CATALINA BALAIS-MABANAG, assisted by

her husband, ELEUTERIO MABANAG,

G.R. No. 153142

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES,* Acting Chairperson,

- versus LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
PERALTA,**
BERSAMIN, and
ABAD,*** JJ.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON
CITY, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, and
RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ,
Promulgated:
Respondents.

March 29, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The issue of citizenship of the registered owner of land cannot anymore be raised to forestall the execution of a final and
executory judgment where the objecting party had the opportunity to raise the issue prior to the finality of the judgment. The time
for assailing the capacity of the winning party to acquire the land was during the trial, not during the execution of a final decision.

Antecedents

As culled from the assailed decision dated December 5, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA),1[1] and from the Courts
decision promulgated on October 7, 1996 in G.R. No. 103577,2[2] the following are the antecedent facts.

On January 19, 1985, Romulo A. Coronel, Alarico A. Coronel, Annette A. Coronel, Annabelle C. Gonzales, Floraida C.
Tupper, and Cielito A. Coronel (Coronels) executed a document entitled receipt of down payment, stipulating that they received
from respondent Ramona Patricia Alcaraz (Ramona), through Ramonas mother, respondent Concepcion D. Alcaraz (Concepcion),
the sum of P50,000.00 as downpayment on the total purchase price of P1,240,000.00 for their inherited house and lot, covered by
TCT No. 119627 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.

The receipt of down payment contained other stipulations, as follows:

We bind ourselves to effect the transfer in our names from our deceased father, Constancio P. Coronel,
the transfer certificate of title immediately upon our receipt of the down payment above-stated.
On our presentation of the TCT already in our name, we will immediately execute the deed of absolute
sale of said property and Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz shall immediately pay the balance of the
P1,190,000.00.3[3]

On February 6, 1985, the property originally registered in the name of the Coronels father (Constancio P. Coronel) was
transferred in the name of the Coronels under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 327043 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City.
On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property covered by TCT No. 327043 to the petitioner for the higher price
of P1,580,000.00 after the latter delivered an initial sum of P300,000.00. For this reason, the Coronels rescinded their contract
with Ramona by depositing her downpayment of P50,000.00 in the bank in trust for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz.

On February 22, 1985, Concepcion, through one Gloria P. Noel as her attorney-in-fact, filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages in her own name in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City against the Coronels, docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-44134.4[4] Concepcion subsequently caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 327403.

On April 2, 1985, the petitioner had a notice of adverse claim annotated on TCT No. 327403 in the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City.

On April 25, 1985, the Coronels executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioner.

On June 5, 1985, TCT No. 351582 was issued in the name of the petitioner.

It is relevant to mention that on May 24, 1985 the petitioner moved to have her answer in intervention admitted in Civil
Case No. Q-44134.5[5] Her intervention was allowed on May 31, 1985.6[6]

Earlier, on May 19, 1986, Concepcion sought leave of court to amend the complaint for the purpose of impleading
Ramona as a co-plaintiff.7[7] The amended complaint naming both Concepcion and Ramona as plaintiffs was attached to the
motion.8[8] On June 25, 1986, the amended complaint was admitted.9[9]

On March 1, 1989, the RTC rendered its decision,10[10] disposing:

WHEREFORE, judgment for specific performance is hereby rendered ordering defendant to execute in
favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale covering that parcel of land embraced in and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 327403 (now TCT No. 331582) of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, together with
all the improvements existing thereon, free from all liens and encumbrances, and once accomplished, to
immediately deliver said document of sale to plaintiffs, and upon receipt thereof, the plaintiffs are ordered to
pay defendants the whole balance of the purchase price amounting to P1,190,000.00 in cash. Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 331582 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City in the name of intervenor is hereby cancelled and
declared to be without any force and effect. Defendants and intervenor and all other persons claiming under
them are hereby ordered to vacate the subject property, and deliver possession thereof to plaintiff. Plaintiffs
claim for damages and attorneys fees, as well as the counterclaims of defendants and intervenors are hereby
dismissed.

No pronouncement as to costs.
So Ordered.

Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, the Coronels and the petitioner interposed an appeal to the CA, which
promulgated a judgment on December 16, 1991, fully upholding the decision of the RTC.

Thus, the petitioner and the Coronels appealed the CA judgment to this Court (G.R. No. 103577), which affirmed the CA
on October 7, 1996.

Thereafter, the decision of the RTC became final and executory.

Acting on the respondents motion for execution, the RTC issued a writ of execution on October 1, 1997. However, the
petitioner and the Coronels filed their motion to stay execution and supplemental motion for reconsideration, which the RTC
denied on March 10, 1998.

Upon failure of the petitioner and the Coronels to comply with the writ of execution, the RTC approved the respondents
motion for appointment of suitable person to execute deed, etc., and ordered on April 8, 1998 the Branch Clerk of the RTC,
Branch 83, Quezon City, to execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of Ramona in lieu of the defendants (i.e., the petitioner and
the Coronels).

On May 19, 1998, the petitioner and the Coronels filed in the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the RTCs orders of
October 1, 1997 and March 10, 1998, but the CA dismissed the petition on July 30, 1998.

On August 21, 1998, the petitioner and the Coronels presented their motion for reconsideration in the CA.

On September 2, 1998, the RTC held in abeyance the respondents motion reiterating previous motion to resolve
respondents motion, whereby the respondents sought an order to direct the petitioner to surrender her TCT No. 331582, and the
Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the petitioners copy of said TCT for her failure to comply with the earlier order for
her to surrender the TCT to the Registrar of Deeds pending resolution by the CA of the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Ultimately, on September 30, 1998, the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The petitioner thus appealed to the Court, which denied her petition for review for being filed out of time. The Court also
denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration on April 21, 1999.

Thereafter, the respondents moved in the RTC for the resolution of their pending motion. After the RTC granted the
respondents pending motion on July 29, 1999, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration against such order, but the RTC
denied her motion on September 23, 1999.

Following the denial of her motion for reconsideration, the petitioner commenced a special civil action of certiorari in
the CA to assail the RTCs action (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 55576). However, the CA dismissed her petition through its decision dated
December 5, 2000, Rollo, pp. 61-69, and denied her motion for reconsideration on April 16, 2002.11[11]

Issues

Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioner submits that the CA erred in sustaining the registration by the Registrar of
Deeds of the deed of absolute sale despite the lack of indication of the citizenship of the buyer of the subject property; and in
sustaining the order of the RTC directing the Branch Clerk of Court to execute the deed of absolute sale without first requiring the
defendants to execute the deed of absolute sale as required by the decision.

Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

A
Res judicata barred petitioners objection

In the complaint dated February 22, 1985, respondent Concepcion, as plaintiff, categorically averred that she was a
Filipino citizen.12[12] The petitioner did not deny or disprove the averment of Filipino citizenship during the trial and on appeal.
The petitioner did not also advert to the issue of citizenship after the complaint was amended in order to implead Ramona as a coplaintiff, despite the petitioners opportunity to do so.

Yet, now, when the final decision of the RTC is already being implemented, the petitioner would thwart the execution by
assailing the directive of the RTC for the Branch Clerk of Court to execute the deed of absolute sale and by blocking the
registration of the deed of absolute sale in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, on the ground that Ramona was disqualified
from owning land in the Philippines.

The petitioners move was outrightly unwarranted.

First: The petitioner did not raise any issue against Ramonas qualifications to own land in the Philippines during the trial
or, at the latest, before the finality of the RTC judgment. The petitioner was thereby deemed to have waived the objection,
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. (2a)

In every action, indeed, the parties and their counsel are enjoined to present all available defenses and objections in order
that the matter in issue can finally be laid to rest in an appropriate contest before the court. The rule is a wise and tested one, borne
by necessity. Without the rule, there will be no end to a litigation, because the dissatisfied litigant may simply raise new or
additional issues in order to prevent, defeat, or delay the implementation of an already final and executory judgment. The
endlessness of litigation can give rise to added costs for the parties, and can surely contribute to the unwarranted clogging of court
dockets. The prospect of a protracted litigation between the parties annuls the very rationale of every litigation to attain justice.
Verily, there must be an end to litigation.

Second: The petitioner cannot now insist that the RTC did not settle the question of the respondents qualifications to own
land due to non-citizenship. It is fundamental that the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as
to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest

by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity.13[13] Thus, in Gabuya v. Layug,14[14] this Court had the occasion to hold that a judgment involving
the same parties, the same facts, and the same issues binds the parties not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or
defeat their claims or demands, but also as to any other admissible matter that might have been offered for that purpose and all
other matters that could have been adjudged in that case.

Third: The present recourse has not been the only one taken by the petitioner and her counsel to assail the qualification of
Ramona to acquire and own the subject property. In fact, the Court catalogued such recourses taken for the petitioner herein in
A.C. No. 5469, entitled Foronda v. Guerrero,15[15] an administrative case for disbarment commenced on June 29, 2001 by
Ricardo A. Foronda (an attorney-in-fact of the respondents) against Atty. Arnold V. Guerrero, the attorney of the petitioner,16[16]
as follows:

1.

Catalina Balais-Mabanag, assisted by her husband Eleuterio Mabanag v. Hon. Estrella T. Estrada, et al.
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47710:

A special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction filed with the CA, on the ground that the respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion, excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing and/or refusing to stay the execution of its
decision. The respondent put forth the argument that Ramona Patricia Alcaraz, being a foreign national, was
incapacitated to purchase the subject property due to the limitations embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
The petition was denied, with the CA ratiocinating as follows:
We are not impressed. We find the trial courts stand on the matter to be legally unassailable.
In the first place, petitioner is not the proper party to question the qualification or eligibility of
Ramona Alcaraz. It is the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, which has the legal
personality and the authority to question the qualification of Ramona Alcaraz to own rural or urban
land. In the second place, the decision sought to be executed has already gained finality. As held
by the Supreme Court, when a courts judgment or order becomes final and executory it is the
ministerial duty of the trial court to issue a writ of execution to enforce its judgment (Rollo, p. 6566).
2. Catalina Balais-Mabanag, et al. v. Concepcion Alvarez, et. al. docketed as G.R. No. 135820:
This petition was filed by the respondent on behalf of his clients asking the Supreme Court to review the
decision of the CA dismissing the petition for injunction in CA-G.R. SP No. 47710. The petition was
denied for having been filed out of time, and the motion for reconsideration therefrom was denied with
finality on April 21, 1999.
3. Spouses Eleuterio & Catalina Mabanag v. Ramona Patricia Alcaraz and the Register of Deeds for Quezon
City docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-31268:
A complaint for Declaration of Inability to Acquire Real Property and Damages filed in the RTC QC,
Branch 83. In its Order dated July 9, 1999, the court dismissed the case on the grounds of res judicata and
forum shopping. The RTC observed that for failure of the plaintiffs in this case to get a favorable decision
from the earlier case, they tried to prevent the execution by disqualifying the herein defendant Alcaraz

4. Catalina Balais-Mabanag, assisted by her husband, Eleuterio Mabanag v. Emelita L Mariano, Concepcion
D. Alcaraz and Ramona P. Alcaraz, et al. docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-43396:
An action for Annulment of Title and Deed of Absolute Sale and Damages with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. In its Order dated March 20, 2001, acting on the
injunctive aspect of the case, the RTC denied the injunction prayed for for failure of the plaintiff to make at
least a prima facie showing of a right to the issuance of the writ. The subsequent motion for reconsideration
filed by the respondent on behalf of his clients was denied on June 18, 2001. Acting on the defendants
Special and Affirmative Defenses and Motion to Dismiss, the court issued an order dated January 16, 2002
dismissing the complaint finding that the decision in Civil Case No. Q-44134 had already been turned over
to complainant as attorney-in-fact of defendants Alcarazes.
5. Catalina Balais-Mabanag, assisted by her husband, Eleuterio Mabanag v. Emelita L Mariano, Concepcion
D. Alcaraz and Ramona P. Alcaraz, et al. docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65783 (Annex 12, Comment)
A special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction filed by Atty. Guerrero on behalf of Catalina Balais-Mabanag. The CA dismissed
the petition on June 14, 2002, and pointed out the following:

6.

a)

On December 5, 2000, the Twelfth Division of the CA had already affirmed the decision of
the RTC that the authority of the Register of Deeds was confined only to the determination of
whether all the requisites for registration are complied with. To authorize the Register of
Deeds to determine whether Ramona Alcaraz was qualified to own real property in the
Philippines was to clothe the Register of Deeds with judicial powers that only courts could
exercise.

b)

The issue as to whether Ramona Alcaraz was qualified to own real property had been passed
upon by the Third Division of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 47710.

c)

The Third Division of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 103577 upheld the RTC and the CA
when it ruled on October 7, 1996 that the sale of the subject land between Alcaraz and the
Coronels was perfected before the sale between Mabanag and the Coronels.

Catalina Balais-Mabanag, etc. v. Emelita L. Mariano et al. docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75911:
Appeal filed by Atty. Guerrero on behalf of Catalina Balais-Mabanag on February 1, 2003 after Civil Case
No. Q-01-43396 for Annulment of Title and Deed of Absolute Sale and Damages was dismissed by RTC
QC, Branch 80.

7. Catalina Balais-Mabanag, assisted by her husband, Eleuterio Mabanag v. Hon. Estrella Estrada, The
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, Concepcion D. Alcaraz and Ramona Patricia-Alcaraz docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 55576:
A special civil action for certiorari, questioning the order of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-44134, ordering
Balais-Mabanag to surrender the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 331582 to the Alcarazes. The CA
dismissed the petition on December 5, 2000 with the final note, to wit:

The Supreme Court Third Division as well as in G.R. No. 103577, on October 7, 1996, ruled:
Thus the sale of the subject parcel of land between petitioners and Romana P. Alcaraz, perfected
on February 6, 1985, prior to that between petitioners and Catalina B. Mabanag on February 18,
1985, was correctly upheld by both the lower courts below.[]
Obviously, the lower courts judgment has become final and executory as per Entry of
Judgment issued by the Supreme Court. It is axiomatic that final and executory judgment can no
longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest
court of the land

All the aforestated recourses have had the uniform result of sustaining the right of Ramona to acquire the property, which
warranted a finding against Atty. Guerrero of resorting to forum shopping, and leading to his suspension from the practice of law
for two years.17[17] Such result fully affirms that the petitioners objection is now barred by res judicata.

For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former
judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (c) it
must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, identity of the
subject matter, and identity of cause of action.18[18]

The guiding principle of the doctrine of res judicata was formulated by Vice Chancellor Wigram in an English case circa
1843, thus:

xxx that where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent
jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except
under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter
which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward,
only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of
res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points which the court was actually required by the
parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject
of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the
time.19[19]

The doctrine is also known as estoppel per rem judicatam and involves both cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel.
The purpose of the doctrine is two-fold to prevent unnecessary proceedings involving expenses to the parties and wastage of the
courts time which could be used by others, and to avoid stale litigations as well as to enable the defendant to know the extent of
the claims being made arising out of the same single incident.20[20]

Under the doctrine of res judicata, therefore, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the
previous suit.21[21] The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate
the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent

jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or
estate.22[22]

B
Petitioner lacked the capacity to institute suit

It should also be pointed out that the petitioner was not the proper party to challenge Ramonas qualifications to acquire
land.

Under Section 7, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185,23[23] the Solicitor General or his representative shall institute escheat
proceedings against its violators. Although the law does not categorically state that only the Government, through the Solicitor
General, may attack the title of an alien transferee of land, it is nonetheless correct to hold that only the Government, through the
Solicitor General, has the personality to file a case challenging the capacity of a person to acquire or to own land based on noncitizenship. This limitation is based on the fact that the violation is committed against the State, not against any individual; and
that in the event that the transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen, the affected property reverts to the State, not to the
previous owner or any other individual.

Herein, even assuming that Ramona was legally disqualified from owning the subject property, the decision that voids or
annuls their right of ownership over the subject land will not inure to the benefit of the petitioner. Instead, the subject property will
be escheated in favor of the State in accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. 185.

C
Deed of absolute sale executed
by Branch Clerk of Court was valid

The petitioner contends that the RTC did not see to it that the writ of execution be first served on her, and a demand for
her compliance be first made; hence, the deed of absolute sale executed by the Branch Clerk of Court to implement the judgment
was void.

We do not agree.

The CA found that it was the petitioner who did not comply with the notice of the sheriff of the implementation of the
judgment through the writ of execution;24[24] and that her non-compliance then justified the RTCs order to the Branch Clerk of
Court to execute the deed of absolute sale to implement the final judgment rendered in G. R. No. 103577.

The fact that the petitioner and her counsel maneuvered to thwart, or, at least, to delay the inevitable execution of the
judgment warranted the RTCs directing the Branch Clerk of Court execute the deed of absolute sale to implement the judgment.
The RTCs effort to implement the judgment could not be stymied by the petitioners deliberate refusal to comply with the
judgment. Such deliberate refusal called for the RTC to order the Branch Clerk of Court to execute the deed of absolute sale in
favor of Ramona, which move of the trial court was precisely authorized by Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. (a) Conveyance, delivery of deeds, or other specific
acts; vesting title. If a judgment directs a party who execute a conveyance of land or personal property, or to
deliver deeds or other documents, or to perform any other specific act in connection therewith, and the party
fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient
party by some other person appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by
the party. If real or personal property is situated within the Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a
conveyance thereof may be an order divest the title of any party and vest it in others, which shall have the force
and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law. (10a)

D
A Word of Caution

In A.C. No. 5469,25[25] the Court observed as follows:

It has, thus, been clearly established that in filing such numerous petitions in behalf of his client, the
respondent thereby engaged in forum shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple
suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum,
a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An important
factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the partieslitigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.

Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and
the administration of justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding
execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes. Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of
the Courts processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the

administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to add, the lawyer who files
such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory
judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for
willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only
such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor.
We note that while lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense
of their clients right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert
every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
In filing multiple petitions before various courts concerning the same subject matter, the respondent
violated Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall exert every
effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. He also violated
Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyers mandate to delay no man for money or malice.

The Court reminds that its foregoing observations on the deleterious effects of forum shopping did not apply only to
Atty. Guerrero, but also to the petitioner as the client whom he represented. Thus, this decision becomes a good occasion to warn
both the petitioner and her attorney that another attempt by them to revive the issue of Ramonas lack of qualification to own the
land will be swiftly and condignly sanctioned.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is denied, and the decision dated December 5, 2000 promulgated in
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 55576 is affirmed.

G.R. No. 188315

August 25, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.
On appeal is the 29 January 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00726 finding appellant Isidro
Flores y Lagua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape.

In 181 Informations, which are similarly worded except for the dates of the commission of the crime and the age of the
complainant, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 140, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 to
03-261, appellant was accused of raping AAA,2 allegedly committed as follows:
That in or about and sometime during the month of _________, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the adopting father of complainant who was then
_________ years of age, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with [AAA] by means of
force and intimidation and against the will of the complainant. 3
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated on the following facts:
1. AAA is below fifteen (15) years of age;
2. Appellant is the guardian of AAA; and
3. AAA has been under the care and custody of appellant and his wife since AAA was one and a half years old.4
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The following facts are undisputed:
AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB,5 since she was just a few months old.6 BBB is married to appellant, who was working
abroad for six (6) years. Appellant came home in 1997 and lived with AAA and BBB. BBB was working as a restaurant
supervisor from 4:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. for six (6) days a week.
Five (5) witnesses testified for the prosecution. They are the victim herself, Marvin Suello (Marvin), PO1 Evangeline Babor (PO1
Babor), P/Sr Insp. Paul Ed Ortiz (P/Sr Insp. Ortiz), and Maximo Duran (Duran).
The prosecutions version of the facts follows
In February 1999 at around 9:30 p.m., AAA, then 11 years old, was sleeping inside the house when she felt and saw appellant
touch her thighs. AAA could see appellants face as there was a light coming from the altar. AAA was naturally surprised and she
asked appellant why the latter did such a thing. Appellant did not answer but told her not to mention the incident to anybody.
AAA then saw appellant went back to his bed and touch his private part. AAA immediately went back to sleep.
The following day, at around the same time, and while BBB was at work, appellant again touched AAA from her legs up to her
breast. AAA tried to resist but appellant threatened that he will kill her and BBB.
Two (2) weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up and saw appellant holding a knife. While
pointing the knife at AAAs neck, appellant removed his shorts, as well as AAAs pajamas. He slowly parted AAAs legs and
inserted his penis into AAAs vagina. Meanwhile, AAA struggled and hit appellants shoulders. Appellant was able to penetrate
her twice before he got out of the house. Two (2) days after, appellant again raped her by inserting his organ into AAAs vagina.
AAA recounted that appellant raped her at least three (3) times a week at around the same time until 15 October 2002, when she
was 14 years old. After the last rape incident, AAA did not go home after school and instead went to the house of her friend,
Marvin.7
On 16 October 2002, Marvin watched television with AAA from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. Afterwards, AAA refused to go home.
She told Marvin that appellant would spank her for going home late. Marvin asked AAA if there were other things that appellant
might have done to her, aside from spanking. At that point, AAA finally cried and divulged that she has been raped by appellant.
Marvin told AAA to file a complaint.8
AAA stayed at her mothers friends house and came back on 18 October 2002. She, together with Marvin, went to Kagawad
Ramon Espena to seek assistance. Marvin went with the Barangay Tanod in apprehending appellant, who at that time, was trying
to escape.9
PO1 Babor was the duty investigator at the Womens and Children Desk of Makati Police Station on 18 October 2002. She took
down the statements of AAA and her friend, Marvin. She then referred AAA to the PNP Crime Laboratory to undergo medicolegal examination.10
P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz confirmed that she conducted the medico-legal examination on AAA. Results of the examination, as indicated in
the medico-legal report, show that the "hymen is with presence of deep healed laceration at 1 oclock and shallow healed
laceration at 2 oclock positions at the time of examination." Said report concluded that AAA is in a "non-virgin state

physically."11 P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz opined that the lacerations could have been caused by any solid object, like the penis inserted at the
genitalia.12
Duran and another Bantay Bayan member were at the barangay outpost at 2:10 p.m. on 18 October 2002 when they were
summoned by Barangay Kagawad Ramon Espena. Acting on the complaint of AAA, they were directed to proceed to the house of
appellant to invite him for questioning. Duran saw appellant about to board a jeep. They stopped the jeep and asked appellant to
alight therefrom and invited him to the Bantay Bayan outpost. Appellant voluntarily went with them. Appellant was then brought
to the police station.13
Only appellant testified in his defense. While appellant admitted that he was a strict father to AAA in that he would scold and
spank her whenever the latter would ran away, he denied raping AAA. 14 He alleged that AAA has the propensity to make up
stories and was even once caught stealing money from her grandmother. Appellant recalled that on 16 October 2002, AAA asked
permission to go out to buy a "project." She never came home.15
On 27 August 2004, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 181 counts of rape. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 to 03-261, finding accused
ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-ONE (181)
counts of RAPE penalized by RA 8353, Chapter 3, Article 266-A, par. 1(a) in relation to Article 266-B par. 1. Taking into account
the minority of [AAA], adopted daughter of the accused, at the time of rape, and the fact the offender is the adoptive father of the
minor complainant, accused, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH for each count of rape, and to pay [AAA] the
amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 150,000.00) for moral damages and FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (PHP 50,000.00) for exemplary damages for each count of rape. 16
The trial court found that force and intimidation attended the commission of the crime of rape through the testimony of the victim,
which the trial court deemed "straightforward, consistent and credible." The trial court also established that appellant is the
adoptive father of AAA since 1989 and that AAA was then a minor, as proven by the birth certificate, testimonies of witnesses,
and admission made by AAA.17 Finally, the trial court dismissed appellants defense of denial as self-serving and which cannot
prevail over AAAs positive testimony.18
Upon denial of appellants motion for reconsideration, the case was initially elevated to the Court of Appeals for its review
pursuant to People v. Mateo.19 However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case in 23 August 2005 for failure of appellant to file
his appellants brief.20 When the case was brought before us on automatic review, we set aside the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals and remanded it back for appropriate action and disposition on the ground that review by the Court of Appeals of the trial
courts judgment imposing the death penalty is automatic and mandatory. 21
On 29 January 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that AAA was raped by appellant, but it did so only on two (2)
counts.
The fallo of the Decision reads:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-082 to 03-260, inclusive, is found not guilty on the
ground of reasonable doubt and is hereby acquitted;
2. Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261 is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count
without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim AAA (to be identified through the Information in this case), the
amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each
count.22
The appellate court found that the guilt of appellant on the first and last incidents of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03261, respectively, was proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. 23 With respect to the other incidents, according to the
appellate court, the testimony of AAA was merely based on general allegations that she was raped on the average of three (3)
times a week from February 1999 to 15 October 2002. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that her statement is inadequate
and insufficient to prove the other charges of rape.24
On 17 February 2009, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court of Appeals Decision. In a Resolution dated 26 October
2009, this Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Appellant and the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) both filed their Manifestations stating that they will no longer file any Supplemental Briefs, but
instead, they will merely adopt their Appellants and Appellee's Briefs, respectively. 25

Appellant harps on the failure of AAA to actively defend herself or resist the alleged assaults. Moreover, considering that the
relatives of AAA live only meters away from her and the frequency of the alleged molestation, appellant proffers that it was
impossible for them not to notice the abuses. Appellant also questions the appreciation of the circumstances of minority and
relationship as basis for the imposition of the death penalty. He contends that an adopting parent is not included within the
purview of qualifying relationships under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. Assuming arguendo that an adopting parent
may be construed as similar to a parent, appellant argues that the term "adopting parent" must be given a definite and technical
meaning in that the process of adoption must first be undertaken and a judicial decree to that matter must have been issued.26
The OSG, on the other hand, avers that the positive and categorical testimony of AAA that appellant sexually abused her, in
tandem with the medico-legal report, are more than sufficient to establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover,
appellant failed to impute any ill motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse him of rape. 27
The OSG insists that AAAs failure to report promptly the previous incidents of rape does not dent her credibility. Appellants
exercise of moral ascendancy over AAA and that fact that she was under physical threat during those times, could have instilled
fear on AAA from reporting said incidents.28
The OSG moved for modification of the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole in light of Republic
Act No. 9346.29
After an extensive review of the records, we find no cogent reason to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Appellant was charged with 181 counts of rape, all of which were committed within the span of three (3) years or from February
1999 until 15 October 2002. We are in full accord with the acquittal of appellant in the 179 counts of rape. Stated otherwise, we
agree with appellants conviction for two (2) counts of rape.
In rape cases, "the victims credibility becomes the single most important issue. For when a woman says she was raped, she says
in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed; thus, if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may
be convicted on the basis thereof." 30
Both the trial court and the appellate court found AAAs testimony credible. The RTC considered it "straightforward and
consistent on material points," while the Court of Appeals described it as "spontaneous, forthright, clear and free-from-serious
contradictions." Well-entrenched is the legal precept that when the "culpability or innocence of an accused hinges on the issue of
the credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court, when duly supported by
sufficient and convincing evidence, must be accorded the highest respect, even finality, by this Court and are not to be disturbed
on appeal."31 We see no reason in this case to depart from the principle. Moreover, we give due deference to the trial courts
assessment of AAAs credibility, having had the opportunity to witnesses firsthand and note her demeanor, conduct, and attitude
under grilling examination.32
Worthy of reiteration is the doctrine that "when the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit
to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be
exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. When a girl, especially a minor, says that she has been defiled, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape was inflicted on her." 33
Out of the 181 counts of rape charged against appellant, the prosecution was only able to prove two counts. Applying the ruling in
People v. Garcia,34 the Court of Appeals correctly declared, thus:
As to the other counts of rape (Criminal Cases Nos. 03-082 to 03-260) imputed against accused-appellant, We find him not guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as the testimony of AAA was merely based on general allegations that she was raped by the accusedappellant on the average of three (3) times a week from February 1999 to 15 October 2002. AAAs bare statement is evidently
inadequate and insufficient to prove the other charges of rape as each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime and
that each of them must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On that score alone, the indefinite testimonial evidence that the victim
was raped three times a week is decidedly inadequate and grossly insufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant therefore
with the required quantum of evidence.35
As regards to the first incident of rape in 1999, AAA recounted how appellant forced her to have sexual intercourse with him,
thus:
Q: What happened after two (2) weeks?
A: I was sleeping when somebody went on top of my head.
Q: Tell us about what time was this when this happened, when you said you noticed somebody climbing up your bed?

A: 9:30 in the evening.

Q: At that time again, where was your [BBB]?
A: At work, sir.
Q: What happened after you noticed somebody climbing up your bed?
A: I woke up and I saw him holding a bread knife.
xxxx
Q: Did you know who was this person who climbed your bed and who was holding a knife?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was that person?
A: "Papa"
Q: When you said "Papa," you are referring to the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened next?
A: "Tinusok nya yong kutsilyo sa leeg ko" and he removed his shorts.
Q: At that time, what were you then wearing?
A: Pajama, sir.
Q: What if any did the accused do to what you were wearing then?
A: He undressed me.
Q: Which one did he remove?
A: My pajama.
Q: What about your upper garments?
A: He did not remove.
Q: After you said the accused remove his shorts and removed your pajama, what happened?
A: He slowly parted my legs.
Q: And then?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: What were you doing, were you resisting when he was doing that?
A: I was resisting but my strength is no match to him. He was strong.
Q: What sort of resistance were you putting up that time?
A: "Hinampas ko po siya sa braso."
Q: What was his response to your act of hitting his arms?
A: "Wag daw po akong papalag at bubutasin nya ang leeg ko."36
Under Article 266-A(d) of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman who is
below 12 years of age. At that time of the commission of the first incident of rape, AAA was only 11 years old, as evidenced by
her birth certificate.37
As regards the final incident of rape in 15 October 2002, AAA narrated:
Q: You said this happened always, approximately three (3) times a week, until when?
A: The last time was in October 15, 2002.
Q: This last incident, describe to us where did it happen again?
A: In our house.
Q: At about what time?
A: 9:30 in the evening.
Q: Narrate to us how did this incident happen?
A: The same. He went to my bed, holding a bread knife, pointing it to me and he removed my shorts and he also
undressed himself.
Q: Then?
A: And he inserted his sexual organ into my vagina and after the incident, he left the house. 38
Since AAA was already 13 years old at the time of the commission of the last incident of rape, the applicable rule is Article 266A(a) which states that rape is committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation.
AAAs testimony that she was defiled by appellant was corroborated by the medical findings of the medico-legal expert. The
presence of deep healed and shallow healed laceration only confirms AAAs claim of rape.
In both rape incidents, the trial court applied Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code in imposing the penalty of death, which was
later modified by the Court of Appeals to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. Article 266-B provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
"l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
xxxx

The Court of Appeals appreciated the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. It relied on the established fact that AAA was still a minor when she was raped and on the stipulated fact that appellant
is her guardian. One of the instances wherein the crime of rape may be qualified is when the victim is a minor AND the accused is
her guardian. At this point, we cannot subscribe to this interpretation and hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in
considering the qualifying circumstance of relationship.
Indeed, it was stipulated during the pre-trial conference that appellant is the guardian of AAA. However, we cannot simply invoke
this admission to consider guardianship as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. "Circumstances that qualify a crime and
increase its penalty to death cannot be subject of stipulation. The accused cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of
death on the basis of stipulations or admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the gravity and irreversibility of capital
punishment. To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the
qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender."39
Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has legal relationship with his ward. The theory that a guardian
must be legally appointed was first enunciated in the early case of People v. De la Cruz. 40 The issue in said case was whether the
aunt of a rape victim could file a criminal complaint on behalf of her niece, when the victims father was still living and residing
in the Philippines. The Solicitor-General contended that the aunt was the legal guardian of the victim, thus, was competent to sign
the information. The Court rejected this contention and ruled as follow:
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 3, is as follows:
"Tampoco puede procederse por causa de estupro, rapto, violacion o abusos deshonestos, sino en virtud de denuncia de la parte
agraviada, o de sus padres, o abuelos o tutor, ni despues de haberse otorgado al ofensor, perdon expreso por dichas partes,
segun los casos." Without passing at this time on the question whether the tutor (legal guardian) may file a complaint in the
temporary absence of the parents or grandparents of the offended party, it suffices to say that we cannot accept the view of the
Government that an aunt who has the temporary custody of a minor in the absence of her father occupies the position of a tutor
(legal guardian). The word "tutor" (guardian) appearing in article 344, supra, must be given the same meaning as in section 551 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, a guardian legally appointed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXVII of
the Code of Civil Procedure.41
Garcia was more direct in addressing the issue of when the accused will be considered a "guardian" as a qualifying circumstance
in the crime of rape. In said case, appellant therein raped a 12-year-old girl. The victim was left to the care of appellant, who is the
live-in partner of the victims aunt. The issue of whether appellant is considered a guardian in the contemplation of the
amendment to the law on rape such that, the victim being a minor, he should be punished with the higher penalty of death for the
nine (9) crimes of rape was answered in the negative by the Court. The underlying reason behind its ruling was explained in this
discourse:
In the law on rape, the role of a guardian is provided for in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, specifically as one who, aside
from the offended party, her parents or grandparents, is authorized to file the sworn written complaint to commence the
prosecution for that crime. In People vs. De la Cruz, it was held that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or judicial
guardian as understood in the rules on civil procedure.
xxxx
It would not be logical to say that the word "guardian" in the third paragraph of Article 344 which is mentioned together with
parents and grandparents of the offended party would have a concept different from the "guardian" in the recent amendments of
Article 335 where he is also mentioned in the company of parents and ascendants of the victim. In Article 344, the inclusion of the
guardian is only to invest him with the power to sign a sworn written complaint to initiate the prosecution of four crimes against
chastity, while his inclusion in the enumeration of the offenders in Article 335 is to authorize the imposition of the death penalty
on him. With much more reason, therefore, should the restrictive concept announced in De la Cruz, that is, that he be a legal or
judicial guardian, be required in the latter article.
The Court notes from the transcripts of the proceedings in Congress on this particular point that the formulators were not
definitive on the concept of "guardian" as it now appears in the attendant circumstances added to the original provisions of Article
335 of the Code. They took note of the status of a guardian as contemplated in the law on rape but, apparently on pragmatic
considerations to be determined by the courts on an ad hoc basis, they agreed to just state "guardian" without the qualification that
he should be a legal or judicial guardian.1wphi1 It was assumed, however, that he should at the very least be a de facto guardian.
Indeed, they must have been aware of jurisprudence that the guardian envisaged in Article 335 of the Code, even after its
amendment by Republic Act No. 4111, would either be a natural guardian, sometimes referred to as a legal or statutory guardian,
or a judicial guardian appointed by the court over the person of the ward.
They did agree, however, that the additional attendant circumstances introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 should be considered
as special qualifying circumstances specifically applicable to the crime of rape and, accordingly, cannot be offset by mitigating
circumstances. The obvious ratiocination is that, just like the effect of the attendant circumstances therefore added by Republic

Act No. 4111, although the crime is still denominated as rape such circumstances have changed the nature of simple rape by
producing a qualified form thereof punishable by the higher penalty of death.
xxxx
The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which
impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such
considerations do not obtain in appellant's case or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a
ward or another's property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions should he betray the
trust.
In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision
introduced by Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in the category of the "common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim" in the same enumeration, since his liaison is with respect to the aunt of [AAA]. Since both logic and fact conjointly
demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree
of authority for a temporary period, we cannot impose the death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the amendments
introduced by Republic Act No. 7659, since he does not fit into that category. 42
People v. De la Cuesta43 adhered to Garcia when it ruled that the mere fact that the mother asked the accused to look after her
child while she was away did not constitute the relationship of guardian-ward as contemplated by law.44
Garcia was further applied by analogy in People v. Delantar 45 where it was held that the "guardian" envisioned in Section 31(c) of
Republic Act No. 7610 is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. In said case, accused was charged for violation of
Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 when he pimped an 11 year old child to at least two clients. The Court held that
the prosecution failed to establish filiation albeit it considered accused as a de facto guardian. However, this was not sufficient to
justify the imposition of the higher penalty pursuant to the ruling in Garcia. In addition, the Court construed the term "guardian"
in this manner:
Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings
may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. 87 Section
31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will
justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an "ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or
collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that the words with which "guardian"
is associated in the provision all denote a legal relationship. From this description we may safely deduce that the guardian
envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established either by being the
wards biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is neither AAAs biological parent nor is he
AAAs adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law. 46
Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not even mentioned in the Informations. What was clearly
stated was that appellant was the "adopting father" of AAA, which the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish.
For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant could only be convicted for two (2)
counts of simple rape, and not qualified rape.
We likewise reduce the Court of Appeals award of civil indemnity from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 and moral damages from
P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.47 The award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00
should be increased to P30,000.00 pursuant to People v. Guillermo.48 While no aggravating circumstance attended the commission
of rapes, it was established during trial that appellant used a deadly weapon to perpetrate the crime. Hence, the award of
exemplary damages is proper.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated 29 January 2009 convicting Isidro Flores y Lagua of the crime of rape in Criminal Cases Nos.
03-081 and 03-261 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in that he is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of simple rape only and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. He is also ordered, for each
count of rape, to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

G.R. No. 162421

August 31, 2007

NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO and ANUNCIACION FELIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 2003, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68319 entitled "Nelson Cabales and Rito Cabales v. Jesus Feliano and Anunciacion Feliano," which affirmed
with modification the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, dated August 11, 2000, in Civil
Case No. R-2878. The resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 23, 2004, which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, is likewise herein assailed.
The facts as found by the trial court and the appellate court are well established.
Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a 5,714-square meter parcel of land located in Brgy. Rizal, Sogod, Southern Leyte,
covered by Tax Declaration No. 17270 to his surviving wife Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora,
Alberto and petitioner Rito.
On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the subject property to Dr. Cayetano Corrompido
for P2,000.00, with right to repurchase within eight (8) years. The three (3) siblings divided the proceeds of the sale among
themselves, each getting a share of P666.66.
The following month or on August 18, 1971, Alberto secured a note ("vale") from Dr. Corrompido in the amount of P300.00.
In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson.
On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year redemption period, Bonifacio and Albino tendered their payment of P666.66 each to
Dr. Corrompido. But Dr. Corrompido only released the document of sale with pacto de retro after Saturnina paid for the share of
her deceased son, Alberto, including his "vale" of P300.00.
On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the subject parcel of land to
respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for P8,000.00. The Deed of Sale provided in its last paragraph, thus:
It is hereby declared and understood that the amount of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX PESOS (P2,286.00)
corresponding and belonging to the Heirs of Alberto Cabales and to Rito Cabales who are still minors upon the execution of this
instrument are held
in trust by the VENDEE and to be paid and delivered only to them upon reaching the age of 21.
On December 17, 1985, the Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte issued Original Certificate of Title No. 17035 over the purchased
land in the names of respondents-spouses.
On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4) children executed an affidavit to the effect that petitioner Nelson would only
receive the amount of P176.34 from respondents-spouses when he reaches the age of 21 considering that Saturnina paid Dr.
Corrompido P966.66 for the obligation of petitioner Nelsons late father Alberto, i.e., P666.66 for his share in the redemption of
the sale with pacto de retro as well as his "vale" of P300.00.

On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito Cabales acknowledged receipt of the sum of P1,143.00 from respondent Jesus
Feliano, representing the formers share in the proceeds of the sale of subject property.
In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then residing in Manila, went back to his fathers hometown in Southern Leyte. That
same year, he learned from his uncle, petitioner Rito, of the sale of subject property. In 1993, he signified his intention to redeem
the subject land during a barangay conciliation process that he initiated.
On January 12, 1995, contending that they could not have sold their respective shares in subject property when they were minors,
petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, a complaint for redemption of the subject land plus
damages.
In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained that petitioners were estopped from claiming any right over subject property
considering that (1) petitioner Rito had already received the amount corresponding to his share of the proceeds of the sale of
subject property, and (2) that petitioner Nelson failed to consign to the court the total amount of the redemption price necessary
for legal redemption. They prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of laches and prescription.
No amicable settlement was reached at pre-trial. Trial ensued and on August 11, 2000, the trial court ruled against petitioners. It
held that (1) Alberto or, by his death, any of his heirs including petitioner Nelson lost their right to subject land when not one of
them repurchased it from Dr. Corrompido; (2) Saturnina was effectively subrogated to the rights and interests of Alberto when she
paid for Albertos share as well as his obligation to Dr. Corrompido; and (3) petitioner Rito had no more right to redeem his share
to subject property as the sale by Saturnina, his legal guardian pursuant to Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, was perfectly
valid; and it was shown that he received his share of the proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, when he was 24 years old.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. It held that the sale by Saturnina of petitioner Ritos
undivided share to the property was unenforceable for lack of authority or legal representation but that the contract was effectively
ratified by petitioner Ritos receipt of the proceeds on July 24, 1986. The appellate court also ruled that petitioner Nelson is coowner to the extent of one-seventh (1/7) of subject property as Saturnina was not subrogated to Albertos rights when she
repurchased his share to the property. It further directed petitioner Nelson to pay the estate of the late Saturnina Cabales the
amount of P966.66, representing the amount which the latter paid for the obligation of petitioner Nelsons late father Alberto.
Finally, however, it denied petitioner Nelsons claim for redemption for his failure to tender or consign in court the redemption
money within the period prescribed by law.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) recognizing petitioner Nelson
Cabales as co-owner of subject land but denied him the right of legal redemption, and (2) not recognizing petitioner Rito Cabales
as co-owner of subject land with similar right of legal redemption.
First, we shall delineate the rights of petitioners to subject land.
When Rufino Cabales died intestate, his wife Saturnina and his six (6) children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto
and petitioner Rito, survived and succeeded him. Article 996 of the New Civil Code provides that "[i]f a widow or widower and
legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the
children." Verily, the seven (7) heirs inherited equally on subject property. Petitioner Rito and Alberto, petitioner Nelsons father,
inherited in their own rights and with equal shares as the others.
But before partition of subject land was effected, Alberto died. By operation of law, his rights and obligations to one-seventh of
subject land were transferred to his legal heirs his wife and his son petitioner Nelson.
We shall now discuss the effects of the two (2) sales of subject land to the rights of the parties.
The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was valid but
only as to their pro-indiviso shares to the land. When Alberto died prior to repurchasing his share, his rights and obligations were
transferred to and assumed by his heirs, namely his wife and his son, petitioner Nelson. But the records show that it was Saturnina,
Albertos mother, and not his heirs, who repurchased for him. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Saturnina was not
subrogated to Albertos or his heirs rights to the property when she repurchased the share.
In Paulmitan v. Court of Appeals,3 we held that a co-owner who redeemed the property in its entirety did not make her the owner
of all of it. The property remained in a condition of co-ownership as the redemption did not provide for a mode of terminating a
co-ownership.4 But the one who redeemed had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and until reimbursed, holds a
lien upon the subject property for the amount due. 5 Necessarily, when Saturnina redeemed for Albertos heirs who had then
acquired his pro-indiviso share in subject property, it did not vest in her ownership over the pro-indiviso share she redeemed. But
she had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and held a lien upon the property for the amount due until
reimbursement. The result is that the heirs of Alberto, i.e., his wife and his son petitioner Nelson, retained ownership over their
pro-indiviso share.

Upon redemption from Dr. Corrompido, the subject property was resold to respondents-spouses by the co-owners. Petitioners Rito
and Nelson were then minors and as indicated in the Deed of Sale, their shares in the proceeds were held in trust by respondentsspouses to be paid and delivered to them upon reaching the age of majority.
As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as correctly held by the Court of Appeals. Articles 320 and 326 of the
New Civil Code6 state that:
Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental
authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of
the Court of First Instance.
Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a
guardian of the childs property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court.
In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is considered legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child
under his or her parental authority without need of giving a bond in case the amount of the property of the child does not exceed
two thousand pesos.7 Corollary to this, Rule 93, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this case,
automatically designates the parent as legal guardian of the child without need of any judicial appointment in case the latters
property does not exceed two thousand pesos,8 thus:
Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. When the property of the child under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the
father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian x x x x 9
Saturnina was clearly petitioner Ritos legal guardian without necessity of court appointment considering that the amount of his
property or one-seventh of subject property was P1,143.00, which is less than two thousand pesos. However, Rule 96, Sec. 1 10
provides that:
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. A guardian appointed shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward,
and the management of his estate, or the management of the estate only, as the case may be. The guardian of the estate of a
nonresident shall have the management of all the estate of the ward within the Philippines, and no court other than that in which
such guardian was appointed shall have jurisdiction over the guardianship.
Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the minors property. It does not include the power of
alienation which needs judicial authority.11 Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latters proindiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do so.
Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who has
acted beyond his powers;
xxxx
Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of petitioner Rito was unenforceable. However, when he
acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito effectively ratified it. This act of ratification
rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale.
Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to alienate or encumber his
property. It was his mother who was his legal guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his undivided share
to the property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the subject property in its entirety to respondentsspouses, they only sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and not that part which pertained to petitioner Nelson and
his mother. Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over their undivided share of subject property. 12
But may petitioners redeem the subject land from respondents-spouses? Articles 1088 and 1623 of the New Civil Code are
pertinent:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.

Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing
by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property,
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.
Clearly, legal redemption may only be exercised by the co-owner or co-owners who did not part with his or their pro-indiviso
share in the property held in common. As demonstrated, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Rito became valid and
binding upon his ratification on July 24, 1986. As a result, he lost his right to redeem subject property.
However, as likewise established, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Nelson and his mother was not valid such that
they were not divested of their ownership thereto. Necessarily, they may redeem the subject property from respondents-spouses.
But they must do so within thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by their co-owners vendors. In reckoning this period, we
held in Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,13 thus:
x x x we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the
law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part
of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. x x x x
x x x x While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason
for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the
lawmakers will.
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 (and Article 1623 for that matter) 14 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly
notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the
shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate the
problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.1awph!1
In the instant case, the right of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sale was made in 1978. We are not unmindful
of the fact that petitioner Nelson was a minor when the sale was perfected. Nevertheless, the records show that in 1988, petitioner
Nelson, then of majority age, was informed of the sale of subject property. Moreover, it was noted by the appellate court that
petitioner Nelson was likewise informed thereof in 1993 and he signified his intention to redeem subject property during a
barangay conciliation process. But he only filed the complaint for legal redemption and damages on January 12, 1995, certainly
more than thirty days from learning about the sale.
In the face of the established facts, petitioner Nelson cannot feign ignorance of the sale of subject property in 1978. To require
strict proof of written notice of the sale would be to countenance an obvious false claim of lack of knowledge thereof, thus
commending the letter of the law over its purpose, i.e., the notification of redemptioners.
The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice of the sale to petitioner Nelson. The thirty-day redemption period
commenced in 1993, after petitioner Nelson sought the barangay conciliation process to redeem his property. By January 12,
1995, when petitioner Nelson filed a complaint for legal redemption and damages, it is clear that the thirty-day period had already
expired.
As in Alonzo, the Court, after due consideration of the facts of the instant case, hereby interprets the law in a way that will render
justice.15
Petitioner Nelson, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, can no longer redeem subject property. But he and his mother remain
co-owners thereof with respondents-spouses. Accordingly, title to subject property must include them.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals of October 27, 2003
and February 23, 2004 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte is ORDERED to
cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 17035 and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in the name of respondentsspouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for the 6/7 portion, and petitioner Nelson Cabales and his mother for the remaining 1/7
portion, pro indiviso.
SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 109557

November 29, 2000

JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision1 of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying reconsideration 2
reversing that of the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo, Branch 32 3 and declaring void the special proceedings instituted therein by
petitioners to authorize petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza, in view of the comatose condition of her husband, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.,
with the approval of the court, to dispose of their conjugal property in favor of co-petitioners, their daughter and son in law, for
the ostensible purpose of "financial need in the personal, business and medical expenses of her incapacitated husband."
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent) on the one hand, against his mother Gilda L. Jardeleza,
and sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda Jardeleza (herein petitioners) on the other hand. The controversy
came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s suffering of a stroke on March 25, 1991, which left him comatose and bereft
of any motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of
herein private respondent Gilda Jardeleza.
"Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the senior Jardeleza spouses was about to be sold, petitioner Teodoro
Jardeleza, on June 6, 1991, filed a petition (Annex "A") before the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, Branch 25, where it was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 4689, in the matter of the guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. The petitioner averred therein that the
present physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. prevent him from competently administering his properties,
and in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardelezas real and personal assets, there was a need for a court-appointed
guardian to administer said properties. It was prayed therein that Letters of Guardianship be issued in favor of herein private
respondent Gilda Ledesma Jardeleza, wife of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. It was further prayed that in the meantime, no property of
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. be negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise alienated to third persons, particularly Lot No. 4291 and all the
improvements thereon, located along Bonifacio Drive, Iloilo City, and covered by T.C.T. No. 47337.
"A few days later, or on June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza herself filed a petition docketed as Special Proceeding NO.
4691, before Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., assumption
of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell the same (Annex "B"). Therein, the petitioner
Gilda L. Jardeleza averred the physical and mental incapacity of her husband, who was then confined for intensive medical care
and treatment at the Iloilo Doctors Hospital. She signified to the court her desire to assume sole powers of administration of their
conjugal properties. She also alleged that her husbands medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up,
accumulating to several hundred thousands of pesos already. For this, she urgently needed to sell one piece of real property,
specifically Lot No. 4291 and its improvements. Thus, she prayed for authorization from the court to sell said property.
"The following day, June 14, 1991, Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City issued an Order (Annex "C") finding the petition in
Spec. Proc. No. 4691 to be sufficient in form and substance, and setting the hearing thereof for June 20, 1991. The scheduled
hearing of the petition proceeded, attended by therein petitioner Gilda Jardeleza, her counsel, her two children, namely Ernesto
Jardeleza, Jr., and Glenda Jardeleza Uy, and Dr. Rolando Padilla, one of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s attending physicians.
"On that same day, June 20, 1991, Branch 32 of the RTC of Iloilo City rendered its Decision (Annex "D"), finding that it was
convinced that Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, and
that the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon was necessary to defray the mounting expenses for treatment and
Hospitalization. The said court also made the pronouncement that the petition filed by Gilda L. Jardeleza was "pursuant to Article
124 of the Family Code, and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings sanctioned under
Article 253 of the same Code x x x.
"The said court then disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, there being factual and legal bases to the petition dated June 13, 1991, the Court hereby renders judgment as
follows:
"1) declaring Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., petitioners husband, to be incapacitated and unable to participate in the administration of
conjugal properties;
"2) authorizing petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties; and
"3) authorizing aforesaid petitioner to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, situated in Iloilo City and covered by
TCT No. 47337 issued in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the buildings standing thereof.
"SO ORDERED.
"On June 24, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the proceedings before Branch 32 in Spec. Proc.
Case No. 4691, said petitioner being unaware and not knowing that a decision has already been rendered on the case by public
respondent.
"On July 3, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment in Spec. Proc. No. 4691
and a motion for consolidation of the two cases (Annex "F"). He propounded the argument that the petition for declaration of
incapacity, assumption of sole powers of administration, and authority to sell the conjugal properties was essentially a petition for
guardianship of the person and properties of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. As such, it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the
provisions on summary proceedings set out in Article 253 of the Family Code. It should follow the rules governing special
proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court which require procedural due process, particularly the need for notice and a hearing on
the merits. On the other hand, even if Gilda Jardelezas petition can be prosecuted by summary proceedings, there was still a
failure to comply with the basic requirements thereof, making the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a defective one. He further
alleged that under the New Civil Code, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. had acquired vested rights as a conjugal partner, and that these
rights cannot be impaired or prejudiced without his consent. Neither can he be deprived of his share in the conjugal properties
through mere summary proceedings. He then restated his position that Spec. Proc. No. 4691 should be consolidated with Spec.
Proc. No. 4689 which was filed earlier and pending before Branch 25.
"Teodoro Jardeleza also questioned the propriety of the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon supposedly to pay the
accumulated financial obligations arising from Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s hospitalization. He alleged that the market value of the
property would be around Twelve to Fifteen Million Pesos, but that he had been informed that it would be sold for much less. He
also pointed out that the building thereon which houses the Jardeleza Clinic is a monument to Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.s industry,
labor and service to his fellowmen. Hence, the said property has a lot of sentimental value to his family. Besides, argued Teodoro
Jardeleza, then conjugal partnership had other liquid assets to pay off all financial obligations. He mentioned that apart from
sufficient cash, Jardeleza, Sr. owned stocks of Iloilo Doctors Hospital which can be off-set against the cost of medical and
hospital bills. Furthermore, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. enjoys certain privileges at the said hospital which allows him to pay on
installment basis. Moreover, two of Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.s attending physicians are his own sons who do not charge anything for
their professional services.
"On July 4, 1991, Teodoro Jardeleza filed in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a supplement to his motion for reconsideration (Annex "G").
He reiterated his contention that summary proceedings was irregularly applied. He also noted that the provisions on summary
proceedings found in Chapter 2 of the Family Code comes under the heading on "Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife"
which contemplates of a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Thus, he argued that were one spouse is "comatose
without motor and mental faculties," the said provisions cannot be made to apply.
"While the motion for reconsideration was pending, Gilda Jardeleza disposed by absolute sale Lot No. 4291 and all its
improvements to her daughter, Ma. Glenda Jardeleza Uy, for Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00), as evidenced by a Deed
Absolute Sale dated July 8, 1991 executed between them (p. 111, Rollo). Under date of July 23, 1991, Gilda Jardeleza filed an
urgent ex-parte motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale.
"On August 12, 1991 Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the motion for approval of the deed of sale on the grounds that: (1)
the motion was prematurely filed and should be held in abeyance until the final resolution of the petition; (2) the motion does not
allege nor prove the justifications for the sale; and (3) the motion does not allege that had Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. been competent,
he would have given his consent to the sale.
"Judge Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto of Branch 32 of the respondent Court, who had penned the decision in Spec. Proc. No.
4691 had in the meantime formally inhibited herself from further acting in this case (Annex "I"). The case was then reraffled to
Branch 28 of the said court.
"On December 19, 1991, the said court issued an Order (Annex "M") denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration and
approving respondent Jardelezas motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale. The said court ruled that:

"After a careful and thorough perusal of the decision, dated June 20, 1991, the Motion for Reconsideration, as well as its
supplements filed by "oppositor", Teodoro L. Jardeleza, through counsel, and the opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration,
including its supplements, filed by petitioner, through counsel, this Court is of the opinion and so holds, that her Honor, Amelita
K. del Rosario-Benedicto, Presiding Judge of Branch 32, of this Court, has properly observed the procedure embodied under
Article 253, in relation to Article 124, of the Family Code, in rendering her decision dated June 20, 1991.
"Also, as correctly stated by petitioner, through counsel, that "oppositor" Teodor L. Jardeleza does not have the personality to
oppose the instant petition considering that the property or properties, subject of the petition, belongs to the conjugal partnership
of the spouses Ernesto and Gilda Jardeleza, who are both still alive.
"In view thereof, the Motion for Reconsideration of "oppositor" Teodoro L. Jardeleza, is hereby denied for lack of merit.
"Considering the validity of the decision dated June 20, 1991, which among others, authorized Gilda L. Jardeleza to sell Lot No.
4291 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47337 issued in the names of Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr., and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the building standing thereon, the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Approval of Deed of
Absolute Sale dated July 23, 1991, filed by petitioner, through counsel, is hereby granted and the deed of absolute sale, executed
and notarized on July 8, 1991, by and between Gilda L. Jardeleza, as vendor, and Ma. Glenda Jardeleza, as vendee, is hereby
approved, and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City, is directed to register the sale and issue the corresponding transfer certificate of
title to the vendee.
"SO ORDERED."4
On December 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing the appealed decision and ordering the trial court
to dismiss the special proceedings to approve the deed of sale, which was also declared void. 5
On December 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, 6 however, on March 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion, finding no cogent and compelling reason to disturb the decision. 7
Hence, this appeal.8
The issue raised is whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke, a
cerebrovascular accident, rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and could not manage their conjugal
partnership property may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and
dispose of a parcel of land with its improvements, worth more than twelve million pesos, with the approval of the court in a
summary proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law, for the amount of eight million pesos.
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the procedural rules on summary proceedings in
relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not applicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take care of himself and
manage the conjugal property due to illness that had rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the appointment of a judicial
guardian of the person or estate or both of such incompetent, under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Indeed,
petitioner earlier had filed such a petition for judicial guardianship.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
"ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
"In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties,
the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)."
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of
the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or
consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or
semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of
brain stem infarct.9 In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court.

Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply to the wife's administration of
the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties
as a guardian under the Rules of Court.10
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must observe the
procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the
summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court.1wphi1 Indeed, the trial
court did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did
not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be
granted.
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void
for lack of due process. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that a denial of due process suffices to cast on the
official act taken by whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity. 11 A decision rendered without due process is void
ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally.12 "A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is
deprived of the opportunity of being heard."13 "A void decision may be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or
collaterally, by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked." 14
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 26936, in toto.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 166470

August 7, 2009

CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-1 and NATIVIDAD CRUZ-HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,

vs.
JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 169217
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-SAGUN and TERESA C. HERNANDEZ-VILLA
ABRILLE, Petitioners,
vs.
JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS,2 Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan
Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of
her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.
On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children, petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma.
Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille.
Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan
family (conservatively estimated at P50 million in 1997).
Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She was then 10 years old and studying at La
Consolacion College. However, due to her "violent personality," Lulu stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5.
In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate. 3 Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even
finish her elementary education, Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulus properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993,
petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties.
During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993), Felix and petitioners undertook various "projects"
involving Lulus real properties. In 1974, Felix allegedly purchased one of Lulus properties for an undisclosed amount to develop
the Marilou Subdivision.4 In 1995, Ma. Victoria informed Lulu that her 11-hectare Montalban, Rizal property5 was under
litigation. Thus, Lulu signed a special power of attorney6 (SPA) believing that she was authorizing Ma. Victoria to appear in court
on her behalf when she was in fact unknowingly authorizing her half-sister to sell the said property to the Manila Electric
Company for P18,206,400.7 Thereafter, Cecilio asked Lulu to authorize him to lease her 45-hectare property in Montalban, Rizal
to Oxford Concrete Aggregates for P58,500 per month so that she could have a car and driver at her disposal.
In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that
petitioners had been dissipating her estate. She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners
Montalban, Rizal home and was receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication.
Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. She later found out that Lulu was
occupying a cramped room lit by a single fluorescent lamp without running water. Since she had not been given a proper toilet,
Lulu urinated and defecated in the garden. Due to Lulu's poor hygiene, respondent brought her to several physicians for medical
examination. Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes from which she was suffering several
complications.8
Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an inventory and accounting of Lulus estate from petitioners. 9 However, the demand
was ignored.
On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship10 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch
76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind.

Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same.

Natividad denied that Marilou Subdivision belonged to Lulu. Since she and her late husband were the registered owners of the
said property, it was allegedly part of their conjugal partnership.
Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for their part, claimed that the issue of Lulus competency had been settled in 1968 (upon her
emancipation) when the court ordered her legal guardian and maternal uncle, Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the properties for her to
manage.
They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and, for that reason, aware of the consequences of executing an SPA. Furthermore,
whether or not Cecilio and Ma. Victoria acted within the scope of their respective authorities could not be determined in a
guardianship proceeding, such matter being the proper subject of an ordinary civil action.
Petitioners also admitted that the property developed into the Marilou Subdivision was among those parcels of land Lulu inherited
from the San Juan family. However, because the "sale" between Felix and Lulu had taken place in 1974, questions regarding its
legality were already barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, its validity could no longer be impugned, or so they claimed.
During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy and experiences with the San Juan and Hernandez
families. Lulu identified and described her parents, stepmother, half-siblings and maternal relatives. She claimed inheriting tracts
of land from the San Juan family. However, these properties were dissipated by the Hernandez family as they lived a "luxurious"
lifestyle. When asked to explain this allegation, Lulu said that her stepmother and half-siblings rode in cars while she was made to
ride a tricycle.
Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulus examinations which revealed the alarming state of her health. 11 Not
only was Lulu severely afflicted with diabetes mellitus and suffering from its complications, 12 she also had an existing
artheroselorotic cardiovascular disease (which was aggravated by her obesity). Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view
of Lulus intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental state, she would not be able to care for herself and selfadminister her medications.
In a decision dated September 25, 2001,13 the RTC concluded that, due to her weak physical and mental condition, there was a
need to appoint a legal guardian over the person and property of Lulu. Thus, it declared Lulu an incompetent and appointed
respondent as guardian over the person and property of Lulu on a P1 million bond.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration asserting that the P1 million bond was grossly insufficient to secure Lulus P50-million
estate against fraudulent loss or dissipation.14 The motion, however, was denied.15
On July 2, 2002, petitioners appealed the September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA). 16 The appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75760.
On December 29, 2004, the CA issued a decision affirming the September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC (in the petition for
guardianship) in toto.17 It held that respondent presented sufficient evidence to prove that Lulu, because of her illnesses and low
educational attainment, needed assistance in taking care of herself and managing her affairs considering the extent of her estate.
With regard to the respondents appointment as the legal guardian, the CA found that, since Lulu did not trust petitioners, none of
them was qualified to be her legal guardian.1avvphi1 Because guardianship was a trust relationship, the RTC was bound to
appoint someone Lulu clearly trusted.
Petitioners now assail the December 29, 2004 decision of the CA in this Court in a petition for review on certiorari docketed as
G.R. No. 166470.18
Meanwhile, Lulu moved into 8 R. Santos St., Marikina City (Marikina apartment) and was provided with two housemaids tasked
to care for her. Sometime in November 2003, Lulu was abducted from her Marikina apartment. Jovita immediately sought the
assistance of the Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER) division of the Philippine National Police.
The PACER subsequently discovered that petitioners were keeping Lulu somewhere in Rodriguez, Rizal. Despite their initial
hostility to the investigation, Ma. Victoria and Cecilio subsequently contacted the PACER to inform them that Lulu voluntarily
left with Natividad because her guardian had allegedly been maltreating her.19
On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus20 in the CA alleging that petitioners abducted Lulu and were
holding her captive in an undisclosed location in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On April 26, 2005, the CA granted the petition for habeas corpus, ruling that Jovita, as her legal guardian, was entitled to her
custody. 21

Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said decision but it was denied in a resolution dated July 12, 2005.22 Aggrieved,
they filed this petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 169217. This was consolidated with G.R. No. 166470.
The basic issue in petitions of this nature is whether the person is an incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial
guardian over her person and property.
Petitioners claim that the opinions of Lulu's attending physicians23 regarding her mental state were inadmissible in evidence as
they were not experts in psychiatry. Respondent therefore failed to prove that Lulu's illnesses rendered her an incompetent. She
should have been presumed to be of sound mind and/or in full possession of her mental capacity. For this reason, Lulu should be
allowed to live with them since under Articles 194 to 196 of the Family Code, 24 legitimate brothers and sisters, whether half-blood
or full-blood are required to support each other fully.
Respondent, on the other hand, reiterated her arguments before the courts a quo. She disclosed that Lulu had been confined in
Recovery.com, a psychosocial rehabilitation center and convalescent home care facility in Quezon City, since 2004 due to violent
and destructive behavior. She also had delusions of being physically and sexually abused by "Boy Negro" and imaginary pets she
called "Michael" and "Madonna." 25 The November 21, 2005 medical report26 stated Lulu had unspecified mental retardation with
psychosis but claimed significant improvements in her behavior.
We find the petition to be without merit.
Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with
whom he is sufficiently acquainted.27 Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them to
thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was below average and her mental stage below normal.
Their opinions were admissible in evidence.
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary.28 The observations of the trial judge coupled
with evidence29 establishing the person's state of mental sanity will suffice. 30 Here, the trial judge was given ample opportunity to
observe Lulu personally when she testified before the RTC.
Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court,31 persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or
other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as
incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking
care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not
Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly
involves questions of fact.
As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a petition for review. We only take cognizance of questions of fact
in exceptional circumstances, none of which is present in this case.32 We thus adopt the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by
the CA.1avvph!1
Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate courts finding as to the propriety of respondent's
appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu.33 We therefore affirm her appointment as such. Consequently, respondent is tasked
to care for and take full custody of Lulu, and manage her estate as well. 34
Inasmuch as respondents appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu was proper, the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in her
favor was also in order.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the rightful custody of person is
withheld from the one entitled thereto.35 Respondent, as the judicial guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care for and protect her
ward. For her to perform her obligation, respondent must have custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus
after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her ward. 36
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DENIED.
Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to respondent, Lulus legal guardian, an accurate and faithful accounting of all the
properties and funds they unlawfully appropriated for themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez, within
thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision. If warranted, the proper complaints should also be filed against them for any
criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandezs estate and her unlawful abduction
from the custody of her legal guardian.
Treble costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

G.R. No. 132223

June 19, 2001

BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner,

vs.
HELEN G. BELMES, respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45650, "In the Matter of
Guardianship of Minors Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Bonifacia P. Vancil, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. Helen G. Belmes,
Oppositor-Appellant," promulgated on July 29, 1997, and its Resolution dated December 18, 1997 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the said Decision.
The facts of the case as summarized by the Court of Appeals in its Decision are:
"Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States of America who
died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie and
Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.
"Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a guardianship
proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1618CEB. At the time, Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is claimed in the petition that the
minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate consisting of proceeds from their fathers death pension
benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00.
"Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for hearing after a 3-consecutive-weekly publications
with the Sunstar Daily.
"On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of
Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.
"On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition to the subject
guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship under Special
Proceedings No. 2819 before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.
"Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and
Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority
over the subject minors at Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing; that the petition
was filed under an improper venue; and that at the time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140
Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.
"On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes motion to remove and/or to
disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the
office and perform her duties as such guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent attempt for a
reconsideration was likewise dismissed in an Order dated November 24, 1988." 1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision reversing the RTC order of October 12, 1988 and dismissing
Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB.

The Court of Appeals held:

"Stress should likewise be made that our Civil Code considers parents, the father, or in the absence, the mother, as natural
guardian of her minor children. The law on parental authority under the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and now the New Family
Code, (Article 225 of the Family Code) ascribe to the same legal pronouncements. Section 7 of Rule 93 of the Revised
Rules of Court confirms the designation of the parents as ipso facto guardian of their minor children without need of a
court appointment and only for good reason may another person be named. Ironically, for the petitioner, there is nothing
on record of any reason at all why Helen Belmes, the biological mother, should be deprived of her legal rights as natural
guardian of her minor children. To give away such privilege from Helen would be an abdication and grave violation of
the very basic fundamental tenets in civil law and the constitution on family solidarity." 2
On March 10, 1998, Bonifacia Vancil filed with this Court the present petition, raising the following "legal points":
"1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that the preferential right of a parent to be appointed guardian over the
persons and estate of the minors is absolute, contrary to existing jurisprudence.
"2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Oppositor Helen G. Belmes, the biological mother, should be
appointed the guardian of the minors despite the undisputed proof that under her custody, her daughter minor Valerie
Vancil was raped seven times by Oppositors live-in partner.
"3. The respondent (sic) Court of Appeals gravely erred when it disqualified petitioner Bonifacia P. Vancil to be
appointed as judicial guardian over the persons and estate of subject minors despite the fact that she has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications as judicial guardian, merely on the basis of her U.S. citizenship which is
clearly not a statutory requirement to become guardian."
At the outset, let it be stressed that in her "Manifestation/Motion," dated September 15, 1998, respondent Helen Belmes stated that
her daughter Valerie turned eighteen on September 2, 1998 as shown by her Birth Certificate. 3 Respondent thus prayed that this
case be dismissed with respect to Valerie, she being no longer a proper subject of guardianship proceedings. The said
"Manifestation/Motion" was noted by this Court in its Resolution dated November 11, 1998.
Considering that Valerie is already of major age, this petition has become moot with respect to her. Thus, only the first and third
"legal points" raised by petitioner should be resolved.
The basic issue for our resolution is who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right
over that of petitioner to be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides:
"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.
In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. In
Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals,4 this Court held:
"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to the custody of their minor
children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right
is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship."
Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.
Petitioners claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article
214 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. xxx."
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals,5 this Court ruled:
"The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the
parents death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent."

Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of
respondent. Considering that respondent is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent,
petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minors guardian, respondents unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not
proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that
respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her (respondents) live-in partner raped Valerie several times.
But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It
bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the
responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties
of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also
qualify as a guardian.
Moreover, we observe that respondents allegation that petitioner has not set foot in the Philippines since 1987 has not been
controverted by her. Besides, petitioners old age and her conviction of libel by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City in
Criminal Case No. CBU-168846 filed by one Danilo R. Deen, will give her a second thought of staying here. Indeed, her coming
back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for only two years is not certain.
Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our
courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards. In Guerrero vs. Teran,7 this Court held:
"Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the theory that her appointment was void because
she did not reside in the Philippine Islands. There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only
as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this
question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate,
etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not
personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not
consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction
of our courts here."
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification in the sense that Valerie, who has attained the
age of majority, will no longer be under the guardianship of respondent Helen Belmes.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154994

June 28, 2005

JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, petitioner,

vs.
CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V, respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 156254

June 28, 2005

CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO V, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; Hon. HELEN B. RICAFORT, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Paraaque City, Branch
260; and JOYCELYN D. PABLO-GUALBERTO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When love is lost between spouses and the marriage inevitably results in separation, the bitterest tussle is often over the custody of
their children. The Court is now tasked to settle the opposing claims of the parents for custody pendente lite of their child who is

less than seven years of age. There being no sufficient proof of any compelling reason to separate the minor from his mother,
custody should remain with her.
The Case
Before us are two consolidated petitions. The first is a Petition for Review1 filed by Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the August 30, 2002 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 70878. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Order of May 17, 2002 is
hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. The custody of the child is hereby ordered returned to [Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto
V].
"The [respondent] court/Judge is hereby directed to consider, hear and resolve [petitioners] motion to lift the award of custody
pendente lite of the child to [respondent]." 3
The second is a Petition for Certiorari4 filed by Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, charging the
appellate court with grave abuse of discretion for denying his Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the August 30, 2002 Decision.
The denial was contained in the CAs November 27, 2002 Resolution, which we quote:
"We could not find any cogent reason why the [last part of the dispositive portion of our Decision of August 30, 2002] should be
deleted, hence, subject motion is hereby DENIED." 5
The Facts
The CA narrated the antecedents as follows:
"x x x [O]n March 12, 2002, [Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V] filed before [the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City] a
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to x x x Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for custody
pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello (the child, for brevity), whom [Joycelyn] allegedly took away with her
from the conjugal home and his school (Infant Toddlers Discovery Center in Paraaque City) when [she] decided to abandon
[Crisanto] sometime in early February 2002[.] x x x [O]n April 2, 2002, [RTC Judge Helen B. Ricafort] heard the ancillary prayer
of [Crisanto] for custody pendente lite. x x x [B]ecause [Joycelyn] allegedly failed to appear despite notice, [Crisanto], a certain
Col. Renato Santos, and Ms. Cherry Batistel, testified before the x x x Judge; x x x documentary evidence [was] also presented[.]
x x x [O]n April 3, 2002, x x x [the] Judge awarded custody pendente lite of the child to [Crisanto.] [T]he Order partly read x x x:
x x x Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V testified. He stated that [Joycelyn] took their minor child with her to Caminawit, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro. At that time, the minor was enrolled at B.F. Homes, Paraaque City. Despite effort[s] exerted by him, he has
failed to see his child. [Joycelyn] and the child are at present staying with the formers step-father at the latters [residence] at
Caminawit, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
Renato Santos, President of United Security Logistic testified that he was commissioned by [Crisanto] to conduct surveillance on
[Joycelyn] and came up with the conclusion that [she] is having lesbian relations with one Noreen Gay Cuidadano in Cebu City.
The findings of Renato Santos [were] corroborated by Cherry Batistel, a house helper of the spouses who stated that [the mother]
does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and on one occasion, she saw [Joycelyn] slapping the child.
Art. 211 of the Family Code provides as follows:
The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their children. In the case of disagreement,
the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
The authority of the father and mother over their children is exercised jointly. This recognition, however, does not place her in
exactly the same place as the father; her authority is subordinated to that of the father.
In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and
moral welfare of the child, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parties.
The Court believes that [Joycelyn] had no reason to take the child with her. Moreover, per Sheriff returns, she is not with him at
Caminawit, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
WHEREFORE, pendente lite, the Court hereby awards custody of the minor, Crisanto Rafaello P. Gualberto X to his father,
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V.

"x x x [O]n April 16, 2002, the hearing of [Joycelyns] motion to lift the award of custody pendente lite of the child to [Crisanto]
was set but the former did not allegedly present any evidence to support her motion. However, on May 17, 2002, [the] Judge
allegedly issued the assailed Order reversing her Order of April 3, 2002 and this time awarding custody of the child to [Joycelyn].
[T]he entire text of the Order [is] herein reproduced, to wit:
Submitted is [Crisantos] Motion to Resolve Prayer for Custody Pendente Lite and [Joycelyns] Motion to Dismiss and the
respective Oppositions thereto.
[Joycelyn], in her Motion to Dismiss, makes issue of the fact that the person referred to in the caption of the Petition is one
JOCELYN Pablo Gualberto and not Joycelyn Pablo Gualberto. [Joycelyn] knows she is the person referred to in the Complaint.
As a matter of fact, the body of the Complaint states her name correct[ly]. The law is intended to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice, not to hinder or delay it. Litigation should be practicable and convenient. The error in the name of
Joycelyn does not involve public policy and has not prejudiced [her].
This case was filed on March 12, 2002. Several attempts were made to serve summons on [Joycelyn] as shown by the Sheriffs
returns. It appears that on the 4th attempt on March 21, 2002, both Ma. Daisy and x x x Ronnie Nolasco, [Joycelyns mother and
stepfather, respectively,] read the contents of the documents presented after which they returned the same.lawphil.net
The Court believes that on that day, summons was duly served and this Court acquired jurisdiction over [Joycelyn].
The filing of [Joycelyns annulment] case on March 26, 2002 was an after thought, perforce the Motion to [D]ismiss should be
denied.
The child subject of this Petition, Crisanto Rafaello P. Gualberto is barely four years old. Under Article 213 of the Family Code,
he shall not be separated from his mother unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The Court finds the reason
stated by [Crisanto] not [to] be compelling reasons.1avvphil.zw+ The father should however be entitled to spend time with the
minor. These do not appear compelling reasons to deprive him of the company of his child.
When [Joycelyn] appeared before this Court, she stated that she has no objection to the father visiting the child even everyday
provided it is in Mindoro.
The Court hereby grants the mother, [Joycelyn], the custody of Crisanto Rafaello P. Gualberto, with [the] right of [Crisanto] to
have the child with him every other weekend.
WHEREFORE:
1. The [M]otion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED;
2. Custody pendente lite is hereby given to the mother Joycelyn Pablo Gualberto with the right of the father, x x x
[Crisanto], to have him every other week-end.
3. Parties are admonished not to use any other agencies of the government like the CIDG to interfere in this case and to
harass the parties."6
In a Petition for Certiorari7 before the CA, Crisanto charged the Regional Trial Court (Branch 260) of Paraaque City with grave
abuse of discretion for issuing its aforequoted May 17, 2002 Order. He alleged that this Order superseded, without any factual or
legal basis, the still valid and subsisting April 3, 2002 Order awarding him custody pendente lite of his minor son; and that it
violated Section 14 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Partly in Crisantos favor, the CA ruled that grave abuse of discretion had been committed by the trial court in reversing the latter
courts previous Order dated April 3, 2002, by issuing the assailed May 17, 2002 Order. The appellate court explained that the
only incident to resolve was Joycelyns Motion to Dismiss, not the issuance of the earlier Order. According to the CA, the prior
Order awarding provisional custody to the father should prevail, not only because it was issued after a hearing, but also because
the trial court did not resolve the correct incident in the later Order.
Nonetheless, the CA stressed that the trial court judge was not precluded from considering and resolving Joycelyns Motion to lift
the award of custody pendente lite to Crisanto, as that Motion had yet to be properly considered and ruled upon. However, it
directed that the child be turned over to him until the issue was resolved.
Hence, these Petitions.8

Issues
In GR No. 154994, Petitioner Joycelyn submits these issues for our consideration:
"1. Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals, when it awarded the custody of the child to the father, violated Art.
213 of the Family Code, which mandates that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
"2. Is it Article 213 or Article 211 which applies in this case involving four-year old Rafaello?"9
On the other hand, Crisanto raises the following issues:
"A. Did Respondent Court commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to or in excess of jurisdiction when, in its August
30, 2002 Decision, it ordered respondent court/Judge to consider, hear and resolve the motion to lift award of custody
pendente lite of the child to petitioner and x x x denied the motion for reconsideration thereof in its November 27, 2002
Resolution, considering that: (1) there is no such motion ever, then or now pending, with the court a quo; (2) the
November 27, 2002 Resolution is unconstitutional; and (3) the April 3, 2002 Order of respondent Judge, the validity of
which has been upheld in the August 30, 2002 Decision of the respondent Court, has become final and executory; and
"B. Ought not the ancillary remedies [o]f habeas corpus, because the whereabouts, physical and mental condition of the
illegally detained Minor Rafaello is now unknown to petitioner and preliminary mandatory injunction with urgent prayer
for immediate issuance of preliminary [injunction], petitioner having a clear and settled right to custody of Minor
Rafaello which has been violated and still is being continuously violated by [petitioner Joycelyn], be granted by this
Honorable Court?"10
Being interrelated, the procedural challenges and the substantive issues in the two Petitions will be addressed jointly.
The Courts Ruling
There is merit in the Petition in GR No. 154994, but not in GR No. 156254.
Preliminary Issue:
The Alleged Prematurity of the Petition in GR No. 154994
Before going into the merits of the present controversy, the Court shall first dispose of a threshold issue. In GR No. 154994,
therein Respondent Crisanto contends that the Petition for Review was filed beyond the deadline (October 24, 2002) allowed by
the Rules of Court and by this Court. He claims that Registry Bill No. 88 shows that the Petition was sent by speed mail, only on
November 4, 2002. Furthermore, he assails the Petition for its prematurity, since his Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the
August 30, 2002 CA Decision was still pending before the appellate court. Thus, he argues that the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction over Joycelyns Petition.
Timeliness of the Petition
The manner of filing and service Joycelyns Petition by mail is governed by Sections 3 and 7 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court,
which we quote:
"SEC. 3. Manner of filing. The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders, judgments and all other papers shall be
made by presenting the original copies thereof, plainly indicated as such personally to the clerk of court or by sending them by
registered mail. xxx In the second case, the date of mailing of motions, pleadings and other papers or payments or deposits, as
shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or
deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the records of the case.
"x x x x x x x x x
"SEC. 7. Service by mail. Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the office, in a sealed envelope,
plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry
service is available in the locality of either the sender of the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail. (Italics supplied)
The records disclose that Joycelyn received the CAs August 30, 2002 Decision on September 9, 2002. On September 17, she
filed before this Court a Motion for a 30-day extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari. This Motion was
granted,11 and the deadline was thus extended until October 24, 2002.

A further perusal of the records reveals that copies of the Petition were sent to this Court and to the parties by registered mail 12 at
the Bian, Laguna Post Office on October 24, 2002. This is the date clearly stamped on the face of the envelope13 and attested to
in the Affidavit of Service14 accompanying the Petition. Petitioner Joycelyn explained that the filing and the service had been
made by registered mail due to the "volume of delivery assignments and the lack of a regular messenger." 15
The Petition is, therefore, considered to have been filed on October 24, 2002, its mailing date as shown by the post office stamp
on the envelope. The last sentence of Section 3 of Rule 13 of the Rules provides that the date of filing may be shown either by the
post office stamp on the envelope or by the registry receipt. Proof of its filing, on the other hand, is shown by the existence of the
petition in the record, pursuant to Section 12 of Rule 13.16
The postmaster satisfactorily clarifies that Registry Bill No. 88, which shows the date November 2, 2002, merely discloses when
the mail matters received by the Bian Post Office on October 24, 2002, were dispatched or sent to the Central Mail Exchange for
distribution to their final destinations.17 The Registry Bill does not reflect the actual mailing date. Instead, it is the postal
Registration Book18 that shows the list of mail matters that have been registered for mailing on a particular day, along with the
names of the senders and the addressees. That book shows that Registry Receipt Nos. 2832-A and 2832-B, pertaining to the
mailed matters for the Supreme Court, were issued on October 24, 2002.
Prematurity of the Petition
As to the alleged prematurity of the Petition of Joycelyn, Crisanto points out that his Urgent Motion for Partial Reconsideration19
was still awaiting resolution by the CA when she filed her Petition before this Court on October 24, 2002. The CA ruled on the
Motion only on November 27, 2002.
The records show, however, that the Motion of Crisanto was mailed only on September 12, 2002. Thus, on September 17, 2002,
when Joycelyn filed her Motion for Extension of Time to file her Petition for Review, she might have still been unaware that he
had moved for a partial reconsideration of the August 20, 2002 CA Decision. Nevertheless, upon being notified of the filing of his
Motion, she should have manifested that fact to this Court.
With the CAs final denial of Crisantos Motion for Reconsideration, Joycelyns lapse may be excused in the interest of resolving
the substantive issues raised by the parties.
First Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
In GR No. 156254, Crisanto submits that the CA gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the trial court judge to "consider,
hear and resolve the motion to lift the award of custody pendente lite" without any proper motion by Joycelyn and after the April
3, 2002 Order of the trial court had become final and executory. The CA is also charged with grave abuse of discretion for
denying his Motion for Partial Reconsideration without stating the reasons for the denial, allegedly in contravention of Section 1
of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court.
The Order to Hear the Motion to Lift the Award of Custody Pendente Lite Proper
To begin with, grave abuse of discretion is committed when an act is 1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence;20 or 2) executed "whimsically or arbitrarily" in a manner "so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined." 21 What constitutes grave abuse of discretion is such capricious
and arbitrary exercise of judgment as that which is equivalent, in the eyes of the law, to lack of jurisdiction. 22
On the basis of these criteria, we hold that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
First, there can be no question that a court of competent jurisdiction is vested with the authority to resolve even unassigned issues.
It can do so when such a step is indispensable or necessary to a just resolution of issues raised in a particular pleading or when the
unassigned issues are inextricably linked or germane to those that have been pleaded. 23 This truism applies with more force when
the relief granted has been specifically prayed for, as in this case.
Explicit in the Motion to Dismiss24 filed by Joycelyn before the RTC is her ancillary prayer for the court to lift and set aside its
April 3, 2002 Order awarding to Crisanto custody pendente lite of their minor son. Indeed, the necessary consequence of granting
her Motion to Dismiss would have been the setting aside of the Order awarding Crisanto provisional custody of the child. Besides,
even if the Motion to Dismiss was denied -- as indeed it was -- the trial court, in its discretion and if warranted, could still have
granted the ancillary prayer as an alternative relief.
Parenthetically, Joycelyns Motion need not have been verified because of the provisional nature of the April 3, 2002 Order.
Under Rule 3825 of the Rules of Court, verification is required only when relief is sought from a final and executory Order.

Accordingly, the court may set aside its own orders even without a proper motion, whenever such action is warranted by the Rules
and to prevent a miscarriage of justice.26
Denial of the Motion for Reconsideration Proper
Second, the requirement in Section 1 of Rule 36 (for judges to state clearly and distinctly the reasons for their dispositions) refers
only to decisions and final orders on the merits, not to those resolving incidental matters.27 The provision reads:
"SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in
writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,
signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court." (Italics supplied)
Here, the declaration of the nullity of marriage is the subject of the main case, in which the issue of custody pendente lite is an
incident. That custody and support of common children may be ruled upon by the court while the action is pending is provided in
Article 49 of the Family Code, which we quote :
"Art. 49. During the pendency of the action28 and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the
spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. x x x."
Clearly then, the requirement cited by Crisanto is inapplicable. In any event, in its questioned Resolution, the CA clearly stated
that it "could not find any cogent reason" to reconsider and set aside the assailed portion of its August 30, 2002 Decision.
The April 3, 2002 Order Not Final and Executory
Third, the award of temporary custody, as the term implies, is provisional and subject to change as circumstances may warrant. In
this connection, there is no need for a lengthy discussion of the alleged finality of the April 3, 2002 RTC Order granting Crisanto
temporary custody of his son. For that matter, even the award of child custody after a judgment on a marriage annulment is not
permanent; it may be reexamined and adjusted if and when the parent who was given custody becomes unfit. 29
Second Issue:
Custody of a Minor Child
When love is lost between spouses and the marriage inevitably results in separation, the bitterest tussle is often over the custody of
their children. The Court is now tasked to settle the opposing claims of the parents for custody pendente lite of their child who is
less than seven years old.30 On the one hand, the mother insists that, based on Article 213 of the Family Code, her minor child
cannot be separated from her. On the other hand, the father argues that she is "unfit" to take care of their son; hence, for
"compelling reasons," he must be awarded custody of the child.
Article 213 of the Family Code31 provides:
"ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court. The
court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise."
This Court has held that when the parents are separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their
child.32 Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads:
"Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be paramount. No
mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such
measure."(Italics supplied)
The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from their mother finds its raison detre in the basic
need of minor children for their mothers loving care. 33 In explaining the rationale for Article 363 of the Civil Code, the Code
Commission stressed thus:
"The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can
sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for
compelling reasons for the good of the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If
she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient

punishment for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the
situation." (Report of the Code Commission, p. 12)
A similar provision is embodied in Article 8 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603). 34 Article 17 of
the same Code is even more explicit in providing for the childs custody under various circumstances, specifically in case the
parents are separated. It clearly mandates that "no child under five years of age shall be separated from his mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to do so." The provision is reproduced in its entirety as follows:
"Art. 17. Joint Parental Authority. The father and the mother shall exercise jointly just and reasonable parental authority and
responsibility over their legitimate or adopted children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary.
"In case of the absence or death of either parent, the present or surviving parent shall continue to exercise parental authority over
such children, unless in case of the surviving parents remarriage, the court for justifiable reasons, appoints another person as
guardian.
"In case of separation of his parents, no child under five years of age shall be separated from his mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to do so." (Italics supplied)
The above mandates reverberate in Articles 211, 212 and 213 of the Family Code. It is unmistakable from the language of these
provisions that Article 21135 was derived from the first sentence of the aforequoted Article 17; Article 212, 36 from the second
sentence; and Article 213,37 save for a few additions, from the third sentence. It should be noted that the Family Code has reverted
to the Civil Code provision mandating that a child below seven years should not be separated from the mother.38
Mandatory Character of Article 213 of the Family Code
In Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson,39 the Court held that the use of "shall" in Article 363 of the Civil Code and the observations made
by the Code Commission underscore the mandatory character of the word.40 Holding in that case that it was a mistake to deprive
the mother of custody of her two children, both then below the age of seven, the Court stressed:
"[Article 363] prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a mother and her child below seven years, unless such a separation
is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court." 41
In like manner, the word "shall" in Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 6 42 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court has been held
to connote a mandatory character.43 Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly contemplate a situation in which the parents of the minor
are married to each other, but are separated by virtue of either a decree of legal separation or a de facto separation. 44 In the present
case, the parents are living separately as a matter of fact.
The Best Interest of the Child a Primary Consideration
The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that "[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration."45
The principle of "best interest of the child" pervades Philippine cases involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status,
minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long been recognized that in choosing the parent to whom
custody is given, the welfare of the minors should always be the paramount consideration. 46 Courts are mandated to take into
account all relevant circumstances that would have a bearing on the childrens well-being and development. Aside from the
material resources and the moral and social situations of each parent, other factors may also be considered to ascertain which one
has the capability to attend to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children. 47 Among these factors are the
previous care and devotion shown by each of the parents; their religious background, moral uprightness, home environment and
time availability; as well as the childrens emotional and educational needs
Tender-Age Presumption
As pointed out earlier, there is express statutory recognition that, as a general rule, a mother is to be preferred in awarding custody
of children under the age of seven. The caveat in Article 213 of the Family Code cannot be ignored, except when the court finds
cause to order otherwise.48
The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of
the mothers unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following
instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.49

Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has
indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the mothers immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive
her of custody.50
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a
prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child. 51 To deprive the wife of
custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have
distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care.52
To this effect did the Court rule in Unson III v. Navarro,53 wherein the mother was openly living with her brother-in-law, the
childs uncle. Under that circumstance, the Court deemed it in the nine-year-old childs best interest to free her "from the
obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that the situation in which the mother ha[d] placed herself might create in
[the childs] moral and social outlook." 54
In Espiritu v. CA,55 the Court took into account psychological and case study reports on the child, whose feelings of insecurity and
anxiety had been traced to strong conflicts with the mother. To the psychologist the child revealed, among other things, that the
latter was disturbed upon seeing "her mother hugging and kissing a bad man who lived in their house and worked for her father."
The Court held that the "illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused the child emotional disturbances, personality
conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values x x x."
Based on the above jurisprudence, it is therefore not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must
also demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under
circumstances not conducive to the childs proper moral development. Such a fact has not been shown here. There is no evidence
that the son was exposed to the mothers alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development
suffered as a result.
Moreover, it is worthy to note that the trial court judge, Helen Bautista-Ricafort, ruled in her May 17, 2002 Order that she had
found the "reason stated by [Crisanto] not to be compelling" 56 as to suffice as a ground for separating the child from his mother.
The judge made this conclusion after personally observing the two of them, both in the courtroom and in her chambers on April
16, 2002, and after a chance to talk to the boy and to observe him firsthand. This assessment, based on her unique opportunity to
witness the childs behavior in the presence of each parent, should carry more weight than a mere reliance on the records. All told,
no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mothers custody.
No Grant of Habeas Corpus and Preliminary Injunction
As we have ruled that Joycelyn has the right to keep her minor son in her custody, the writ of habeas corpus and the preliminary
mandatory injunction prayed for by Crisanto have no leg to stand on. A writ of habeas corpus may be issued only when the
"rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto," 57 a situation that does not apply here.
On the other hand, the ancillary remedy of preliminary mandatory injunction cannot be granted, because Crisantos right to
custody has not been proven to be "clear and unmistakable." 58 Unlike an ordinary preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction is more cautiously regarded, since the latter requires the performance of a particular act that tends to go
beyond the maintenance of the status quo.59 Besides, such an injunction would serve no purpose, now that the case has been
decided on its merits.60
WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No. 154994 is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and the May 17, 2002 Regional Trial Court Order REINSTATED. The Petition in GR No. 156254 is DISMISSED.
Costs against Petitioner Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.