Pimentel (Petitioner)

V. Aguire (Respondent)
FACTS:
The current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation
requires continued prudence in government fiscal management to maintain
economic stability and sustain the country's growth momentum; It is then
imperative that all government agencies adopt cash management measures to
adopt expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for nonpersonal services; Fidel Ramos, then president, by virtue of his power
Validity of AO 372 Insofar as LGUs are concerned
1) Scope of presidents power of general supervision over LGUs
a.
General Supervision (Sec. 4)- overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties
2)
Extent of the LGU autonomy
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply the ff: requisites
before the issuance and implementation of AO 372. Requisites before the
President may interfere in local fiscal matters:
(1)
An unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government
(2)
Consultations with the presiding officers of the senate and house
of representatives and the presidents of various local leagues
(3)
Corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the
department of finance, interior and local government, budget
and management
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion [in]
ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the
LGU[']S fiscal autonomy
2. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the withholding of 10% of the LGU[']S IRA
HELD: OSG: AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President
consistent with his power of supervision over local governments.
This is a rather novel theory -- that people should await the implementing evil
to befall on them before they can question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional.
Be it remembered that the real issue here is whether the Constitution and the law
are contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are violated by the acts
implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case Taada v. Angara,[33] this Court
held that when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court.
By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged
action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without
any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the
law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Said the Court:
"In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. 'The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty

(to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is

upheld.'[34] Once a 'controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court x x x , it becomes a legal issue
which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.'[35]
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO (Petitioners)
V. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (respondents)
FACTS: GRP and MILF were scheduled to sign MOA-AD Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on
Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. However, this did not materialize for this
court issued TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same. Petitioners declare the
MOA-AD to be unconstitutional, that they be excluded from Bangsamoro, that it be
declared null and void. The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and
PAPP Esperon drafted the terms of the MOA-AD without consulting the local
government units or communities affected, nor informing them of the proceedings.
ISSUES:
Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed
the MOA-AD?
Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?
HELD:
RIPENESS: The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or
controversies. Courts decline
to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or
mere academic questions. This limitation of judicial review defines the role
assigned to the judiciary and tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of the
government.
There must be a conflict of legal rights, or assertion of legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution that must be interpreted using an existing
law or jurisprudence. Only then can then can the court decide on the
constitutionality of an act or treaty
OSG: There is no justiciable controversy ripe for judicial review in present petitions
The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further
negotiations and legislative enactments as well as constitutional processes
aimed at attaining a final peaceful agreement. MOA-AD remains to be a
proposal that does not automatically create legally demandable rights and
obligations until the list of operative acts required have been duly complied
with.
Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD, there are no
concrete acts that could possibly violate petitioners and intervenors rights
since the acts complained of are mere contemplated steps toward the
formulation of a final peace agreement. Plainly, petitioners and intervenors
perceived injury, if at all, is merely imaginary and illusory apart from being
unfounded and based on mere conjectures. (Underscoring supplied)
SC: The law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
MOA-AD is a matter of public concern involving sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the state. Respondents cannot thus point to the
absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such

policy. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct
public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly
provided by E.O. No. 3 (preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there
is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the
comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the peoples participation).
In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners right to be consulted on the
peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to information and
disclosure.
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently
worded. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the
Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any
rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not
recognized under the present Constitution
DE CASTRO (Petitioner)
V. JBC(respondent)
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven
days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9,
Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start
the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.;
and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined
their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010,
respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not
apply to appointments in the Supreme Court . It argues that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in
Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial

Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its
insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the
President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositorsintervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is,
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its
process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1),
Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short
list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate
Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for
judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the
proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be
submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief
Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the
fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and
practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to
the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe
for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the
candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of
constitutional experts, as may be needed.
1. A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositorsintervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that
is, after May 17, 2010).
2. Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the
short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII,
which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to
fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate
Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
The ripeness of the controversy for judicial determination may not be doubted. The
challenges to the authority of the JBC to open the process of nomination and to
continue the process until the submission of the list of nominees; the insistence of
some of the petitioners to compel the JBC through mandamus to submit the short
list to the incumbent President; the counter-insistence of the intervenors to prohibit
the JBC from submitting the short list to the incumbent President on the ground that

said list should be submitted instead to the next President; the strong position that
the incumbent President is already prohibited under Section 15, Article VII from
making any appointments, including those to the Judiciary, starting on May 10, 2010
until June 30, 2010; and the contrary position that the incumbent President is not so
prohibited are only some of the real issues for determination. All such issues
establish the ripeness of the controversy, considering that for some the short list
must be submitted before the vacancy actually occurs by May 17, 2010. The
outcome will not be an abstraction, or a merely hypothetical exercise. The
resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions
that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began,
or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.
We need not await the occurrence of the vacancy by May 17, 2010 in order for the
principal issue to ripe for judicial determination by the Court. It is enough that one
alleges conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but seemingly
proscribed by the Constitution. A reasonable certainty of the occurrence of the
perceived threat to a constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing
a challenge, provided the Court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to
intelligently adjudicate the issues.[65] Herein, the facts are not in doubt, for only
legal issues remain.
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15.
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4.
(1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately
situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15
to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect
of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily
and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4
(1) thereof.
DECISION:
Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and
Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to
be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May
17, 2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position
of Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other
vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees
corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision.

PORMENTO (Petitioner)
V. ESTRADA (Respondent)
FACTS:
The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is
covered by the ban on
the President from any reelection. Private respondent was elected President of the
Republic of
the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the
presidency again in
the general elections held on May 10, 2010.
Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondents candidacy
and filed a petition for disqualification. However, his petition was denied by the
Second Division of public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC). His
motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.
Hence, private respondent was able to participate as a candidate for the
position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second
highest number of votes.
ISSUE:
1. WON then President Estrada is eligible for any reelection following the
provision of Sec. 4, Article VII of the Constitution
HELD:
Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will
be premised on a persons second (whether immediate or not) election as
President, there is (1) no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. (2)
No live conflict of legal rights exists.[6] There is in this case no definite,
concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests.[7] No specific relief may
conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of
the parties herein.[8] As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise
of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or
controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.
GALICTO (Petitioner)
V. AQUINO (Respondent)
FACTS:
EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a
fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs.
E.O 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other
forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO
900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the
President and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of
members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010.
HELD:
EO 7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of the
President and for being in breach of existing laws

RULING: Dismissed for its patent formal and procedural infirmities, and for having
been mooted by subsequent events.
(1) Certiorari is not the proper remedy, filing in RTC would have been valid,
(2) Petitioner lacks locus standi: Jurisprudence defines interest as "material
interest, an interest
in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest
in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is
meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest
(3) The petition has a defective jurat
(4) The petition has been mooted by supervening events
(a) lapse of Dec. 31, 2010 of Sec. 10 of EO 7 that suspended allowances and
bonuses
(b) R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in the charters of GOCCs and
GFIs
empowering their board of directors/trustees to determine their own
compensation system, in favor of the grant of authority to the President to
perform this act.
DAVID (Petitioner)
V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO (Respondent)
FACTS:
Subject of controversy: the power of the president in times of emergency.
OSG: first and second requisites are absent (1) actual case or controversy, (2) raise
a question of constitutionality, but exceptions are present (a) grave violation of
constitution, (b) exceptional character , (c) when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; (4)
the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Petitioner alleged that PP1017 is bereft of factual basis. Said memorandum
was formed after the escape of Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the
Magdalo D-Day, the defections of military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and
the reproving statements from the communist leaders. Judging the seriousness of
such events, President Arroyo called out military aid to prevent or suppress lawless
violence.
ISSUES:
1. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid?
2. Do they justify these illegal acts?
HELD:
If the government consciously or unconsciously oversteps these limitations
there must be some authority competent to hold it in control, to thwart its
unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the
people as expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is the
beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review Marbury v. Madison
SC: President Arroyos issuance of PP1021 did not render the present petitions moot
and academic.
P 1017 is merely an invocation of the Presidents calling-out power. Its general
purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo

to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or
impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens constitutional
rights.
The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or
ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not
a mere incidental result arising from its exertion. This is logical. Just imagine the
absurdity of situations when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because the
officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this were so, judging from the
blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon by the Court, majority
of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been declared
unconstitutional a long time ago.
G.O. No 5 carry into effect provisions of PP1017.
To be valid, it must be reasonable and not arbitrary. PP1017 extraneous
provisions giving express or implied power to issue decrees is unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is
CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions
of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as
well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does
not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the
AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.
Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable
by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal
and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in
the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of
standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the
warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for
publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER (Petitioner)
V. ELMA(Respondent)
FACTS:
Respondent Elma was appointed as Chairman of the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his tenure as
PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He
accepted the second appointment, but waived any renumeration that he may
receive as CPLC. Petitioners sought to have both appointments declared as
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
ISSUE: constitutionality of respondent Elmas concurrent appointments
HELD: In its Decision, the Court declared that the concurrent appointments of the
respondent as PCGG Chairman and CPLC were unconstitutional. It ruled that the

concurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IXB of the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices. The duties of the
CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the
heads of various executive departments and agencies and reviewing investigations
involving heads of executive departments. Since the actions of the PCGG Chairman,
a head of an executive agency, are subject to the review of the CPLC, such
appointments would be incompatible.
The mere application of constitutional provisions does not require the case to
be heard and decided en banc. Contrary to the allegations of the respondent, the
decision of the Court in this case does not modify the ruling in Civil Liberties Union
v. Executive Secretary. It should also be noted that Section 3 of Supreme Court
Circular No. 2-89, dated 7 February 1989 clearly provides that the Court en banc is
not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be
appealed.
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the respondents motion for reconsideration and for
elevation of this case to the Court en banc.
SO ORDERED.
LIMKAICHONG (Petitioner)
V. COMELEC (Respondent)
FACTS:
Limkaichong was a disqualified congressional candidate for the first district of
Negros oriental. Her disqualification was affirmed by COMELEC. Napoleon Camero, a
registered voter of La Libertad, Negros Oriental, filed the petition for her
disqualification on the ground that she lacked the citizenship requirement of a
Member of the House of Representatives, having been born by Chinese citizens at
the time of her birth.
ISSUE:
1. WON LimkaiChongs proclamation was valid.
2. Whether, upon Limkaichong's proclamation, the HRET, instead of the COMELEC,
should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.
HELD:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins
AUROLLO (Pet)
V. AQUINO (Res)
FACTS:
For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of
the Disbursement Acceleration Program(DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No.
541, and related issuances of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
implementing the DAP.

At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987

Constitution, a provision of the fundamental law that firmly ordains that "[n]o
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law." The tenor and context of the challenges posed by the petitioners
against the DAP indicate that the DAP contravened this provision by allowing the
Executive to allocate public money pooled from programmed and unprogrammed
funds of its various agencies in the guise of the President exercising his
constitutional authority under Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to transfer
funds out of savings to augment the appropriations of offices within the Executive
Branch of the Government. But the challenges are further complicated by the
interjection of allegations of transfer of funds to agencies or offices outside of the
Executive.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law."
HELD:
Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork barrel, the
Court has become more alert to discharge its constitutional duty. We will not now
refrain from exercising our expanded judicial power in order to review and
determine, with authority, the limitations on the Chief Executives spending power.
b) Requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review were
complied with
(1) there must been actual case or justiciable controversy before the Court;
(2) the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication;
(3) the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must
be the very litis mota of the case.36
An actual and justiciable controversy exists in these consolidated cases. The
incompatibility of the perspectives of the parties on the constitutionality of the DAP
and its relevant issuances satisfy the requirement for a conflict between legal rights.
The issues being raised herein meet the requisite ripeness considering that the
challenged executive acts were already being implemented by the DBM, and there
are averments by the petitioners that such implementation was repugnant to the
letter and spirit of the Constitution. Moreover, the implementation of the DAP
entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums of public funds. The fact that
public funds have been allocated, disbursed or utilized by reason or on account of
such challenged executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an actual controversy
that is ripe for adjudication by the Court.
DAP as a program, no longer exists, thereby mooting these present cases
brought to challenge its constitutionality. Any constitutional challenge should no
longer be at the level of the program, which is now extinct, but at the level of its
prior applications or the specific disbursements under the now defunct policy. We
challenge the petitioners to pick and choose which among the 116 DAP projects
they wish to nullify, the full details we will have provided by February 5. We urge
this Court to be cautious in limiting the constitutional authority of the President and
the Legislature to respond to the dynamic needs of the country and the evolving

demands of governance, lest we end up straight jacketing our elected

representatives in ways not consistent with our constitutional structure and
democratic principles.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value.41
The Court cannot agree that the termination of the DAP as a program was
a supervening event that effectively mooted these consolidated cases. Verily, the
Court had in the past exercised its power of judicial review despite the cases being
rendered moot and academic by supervening events, like:
(1) when there was a grave violation of the Constitution;
(2) when the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of
paramount public interest; (3) when the constitutional issue raised required the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and
(4) when the case was capable of repetition yet evading review

Topacio (Petitioner)
V. Ong (Respondent, Associate Justice of the Sandigan Bayan and OSG)
Facts:
It will be recalled that in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,1 the Court enjoined
Ong "from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court or assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office,
until he shall have successfully completed all necessary steps, through the
appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship.
Invoking paragraph 1, Section 7, Article VIII of PC, petitioner points out
that natural-born citizenship is also a qualification for appointment as member of
the Sandiganbayan and that Ong has failed to meet the citizenship requirement
from the time of his appointment as such in October 1998.
The OSG, by letter of September 25, 2007, informed petitioner that it "cannot
favorably act on [his] request for the filing of a quo warranto petition until the [RTC]
case shall have been terminated with finality."7 Petitioner assails this position of the
OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion, aside from Ongs continuous
discharge of judicial functions.
Petitioner thus contends that Ong should immediately desist from holding the
position of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan since he is disqualified on the
basis of citizenship, whether gauged from his birth certificate which indicates him to
be a Chinese citizen or against his bar records bearing out his status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen, as declared in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita.
Ong, on the other hand, states that Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita did not
annul or declare null his appointment as Justice of the Supreme Court, but merely
enjoined him from accepting his appointment, and that there is no definitive
pronouncement therein that he is not a natural-born Filipino. He informs that he,
nonetheless, voluntarily relinquished the appointment to the Supreme Court out of
judicial statesmanship.
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine
the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from
its enjoyment. It is brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped,
intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office, and may be
commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or
by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another.For a quo warranto petition to be successful,
the private person suing must show a clear right to the contested office.
In the present case, petitioner presented NO SUFFICIENT PROOF of a clear
and indubitable franchise to the office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.
He in fact concedes that he was never entitled to assume the office of an Associate
Justice of the Sandiganbayan
In the instance in which the Petition for Quo Warranto is filed by an individual
in his own name, he must be able to prove that he is entitled to the controverted
public office, position, or franchise; otherwise, the holder of the same has a right to
the undisturbed possession thereof. In actions for Quo Warranto to determine title to
a public office, the complaint, to be sufficient in form, must show that the plaintiff is
entitled to the office. In Garcia v. Perez, this Court ruled that the person instituting
Quo Warranto proceedings on his own behalf, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules
of Court, must aver and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute.

Without such averment or evidence of such right, the action may be dismissed
at any stage.
HELD: The Court cannot, upon the authority of the present petition, determine said
question without encroaching on and preempting the proceedings emanating from
the RTC case. Even petitioner clarifies that he is not presently seeking a resolution
on Ongs citizenship, even while he acknowledges the uncertainty of Ongs naturalborn citizenship.
Planters Products, Inc. (Petitioner)
v. Fertiphil Corp. (Respondent)
Facts:
THE Regional Trial Courts (RTC) have the authority and jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of statutes, executive orders, presidential decrees and other
issuances. The Constitution vests that power not only in the Supreme Court but in
all Regional Trial Courts. The principle is relevant in this petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming with modification
that of the RTC in Makati City,finding
*petitioner Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) liable to private respondent Fertiphil
Corporation (Fertiphil) for the levies it paid under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No.
1465.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff paid the amount of P6,698,144.00 to the
Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority pursuant to the P10 per bag of fertilizer
sold imposition under LOI 1465 which, in turn, remitted the amount to the
defendant Planters Products, Inc.
Thus, by virtue of LOI 1465 the plaintiff, Fertiphil Corporation, which is a
private domestic corporation, became poorer by the amount of P6,698,144.00 and
the defendant, Planters Product, Inc., another private domestic corporation, became
richer by the amount of P6,698,144.00.
Tested by the standards of constitutionality as set forth in the afore-quoted
jurisprudence, it is quite evident that LOI 1465 insofar as it imposes the amount of
P10 per fertilizer bag sold in the country and orders that the said amount should go
to the defendant Planters Product, Inc. is unlawful because it violates the mandate
that a tax can be levied only for a public purpose and not to benefit, aid and
promote a private enterprise such as Planters Product, Inc
Fertiphil
1. filed a complaint for collection and damages[8] against FPA (Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority) and PPI with the RTC in Makati. It questioned the
constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive,
invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process
of law.
2. Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned
corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the
fertilizer industry.
FPA through OSG
1. the issuance of LOI No. 1465 was a valid exercise of the police power of the
State in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer industry in the country. It also
averred that Fertiphil did not sustain any damage from the LOI because the
burden imposed by the levy fell on the ultimate consumer, not the seller.
ISSUE:

1. The question then is whether it was proper for the trial court to exercise its
power to judicially determine the constitutionality of the subject statute in the
instant case.
- RTC may resolve constitutional issues; the constitutional issue
was adequately raised in the complaint; it is the lis mota of the
case.
2. WON Fertiphil has locus standi.
- Yes. because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a mere
procedural technicality which may be waived. The harm to their
business consists not only in fewer clients because of the increased
price, but also in adopting alternative corporate strategies to meet
the demands of LOI No. 1465. Fertiphil and other fertilizer sellers
may have shouldered all or part of the levy just to be competitive in
the market. The harm occasioned on the business of Fertiphil is
sufficient injury for purposes of locus standi.
HELD:
As a rule, where the controversy can be settled on other grounds, the courts will not
resolve the constitutionality of a law. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of political departments are
valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary.
However, the courts are not precluded from exercising such power when the
following requisites are obtaining in a controversy before it:
1. there must be before the court an actual case calling for the exercise of
judicial review.
2. question must be ripe for adjudication.
3. person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to
challenge.
4. the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest
opportunity;
5. and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case
Indisputably, the present case was primarily instituted for collection and damages.
However, a perusal of the complaint also reveals that the instant action is founded
on the claim that the levy imposed was an unlawful and unconstitutional special
assessment. Consequently, the requisite that the constitutionality of the law in
question be the very lis mota of the case is present, making it proper for the trial
court to rule on the constitutionality of LOI 1465.
Validity of a police measure as follows:
(1) the interests ( public generally, requires its exercise); and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals