjoined us to work hard and be good boys;
10. That the same evening we received our salary diferentials based on the
new rates negotiated for us by the ITF.
11. That while we were in the Port Dubai, Saudi Arabia, we were not receiving
our pay, since the Ship's Captain refused to implement the world-wide rates
and insisted on paying us the Far East Rate;
12. That the Port Dubai is one that is within the Worldwide rates sphere.
13. That on October 22, 1975, Mr. Greg Nacional Operation Manager of
respondent corporation, arrived in Dubai Saudi Arabia and boarded our ship;
14. That on October 23, 1975, Mr. Nacional called all the crew members,
including us to a meeting at the Mess Hall and there he explained that the
Company cannot accept the worldwide rate. The Special Agreement signed by
Mr. Ogle in behalf of the Company is nothing but a scrap of paper. Mr. Jaime
Caunca then asked Mr. Nacional, in view of what he was saying, whether the
Company will honor the Special Agreement and Mr. Nacional answered "Yes".
That we must accept the Far East Rates which was put to a vote. Only two
voted for accepting the Far East Rates;
15. That immediately thereafter Mr. Nacional left us;
16. That same evening, Mr. Nacional returned and threatened that he has
received a cable from the Home Office that if we do not accept the Far East
Rate, our services will be terminated and there will be a change in crew;
17. That when Mr. Nacional left, we talked amongst ourselves and decided to
accept the Far East Rates;
18. That in the meeting that evening because of the threat we informed Mr.
Nacional we were accepting the Far East Rate and he made us sign a
document to that efect;
19. That we the complainants with the exception of Leopoldo Mamaril and
Efren Garcia, were not able to sign as we were at the time on work schedules,
and Mr. Nacional did not bother anymore if we signed or not;
20. That after the meeting Mr. Nacional cabled the Home Office, informing
them that we the complainants with the exception of Messrs. Mamaril and
Garcia were not accepting the Far East Rates;
21. That in the meeting of October 25, 1975, Mr. Nacional signed a document
whereby he promised to give no priority of first preference in "boarding a
vessel and that we are not blacklisted";
22. That in spite of our having accepted the Far East Rate, our services were
terminated and advised us that there was a change in crew;
23. That on October 27, 1975, which was our scheduled flight home, nobody
attended us, not even our clearance for our group travel and consequently we
were not able to board the plane, forcing us to sleep on the floor at the airport
in the evening of October 27, 1975;
24. That the following day we went back to the hotel in Dubai which was a two
hours ride from the airport, where we were to await another flight for home
via Air France;
25. That we were finally able to leave for home on November 2, 1975 arriving
here on the 3rd of November;
26. That we paid for all excess baggages;
27. That Mr. Nacional left us stranded, since he went ahead on October 27,
1975;
28. That immediately upon arriving in Manila, we went to respondent
Company and saw Mr. Nacional, who informed us that we were not blacklisted,
however, Mr. Mckenzie, Administrative Manager did inform us that we were all
blacklisted;
29. That we were asking from the respondent Company our leave pay, which
they refused to give, if we did not agree to a US$100.00 deduction;
30. That with the exception of Messrs. Jaime Caunca Amado Manansala and
Antonio Cabrera, we received our leave pay with the US$100.00 deduction;
31. That in view of the written promise of Mr. Nacional in Dubai last October
23, 1975 to give us priority and preference in boarding a vessel and that we
were not blacklisted we have on several occasions approached him regarding
his promise, which up to the present he has refused to honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Answering the complaint, petitioner countered that when the vessel was in London, private
respondents together with the other crew insisted on worldwide ITF rate as per special
agreement; that said employees threatened the ship authorities that unless they agreed to
the increased wages the vessel would not be able to leave port or would have been picketed
and/or boycotted and declared a hot ship by the ITF; that the Master of the ship was left with
no alternative but to agree; that upon the vessel's arrival at the Asian port of Dubai on
October 22, 1975, a representative of petitioner went on board the ship and requested the
crew together with private respondents to desist from insisting worldwide ITF rate and
instead accept the Far East rate; that said respondents refused to accept Far East ITF rates
while the rest of the Filipino crew members accepted the Far East rates; that private
respondents were replaced at the expense of petitioner and it was prayed that respondents
be required to comply with their obligations under the contract by requiring them to pay
their repatriation expenses and all other incidental expenses incurred by the master and
crew of the vessel.
After the hearing on the merits, the hearing Officer of the Secretariat rendered a
decision 2 on March 14, 1977 finding private respondents to have violated their contract of
employment when they accepted salary rates diferent from their contract verified and
approved by the National Seamen Board. As to the issue raised by private respondents that
the original contract has been novated, it was held that:
xxx xxx xxx
For novation to be a valid defense, it is a legal requirement that all parties to
the contract should give their consent. In the instant case only the
complainants and respondents gave their consent. The National Seamen
Board had no participation in the alleged novation of the previously approved
employment contract. It would have been diferent if the consent of the
National Seamen Board was first secured before the alleged novation of the
approved contract was undertaken, hence, the defense of novation is not in
order.
xxx xxx xxx
The Hearing Officer likewise rules that petitioner violated the contract when its
representative signed the Special Agreement and he signed the same at his own risk and
must bear the consequence of such act, and since both parties are in paridelicto, complaint
and counterclaim were dismissed for lack of merit but petitioner was ordered to pay
respondents Caunca and Cabrera their respective leave pay for the period that they have
served M/V Woermann Sanaga plus attorney's fees.
Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration with the Board which modified the
decision of the Secretariat in an Order 3 of December 19, 1977 and ruled that petitioner is
liable for breach of contract when it ordered the dismissal of private respondents and their
subsequent repatriation before the expiration of their respective employment contracts. The
Chairman of the Board stressed that "where the contract is for a definite period, the captain
and the crew members may not be discharged until after the contract shall have been
performed" citing the case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Ogilvie, et al. (104 Phil. 748). He
directed petitioner to pay private respondents the unexpired portion of their contracts and
their leave pay, less the amount they received as diferentials by virtue of the special
agreements entered in Rotterdam, and ten percent of the total amounts recovered as
attorney's fees.
Petitioner sought clarification and reconsideration of the said order and asked for a
confrontation with private respondents to determine the specific adjudications to be made. A
series of conferences were conducted by the Board. It was claimed by petitioner that it did
not have in its possession the records necessary to determine the exact amount of the
judgment since the records were in the sole custody of the captain of the ship and
demanded that private respondents produce the needed records. On this score, counsel for
respondents manifested that to require the master of the ship to produce the records would
result to undue delay in the disposition of the case to the detriment of his clients, some of
whom are still unemployed.
Under the circumstances, the Board was left with no alternative but to issue an Order dated
April 3, 1979 4 fixing the amount due private respondents at their three (3) months' salary
equivalent without qualifications or deduction. Hence,the instant petition before Us alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent official as Chairman of the Board, in
issuing said order which allegedly nullified the findings of the Secretariat and premised
adjudication on imaginary conditions which were never taken up with full evidence in the
course of hearing on the merits.
The whole controversy is centered around the liability of petitioner when it ordered the
dismissal of herein private respondents before the expiration of their respective employment
contracts.
In its Order of December 19, 1977 5 the Board, thru its Chairman, Minister Blas F. Ople, held
that there is no showing that the seamen conspired with the ITF in coercing the ship
authorities to grant salary increases, and the Special Agreement was signed only by
petitioner and the ITF without any participation from the respondents who, accordingly, may
not be charged as they were, by the Secretariat, with violation of their employment contract.
The Board likewise stressed that the crew members may not be discharged until after the
expiration of the contract which is for a definite period, and where the crew members are
discharged without just cause before the contract shall have been performed, they shall be
entitled to collect from the owner or agent of the vessel their unpaid salaries for the period
they were engaged to render the services, applying the case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc.
vs. Jesus Ogilivie et al. 6
The findings and conclusion of the Board should be sustained. As already intimated above,
there is no logic in the statement made by the Secretariat's Hearing Officer that the private
respondents are liable for breach of their employment contracts for accepting salaries higher
than their contracted rates. Said respondents are not signatories to the Special Agreement,
nor was there any showing that they instigated the execution thereof. Respondents should
not be blamed for accepting higher salaries since it is but human for them to grab every
opportunity which would improve their working conditions and earning capacity. It is a basic
right of all workingmen to seek greater benefits not only for themselves but for their families
as well, and this can be achieved through collective bargaining or with the assistance of
trade unions. The Constitution itself guarantees the promotion of social welfare and
protection to labor. It is therefore the Hearing Officer that gravely erred in disallowing the
payment of the unexpired portion of the seamen's respective contracts of employment.
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents was justified because the latter
threatened the ship authorities in acceeding to their demands, and this constitutes serious
misconduct as contemplated by the Labor Code. This contention is not well-taken. The
records fail to establish clearly the commission of any threat. But even if there had been
such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured because it is but natural for
them to employ some means of pressing their demands for petitioner, who refused to abide
with the terms of the Special Agreement, to honor and respect the same. They were only
acting in the exercise of their rights, and to deprive them of their freedom of expression is
contrary to law and public policy. There is no serious misconduct to speak of in the case at
bar which would justify respondents' dismissal just because of their firmness in their demand
for the fulfillment by petitioner of its obligation it entered into without any coercion, specially
on the part of private respondents.
On the other hand, it is petitioner who is guilty of breach of contract when they dismissed
the respondents without just cause and prior to the expiration of the employment contracts.
As the records clearly show, petitioner voluntarily entered into the Special Agreement with
ITF and by virtue thereof the crew men were actually given their salary diferentials in view
of the new rates. It cannot be said that it was because of respondents' fault that petitioner
made a sudden turn-about and refused to honor the special agreement.
In brief, We declare petitioner guilty of breach of contract and should therefore be made to
comply with the directives contained in the disputed Orders of December 19, 1977 and April
3, 1979.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated March 14, 1977 of the Hearing Officer
is SET ASIDE and the Orders dated December 19, 1977 and April 3, 1979 of the National
Seamen Board are AFFIRMED in toto. This decision is immediately executory. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109808 March 1, 1995

ESALYN CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDNA BONTO-PEREZ, HON. ROGELIO T. RAYALA, HON. DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA,
HON. JOSE N. SARMIENTO, CENTRUM PROMOTIONS PLACEMENT CORPORATION,
JOSE A. AZUCENA, JR., and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC. respondents.
PUNO, J.:
One of the anguished cries in our society today is that while our laws appear to protect the
poor, their interpretation is sometimes anti-poor. In the case at bench, petitioner, a poor,
uncounselled entertainment dancer signed a contract with her Japanese employer calling for
a monthly salary of One Thousand Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500) but later had to sign
an immoral side agreement reducing her salary below the minimum standard set by the
POEA. Petitioner invoked the law to collect her salary diferentials, but incredibly found
public respondent straining the seams of our law to disfavor her. There is no greater
disappointment to the poor like petitioner than to discover the ugly reality behind the
beautiful rhetoric of laws. We will not allow this travesty.
This is a petition for certiorari to review the Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), 1 dated December 29, 1992, which affirmed the Decision of public
respondent Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Administrator Jose N.
Sarmiento, dated February 17, 1992, dismissing petitioner's complaint for unpaid salaries
amounting to Six Thousand Dollars (US$6,000.00).
The facts are undisputed.
On December 1, 1988, petitioner, an entertainment dancer, entered into a standard
employment contract for overseas Filipino artists and entertainers with Planning Japan Co.,
Ltd., 2 through its Philippine representative, private respondent Centrum Placement &
Promotions Corporation. The contract had a duration of two (2) to six (6) months, and
petitioner was to be paid a monthly compensation of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
(US$1,5000.00). On December 5, 1888, the POEA approved the contract. Subsequently,
petitioner executed the following side agreement with her Japanese employer through her
local manager, Jaz Talents Promotion:
Date: Dec. 10, 1988
SUBJECT: Salary Deduction
MANAGERIAL COMMISSION
DATE OF DEPARTURE: _________________
ATTENTION: MR. IWATA
I, ESALYN CHAVEZ, DANCER, do hereby with my own free will and voluntarily
have the honor to authorize your good office to please deduct the amount
of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS ($250) from my contracted monthly salary
of SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS ($750) as monthly commission for my
Manager, Mr. Jose A. Azucena, Jr.
That, my monthly salary (net) is FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($500).
(sgd. by petitioner) 3
On December 16, 1988, petitioner left for Osaka, Japan, where she worked for six (6)
months, until June 10, 1989. She came back to the Philippines on June 14, 1989.
Petitioner instituted the case at bench for underpayment of wages with the POEA on
February 21, 1991. She prayed for the payment of Six Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$6,000.00),
representing the unpaid portion of her basic salary for six months. Charged in the case were
private respondent Centrum Promotions and Placement Corporation, the Philippine
representative of Planning Japan, Co., Inc., its insurer, Times Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.,
and Jaz Talents Promotion.
The complaint was dismissed by public respondent POEA Administrator on February 17,
1992. He ratiocinated,inter alia:
. . . Apparently and from all indications, complainant (referring to petitioner
herein) was satisfied and did not have any complaint (about) anything
regarding her employment in Japan until after almost two (2) years (when) she
filed the instant complaint on February 21, 1991. The records show that after
signing the Standard Employment Contract on December 1, 1988, she entered
into a side agreement with the Japanese employer thru her local manager, Jaz
Talents Promotion consenting to a monthly salary of US$750.00 which she
affirmed during the conference of May 21, 1991. Respondent agency had no
knowledge nor participation in the said agreement such that it could not be
faulted for violation of the Standard Employment Contract regarding the
stipulated salary. We cannot take cognizance of such violation when one of the
principal party (sic) thereto opted to receive a salary diferent from what has
been stipulated in their contract, especially so if the contracting party did not
consent/participate in such arrangement. Complainant (petitioner) cannot now
demand from respondent agency to pay her the salary based (on) the
processed Employment Contract for she is now considered in bad faith and
hence, estopped from claiming thereto thru her own act of consenting and
agreeing to receive a salary not in accordance with her contract of
employment. Moreover, her self-imposed silence for a long period of time
worked to her own disadvantage as she allowed laches to prevail which barred
respondent from doing something at the outset. Normally, if a person's right
(is) violated, she/he would immediately react to protect her/his rights which is
not true in the case at bar.
The term laches has been defined as one's negligence or failure to assert his
right in due time or within reasonable time from the accrual of his cause of
action, thus, leading another party to believe that there is nothing wrong with
his own claim. This resulted in placing the negligent party in estoppel to assert
or enforce his right. . . . Likewise, the Supreme Court in one case held that not
only is inaction within reasonable time to enforce a right the basic premise
that underlies a valid defense of laches but such inaction evinces implied
consent or acquiescence to the violation of the right . . .
Under the prevailing circumstances of this case, it is outside the regulatory
powers of the Administration to rule on the liability of respondent Jaz Talents
Promotions, if any, (it) not being a licensed private agency but a promotion
which trains entertainers for abroad.
xxx xxx xxx
(Citations omitted.)
On appeal, the NLRC upheld the Decision, thus:
We fail to see any conspiracy that the complainant (petitioner herein) imputes
to the respondents. She has, to put it bluntly, not established and/or laid the
basis for Us to arrive at a conclusion that the respondents have been and
should be held liable for her claims.
The way We see it, the records do not at all indicate any connection between
respondents Centrum Promotion & Placement Corporation and Jaz Talents
Promotion.
There is, therefore, no merit in the appeal. Hence, We affirmed. 4
Dissatisfied with the NLRC's Decision, petitioner instituted the present petition, alleging that
public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in finding: that she is guilty of
laches; that she entered into a side contract on December 10, 1988 for the reduction of her
basic salary to Seven Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$750.00) which superseded, nullified and
invalidated the standard employment contract she entered into on December 1, 1988; and
that Planning Japan Co., Ltd. and private respondents are not solidarily liable to her for Six
Thousand US Dollars (US$6,000.00) in unpaid wages. 5
The petition is meritorious.
Firstly, we hold that the managerial commission agreement executed by petitioner to
authorize her Japanese Employer to deduct Two Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$250.00) from
her monthly basic salary is void because it is against our existing laws, morals and public
policy. It cannot supersede the standard employment contract of December 1, 1988
approved by the POEA with the following stipulation appended thereto:
It is understood that the terms and conditions stated in this Employment

Contract are in conformance with the Standard Employment Contract for
Entertainers prescribed by the POEA under Memorandum Circular No. 2,
Series of 1986. Any alterations or changes made in any part of this contract
without prior approval by the POEA shall be null and void; 6 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The stipulation is in line with the provisions of Rule II, Book V and Section 2(f), Rule I, Book VI
of the 1991 Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, thus:
Book V, Rule II
Sec. 1. Employment Standards. The Administration shall determine, formulate
and review employment standards in accordance with the market
development and welfare objectives of the overseas employment program
and the prevailing market conditions.
Sec. 2. Minimum Provisions for Contract. The following shall be considered the
minimum requirements for contracts of employment:
a. Guaranteed wages for regular working hours and overtime
pay for services rendered beyond regular working hours in
accordance with the standards established by the
Administration;
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Standard Employment Contract. The administration shall undertake
development and/or periodic review of region, country and skills specific
employment contracts for landbased workers and conduct regular review of
standard employment contracts (SEC) for seafarers. These contracts shall
provide for minimum employment standards herein enumerated under
Section 2, of this Rule and shall recognize the prevailing labor and social
legislations at the site of employment and international conventions. The SEC
shall set the minimum terms and conditions of employment. All employers
and principals shall adopt the SEC in connection with the hiring of workers
without prejudice to their adoption of other terms and conditions of
employment over and above the minimum standards of the Administration.
(Emphasis supplied.)
and
BOOK VI, RULE I
Sec. 2. Grounds for suspension/cancellation of license.
xxx xxx xxx
f. Substituting or altering employment contracts and other documents

approved and verified by the Administration from the time of actual signing
thereof by the parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same
without the Administration's approval.
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, the basic salary of One Thousand Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500.00)
guaranteed to petitioner under the parties' standard employment contract is in accordance
with the minimum employment standards with respect to wages set by the POEA, Thus, the
side agreement which reduced petitioner's basic wage to Seven Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars
(US$750.00) is null and void for violating the POEA's minimum employment standards, and
for not having been approved by the POEA. Indeed, this side agreement is a scheme all too
frequently resorted to by unscrupulous employers against our helpless overseas workers
who are compelled to agree to satisfy their basic economic needs.
Secondly. The doctrine of laches or "stale demands"' cannot be applied to petitioner. Laches
has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length time
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, 7 thus
giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
declined to assert it. 8 It is not concerned with mere lapse of time; the fact of delay, standing
alone, is insufficient to constitute laches. 9
The doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace
of society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. 10 There is no absolute
rule as to what constitutes laches; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and
since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It
cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. 11
In the case at bench, petitioner filed her claim well within the three-year prescriptive period
for the filing of money claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor Code. 12 For this reason, we
hold the doctrine of laches inapplicable to petitioner. As we ruled in Imperial Victory
Shipping Agency v. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 (1991):
. . . Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our
courts are basically courts of law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be
invoked to resist the enforcement of an existing legal right. We have ruled
in Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court . . . that it is a long standing
principle that equity follows the law. Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are
bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them.
In Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals . . ., this Court was more emphatic upholding
the rules of procedure. We said therein:
As for equity, which has been aptly described as a "justice

outside legality," this applied only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of
procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent
positive rules being present here, they should pre-empt and
prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity.
Thus, where the claim was filed within the three-year statutory period,
recovery therefore cannot be barred by laches. Courts should never apply the
doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time limited for the
commencement of actions at law.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied. Citations omitted.)
Thirdly, private respondents Centrum and Times as well as Planning Japan Co., Ltd. the
agency's foreign principal are solidarily liable to petitioner for her unpaid wages. This is in
accordance with stipulation 13.7 of the parties' standard employment contract which
provides:
13.7. The Employer (in this case, Planning Japan Co., Ltd. ) and its locally (sic)
agent/promoter/representative (private respondent Centrum Promotions &
Placement Corporation) shall be jointly and severally responsible for the
proper implementation of the terms and conditions in this
Contract. 13 (Emphasis supplied.)
This solidary liability also arises from the provisions of Section 10(a)(2), Rule V, Book I
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, thus:
Sec. 10. Requirement before recruitment. Before recruiting any worker, the
private employment agency shall submit to the Bureau the following
documents:
a) A formal appointment or agency contract executed by a foreign-based
employer in favor of the license holder to recruit and hire personnel for the
former . . . . Such formal appointment or recruitment agreement shall contain
the following provisions, among others:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Power of the agency to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the
principal or foreign based employer for any of the violations of the
recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment.
xxx xxx xxx
Our overseas workers constitute an exploited class. Most of them come from the poorest
sector of our society. They are thoroughly disadvantaged. Their profile shows they live in
sufocating slums, trapped in an environment of crime. Hardly literate and in ill health, their
only hope lies in jobs they can hardly find in our country. Their unfortunate circumstance
makes them easy prey to avaricious employers. They will climb mountains, cross the seas,
endure slave treatment in foreign lands just to survive. Out of despondence, they will work
under sub-human conditions and accept salaries below the minimum. The least we can do is
to protect them with our laws in our land. Regretfully, respondent public officials who should
sympathize with the working class appear to have a diferent orientation.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of respondent POEA
Administrator and NLRC Commissioners in POEA Case No. Adj. 91-02-199 (ER), respectively
dated February 17 and December 29, 1992, and the Resolution of the NLRC, dated March 23,
1993, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are held jointly and severally liable
to petitioner for the payment of SIX THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$6,000.00) in unpaid
wages. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

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ARCO METAL PRODUCTS, CO., G.R. No.

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA

Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Arco Metal-NAFLU (SAMARM-NAFLU) v. Arco Metal

Petitioner is a company engaged in the manufacture of metal products, whereas

Respondent protested the prorated scheme, claiming that on several occasions

The petition ultimately fails.

Section 2. Sick Leave will only be granted to actual sickness duly

Section 3. That the Company further grants the amount of Two

On the second issue, however, petitioner founders.

Suspension 1 Sept. 1996 to 5 Oct. 1996

Associated Labor Unions, et al.

withdrawn. Meanwhile in DavaoIntegrated Port Stevedoring Services v. Abarquez,[19] the

unilaterally withdraw the existing privilege of

G.R. No. 174809

June 27, 2012

Decision[1] dated May

Petitioner Duty Free Philippines Services, Inc. is a manpower agency

On March 16, 1989, [respondent] Manolo Tria was employed by

After further investigation, it was discovered that the subject

Consequently, the Discipline Committee requested [respondent] to

[Respondent] denied his participation in the illegal transaction.

On August 27, 1998, the DFP Discipline Committee [DFPDC] issued

Aggrieved, [respondent] filed a Complaint against Petitioner for Illegal

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being considered, judgment is

The claim for damages is denied for lack of merit.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER

DFPSI IS THE DIRECT EMPLOYER OF RESPONDENT INSTEAD

THE ISSUE AS TO WHO TERMINATED RESPONDENT WAS

x x x Petitioner is estopped from denying that respondents worked for it. In

By setting forth these defenses, petitioner, in effect, admitted

which are not squarely denied, and amounts to an acknowledgment

It is a fundamental rule of procedure that higher courts are precluded from

Petitioner dismissed respondent from employment based on the recommendation of

Respondent was implicated in the anomalous transaction by his co-employees who

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ (at

3. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of syndicated and large-scale

Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellants of

amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND (P130,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 195419

HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH and Promulgated:

In his Counter-Affidavit (Exh. 1-Aringoy), Ronnie Aringoy affirmed that he personally

The Decision of the Trial Court

To pay the costs.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The Ruling of this Court

We dismiss the appeal for lack of merit.

Grounds for Appeal

Aringoy presented three witnesses: his niece

(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or

(2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or

(4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on

(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;

(8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of

(9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant

Criminal Case No. 21930 (Illegal Recruitment)

[I]llegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,

Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of

Authority means a document issued by the Department of Labor authorizing a person

Section 7 of RA 8042 provides for the penalty of illegal recruitment committed by a

he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully

the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more persons

In People v. Lago,46 the Court discussed conspiracy in this wise: