MHC AND MHICL vs.

NLRC et al

The Palace Hotel Manager, Mr. Henk mailed a ready to

G.R. No. 120077

sign employment contract to respondent Santos. Santos

October 13, 2000

resigned from the Mazoon Printing Press. Santos wrote

FACTS: private respondent Santos was an overseas

the Palace Hotel and acknowledged Mr. Henks letter.

worker employed as a printer at the Mazoon Printing

The employment contract stated that his employment

Press, Sultanate of Oman. Subsequently he was directly

would be for a period of two years. He then started to

hired by the Palace Hotel, Beijing, Peoples Republic of

work at the Palace Hotel.

China and later terminated due to retrenchment.

Petitioners are the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC)

Subsequently, respondent Santos signed an amended

and the Manila Hotel International Company, Limited

employment agreement with the Palace Hotel. In the

(MHICL).

contract, Mr. Shmidt represented the Palace Hotel. The

Vice President (Operations and Development) of

When the case was filed in 1990, MHC was still a

petitioner MHICL Cergueda signed the employment

government-owned and controlled corporation duly

agreement under the word noted.

organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.

MHICL is a corporation duly organized and existing under

After working in the Palace hotel for less than 1 year, the

the laws of Hong Kong. MHC is an incorporator of

Palace Hotel informed respondent Santos by letter

MHICL, owning 50% of its capital stock.

signed by Mr. Shmidt that his employment at the Palace

Hotel print shop would be terminated due to business

By virtue of a management agreement with the Palace

reverses brought about by the political upheaval in

Hotel, MHICL trained the personnel and staff of the

China. The Palace Hotel terminated the employment of

Palace Hotel at Beijing, China.

Santos and paid all benefits due him, including his plane
fare back to the Philippines. Santos was repatriated to

Now the facts.

the Philippines.

During his employment with the Mazoon Printing Press,

Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the

respondent Santos received a letter from Mr. Shmidt,

Arbitration Branch, NCR, NLRC. He prayed for an award

General Manager, Palace Hotel, Beijing, China. Mr.

of AD, ED and AF for. The complaint named MHC, MHICL,

Schmidt informed respondent Santos that he was

the Palace Hotel and Mr. Shmidt as respondents. The

recommended by one Buenio, a friend of his. Mr. Shmidt

Palace Hotel and Mr. Shmidt were not served with

offered respondent Santos the same position as printer,

summons and neither participated in the proceedings

but with a higher monthly salary and increased benefits.

before the LA.

Respondent Santos wrote to Mr. Shmidt and signified his

acceptance of the offer.

The LA decided the case against petitioners. Petitioners

appealed to the NLRC, arguing that the POEA, not the

NLRC had jurisdiction over the case. The NLRC

The employment contract. Respondent Santos was

promulgated a resolution, stating that the appealed

hired directly by the Palace Hotel, a foreign employer,

Decision be declared null and void for want of jurisdiction

through correspondence sent to the Sultanate of Oman,

where respondent Santos was then employed. He was

Santos moved for reconsideration of the afore-quoted

hired without the intervention of the POEA or any

resolution. He argued that the case was not cognizable

authorized recruitment agency of the government.

by the POEA as he was not an overseas contract worker.

The NLRC granted the motion and reversed itself. The

Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine

NLRC directed another LA to hear the case on the

court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if

question of whether private respondent was retrenched

it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the Philippine court

or dismissed. The La found that Santos was illegally

is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;

dismissed from employment and recommended that he

(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an

be paid actual damages equivalent to his salaries for the

intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3)

unexpired portion of his contract. The NLRC ruled in

that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to

favor of private respondent. Petitioners filed an MR

enforce its decision. The conditions are unavailing in the

arguing that the LAs recommendation had no basis in

case at bar.

law and in fact, however it was denied. Hence, this

petition.

Not Convenient. We fail to see how the NLRC is a

convenient forum given that all the incidents of the case

ISSUE: Is the NLRC a proper forum to decide this case?

from the time of recruitment, to employment to

HELD: petition granted; the orders and resolutions of the

dismissal

NLRC are annulled.

inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the proper

occurred

outside

the

Philippines.

The

defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are not

NO

nationals of the Philippines. Neither .are they doing

Forum Non-Conveniens

business in the Philippines. Likewise, the main

witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-residents of

The NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum.

the Philippines.

We note that the main aspects of the case transpired in

No power to determine applicable law. Neither can an

two foreign jurisdictions and the case involves purely

intelligent decision be made as to the law governing the

foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has

employment contract as such was perfected in foreign

with the case is that Santos is a Filipino citizen. The

soil. This calls to fore the application of the principle of

Palace Hotel and MHICL are foreign corporations. Not all

lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the

cases involving our citizens can be tried here.

contract was made).

The employment contract was not perfected in the

II. MHC Not Liable

Philippines. Santos signified his acceptance by writing a

letter while he was in the Republic of Oman. This letter

Even if we assume two things: (1) that the NLRC had

was sent to the Palace Hotel in the Peoples Republic of

jurisdiction over the case, and (2) that MHICL was liable

China.

for Santos retrenchment, still MHC, as a separate and

distinct juridical entity cannot be held liable.

No power to determine the facts. Neither can the

NLRC determine the facts surrounding the alleged illegal

True, MHC is an incorporator of MHICL and owns 50% of

dismissal as all acts complained of took place in Beijing,

its capital stock. However, this is not enough to pierce

Peoples Republic of China. The NLRC was not in a

the veil of corporate fiction between MHICL and MHC. In

position to determine whether the Tiannamen Square

Traders Royal Bank v. CA, we held that the mere

incident truly adversely affected operations of the Palace

ownership by a single stockholder or by another

Hotel as to justify Santos retrenchment.

corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a

corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for

Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute decision.

disregarding

Even assuming that a proper decision could be

personalities.

the

fiction

of

separate

corporate

reached by the NLRC, such would not have any binding

effect against the employer, the Palace Hotel. The Palace

It is basic that a corporation has a personality separate

Hotel is a corporation incorporated under the laws of

and distinct from those composing it as well as from that

China and was not even served with summons.

of any other legal entity to which it may be related. Clear

Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired.

and convincing evidence is needed to pierce the veil of

corporate fiction. In this case, we find no evidence to

This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have

show that MHICL and MHC are one and the same entity.

no power to solve controversies involving foreign

employers. Neither are we saying that we do not have

III. MHICL not Liable

power over an employment contract executed in a

foreign country. If Santos were an overseas contract

Santos predicates MHICLs liability on the fact that MHICL

worker, a Philippine forum, specifically the POEA, not

signed his employment contract with the Palace Hotel.

the NLRC, would protect him. He is not an overseas

This fact fails to persuade us.

contract worker a fact which he admits with conviction.

First, we note that the Vice President (Operations and
__

Development)

Even assuming that the NLRC was the proper forum,

employment contract as a mere witness. He merely

even on the merits, the NLRCs decision cannot be

signed under the word noted.

sustained.

of

MHICL,

Cergueda

signed

the

When one notes a contract, one is not expressing his

that the Palace Hotel is a member of the Manila Hotel

agreement or approval, as a party would. In Sichangco v.

Group is not enough to pierce the corporate veil

Board of Commissioners of Immigration, the Court

between MHICL and the Palace Hotel.

recognized that the term noted means that the person

so noting has merely taken cognizance of the existence

Considering that the NLRC was forum non-conveniens

of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious

and considering further that no employer-employee

deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter.

relationship existed between MHICL, MHC and Santos,

Second, and more importantly, there was no existing

the LA clearly had no jurisdiction over respondents claim

employer-employee relationship between Santos and

in the NLRC case. In all the cases under the exclusive and

MHICL. In determining the existence of an employer-

original jurisdiction of the LA, an employer-employee

employee relationship, the following elements are

relationship

considered:

requirement.

is

an

indispensable

jurisdictional

(1) the selection and engagement of the employee;

(2) the payment of wages;
(3) the power to dismiss; and
(4) the power to control employees conduct.

COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC et

al vs.CA et al.
G.R. No. 102223

MHICL did not have and did not exercise any of the

August 22, 1996

aforementioned powers. It did not select respondent

FACTS: Petitioners COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND

Santos as an employee for the Palace Hotel. He was

DESIGN, INC., (CMDI) and ASPAC MULTI-TRADE INC.,

referred to the Palace Hotel by his friend, Buenio. MHICL

did not engage respondent Santos to work. The terms of
employment were negotiated and finalized through
correspondence between Santos, Mr. Schmidt and Mr.
Henk, who were officers and representatives of the
Palace Hotel and not MHICL. Neither did Santos adduce
any proof that MHICL had the power to control his
conduct. Finally, it was the Palace Hotel, through Mr.
Schmidt and not MHICL that terminated respondent
Santos services.

(ASPAC) are both domestic corporations.. Private

Respondents ITEC, INC. and/or ITEC, INTERNATIONAL,
INC. (ITEC) are corporations duly organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Alabama, USA. There is no
dispute that ITEC is a foreign corporation not licensed to
do business in the Philippines.
ITEC entered into a contract with ASPAC referred to as
Representative Agreement. Pursuant to the contract,
ITEC engaged ASPAC as its exclusive representative in
the Philippines for the sale of ITECs products, in
consideration of which, ASPAC was paid a stipulated

Likewise, there is no evidence to show that the Palace

Hotel and MHICL are one and the same entity. The fact

commission. Through a License Agreement entered

into by the same parties later on, ASPAC was able to
incorporate and use the name ITEC in its own name.

Thus , ASPAC Multi-Trade, Inc. became legally and

2. Can the Philippine court give due course to the suit or

publicly

dismiss it, on the principle of forum non convenience?

known

as

ASPAC-ITEC

(Philippines).

One year into the second term of the parties

Representative Agreement, ITEC decided to terminate

HELD: petition dismissed.

the same, because petitioner ASPAC allegedly violated its

1. YES; We are persuaded to conclude that ITEC had been

contractual

their

engaged in or doing business in the Philippines for

agreements. ITEC charges the petitioners and another

some time now. This is the inevitable result after a

Philippine

BASE

scrutiny of the different contracts and agreements

COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (DIGITAL), the President of

entered into by ITEC with its various business contacts in

which is likewise petitioner Aguirre, of using knowledge

the country. Its arrangements, with these entities

and information of ITECs products specifications to

indicate convincingly that ITEC is actively engaging in

develop their own line of equipment and product

business in the country.

commitment

Corporation,

as

stipulated

DIGITAL

in

support, which are similar, if not identical to ITECs own,

and offering them to ITECs former customer.

A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines

may sue in Philippine Courts although not authorized to

The complaint was filed with the RTC-Makati by ITEC,

do business here against a Philippine citizen or entity

INC. Defendants filed a MTD the complaint on the

who had contracted with and benefited by said

following grounds: (1) That plaintiff has no legal capacity

corporation. To put it in another way, a party is estopped

to sue as it is a foreign corporation doing business in the

to challenge the personality of a corporation after having

Philippines without the required BOI authority and SEC

acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with

license, and (2) that plaintiff is simply engaged in forum

it. And the doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate

shopping which justifies the application against it of the

existence applies to a foreign as well as to domestic

principle of forum non conveniens. The MTD was

corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of

denied.

foreign origin as a corporate entity is estopped to deny

its corporate existence and capacity.

Petitioners elevated the case to the respondent CA on a

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of

In Antam Consolidated Inc. vs. CA et al. we expressed our

the Revised ROC. It was dismissed as well. MR denied,

chagrin over this commonly used scheme of defaulting

hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule

local companies which are being sued by unlicensed

45.

foreign companies not engaged in business in the

Philippines to invoke the lack of capacity to sue of such

ISSUE:

foreign companies. Obviously, the same ploy is resorted

1. Did the Philippine court acquire jurisdiction over the

to by ASPAC to prevent the injunctive action filed by ITEC

person of the petitioner corp, despite allegations of lack

to enjoin petitioner from using knowledge possibly

of capacity to sue because of non-registration?

acquired in violation of fiduciary arrangements between

The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in

the parties.

view of the courts disposition to give due course to the

questioned action, the matter of the present forum not

2. YES; Petitioners insistence on the dismissal of this

being the most convenient as a ground for the suits

action due to the application, or non application, of the

dismissal, deserves scant consideration.

private international law rule of forum non conveniens

defies well-settled rules of fair play. According to
petitioner, the Philippine Court has no venue to apply its

PHILSEC INVESTMENT et al vs.CA et al

discretion whether to give cognizance or not to the

G.R. No. 103493

present action, because it has not acquired jurisdiction

June 19, 1997

over the person of the plaintiff in the case, the latter

FACTS: Private respondent Ducat obtained separate

allegedly having no personality to sue before Philippine

loans from petitioners Ayala International Finance

Courts. This argument is misplaced because the court has

Limited (AYALA) and Philsec Investment Corp (PHILSEC),

already acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff in the suit,

secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat.

by virtue of his filing the original complaint. And as we

In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private

have already observed, petitioner is not at liberty to

respondent 1488, Inc., through its president, private

question plaintiffs standing to sue, having already

respondent Daic, assumed Ducats obligation under an

acceded to the same by virtue of its entry into the

Agreement, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty

Representative Agreement referred to earlier.

Deed with Vendors Lien by which it sold to petitioner

Athona Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in

Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the

Texas, U.S.A., while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan

Philippine Court, based on the facts of the case, whether

to ATHONA as initial payment of the purchase price. The

to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the

balance was to be paid by means of a promissory note

principle of forum non convenience. Hence, the

executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently,

Philippine Court may refuse to assume jurisdiction in

upon their receipt of the money from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC

spite of its having acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the

and AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness and

court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses

delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their

to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met:

possession belonging to Ducat.

1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties

As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the

may conveniently resort to;

entire amount covered by the note became due and

2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an

demandable. Accordingly, private respondent 1488, Inc.

intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and,

sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the

3) That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power

United States for payment of the balance and for

to enforce its decision.

damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly

perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the

ISSUE: is the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the

marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488,

judgment of the U.S. court?

Inc. under the Agreement.

HELD: CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makati
While the Civil Case was pending in the United States,

NO

petitioners filed a complaint For Sum of Money with

While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to

Damages and Writ of Preliminary Attachment against

foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the

private respondents in the RTC Makati. The complaint

parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample

reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their respective

opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the

counterclaims in the Civil Action in the United States

law. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to

District Court of Southern Texas that private respondents

actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in

committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400

rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie

percent more than its true value.

evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as

such, is subject to proof to the contrary. Rule 39, 50

Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati

provides:

on the grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil

Action in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3)

Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a

failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause

judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having

of action.

jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

The trial court granted Ducats MTD, stating that the

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the

evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be

judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

more suitably tried before the forum of the litis

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment

pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private

is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties

international law of forum non conveniens, even as it

and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but

noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.

the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of

jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,

Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial

or clear mistake of law or fact.

court erred in applying the principle of litis pendentia

and forum non conveniens.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were

given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the

The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat,

U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or

1488, Inc., and Daic on the ground of litis pendentia.

conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The

proceedings in the trial court were summary. Neither the
trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished

copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of

As a security for the repayment by the COMPANY of

the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper

sums advanced by HSBC to it through the aforesaid

determination of whether the issues then being litigated

overdraft facility, in 1982, both private respondents and

in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this

a certain Lowe, all of whom were directors of the

case such that the judgment that might be rendered

COMPANY at such time, executed a Joint and Several

would constitute res judicata.

Guarantee in favor of HSBC whereby private respondents

and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly and severally, on

Second. Nor is the trial courts refusal to take cognizance

demand all sums owed by the COMPANY to petitioner

of the case justifiable under the principle of forum non

BANK under the aforestated overdraft facility.

conveniens:
The Joint and Several Guarantee provides, inter alia, that:
First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16,

This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities

sec.1, which does not include forum non conveniens. The

arising hereunder shall be construed and determined

propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle

under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws

requires a factual determination, hence, it is more

of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the

properly

Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all

considered

matter

of

defense.

Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court

disputes arising under this guarantee.

to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it

should do so only after vital facts are established, to

The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC

determine whether special circumstances require the

demanded payment and inasmuch as the private

courts desistance.

respondents still failed to pay, HSBC filed A complaint for

collection of a sum of money against private respondents
Sherman and Reloj before RTC of Quezon City.

HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION

Private respondents filed an MTD on the ground of lack

(HSBC) vs. SHERMAN et al

of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The trial court

G.R. No. 72494

denied the motion. They then filed before the

August 11, 1989

respondent

FACTS: It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book

preliminary injunction and/or prayer for a restraining

Supply Service PTE, Ltd. (COMPANY), a company

order. The IAC rendered a decision enjoining the RTC

incorporated in Singapore applied with and was granted

Quezon City from taking further cognizance of the case

by HSBC Singapore branch an overdraft facility in the

and to dismiss the same for filing with the proper court

maximum amount of Singapore dollars 200,000 with

of Singapore which is the proper forum. MR denied,

interest at 3% over HSBC prime rate, payable monthly,

hence this petition.

on amounts due under said overdraft facility.

IAC

petition

for

prohibition

with

ISSUE: Do Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the

did the clause in question operate to divest Philippine

suit, vis-a-vis the Guarantee stipulation regarding

courts of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is

jurisdiction?

often defined as the light of a State to exercise authority

over persons and things within its boundaries subject to

HELD: YES

certain exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume

One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in

jurisdiction over travelling sovereigns, ambassadors and

International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in

diplomatic representatives of other States, and foreign

the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it,

military units stationed in or marching through State

whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in

territory with the permission of the latters authorities.

personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be

This authority, which finds its source in the concept of

based on some minimum contacts that will not offend

sovereignty, is exclusive within and throughout the

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice

domain of the State. A State is competent to take hold of

The defense of private respondents that the complaint

any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and

should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on

agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases

technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove,

brought before them

that the filing of the action here will cause them any
unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense. On the other

NOTES:

hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the

The

action here just to harass private respondents.

In a conflict problem, a court will simply refuse to

respondent

IAC

likewise

ruled

that:

entertain the case if it is not authorized by law to

In the case of Neville Y. Lamis Ents., et al. v. Lagamon,

exercise jurisdiction. And even if it is so authorized, it

etc., where the stipulation was [i]n case of litigation,

may still refuse to entertain the case by applying the

jurisdiction shall be vested in the Court of Davao City.

principle

We held:

However, whether a suit should be entertained or

of

forum

non

conveniens.

dismissed on the basis of the principle of forum non

Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as

conveniens depends largely upon the facts of the

the venue, suffice it to say that a stipulation as to venue

particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion

does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of

of the trial court. Thus, the IAC should not have relied on

plaintiff or defendant under Section 2 (b), Rule 4, ROC, in

such principle.

the absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the

agreement which would indicate that the place named is
the

only

venue

agreed

upon

by

the

parties.

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the parties did

not thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore,
to the exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither

AZNAR vs. GARCIA

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is

G.R. No. L-16749

subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

January 31, 1963

FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both

was distributed by Executioner Aznar according to the

with respect to the order of succession and to the

will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN

amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity

Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his

of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the

daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.

national law of the person whose succession is under

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was

consideration, whatever may be the nature of the

filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her of her legitime as

property and regardless of the country where said

an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared

property may be found.

by Us an acknowledged natural child of the deceased

Edward in an earlier case.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires

the determination of the meaning of the term national

As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he

law is used therein.

acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento

from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the

The next question is: What is the law in California

Philippines,

governing

and the deceased appears to have

the

disposition

of

personal

property?

considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact

The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the

that when he executed his will he declared that he was a

executor-appellee that under the California Probate

citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have

Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the

intended to abandon his California citizenship by

form and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the

acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was

provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California,

domiciled in the Philippines.

which is as follows:

ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where

Philippine law or the California law?

personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the

person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his

HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby

domicile.

reversed and the case returned to the lower court with

instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine
law on succession provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary
dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, which is as follows:

It is argued on executors behalf that as the deceased

Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the
internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman
case, should govern the determination of the validity of
the testamentary provisions of Christensens will, such

law being in force in the State of California of which

Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the

Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand,

national law of the deceased should govern. This

insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in

contention can not be sustained.

accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the

renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the

provision in question should be referred back to the law

national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is

of the decedents domicile, which is the Philippines.

the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code,

i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its

of the question to the law of the testators domicile. The

conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re

conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,

Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and

precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not

the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced

domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the

jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere,

Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile

the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens

can not and should not refer the case back to California;

living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of

such action would leave the issue incapable of

its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other

determination because the case will then be like a

jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of

football, tossed back and forth between the two states,

the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign

between the country of which the decedent was a citizen

element involved is in accord with the general principle

and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court

of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in

must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws

most matters or rights which follow the person of the

rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to

owner.

be decided, especially as the application of the internal

law of California provides no legitime for children while

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of

the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the

the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the

Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged

internal law of California. But as above explained the

forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its

citizens, one for residents therein and another for those

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased

domiciled in other jurisdictions.

Edward, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the

validity of the provisions of his will depriving his

It is argued on appellees (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that

acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should

the clause if there is no law to the contrary in the place

be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile,

where the property is situated in Sec. 946 of the

pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by

California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code

the internal law of California..

of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the

NOTES: There is no single American law governing the

After obtaining the proceeds from the sale, the plaintiff

validity of testamentary provisions in the United States,

in violation of the conveyance, wrongfully instituted an

each state of the Union having its own private law

action in the Supreme Court of Hongkong against the

applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the

defendant in which the plaintiff claimed to be the sole

state. The national law indicated in Article 16 of the

owner of the trade-marks for the exports of the business.

Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly

The Supreme Court of Hongkong ruled in favor of the

mean or apply to any general American law. So it can

plaintiff, allegedly through misrepresentation, ordering

refer to no other than the private law of the State of

defendant to pay the former for costs and AF. The Court

California.

ruled that the deed of conveyance limited the sale of the

business to the trademarks within the Philippines,

INGENOHL vs. OLSEN AND COMPANY, INC

implying that the plaintiff is still entitled to the sell the

G.R. No. L-22288

cigars under the same trademarks through exporting,

January 12, 1925

which accounts to 95% of the total sales of the company.

FACTS: In 1919, the acting Alien Property Custodian of

(This means that the plaintiff paid the cash equivalent of

the United States, by virtue of the Trading with the

the whole of the business but only entitled to 5% of the

Enemy Act as amended, required and caused to be

such, the sales within the Philippines)- UNFAIR TALAGA!

conveyed to him the property and business then

belonging to the company known as Syndicat Oriente,

The CFI rendered judgment for the plaintiff for the full

formed under the laws of Belgium, of which the plaintiff

amount of his claim, with interest, from which the

was the gestor, and an enemy as defined in said Act.

defendant appeals. Defendant company alleges that

The primary purpose of the proceeding was to seize, sell

when he purchased the property and business, all

and convey any and all of the property owned and held

trademarks are included; that the subject of the sale is

by the company within the jurisdiction of the United

not only those trademarks for sales within the

States, as a war measure, upon the ground that they

Philippines.

were alien enemies of the United States.

During the public sale, defendant corporation was the

ISSUE: Should the judgment rendered by the Hongkong

highest bidder. The said Alien Property Custodian of the

court be enforced by Philippine courts?

United States having thereafter accepted said bid and

received from the defendant corporation in cash the

HELD: NO; we do not hesitate to say that the judgment

amount of said bid, did execute in favor of the defendant

rendered in the Hongkong court was a clear mistake of

corporation a deed of conveyance. The defendant paid in

both law and fact, and that it ought not to be enforced in

good faith, and took over the property and assets of the

the Philippine Islands.

company, including its trade-marks and trade names and

The business of the plaintiff is almost exclusively an

its business as a going concern

export business, and that the transfer of the goodwill

thereof necessarily carried with it the transfer of said

export business and of the trade-marks and trade names

Be that as it may, this court is bound be section 311 of

which

therefrom

the Code of Civil Procedure. That law was enacted by the

- It is conceded that the Hongkong court had

Legislature of the Philippine Islands, and as to the

jurisdiction and that the defendant appeared in the

Philippine Islands, it is the law of the land. In the absence

action and contested the case on its merits. Hence, there

of that statute, no matter how wrongful the judgment of

was no collusion. Neither is it claimed that there was any

the Hongkong court may be, there would be strong

fraud, but it is vigorously contended that the Hongkong

reasons for holding that it should be enforced by this

judgment was a clear mistake of both law and fact.

court.

could

not

be

disconnected

Exclusive of the provisions of section 311 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, it is very doubtful whether it could be

PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING

sustained upon the ground of comity or the Law of

G.R. No. 80116

Nations. As between allied nations and under the law of

June 30, 1989

comity, their mutual policy should be to sustain and

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and

enforce the spirit and intention with which the seizure

private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national,

and sale of any property of an alien enemy was made

were married in Germany. After about three and a half

rather than to minimize, destroy or defeat them.

years

of

marriage,

such

connubial

disharmony

eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding

We are construing a deed of conveyance from the United

against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal

States to the defendant. The primary purpose of the

Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce

whole proceeding was to seize and convey all of the

on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.

property of the plaintiff or his company within the

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce

jurisdiction of the United States, including trade names

decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before

and trade-marks as those of an alien enemy. To now give

the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still

the defendant the use and benefit of only 5 per cent of

married to said Geiling, Pilapil had an affair with a

such trade names and trade-marks, and to permit the

certain William Chia. The Assistant Fiscal, after the

plaintiff to have and retain the other 95 per cent to his

corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal

own use and benefit after he has ratified and confirmed

of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

the sale, would impugn the honor and good name of the

However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor

United States in the whole proceeding and defeat the

approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint

very purpose for which it seized and sold the property of

for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled PP

an alien enemy, to wipe Ingenohl and his company out of

Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the court

existence and put them out of business in so far as the

presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.

United States had the power to do so

A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was
denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil

action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a

Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is

TRO, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower

necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for

court denying her motion to quash.

adultery

that

the

marital

bonds

between

the

complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing

As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus

at the time of the institution of the action by the former

presupposes that the marital relationship is still

against the latter.

subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal

action for adultery.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent

obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal

ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the

Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its

filing of the complaint for adultery, considering that it

legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar

was done after obtaining a divorce decree?

as private respondent is concerned in view of the

nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of

HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying

status of persons Under the same considerations and

petitioners MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one entered

rationale, private respondent, being no longer the

DISMISSING the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The

husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to

TRO issued in this case is hereby made permanent.

commence the adultery case under the imposture that

NO

he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery

cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written

BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ

complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since

G.R. No. 142840

been established, with unwavering consistency, that

May 7, 2001

compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in

merely a formal, requirement.

this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that

no person shall be a Member of the House of

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the

Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.

offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was

follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity

born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985,

or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing

however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and

of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since

without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines,

the raison detre of said provision of law would be absent

took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence,

where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the

he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An

spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of

Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine

the criminal case.

Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section

1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among

other, rendering service to or accepting commission in

law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which

the armed forces of a foreign country.

Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former

citizen:

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of

1. by naturalization,

Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as

2. by repatriation, and

a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in

3. by direct act of Congress.

the U.S. Marine Corps.

**

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those

through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing

who lost their citizenship due to:

for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons

1. desertion of the armed forces;

Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in

Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the

World War II;

United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the

3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any

Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the

other time,

1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was

4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and

then running for reelection.

5. political economic necessity

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original

Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz

nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who

was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since

lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a

he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article

naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was

VI,

Constitution.

originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his

HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for

Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former

quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected

status as a natural-born Filipino.

section

of

the

Representative in the said election.

R.A.

No.

2630

provides:

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship

American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born

by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the

Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation

from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired

HELD: petition dismissed

United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine

YES

citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may

of the Philippines and registering the same with Local

however reacquire the same in the manner provided by

Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided

in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall

The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied

contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

the MTD in the mentioned case on the ground that the

property involved is located in the Philippines so that the

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the

Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is

Republic and having registered the same in the Civil

now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with

the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have

ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the

recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a

parties and their alleged conjugal property in the

status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino

Philippines?

father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation

allows him to recover, or return to, his original status

HELD: Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is

before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to
determine whether the property relations between Alice

VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTON

and Richard, after their marriage, were upon absolute or

G.R. No. L-68470

relative community property, upon complete separation

October 8, 1985

of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in

FACTS: Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the

this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a

citizen of the USA. They were married in Hongkong in

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce,

1972 and begot two children. The parties were divorced

had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared

in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice has then re-married also in

in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It

Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who

In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay,

authorized his attorneys in the divorce case to agree to

stating that Alices business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal

the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the

property of the parties, and asking that Alice be ordered

understanding that there were neither community

to render an accounting of that business, and that

property nor community obligations.

Richard be declared with right to manage the conjugal

property.

As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed

in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD. to

Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the

represent him in the divorce proceedings:

cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the

divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein

xxx

xxx

xxx

respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner

You are hereby authorized to accept service of

had no community property as of June 11, 1982.

Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do

all things necessary and proper to represent me, without

bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which

further contesting, subject to the following:

validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose

decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of

own representation before said Court from asserting his

incompatibility.

right over the alleged conjugal property.

2. That there is no community of property to be

adjudicated by the Court.
3. That there are no community obligations to be

THE GOVT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. FRANK

adjudicated by the court.

G.

xxx xxx xxx

March 23, 1909

R.

No.

2935

FACTS: In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, Frank

There can be no question as to the validity of that

entered into a contract for a period of 2 years with the

Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States.

Plaintiff, by which Frank was to receive a salary as a

The decree is binding on private respondent as an

stenographer in the service of the said Plaintiff, and in

American citizen. What he is contending in this case is

addition thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses

that the divorce is not valid and binding in this

incurred in traveling from the said city of Chicago to

jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and

Manila, and one-half salary during said period of travel.

public policy.
Said contract contained a provision that in case of a
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied

violation of its terms on the part of Frank, he should

in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals

become liable to the Plaintiff for the amount expended

are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the

by the Government by way of expenses incurred in

same being considered contrary to our concept of public

traveling from Chicago to Manila and the one-half salary

police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces

paid during such period.

abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,

provided they are valid according to their national law. In

Frank entered upon the performance of his contract and

this case, the divorce in Nevada released private

was paid half-salary from the date until the date of his

respondent from the marriage from the standards of

arrival in the Philippine Islands.

American law, under which divorce dissolves the

marriage.

Thereafter, Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and

refused to make a further compliance with the terms of

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is

the contract.

no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no

standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband

The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI-Manila to

entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is

recover from Frank the sum of money, which amount the

Plaintiff claimed had been paid to Frank as expenses

been changed in any respect by the fact that said laws

incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half-

had been amended. These acts, constituting the terms of

salary for the period consumed in travel.

the contract, still constituted a part of said contract and

were enforceable in favor of the Defendant.

It was expressly agreed between the parties to said

contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute

2. NO; The Defendant alleged in his special defense that

a part of said contract.

he was a minor and therefore the contract could not be

enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the

The Defendant filed a general denial and a special

time the contract was entered into in the State of Illinois,

defense,

that

he was an adult under the laws of that State and had full

(1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had

authority to contract. Frank claims that, by reason of the

amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby

fact that, under that laws of the Philippine Islands at the

materially altered the said contract, and also that

time the contract was made, made persons in said

(2) he was a minor at the time the contract was entered

Islands did not reach their majority until they had

into and was therefore not responsible under the law.

attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said

the lower court rendered a judgment against Frank and

contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine

in favor of the Plaintiff for the sum of 265. 90 dollars

Islands governed.

ISSUE:

It is not disputed upon the contrary the fact is

1. Did the amendment of the laws altered the tenor of

admitted that at the time and place of the making of

the contract entered into between Plaintiff and

the contract in question the Defendant had full capacity

Defendant?

to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than

2. Can the defendant allege minority/infancy?

that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation

alleging

in

his

special

defense

and validity of a contract are determined b the law of the

HELD: the judgment of the lower court is affirmed

place where the contract is made. Matters connected

1. NO; It may be said that the mere fact that the

with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing

legislative department of the Government of the

at the place of performance. Matters respecting a

Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No. 80 and No.

remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of

224 by Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have the effect

evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the

of changing the terms of the contract made between the

law of the place where the suit is brought.

Plaintiff and the Defendant. The legislative department

of the Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of
the Act of Congress of 1902 from altering or changing the
terms of a contract. The right which the Defendant had
acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not